PARRICIDE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIVIC GENOSA

Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel
theory -- the "battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense.
Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there
was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-
husband at the time she shot him.

Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of
cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
"psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the
mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation.
The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite
of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put
her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled
her to vindicate her life and her unborn child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released
from custody on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty
while under detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision
1
of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic
Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the
accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by
Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating
circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused
with the penalty of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."
2

The Information
3
charged appellant with parricide as follows:
"That on or about the 15
th
day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,
Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the
use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the
purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2
nd
stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes
protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the
mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the
head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the
blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura
and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/
shedding of the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."
4

With the assistance of her counsel,
5
appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on
March 3, 1997.
6
In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the facts in
this wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in
Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel,
Leyte. For a time, Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too.
Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house
at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children,
namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after
receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home.
Arturo would pass Ben's house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house
of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben
went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in
the evening for the masiaorunner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive
but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas' rented house, he heard her
say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am
innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that
since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and was always
closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and
neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig
because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked
Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who
unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus
going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids
in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the
waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the
Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to
Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to
talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul
odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went
there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside.
Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock
with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but
only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went
inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There,
he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket.
He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban
went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son's
misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the
dead body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at
the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the
Genosas' rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina
Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom
where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet.
There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin
found in one corner at the side of anaparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters
from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3)
feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an
open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in
disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to
be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was
conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at
Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had
been dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The
postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the
Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause
of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial
hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on
November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet
might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao,
appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but
did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas'
house. Ecel went home despite appellant's request for her to sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to
a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were
doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched
off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or
wire to keep her from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about
to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled
her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this
point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his
packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged
appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and
told her 'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified
that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not
have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She
however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and
his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about
to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting
him. She supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He
did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom."
7
(Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to
her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree
of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of
her husband's death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple
had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were
neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins.
Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and
tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was
her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together with
Ben's brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben
'lived happily'. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and
their fights would become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember
when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic
quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict
injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a
kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with
blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having
asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning,
Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood from Ben's
forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after
Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and
Marivic married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said
as the marriage went along, Marivic became 'already very demanding. Mrs.
Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were 'three
(3) misunderstandings.' The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife
through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic
struck Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was also
affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and her husband went to Ben to help;
and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the
house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical
intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 'After
we collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed
there for three (3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer
allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went
to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben,
after which he went across the road to wait 'for the runner and the usher of the
masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was
rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet.' On
his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They
were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to
feed his fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently
overheard by him was Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben
replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent.' Basobas thought they were joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa
residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every
Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben 'before when he was
stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her and that Ben
would always take her back after she would leave him 'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time
that they had been quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right
forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her
and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her,
sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her
parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and
would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek
medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would
enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben
would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a
week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified
as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas,
testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and
Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the
spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do
anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night
as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.
8
)
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos,
testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15,
1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa
house and saw 'the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was
holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after
a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children.
After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned
at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night as that
testified to by Arturo Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were
living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs.
Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He
said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would
pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their
house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified 'if
somebody would come.' He testified that while Ben was alive 'he used to gamble
and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, 'Teody'
because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and
look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I
would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness
pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her.' Mr.
Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily
testified only that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified
that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked
her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and
some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic
wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house 'because she might be battered
by her husband.' When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening,
Miss Arano said that 'her husband was already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano
knew he was drunk 'because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his
face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please
note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano
testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house
as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At
one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when
Ben arrived because the couple 'were very noisy in the sala and I had heard
something was broken like a vase.' She said Marivic ran into her room and they
locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a chair and a knife and 'showed
us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.' She said that Marivic
shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she
left Marivic's house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at
PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and had also received
treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until
November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon
Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS
Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered
him an expert witness.'
x x x x x x x x x
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on
twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD
Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by
Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reportedwas marked as Exhibit
'3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say
whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only
a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient,
'whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided,
testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past
8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple
who were experiencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic to return in the morning,
but he did not hear from her again and assumed 'that they might have settled with
each other or they might have forgiven with each other.'
x x x x x x x x x
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was
her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby
safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she
was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born
prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at
least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile.
Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that
night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he
died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their
house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day,
November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a
room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro';
she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe
delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away;
that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once';
that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours
after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged her towards the
drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an
investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This
fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses
during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel,
Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to
take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the
autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the
medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some police officer and
neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone
position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
x x x x x x x x x
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the
skeletal area of the head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her
examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as
to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa
charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with
treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard
deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and
23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998,
and 5 and 6 August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial
date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City,
rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the
crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance,
thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and,
under date of 24 January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P.
Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a
precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for
Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted
the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20
January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G.
Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she
submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the
Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state
of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening
of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun,
then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the
description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit
'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly
granted Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial
court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the
'battered woman syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and,
thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with
the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before
the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had
interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were
done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years
with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as
a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the
Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de
Manila University and St. Joseph's College; and was the counseling psychologist of
the National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of
the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the
Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological
Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological
Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from
about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a
member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She
was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has
written a book entitled 'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan
and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert
on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence,
and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and
discovered that 'there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts,
from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of
psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also
sexual abuse.'
x x x x x x x x x
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very
low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x
x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would
happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who
precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and
even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes
from a dysfunctional family or from 'broken homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very
low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes
out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also
had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in
vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.' The batterer also
usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes
them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused
each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman
does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the
violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief
in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
x x x x x x x x x
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave
the house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back
triggering 'physical violence on both of them.' She said that in a 'normal marital
relationship,' abuses also happen, but these are 'not consistent, not chronic, are
not happening day in [and] day out.' In an 'abnormal marital relationship,' the
abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and 'even would cause
hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.'
x x x x x x x x x
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she
administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman
because 'inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there
are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as
damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint of
all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.'
x x x x x x x x x
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even
consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time
of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
x x x x x x x x x
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed
away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the
Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association.
He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in
private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre
where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called
to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna
Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government
service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree
from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World
Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan
Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine
Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978' which was presented twice in
international congresses. He also authored 'The Mental Health of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines 2000', which was likewise published internationally and locally.
He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis
grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he
published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the
mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged.
Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while
one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had
already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case
in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and
he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial
intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic
violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon
City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse,
battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman
is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 'depends on
the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very
healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the
psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is
stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic
stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the 'anxiety
neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming brutality,
trauma.'
x x x x x x x x x
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the beating or
trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She
thinks 'of nothing but the suffering.'
x x x x x x x x x
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional
tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed
and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her 'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's
illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to
the batterer, he normally 'internalizes what is around him within the environment.'
And it becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the
time; he is so macho; he shows his strong faade 'but in it there are doubts in
himself and prone to act without thinking.'
x x x x x x x x x
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the precipator
(sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma
occurred (sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her
mind or in his mind.'
x x x x x x x x x
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to
defend themselves, and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any
weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because
that abound in the household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has
'reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on
her but to act decisively.'
x x x x x x x x x
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he
conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological
evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out
with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
x x x x x x x x x
"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time
she killed her husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-
experiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we are trying to explain scientifically that
the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in
flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-
experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he interviewed Marivic
'she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally
stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'
x x x x x x x x x
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the
public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the
records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated."
9

Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the
prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping.
Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery,
because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep
when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic
review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court
allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2)
the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts'
reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative,
a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's Motion,
remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court
to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the
TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by
two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan
10
and Alfredo Pajarillo,
11
supposedly experts
on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then
presented to and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to
form part of the records of the case.
12

The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa
were legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a
pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced
from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a
womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben
Genosa was a battered husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of
Marivic Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and her
subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the
life of her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements
in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case,
thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and
condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death."
13

In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-
defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben
Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the
resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge
gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the case.
14

In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of
the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17-page Decision,
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the
defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record --
made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the
testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not
agree with the trial judge's conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial
evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty"
manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996.
Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial
judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he
conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him,
much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he
handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance
with his constitutional obligation.
15

Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had
been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v.
Malabago,
16
this Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In
the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage
certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by
the trial court if such proof is not objected to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's
deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.
17
The defense
raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant
herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to Ben.
18
Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial
admission is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that
(1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact
made.
19
Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the
defense offered no proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her
marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death --
whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court
elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the appellant has
admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and
of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if
not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the victim's death."
Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or
defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a
drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review,
appellant had not raised the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for which such
evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue
before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under
prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to
the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior, did not
constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant's
children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to
determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to present.
20
As the former further
points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting
her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them
to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to
Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are
attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's
appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense
and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is
incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing
evidence.
21
Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense
of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
defense.
22

The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome.
While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign
jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.
23
By
appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign
courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who
has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time."
24

A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something
he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women
in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman
may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and
she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."
25

Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional
beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the
dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and false
hopes that the relationship will improve.
26

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of
violence,"
27
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
28

During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight
physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the
batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way.
What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are
comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by
the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory" and
passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually
successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent
loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress,
the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally
unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some
unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control" and leads to an acute battering
incident.
29

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and,
sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also
inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the
violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his
reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him,
and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although
she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute
violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically,
and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering
incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or
intervenors are likely to get hurt.
30

The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During
this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer
may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been
viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to
beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that
the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this
"good, gentle and caring man" is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of
the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The
truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help,
are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he
seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful
reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In
this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for
his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension,
violence and forgiveness," each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be
separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the
other.
31

History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several
witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel
to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive
to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he
pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I
go to him and he said 'sorry'.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive
behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
x x x x x x x x x
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
[Court] /to the witness
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on
your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the
occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me."
32

Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"
33
on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D.
Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the
chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and
redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and
contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2
o
to trauma. Attending
physician: Dr. Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician:
Dr. Canora; and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the
attending physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the
patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough
substance if force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast.
So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is
tenderness pain.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
x x x x x x x x x
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did she tell you?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries.
And she told me that it was done to her by her husband.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in
the month of November, 1995 when this incident happened?
A As per record, yes.
Q What was the date?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
A Yes, sir.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient
pregnant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her
pregnancy or for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her
pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
x x x x x x x x x
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able
to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension
and I think I have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a
consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had
hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She
does not response when the medication was given to her, because tension
headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the
family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So,
from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in
hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of
the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of
blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus."
34

Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte,
testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions
Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by
Ben.
35

Ecel Arano also testified
36
that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep
at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt
her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten o'clock at night,
because the couple "were very noisy and I heard something was broken like a vase." Then
Marivic came running into Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window
grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben
-- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him
already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house.
Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing,
she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other
witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.
37
Marivic relates in detail the following
backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid
picture of his cruelty towards her:
"ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the
evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office
hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I
immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my second child said, 'he
was not home yet'. I was worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that
he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I
prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at
that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he
would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted
because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because
of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did
he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just
worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid
trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I
just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, 'why
did you switch off the light when the children were there.' At that time I was also
attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me
for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut
the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared
and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that
bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the
bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing
his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he
drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he
could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which
contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me
and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to
open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to
pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and
on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this
blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me."
38

In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to
assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa
for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly
related the latter's ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in
layman's term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was
suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional
abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager
income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. The
husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even
womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry and which will
trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from
the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the
husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was
very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware,
almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day
out."
39

In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or
unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked
to her about three hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most
important information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her
marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew
of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of
the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them
as substantial.
x x x x x x x x x
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they
were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that
were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also
battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in
Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that
room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it
really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter.
I think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your
opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was
really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also
believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction
because of all the battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person
who had lost she's not during the time and that is why it happened because of all
the physical battering, emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she
had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.
40

Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x
x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The
purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone
who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I
can trust. That the data that I'm gathering from her are the truth."
41

The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his
Psychiatric Report,
42
which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa.
The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked
good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until "Ben started to be attracted to
other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same
time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family,
particularly to his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses
but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her
husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to
anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had
been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and
maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting
from the Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning
friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering
became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x."
43

From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that
Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of
mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the
judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately
surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the
psychological effect of battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and
necessary. "How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The
average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of
treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner
who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack
her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life
for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called
'battered wife syndrome.'"
44

To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from
that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been
subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to
-- those who have not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify
and refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women.
45

The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic
violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the
treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of
her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted
upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter's "ability to act decisively in her own
interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape."
46
In her
years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often escalates at the point of separation
and battered women are in greater danger of dying then."
47

Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman usually has
a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x
x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they
were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be
physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them."
48

According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily
leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that
she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for
the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.
49

The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously
testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty
thousand" violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such
cases abounded. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about
forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman
would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.
50

Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic
stress disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism."
51
After being repeatedly
and severely abused, battered persons "may believe that they are essentially helpless,
lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect
of stimulating the development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the
victim's ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x
x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive
effect."
52

