Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 Gilbert Rozman

Chinas changing images of

Japan, 19892001: the struggle
to balance partnership and
rivalry
Gilbert Rozman
Department of Sociology, 149 Wallace Hall, Princeton University,
Princeton, NJ 08544, USA. Email: grozman@princeton.edu
Abstract
Chinese views of Japan, both official and popular, grew more negative after
the end of the cold war. From 1989 to 1993 the Japanese side bears much
of the blame for failing to overcome the distrust of the Chinese people. When
the major deterioration in Japans image occurred from 1994 to 1998,
however, it was Chinas leadership that was chiefly responsible, arousing
nationalist emotions. When Chinas leaders sought to reverse this process
from 1999 to 2001 they were unsuccessful both because of the intensity of
public emotions and the lack of reassurance from the Japanese leadership
and public. Divisions inside China reveal the hesitation of leaders to foster a
realistic image of Japan. By tracing the content of changing Chinese
perceptions, we can observe the effects of overconfidence and insensitivity in
each state and recognize the difficulty at times of uncertain national identity
of finding a coordinated strategy for expanding mutual trust.
1 Introduction
Japans significance for China after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been
second only to that of the United States. On the one hand, Japan ranks as one
of two top economic partners, the prime source of developmental assistance,
and the main sponsor of the regionalism desired by the Chinese government.
On the other, it is a rival, whose history provides the greatest legitimacy for
Chinese nationalism, whose regional leadership aspirations raise the most
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 2 (2002) 95129
Oxford University Press and the Japan Association of International Relations 2002
alarm, and whose alliance with the United States blocks Chinas plans.
Through publications and interviews one can detect changing and clashing
views on Japan.
1
Since the two debates over the Soviet Union from 1978 into
the mid-1980s and again in the transition to Russia in the first years of the
1990s, perhaps no debate on another country has had such importance for
Chinas foreign options as the 19992001 debate on Japan.
2
This paper
reviews Chinese reasoning on Japan and its impact on the Chinese public, first
dividing the past twelve years into three periods and then summing up the strug-
gle between clashing viewpoints that can be surmised from available sources.
Chinese views of Japan figure importantly in Japanese and Chinese efforts
to manage bilateral relations. In 2000 Prime Minister Zhu Rongji explained
to the Japanese people that although the Chinese government, in order to
improve relations, was pressing ahead with smile diplomacy, Chinese public
opinion was sceptical (Sentaku, 2000). While promising that the government
would work hard to convince a recalcitrant public, he urged the Japanese
side also to do more to persuade it. The Japanese right, too, warned that the
Chinese public held negative views of Japan, but the explanation was differ-
ent: instead of Japan bearing some responsibility and needing to appeal to
it, blame was placed fully on the Chinese leadership for stirring up the
people. These critics assume that the leadership, on its own, can turn things
around (Ko, 2000). In fact, a large body of China specialists on Japan and
international affairs operate between the oft-aroused sentiments of the pub-
lic and the public posturing of high leaders. While their writings necessarily
mirror the latest official instructions, varying themes and nuances suggest
that a divergence exists.
3
By scrutinizing these writings, we can improve our
understanding of when and why the Chinese have become more critical and
96 Gilbert Rozman
1 The research for this paper is drawn from three sources: (i) articles and books in Chinese gathered
over the course of a decade, often during visits to Chinese institutes such as the Institute of Japan
and the Asia-Pacific Institute, both at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and others in the
North-east provinces; (ii) articles and books in Japanese that report on Chinese views, many
available through newspapers and bookstores and others gathered with the generous assistance of
Iwaki Shigeyuki; and (iii) interviews at intervals of 12 years with Chinese specialists on Japan.
2 At the turn of each decade over the past half-century a debate has unfolded in China on
international relations. Around 1960 it led Mao to turn against the Soviet Union, in 197071 it
meant favoring the United States over the Soviet Union, a decade later equidistance between the
two superpowers was chosen, at the start of the 1990s Chinese decided on the meaning of the
Soviet decline and collapse, and now, although the focus is on the continued rise of the United
States, another interesting question has become Japans place as a partner huoban or rival
duishou. Never has Japan been more central to Chinese debates on foreign policy.
3 As in an earlier examination (Rozman, 1987) of Chinese writings on the Soviet Union, I treat the
apparent message in published sources on sensitive themes as a reflection of the official position,
while searching in secondary or hidden messages for signs of differences of opinion. Sometimes
divergent views are openly admitted, notably after a change in policy. References to China
refer to the official position. Views of the Chinese people come from opinion surveys or secondary
sources, impressionistic but consistent.
outspoken in their views of Japan, and what China and Japan might do to
arrest this trend. Success requires taking into account both the place of
bilateral relations in the worlds great power context and the level of trust
achieved between the two sides.
Since 1999 Chinese officials have kept telling their Japanese counterparts
that even if public opinion was decidedly negative towards Japan, the gov-
ernment was working hard to restrain it. This explanation had merit,
especially after President Jiang Zemins November 1998 visit to Japan had
unleashed an outcry over history in China as well as Japan, and when
Japans new middle school textbooks outraged China in 2001. Over the same
timeframe Japanese officials and writers kept blaming the Chinese govern-
ment for stirring emotions that damaged relations (Rozman, 2001). Given
that governments artful manipulation of nationalism in recent years, this
perspective also had merit. In 2001 the Chinese public was convinced that
rising Japanese nationalism was driving them to anger, while the Japanese
people had largely abandoned hope that under a communist leadership with
its control over news the Chinese could forsake an unbalanced view of them.
We need to assess the relative impact of these two causes as well as explain
the pattern of changing Chinese perceptions.
2 Views of Japan, 19891993
Zhou Enlais support in 1964 for Japanese studies, along with expertise on
other areas, encouraged development of the research centers that later pro-
vided much of the knowledge for Chinas opening to the world. Although
relations were normalized in 1972, it was not until Maos death and the end
of the Cultural Revolution that writings on the success of modernization in
Japan were permitted, and by the end of the 1970s a large number of trans-
lations circulating internally made learning from Japan a serious pursuit. In
the 1980s additional institutes and new journals were established, as the range
of coverage of Japan kept expanding. Of special interest was the internal
journal Riben wenti ziliao, which in its coverage of more sensitive topics and
overview of viewpoints shows how the field evolved (Riben wenti ziliao,
1983).
4
In the 1980s Japan ranked third behind the United States and the
Soviet Union as a priority for study (Rozman, 1985; Shambaugh, 1991), and
on some important themes, e.g. management methods and regional economic
ties, it was clearly the most important.
5
Much of the coverage was positive,
aimed at finding lessons for China.
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 97
4 From the outset this journal detailed the state of Japanese studies in China, including the subjects
covered and those that deserved more attention.
5 See the Shanghai Library monthly journal Quanguo baokan suoyin. Japans coverage rose, in part,
because Chinese writings paid most attention to economic issues, as seen in the titles of articles.
A Shanghai journal reported that in a 1987 survey of 2500 Chinese in
forty cities, the highest number of respondents (31.4%) chose Japan as the
foreign country with the best image, ahead of Western Europe (16.9%), the
United States (8.4%) and the Soviet Union (2.3%). Covering this news,
Yomiuri shimbun (4 April, p. 4) concluded that it proved that bilateral
exchanges were deepening and the bad historical image that China had of
Japan was weakening. Although in the late 1980s there may have been some
hardening of views that gave Japanese experts second thoughts, this survey is
memorable primarily for the false impression it gave the Japanese of what
they needed to do to improve their image in China. Complacency over
Chinese attitudes reinforced growing confidence in their countrys economic
and international success to brush aside vitally needed efforts to satisfy the
concerns of the Chinese people.
On the eve of the Tiananmen demonstrations and repression, a joint sur-
vey with Yomiuri shimbun was published in Riben wenti ziliao, which showed
optimism in China regarding bilateral relations along with a deep reservoir
of distrust. More than 70% of Chinese respondents said that ties political,
economic or cultural would develop very well or quite well over the next
ten years. Nearly 90% said bilateral relations should become closer. Yet,
when asked if they can trust the other, 35% of Chinese said they could not
and another 9% made it emphatic that they could not at all, as opposed to
just 13% and 1% of Japanese respondents asked the same question (Riben
wenti ziliao, 1989). Attitudes were ambivalent, and more affected by history,
than views on the Soviet Union, with which normalization was occurring,
and on the United States, which was again treated as the main threat and
source of peaceful evolution. Japan might have taken such findings to heart
as a warning to strive harder to persuade the Chinese public regarding his-
tory as well as the future.
In 1993 a Japanese translation of Allen Whitings China Eyes Japan showed an
American scholars viewof Chinese perceptions between 1982 and 1987, a time of
intermittent frictions over textbook revisions, visits to the Yasukuni shrine (to the
war dead) and economic problems. Whiting found that between 1984 and 1986,
when Party Secretary Hu Yaobang was advocating closer relations, images were
mostly favorable, despite misperceptions that led to negativism on some themes,
exacerbated by a shift in 1987 after Hu was ousted (Whiting, 1989, pp. 184196).
A full-page Peoples Daily article on relations in the fall of 1985 typified the
upbeat mood (Renmin ribao, 29 October, p. 2). Despite concern over one-sided
criticisms, Japan became excessively hopeful that co-operative leaders would
shape images in a positive direction, in accord with Chinas economic interests.
