THIRD DIVISION

BGen. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR.,

Petitioner,




- versus -
G.R. Nos. 173057-74

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,
Chairperson,
PERALTA,
*

BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, as Justice of the
Sandiganbayan; 4
TH
DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
Promulgated:

September 20, 2010

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution
[1]
dated May 4, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. 28022-23 and 25122-45. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motions for inhibition,
[2]
which sought to
disqualify respondent Justice Jose R. Hernandez, Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, from
taking part in said cases.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner, Retired BGen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS),
[3]
signed several deeds of sale for the acquisition of parcels
of land for the development of housing projects and for other concerns. However, it appears that the landowners
from whom the AFP-RSBS acquired the lots executed unilateral deeds of sale providing for a lesser consideration
apparently to evade the payment of correct taxes. Hence, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an
extensive investigation in 1998 on the alleged anomaly.
In its Report dated December 23, 1998, the Committee concluded that there were irregularities committed
by the officials of the AFP-RSBS and recommended the prosecution of those responsible, including petitioner, who
had signed the unregistered deeds of sale as AFP-RSBS President. Accordingly, on January 28, 1999, fourteen (14)
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner for violation of Section 3(e)
[4]
of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents as defined under paragraph 4 of Article 171
[5]
of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
[6]
The informations charging petitioner with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25122-25133 while those charging estafa through falsification of public documents
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25134-25145.
Then, on July 27, 2003, junior officers and enlisted men from elite units of the AFP took over the Oakwood
Premier Apartments at Ayala Center in Makati City to air their grievances about graft and corruption in the
military. In response to the incident, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created a Fact-Finding Commission
(Feliciano Commission) wherein respondents wife, Professor Carolina G. Hernandez, was appointed as one of the
Commissioners. On October 17, 2003, the Feliciano Commission submitted its Report recommending, among others,
the prosecution of petitioner. President Arroyo then issued Executive Order No. 255 on December 5, 2003, creating
the Office of a Presidential Adviser under the Office of the President to implement the recommendations of the
Feliciano Commission.
[7]
Professor Carolina G. Hernandez was appointed as Presidential Adviser in the newly created
office. Shortly thereafter, respondent Justice Hernandez was appointed as Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan
and assigned to its Fourth Division.
On October 11, 2004, eight additional informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner.
Two were assigned to the Fourth Division of the court, one for violation of R.A. No. 3019, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 28022, and the other for estafa through falsification of public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. 28023.
On April 6, 2006, petitioner filed two motions to inhibit Justice Hernandez from taking part in Criminal Case
Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23 pendingbefore the Fourth Division. Petitioner cited that Justice
Hernandezs wife, Professor Hernandez, was a member of the Feliciano Commission and was tasked to implement
fully the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, including his criminal prosecution. Further, the
spousal relationship between Justice Hernandez and Professor Hernandez created in his mind impression of partiality
and bias, which circumstance constitutes a just and valid ground for his inhibition under the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
In its Consolidated Comment/Opposition,
[8]
the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) asserted that the
grounds raised by petitioner in his motions for inhibition were anchored on mere speculations and conjectures. It
stressed that the recommendation of the Feliciano Commission was a product of consensus of the members of the
Commission which was a collegial body. And even if Professor Hernandez signed the Report of the Commission to
implement the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the findings of the said Commission did not
remove the presumption of innocence in petitioners favor. Hence, the OSP argued that the mere membership of
Prof. Hernandez in the Feliciano Commission did not automatically disqualify Justice Hernandez from hearing the
criminal cases against petitioners.
On May 4, 2006, Justice Hernandez issued the assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, accused Jose S. Ramiscals Motions for Inhibition are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the Resolution, but instead filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before this Court on the following grounds:
I
THE RESPONDENT HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO INHIBIT HIMSELF
FROM THE CASES PENDING BEFORE THE 4
TH
DIVISION AGAINST PETITIONER
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT UNDER RULE 137 HE IS DISQUALIFIED TO TRY OR SIT IN JUDGMENT
IN THESE CASES;
II
THE RESPONDENT 4
TH
DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS PROCEEDING TO HEAR THESE
CASES WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ITS MEMBER, THE RESPONDENT JUSTICE JOSE HERNANDEZ, IS
DISQUALIFIED FROM SITTING OR TAKING PART IN ITS PROCEEDINGS; AND,
III
THE HON. JUSTICE HERNANDEZ IS DISQUALIFIED FROM TAKING PART IN SITTING OR HEARING
THE CASES AGAINST PETITIONER IN ALL THE CASES PENDING BEFORE ALL THE FIVE (5)
DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS DISQUALIFICATION UNDER
RULE 137.
[9]

Essentially, the issue is: Did Justice Hernandez commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in not inhibiting himself from the cases against petitioner pending before the Sandiganbayan?
Petitioner submits that it was erroneous for Justice Hernandez to deny the motions to inhibit himself under
the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, when in fact the basis for his disqualification
was the latters spousal relationship with Professor Hernandez, which situation was governed by the first paragraph
of the said section. According to petitioner, while Professor Hernandez was not directly pecuniarily interested in
the case, she was more than so interested in them because as an appointee of President Arroyo, she was receiving
emoluments to monitor the progress of the cases and to see to it that the recommendations of the Feliciano
Commission are fulfilled.
We deny the petition.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties
in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the
cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The
second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned
whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.
[10]