A study
53
conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania,
found that "even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she
will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to
escape." He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-
important. He referred to this phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of
a situation turn out to be less important than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions
concerning the situation. Battered women don't attempt to leave the battering situation,
even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict
their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible
circumstances."
54

Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent
behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
escape.
55
Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave
the relationship.
56
Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because
she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she
would be found and hurt even more.
57

In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing
that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long
period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to
find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to
find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death
of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was
able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that
single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering?
How did Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she
employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She
simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house;
58
that
Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his
words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did
she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support
of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did
she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as
preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and
thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the
syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense.
Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the
personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated
and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each
other's testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual
cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that
appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be
proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that
would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically
in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the
legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the
context of self-defense.
59

From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS
defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense
60
-- she must
have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to
kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense
must face a real threaton one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent
and actual, not merely imaginary.
61
Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following
requisites and effect of self-defense:
62

"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.
63
It presupposes actual,
sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person.
64
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there
was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack
upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed.
The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no
longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and
based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have
pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life
would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS,
further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents
of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to
await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing
her to 'murder by installment.'"
65
Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim
in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of
danger.
66
Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-
defense.
67
In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or
incomplete -- on the part of the victim.
68
Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely
justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying
circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in
her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an
appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not
been raised by the parties.
69

From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering
Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative]
provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-
control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of
impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at
the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only
be ended by an act of violence on her part."
70

Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of
"repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the
severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress
disorder.
71
Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the
severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the
prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and constitutional
stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social support available to
the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
x x x x x x x x x
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of
severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic
stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the
very very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder.
Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the
individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation
therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is
pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself,
she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual
will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse,
restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be
happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any
prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6)
months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book
specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious
battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how
you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress
disorder."
72

Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x
affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."
73

In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted
in "cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-
control," "psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of
memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an
illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving
her of consciousness of her acts.There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of
action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9
74
and 10
75
of Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating
factor.
76

In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has
been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.
77
To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal
equanimity.
78

Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded
his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the
neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was
eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her
fetus.
79
His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both
Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her
reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental
state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with
feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of
indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the
weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable
period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is
Dr. Pajarillo's testimony
80
that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a victim of
"overwhelming brutality [or] trauma" -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were
real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-
experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks
"of nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under
similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time
interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a
period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness
diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had
inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months
pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise
on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on
her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense
that the offended party might make.
81
In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the
circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be
deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of
evidence.
82
Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself.
83

Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of
death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the
lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an "open, depressed, circular" fracture
located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked,
however, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of
appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he
drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he
could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which
contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me
and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to
open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to
pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and
on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
x x x x x x x x x
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this
blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed
him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before
when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood
pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood
pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the
witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took pity
on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the
baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer."
84

The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no
showing of the victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides,
equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be
said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
85

Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor
must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the
party attacked.
86
There is no showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose
a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any
retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the
gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-
spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately
employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution,
this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.
87

Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have
been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by
one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5
88
of the same Code.
89
The penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating
circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no
other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the
offense.
90
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be
within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum
shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison
as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as
maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply
for and be released from detention on parole.
91

Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy
nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the present case. The
Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort
beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case,
it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to
understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically
abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general
and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the
limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we
amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the
cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to
use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based
on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of
the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED.
However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her
from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held
for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
In convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide, our esteemed colleague Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban found that there was no factual basis to conclude that Marivic was
suffering from "Battered Woman Syndrome" (BWS) at the time she took the life of her
husband. With due respect, I register my dissent.
The novel theory of "Battered Woman Syndrome" is recognized in foreign jurisprudence as a
form of self-defense. It operates upon the premise that a woman who has been cyclically
abused and controlled over a period of time develops a fearful state of mind. Living in
constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain to occur
and will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer
makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously
threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that
she would succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem
other than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending
lethal aggression and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts
and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.
1

As exhaustively discussed in the ponencia, the "Battered Woman Syndrome" has three
phases, to wit: (1) the tension-building phase, where minor batterings in the form of verbal
or slight physical abuse occurs. Here, the woman tries to pacify the batterer through a show
of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way; (2) the acute battering
incident phase which is characterized by brutality, destructiveness and sometimes, death.
The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him and that resistance
would only exacerbate her condition; and (3) the tranquil period, where the couple
experience a compound relief and the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior
towards his partner.
Contrary to the findings in the ponencia, the defense was able to establish the occurrence on
more than one occasion of the "tension-building phase" of the cycle. The various testimonies
of appellant's witnesses clearly reveal that she knew exactly when she would once again be
subjected to acute battery. Her cousin, Ecel Arano, testified that she often asked the latter to
sleep in her house as she was afraid every time her husband came home drunk. Clearly,
whenever appellant requested for Arano's company, she was experiencing a tension-building
phase. The barangay captain, Panfilo Tero, also testified that appellant sought his help two
months before she killed her husband, again demonstrating that she was in the tension-
building phase and was attempting to prevent another incident of acute battery. Appellant
presented evidence to prove that the tension-building phase would occur whenever her
husband would go out looking for other women, would lose at cockfights or would come
home drunk. She often tried to ignore her husband's attitude or, as testified to by some
witnesses for the prosecution, even shouted back, fought off or even injured her husband
during the tension-building phase, if only to prevent the onset of acute battery.
Appellant was able to perfectly describe the tension-building phase of the cycle immediately
prior to the death of her husband, i.e., when she knew or felt that she was going to be killed
by the deceased. She could not possibly have testified with clarity as to prior tension-building
phases in the cycle as she had never tried to kill her husband before this time.
It was shown by the testimonies of appellant and even witnesses for the prosecution that
appellant would seek shelter in her mother's or her father's house after an acute battering
incident, after which would begin the process of begging for forgiveness, promises of change
in behavior and return to the conjugal home, only for the same cycle to begin all over again.
To require appellant to prove the state of mind of the deceased, as seems to be required in
the ponencia, would mean that no person would ever be able to prove self-defense in a
battered woman case. Appellant could not possibly prove whether the deceased felt
provoked into battering by any act or omission of appellant. She cannot possibly prove that
she felt herself to be the sole support of the deceased's emotional stability and well-being.
Nevertheless, appellant felt trapped and helpless in the relationship as, in the end, she
resorted to killing her husband as no one could or did help her, whether out of fear or
insensitivity, during the violent marriage she endured.
The "acute battering incident stage" was well demonstrated by the severe beatings suffered
by Marivic in the hands of the deceased as well as the threats to kill her using a bolo or a
cutter.
2
The physical abuses occurred at least 3 times a week in the 11 miserable years of
their marriage,
3
six incidents of which were documented by the 1990-1995 medical records
of Marivic. They included, among others, hematoma, contusion, and pain on the breasts;
multiple contusions and trauma on the different parts of her body even during her pregnancy
in 1995.
4
The tranquil period underwent by Marivic was shown by the repeated "kiss and
make-up" episodes of their relationship. On more than 5 occasions, Marivic ran to her
parents' house after violent fights with the deceased only to forgive the latter every time he
would fetch her and promise to change.
5

All these recurring phases of cycle of violence, repentance and forgiveness developed a
trauma in the mind of Marivic making her believe that a forthcoming attack from the
deceased would cause her death. This state of mind of Marivic was revealed in her testimony
given way back in 1998, before she was examined by experts on BWS. Unaware of the
significance of her declarations, she candidly narrated how she felt immediately before she
killed the deceased, thus -
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened when you were brought to the drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he
could not open it because he did not have the key. [T]hen he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to
kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he
used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was
about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the room,
and on that very moment everything on my mind was pity on myself, then the
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit.
xxx xxx xxx
6

Q What else happened?
A When I was in the room, I felt the same thing like what happened before I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure has
raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
xxx xxx xxx
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through him, I took pity on
myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the
baby, so I got the gun and shot him.
7

It must be stressed that the defense of "Battered Woman Syndrome" was not raised by
Marivic before the lower court but only here on automatic review. This makes the foregoing
testimony more worthy of great weight and credence considering that the same could not
have been cunningly given to suit or conform to the profile of a battered woman.
Moreover, there was indeed basis for Marivic to fear death because of her medical history.
Dr. Dino Caing testified that he treated Marivic for hypertension due to domestically related
emotional stress on 23 separate occasions. The latest one was on November 6, 1995 when
she suffered from severe hypertension and had a blood pressure of 180/120 on the
8
th
month of her pregnancy.
8

Furthermore, Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist and an expert on BWS who
examined Marivic, assessed the effects of the repeated violence on the latter as follows:
A What I remember ... was it was more than ten years that she was suffering from
emotional anguish. There were a lot of instance of abuses, ... emotional
abuse...verbal abuse and... physical abuse. The husband had very meager income,
she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband
was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing,
being involved in cockfighting and in going home very angry which... triggered a lot
of physical abuse. She also had the experience of taunting from the husband for
the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying
that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at
the same time very depressed because she .. .[felt] almost like living in purgatory or
even in hell when it was happening day in and day out.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what was it that triggered ... that tragedy in your opinion?
A I think for several weeks, she was already having all those tensions, all those
anxieties, they were not enough, that the husband was even going to cockfighting x
x x
A She was angry with him, he was angry with her and I think he dragged her and
even spun her around. She tried to fight him so there was a lot of fight and when
she was able to escape, she went to another room and she locked herself with the
children. And when the husband was for a while very angry he calms down then
and then (sic). But I remember before that the husband was looking for the gun
and I think he was not able to open the cabinet because she had the key. So during
that time, I remember, that she was very much afraid of him, so when the husband
calmed down and he was asleep, all she was concerned was to end up her misery,
to save her child which she was carrying and to save her two children. I believe that
somehow she's not rational.
9

xxx xxx xxx
PROS. TRUYA
Q Mrs. Witness, being an expert witness, giving more the facts and circumstances
on this case that the books you studied in the expertise in line and in the 77 hour
contact with appellant Mrs. Genosa, could you say that this is not ordinary self-
defense but a survival on her part?
A Yes, sir.
Q To what she did to her husband (sic)?
A Yes, sir this is not an ordinary self-defense, but this [is] a need to survive, a need
to survive with her two sons and [the] child she's bringing.
Q Had she not able to kill her husband, would she still be in the very short moment
with the victim (sic)?
A If she did not do that she believes that she will be the one who would be killed.
10

There is no doubt therefore that Marivic was afflicted with the "Battered Woman Syndrome"
and that it was an apprehension of death and the instinct to defend her and her unborn
child's life that drove her to kill her husband.
The ponente further refused to sustain the self-defense proffered by Marivic because there
was allegedly no aggression or danger posed on her life by the victim at the time she
attacked the latter. Again, I beg to disagree.
Traditionally, in order that self-defense may be appreciated, the unlawful aggression or the
attack must be imminent and actually in existence. This interpretation must, however, be re-
evaluated vis-a-vis the recognized inherent characteristic of the psyche of a person afflicted
with the "Battered Woman Syndrome." As previously discussed, women afflicted by this
syndrome live in constant fear for their life and thus respond in self-defense. Once BWS and
an impending danger based on the conduct of the deceased in previous battering episodes
are established, actual occurrence of an assault is no longer a condition sine qua non before
self defense may be upheld. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required
imminence of danger. As stated in theponencia, to require the battered person to await an
obvious deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to
murder by installment.
In the case at bar, the cycle of violence perpetrated by the deceased, which culminated in the
physical assaults and an attempt to shoot Marivic when she was 8 months pregnant, took the
place of unlawful aggression, thus entitling her to a complete self defense even if there was
no actual employment of violence by the deceased at the time of the killing. Marivic had
every reason to believe that the deceased would kill her that night not only because the
latter was verbally threatening to kill her while attempting to get a gun from the drawer, but
more importantly because the deceased wounded her on the wrist with a bolo, and because
of the deceased's previous conduct of threatening to cut her throat with a cutter which he
kept in his wallet. Quoted hereunder are the relevant testimonies of Marivic -
A When I arrived home, he was already in his usual behavior.
xxx xxx xxx
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
xxx xxx xxx
A He was nagging ... me at that time and I just ignore[d] him because I want to
avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed
because I just ignore[d] hi[s] provocation and he switch off the light and I said to
him, "why did you switch off the light when the children were there." At that time I
was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He was angry
with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and g[o]t a bolo
and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
xxx xxx xxx
A He switch[ed] off the light and the children were shouting because they were
scared and he was already holding a bolo.
Q How do you describe this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that
bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I ran to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempted] to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell [on] the
bedside.
11

xxx xxx xxx
COURT
To the witness
xxx xxx xxx
Q The bolo that you said which Ben was holding at that time, [was] it a bolo or a
knife?
A Bolo.
Q Were you wounded or were there inflictions on your body when he was holding
and trying to frighten you [with] that bolo?
A No, only here.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness pointed to her wrist).
COURT
To the witness
Q You were demonstrating a motion, whirling, did your husband really whirl you?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q How did he whirl you?
A Whirled around.
Q Just like spinning.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Where did he whirl you, was it inside the bedroom or outside?
A In our bedroom.
Q Then after the whirling what happened?
A He kicked my ass and then I screamed.
12

xxx xxx xxx
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do...?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
13

