E2105 Constitutional Law 1 Prof Muyot

Santiago v Sandiganbayan
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, petitioner, v.
Sandiganbayan, respondent.

Doctrine: RA3019 Sec 13 is not a penalty but a
preliminary preventive measure.
Nature: Certiorari
Date: 2001 Apr 18
Ponente: Vitug

Short Version: Petitioner assails the order of 90-day
preventive suspension by the Sandiganbayan with regard
to criminal case against petitioner in violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Facts:
1) 1992 Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin
petitioner from leaving the country.
2) 1996 Jan 5, Sandiganbayan suspends Santiango from
her duties as head of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) regarding the criminal case against her.
3) Santiago allegedly approved the legalization of
unqualified aliens who entered the country in Jan 1984.

Issue/s: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the
authority to suspend Santiago as a Senator.

Held: Yes, because the order of suspension prescribed by
RA 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own members. Sec 13 of RA 3019 is not a
penalty but a preliminary preventive measure.

Decision: Petition DISMISSED


De Venecia v Sandiganbayan
Jose De Venecia, et al., petitioners, v Sandiganbayan,
respondents.

Doctrine: The suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft
law is mandatory not a penalty.
Nature: Certiorari
Date: 2002 February 5
Ponente:

Short Version: The petitioners seek to annul the Order
dated 28 August 1997 of the Sandiganbayan directing the
preventive suspension of Rep. Paredes and the
Resolution dated 29 August 1997 declaring Speaker De
venecia in contempt of court.

Issue/s: Whether the Sandiganbayan may cite in
contempt of court the Speaker of the House for refusing to
implement the preventive suspension order of a member
of the House re a criminal case.

Held: Yes, the suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft
law is mandatory not a penalty.

Decision: the case is deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED for being moot


Casco Chemical Co. v Gimenez
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc., petitioner, v. Hon.
Pedro Gimenez, in his capacity as Auditor General of the
Philippines, and Hon. Ismael Mathay, in his capacity as
Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.
Doctrine: The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President.
Nature: review decision Auditor General denying a
claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical
Co., Inc.
Date: 1963 February 28
Ponente: Concepcion

Short Version: The petitioner assails the decision of the
Central Bank to deny their application for exemption from
the margin fee pursuant to Sec 2, RA 2609.

Facts:
1) Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609,
otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee
Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1,
1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of
25% on foreign exchange transactions.
2) The Bank later promulgated a memorandum
establishing the procedure for applications for exemption
from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic
Act No. 2609.
3) Several times in November and December 1959,
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. which is
engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used
in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood
producers bought foreign exchange for the importation
of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw
materials in the production of said glues and paid
therefore the aforementioned margin fee aggregating
P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another
purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of
P6,345.72 as margin fee therefore.
4) Petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of
P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the
Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee.
5) The respondents deny the application for exemption.
6) Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde"
appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea
and formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that
respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of
the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise.
7) Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and"
between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that
the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea"
formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product,

Issue/s: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are
exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin
fee.
E2105 Constitutional Law 1 Prof Muyot

Held: No, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant
to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed
upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of
the following:.
x x x x x x x x x
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood
and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive
use of end-users.

Said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the
view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent
of the House of Representatives.
The enrolled billwhich uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde"is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Decision: Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED


United States v Pons
The United States, plaintiff-appellee, v. Juan Pons,
defendant-appellant.

Doctrine: The journals of the legislature have been
declared conclusive upon the courts,
Nature: Appeal
Date: 1916 August 12
Ponente: Trent

Short Version: The petitioner assails the validity of R 2381,
for which he will be punished if found guilty, on the ground
that it was passed on Mar1 1914 instead of Feb 28.

Facts:
1) 1915, Apr 10, Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto
Lasarte, conspiring together and plotting among
themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and fraudulently, bring from Spain, on board the steamer
Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of
Manila, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the
value of P62,400,
2) Pons and Beliso were found guilty; while Lasarte was
not yet arrested. Beliso and Pons appealed but Beliso
withdrew his appeal so the judgment as to him became
final.
3) Petitioner alleged and offered to prove that the last day
of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for
1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381,
under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was
not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on
March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null
and void.

Issue/s: Whether or not RA 2381 was passed on the
appropriate date for it to be considered valid.