In denying the motions for his inhibition, Justice Hernandez explained that petitioner failed to impute any act
of bias or impartiality on his part, to wit:
What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law is the necessity
of proving bias and partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof
required needs to point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for
inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice
Hernandez from where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or appreciated. In fact, it is
oddly striking that the accused does not even make a claim or imputation of bias or partiality on
the part of Justice Hernandez. Understandably, he simply cannot make such allegation all because
there is none to be told. If allegations or perceptions of bias from the tenor and language of a
judge is considered by the Supreme Court as insufficient to show prejudgment, how much more
insufficient it becomes if there is absent any allegation of bias or partiality to begin with.
[11]

We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed Resolution upon the grounds so
stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi,
[12]
that the mere imputation of
bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence
must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which
may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial.
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the just or valid
reasons contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a judge may
inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the judges partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble
role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and
prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough.
[13]

Petitioner contends that his motions were based on the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, but a closer
examination of the motions for inhibition reveals that petitioner undoubtedly invoked the second paragraph by
underscoring the phrase, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. This was an express
indication of the rule that he was invoking. Moreover, it was specifically stated in paragraph 7 of both motions that
in accuseds mind, such circumstances militates against the Hon. Justice Hernandez and constitutes a just and valid
ground for his inhibition under the 2
nd
paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 137, in so far as the cases against accused are
concerned. Hence, there is no question that petitioner relied on the second paragraph of the Rule which
contemplates voluntary inhibition as basis for his motions for inhibition.
And even if we were to assume that petitioner indeed invoked the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 in his
motions to inhibit, we should stress that marital relationship by itself is not a ground to disqualify a judge from
hearing a case. Under the first paragraph of the rule on inhibition, No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.... The relationship
mentioned therein becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the judge is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to show that Professor Carolina G.
Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before the Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition of
Justice Hernandez under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated May 4, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23 isAFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.






CUI VS CUI

FACTS:
Jesus and Antonio are the legitimate children of Don Mariano Cui and Doa Antonia Perales who died intestate in1939. Jesus
alleged that during the marriage of Don Mariano and Dona Antonia, their parents acquired certain properties inthe City of
Cebu, namely, Lots Nos. 2312, 2313 and 2319. Upon the death of their mother, the properties were placed under the
administration of their dad.that while the latter was 84 years of age, Antonio by means of deceit, secured the
transfer to themselves the said lotswithout any pecuniary consideration; that in the deed of sale executed
on March 8, 1946, Rosario Cui appeared as one of the vendees, but on learning of this fact she
subsequently renounced her rights under the sale and returned her portion toDon Mariano Cui by executing a
deed of resale in his favor on October 11, 1946; that defendants, fraudulently and with thedesire of enriching themselves
unjustly at the expense of their father, Don Mariano Cui, and of their brothers and co-heirs,secured a
loan of P130,000 from the Rehabilitation properties, and with the loan thus obtained, defendants
constructedthereon an apartment building of strong materials consisting of 14 doors, valued at
approximately P130,000 and another building on the same parcels of land, which buildings were leased
to some Chinese commercial firms a monthly rental of P7,600, which defendants have collected and will continue to
collect to the prejudice of the plaintiffs;Jesus alleged that the sale should be invalidated so far as the portion of
the property sold to Antonio Cui is concerned, for the reason that when that sale was effected, Antonio was then
acting as the agent or administrator of the properties of DonMariano Cui.Jesus lays stress on the power of attorney Exhibit L
which was executed by Don Mariano in favor of Antonio Cui on March 2,1946, wherein the former has constituted the
latter as his "true and lawful attorney" to perform in his name and that of theintestate heirs of Doa Antonia
Perales.
ISSUE
: WON the sale of the property to Antonio was valid.
HELD
: YES.While under article 1459 of the old Civil Code an agent or administrator is disqualified from purchasing property in his
handsfor sale or management, and, in this case, the property in question was sold to Antonio Cui while he was already the
agentor administrator of the properties of Don Mariano Cui, we however believe that this question cannot
now be raised or invoked.
The prohibition of the law is contained in article 1459 of the old Civil Code, but this prohibition has already
beenremoved.
Under the provisions of article 1491, section 2, of the new Civil Code, an agent may now buy property placed inhis hands for
sale or administration, provided that the principal gives his consent thereto. While the new Code came
intoeffect only on August 30, 1950, however, since this is a right that is declared for the first time, the
same may be givenretroactive effect if no vested or acquired right is impaired (Article 2253, new Civil Code). During the
lifetime Don Mariano,and particularly on March 8, 1946, the herein appellants could not claim any vested or acquired right in
these properties, for,as heirs, the most they had was a mere expentancy. We may, therefore, invoke now this practical and
liberal provision of our new Civil Code even if the sale had taken place before its effectivity.










THIRD DIVISION

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St.,Pasay City,
Petitioner,

- versus -

JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Public Respondent.

BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St.,Pasay City,
Private Respondent.
G.R. No. 154464

Present:

TINGA, J.,
*

CHICO-NAZARIO,
Acting Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
*

NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 11, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION

NACHURA, J.:



This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the
Resolutions dated May 10, 2002
[1]
and July 31, 2002
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City,
which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of
the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his
behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance.
Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
[3]
that a non-
lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the
Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley
Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz
vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares
then remarked, Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? and proceeded to hear the pending Motion
to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,
[4]
praying for the voluntary
inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the
conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts
that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that
justice will not be served.
[5]


In an Order
[6]
dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing
tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition,
considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
[7]
of the
said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality.
[8]
In the same Order, the trial court held
that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to
satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration,
[9]
petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A,
but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different
circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order
[10]
dated July 31,
2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the
following errors:
I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTERS BEHALF, IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT
VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN
INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.