A I was frightened that my husband would hurt me, so I packed all his things then
on the following day I will leave, I was afraid and I want to make sure I would
deliver my baby safely.
14

xxx xxx xxx
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and got angry with me for packing his
clothes, then he dragged me again outside of the bedroom holding my neck.
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he
drag... you?
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backwards.
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept shouting
at me that "you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened when you were brought to the drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he
could not open it because he did not have the key. [T]hen he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to
kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he
used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was
about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the room,
and on that very moment everything on my mind was pity on myself, then the
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
15

RE-DIRECT BY ATTY. TABUCANON
Q In other words, there were two (2) incidents, the first incident and then he left
and then two (2) hours after he came back?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the whirling happened in the first incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the dragging with arms flexed in her neck and on that blade
happened on the second incident (sic)?
A Ye, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
To the witness
Q Why, what is that blade about?
A A cutter about 3 inches long.
Q Who used that?
A Ben.
Q He used that on you?
A He scared me on that (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
Q But he did not hit you with that?
A Yes, because I managed to run every time he scared (sic).
16

There are many things which cannot be proved by direct evidence. One of this is state of
mind. In the case at bar, there is more than sufficient physical evidence presented by the
appellant from which her mental state can be inferred. The prosecution did not object to the
presentation of these physical and testimonial pieces of evidence, namely, the medical
records of 23 instances of domestic violence-related injuries and the testimonies of
neighbors, cousins and even the barangay captain. Indeed, no person would endure 23
reported instances of beatings if she were planning to kill her spouse in the first place. The
majority need not worry that women around the country will mastermind the killings of their
husbands and then use this Decision to bolster their attempts to employ the BWS defense.
Moreover, as found in the ponencia, appellant should be allowed the mitigating circumstance
of passion and obfuscation. This, at the very least, supports a finding that the acts of violence
and battery committed by the deceased were illegal and unlawful and were committed
immediately before appellant could recover her natural equanimity. But what is the natural
equanimity of a battered woman? Appellant was not a normal married woman. She can
never be in a state of natural equanimity as she was in a constant state of alertness and
hypersensitivity to the next phase of acute battery. The esteemed ponente also correctly
found that the appellant acted with diminished will-power. However, he failed to go further.
In the case of People v. Javier,
17
it was held:
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him to
prove the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside from the
testimony of the accused that his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to loss of
sleep, no medical finding was presented regarding his mental condition at the time of the
killing. This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere
presumptions and conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-
appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of will-power at the time of
the killing.
18

In the case at bar, appellant was allowed and did in fact present clear and convincing
evidence that she was a battered woman for 13-14 years and that she suffered from the
"Battered Woman Syndrome". Expert testimony was presented and admitted to this effect,
such that the ponente ably discussed the causes and effects of the syndrome. To ignore the
testimony and the evidence thus presented is to make impossible the proof of mental state.
Evidence as to the mental state need not be also "beyond reasonable doubt."
Verily, the requirement of threatening behavioral pattern of the batterer in previous violent
episodes was sufficiently satisfied in the present case. This, juxtaposed to Marivic's affliction
with BWS justified the killing of the deceased. The danger posed or created in her mind by
the latter's threats using bladed weapons, bred a state of fear, where under the
circumstances, the natural response of the battered woman would be to defend herself even
at the cost of taking the life of the batterer.
The ponencia's acknowledgement of "Battered Woman Syndrome" as a valid form of self-
defense, is a noble recognition of the plight of, and a triumph for battered women who are
trapped in a culture of silence, shame, and fear. This would however be an empty victory if
we deliberately close our eyes to the antecedents of this case. The facts are simple. Marivic
was suffering from the "Battered Woman Syndrome" and was defending herself when she
killed her husband. Her acquittal of the charge of parricide is therefore in order.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to ACQUIT Marivic Genosa.
RAPE
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA
For automatic review is the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 28 April 2006,
affirming with modification the decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, Branch 28,
3
dated 27 December 2000, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of qualified rape and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness.
In three (3) separate Informations
4
for Criminal Cases No. SC-7422, SC-7423 and SC-7424 all
dated 16 June 1999, appellant was indicted before the RTC for three (3) counts of qualified
rape against his minor daughter AAA.
5
The accusatory portions in all the Informations are
identical, except as regards the date of commission of the crime. The Information in Criminal
Case No. SC-7422 reads:
At the instance of the private complainant [AAA] with the conformity of her mother [BBB]
6
in
a sworn complaint filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lumban-Kalayaan (Laguna),
the undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna hereby accuses ALVIN ABULON Y
SALVANIA, of the crime of "RAPE," committed as follows:
"That on or about March 14, 1999, in the Municipality of Kalayaan, Province of Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs,
with grave abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness, and with force and intimidation,
did then and there wilfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his
legitimate minor daughter, [AAA], who at the [sic] time was thirteen (13) years of age,
against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice."
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After appellant pleaded not guilty, trial ensued with AAA herself, as the first prosecution
witness, testifying to the following facts:
AAA is the oldest of five (5) legitimate children born to appellant and BBB. On 14, 15, and 16
March 1999, appellant raped AAA. The first rape incident occurred at around 1:30 in the
morning of 14 March 1999. AAA was home, fast asleep next to her brother and sister when
she suddenly woke up to the noise created by her father who arrived drunk, but who likewise
soon thereafter returned to the wedding festivities he was attending. Abiding by their
father's instructions, AAA and her siblings went back to sleep.
7

AAA was next awakened by the weight of her father lying naked on top of her. Appellant had
removed her underwear while she slept. He poked a knife on AAA's waist and threatened to
kill her and her siblings if she reported the incident to anyone. She begged him to stop but he
proceeded to kiss her mouth, vagina, and breast, and to have carnal knowledge of
her.
8
Although they witnessed the ongoing ordeal, AAA's siblings could do nothing but cry as
appellant likewise poked the knife on them.
9
The following morning, AAA found a whitish
substance and blood stains on her panty.
10

On 15 March 1999, at around 10:30 in the evening, AAA and her siblings were awakened as
appellant came home drunk. He told them to eat first as they had not taken their supper yet.
After dining together, appellant left and AAA, her brother, and her sister went back to
sleep.
11
As in the previous evening, appellant roused AAA in mid-sleep. This time, she woke
up with her father holding her hand, covering her mouth and lying on top of her. He
undressed AAA, then mounted her. Repeatedly, he inserted his penis into her vagina, and
AAA felt pain in her private parts. Appellant also kissed and fondled AAA on different parts of
her body.
12

Again, AAA's siblings could only cry as they saw appellant rape their sister. AAA's sister,
however, took a pen and wrote her a note which read: "Ate, let us tell what father was doing
to the police officer." After appellant had raped AAA, the latter's sister asked their father why
he had done such to AAA. In response, appellant spanked AAA's sister and threatened to kill
all of them should they report the incidents to the police.
13
The sisters nonetheless related to
their relatives AAA's misfortune, but the relatives did not take heed as they regarded
appellant to be a kind man.
14

The third rape episode happened at around 3:30 in the morning of 16 March 1999. Although
appellant did not insert his penis into AAA's vagina on this occasion, he took off her lower
undergarments and kissed her vagina.
15
On cross-examination, AAA asserted that her father
inserted his tongue into the hole of her vagina and she felt pain because of this.
16

To corroborate AAA's testimony, the prosecution presented BBB and AAA's 6-year old
brother CCC.
17
BBB testified that she was a stay-in housemaid working in Las Pias on the
dates that her daughter was raped by appellant. On 26 March 1999, she went home and
stayed with her family. However, it was only on 4 May 1999 that BBB learned of the rape,
when CCC told her that appellant had raped AAA three (3) times and that he had seen his
father on top of his sister during those occasions. BBB then verified the matter with AAA
herself, and the latter affirmed the incidents. BBB thus took AAA with her to the barangay
and police authorities to report the incidents, and later to the provincial hospital for medical
examination.
18

CCC testified that on three (3) separate occasions, he saw his father lying naked on top of
AAA, who was likewise naked.
19

The prosecution also presented SPO1 Bayani G. Montesur (SPO1 Montesur) and Dr. Gloria
Cabael (Dr. Cabael). SPO1 Montesur identified the Police Blotter of 4 May 1999 which
recorded the complaints of rape against appellant and the report of the latter's arrest.
20
Dr.
Cabael, on the other hand, testified that she examined AAA on 4 May 1999 upon the request
of Police Officer Gallarosa. She identified the Rape Case Report she prepared thereafter.
21

Appellant testified as the sole witness on his behalf, proffering denial and alibi as his
defenses. According to appellant, he was hired by his aunt, Raquel Masangkay, to deliver
hogs and that at 1:30 in the morning of 14 March 1999, he was in Calamba, Laguna pursuant
to such employment. He averred that he went home at 7:00 in the morning of the following
day and thus could not have raped his daughter as alleged.
22
Likewise denying the second
rape charge, appellant testified that on 15 March 1999, he attended a wedding ceremony in
Sityo Kalayaan, San Antonio, Kalayaan, Laguna. He went home drunk at 6:00 that evening and
promptly went to sleep.
23
Similarly, at 3:00 in the morning of 16 March 1999, appellant
claimed to have been asleep with his children and could not have thus committed the rape as
charged.
24

Finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant of
the crime of qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 and the crime of acts
of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. SC-7424, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Judgment
against appellant and sentenced him accordingly, thus:
W H E R E F O R E :
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7422, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of CONSUMMATED QUALIFIED RAPE as
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 7639, otherwise known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the SUPREME PENALTY of DEATH and to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the following
sums:
P 75,000.00 - as civil indemnity
50,000.00 - as moral damages; and
50,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7423, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of CONSUMMATED QUALIFIED RAPE as
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 7639, otherwise known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the SUPREME PENALTY of DEATH and to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the following
sums:
P 75,000.00 - as civil indemnity
50,000.00 - as moral damages; and
50,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7424, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined
and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for SIX (6) MONTHS of ARRESTO MAYOR as MINIMUM to
SIX (6) YEARS of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered to pay the costs of the instant three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.
25

With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review. However, pursuant to this Court's ruling in People v. Mateo,
26
the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals. On 28 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its
decision affirming appellant's conviction, but with modification as to damages awarded to
the victim. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, in
Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 finding appellant Alvin S. Abulon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of qualified rape, and in Criminal Case No. SC-7424, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: In Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422-7423, the
award of exemplary damages in the amount of [P]50,000.00 is reduced to [P]25,000.00. In
Criminal Case No. SC-7424, appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of [P]30,000.00
as moral damages. We affirm in all other respects.
Pursuant to A.M. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure to
Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004, this case is elevated
and certified to the Supreme Court for its automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
27

In his Brief,
28
appellant assails his conviction and imputes grave error to the trial court for
giving weight and credence to the testimony of AAA. In particular, he makes capital of AAA's
delay in reporting the incidents to her mother. He likewise impugns the trial court's alleged
bias in propounding inappropriate leading questions to private complainant AAA. Finally, he
maintains that the Informations against him are defective as they failed to allege the key
element of force and/or intimidation.
29

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with modifications.
The duty to ascertain the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the
trial court,
30
because it has the unique position of observing the witness's deportment on the
stand while testifying. Absent any compelling reason to justify the reversal of the evaluations
and conclusions of the trial court, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's
findings.
31

In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends
almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony. By the very nature of this
crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself.
32
Her
testimony is most vital and must be received with the utmost caution.
33
When a rape victim's
testimony, however, is straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling
examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. Once found
credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
34