Throughout the 1980s and well into the 1990s Japan loomed as a rising
power with great significance for Chinas future. It represented a highly suc-
98 Gilbert Rozman
cessful case in which modernization to rival that of the United States had
been applied in East Asia with stunning results, and offered lessons for
Chinas struggle to shed traditional socialism without falling prey to individ-
ualist capitalism. Japan also constituted a generous source of vitally needed
aid and investment, generated by both reassurances of openness and accusa-
tions that aroused guilt. Finally, China viewed Japan as a rising great power
that, for various reasons, some rooted in the past, threatened Chinas ambi-
tions. All three of these images reached a new intensity by 1992. With the
fall of the Soviet Union, the recession in the United States in the midst of
the worldwide rise of regionalism, and Beijings own post-Tiananmen strat-
egy of concentrating on its neighbors, Japan acquired new importance. The
Japanese largely ignored the intensified nationalist rhetoric after Chinas
crackdown on political reformers and the subsequent international condem-
nation, and expected to gain from Chinas greater need for their
co-operation. However, they drew the wrong lessons from a lull in criticism
focused on Japan, while overestimating the positive messages on Japan as
modernization model, economic facilitator, and supporter in regionalism
and balanced great-power relations (Ross, 1996, pp. 18, 24).
6
The image of modernizing Japan as a bridge for China, of course, dates
back to the 1870s. After Deng Xiaoping led China away from both the
Maoist model of incessant class struggle and the Soviet path of centralized
planning, the study of Japan helped to make the case that a new model
could be found that would not have to mirror the individualist type of
capitalism still regarded as anathema. Japans image reinforced the importance
of a superior educational system to exploit modern science and technology
while achieving economic growth; an export-oriented borrowing strategy
that could be compatible with social control; and top-down administrative
guidance that might allow the Communist Party to retain control. All of this
encouraged Chinas leaders to believe that they need not jettison the core of
the countrys system. Various translated writings, by selectivly borrowing
from other works, treated Japans experience as a hybrid of capitalism and
socialism or as an example of Eastern civilization. In the mid-1980s a wave
of urban reform was mooted in China as a way to duplicate Japans eco-
nomic success. Some claimed that socialist and capitalist economies had
much in common, citing Japan as proof for similarities in the role of the
state in managing the economy (Feng Shaokui, 1995, p. 2)
As socialist models for development were fading, Japans role as a teacher
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 99
6 According to Robert Ross, Chinese scholars and journalists were instructed after 4 June 1989 until
1995 not to write negatively about Japan, when Beijing evaluated Japanese foreign policy
favorably. While I find too much negative in Chinas coverage to agree with Ross, he does suggest
the relative softness of writings on Japan for a time.
rose further (Chew, 1991). Although Japans success was soon eclipsed by the
four little dragons, especially Singapore after 1990 and then South Korea,
the shadow of Japans economic miracle remained in the background.
Indeed, the fall of the Soviet Union and the United States success in the
Gulf War brought renewed interest in the need to master high-tech produc-
tion in order to boost comprehensive national power. Following Dengs bold
encouragement to study capitalism and borrow useful ideas, a new wave of
writings on the twentieth anniversary of the 1972 summit touted Japans
lessons (Riben xuekan, 1992). Praise for Japans managerial system equaled
that coming from the West, and the Chinese also applauded human relations
in Japan as relevant to socialisms need to draw on the selfless spirit of
employees as a creative force (Bai, 1991), despite an obligatory concluding
section that many shortcomings existed and would become more evident
(Chen, 1992). Japans example was proof that East Asian modernization was
superior to Western modernization and would bring the rise of Eastern civil-
ization (Kongzi yanju, 1990).
Along with the goal of borrowing to accelerate modernization, the
Chinese created a second image of Japan aimed at promoting a positive
environment for foreign investment and development assistance. The themes
of friendship and shared culture supported this goal. Despite periodic
reminders during the 1980s of the horror of Japans invasion, there was also
discussion of periods of friendship and cultural proximity, raising hopes for
a harmonious future together. A new literature arose appreciative of Japans
unique literature and contemporary social life. Following the 1987 assertion
that China is only at the initial stage of socialism and therefore must borrow
more heavily from capitalist countries even in non-economic spheres, Japans
approach to culture became the subject of a wider debate (Riben wenti ziliao,
1992a, p. 1).
7
The search for the secret of Japans success turned increasingly
to its ability to fuse the modern and the traditional, to borrow from the West
without losing the nations roots in the East (Liu Tianchun, 1994). This
served to boost goodwill. Recognition of Japans growing clout in the world
based on high technology created a thirst for this to be shared with China
(Zheng, 1988). After years of complaining that Japan was largely limiting its
investment to small and medium-sized companies using cheap Chinese labor
in textiles and light industry, in late 1992 the Chinese acknowledged a China
fever among large Japanese firms that were now transferring high technol-
ogy. The authors explained that new economic pressures as well as increasing
competition had forced this change, but Japans image nevertheless remained
largely positive (Shijie jingmao neican, 1992).
100 Gilbert Rozman
7 Many generalizations about the field are noted in the tenth anniversary issue of the main journal,
which is distributed only for internal use.
The Japanese took satisfaction from Chinese leaders willingness to focus
on future ties between the two nations rather than on the past. Hu
Yaobangs invitation to thousands of Japanese youth to visit China marked
the zenith of this support. Although this initiative was criticized after Hu
was ousted, Chinese officials continued to signal their Japanese counterparts
of the emphasis they placed on the future. However, the crackdown against
peaceful evolution after 4 June 1989 included heightened vigilance against
notions of convergence with Japan. It became risky to highlight any com-
monality between the two cultures; the Chinese became more insistent that
the rise of Eastern civilization ultimately meant the rise of China at its cen-
ter. Even though the visit of Emperor Akihito in the fall of 1992 generated
some optimism, care was taken to limit expectations of closeness between
the two countries (China Daily, Business Weekly, 1992).
At the turn of the 1990s a third image centering on the emergence of a
great power gained the most ground in Japanese studies. Studies of inter-
national relations and politics displayed this interest most prominently, but
so too did writings on Japanese history, the history of Sino-Japanese rela-
tions, and even the nature of Japanese society and popular culture (Cun,
1992). According to this line of thinking, Japans aspirations of power
exceeded its moral right to it, and China must struggle to keep these ambi-
tions in check. The object of studying Japan was now to predict and help to
prevent Japans grasp for power. Positive assessments of what Japan did
right to facilitate its rise as an economic great power were joined by strong
warnings about Japans lack of realism about why it should not aspire to be
a political and military great power. The end of the Cold War and the loss of
Soviet power, as well as the perceived gradual decline of US power, only
heightened Chinese concern about the prospect of ascendant Japanese
power (Liu and Xu, 1992). In 1992 sources made more mention of concerns
about Japan having some kind of worrisome strategy. They conveyed a
level of distrust of Japan that set the stage for a downturn in public opinion
during the following period. The Chinese spoke of Japans sense of being a
superior nation with an expansionist taste, or of its intent to manage the
world alongside the United States, but also of its need for regionalism
involving China to realize such goals. The Chinese were less optimistic than
the Japanese about bilateral relations because they had a low opinion of the
morality of the Japanese people and a higher estimation of Japans intent to
gain regional dominance.
Popular feelings against Japan remained deeply embedded among older
generations and had been transmitted to Chinese students. Many were dis-
satisfied with Tanaka Kakueis weak statement of regret in 1972 for Japan
having caused trouble to the Chinese people as if this transgression was
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 101
equivalent to splashing mud on their cuffs. While the Japanese spoke hope-
fully about the visit of Emperor Akihito putting history behind them, they
gave little thought to how much the emperor should say to assuage Chinese
feelings in comparison to how little he should say in order to appease nation-
alists at home. Optimistically anticipating a new regional partnership with
China, the Japanese let the opportunity pass to try to win the trust of the
Chinese people.
When Emperor Akihito visited China in October 1992 the Chinese were
still anxious to boost Japanese investment and co-operation. They remained
uncertain about the path of development of the new Russian state and
unclear about the direction of the United States after the presidential elec-
tion, while still struggling to end three years of sanctions and to put in place
new economic reforms. The Chinese seized the occasion to showcase their
country to use this visit, laden with symbolism, to shift bilateral relations
onto a high-speed track, and in this way to approach the goal of creating a
North-east Asian region that would enhance Chinas political and economic
standing in an age of regionalism. They had promised Japans leaders that
this historic visit would not produce any embarrassments; it was not their
fault that the aftertaste felt by the Chinese public fell far short of Japans
expectations.
According to the South China Morning Post (9 October 1992, p. 4), ten-
sions over relations with Japan mounted on the eve of the emperors visit. A
central government document distributed to military, police and university
administrators warned of demonstrations by the Chinese Popular Commit-
tee for Japanese Reparations. Many had not reconciled themselves to the
1972 decision by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, accepted by Deng Xiaoping,
against seeking reparations from Japan. Students who had rallied in 1986
around slogans critical of Japan were joining the movement and trying to
turn it into a populist springboard. They wanted the emperor to apologize
for the atrocities of 193145, and demanded Japan take new measures to
demonstrate that it would not become a military power after having just sent
peacekeeping troops abroad for the first time in the postwar era to serve in
Cambodia. There were also calls for China to reopen the issue of war repar-
ations, for which it was considered justified in seeking $180 billion. The
article also reported that a nationwide poll by Beijing Review on attitudes
toward Japan was being suppressed. In this poll almost 95% of 1138 respon-
dents wanted the emperor to apologize for atrocities and more than
three-quarters of them also supported demands for Tokyo to pay war repar-
ations. If censored publications refused to give voice to these demands, this
did not mean that the issue would not resurface.