The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner
as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it
has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however,
to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be
directed.
[11]
A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.
[12]
The hierarchy of courts is
determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for
compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions
filed directly before it.
[13]


Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to
continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved
with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as
it necessarily delays more important concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall
be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
thePhilippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.


The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his
failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioners appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact
that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure
of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized schools clinical legal education program and is under
supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by
a duly authorized member of the bar.


and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the
petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party.
The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his
appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may
personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the
litigation.
[14]
Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence
and procedure as those qualified to practice law,
[15]
petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into
the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally
conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party
exercising his right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore,
be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the
petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear
in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is
misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student
practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was
incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself
and counsel,
[16]
this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived.
[17]
The rationale for
this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado,
[18]
where we declared that even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the
Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party
litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyers assistance, effectively undertake the successful
pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and
impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident
to this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law
student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before
inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should
grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality
by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the
pre-trial when she said: Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? Petitioner avers that by denying his
motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing
petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and confidence in the respondents impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case
[19]
against the
respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15,
2002. We now adopt the Courts findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing
evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial,
[20]
as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself
must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before
her.
[21]
Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in
favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City
is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990
ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges
against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order
complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the
Court granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976,
complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro
Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as
the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of
fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being
terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which
properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the
case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with
him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the
land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming
that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the
Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a
public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and
registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement
dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office
of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent
against complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis
before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by
making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell
a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18, 1976, denying the
accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24,
1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant
presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and
counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the long delay in the
resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy
disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on
August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for
postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their
respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the
Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the
Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales
be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts of
misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case
where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development
agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories who
had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their
signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he
intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental
motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous
pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's contention that
the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether or not
there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an
administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20
of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled
DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office of
the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the
investigation has been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim, reference to the
IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-
707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-
B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case,
the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The
Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official
and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1,
1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20
of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor
General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to
dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent
submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a thorough
and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will
result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the
disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the case to the
IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity
to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial
of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less
than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who
appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of misconduct
alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General, the
Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary
power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by the
Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the
Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of
72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed,
respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143]
pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said
case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half
(1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring
his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article
1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in
litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920);
Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer
should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear
anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of
property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary
action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied),
Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws
[of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any
violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised
Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression
of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the
instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and
to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from
purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is
disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with
such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional
Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On
the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new
Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code,
as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation
constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because the land
development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in
the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the
implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino, married to
Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire
satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the
abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D of the
Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to be absolute
and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the land
development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a
public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held
on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the complainant in an
anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was
understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to
warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public
auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves
as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of
TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to
Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to
the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous
conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty
to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a
party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at
a public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly
undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and
failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22,
1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to be true copies of
an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by respondent
with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement
namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista
were made to appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters
(SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed
the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never
did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after
respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copyattached to the letter and to send
it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent
acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the
alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum
on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly
misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado.
Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent
with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law
[Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01,
Code of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed by respondent
in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394].
The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part
that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon
Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
Alfaro T.
Fortunad
o
[signed]
Editha T.
Fortunad
o
[signed]
Nestor
T.
Fortunad
o
[signed]
C
O
N
F
O
R
M
E
Ramon
A.
Gonzales
[signed]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree
with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to
reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for
reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay
expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324
(1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry
on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See
Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the
fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez,
Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil
Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter.
The evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge
and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they
gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23,
1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is
where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6,
Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of First Instance and
the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still
pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and
perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest,
respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for
holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No.
Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim
that it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is no basis for
holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above discussion on the
other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and the rules
governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to
uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar."
[Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor
General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the
case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of
this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and
guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.



























EN BANC

[G.R. No. 96333. September 2, 1992.]

EDUARDO C. DE VERA, Petitioner, v. HON. COMMISSIONER ERNESTO L. PINEDA; NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON BAR INVESTIGATION AND DISCIPLINE OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES; THE HON. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OR THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
(IBP); AND ROSARIO P. MERCADO, JESUS K. MERCADO AND J.K. MERCADO & SONS AGRICULTURAL
ENTERPRISES INCORPORATED, Respondents.

Eduardo C. De Vera in his own behalf.

Carmen Leonor M. Alcantara for Private Respondents.

The IBP Director for Legal Affairs for public respondents.


SYLLABUS


1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; WHEN NOT AVAILABLE; RULE. It is now well-settled
that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judges findings and conclusions (Pacis
v. Averia, 18 SCRA 907, 915, citing Regala v. CFI of Bulacan, 77 Phil. 684; Ong Sit v. Piccio, 78 Phil. 785; Icutamin v.
Hernandez, 81 Phil., 161; Verhomal v. Tan, 88 Phil. 450; Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil. 340), and that certiorari will
not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As long as a court or
administrative agency acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction, will
amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil
action of certiorari (Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. [INPORT] v. The Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et
Al., 171 SCRA 579, 584, citing Santos, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 56114, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378).

2. LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS; RULE IN CONDUCTING THEREOF. Section 12 of Rule 139-B
provides that" (e)very case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
record and evidence submitted to it by the Investigator with his report" and that" (i)f the Board, by a vote of a
majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; CONCEPT AND PURPOSE THEREOF. At this juncture, it may well be re-stated that "proceedings for the
disbarment of members of the bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is
a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice." (Tajan v. Hon. Vicente Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-
28899, 30 May 1974, 57 SCRA 154). Since disciplinary actions against members of the bar are impressed with public
interest, they should be resolved with dispatch. The filing of the instant petition has served no purpose other than to
delay the proceedings in A.C. No. 3066.


R E S O L U T I O N


This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or
preliminary prohibitory injunction, premised upon the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sometime in 1984, respondent Rosario P. Mercado filed with the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14, presided over by
Judge Jose R. Bandalan, a complaint for dissolution of conjugal partnership, support, recovery of conjugal share,
damages, etc. against Jesus K. Mercado, J.K. Mercado & Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Stanfilo, docketed as
Civil Case No. 17215.

Petitioner herein Eduardo C. De Vera was the counsel of respondent Rosario P. Mercado in the aforesaid civil case.

On 15 December 1986, Judge Bandalan rendered a decision in favor of respondent Rosario P. Mercado, awarding to
the latter some P9 million more or less. Thereafter, said respondent through her counsel, petitioner herein, filed a
motion for execution pending appeal which Judge Bandalan granted in his order dated 5 January 1987 (p. 131,
rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On 12 January 1987, a writ of execution pending appeal (p. 43, rollo) was issued, after which, notices of garnishment
under execution pending appeal (p. 146, rollo) were served on 14 January 1987 on the Manager of RCBC, Claveria
St., Davao City and RCBC, Tagum, Davao del Norte; and on the Manager, Traders Royal Bank, City Hall Drive, Davao
City and on Traders Royal Bank, R. Magsaysay Ave., Davao City, by RTC Deputy Sheriff Aquillo Angon thereby
garnishing the bank deposits of Dr. Jesus K. Mercado and the family corporation and Stanfilo, in the total amount of
P1,270,734.56 (p. 213, rollo).

Sometime thereafter, the respondent Rosario P. Mercado terminated the legal services of petitioner, and offered to
the latter the sum of P350,000.00 as his attorneys fees. The petitioner refused, claiming that under the decision of
the RTC, he is entitled to 25% or P2,254,217.00. Respondent Rosario P. Mercado in turn demanded from petitioner
the "excess" of P350,000.00 of the garnished funds still in his custody. The petitioner refused and told his former
client that he had already applied the demanded amount in partial satisfaction of his attorneys fees.

In the meantime, Judge Jose R. Bandalans courtesy resignation was accepted by the President of the Philippines.

On or about 8 June 1987, respondent Rosario P. Mercado, together with other respondents in this case, filed with
this Court a complaint for disbarment against petitioner herein and former Judge Jose R. Bandalan, docketed as A.C.
No. 3066. The complaint alleges, among others, that petitioner, in alleged breach of legal ethics, was trying to
"extort unconscionable" attorneys fees from Mrs. Mercado, by refusing to "return" the excess P350,000.00 in his
custody and that said Mrs. Mercado did not know how the garnished funds had been spent or disbursed and
therefore, asked petitioner herein to render an accounting of the funds; that respondent Rosario P. Mercado saw
petitioner giving a "supot", allegedly containing P100,000.00 to Judge Bandalan at the latters house, after the
garnishment on 14 January 1987; and that petitioner told respondent Rosario P. Mercado that it was he (petitioner)
who wrote the decision of Judge Jose R. Bandalan in Civil Case No. 17215 (pp. 216-217, rollo).

Initially, the complaint for disbarment (A.C. No. 3066) was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the approval and implementation of Rule 139-B,
amending Rule 139 of the Rules of Court on disbarment and discipline of attorneys, disbarment cases pending in the
Office of the Solicitor General were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) through its Commission
on Bar Discipline. Administrative Case No. 3066 was among the cases transferred to the IBP and it was assigned to
respondent Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda for investigation.

Thereafter, the case was set for investigation on 10 and 11 April 1989, but on motion of petitioner, the investigation
was reset to 26 May and 8 June 1989. However, Jose R. Bandalan (co-respondent in said administrative case) moved
for the resetting of the investigation set on 26 May and 8 June 1989. Hence, on 26 April 1989, respondent
Commissioner issued a Notice of Hearing (p. 169, rollo) setting the investigation to 13 and 14 June 1989, copies of
which notice were received by petitioner and respondent Jose R. Bandalan on 9 May 1989 (pp. 170, 171,
rollo).chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On 6 June 1989, or just a week before the scheduled investigation, petitioner filed by registered air mail an urgent
motion for postponement of the scheduled investigation on 13 and 14 June 1989, and sent a telegram to respondent
Commissioner informing him of such motion. The telegram was received by respondent Commissioner on 12 June
1989, or one day before the scheduled investigation, while the written motion was received by him on 27 June 1989,
or 14 days after 13 June 1989 (pp. 10-11, 268-269, rollo).

At the scheduled investigation on 13 June 1989, respondent Commissioner denied the telegraphic motion for
postponement and proceeded with the investigation wherein respondent Rosario P. Mercado took the witness stand
and testified as a witness for the complainants. After the 14 June 1989 investigation, the complainants rested their
case. Thereafter, respondent Commissioner issued an order considering the petitioner and his co-respondent
Bandalan as having waived their right to present their evidence and the case submitted for decision.