The court a quo found the testimony of AAA in its entirety to be credible, made in a candid,
spontaneous, and straightforward manner and never shaken even under rigid cross-
examination.
35
We agree that AAA's narration of her harrowing experience is worthy of
credence, thus:
Criminal Case No. SC-7422
Trial Prosecutor:
Q : Tell us what happened at around 1:30 in the morning of March 11, [sic] 1999 to
you?cralaw library
A: My brother and sister and I were already asleep when my father who was drank [sic] came
home. We told him to just sleep. My father told us that he would still return to the wedding
celebration (kasalan).
x x x
Q: What happened next when you continued sleeping?cralaw library
A: I was awakened when I felt my father already on top of me, sir.
Q: Tell us exactly what was [sic] your position then at that time you woke up?cralaw library
A: I was still lying straight down, sir.
Q: How about your father in relation to you, where was he at the time you woke up?cralaw
library
A: He was on top (nakadagan) of me, sir.
Court:
Q: Was he naked?cralaw library
A: Already naked, Your Honor.
Q: How about you, do [sic] you have your clothes on?cralaw library
A: I have [sic] my lady sando on, Your Honor.
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: Are [sic] you still wearing your panty when you were awakened?cralaw library
A: No more, sir.
x x x
Q: What did your father do aside from placing his body on top of you?cralaw library
A: He poked a knife on [sic] me, sir.
Court:
Q: Did he say something?cralaw library
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What did he say?cralaw library
A: He said that if he [sic] report her [sic] to anybody he would kill us, Your Honor.
x x x
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: What else did he do aside from telling you "huag kang magsusumbong"?cralaw library
A: He also poked the knife on [sic] my brother and sister, sir.
Q: They were already awakened at that time?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What else did he do aside from poking a knife on [sic] you and your brother and
sister?cralaw library
A: No more, sir.
Court:
Q: While your father according to you is [sic] on top of you, what did he do if any?cralaw
library
A: "Kinayog na po niya ako."
Q: What do you mean by telling [sic] "kinayog na po niya ako"?cralaw library
A: He was moving, Your Honor.
Q: While your father was moving, what else was happening at that time?cralaw library
A: I felt pain, Your Honor.
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: From where did you feel that pain?cralaw library
A: From my private part, sir.
x x x
Q: Do you know if you know why you felt the pain on the lower portion of your body?cralaw
library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell us if you know?cralaw library
A: Something whitish coming out from it, sir.
Court:
Q: From where did it come from [sic]? That whitish substance?cralaw library
A: From my father's private part, Your Honor.
Q: Why, what happened to the private part of your father?cralaw library
A: I do not know, Your Honor.
Q: When you felt pain, what was your father doing then?cralaw library
A: He repeated what he told [sic] previously not to tell to [sic] anybody.
Q: At that time, did you see the private part of your father?cralaw library
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: When you felt pain. Do you know what is [sic] happening to the private part of your
father?cralaw library
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What was happening?cralaw library
A: His private part stiffened or hardened (tumirik), Your Honor.
Q: Where was it placed if any?cralaw library
A: Into my private part, Your Honor.
Q: Did the private part of you father actually penetrate your vagina?cralaw library
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What did you feel at the time the penis of your father entered your vagina?cralaw library
A: It was painful, Your Honor.
Q: At that time was your father making any movement?cralaw library
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Will you describe the movement made by your father?cralaw library
A: (Witness demonstrating an upward and downward stroke by placing her right palm over
her left hand)
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: Did he kiss you?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In what part of your body?cralaw library
A: On my mouth, sir.
Q: Aside from your mouth, what other part or parts of your body did he kiss?cralaw library
A: On my private part, sir.
Q: When did he kiss you private part, before inserting his penis or after?cralaw library
A: After he inserted his penis, sir.
Q: What other part of your body did he kiss?cralaw library
A: On my breast, sir.
36

x x x
Criminal Case No. SC-7423
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, you said that the second incident happened [on] March 15, 1999, am I
correct?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And where and what time said [sic] second incident happened?cralaw library
A: 10:30 in the evening, sir, also in our house, sir.
x x x
Q: And what were you doing when your father returned at around 11:00 o'clock in the
evening?cralaw library
A: We were all asleep, sir.
Q: And how did you come to know that he returned at around 11:00 P.M.?cralaw library
A: My father suddenly held my hand, sir.
Q: And because of that, you were awakened?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened when you were awakened because your father held your
hand?cralaw library
A: He covered my mouth, sir.
Q: And after covering your mouth, what else did he do?cralaw library
A: He removed the lower portion of my clothes. "Hinubuan po niya ako."
x x x
Q: After removing your lady sando, what else did he do?cralaw library
A: He laid himself on top of me, sir.
x x x
Q: Now, what did he do to you when he was already on top of you?cralaw library
A: He was "kinakayog niya po ako."
Q: Aside from "kinakayog," what else did he do?cralaw library
A: He kissed my breast, sir.
Q: Aside from that, what else?cralaw library
A: He likewise touched my private part, sir.
Q: When he was on top of you, do you know where was [sic] his penis at that time?cralaw
library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?cralaw library
A: Into my vagina, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that the penis of your father was inside your vagina?cralaw
library
A: I felt pain in my private part, sir.
Q: And do you know why you felt pain in your private part?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?cralaw library
A: His private part '. (Thereafter witness is crying while uttering words: "I am afraid I might be
killed by my father.") He held his penis into my vagina. Thereafter, inserted it repeatedly into
mine, sir.
Q: And you were able to actually feel his penis inside your vagina?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
37

x x x
Criminal Case No. SC-7424
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, you said also that you were raped on March 16, 1999, am I correct?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What time?cralaw library
A: It was 3:30 o'clock in the morning, sir.
x x x
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q Now, how did it happen, that third incident?cralaw library
A I was able to run downstairs but when I was about to open the door, he was able to hold
my dress, sir.
Q: Was your father drunk at that time?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you come to know?cralaw library
A: His eyes were red and he was laughing at me while telling me: "It is your end." (Witness
crying while answering the question.)
Q: Now, what happened when your father was able to hold your dress?cralaw library
A: He carried me upstairs, sir.
Q: Was he able to carry you upstairs?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do, if any, when you were upstairs?cralaw library
A: He removed my panty and shortpants, sir.
Q: After removing your shorts and panty, what else did he do?cralaw library
A: No more but he kissed my vagina.
Q: Which part of your vagina did he kiss?cralaw library
A: That part of my vagina with hold [sic].
Court:
Q: What about your upper garments at that time?cralaw library
A: He did not remove it, Your Honor.
Q: What else did he do, aside from that?cralaw library
A: Nothing more, just that.
Q: After kissing your vagina, what else happened, if any?cralaw library
A: He again poked the knife on us, Your Honor.
Q: At that time, was your father naked or not?cralaw library
A: Still with his clothes on, Your Honor.
x x x
Q: For clarification, what else, if any, did your father do after your father kissed your
vagina?cralaw library
A: Nothing more, merely that act, Your Honor.
Q: You mean your father did not insert his penis to [sic] your vagina anymore?cralaw library
A: No more, Your Honor.
x x x
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, what did he use in kissing your clitoris?cralaw library
A: His tongue, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that it was his tongue that he used?cralaw library
A: It is because I saw him put out his tongue, sir.
38

Verily, it is inconceivable and contrary to human experience for a daughter, who is attached
to her father by the natural bond of love and affection, to accuse him of rape, unless he is the
one who raped and defoliated her.
39
As we have pronounced in People v. Canoy:
40

It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination
of her most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her
family, to shame, pity or even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious
that could mean the death sentence to the very person to whom she owes her life, had she
really not have been aggrieved. Nor do we believe that the victim would fabricate a story of
rape simply because she wanted to exact revenge against her father, appellant herein, for
allegedly scolding and maltreating her.
41

In stark contrast with AAA's convincing recital of facts, supported as it was by the testimonies
of BBB and CCC, are appellant's uncorroborated and shaky defenses of denial and alibi.
Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot prevail
over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the complainant.
42
Alibi is an
inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily be
fabricated.
43
Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.
44

The records disclose that not a shred of evidence was adduced by appellant to corroborate
his alibi. Alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses,
otherwise, it is fatal to the accused.
45
Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated
that it was physically impossible for appellant to be present at the place where the crime was
committed at the time of its commission.
46
By his own testimony, appellant clearly failed to
show that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the crime
when the rapes were alleged to have occurred. Except for the first incident, appellant was
within the vicinity of his home and in fact alleged that he was supposedly even sleeping
therein on the occasion of the second and third incidents.chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant's contention that AAA's accusations are clouded by her failure to report the alleged
occurrences of rape is unmeritorious. To begin with, AAA categorically testified that she told
her father's niece about the incidents. However, the latter doubted her, believing instead
that appellant was not that kind of man. AAA's subsequent attempt to report the incidents to
the barangay turned out to be futile as well as she was only able to speak with the barangay
driver, who happened to be appellant's brother-in-law. She was likewise disbelieved by the
latter. Her disclosure of the rapes to a certain Menoy did not yield any positive result either.
Fearing for the lives of her grandparents, AAA decided not to tell them about the incidents.
47

A child of thirteen years cannot be expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to
the authorities.
48
Indeed, We see how AAA must have felt absolutely hopeless since the
people around her were relatives of her father and her attempts to solicit help from them
were in vain. Thus, AAA's silence in not reporting the incidents to her mother and filing the
appropriate case against appellant for over a month is sufficiently explained. The charge of
rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained.
49
It is not
beyond ken that the child, living under threat from appellant and having been turned away
by trusted relatives, even accused by them of lying, would simply opt to just suffer in silence
thereafter. In People v. Gutierrez,
50
we held:
Complainant's failure to immediately report the rape does not diminish her credibility. The
silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without
loss of material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault on their virtues because of
the rapist's threat on their lives, more so when the offender is someone whom she knew and
who was living with her.
51

Appellant brands the trial judge as partial against him for propounding leading questions to
AAA. According to him, were it not for the lower court's and the prosecution's biased leading
questions, AAA would not have proven the elements of the crimes charged.
52

Appellant's argument is not well-taken. It is the judge's prerogative to ask clarificatory
queries to ferret out the truth.
53
It cannot be taken against him if the questions he
propounds reveal certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one
party.
54
After all, the judge is the arbiter and ought to be satisfied himself as to the respective
merits and claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands of due
process.
55
Also, being the arbiter, he may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence
to expedite proceedings and prevent unnecessary waste of time.
56

Besides, jurisprudence explains that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be
received with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the
accused. The propriety of the judge's questions is determined by their quality and not
necessarily by their quantity and, in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was
prejudiced by such questioning or not.
57
In the instant case, the Court finds that on the whole,
the questions propounded by the judge a quo were but clarificatory in nature and that,
concomitantly, appellant failed to satisfactorily establish that he was prejudiced by such
queries.
The matter of the purportedly defective Informations was properly addressed by the Court of
Appeals, pointing out that a close scrutiny of the Informations would reveal that the words
"force and/or intimidation" are specifically alleged therein.
58
Even if these were not so, well-
established is the rule that force or intimidation need not be proven in incestuous cases. The
overpowering moral influence of a father over his daughter takes the place of violence and
offer of resistance ordinarily required in rape cases where the accused is unrelated to the
victim.
59

Now, we turn to the determination of the crime for which appellant under the third charge is
liable and the corresponding penalty therefor. In the Brief for the People, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) argues that all three (3) charges of rape, including the rape
committed on 16 March 1999 subject of Criminal Case No. SC-7424, were proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that it was clear from the evidence that appellant
merely kissed the vagina of AAA and made no attempt of penetration, meaning penile
penetration, and for that reason found him guilty of acts of lasciviousness only.
60
Yet, in
affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals did not find any categorical testimony on AAA's
part that appellant had inserted his tongue in her vagina, stressing instead that the mere
probability of such insertion cannot take the place of proof required to establish the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt for rape.
61

The automatic appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case for review,
62
as in this case.
Thus, this Court is mandated to re-examine the vital facts established a quo and to properly
apply the law thereto. The two courts below were both mistaken, as we note that AAA
unqualifiedly testified on cross-examination to appellant's insertion of his tongue into her
vagina, viz:
Court:
Q: On the third time you are [sic] allegedly raped, you said it happened at 3:30 in the
morning of March 16, 1999.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you said yesterday that he did not insert his pennies [sic] to [sic] your vagina on
March 16?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What he did is he kissed your vagina?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q : For how long did he kiss your vagina?cralaw library
A: Two minutes, sir.
Q: What did he actually do when he kissed your vagina?cralaw library
A: He kissed my vagina, thereafter he laughed and laughed.
Q: You mean to tell the court when he kissed your vagina he used his lips?cralaw library
A: His lips and tongue, sir.
Q: What did he do?cralaw library
A: He put out his tongue thereafter he "inano" the hole of my vagina.
Court:
Q: What did your father do with his tongue?cralaw library
A: He placed it in the hole of my vagina.
Q: Did you feel pain?cralaw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By just kissing your vagina you felt pain?cralaw library
A: Yes, Your Honor.
63

Notwithstanding the explicit testimony of AAA on the matter, this Court cannot find
appellant guilty of rape as proved, but of acts of lasciviousness only. In reaching this
conclusion, we take a route different from the ones respectively taken by the courts below.
With the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (R.A. No. 8353), otherwise known as the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997,
64
the concept of rape was revolutionized with the new recognition that
the crime should include sexual violence on the woman's sex-related orifices other than her
organ, and be expanded as well to cover gender-free rape.
65
The transformation mainly
consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of
rape by "sexual assault"
66
as differentiated from the traditional "rape through carnal
knowledge" or "rape through sexual intercourse."
Section 2 of the law provides:
Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a
Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 9815, as amended, otherwise known as
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same
Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. - Rape Is Committed'
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise is unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; andcralawlibrary
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Paragraph 1 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8353, which is now Paragraph 1 of the new Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, covers rape through sexual intercourse while paragraph 2
refers to rape by sexual assault. Rape through sexual intercourse is also denominated as
"organ rape" or "penile rape." On the other hand, rape by sexual assault is otherwise called
"instrument or object rape,"
67
also "gender-free rape,"
68
or the narrower "homosexual
rape."
69