102 Gilbert Rozman
The emperors visit marked the culmination of a period when writings on
Japan stressed the positive more than the negative, urging increased mutual
understanding by concentrating on what the two nations have in common
while putting differences aside. After all, Chinas leaders appreciated the fact
that even if the Japanese advocate Western values such as human rights, they
at least recognize that in Asia a gradual approach is needed (Du, 1992). Even
on the sensitive subject of historical relations, it served Chinas main pur-
poses not to hurt Japanese feelings by dwelling on harsh memories. The
atmosphere shaped a favorable environment for investment, trade and
regional stability. The results were appreciated. China noted that Japans
investments were rising rapidly amidst new recognition of Chinas long-term
prospects and interest in regional economic integration. However, approval
of economic results did not lead to more satisfaction with Japan.
There can be no doubt that the relatively positive tone toward Japan
through 1992 reflected the poor state of Sino-US relations and a sense of
international isolation due to sanctions, the collapse of the socialist bloc and
the breakup of the Soviet Union. On the very day Bill Clinton was elected
president, the Peoples Daily publicized the results of a recent joint confer-
ence with Asahi shimbun commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the
normalization of relations and looking ahead to Sino-Japanese co-operation
in the rise of Asia. The Chinese contributions predicted the replacement of
Western culture, the intensification of regional development and dynamism,
and the narrowing gap in GNP between the two regional great powers
(Renmin ribao, 4 November 1992, p. 2). Clearly, Japan was indispensable for
China to ride the wave of East Asias global ascent while keeping the United
States from thwarting Chinese ambitions.
The primary reason for distrust was different thinking on history. The
Chinese argued that of all the countries in the world, whatever their past
moral shortcomings and international aggression, Japan was the only one
that had forfeited the moral right to be a political or military great power
because of its record of brutality in Asia. It should be kept in fetters. As the
global debate over a new world order unfolded, the Chinese felt that they
had to redouble their efforts to expose the lessons of history in order to use
them against Japanese ambitions. When Japan began to discuss participation
in international peacekeeping forces, the Chinese downplayed the fact that
Japan spends only 1% of its GNP on the military to warn of a hidden
strategy to shake off all constitutional limitations. They also claimed that
Tokyo was striving to take the lead role in the Asia-Pacific region and the
North-east Asia region, while making all-out efforts to change the con-
sciousness of its citizens (Yuan, 1992). Arguments against Japans right to
convert economic into political power accompanied objections to notions of
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 103
the new world order that assigned Japan a large role, such as replacing the
old bipolar order with a tripolar one based around the United States, Japan
and the European Union (Lin, 1992). The exaggerated critique of Japan as if
it remained dangerously close to its prewar past sullied a spirit of
co-operation.
Another source of distrust was the image of Japan seeking to lock China
into a division of labor in which China would be stuck at the bottom. Arti-
cles complained that by keeping investment low and limiting the transfer of
high or recent technology, Japan wanted to keep China in a junior role in the
division of labor as part of a strategy of vertical regional integration that
resembled imperialist economic methods and even the Greater East Asian
Co-prosperity Sphere of the war years. This image depicts Japan as the heir
to the United States hegemonic aspirations in Asia and as the capitalist
state with the most potential for economic and technological power in the
future but anxious to prevent any loss. Rather than giving the Japanese any
credit for the rapid growth of Chinas economy, the literature charged that
they invest for the short-term, while consciously striving to keep China from
becoming a serious competitor (Riben wenti ziliao, 1992b). Chinese authors
faulted Japan both for failing to make an adequate commitment to the
region and for aiming to dominate it. They charged that Japan was really
tied to the West, sharing values and devoting only a small part of its invest-
ment and trade to Asia (Wang Jiafu, 1992). In the north-east, where for
reasons of history and geography people felt entitled to a large share of
Japans investments, this message could be heard, but as Chinas primary site
for historical research on Japan, which inevitably kept alive national wounds
(Riben baike cidian, 1990), they were not immune to the increasingly domi-
nant message: Japan has an unhealthy interest in making East Asia its
hinterland.
Third, opposition to Japan took the form of a cultural argument that at
least implicitly challenged global appreciation for Japanese culture.
Compared to Western writings, Chinese sources were superficial and overly
critical in treating contemporary society, public opinion and cultural life in
Japan (Ji, 1992). More than in the 1980s, Chinese sources depicted Japanese
culture as a regional and global threat, resorting to stereotypes while under-
mining the prospect of mutual understanding. Only two objectives seemed
to be present in the increasingly popular discussions of Japanese culture: to
analyze narrowly the relevance of culture in economic development, and to
determine broadly the forces behind militarism in the past and the recent
revival of nationalism. While the Chinese talked a lot about friendly rela-
tions, increased exchanges and integrated economies, they glaringly omitted
discussion about mutual appreciation of each others traditions and values.
104 Gilbert Rozman
Writers were warned to avoid humanistic themes that might arouse sympa-
thy among the Chinese people for the dreaded peaceful evolution that
supposedly drew demonstrators to the streets in 1989 and helped bring down
communism in the Soviet Union, and so omitted positive coverage of Japan-
ese thinking an approach that resonated well with the public.
The Chinese often took for granted the following progression: if Japan
sent peacekeeping forces under UN auspices or assumed a more active
global political role by taking responsibility for helping to solve the worlds
problems, this would mean that it was preparing for political dominance,
and if it gained some political power, this would inevitably fuel a drive for
military great-power status. Such reasoning led to excessive vigilance against
modest changes, and damaged relations between the two countries. There
was no recognition at all that Chinas communist government also needed to
do a lot of convincing before a world that had witnessed the brutality at
Tiananmen. China tried to sweep idealism completely out of international
relations, but it also showed a lack of realism. Instead of accepting each
countrys power as is, China wanted Japan to open its pockets wide to boost
Chinas national power, while insisting that Japan stand by with no reaction
to any efforts on the part of China to expand and assert its own regional or
global political and military power.
One barrier to Chinese understanding of Japan was the refusal to
acknowledge idealism and goodwill in a great powers motives. The Chinese
belittled Japanese reasons for providing assistance, raising human rights
issues or even seeking increased co-operation. Such suspicions traced all
Japanese actions to narrow national interest, creating a cloudy climate in
which to pursue anything but economic co-operation. After June 1989
Chinese officials reinforced the image of their country as a victim of those in
the United States and Japan who were determined to continue a century and
a half of weakening China and preventing it from realizing its potential.
They cultivated a Sinocentric view of the world, putting the burden on
Japanese shoulders to be realistic about the rise of China and to alter exist-
ing thinking about history and regionalism. There was no strategy to meet
the Japanese halfway.
In early 1993 we already can detect a rise in Chinas self-confidence
towards Japan. If earlier there had been fears that China would be under
increased pressure, the new situation had China enjoying the most favorable
international environment it had seen since 1949. After Boris Yeltsins visit
to Beijing in December 1992, Chinese leaders felt confident of ties with Rus-
sia. As Clinton assumed office, they asserted that US contradictions with
Japan were growing and Japan would fail to gain regional economic hege-
mony. Above all, delight with the economic results of 1992 led the Chinese
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 105
to write confidently of using the Chinese market as a weapon in the diplo-
matic struggle (Wang Huaining, 1993). Taking Japan for granted, they
assumed that the forces for regionalism would accelerate, great-power rela-
tions would become more balanced and China would boost its centrality in
Asia at Japans expense (Wang Huning, 1993). An assertive China was pre-
paring to view Japan from a position of strength.
3 Views of Japan, 19941998
The trajectories of China and Japan changed decisively in 1993. Whereas
China drew world attention as the new economic miracle and the next
superpower, Japan became mired in stagnation with little sign of the political
will necessary for reform. This reversal of fortunes was soon noted in Chinese
publications, which took the position that Japan needed China as much as
China needed Japan. Interest in learning from Japans success fell sharply, and
was negligible after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Chinas leaders took a new
outlook on Japan, strongly opposing its political aspirations and playing the
historical card. Whereas in late 1992 there had been talk of a new era follow-
ing the twentieth anniversary of normalization when history could be left to
the historians as ties concentrated on economic relations and technical co-
operation (Jiang, 1992), in 1995 the emphasis had shifted to using the fiftieth
anniversary of the end of the Second World War to block Japans plans. If in
1993 the Chinese were relatively relaxed about Japan rushing to be a political
power and doubted it would use military power in its great-power strategy
(Feng Shaokui, 1993), by 1995 they concocted a threat from Japan before the
Japanese agitated about a threat from China.
Why had Chinese images of Japan deteriorated markedly by the
mid-1990s? Worsening Japanese images of China, since these trailed changes
in Chinese views, did not provoke China. Investment from Japans large
firms exceeded expectations, as did trade. The answer must be sought in
changes in Chinese foreign policy and nationalist strategies from above.
Leaders felt emboldened by the new balance of power with Japan and their
assessment of: (i) the advantage of nationalist rhetoric for winning support
from the Chinese people; and (ii) the effectiveness of pressure on Japan for
Chinas role in great-power relations. As Japans leaders grew critical of
Chinas military build-up and talk spread of using, as pressure, the criteria
adopted in 1991 for overseas development assistance (ODA), including insis-
tence on restraint in military spending, the Chinese assertively brought up
Japans historic misdeeds.