Upon receipt of the orders dated 13 June 1989 and 14 June 1989, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (p. 38,
rollo) dated 28 June 1989. The complainants filed an opposition thereto. On 21 July 1989, respondent Commissioner
issued an order (p. 268, rollo) granting the motion for reconsideration by reopening the investigation and allowing
the petitioner and his co-respondent Bandalan to present their evidence on 26, 27 and 28 July 1989, with a warning
that no further postponement shall be allowed.

At the investigation held on 26 July 1989, petitioner proceeded to Present his evidence. Thereafter, subsequent
investigations were conducted for the reception of petitioners evidence.

During the investigation of 21 October 1989, respondent Commissioner Pineda, in consultation with the parties,
adopted a modified form of procedure in conducting the investigation with respect to "out-of-Manila" witnesses by
directing that the petitioner and his co-respondent Bandalan could take down the affidavits of their witnesses who
are in Davao City or outside Manila, and that the said affidavits could be used by them as "direct testimonies" of the
affiants, but subject to cross-examination by any adverse party, namely, the complainants, and such cross-
examination would be done in Davao City. The text of respondent Commissioner Pinedas order reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"With regard to the Motion to Take Deposition of Witnesses filed by Atty. De Vera and Atty. Bandalan, instead of
deposition said respondents will just present the respective affidavits of their announced witnesses to be sent to the
Commission copy-furnished the complainants through counsels within five days from receipt of said copies of the said
affidavits. The complainants shall comment or file any counter-affidavit within a period of ten days. If the
complainants shall desire to cross-examine the affiants orally, the cross-examination shall be held in Davao City
before any authorized representative of the Commission as may be allowed at the proper time. In the event that no
oral cross-examination is desired, then the affidavits will just be submitted as the direct, testimony of the said
witnesses subject to the comments or opposition of the complainants. (TSN, pp. 78-79, Oct. 21/89 hearing)." (p. 13,
rollo).

When petitioners co-respondent Atty. Bandalans turn to present his evidence came up, the latter presented the
affidavit (p. 41, rollo) of Roberto Esguerra, an incumbent deputy sheriff of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14,
wherein the said affiant absolved petitioner and respondent Bandalan from the charges in the disbarment
case.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Subsequently, in one of the hearings that followed, complainants orally moved that they be allowed to cross-examine
said Roberto Esguerra in Manila, which respondent Commissioner granted, despite the petitioners objections as it
was contrary to the order of 21 October 1989 which directed that the cross-examination would be done in Davao City
where the witnesses executed the affidavits.

At the investigation held on 30 June 1990, Roberto Esguerra partially recanted his affidavit.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a MOTION dated 9 July 1990 for leave to take Janet Unzons testimony in Davao City thru
deposition (p. 15, rollo). The petitioner also filed with the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines a
MOTION (a) to declare a mis-trial in the on-going investigation and invalidate proceedings thus far taken and to
disqualify or inhibit Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda from further investigating this case; (b) to transfer venue of re-
investigation to Davao City, under strict compliance with Rule 139-B; and (c) to suspend further investigation in this
case until final resolution, including that of the Supreme Court, if necessary, of issues therein raised, likewise dated 9
July 1990 (p. 49, rollo).

On 9 October 1990, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued an order (p. 64, rollo), the
pertinent portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The records of the case do not show any valid ground for a mis-trial. Respondent Atty. de Vera and his co-
respondent were granted full opportunities to present their respective defenses. Due process was fully accorded to
them, hence, a mis-trial is not in order.

"Respondent Atty. de Vera likewise failed to show, and the records are bereft of facts indicating that Commissioner
Ernesto Pineda is biased and partial in the conduct of the investigation. The motion to disqualify Commissioner
Pineda from further conducting the investigation in this case, is also DENIED for lack of basis.

"The matter of transferring venue of further investigation to be conducted herein to Davao City is likewise DENIED.
Transfer of venue at this later stage in the proceedings will only further delay the investigation in this case.

"However, in the highest interest of justice, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera is hereby granted another
opportunity to present additional evidence in his behalf. Re-opening of about to be terminated investigation,
however, should not be construed as having allowed any party to rebut the testimony of his own witness, which is
not permitted under the law, prevailing rules of procedure and pertinent jurisprudence.

"In view of the adoption of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Commission on Bar Investigation and
Discipline (NCBID), this case is reassigned to the Second Division of the NCBID composed of Justice Venicio T.
Escolin as Chairman and Judge Concepcion B. Buencamino and Comm. Ernesto L. Pineda as Members.

"The Second Division of the Commission is hereby directed to resume the investigation of this case without further
delay." (Rollo, pp. 65-66)

Conformably with the order of the Board of Governors dated 9 October 1990, respondent Commissioner Pineda set
the resumption of the investigation for the reception of petitioners additional evidence on 27 and 28 November
1990.

Upon receipt of the order dated 9 October 1990 of the Board of Governors, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration dated 13 November 1990 (p. 68, rollo). Petitioner also filed a motion (a) to suspend or defer
resumption of investigation, (b) to clarify procedure; and (c) for voluntary inhibition of Commissioner Ernesto L.
Pineda, dated 13 November 1990 (p. 75, rollo).