In People v. Silvano,
70
the Court recognized that the father's insertion of his tongue and finger
into his daughter's vaginal orifice would have subjected him to liability for "instrument or
object rape" had the new law been in effect already at the time he committed the acts.
Similarly, in People v. Miranda,
71
the Court observed that appellant's insertion of his fingers
into the complainant's organ would have constituted rape by sexual assault had it been
committed when the new law was already in effect.
The differences between the two modes of committing rape are the following:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be
a man or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the
offended party may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the
second is committed by inserting the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; andcralawlibrary
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not
necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information
in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found
guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was proven, without violating his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5,
Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of
acts of lasciviousness. Said provisions read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. - When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall
be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily included in rape.
72

In light of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines,"
73
the penalty of death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the
penalty meted out to appellant for rape through sexual intercourse in Criminal Cases No. SC-
7422 and SC-7423 is reduced in each case from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole.
74
We affirm the conviction of appellant in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 for acts of
lascivousness but modify the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals instead to an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum as neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime.
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award in Criminal Cases No. SC-
7422 and SC-7423 in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Therefore, appellant is ordered to
indemnify AAA, for each count of qualified rape, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
75
The
award of damages in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 01926 is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423, appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim, AAA, in the amounts
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages plus costs. In Criminal Case No. SC-7424, appellant is found guilty of the crime of
acts of lasciviousness and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for
six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 plus
costs.
SO ORDERED.
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
In an information, dated 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the complex crime of parricide with
intentional abortion, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of December, 1974, in Tigbinan, Labo,
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence on MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, the lawfully
wedded wife of the accused, by then and there boxing and stranging her,
causing upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and
by the same criminal act committed on the person of the wife of the
accused, who was at the time 8 months on the family way, the accused
likewise did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the
death of the child while still in its maternal womb, thereby committing
both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION as defined and
punished under Art. 246 and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal
Code, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said woman and child
in the amount as the Honorable Court shall assess.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to the
offenses charged.
After trial the lower court rendered a decision ** dated 9 August 1978, the dispositive part of
which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with
Intentional Abortion, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marciano Abuyo in the
sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For unselfish, valuable and
exemplary service rendered by counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano C.
Dating, Jr., a compensation of P500.00 is hereby recommended for him
subject to the availability of funds
SO ORDERED.
The accused having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, this case is on automatic
review before this Court.
At the trial in the court a quo, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. Juan L.
Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania and Narciso Abuyo.
Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., who was then Rural Health Officer of Talisay, Camarines Norte,
testified that, after passing the Board Examination, he was employed as a Resident Physician
of La Union Provincial Hospital, then as Junior Resident Physician of Bethane Hospital in San
Fernando, La Union and that later, he joined the government service, starting from 1968 up
to the time of the trial; that as a Doctor of Medicine, he had performed about ten (10) post
mortem examinations; that he was called upon by the Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine
the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was exhumed from its grave in the Municipal
Cemetery of Talisay at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 December 1974; that
his post mortem examination lasted from 12:30 o'clock to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the
same day. He reduced his findings of injuries into writing. (Exhibit "A"), which, together with
their probable cause, as testified to by him, are as follows:
Injury Cause
1) Multiple abrasions with "Blunt object or friction by
contusion, left leg, middle
part,
hard object" (tsn., Aug. 20,
posterior
covering an area of 1976, p. 7)
about 2 & 1/2 by 5 inches.
2) Abrasions, 1/2 by 2 Friction on a hard object"
inches, medial side of the
cubi
(tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 7)
tal fossa (back left leg)
3) Multiple pinhead sized Hard pinhead sized material
wounds, right face, starting (tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 7)
from the side of the right
eye

down to mandibular bone
(right check)
4) Upper right eyelid No cause given
more prominent than the
left

eyelid ("the right upper
eyelid a

little bit bulging than the
left

eye "and" sort of "swollen")
(tsn.,

Aug. 20, 1976, pp. 7-8)
5) Tongue protruding bet Usually, the main cause of
ween the lips, about 1 inch
teeth
protruding tongue during
line. death is (by) strangulation.
(tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 8)
6) Deceased is pregnant
with a baby boy about 7-8
months old (tsn., Aug. 20,
1976, p. 8).
Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a
certification thereof (Exhibit "A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the
deceased Marciano Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5 December 1974, made on the
basis of the information relayed by a certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial,
without mentioning the cause of death; that the cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was
indicated on said death certificate only after the post mortem examination on 11 December
1974.
The other witness for the prosecution was Pedro Salufrania, son of herein appellant and of
the deceased. The lower court's decision states that, by reason of interest and relationship,
before Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-accused Filomeno
Salufrania, he was carefully examined by the prosecuting officer and the defense counsel
under the careful supervision of the court a quo, to determine whether, at his age of 13 years
old, he was already capable of receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating them
truly and, also, whether he was compelled and/or threatened by anybody to testify against
his father-accused.
1

The lower court found Pedro Salufrania to be determined and intelligent. He convincingly
declared that he was not threatened by any of his uncles on his mother's side to testify
against his father, because it was true that the latter killed his mother. Then, formally
testifying as the prosecution's lone eyewitness, he stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania
and his mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3
December 1974, in their small house at a far away sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines
Norte; that during said quarrel, he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach
and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death; that he saw blood ooze from
the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where she fell.
Pedro Salufrania further testified that after killing his mother, the accused- appellant went
out of the house to get a hammock; that his brother Alex and he were the only ones who
witnessed how the accused killed their mother because his sister and other brothers were
already asleep when the horrible incident happened; that his brothers Celedonio, Danilo and
sister Merly woke up after the death of their mother and kept watch at their mothers body
while their father was away; that their father arrived early the next morning with the
hammock and after placing their dead mother on the hammock, the accused carried her on
his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the house of his sister Conching, located at a
populated section of Tigbinan that from Tigbinan the corpse was transferred to Gabon,
Talisay, Camarines Norte for burial.
Continuing his testimony, Pedro Salufrania stated that he is now living with his uncle Eduardo
Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter
has threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of
his mother's death.
The third witness for the prosecution was Narciso Abuyo, a resident of Gabon, Talisay,
Camarines Norte. He testified that the accused Filomeno Salufrania and his sister, the
deceased Marciana Abuyo, were lawfully wedded husband and wife as evidenced by a
marriage contract (Exhibit "C"). He declared that his sister was more or less seven (7) months
pregnant when she died; that he first came to know about his sister's death on 4 December
1974 thru his nephews Pedro and Alex Salufrania who first informed him that their mother
died of stomach ailment and headache; that he went to Tigbinan to request for the body of
his sister so that it may be buried in Talisay, Camarines Norte and, as intended, Marciana
Abuyo was buried in the Talisay Cemetery on 6 December 1974.
Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3) children of
his deceased sister went to his house and refused to go home with their father Filomeno
Salufrania; that when asked for the reason why, his nephew Alex Salufraa told him that the
real cause of death of their mother was not stomach ailment and headache, rather, she was
boxed on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that immediately after learning
of the true cause of death of his sister, he brought the matter to the attention of the police
authorities of Talisay, Camarines Norte, who investigated Alex and Pedro Salufirania and
later, to that of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte.
The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling Balce and the
accused Filomeno Salufrania.
Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania. He declared that
Marciana Abuyo died at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 in her house
at Sitio Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Camarines Norte; that he happened to pass by said house
because his attention was attracted by the bright light in the fireplace and he saw Filomeno
Salufrania boiling "ikmo" and garlic as medicine for his wife who was about to deliver a child;
that he helped the accused by applying "ikmo" to the different parts of the body of Marciana
Abuyo and by administering the native treatment known as "bantil", that is, by pinching and
pulling the skin with two fingers of his closed fist; that when the condition of Marciana Abuyo
worsened, he told Filomeno Salufrania to go and get Juanita Bragais who is known as a healer
but the latter arrived at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 and that at
that time Marciana Abuyo was already dead.
Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another son of
Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974. He further
testified that when he reached the house of the Salufranias, Marciana Abuyo was already
dead so he just helped Filomeno Salufrania in transferring the body of his wife to the house
of the latter's brother-in-law at Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte.
Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a former resident of Kapagisahan Tigbinan, Labo,
Camarines Norte testified that she arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00
o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 after being called by one of the latter's sons; that
she saw Marciana still in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed her that
Marciana was suffering from an old stomach ailment.
The accused Filomeno Salufrania admitted that he was that lawful husband of the deceased
Marciana Abuyo; that at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of 3 December 1974, Marciana
arrived home from Talisay where she had earlier stayed for about a week; that she was
hungry upon her arrival, so he allegedly cooked their food and after eating their lunch, he
proceeded to his work while his wife rested in their house; that when he returned home at
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, his wife complained to him of stomach pain
and he was told to prepare the beddings because she was already sleepy; that at about 4:00
o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974, he was awakened by his wife who was still
complaining of stomach pain, and that she asked for a drink of hot water; that while he was
boiling water, Geronimo Villan arrived and assisted him in administering to his wife the
native treatments known as "hilot" or massaging and "banti" that Geronimo Villan and
Francisco Repuya alternately applied "bantil" to his wife but when her condition worsened,
he woke up his children, Pedro and Alex to fetch Rico Villanueva who might be able to ,save
the life of their mother; that his children left and returned without Rico Villanueva but the
latter arrived a little later.
Accused-appellant then went on to say that he sent for Juanito Bragais but the latter was not
able to cure his wife, since the latter was already dead when he arrived; that after the death
of his wife, he ordered his children to get the hammock of Kaloy Belardo whose house was
about two (2) kilometers away from their house, and upon the arrival of the hammock, he
placed the body of his wife thereon and brought it to the house of his sister Consolacion
Salufrania in Tigbinan; that while the corpse of Marciana Abuyo was at Tigbinan he sent
Chiding and his elder son to inform the brothers and sisters of his wife at Talisay about her
death and that Leonila Abuyo and Salvador Abuyo came; that he informed the Barangay
Captain of Tigbinan of the cause of death of his wife; that upon the suggestion of the
brothers and sisters of Marciana Abuyo, especially Salvador Abuyo, the body of their sister
was brought home to Talisay and thereafter buried at the Talisay Cemetery; that there was
no quarrel between him and his wife that preceded the latter's death, and that during the
lifetime of the deceased, they loved each other; that after her burial, his son Pedro Salufrania
was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then, he was not able to talk to his
son until during the trial; and that at the time of death of his wife, aside from the members
of his family, Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and Liling Angeles Balce were also present.
The case was considered submitted for decision by the trial court on 18 July 1978. As
aforestated, the trial court found the appellant guilty of the crimes charged and sentenced
him to the penalty of death.
The appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY
OF AN INCOMPETENT WITNESS, AND ON INCONSISTENT AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF
THE PROSECUTION, THEREBY VIOLATING THE RULE THAT THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO AN
ACQUITTAL UNLESS HIS GUILT IS SHOWN BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IS CREDIBLE AND
SUFFICIENT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE COMPLEX
CRIME OF PARRICIDE WITH INTENTIONAL ABORTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCREDITING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED.
Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to determine the competence of Pedro Salufrania
before he was allowed to testify. Since Pedro was allegedly a child of tender age, being only
thirteen (13) years old when he testified, and only eleven (11) years old when the offense
charged occurred, he is presumed incompetent under Rule 130 Sec. 19 (b) of the Revised
Rules of Court, which includes among those who cannot be witnesses:
Children who appear to the court to be of such tender age and inferior
capacity as to be incapable of receiving correct impressions of the facts
respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.
Therefore, according to appellant, for failure of the trial court to determine Pedro's
competence, the presumption of incompetency was not rebutted and Pedro's testimony
should not have been admitted. Moreover, appellant stresses that there is no basis for the
trial court's finding that Pedro is intelligent.
Appellant's contention is without merit. The record shows that the trial court determined
Pedro Salufrania's competency before he was allowed to testify under oath.
2
The trial court's
conclusion that Pedro was intelligent and competent is fully supported by Pedro's
responsiveness to the questions propounded to him when he was already under oath:
A. Did you go here in court to testify voluntarily?
Q. Yes, Your Honor.
A. Were you not forced by your uncle to testify in his
case?
Q. No, I was not forced by my uncle.
xxx xxx xxx
A. The accused is your father?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Do you love him?
Q. No, sir.
A. Your father is accused now of crime which carries
the penalty of death, are you still willing to testify
against him?
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you say that you don't love your father
A. Because he killed my mother.
Q. And that is the reason why you hate your father
now?
A. Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 3, 7,17, Nov. 12, 1976).
Pedro's strong sense of moral duty to tell the truth, even though it should lead to his father's
conviction, shows that he fully appreciated the meaning of an oath, which likewise proves
that he was no longer a child of tender years at the time of his testimony.
Appellant also alleges that, since Pedro changed his answer from no to yes when he was
asked whether he was threatened by his uncle to testify against his father, shows that Pedro
was lying and proves that he did not appreciate the meaning of an oath at all.
3