Even before the deterioration in relations, the Chinese had intensified
warnings about Japans unjustified aspirations to become a political great
106 Gilbert Rozman
power (Xu Shigang, 1995). Instead of expressing gratitude for Japans large-
scale ODA, they dismissed it as a means to become a political great power
and gain regional leadership (Yang Yuanzhong, 1995). Rather than allaying
early signs of Japanese worry about a Chinese threat, leaders acted as if any
anxiety was a reflection of suspect motives. A vicious cycle resulted: the
Chinese side heightened Japanese alarm and then took that alarm as evidence
of nefarious intentions. Sensing that Japan would use the fiftieth anniversary
year in 1995 to put its past behind it, the Chinese redoubled their efforts to
keep the past in the forefront. Denials of the Nanjing massacre and a war
of aggression by Japanese cabinet officials in May and August 1994 no
doubt had a provocative effect (Japan Times, 2228 August 1994, p. 20), but
responsibility chiefly lay with the Chinese policy of targeting Japan.
Chinas leaders made decisions about events in the region that had conse-
quences for relations with Japan and for mutual perceptions. They took an
aggressive approach to moves in Taiwan that they construed as edging
toward independence, and did not measure their responses to avoid driving
Japan closer to Taiwan. Even if Chinas leaders calculated that further
nuclear tests were needed after the rest of the world had agreed on a treaty
to stop testing, they did not need to belittle Japans acute sensitivity as if it
were nothing more than a move to pressure China motivated by power cal-
culations. When the Japanese reacted, the Chinese expressed alarm, stirring
public emotions against Japan. It was not that the Chinese were uninformed;
analysts reflected on the hottest issues and translators cranked out editions
of the latest publications in Japan with remarkable speed (Motozawa, 2000).
These were years when the quality of scholarship on Japan rose impressively,
but the old guard who set the rules for analysis steered conclusions in a
direction bound to harm mutual trust.
The main downturn in mutual perceptions was precipitated by exchanges
over Chinese nuclear testing in the atmosphere in 1995. For Japan, the target
of two nuclear bombs and enthusiastic champion of the new global test ban,
criticisms of the last of the existing nuclear powers to defy this ban reflected
a groundswell of public sentiment. For the Chinese, the first harsh criticisms
since 1972 to originate primarily from the country that had wreaked havoc
on their land and never satisfactorily apologized naturally drew mass discon-
tent. The Chinese side did not reflect on Japans unique status as a nuclear
victim or that this response was in keeping with a country disinclined toward
militarization (Kamimura, 2001). Instead, China laced its criticisms with the
idea that Japanese militarism was reviving, losing credibility in Japan and
exacerbating domestic emotions. An understandable cause of disagreement
turned into something far worse as emotions spiraled beyond control.
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 107
In 1995 and 1996 two approaches to regionalism and great-power rela-
tions were on a collision course. For Japanese politicians, whether on the left
or the right, at stake were the principles they had brought from the Cold
War into a new era. On the left, Chinas nuclear test of 15 May 1995, in defi-
ance of the global community and a request by Prime Minister Murayama
Tomiichi during a visit to Beijing earlier in the month, aroused anti-nuclear
feelings and there were demands that loans be suspended, as required by the
ODA charter. On the right, that test, as well as subsequent ones in August
and September, signaled the rise of a military power in the region, leaving
Japanese security weakened. Both sides agreed that Tokyo must pressure
Beijing, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked hard to keep the
response limited (Green, 2001, pp. 8082). There was a shared understand-
ing that if Japan intended to stand behind its principles in shaping its own
region and in the global arena it needed to be firm with China. For Beijings
leaders the principles were no less clear: they were determined to make
China a military power in order to exert global influence and gain the ability
to use force, if necessary, to retake Taiwan. They were also insistent that
Japan, given its stained history, had no right to pressure China. The Chinese
considered ODA from Japan to be a form of war reparations, and they
denied Japan the right to suspend it.
If in retrospect this clash of principles was virtually unavoidable, the way
it was handled by the Chinese side need not have been so extreme. Focusing
on leaders such as Hashimoto Ryutaro and Ozawa Ichiro, they exaggerated
the role of rightist thought in Japan (Zhanhou, 1996, pp. 623636). Seizing
the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the ending of the war, the Chinese
made Japans historical misdeeds an obsession, and rekindled dark memo-
ries. Equating communist leadership with nationalism in China, they may
have boosted the legitimacy of their party, but at a cost to their image in
Japan and Japans image in China.
Chinas negative shift in its view of Japan came as a shock to the Japanese
people in 199496. One could argue that the Japanese had provoked it
through condescension to backward Chinese in the 1980s, by taking
Chinas isolation in international affairs for granted between 1989 and 1991,
or by allowing Japanese nationalism focused on history to come more into
the open in 199395. No doubt the Japanese had been overconfident and
showed little sensitivity, but however much they preferred to retain the
edge over China, they also sincerely welcomed its economic growth and
partnership. The Japanese feared disorder more than rivalry, and they cham-
pioned Chinas cause in international circles. The Chinese were not justified
in becoming so negative, and their leaders would learn to regret the
consequences.
108 Gilbert Rozman
The Japanese had assumed that networks forged with Chinas present and
future leaders would lead to improving relations. By the mid-1990s the elder
statesmen who had personally guided bilateral relations were dead, and
nobody could fill the void. There was much hand-wringing about the
absence of pipes to calm worries when they arose. The situation was no
better with networks for the future. In 1992 a Japanese book surveyed the
attitudes of Chinese students living in Japan. It noted that students generally
start in two-year language schools before taking the entrance examinations
to universities or technical schools. They need a guarantor, whose services
they often buy. In addition, they defy restrictions on hours of employment
by working in 3-D (dirty, dangerous and difficult) jobs through the late
afternoon and evenings to cover the costs for school and living expenses.
With few dormitory rooms available and most Japanese reluctant to rent to
them, they face hurdles in living too. All of these problems are compounded
by the impression that the Japanese look down on the Chinese as untrust-
worthy, poor and lazy. It follows that these students really do not enjoy their
experience or like Japan (Sukigara and Suzuki, 1992). Throughout the 1990s
the theme resurfaced that just because Chinese people got to know Japan
better, does not mean they will appreciate it more.
Comparisons can be made with a previous boom in overseas study and
the view of Japan held by returning Chinese students. Whereas from 1896 to
the 1910s the boom of Chinese studying in Japan contributed greatly to rev-
olution and reform in thinking, this second boom amounting to 200 000
visiting students over two decades has supplied some of the necessary
knowledge and technology for modernization. Yet, there is fear that as the
first boom was undercut by an assertive Japanese foreign policy that led to
boycotts of Japanese goods and growing resentment of aggressive aims, the
second boom is not producing the strategic capital for Japans foreign pol-
icy goals. Among the explanations cited are: (i) after the collapse of the
bubble economy Japan has been slow to meet the financial burden of these
students; (ii) troubles arising from small numbers of students have caused
lots of real estate dealers and part-time employers to exclude foreigners and
give the impression that Japanese society is cold to foreign students; and (iii)
many feel spiritually isolated while struggling with language study, entrance
exams, social adjustment and financial problems (Zhu, 2001, pp. 5457).
Even if improvements were to be made in the infrastructure proposed to
turn these returnees into advocates of a positive image of Japan, there would
still be the problem of communicating frankly about history and current
affairs in a manner that leaves both sides with increased mutual respect.
After the drop in public opinion in each country toward the other, and the
emotional response in China coupled with the indifference in Japan to recent
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 109
textbook revisions, it is unlikely that the Japanese will become more sensitive
or the Chinese respect the views of their hosts.
The Chinese governments handling of the downturn in public opinion
reveals a lack of concern for the impact of popular thinking on international
relations. In February 1997 when Zhongguo qingnianbao reported on its 1996
survey of 100 000 young people, it asserted that just 15% had good feelings
toward Japan and 14% thought bilateral relations were good, while a 1997
follow-up found that 10% like Japan and 34% dislike it (Amako, 1998, p. 24).
The Chinese media and movie industry, under the obvious direction of the
Propaganda Department of the Communist Party, had fostered a negative
image through its one-sided coverage, emphasizing war history instead of
contemporary life. This reflected an intensified effort to build a great-power
national identity with the ideology of a strong state. To the Japanese it dem-
onstrated the failure of two decades of goodwill efforts backed by lots of
money in assistance, investments and exchanges. And when Chinese leaders
took a new look at the importance of Japan for Chinas continued economic
growth, balance in great-power relations and regionalism, they discovered
that they did not know how to reverse this public negativity and its repercus-
sions in Japan.
Thomas Christensen found in his periodic interviews with international
security experts in China a lack of empathy with Japan, stifling the opinions
of those who did empathize. Influential figures did not understand Japanese
anxieties over Chinese actions (Christensen, 1999, pp. 7071). Intense anti-
Japanese feelings were compounded by the unexpected nature of develop-
ments in 1995 and 1996: increased fear of the United States when it gave
priority to security over economics in the region; a more assertive Japanese
government on nuclear testing; tension over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai)
islands; and the Japanese prime ministers visit to the Yasukuni shrine. The
redefinition of the USJapan alliance raised the most alarm (Garrett and
Glaser, 1997). Having overreacted, Chinese leaders found it hard to calm a
public already prepared to cast Japan as an arch villain.