On 23 November 1990, the Board of Governors issued an order (p. 79, rollo) denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the order dated 9 October 1990, reading as follows:cralawnad

"Pursuant to Section 6, Rule IV of the newly adopted Rules of Procedure of the National Commission on Bar
Investigation and Discipline, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 6. No interlocutory order shall stay the progress of an action nor shall be the subject of appeal to the Board
of Governors until the investigation is terminated by the investigating Commissioner or panel of Commissioners
whose report and recommendation shall be submitted to the Board of Governors for final resolution thereof. Multiple
appeal to or review by the Board shall be avoided, unless ordered otherwise by the Board upon request of the
Commission.

the Board hereby denies your Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated November 13, 1990."cralaw
virtua1aw library

At the resumption of the investigation on 27 November 1990 for the reception of petitioners additional evidence, the
petitioner manifested that, although he was ready to present his additional evidence, he could not as yet do so,
because: (a) he had not yet received the formal written order denying his motion for reconsideration of the order
dated 9 October 1990; and (b) that respondent Commissioner himself had not yet resolved his pending motions for
leave to take Janet Unzons testimony in Davao City thru deposition and motion for the voluntary inhibition of
respondent Commissioner Pineda, and that his additional evidence would consist of the testimony of Janet Unzon, his
sur-rebuttal testimony to refute the rebuttal evidence of complainants and his further testimony on the circumstances
of the recantation of Esguerra. Nonetheless, respondent Commissioner Pineda issued an order (p. 78, rollo) the
pertinent portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The records shows that respondent Eduardo De Vera received a copy of the Order of the Board of Governors dated
October 9, 1990 on October 22, 1990. Further, the record shows that the same respondent received on October 22,
1990 the Order of October 16, 1990 setting the case on November 27, and 28, 1990 both at 9:00 A.M. and in that
Order it is indicated that the hearing is intransferrable in nature.

"Considering that the respondent is not ready to present his evidence despite notice of the aforementioned Order, he
is hereby deemed to have waived his right to present further evidence.

"Further, the parties if they so desire may file their respective memorandum within a period of fifteen (15) days from
today, afterwhich, the case is deemed submitted for report and recommendation."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, the petitioner filed the present petition for CERTIORARI to annul and set aside (a) the proceedings and/or
investigation conducted by respondent Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda in A.C. No. 3066, beginning from 13 June
1989 to 27 November 1990 and the order of respondent Commissioner dated 17 November 1990; (b) the order
dated 9 October 1990 of the Board of Governors and its subsequent order dated 23 November 1990, alleging that
respondent Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying his telegraphic motion for the resetting of the scheduled investigation on 13 and 14 June 1989
and in proceeding and conducting the said investigation ex-parte; in allowing respondent Rosario Mercado to use her
affidavit as a substitute for her question-and-answer type of direct testimony; in directing Roberto Esguerra to
appear before him (Commissioner Pineda) in Manila for cross-examination by the complainants in violation of the
modified procedure of investigation as provided in the order dated 21 October 1989; in failing to resolve petitioners
motions for leave to take Janet Unzons testimony in Davao City and the motion for his voluntary inhibition; and in
issuing the order dated 27 November 1990; and that the respondent Board of Governors also acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the orders dated 9 October 1990 and 23 November
1990, and PROHIBITION to enjoin the respondents Commissioner Pineda and Board of Governors from enforcing the
order dated 27 November 1990; from closing or terminating the investigation in A.C. No. 3066; and/or from making
any evaluation, report and/or recommendation with respect to the said case until further order from this
Court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The petition is devoid of merit. The issues raised are procedural questions regarding the conduct of the investigation
in A.C. No. 3066. It is now well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the
judges findings and conclusions (Pacis v. Averia, 18 SCRA 907, 915, citing Regala v. CFI of Bulacan, 77 Phil. 684;
Ong Sit v. Piccio, 78 Phil. 785; Icutamin v. Hernandez, 81 Phil., 161; Verhomal v. Tan, 88 Phil. 450; Matute v.
Macadaeg, 99 Phil. 340), and thatcertiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous
conclusions of law or fact.

As long as a court or administrative agency acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of
its jurisdiction, will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not
by a special civil action of certiorari (Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. [INPORT] v. The Hon. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Et Al., 171 SCRA 579, 584, citing Santos, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 56114, July 28, 1987,
152 SCRA 378).

Moreover, the petition is premature. The respondent Commissioner has not yet submitted his Report to the IBP
Board of Governors, and such report is subject to review by the latter. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides that"
(e)very case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
submitted to it by the Investigator with his report" and that" (i)f the Board, by a vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case,
shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action."cralaw virtua1aw library

At this juncture, it may well be re-stated that "proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any
sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration
of justice." (Tajan v. Hon. Vicente Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-28899, 30 May 1974, 57 SCRA
154).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Since disciplinary actions against members of the bar are impressed with public interest, they should be resolved with
dispatch. The filing of the instant petition has served no purpose other than to delay the proceedings in A.C. No.
3066.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the petition. This resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. The
respondent investigator is hereby ordered TO RENDER and SUBMIT his report and recommendation to the IBP Board
of Governors, within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.
DOCKET NO. / CASE NO.: G.R. No. 160025
DATE: April 23, 2014
PETITIONER: Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Baguio City
RESPONDENT: Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation
FACTS:
Baguio City and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation agreed on June 26, 2000 that the latter
(Jadewell) will be in charge for the on-street parking as well as the installation of modern parking
meters (DG4S Pay and Display Parking Meter) in the City. However, the City Council through City
Resolution No. 037 s. 2002 alleged that Jadewell failed to comply with the agreement thus the
Council revoked it. Baguio City informed Jadewell through its President, Rogelio Tan, on a letter
dated September 22, 2006 of the rescission and in compliance with the Memorandum of Agreement
section 12, 60 days was given to Jadewell prior to its effectivity. However, Jadewell had not
questioned. Instead, filed a contempt case against Mayor Reinaldo Bautista, Jr., the City Council
including the City Legal Officer, Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes. Jadewell sought legal action before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio questioning the revocation but it was beyond the 60-day period
provided in the MOA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of the agreement was valid?
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that since Jadewell has not questioned the legal efficacy of the notice
but raised only the issue as a matter of contumacious behavior on the part of the respondents, thus
the rescission had taken effect and the MOA between the City and Jadewell legally ceased to exist.