Again, this contention is without merit, Pedro became confused when the trial court ordered
that the original question be reformed. Pedro's confusion is apparent from the fact that
when asked the third time, he affirmed his first answer,
Q. Isn't it that your uncle threatened you with bodily
harm if you will not give statement before the police?
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. But later you actually went with your uncle to the
police because you were threatened by him with
bodily harm if you will not follow him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is it true that your uncle threatened you with
bodily harm if you will not give statement to the
police?
A. No, sir. (tsn., pp. 6, 7, Nov. 12, 1976)
Appellant next lists the following alleged inconsistencies to discredit the testimony of Pedro.
First, Pedro testified on direct examination that his mother died in the evening of December
3. while on cross-examination he said that she died in the morning of December 4. It must be
noted that he affirmed twice during cross-examination that his mother died on December 3,
just as he had testified during direct examination. Significantly, he did not mention December
4 as the date when she died, as appellant would make it appear. Pedro merely answered
'yes' to the question "And isn't it that your mother died in the early morning on that day
(December 4) and not on the evening of December 3?"
4
Thus, Pedro's answer could have
resulted only from a misapprehension of the a question, and for no other reason.
Second, appellant alleges that Pedro testified on direct examination that he saw appellant
leave the house to get a hammock after strangling the victim and then came back the
following morning. However, upon cross-examination, Pedro testified that appellant left at
noon or in the afternoon of December 4. Moreover, Pedro allegedly testified on re-direct
that he saw appellant sleep beside the dead body of his mother. Again Pedro
misapprehended the question propounded to him. Ajudicious reading of the transcript will
bear this out:
Q. When did your father leave to get the hammock?
A. In the afternoon.
Q. That may be when the body was brought to
Talisay. When your father, rather, when you said that
your father left to get a hammock so that your
mother may be brought to Tigbinan what time was
that?
A. About 12:00 o'clock noon. (Tsn, p. 16, Nov. 12,
1976)
One may discern that the court itself noticed that there was a missapprehension when it
commented "that maybe when the body was brought to Talisay" after Pedro answered "In
the afternoon". When Pedro answered "about 12:00 noon' he must have been referring to
the time when appellant carried his dead wife to Tigbinan. It must be noted that the question
was so worded that it could have misled Pedro to think that what was being asked was the
time when appellant brought his dead wife to Tigbinan. In fact, there is nothing inconsistent
with Pedro's testimony that he saw his father leave in the evening of December 3 and again
saw him asleep and thus not noticed appellant's coming back after securing a hammock and
sleeping beside the deceased. Pedro was therefore telling the truth when he said that, upon
waking up, he saw his father sleeping beside his dead mother. By then, appellant had already
returned with the hammock.
Third, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that the corpse was carried to Tigbinan
in the morning of December 4, while on cross-examination, he said it was in the evening.
5
It
must be pointed out that Pedro merely answered "yes" to a question purportedly
mentioning the time when the victim's body was transferred to Tigbinan. The question is as
follows: "The corpse of your mother was brought to the Tigbinan proper when the vigil was
had in the evening of December 4, is that right?" It is to be noted that the question's thrust is
whether or not the victim's body was brought to Tigbinan. The time it was brought was
merely incidental. Thus, Pedro may not have paid attention to the part of the question
involving time. Moreover, the phrase "in the evening" may have referred either to the time
of transport of the body or to the vigil, which could have definitely confused Pedro.
Fourth, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that he, together with his brothers
and sister, kept vigil beside their mother's dead body that night, while on cross-examination,
he testified that they just kept lying down and pretended to sleep.
6
There is nothing
inconsistent here. The children could have kept vigil while lying down with their deceased
mother.
Appellant further cites other alleged improbabilities to discredit Pedro's testimony. Appellant
contends that it was improbable for Pedro to have seen the attack on his mother since he
testified that the room was dimly lighted, and that, while the attach was going on, he closed
his eyes pretending to sleep.
7
This contention is without merit. Even though the room was
dimly lighted, Pedro was only two (2) meters away from his parents; thus, he could easily
see, as he saw, the attack on his mother.
8
Also, although he pretended to be asleep, it was
unlikely that he kept his eyes closed all the while, as he was aware that a fight was going on.
Rather, it was to be expected that he had his eyes open and, thus, he saw the heinous crime
unfold and ultimately consumated.
Appellant alleges that he does not believe that it was fear of him that caused the delay in
Pedro's divulging the real cause of his mother's death until 10 December 1974. According to
appellant, such fear could no longer have influenced Pedro from December 6, the date he
started to live separately from him. This contention is untenable. Even though Pedro started
to live separately from his father from December 6, it cannot be said that the influence of
appellant's threat suddenly ceased from that time. It must be noted that Pedro was young
and was still very much under appellant's influence and control. The thought and memory of
his father's viciousness were still too fresh even after three days from his mother's death.
The fear that he too could be killed by appellant in like manner must have deterred him from
divulging the truth earlier.
Appellant also alleges that it was improbable for Pedro to have just watched the killing of his
mother. This contention is untenable. At that moment, when his mother was being assaulted
and strangled, Pedro must have been so shocked as to be rendered immobile and powerless
to do anything. This is a normal reaction in such a situation. Besides, it is a fact of life that
different people react differently to the same types of situations.
9
One cannot overlook that
there is no standard form of behaviour when one is confronted by a shocking occurrence.
10

Appellant next alleges that since the prosecution has failed without satisfactory explanation
to present Pedro's brother Alex who is alleged to be also an eyewitness to the killing of the
victim, it is presumed that Alex's testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if
presented. This contention is without merit. First, Alex, who is younger than Pedro by 3
years, may not have been competent to testify due to his tender age. Second, even assuming
that he was competent to testify, his testimony could be merely corroborative.
Corroboration is not necessary in this case because the details of the crime have already
been testified to by Pedro with sufficient clarity. The failure to present all the eyewitnesses
to an act does not necessarily give rise to an unfavorable presumption, especially when the
testimony of the witness sought to be presented is merely corroborative.
11
Witnesses are to
be weighed, not numbered, and it is a well established rule that the testimony of a single
witness, even if uncorroborated, but positive and credible, is sufficient to support a
conviction.
12
In any event, it is not for the appellant to say how many witnesses the
prosecution should have presented.
13

The inconsistencies magnified by appellant in the testimony of Pedro Salufrania have been
satisfactorily explained. In fact, some of them are not material since they neither touch upon
the manner of death of the victim nor question the identity of the killer, both of which were
unwaveringly testified upon by Pedro. Thus, with the alleged inconsistencies and
improbabilities explained away, Pedro's testimony remains unperturbed. Even if there were
discrepancies, such discrepancies were minor and may be considered as earmarks of
verisimilitude.
14

The trial court's assessment of Pedro's testimony, as quoted hereunder, deserves more than
passing consideration:
... The testimony of eye-witness Pedro Salufrania, 13-year old son of the
victim Marciana Abuyo and her killer-spouse Filomeno Salufrania,
appears to be very clear, convincing and truthful. It is vivid as to the
details of the horrible occurence that took place at about 6:00 o'clock in
the evening of December 3, 1974 in their small house at a far away sitio
of Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte, resulting in the untimely and cruel
death of her (sic) mother. He and his brother Alex were the only
eyewitnesses to the gory crime committed by their father. The credibility
of this witness (Pedro Salufrania) and his testimony was invested when,
despite rigid cross-examination, the veracity of his testimony in chief was
not impeached. He remained firm and on the verge of crying, when he
pointed an accusing finger at his father during the trial. He was unshaken
notwithstanding a long and detailed cross-examination. And, there is
reason to bestow complete credence to his testimony because he had
the opportunity to closely observe how his father had deliberately and
cruelly ended the life of his mother. Despite his tender age and apparent
childish innocence, this Court believes that he can clearly perceive and
perceiving, make known his perception, precluding the possibility of
coaching or tutoring by someone. His declaration as to when, where and
how the horrible incident complained of happened is the believable
version.
15

Appellant questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an expert witness, since this is the
first time that the doctor conducted an autopsy on a cadaver which had been buried for
about a week. It must be noted, however, that although this was the doctor's first autopsy
under circumstances present in this case, he had, however, conducted similar post-
mortem examinations on ten (10) other occasions. This would constitute sufficient
experience. Significantly, appellant did not object to the doctor's expression of medical
opinions during the trial. Being an expert in his field, the doctor is presumed to have taken all
pertinent factors into consideration with regard to the autopsy, including embalming and the
state of the cadaver's decomposition. Dr. Juan Dyquiangco Jr., was a disinterested witness in
the case, and a reputable public official in whose favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties must be applied.
Appellant further alleges that the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of Pedro
Salufrania do not tally. Suffice it to say that the Court finds no inconsistencies between the
findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and Pedro Salufrania's testimony. Both are consistent on material
points. Thus, the Court sees no reason to disturb the conclusions reached by the trial court
insofar as their credibility and the appellant's guilt are concerned.
Appellant's third assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in discrediting his
evidence simply because the testimonies of the defense witnesses were consistent on
material points. Moreover, there is no showing, according to the appellant, that said
testimonies were rehearsed so as to dovetail with each other.
This contention is without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that appellant did not even
bother to discuss his defense in order to refute the massive evidence against him. This is
tantamount to an admission that he could not adequately support his version of Marciana
Abuyo's death. The trial court's reasons for rejecting the defense version, as hereunder
quoted, are tenable and sound. Thus
On the contrary, the testimonies of defense witnesses Geronimo Villan,
Angeles Liling Balce and the accused Filomeno Salufrania suspiciously
dove-tailed in every detail as to when, where and how .Marciana Abuyo
died at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974, in their house at
sitio Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Carnarines Norte, of stomach pain. On
these points, these witnesses and the accused made statements which
seemed to be very fresh and clear in their minds, despite the lapse of
four long years. Their exact and uniform declarations on these points,
their phenomenal recollections, without sufficient special or uncommon
reason to recall, rendered their testimonies unconvincing. If at all, their
testimonies appeared to this Court to be an eleventh hour concoction.
And, as defense witnesses, after observing them and their declarations
on the witness stand, they appeared to the Court to be untruthful and
unreliable. For, despite the synchronization of time when, the place
where and how the incidence happened, their testimonies on other
material points revealed their tendency to exaggerate and their
propensity to falsehood, thus-Aside from the accused Filomeno
Salufrania, there are three other witnesses for the defense Geronimo
Villan Angeles Liling Balce and Juanita Bragais. There is nothing in the
testimony of Juanito Bragais because he did not witness how and when
Marciana Abuyo died. Francisco Repuya, who was also alleged by
Filomeno Salufrania to be present when Marciana Abuyo died, did not
testify. Accused Filomeno Salufrania never claimed that he summoned
for Angeles Liling Balce. According to him Angeles Liling Balce was not
present during the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo, for she was
fetched by him only after the death of his wife. Logically, therefore, there
is no basis for the presentation of Angeles Liling Balce that she was
present during the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo. She was merely
play-acting. Geronimo Villan who claimed he passed-by the house of
Filomeno Salufrania and saw the latter boiling water with "ikmo" and
garlic, as medicine for his wife Marciana Abuyo, who was about to give
birth was discredited by accused himself who declared he was merely
boiling water for the hot drink of his wife, who was suferring from her old
stomach ailment. In like manner, witness Geronimo Villan discredited the
accused Filomeno Salufrania, about the presence of Francisco Repuya,
who allegedly alternated with Geronimo Villan in applying the native
treatments of 'hilot' and 'bantil' to Marciana Abuyo, when throughout his
testimony he (Geronimo Villan) never mentioned the presence of
Francisco Repuya.
After closely observing defense witnesses Geronimo Villan and Angeles
Liling Balce, this Court is convinced that their testimonies and accounts of
the incident are fabricated, untruthful and not worth of credence.
Certainly, they were not present immediately before and during the
moment of death of Marciana Abuyo. ...
Added to these, there is one scandalous circumstance, which to the mind
of this Court, betrays the guilty conscience of the accused. If there was
nothing revealing in the face of the deceased Marciana Abuyo, why was
her face covered by a piece of cloth by the accused. ...
Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in the
testimony of witnesses. This Court will normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses, in view of its advantage in observing first hand their demeanor in
giving their testimony.
16
Such rule applies in the present case.
Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show
that he had the intention to cause an abortion. In this contention, appellant is correct. He
should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of
the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional
Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or
after having been expelled therefrom.
17

The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion
because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then
strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently
established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of
the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact,
appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an
abortion.
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused
Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that
caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein
accused upon his victim.
It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months
pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her
husband accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together
with the foetus in her womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states
that the accused should be punished with the penalty corresponding to the more serious
came of parricide, to be imposed in its maximum period which is death. However, by reason
of the 1987 Constitution which has abolished the death penalty, appellant should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00
awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30,000.00 in line with
the recent decisions of the Court. With costs against the appellant,
SO ORDERED.
RAPE WITH KIDNAPPING
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
"WESLEY;" ALBERT CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE
RUSIA alias TISOY TAGALOG;" JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG;" and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias "MM," Appellants.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full responsibility over ones
action.
1
Our legal system, for instance, does not punish a youth as it would an adult, and it
sees youthful misconduct as evidence of unreasoned or impaired judgment. Thus, in a myriad
of cases, we have applied the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code -- the rationale of which is to show mercy and some
extent of leniency in favor of an accused who, by reason of his age, is presumed to have
acted with less discernment. The case at bar is another instance when the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority must apply.
For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration
2
filed by brothers James Anthony and
James Andrew, both surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of the penalties we imposed
upon the latter on the ground that he was a minor at the time the crimes were committed.
A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.
On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision
3
convicting the Uy brothers, together with
Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag of
the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape; and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU 45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias
PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias
ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG;and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias
PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias
ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG;and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY who was a
minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of
simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of TWELVE (12) years ofprision mayor in its maximum period,
as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period,
as MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and
Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (c) P150,000.00 as moral
damages; and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that
the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No.
7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellencys pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
On March 23, 2004, the Uy brothers filed a motion for reconsideration anchored on the
following grounds:
I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S.
UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16,
1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU
LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING.
4