Having built a strong foundation for co-operation on the international
stage with Russia and been courted by the United States from the second
half of 1996, Chinese leaders pressed Japan harder. They seemed to be hope-
ful about re-creating the strategic triangle of the second half of the Cold
War with Japan left on the sidelines. Analysts embraced the vocabulary of
triangles to depict the evolving relations among regional and global powers,
assigning a place to Japan mostly as a force for balancing the United States
(Rozman, 1999). Chinese reasoning on how to calculate national power and
to achieve balance among nations harked back to what Japanese and Ameri-
cans saw as Cold War logic. It privileged power concerns over regional
110 Gilbert Rozman
integration. Although there were moments of renewed hope for Sino-Japan-
ese ties, such as the celebration of twenty-five years of relations in 1997, they
did not last long. Throughout 1998 the main theme remained Japans strat-
egy to become a political great power and Chinese efforts to resist it (Feng
Tejun, 1998, pp. 112117),
Alarmed by the downturn in public opinion, leaders in both China and
Japan made some efforts in 1997 and 1998 to stabilize relations. Experts in
China appealed for patience. They argued that blossoming economic ties
would draw Japan closer to China and lead toward multipolarization (Yang
Yuanzhong, 1997). The United States and Japan were bound to face
increased tensions, including over leadership in East Asia; China could take
its time. With the uncertainty of the Asian financial crisis, the plea for
caution took on new urgency. The focus turned to forging balanced triangles
for regional and global relations; to allaying Japans nervous concerns, and
allowing it time to express its real interests. It was expected that equilibrium
would take shape in the ChinaUSJapan triangle that would stabilize the
region as China continued its inexorable rise. Some scholars drew attention
to Japanese psychology, especially reasons for concern over China, with
advice that a balance of power would make Sino-Japanese relations a force
for multilateralism (Song, 1998), but such views stayed in the background
(Yang Bojiang, 1999).
Sino-Japanese mutual perceptions traversed a rocky path in the second
half of 1998 after appearing to recover from their nadir in 1996. Chinese
leaders could not resist taking advantage of Bill Clintons eagerness to
improve relations to try to use triangular relations against Japan. They
insisted on Clinton not stopping in Tokyo before or after his visit to China
in mid-1998, and they took pleasure in a joint statement complaining about
Japans inadequate response to the depressed economies of the region. But
the worst moment came when President Jiang Zemin visited Japan in
November. Jiangs visit had been overshadowed by the historic summit with
South Koreas Kim Dae-jung a month earlier, at which Japan exchanged a
written apology about the past for a promise that the issue would not be
raised again. In the light of this, Jiang could have reconciled himself to
achieving only modest results, but instead he played the history card repeat-
edly. This aroused Chinese public opinion and, in turn, virtually unified the
Japanese people against the Chinese president. Again repairs were required
to patch up relations. Chinas leaders realized that emotional relations on
both sides would make the pursuit of national interests difficult.
Clearly, Jiangs handling of his visit in 1998 had been a mistake, but it was
only the last in a string of errors over five years that had excessively agitated
the Chinese public. If the Japanese bear some responsibility for provoking
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 111
the Chinese unnecessarily, as in the construction of a lighthouse on one of
the Senkaku islands in July 1996, the lions share of the blame for the
Chinese publics deepening hostility in this period falls on the shoulders of
the Chinese leadership. In 1999 they recognized their mistake and vowed not
only to improve bilateral ties but also to convey a different image of Japan to
the public.
The Chinese were not driven by economic interdependence to an
increased appreciation of Japan. Rising economic ties from 1992 were,
strangely, accompanied by deteriorating political ties. Indeed, only when the
economic boom slowed in 199799 did efforts to stabilize political ties
increase. Chinese sources do not do a good job in explaining the affinity
nose-diving of 199496 or the turnaround afterwards. Many make it seem
as if Japan was responsible, driven first by LDP extremists moved by nation-
alism independent of economic interests, and then reversed by great-power
strategic thinkers and business interests, each looking for balanced security
in the twenty-first century. In addition, they claim that the United States
keeps driving Japan away from China, only to find that Japan awakens to its
subordination and turns back to China (Xu Zhixian, 1998). Analysts fail to
back these assertions with any analysis of Japanese domestic politics or
JapanUS relations, and they ignore the effect of Chinese domestic politics
and ChinaUS relations on images of Japan.
On the day of the fiftieth anniversary of the Peoples Republic of China,
the results were published of a survey of the attitudes toward Japan of
Chinese college students studying Japanese. Not many were taking the lan-
guage: at the university level just one-fifteenth of the number taking English,
and for earlier levels less than 0.5%. But this select group could be expected
to be positive since just about all wanted to work in fields linked to Japan:
many expected to be employed by Japanese companies, and had chosen
Japanese because they liked Japans animation films or music. Only
one-quarter of respondents expressed a friendly attitude, one-third were
more or less friendly, while slightly over a quarter were split evenly between
not feeling friendly or feeling ambivalent, and some did not know how to
answer (Chugoku, 1999). These disappointing responses came after years of
negative coverage, but at a time when the mass media was refraining from
arousing emotions. They suggested how hard it would be to create in China
a positive image of Japan.
Attentive to the internal debate on Japan in China, Keio University pro-
fessor Kokubun Ryosei pointed to the prospect of a Chinese effort to
improve relations with Japan months before it became a reality. He noted
that Chinese were alarmed by the expansion of NATO and its military
involvement in Yugoslavia, making it even more sensitive to the possibility
112 Gilbert Rozman
that the new USJapan guidelines would lead to containment of China.
Thus, they had been debating how to separate Japan, even if only slightly,
from the United States. After overlooking the peaceful development of post-
war Japan and treating the USJapan security treaty as the cork in the bottle
preventing Japans militarization, the Chinese now shifted gear, downplaying
the military danger from Japan and arguing that Chinas domestic problems
were piling up and required a more stable environment. After Jiangs alarm-
ingly unsuccessful visit, they tried to reassure Japanese while calming their
own public (Mainichi, 11 April 1999, p. 6).
4 Views of Japan, 19992001
Chinas smile diplomacy was announced in interviews that noted a policy
shift in the fall of 1999 (Asahi, 1999), as well as through a noticeable change
in tone in the Chinese media and academic literature. Articles stressing the
importance of friendship with Japan were commonplace by the spring of
2000. The visibility of this effort received a boost from coverage of Jiang
Zemins meeting with Japanese travelers on 20 May and Zhu Rongjis friend-
ship tour of Japan from 12 to 17 October. However, Chinese internet postings
defied the official goals, and even criticized Zhu for his message that present-
day Japanese should not bear responsibility for the militarism and war
against China, and furthermore that China highly appreciated Japans
ODA (Watanabe, 2001, p. 126). Official policy and public opinion were not in
accord.
Officials recognized this and showed signs of wanting to change public
attitudes. Japanese publications noted a shift at the beginning of 2000 in the
Chinese governments approach to public opinion. In the 1980s a sympa-
thetic image of life in Japan had been conveyed through television dramas or
movies shown to the Chinese people, then in the mid-1990s emphasis on the
war years had eclipsed current life on television, causing viewers to see Japan
more through its past than its present. Japanese discontent over this
one-sided coverage came into the open in 1999 just as the Chinese were
reassessing the negative fallout from the public relations fiasco of Jiang
Zemins visit. But observers were surprised to find an article by Feng
Shaokui in the first issue of Shijie zhishi of 2000 that changed the tone
abruptly. On many themes this article stressed the positive: (i) the develop-
ment of friendly relations and true co-operation would be of great use to the
two countries and to the people of Asia; (ii) Chinas emotional attitude is
not productive; (iii) the majority of Japanese do not deny the history of
aggression; and (iv) the challenge of right-wing nationalists can be over-
come. If the Japanese were pleased, Chinese readers flooded Shijie zhishi
with criticisms of the article. Now the Japanese had to acknowledge that the
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 113
problem was rooted more in public opinion than in government manipula-
tion (Ryo, 2000, pp. 154155).
Negative responses to the January 2000 article centered on many themes:
the Japanese people have not shown the kind of remorse or understanding
that would justify absolving them of criticism for militarism; Maos decision
to forego reparations does not mean the Chinese people and especially
victims of the war are not justified in seeking restitution; even if Japan is
regarded as Chinas biggest trade partner and lender, these are purely com-
mercial undertakings and do not reflect goodwill. But the rare open airing
of differences on foreign policy did not stop with this journal for intellectu-
als. Soon popular newsstand magazines such as Shidian caught the eye of
readers with stridently nationalist headlines portraying Japan as a future
nuclear power, a threat to China and a militaristic power that rejects charges
of past aggression. They appealed to a deep-seated emotional antagonism
towards Japan, filled with distrust of a people who can deny historical truths
and forebodings of what they will do in the future. The debate had come
into the open.
The Japanese noted with surprise the hesitancy of two groups to resist the
public rejection of a new soft line. One group comprises those who favor the
United States or have close ties with overseas Chinese and share in the nega-
tive image of Japans handling of history. The second group are those who
have studied in Japan and know well the changes of the postwar era, but
find a lot to criticize in narrow nationalism and ethical pragmatism (Ryo,
2000, pp. 156162). A freer press in China exposed the depths of popular
distrust of Japan.
By the start of the twenty-first century the quantity and quality of
Chinese academic writings and also glossy periodicals on Japan had reached
a new peak. Often they openly objected to past simplifications in criticisms.
Among the many themes, studies went into detail on the character of the
Japanese, describing positive features more than negative ones. Moreover,
they warned that the Chinese had succumbed to negative stereotyping and
needed this kind of information to look beyond history (Yang Ningyi, 2001,
p. 3). Having funded some of the publications and research centers, as well
as trained the young scholars, the Japanese could take some satisfaction
from this output. Yet by this time it was clear that the Chinese public was, on
the whole, clinging to its negative outlook, and academic information would
not suffice.
As China was striving to assuage rumpled Japanese feelings in 2000, the
Japanese right insisted that the real problem was heightened dislike of Japan
in China as a result of mind control (Sankei shimbun, 30 October 2000).