Held: Yes, Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the
Commission shall perform the duties which would properly
be required of the Recorder of the Commission under the
existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative
Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among
other things, "that the proceedings of the Commission
shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal," and
that it shall be the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct
journal of the proceedings of the Commission."
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his
contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or
recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are
the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their
very nature and object the records of the Legislature are
as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into
the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature,
when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would
be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws.

Decision: The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.


Astorga v Villegas
Herminio A. Astorga, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of
Manila, petitioner, v. Antonio J. Villegas et al, respondents.
Doctrine: The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires
it.
Nature:
Date: 1974 Apr 30
Ponente: Makalintal

Short Version: The petitioner relies on the validity of
House Bill 9266 with amendments passed by Sen Roxas
(which later became RA 4065) in assailing the order of
respondent Mayor in enjoining him from exercising the
powers as Acting Mayor.

Facts:
1) 1964 March 30, House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local
application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It
was there passed on third reading without amendments on
April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for
its concurrence.
2) Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal
Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M.
Roxas favorably recommended approval with a minor
amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of
the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the
Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in
case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
3) When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate
on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
amendments to Section 1 were introduced by Senator
Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in
toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by
Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the
Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
4) On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a
letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No.
E2105 Constitutional Law 1 Prof Muyot
9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964
"with amendments." Attached to the letter was a
certification of the amendment, which was the one
recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved by
the Senate.
5) The House of Representatives thereafter signified its
approval of House Bill No. 9266; certified and attested by
the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of
the Senate and the Senate President. The President of the
Philippines affixed his signature by way of approval on
June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act
No. 4065.
6) 1964 July 5, Senator Tolentino issued a press
statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266
signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a
wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by
him and approved on the Senate floor.
7) The Senate President addressed a letter dated July 11,
1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that
the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding
officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress
and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as
invalid and of no effect. The President subsequently
withdraws his signature.
8) Mayor Villegas of Manila issued circulars to the
department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government to disregard the provisions of Republic Act
4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to
recall five members of the city police force who had been
assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of
Republic Act 4065.
9) 1965 April 28, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who
was then going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued
a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner
Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the
powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the
Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act
4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor
under any other law until further orders from this Court."

Issue/s: Which House Bill 9266 version was truly ratified
and enacted (seeing that there are two amendments)?

Held: The Tolentino version.
The function of an attestation is not of approval, because a
bill is considered approved after it has passed both
Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the
Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not
the signatures are mandatory such that their absence
would render the statute invalid.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The
lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not
add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already
present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval
by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress
is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
Court can resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments
were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate
but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him.
But since both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive withdrew their signatures on the erroneous bill,
it has thus become INVALID.

Decision: The petition is DENIED and the so-called
Republic Act No. 4065 is declared not to have been duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary
restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made
permanent.


Morales v Subido
Enrique V. Morales, petitioner, v. Abelardo Subido, as
Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.

Doctrine: In the event of any discrepancy, the enrolled bill
prevails over the matters not expressly required to be
entered on the journal.
Nature: Petition - appeal
Date: 1969 February 27
Ponente: Castro

Short Version: Petitioner contends that that the version of
the provision (Sec 10, HB 6951), as amended at the
behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the
Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged
from the conference committee the only change made in
the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has
served as chief of police with exemplary record".

Facts:
1) Sec 10, HB 6951 reads: No person may be appointed
chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or
police department of any city and has held the rank of
captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
2) The petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of
the different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the various
changes, and a certified photostatic copy of a
memorandum which according to him was signed by an
employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the bill, explaining the
change in section 10, thus: .
Section 10 was recast for clarity (with the consent of
Sen. Ganzon & Congressman Montano).
It would thus appear that the omissionwhether
deliberate or unintendedof the phrase, "who has served
the police department of a city was made not at any stage
E2105 Constitutional Law 1 Prof Muyot
of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of the
engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the
proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by
Congress but only by an employee thereof; and that what
purportedly was a rewriting to suit some stylistic
preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning.

Issue/s: Which between the legislative journal and
enrolled bill should be used as a more reliable source of
the validity of the legislation

Held: The enrolled bill;
The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of
the President of the Philippines shows that section 10 is
exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip
form by the Bureau of Printing. We cannot go behind the
enrolled Act to discover what really happened.
Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito we held that an enrolled bill
"imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts."
Not in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill.
To be sure there are certain matters which the
Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the
journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such
matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do
not now decide.

Decision: motions for reconsideration are DENIED.