The issues raised in the above motion being intertwined with those raised by Larraaga,
Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and Balansag in their separate motions for reconsideration, we
deemed it appropriate to consolidate the motions. After a painstaking evaluation of every
piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in response to the movants
plea for the reversal of their conviction, still we are convinced that the movants guilt has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in our Resolution dated July 21, 2005, we
denied all the motions. However, left unresolved is the issue of James Andrews minority.
Hence, this disquisition.
In their motion, the Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years and
two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed. To
substantiate such claim, he begs leave and pleads that we admit at this stage of the
proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2)
Baptismal Certificate. In the ultimate, he prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of
his brother James Anthony.
Considering that the entry of James Andrews birth in the proffered Certificate of Live Birth is
not legible, we required the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the City Civil Registrar of
Cotobato, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James
Certificate of Live Birth, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the Uy brothers
motion, solely on the issue of James Andrews minority.
On November 17, 2005, the Solicitor General submitted his comment. Attached therewith
are clear and legible copies of James Certificate of Live Birth duly certified by the Office of
the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato and the National Statistics Office. Both documents bear
the entry October 27, 1979 as the date of his birth, thus, showing that he was indeed only 17
years and 262 days old when the crimes were committed on July 16, 1997.
Consequently, the Solicitor General recommended that the penalty imposed on James
Andrew be modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape, the death penalty should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, for the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be reduced to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum, similar to the penalty imposed on his brother
James Anthony in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.
The motion is meritorious.
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of
the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
x x x
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is one degree lower
than the statutory penalty. The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom
is reclusion perpetua.
5
On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious
illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion
temporal.
6
There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be
imposed on James Andrew is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
7

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed upon James Andrew; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the imposable penalty
upon him is twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our Decision dated
February 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303,
James Andrew Uy is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal
Case No. CBU-45304, the penalty of twelve (12) years ofprision mayor in its maximum period,
as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. ELVIE EJANDRA
PER CURIAM:
This is a review on automatic appeal of the Decision
1
of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 219, convicting appellants Elvie Ejandra, Magdalena Calunod, Edwin Tampos and Roel
Revilla of kidnapping for ransom, and sentencing them to suffer the death penalty.
The Indictment
The accused were charged of kidnapping for ransom in an Information filed in the Regional
Trial Court which reads:
That on or about July 2, 1997, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, while confederating, conniving,
conspiring, and helping each and one another, did then and there with the use of
force, threat and intimidation, take and carry away, a nine-year-old minor child, Ed
Henderson Tan, against the will and consent of the latter nor any of his natural and
legal parents or guardian, to an unknown destination, detain, hold and control Ed
Henderson Tan depriving him of his liberty, and during their control and custody of
Ed Henderson Tan, call, demand and negotiate the payment of ransom money from
Eddie Tan, the father of Ed Henderson Tan, for the safe release and return of the
victim Ed Henderson, otherwise, the victim would be harmed or killed, the victims
father Eddie Tan actually paid the accused the amount of P548,000.00 as ransom
money, for the safe release of the victim to the damage and prejudice of the victim
Ed Henderson Tan and his father Eddie Tan.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2

The accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned for the crime charged on November 11,
1997, and entered their respective pleas of not guilty.
The Evidence for the Prosecution
Ed Henderson Tan, the nine-year old son of the spouses Eddie and Marileen Tan, was a Grade
III student at the Philippine Institute of Quezon City, located at Kitanlad, Quezon City.
3
At
about 4:00 p.m. on July 2, 1997, Ed Henderson was dismissed from his classes and proceeded
to the nearby house of his tutor in Chinese language, Huang Lao Shih.
4
Ed Henderson and his
father, Eddie Tan, had earlier agreed that after the tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m., Ed
Henderson would phone his father, who would then fetch him from his mentors house.
5
The
tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m., as scheduled, and Ed Henderson then proceeded to the
store near the gate of the school to have his periodic test papers photocopied.
6
He left the
store and was on his way back to the house of his tutor to wait for his father.
Suddenly, Ed Tampos, armed with a revolver (de bola),
7
chased and overtook Ed Henderson
at the Royalty canteen near the school.
8
Tampos ordered the boy to proceed to a motorcyle
parked nearby and warned the latter that if he refused, he would be shot. Petrified, Ed
Henderson approached the motorcycle where appellants Elvie Ejandra and Roel Revilla were
waiting. Ejandra had no legs (pilay), while Revilla had curly hair. There was no lamp post
outside the school premises but the lights inside the school were still on.
9
Ejandra covered Ed
Hendersons mouth with his hand, pointed his gun at the boy
10
and warned the latter not to
shout.
11
Revilla boarded the motorcycle and took the drivers seat. Ejandra sat behind him,
and Tampos sat behind Ejandra. Tampos ordered Ed Henderson to board the motorcyle, or
else, he would be shot.
12
The boy was then ordered to sit behind Tampos.
13

Ed was brought to a one-storey house with cemented flooring and white-colored
walls.
14
Once inside, he saw a man who was drinking, who turned out to be Antonio Huera,
and a female, who turned out to be Magdalena Calunod.
15
Ed Henderson also saw a cell
phone.
16
The was ordered to write down his fathers telephone number, as well as that of
their house and their store.
17
Ed Henderson did as he was told, and wrote down the number
737-61-77 the telephone number of his father, Eddie Tan. It appeared to the boy that Ejandra
was the leader of his abductors because it was he who gave orders to the others.
In the meantime, Eddie went to fetch his son at 7:00 p.m. at his tutors house, but the boy
was nowhere to be found.
18
Frantic, Eddie contacted his friends and relatives and asked if
they knew where his son was, to no avail. He even called up hospitals, inquiring if a boy
named Ed Henderson had been admitted as a patient.
19
Shortly after midnight, Eddie
received a call from his house that someone had called earlier up his mother, Benita Tan,
with the information that his son had been kidnapped
20
and that the kidnappers wanted to
talk to the parents.
21
Eddie rushed back home.
At 12:30 a.m., Eddie received a call through his home phone, informing him that his son had
been kidnapped. The caller demanded P10,000,000 for the safe release of his son.
22
When
Eddie informed the caller that he did not have P10,000,000, the latter hung up the phone.
23

In the meantime, as ordered by Ejandra, Ed Henderson called up his father, through the
kidnappers cell phone, to urge his father to pay the ransom money.
24

Thereafter, Eddie received several calls threatening him that if he refused to pay the ransom
they demanded, the kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons ear and finger, and thereafter kill
the boy and dump his body in an isolated place. Eddie pleaded for mercy but the caller would
simply hang up the telephone.
25

Eddie and his family were terrified of the callers threats that they could hardly sleep. They
lost their appetite just thinking of what Ed Henderson would suffer in the hands of his
kidnappers.
26
At 6:00 p.m. on July 3, 1997, a Sunday, Eddie received another call informing
him that the kidnappers had agreed to reduce the ransom toP5,000,000.
27
Eddie told the
caller that he did not have P5,000,000 and pleaded that the ransom be reduced. However,
the caller merely repeated his threat that the kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons fingers
and ears, and dump the boy in an isolated place.
28

Meanwhile, Eddie began borrowing money from his relatives and friends. He received
another call reiterating the demand for ransom. He told the caller that he would try to
raise P585,000 but the caller told Eddie to raiseP600,000. Eddie was finally able to
borrow P548,000 from his relatives and friends. When the caller called anew, Eddie revealed
that he was able to raise only P548,000 and reiterated that he could no longer borrow any
additional amount.
29

At 10:00 a.m. the next day, July 4, 1997, another call from the kidnappers came through, and
Eddie reiterated that he could no longer raise any additional amount. The caller hung up, but
called again and informed Eddie that the kidnappers had agreed to accept a ransom
of P548,000.00.
30
At about noon, the caller contacted Eddie and instructed him to place the
money in a newspaper and to bring the money to the parking lot in front of the Sto. Domingo
Church in Quezon City within ten minutes. The caller further instructed Eddie to open the
doors and windows of his car upon arriving at the designated spot. Eddie was also told that a
man would approach him and call him "Eddie."
Eddie did as he was told.
31
He placed the money in a newspaper and placed it in a Shoe Mart
(SM) plastic bag.
32
He then proceeded to the designated place on board his Besta van. He
parked the van in the parking lot in front of the convent adjacent to the Sto. Domingo
Church.
33
He opened the doors and windows, then alighted from the car. Momentarily,
appellant Calunod approached Eddie and called out, "EddieaEddie." Eddie noted that
Calunod had a scar on her right temple. Eddie was taken aback because he was expecting a
man to approach him. Nevertheless, when he heard Calunod say "Eddie," he handed over the
plastic bag which contained the money.
34
He asked her how his son was,
35
she told him not
to worry because she would bring the boy home. Calunod then walked to the gate of the
Santo Domingo Church.
36
Eddie went home to wait for his sons return. Shortly after his
arrival at their house, Eddie received two telephone calls from a male and a female,
respectively, who informed him of his sons impending release.
Between 3:20 to 3:30 p.m. of July 4, 1997, Ed Henderson was told that he would be brought
back home.
37
The boy then called up his mother and told her that he would be back soon.
Tampos and Calunod boarded Ed Henderson in a taxi. Calunod ordered the boy to pretend
that she was his aunt.
38
Ed recalled that it was also Calunod who took care of him and gave
him food in the house where he was detained.
39
The taxi stopped near the Imperial
Drugstore at E. Rodriguez Avenue, where Calunod instructed Ed Henderson to get down. She
gave the boy P50.00 for his fare back home. The boy took a taxi and was soon reunited with
his waiting family.
On July 7, 1997, Ed Henderson gave a sworn statement to PO3 Terencio Claudio of the
Criminal Investigation Division in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
40
He was shown photographs of
suspects of kidnappings and he identified, from the pictures shown to him, Elvie Ejandra alias
Alejandro Ejandra and Magdalena Calunod
41
as two of his kidnappers.
The Case for the Accused
Edwin Tampos denied any involvement in the kidnapping of Ed Henderson, and invoked alibi
as an additional defense. He claimed that the first time he met Elvie Ejandra and Magdalena
Calunod was in Camp Crame, Quezon City, after he was arrested, with Roel Revilla, on board
the latters tricycle at 10:00 p.m. on August 13, 1997. He knew Antonio Huera, who lived in
the same place and solicited bets for "ending." He also knew Roel Revilla, who was a tricycle
driver. Tampos claimed that he was arrested without any warrant therefor, and that he was
handcuffed, mauled and blindfolded. He was asked if he was a kidnapper, denied that he was
one and was forced to sign a piece of paper. He testified that he eked out a living as a
butcher of pigs at Villa Beatriz, Old Balara, Quezon City. He sold the butchered pigs three
times a week within the neighborhood. His aunt, Biba Oray, financed his business.
42
Tampos
also averred that he owned three fighting cocks.
43

Tampos claimed that on July 2, 1997, he was so tired of butchering pigs and opted to stay
home the whole day and night. At 10:00 p.m., he went out of his house and bought
cigarettes.
44
He returned home immediately thereafter and slept.
45
He and his aunt made
plans to buy pigs to be butchered. He was also at home the following day, July 4, 1997,
tending to his three fighting cocks.
46

Roel Revilla, likewise, denied any involvement in the kidnapping of Ed Henderson and also
interposed an alibi. He testified that he arrived from Sogus, Southern Leyte on August 5,
1997 and stayed in the house of Antonio Huera, his brothers friend at Villa Beatriz, Old
Balara, Quezon City. Huera worked at the Tarpark and promised that he would help Revilla
get a job there.
47
He was arrested on August 13, 1998 by the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC) agents, along with Huera and Tampos. They were brought to Camp
Crame, Quezon City, where they were blindfolded, mauled and tortured. He was asked if he
was a kidnapper, but he denied any involvement in the incident. He averred that he did not
know of any reason why Ed Henderson would implicate him in the kidnapping.
Magdalena Calunod denied any involvement in the crime charged. She testified that she was
thirty-five-year-old businesswoman from Iligan City. She had a stall in Manggahan in 1994,
but the same was demolished in 1995. She returned to Iligan City and tended fighting cocks
from 1995 to 1997.
48
In August 1997, she was residing in a rented house at Bidasari, Lagro
Subdivision, Quezon City. Sometime on August 14, 1998, she and Ejandra were on their way
to Nueva Ecija when policemen blocked their vehicle. She, at first, thought that the men
were hold-uppers because they were divested of their money, pieces of jewelry and clothes.
The policemen were not armed with any warrant of arrest. She admitted that she had been
charged of kidnapping in another case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on August
10, 1997.
Elvie Ejandra also denied any involvement in the kidnapping of Henderson. Like the other
accused, he interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that he and Magdalena Calunod
were married.
49
Since 1994, he had been engaged in the business of onions and ready-to-
wear clothes which they sold in Baclaran and Divisoria. They also had a stall in Manggahan
where they sold onions.
50
When their stall was demolished in 1994, they went back to Iligan
City.
51
On July 2, 1993, he and Calunod were in Iligan City tending fighting cocks. They
returned to Quezon City from Iligan City only on July 9 or July 10, 1997.
52
They were arrested
on August 14, 1997 by policemen while they were on their way to Sicsican, Nueva Ecija.
When he was arrested, he had a drivers license in the name of Bebot Suangco.
53
He averred
that he did not have any cell phone, but had a car with plate no. 413.
54