Blaming the Chinese government, these Japanese regarded the belated
114 Gilbert Rozman
acknowledgement of gratitude for Japanese ODA (Jin, 2000) and of the
marked differences between present-day and wartime Japan as a paltry
effort. While the political right conveyed an image of Chinese citizens
aroused by anti-Japanese propaganda into emotional hostility that left little
possibility of reaching them with a more positive picture, others suggested a
more complicated situation. Asahi shimbun pointed to an August 2000 gath-
ering in Beijing of 2000 Japan fans despite the mood of loathing for Japan
(kennichi) just a week later at the annual remembrance of the war (Asahi
shimbun, 20 March 2001, p. 1) For the most part, the Japanese left, a mere
shadow of its once feisty self, bemoaned the state of Chinese opinion toward
Japan. While citing examples of more sympathetic media coverage, such as
praise for Japans womens marathon gold medallist at the Sydney Olympics
as the pride of Asia, it too pointed to evidence that many of the millions of
educated young people on the internet were airing their hostility towards
Japan and even calling Zhu Rongji a traitor for his assertion to Japanese
reporters that China does not want to hurt Japanese feelings over historical
matters. Even two years after Jiangs visit, Chinese public opinion was not
softening, the Japanese were told (Mainichi shimbun, 2 November 2000).
Since recent Chinese government efforts to portray Japan more favorably
were having little impact, some Japanese called for more state action, includ-
ing a re-examination of educational content at many levels, while warning
that increased open debate in China might only exacerbate the problem seen
on the internet.
Chinese views of Japan often appear bifurcated between positive impres-
sions in localities that are most active as both research centers and economic
partners and negative images in the center of the country, especially where
security is the focus. Along the south-east coast and in cities such as Dalian
and Tianjin one finds the most favorable commentaries, while criticisms have
been most intense in Beijing institutes that deal with great-power relations.
On the whole, young scholars trained in Japan and the United States exam-
ine global or regional integration and their promising implications for
bilateral ties, while, on the other side, older international security specialists
warn of Japan using the Asian economic crisis or the prospect of the yen
becoming a regional currency to boost its power at the expense of China.
Many see Japan through a narrow lens, harking back to zero-sum notions of
regional leadership or to Cold War ideas of contradictions between Japan
and the United States. Despite close economic relations, the constituency for
good relations remains shaky.
Some Japanese are alert to a continuing positive impact of Japanese mass
culture on the Chinese, especially young people. Already in the early 1980s
some of Japans most popular dramas were riveting Chinese audiences. In
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 115
the 1990s Star Television continued to air recent dramas originating from
Hong Kong, while video rentals were widely publicized in newspapers and
magazines. Chinese college students are from a generation raised on Japan-
ese animations aimed at young children, followed by manga as they grow
older. Indirectly, Hong Kong and Taiwan echo Japanese culture or become
conduits for fashion originating in Tokyo. Again in the second half of 2000
articles on Japanese dramas became more numerous, indicating that pop
culture retains its hold among the Chinese public (Watanabe, 2001,
pp. 122124). Yet the intense popularity of shows seen by large numbers of
Chinese in the mid-1980s was not repeated, and such shows are unlikely to
be commercially viable now. As relations became more politicized, popular
culture no longer offers a promising shortcut to trust. The Japanese should
have recognized the enormous opportunity that they had and done much
more to reach the Chinese public earlier.
Explaining the degree of antagonistic feelings that the Chinese have
toward Japan, analysts have argued that China not only responded to insuf-
ficient Japanese reflection on the past aggressions, but, in addition, Chinese
students in Japan had reported that prices were high, Asians were looked
down on, it was hard to find a decent part-time job after the collapse of the
bubble economy, scholarships were difficult to get, and in general Japan was
not a good place to live. Chinese working for Japanese firms in China also
were dissatisfied. Finally, recent troubles between Japanese students in
China, admitted without tests and often more interested in having a good
time than studying, and Chinese students also overlapped with history.
Such problems led respondents to view the Japanese as arrogant. In a poll
of 100 000 Chinese conducted by Zhongguo qingnianbao, 90% answered that
they were worried by the militarization of Japan, while only 5% were not
(Watanabe, 2001, p. 125). An agreement to exchange 15 000 young people
from 1999 to 2003 offered only a small ray of hope of changing this situa-
tion. This forward-looking agreement which was overshadowed by the
November 1998 summit did not reassure some in Japan as when the first
group arrived in Beijing, their visit began at a museum dedicated to the war,
and Jiang Zemin greeted them by speaking of historical responsibility
(Beijing ribao, 25 October 1999).
The Japanese pointed to two sharply conflicting views of Japan that were
prevalent in China. One, as expressed by Zhu Rongji in his visit to Japan of
October 2000, said that postwar Japan had followed the path of peace and
development, achieving tremendous success. The other insisted that militar-
ism was being revived in Japan. Some in Japan found Zhus message insin-
cere, a tactical response with little chance of overturning the effects of a
campaign that had loudly spread the negative image. Others said that it was
116 Gilbert Rozman
a significant change that could be expected to improve feelings toward Japan
(Yomiuri shimbun, 7 November 2000, evening). At the center of the debate
was whether the positive approach was just a short-term device to win some
benefits or whether it reflected the true sentiments of Chinas leaders and the
public.
Within China some analysts warned against the demonizing of Japan and
finally managed to present a fuller, more objective image of that country. In
the early 1990s they were concerned that Chinas excessive fear of rising
Japanese power threatened to undermine relations. In interviews they took
exception to three lines of criticism of Japan.
8
(i) They worried that Chinas
insistence on regionalism based on horizontal relations would not give
adequate weight to the requirements of long-term, large-scale investment.
Continuously charging Japan with plotting to forge a vertical division of
labor aimed at keeping China backward did not bode well for winning
Japans support for regionalism. (ii) The critics were concerned that the con-
stant rhetoric that Japan has no right to become a political great power as
well as a military great power is an attempt to stop the inevitable. It was
unrealistic and also potentially damaging to bilateral relations to expect a
hierarchical political relationship between China and Japan. (iii) Critics
doubted that USJapan relations would decline allowing China much lever-
age, as the mainstream position argued.
In 19992000, critics of Chinas approach to Japan had some success,
making five main arguments.
9
(i) Japanese power and its chances of being
used aggressively have been exaggerated. Analyses of Japans weakness
turned to the cultural roots of a society that relies on borrowing rather than
creativity in developing new knowledge, and concluded that Japan would
lose competitiveness and grow increasingly dependent on its East Asian
neighbors. It follows that the goal for China should be not to block Japans
inevitable rise as a political power, but to channel that rise within a frame-
work where China can create a balance and deflect the more serious threat
of Japan becoming a military great power. (ii) China must recognize the
growing threat of US hegemony and focus on Japan as the weak link in the
security alliance. The Japanese must believe that they can use China for
leverage in great-power relations and have an outlet when they feel that the
United States is controlling them. The decision to use the term strategic
partnership for Sino-Japanese relations symbolized this new approach.
Newly sensitive to the psychology of the Japanese people, who have been
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 117
8 These interviews were conducted during a research stay in China in the fall of 1992 and the spring
of 1993 as well as at later dates.
9 While my review of Chinese writings lends support to these conclusions, I rely also on interviews
during two visits to China in October 1999 and December 2000.
frustrated in their aspirations in the 1990s, Chinese analysts called for a care-
ful, reassuring approach. (iii) The Chinese should recognize the need for
regionalism as a means to overcome the inherent limitations of bilateral ties
with Japan. That way they can use South Koreas role as a constructive third
party as well as remove Sino-Japanese relations somewhat from the shadow
of Sino-US relations and their destabilizing effects. (iv) The Chinese must
recognize their need for Japans economic help. In 1999, as the economic
growth rate in China dropped, plans to reform state-owned enterprises
proved difficult, and warnings were heard that entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) could be perilous; co-operation from a country with an
economy six or seven times that of China seemed essential. This could not
be taken for granted after the downturn in Japanese investment and exports
that had just occurred (Zhao, 1999). As it increasingly recognized its own
weakness and became sceptical about ties with Russia, especially the poor
state of economic relations, China better appreciated its need for Japan,
including the value of ODA. (v) Chinas leaders must be more concerned
about the emotions of its own citizens. Aware that the Chinese as well as the
Japanese were losing their friendly feelings for each other, many feared that
this would interfere with great-power calculations. Moreover, the vitality of
the grass-roots movement demanding reparations from Japan looms as a
threat to relations in the future.
Above all, Chinese scholars posited Japan at a crossroads, where it could
make China a partner or turn it into an opponent. By choosing the former,
Japan could look forward to a beneficial triangle with the United States and
maximum flexibility as a great power, including political power now recog-
nized as inevitable. Japan would become more independent politically. It
would gain through regional economic integration. And its decision not to
press for Western values in Asia would make it more acceptable to its neigh-
bors (Liu Jiangyong, 2000, pp. 295324). If some of these arguments seem
too self-serving for China, they at least open the way to joint exploration of
common ground.
If Chinas leaders accepted some of these arguments, this does not neces-
sarily mean that they really favored a long-term process of reconciliation
and respect. Those who are dubious that the change is more than tactical
note that the positive tone dominant in Sino-Japanese relations between
1990 and 1992 resulted mostly from US-led efforts to counteract global iso-
lation, and likewise, in 19992000 Chinas newfound closeness to Japan
accompanied a shift in domestic power to conservatives and worsening
USChina relations. More than Tokyo, Beijing fears an imbalance in the
ChinaJapanUS triangle and adjusts its policy toward Tokyo accordingly.
Since Tokyo closely monitors Chinese coverage of Japan, Beijing also has
118 Gilbert Rozman
been obliged to change the tone of domestic media and the foreign policy
establishment to make its case to Japan. One can doubt that this means
much when Chinas leaders are drifting in a more nationalist direction both
in domestic propaganda and in global strategy.
From 27 February to 23 March 2001 Sankei shimbun carried a series of
twenty-one articles on the teaching of history in China. These articles
offered detailed support for what many had been writing: the Chinese lead-
ership buttresses growing nationalism by presenting Japanese history more
negatively and stirring public opinion towards increased animosity. This, in
turn, has become the foundation of worsening Sino-Japanese relations. It is
worth examining the Sankei arguments closely in order to follow this logic.
The series begins with the contention that Chinese absolutism needs to
portray China as a victim by creating an historical consciousness that justi-
fies its own evolution. It devotes an extraordinary amount of its historical
education to Japan, almost all of it to the war of resistance. Coverage starts
with six- and seven-year-olds learning of Japans invasion and cruelty,
including vivid visual images. Even the contents of Chinese language
instruction are crammed with fervent patriotism and political consciousness.
Right after reading about Japans cruelty, including killing tens of millions
of Chinese, the children learn of the wonderful Chinese Communist Party
that spilled its blood to do everything for the nation and finally defeated
Japan. By the time children are nine they read of the various cruel ways used
by soldiers who took pleasure in murder games.
Much attention centers on what the Chinese side claims was the killing of
more than 300 000 disarmed soldiers and unarmed civilians in Nanjing.
After quoting many details in middle-school textbooks on the Nanjing mas-
sacre, the sixth article in the series volunteers that the objective of historical
education is connected to instilling hatred of present-day Japan. Compari-
sons follow with earlier middle-school textbooks. They show a rise from
1980 to 1992 from 150 to 520 lines on the Nanjing incident, a shift from crit-
icism of the army to Japan in general, and playing up the story with visual
effects. Pointing to changes that started with a decision under Jiang Zemin,
the series views historical consciousness as a political tool. Without the
Chinese Communist Party liberating the country, there would be no new
China, children are taught.
It is not only the war of the 1930s40s that is distorted, according to
Sankei. Chinese middle-school students are taught a negative historical view
of Japan as a backward feudal country in which only class struggle eventu-
ally brings the end of the era. Textbooks are further criticized for gross
distortions of the Sino-Japanese war of 189495. They overlook that Korea
was a dependency of Qing China, that the Qing had sent troops to suppress
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 119
a rebellion in Korea, that Japan liberated Korea from China, and that Russia
was heading south and threatening Japan. Instead, Chinese textbooks con-
clude that Japan from the early Meiji era had a plan to invade China aimed
at satisfying the greed of the rising capitalist class. When covering the Boxer
Rebellion and other foreign interventions, the textbooks point the arrow of
blame at Japan. In discussing Japans invasion of Taiwan, they neglect to
mention that Chinese control did not really extend to it and that, according
to international law, Japan was entitled to sign an accord with China grant-
ing it this land as part of a treaty after a war. In article 12 readers learn that
Chinese children are taught to equate pro-Japanese with traitors. Later they
are reminded that in the 1990s coverage of the 1937 start of all-out war
changed in tone, ignoring the background of the time. The Japanese paper
also questions the figures for casualties and damages in the war, noting that
they were raised sharply from the 1991 to the 1995 texts. The message on
Japanese cruelty is pervasive, even appearing in music class textbooks.
Children are taught to loathe Japan; almost nothing appears on the postwar
country. Both friendly postwar Sino-Japanese relations and Japans peace
orientation are omitted, as is mention of the huge assistance it has given to
China. Article 16 concludes that teaching a history of hatred cannot be for
the purpose of understanding and amity.
Apart from textbooks, the Japanese are troubled by reports of the image
of their country conveyed in the media and academic writings in China.
Convinced that they live in a country of peace with a mission to oppose
nuclear testing and a new arms race, they faced a growing sentiment in
China that not only was their country still plagued by the bushido fighting
spirit seen in the war years but it was also bent on becoming a military
power again (Cho, 1998, p. 113). Taking little heed of recent improvements,
the right wing in Japan suggests that a media blitz continues to show the
Chinese people a distorted image. While this is correct to a degree, the multi-
tude of historical distortions in these rightist attacks on Chinese views pose
an even more serious danger to mutual understanding.
The new textbooks approved in Japan in the spring of 2001 damaged
Japans image in China further. Repeatedly, China criticizes these junior high
textbooks for glorifying a war of invasion. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan
summoned Japans ambassador to warn that the textbooks, which claim that
Japan fought to liberate Asian countries, could disrupt bilateral relations
and undermine the trust of the Chinese people. He added that the Chinese
would now be wondering if Japan can keep its solemn commitment on his-
tory as long as the Japanese are being seriously poisoned by their history
education (China Daily, 5 April 2001).
120 Gilbert Rozman
The exchange of opinions over the Japanese textbooks sharpened negative
sentiments on both sides. Chinese views towards Japan hardened as the
Japanese right-wing press revived the reasoning of the war years. The
Chinese could read accounts that Manchuria was not Chinese territory and
Japans co-operation with Manchuko should not be labeled an invasion of
China, that Japan used military force to liberate Asia from European and
American colonialism, and that Koreans, Taiwanese and South-east Asians
fought alongside Japanese and wished for a Japanese victory in the war. This
was nothing less than a frontal assault on the verdicts of the Tokyo tribunal
(Nakamura, 2001.)
When the textbook issue arose in late 2000 and early 2001, Chinese com-
ments showed restraint, but after Diet members made provocative state-
ments e.g. that the Greater East Asian War ended colonialism in Asia
and the Japanese government made clear that this time changes in proposed
revisions would not be a political concern, the Chinese attitude changed. On
27 February 2001 Jiefang junbao asked how a country that lacked the
courage to look squarely at its history could win the trust of its neighbors.
(Tokyo shimbun, 28 February 2001, p. 3). The mood in China was hardening
after more than a year of smile diplomacy. When Japans leaders rejected
all entreaties to revise the textbooks, explaining that it was a matter of free-
dom of speech, and when Koizumi only moved his visit to the Yasukuni
shrine forward instead of canceling it, the message left with the public was
that Japan was glorifying its wartime aggression in Asia.
Sino-Japanese relations soured in the first months of 2001 due not only to
textbook revisions in Japan but also to what the Chinese called discrimina-
tion by Japanese firms, and the Japanese called the bashing of Japanese
companies. The media demanded an apology from both Japan Airlines and
All Nippon Airlines for forcing Chinese passengers to spend the night in
Japanese airports while treating other passengers differently. An outcry arose
after Mitsubishi Motors recalled cars in the United States but refused to
recall similar models in China. Matsushita refused to honor consumer
claims over defective cellular phones in China in a similar manner
(Chugoku, 2001). Even as the Chinese government was striving to reduce
criticism of Japan, consumer consciousness offered fertile soil in which com-
plaints could flourish.
Chinese criticisms of Japan in the mass media, on the internet, in labor
troubles, in trade disputes and at the official level reached such a peak in
the middle of 2001 that one nationalist Japanese journal called it Japan
bashing fever (Sonoda and Yuasa, 2001, p. 167). Chinas government could
not control the outpouring of emotions from below, blaming Japanese com-
panies for discrimination in treatment of customers and types of goods sold,
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 121
accusing Japanese politicians of rekindling historic animosities, and, in
essence, charging the Japanese people with violating the trust from China.
As one problem after another was added to the list, the antagonisms were
compounded. Relations and images have hit another low.
In the midst of repeated acknowledgements that China is sincerely
endeavoring to create a new, forward-looking framework for bilateral rela-
tions, many are suspicious. They suspect that the change from late 1999
was just a tactical shift, largely due to anger with the United States. Some
Chinese experts respond that it was, in fact, a sea change based on a
far-reaching reassessment and recognition of the terrible effects on public
opinion after the Jiang visit in November 1998. When Japan emerges from
its foreign policy paralysis of 2001 (Rozman, 2002) more effort may be made
to explore Chinas true intent.
If Japan were to become more entangled in the dispute over Taiwan, this
could become the single issue that does most damage to relations with China
(Zhang, 2000, pp. 240241). The Chinese closely monitor the pro-Taiwan
faction in the Diet and popular support for Taiwans independence. So far,
they calculate it is possible to contain this trend (Zhao, 2000), and prevent
an explosion of public outrage that might follow. However, rising danger of
a rupture over Taiwan illustrates how bilateral ties are increasingly subject to
multilateral, especially US, influence.
In 198992 and in 19992001 Chinese concerns over the United States led
to more leeway for Japan, while in 199798 increased optimism about the
United States added to pressure on Japan. The impact of the triangle can be
complicated; at times, primarily before 1972, China has harshly opposed
both nations and at other times, especially in the late 1970s, it has been posi-
tive towards both. If alarm in China over Bushs unilateralism means
continuation of the smile diplomacy toward Japan, then the Japanese will
have a good chance to recover from the worsening image of 2001 and make
their case to the Chinese people.