Antonio Huera also denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that
he was employed by the Car Parts Manufacturing as a power press operator.
55
However,
when his employment was terminated on June 25, 1997, he became a collector of bets for
"ending."
56
On July 27, 1997, he was in the house of his uncle, which was a stones throw
away from his own house at No. 7, Don Fabian Street, Villa Beatriz Subdivision, Old Balara,
Quezon City.
57
His grandfather died that day in Southern Leyte
58
and was later buried on July
3, 1997.
59
Roel Revilla spent the night in his house when he arrived from Southern
Leyte.
60
Huera also admitted that Elvie Ejandra was his classmate in high school, who visited
him on August 5, 1997.
61
He was arrested at 5:30 a.m. of August 14, 1997 at his house, on the
mere suspicion that he was a kidnapper. He and two others were brought to Camp Crame,
Quezon City, where he was beaten and maltreated.
On June 4, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of kidnapping for
ransom defined and penalized in Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced each
of them to suffer the death penalty. Antonio Huera, was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence, The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Edwin Tampos, Elvie Ejandra, Magdalena Calunod,
and Roel Revilla GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
ransom, the court hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH;
to pay the victim, Ed Henderson Tan and his family, the amount ofP548,000.00 as
actual damages with legal interest until fully paid, and P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages; and to pay the costs.
Accused Antonio Huera is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The
Warden of Quezon City Jail is hereby ordered to release him from custody unless
he is being detained for another charge or unlawful case.
SO ORDERED.
62

The Present Appeal
Appellants Ejandra and Calunod do not dispute that they kidnapped Ed Henderson. They
merely assert that the prosecution failed to prove that they had a cellular phone, implying
that they could not have used it to demand ransom for the victims release. It was their
daughter, Sherry Mae Saliot who was the subscriber to telephone number 490-55-95. They
also assert that they were arrested without any warrant therefor.
63

For their part, appellants Tampos and Revilla contend that the trial court erred in not
acquitting them of the crime charged on reasonable doubt.
64
They aver that Ed Henderson
could not have recognized them as two of those who kidnapped him at 7:00 p.m. on July 2,
1997 in the vicinity of the Philippine Institute of Quezon City, because the place was dark.
They assert that it was physically impossible for four people to ride on a motorcycle. The
appellants aver that Ed Hendersons testimony is unreliable, as police officers coached him
and taught him what to say during a confrontation between him and the suspects in Camp
Crame, Quezon City.
Appellant Revilla posits that the boy could have mistaken him for Tito Lozada with whom the
appellants were when they were arrested. He argues that he merely stayed in the house of
Huera and since the latter was acquitted, he should also be acquitted. Appellant Revilla
insists that his extrajudicial confession is not admissible in evidence against him because he
was forced by policemen into signing the same. He argues that the trial court erred in not
considering his alibi, that on July 7, 1997 he was in Sogus, Southern Leyte. Appellant Tampos
further alleges that it was unlikely that he would be involved in the kidnapping because he
was engaged in the lucrative business of being a butcher and meat vendor. He asserted that
he was forced into signing a piece of paper in Camp Crame; hence, the said paper is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that in failing to assail any irregularity
in their arrest before they were arraigned for the crime charged on November 11, 1993, the
appellants thereby waived their right to do so. The appellants even failed to file their
respective counter-affidavits during the preliminary investigation of the charge against them
at the Department of Justice. Moreover, the prosecution adduced overwhelming evidence to
prove the crime charged that the appellants were the perpetrators of the said crime.
The contentions of the appellants do not persuade. Ed Henderson positively and in a
straightforward manner testified that appellant Tampos was the one who chased and
grabbed him near his school, and that it was appellant Revilla who drove the motorcycle
from the school to the house where he was detained. Ed Henderson was able to recognize
the two appellants because the lights inside the Philippine Institute illuminated the place
where he was chased and grabbed by appellant Tampos. The victim even noticed that
appellant Revilla, who drove the motorcycle, had curly hair. Appellant Tampos was so close
to Ed Henderson, as it was he who poked the gun at the boy, and even warned the latter that
he would be shot if he refused to board the motorcycle. The testimony of Ed Henderson
pointing to appellants Tampos and Revilla as two of his kidnappers near the Philippine
Institute of Quezon City, reads:
ATTY. CHUA:
Q What were you doing when you were kidnapped?
A I have something xeroxed, sir.
Q Can you tell this court how you were "nahuli"?
A When I finished xeroxing something, I was running and then
somebody chased me, sir.
Q Who was the one chasing you?
A "Yung humuli sa akin."
Q If he is in court, will you please step down from the witness stand and point him
to us?
A Yes, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness stepping down from the witness stand and proceed to a man wearing
yellow T-shirt who when asked to identify himself he gave his name as Edwin
Tampos.
ATTY. CHUA:
Q After this man whom you pointed to, caught you, what did you do?
A He showed me a gun, sir.
Q After he showed you a gun, what did you do?
A He told me "sakay."
Q Where?
A In a motorcycle, sir.
65


ATTY. ROUS:
Q Mr. Witness, who was the one driving the motorcycle?
A The person with curly hair, sir.
Q Where were you seated when you were boarded
ATTY. CHUA:
At what point in time because he rode the motorcycle twice, Your Honor.
ATTY. ROUS:
Q When you were taken from your school, who was the person driving?
A The person with curly hair, sir.
Q When you were taken from your school, where were you seated in the
motorcycle?
A I was positioned "sa pangatlo" sir.
Q What do you mean by "pangatlo"?
A The first one in the motorcycle was the driver, the curly hair, the second one is
Edwin Tampos and I was on the third part.
Q What was the color of this motorcycle?
A Red, sir.
66

Moreover, Ed Henderson was with appellants Revilla and Tampos when they reached the
house where the boy was detained. The lights inside the house were on and Ed Henderson,
saw the appellants Revilla and Tampos at close range. The victim, likewise, identified
appellant Tampos when the latter and Calunod boarded him in a motorcycle in broad
daylight in the afternoon of July 4, 1997. Tampos and Calunod brought the boy to the
Imperial Drugstore at E. Rodriguez Avenue where he boarded a taxicab that brought him
home. Ed Hendersons testimony on this matter is quoted, viz:
Q You said you were able to go home. Do you recall what date they released you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What date was that?
A July 4, 1997, sir.
Q Around what time were you released?
A In the afternoon, sir.
Q How were you able to go home?
A At first they load me in a motorcycle and they hailed me a taxicab, sir.
Q Who were with you in the motorcycle?
A Edwin Tampos and the female, sir.
Q What happened after the female called the taxicab?
A She told me to pretend that she is my aunt and afterwards, she gave
me P50.00.
67

Finally, appellants Revilla and Tampos were identified by Ed Henderson in open court,
pointing to both of them as two of his kidnappers.
It bears stressing that Ed Henderson was only nine years old and in Grade III when he was
kidnapped. In People vs. Bisda, et al.,
68
the kidnap victim Angela was barely six years old
when she testified. We held that, considering her tender years, innocent and guileless, it is
incredible that she would testify falsely that the appellants took her from the school through
threats and detained her in the "dirty house" for five days. Thus, testimonies of child victims
are given full weight and credit.
The testimony of children of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that
of older persons.
69
InPeople vs. Alba,
70
this Court ruled that children of sound mind are likely
to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and
their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons.
In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of Ed Henderson credible and entitled
to full probative weight. Well settled is the rule that the findings of facts of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the credibility of the said
witnesses and its evidence based on the said findings are given high respect if not conclusive
effect by the appellate court, unless the trial court overlooked, misconstrued or
misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the
outcome of the case.
71
We have meticulously reviewed the records and find no justification
to deviate from the findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of Ed
Henderson and the veracity and probative weight of his testimony.
The appellants denials and alibi, which are merely self-serving evidence cannot prevail over
the positive, consistent and straightforward testimony of Ed Henderson.
72
Alibi is an
inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.
73
To merit
approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place
other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was
committed.
74
Appellants Revilla and Tampos failed to prove their alibi. They relied merely
and solely on their bare and dubious testimonies to prove their defense. Appellant Revilla,
likewise, failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove exactly when he left Sogus,
Southern Leyte, via a domestic vessel and the time and date of his arrival in Manila.
The acquittal of Huera on reasonable doubt is not a ground for the acquittal of appellant
Revilla. As gleaned from the trial courts decision, Huera was acquitted on reasonable doubt
because the only evidence against him was the testimony of Ed Henderson, that when he
and his kidnappers arrived in the house where the latter was thereafter detained, he saw
Huera drinking. There is no evidence against Huera relating to the boys detention and his
release on July 4, 1997. There is even no evidence that Huera was in the house when Ed
Henderson was detained on July 3 and 4, 1997.
Contrary to the assertion of the appellants, it is not physically impossible for four people to
ride on a motorcycle, taking into account the sizes and weights of the riders. Ed Henderson
was, after all, only nine years old at that time.
The Court also rejects appellant Tampos plea that the Court take discretionary judicial notice
that the business of butchering pigs and selling their meat is, by nature, a lucrative business.
The appellant was burdened to prove his claim that he was so affluent that it was incredible
for him to indulge in kidnapping for ransom. The appellant failed to do so, and merely relied
on his bare testimony. There is no evidence how much the appellant earned from the
business he was allegedly engaged in. In contrast, the appellants collected P548,000.00 by
way of ransom from Eddie Tan for the kidnapping of his son.
The fact that the cell phone used by the kidnappers to demand ransom was owned by Sherry
Mae Saliot, the daughter of appellants Ejandra and Calunod, does not constitute evidence
that the said appellants could not have used the said cell phone to demand ransom from
Eddie Tan. Sherry Mae Saliot could have just given the cell phone to her parents for their use,
while she paid for the charges thereon.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the appellants Ejandra and Calunod
waived any irregularities relating to their warrantless arrest when they failed to file a motion
to quash the Information on that ground, or to object to any irregularity in their arrest before
they were arraigned. They are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest.
75

In People vs. Bisda,
76
we had the occasion to state:
In People v. Pagalasan, this Court held that conspiracy need not be proven by
direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during
and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a
common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once
found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished unless abandoned or
broken up. To hold accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to
the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely
engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are,
in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily
liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively
from that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v.
Andolscheck, "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he
takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common
purposes as he understands them.
In the case at bar, the overt acts of the appellants were so coordinated to attain a common
purpose: that of kidnapping and detaining Ed Henderson for ransom. Appellants Ejandra,
Tampos and Revilla abducted the victim. Appellant Revilla drove the motorcycle from the
place of abduction to the house where the victim was detained. Appellant Calunod guarded
the victim during the latters detention, and later brought the victim to E. Rodriguez Avenue
in Quezon City prior to his release, along with appellant Tampos. Appellant Calunod also
collected the ransom from the victims father. All the foregoing facts indubitably show that
the appellants conspired to kidnap the victim for ransom.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none
of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
77

For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is
burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the
offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives
the latter of h is liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping
or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and serious illegal
detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is immaterial.
78

To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt:
(a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation
of the victim of his liberty; and, (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or
other person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is
a qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before, during
and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim.
79
Neither actual demand for nor actual
payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed.
80
Ransom as employed in the
law is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of
value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained
person, a payment that releases from captivity.
81
It may include benefits not necessarily
pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victims release.
82

In this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom for the release of
the victim. The trial court correctly sentenced the appellants to death. However, the trial
court erred in failing to order the appellants to pay, jointly and severally, to Ed Henderson,
his parents Eddie and Marileen Tan the amount of P485,000.00 as actual damages and the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages. Under Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code,
the principals are jointly and severally liable for the civil liabilities arising from the delict.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that Rep. Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in
the case at bar.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 219, convicting appellants Elvie Ejandra alias Elvies Ejandra alias Bebot
Ejandra alias Bebot Ocay Suangco, Magdalena Calunod y Maganoy alias Magdalena Saliot-
Suangco, Roel Ceron Revilla and Edwin Tampos y Amparo of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, sentencing each of them to suffer the
death penalty is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The aforementioned appellants
areORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, to the victim Ed Henderson Tan and his
parents P350,000 as moral damages, and to pay, jointly and severally, to the Spouses Eddie
and Marileen Tan, the amount of P485,000 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this Decision, to
the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.