On 11 September 2001 the international environment shifted abruptly. An
outraged US government began a drive against terrorism. China was put on
the spot over its assistance and sympathy to suspect states and its insistence
on the inviolability of the sovereignty of states regardless of their links to
terrorism. Given Russias agreement with the United States that Islamic ter-
rorism originating in Afghanistan must be stopped, Chinas leaders were
concerned about being isolated. Yet, they also could take comfort from the
likelihood that the unilateralist instincts of the Bush administration would
soon drive rifts in plans for joint action. Japan, too, could not be at ease
with a project imposed by the United States with little room for an inde-
pendent voice. Under the shadow of a massive shift in global attention,
122 Gilbert Rozman
Beijing and Tokyo could draw a little closer to gain leverage or could be
driven apart when Beijing calculated that it would lose influence anyway
from global reorganization that leaves less space for opposing the United
States or dividing Japan and the United States. In October 2001, two weeks
before the APEC summit in Shanghai, Koizumi visited Beijing to mend rela-
tions by repeating apologies over history, as Japan was preparing to send
ships to support the US war on terrorism and China reacted calmly to avoid
isolation.
5 Conclusions
Over the period 19892001 both sides were to blame for failing to overcome
the distrust of the Chinese people toward Japan, but the preponderance of
blame was shifting. During the first five years more fault lies with Japan, par-
ticularly its benign neglect of what mattered most to the psychology of the
Chinese people as overconfidence and the veto power of Japans rising right
wing guided thinking. To be sure, a cooling in Chinas leadership after the
ousting of Hu Yaobang combined with a rise in nationalism from June 1989
and then Chinas mounting assertiveness in 1993 all frustrated sincere Japan-
ese desires for closer ties. The Chinese government is far from blameless, but
the Japanese leadership and public messed up a chance to act from strength
by taking the past seriously.
In the next five years the chief culprit was the Chinese leadership, inebri-
ated with its own overconfidence towards Japan and intent on boosting
nationalism regardless of its impact on relations. There were, of course,
Japanese provocations that aroused popular resentment in China, and public
opinion, whose vocal elements pressed for a stronger stance against Japan,
was increasingly becoming an independent force in China, but it was largely
the actions of Chinas leaders that aroused nationalist emotions, which, in
turn, became the driving force for deteriorating mutual respect over the
entire period to 2001.
In 19992001 the Chinese government had changed course, but the public
remained deeply suspicious. Again the responsibility shifted to the Japanese
side to earn the trust of the Chinese people, but it failed the test. The new
textbooks are but the most striking example of rising Japanese nationalism
that antagonizes the Chinese public. By the summer of 2001 Japanese lead-
ers were anxious to stabilize relations; yet they were also determined to
assert an independent foreign policy regardless of Chinas views. Given the
new US assertiveness, first over missile defense and then more importantly in
the battle against terrorism, it is now Chinas turn to decide whether it
should either calm its concern over the new sources of tension in bilateral
relations with Japan in order to add some balance to great-power relations
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 123
while co-operating with the United States in some anti-terrorist actions, or
turn simultaneously against Japan and the United States. If China took the
latter course, it could be repeating the mistake of the mid-1990s by alienat-
ing Japanese opinion at the same time that it is provoking a closer alliance
with the United States.
There is no simple formula to describe the impact of the international
environment on Sino-Japanese relations. For Chinas leaders, the overriding
objective has been to boost comprehensive national power. In 198992 and
19992001 improved relations with Japan were appealing as one of the best
means to that end, and leaders shaped images of Japan accordingly. When
China was confident that its power was rising, as in 199498 through high
rates of growth, closer ties to Russia, and, for part of this time, more atten-
tion from the United States, the illusion arose that hardening positions
toward Japan would serve national power. As US power has grown, Chinas
leaders have not been consistent in their response to Japan. Thus, in the face
of the new assertiveness of the Bush administration in the fall of 2001,
Beijing has no ready answer whether it should try a full smile diplomacy
toward Japan or deepen the frown apparent in mid-2001 when relations
deteriorated due to Japans actions and the force of Chinese public opinion.
Chinas leaders need to look back on their own errors. As the priorities of
the leadership changed, so did Chinas views of Japan. Under Mao and
Zhou, relations with Japan became a function of international politics, shift-
ing towards Tokyo in order to prevent hegemonic behavior. Dengs policy
toward Japan became a means for Chinas economic development, and
thereby quelled criticism. But Jiang shifted the priority to great-power influ-
ence in a fluid world environment. This brought less stability both in policies
and in the messages conveyed to the Chinese public. Meanwhile, urban
Chinese became independent actors whose attitudes came to shape relations.
For the older generation, revival of war memories had a lasting effect, since
no catharsis had occurred through a Chinese occupation of Japan or a sense
of restitution. Among younger people who had had a chance to come into
close contact with Japan, the aloofness with which they were received as well
as the historical amnesia they encountered left a bad impression. For stu-
dents eager to believe in their nation, Japans insensitivity created ideal
conditions for rising nationalism. Having played to these negative feelings,
Chinese leaders could not dampen them when they tried. Jiang Zemins
legacy includes stirring public distrust against Japan and then failing to
overcome it when that seemed desirable.
The primary problem on the Chinese side is overconfidence. In the
mid-1990s, fortified by extraordinary economic success and stronger rela-
tions with Russia, China took its own long-term modernization for granted
124 Gilbert Rozman
and became too assertive against the potential of Japans rise in power. The
overreaction made Chinas concerns a self-fulfilling prophecy, giving cause
for the Japanese right to use a perceived threat from China for the very
advances foreseen by China. Again in 199798 Chinese overoptimism about
relations with the United States and their success in avoiding the Asian
financial crisis led to Japan being treated as if it could be bypassed by the
big powers. As leaders jockey for power in the succession process of 2002
they may not be able to shift to a more cautious path.
Chinas leaders recognize that they must walk a tightrope on history: rais-
ing it enough to keep the Japanese from forgetting its essential lessons, but
not so much that it makes them numb to the past and angry at the messen-
ger. They accept Japanese complaints that too little was written about
Chinas gratitude for ODA, but fear appearing weak before a public that
believes Japan owes China much more than it has provided.
It was not only the Chinese sides misleading images of Japan that jeopar-
dized relations. Japan, too, shares the blame for failing to build new
momentum towards closer relations. In the second half of the 1980s along
with the bubble economy leading to massive debt and the LDP monopoly of
power fueling a new level of corruption linked to pork-barrel politics, grow-
ing nationalist sentiments within the leadership diminished the prospect of
appealing to Chinese opinion on the basis of contrition over history. After
4 June 1989 and the collapse across the socialist bloc, the Japanese falsely
assumed that Chinese rejection of their communist past would overshadow
their antipathy toward Japans militarist invasion. Anticipating luring China
into regional integration and even becoming a bridge between the insensitive
United States and a besieged China, the Japanese gave little thought to what
would be needed to win the trust of the Chinese people. Through 1993 it was
this insensitivity even more than the Chinese governments fear of Japanese
power that left the Chinese public highly susceptible to renewed hostility
towards Japan.
Causality for the Chinese government can be traced to an obsession with
adding to comprehensive national power, a strategy of nationalism by the
Communist Party to retain power, and the growing force of public opinion
justifiably aggrieved. On the Japanese side the causes of behavior that pro-
vokes China also can be reduced to three primary factors: (i) for the
majority who have not reflected deeply on history, an image of ingratitude
and threatening intentions to gain dominance; (ii) for some anxious to boost
political and military power, a convenient view of China as a threat that
ignores the psychology of the Chinese people; and (iii) for a minority intent
on vindicating Japanese history and overturning the postwar mood of the
society, a sense that China offers a promising opportunity to remake Japan.
Chinas changing images of Japan, 19892001 125
On both sides, struggles over national identity and domestic political agen-
das are driving actions that shape Chinese views of Japan.
What will Chinas posture towards Japan be in the post-Jiang era? It could be
determined by the leadership struggle inside China either in accord with the hopes
of many in both countries that younger leaders will turn away from Jiangs
reputed critical propensity, or in line with the impatience of current leaders, who
are inclined to press the United States on Taiwan and are likely to drawJapan into
the fray. The Japanese have long pinned their hopes on the succession of the
fourth generation of leaders in the Peoples Republic who have no personal
experience of the war era. Indeed, the lites that have arisen since the 1980s as
China has become more open and modernized are likely to share much more of
the global thinking of Americans and Japanese than the current leadership. We
should welcome their arrival while doing our utmost to create an environment
where they have room to act.
The future may also be decided inside Japan, where the textbook revisions
of 2001 have already set back relations. If the Japanese treat Chinese public
opinion with contempt, they can expect little from a new leadership in
China. In the period 19992001 it has been Japans leaders more than
Chinas that have disillusioned the Chinese public about the future of rela-
tions. Chinas encouragement to nationalism in the mid-1990s amidst flawed
calculations about great-power relations was a big factor in the susceptibility
of the Chinese public to more negative views, but Japans deplorable histori-
cal record in China, along with its negligent attitude toward building trust,
are also responsible. Even if younger Chinese are more globally oriented,
their views of Japan may remain negative. Some Japanese, in fact, worry that
educated Chinese share more in common with Americans in their thinking
than Japanese. They need to be reassured by Japans leaders and public.
Japan also faces a generational transition in its leaders, testing views of his-
tory as well as of globalization.
Japan must pull back from a reassertion of nationalism based on histori-
cal revisionism if it is to expect more trust from the Chinese people. Top
leaders may have an excuse in the process of textbook review that denies the
government direct censorship over the alternatives chosen, but if there was a
will to convey a sympathetic response to Chinas legitimate concerns, it
could be done. Ultimately, it is the Japanese people who must decide how
important winning Chinese trust is. If in the 1930s Japans militarist leader-
ship may be held largely responsible for damage to relations, in the coming
decade the Japanese public may be most at fault if relations fail to improve
based on distrust. To make that possible, however, will require China to
prove that its real intent is to build mutual respect and accept Japan as a
regional power and a US ally in the global order.
126 Gilbert Rozman
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