G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994
SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA, ROLDAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,
DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE CAEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO CRUZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.
Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.
Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

VITUG, J.:
Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted this petition for certiorari, prohibition, relief from judgment, as
well as declaratory relief, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, asking us to order the Metropolitan Trial
Court ("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203-CV.
This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private respondent Vicente
Caeda ("Caeda"), then as plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants, with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (Branch X). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985, rendered judgment; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all persons
claiming right under them to vacate the premises and to remove their house/apartment and
surrender possession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P100.00
a month from January 1987 as the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises until the land is actually vacated, and the costs of suit.
1

No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On 22 August 1985, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXXII) seeking the annulment of the
aforesaid decision in the ejectment case and to set aside an order of its execution. The petition was in due time
dismissed. Again, no appeal was taken therefrom.
On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filed by petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the nullification of the judgment in the
ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. This time, petitioners appealed the
dismissal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of execution was issued by the MTC for the enforcement of its
decision. The writ, however, was held in abeyance when petitioners deposited with the Court of Appeals the sum of
P3,000.00 in cash plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month beginning February 1987. On 11 March 1987,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this Court was to be
of no avail. The petition was denied, and an entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.
Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When petitioners refused to remove their house
on the premises in question, upon motion of private respondent, an order of demolition was issued. Shortly
thereafter, the demolition began. Before the completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XIX) following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and
restraining order, filed by petitioners. On 23 February 1988, the trial court dismissed the petition.
Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew the MTC decision in a
petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief (docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944) before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV), which, again, issued a restraining order.
2

Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of execution with the MTC. An ex-parte motion of petitioners
for the issuance of a second restraining order was this time denied by the RTC (Branch XXV).
3
On 23 August
1990,
4
the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.
In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce its decision,
dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No. 107203, when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority
development by the National Housing Authority on 01 December 1987 by authority of Presidential Decree 2016.
The petition is totally without merit.
In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No. 98446, entitled,
"Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case is intimately related, where we
ruled:
. . . The singular question common to both cases submitted for resolution of this court is the
implication of Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Law,"
and its amendments or ramifications embodied in Proclamation No. 1893, as amended by
Proclamation No. 1967 and Presidential Decree No. 2016. All the above statutes are being
implemented by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council, Office of the President.
There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs the resolution of this case. On May 20,
1992, this Court required the National Housing Authority to submit a Comment on the status of the
program of acquisition by the Government of the land area which includes the disputed property,
as part of the Areas for Priority Development (APD), under the aforementioned decrees and
proclamations.
In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the Metro Manila
Project Department of the National Housing Authority, submitted the following report on the status
of Lot 6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890 Obesis Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as the Carlos
Estate, an APD site. Pertinent portions of the report read:
Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located at No. 1890 Obesis St.,
Pandacan, Manila which is the subject matter of the case and located within the
Carlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No.
1967, is not for acquisition by NHA.
The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal
Improvement Project (ZIP) and Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The site,
however, is under the administration of the Presidential Commission on Urban
Poor (PCUP) for acquisition and upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.)
The above information answers the uncertainty concerning the status of the alleged negotiation for
the acquisition by the government of certain areas in Metro Manila. The NHA is definitely NOT
acquiring the said lot for its program.
It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for Review is to set aside the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower courts, in order to avoid
eviction from the disputed premises and to be allowed to acquire the same allegedly under the
Community Mortgage Program of the National Housing Authority, we find the petition without merit
and deny the same. Consequently, the petition is DISMISSED.
5

What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners, through different
counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this Court has been spared. The utter lack of merit
of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable
execution of a decision that has long become final and executory.
Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision before different
branches of the court, trifling with judicial processes. Never, again, should this practice be countenanced.
6

The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to the pursuit of
justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must uphold and keep inviolable.
Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of that pledge; thus -
LAWYER'S OATH
I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent
to the same; I will not delay any man's cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.)
We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which
visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both
an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power.
7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly CENSURED and WARNED
that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with most severely. Double costs against
petitioners.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes
1 Rollo of G.R. No. 98446, 13-14.
2 Rollo of G.R. No. 86421, 13-14.
3 Ibid., Annex "H", Petition, 29-30.
4 Rollo of G.R. No. 98446, 14-15.
5 Rollo of G.R. No. 98446, pp. 90-91.
6 The Court has since issued Administrative Circular No. 04-94, effective 01 April 1994, hereunder
quoted for guidance:

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL REQUISITES FOR CIVIL COMPLAINTS, PETITIONS AND
OTHER INITIATORY PLEADINGS FILED IN ALL COURTS AND AGENCIES, OTHER
THAN THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, TO PREVENT
FORUM SHOPPING OR MULTIPLE FILING OF SUCH PLEADINGS.
Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated April 1, 1994, applies to and governs the filing
of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to
prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in
other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping.
Complementary thereto and for the same purpose, the following requirements, in
addition to those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing
circulars, shall be strictly complied with in the filing of complaints, petitions,
applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and shall be subject to sanctions
provided hereunder:
(1) The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the
complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under
oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and
undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no
such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding
which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status
thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn
certification contemplated herein have been filed.
"The complaint and other initiatory, pleadings referred to and subject of this
Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth,
etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in- intervention, petition, or application
where- in a party asserts his claim for relief.
"(2) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the
complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and
after hearing. However, any clearly wilful and deliberate forum shopping by any
party and his counsel through the filing of multiple complaints or other initiatory
pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground for summary dismissal
thereof and shall constitute direct contempt of court. Furthermore, the
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings
therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings against the counsel and the
filing of a criminal action against the guilty party." (Emphasis supplied)
7 Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316.
Complainant: Alfonso C. Chua
Respondent: Judge Roberto S. Chiongson
Ponente: J. Davide, Jr.

FACTS:
A complaint was filed against Alfonso Choa for making untruthful statements or falsehoods in his Petition for
Naturalization. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned to Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City Branch III presided by the respondent Judge Roberto Chiongson. On
February 21, 1995, respondent Judge found the complainant guilty of the crime of perjury and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional and to pay the costs. The complainant
moved for a reconsideration of the judgment but was subsequently denied for lack of merit. He then filed the
instant complaint against the respondent Judge and prayed for the latters removal from office alleging, inter
alia, that he was sentenced to suffer a penalty higher than that provided by law, without applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the crime of
perjury.
HELD:
No. Section 2 of R.A. No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) substantially provides that the Act shall not
apply to those penalties whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. The penalty for
perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its maximum period which is one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months to prision correccional in its minimum period which is six (6) months
and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. The complainant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
six months and one day of prision correccional. Thus, the respondent Judge was correct in not applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.











ELIGIO P. MALLARI, G.R. No. 157659
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
-versus- CARPIO-MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM and
THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF Promulgated:
OF PAMPANGA,
Respondents. January 25, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N


BERSAMIN, J.:

By petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on March 17, 2003,
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed his petition forcertiorari.

Antecedents


In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling P34,000.00 from respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS). To secure the performance of his obligations, he mortgaged two parcels of land registered
under his and his wife Marcelina Mallaris names. However, he paid GSIS about ten years after contracting the
obligations only P10,000.00 on May 22, 1978 and P20,000.00 on August 11, 1978.
[1]


What followed thereafter was the series of inordinate moves of the petitioner to delay the efforts of GSIS to
recover on the debt, and to have the unhampered possession of the foreclosed property.

After reminding the petitioner of his unpaid obligation on May 2, 1979, GSIS sent on November 2, 1981 a
telegraphic demand to him to update his account. On November 10, 1981, he requested a final accounting, but did
not do anything more. Nearly three years later, on March 21, 1984, GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage by reason of his failure to settle his account. On November 22, 1984, he requested an updated
computation of his outstanding account. On November 29, 1984, he persuaded the sheriff to hold the publication of
the foreclosure notice in abeyance, to await action on his pending request for final accounting (that is, taking his
payments ofP30,000.00 made in 1978 into account). On December 13, 1984, GSIS responded to his request and
rendered a detailed explanation of the account. On May 30, 1985, it sent another updated statement of account.
On July 21, 1986, it finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him because he had meanwhile
made no further payments.

On August 22, 1986, the petitioner sued GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 44, in San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No. 7802,
[2]
ostensibly to enjoin them
from proceeding against him for injunction (with an application for preliminary injunction). The RTC ultimately
decided Civil Case No. 7802 in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale; cancelling Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R already issued in the name of GSIS; and reinstating
TCT No. 61171-R and TCT No. 54835-R in his and his wifes names.
[3]


GSIS appealed the adverse decision to the CA, which reversed the RTC on March 27, 1996.
[4]


The petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No.
124468).
[5]


On September 16, 1996, this Court denied his petition for review.
[6]
On January 15, 1997, this Court turned
down his motion for reconsideration.
[7]


As a result, the CA decision dated March 27, 1996 became final and executory, rendering unassailable both
the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale held on September 22, 1986, and the issuance of TCT No. 284272-R
and TCT No. 284273-R in the name of GSIS.

GSIS thus filed an ex parte motion for execution and for a writ of possession on September 2,
1999.
[8]
Granting the ex parte motion on October 8, 1999,
[9]
the RTC issued a writ of execution cum writ of
possession on October 21, 1999,
[10]
ordering the sheriff to place GSIS in possession of the properties.

The sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly because of the petitioners request for an extension of
time within which to vacate the properties. It is noted that GSIS acceded to the request.
[11]

Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or to quash the writ of execution on March 27, 2000.
[12]
Also, the petitioner commenced a second case against
GSIS and the provincial sheriff in the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga (Civil Case No. 12053), ostensibly for
consignation (coupled with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order). However, the
RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 12053 on November 10, 2000 on the ground of res judicata, impelling him to appeal
the dismissal to the CA (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 70300).
[13]


In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion dated April 5, 2000 in Civil Case No. 7802 to hold GSIS, et
al.
[14]
in contempt of court for painting the fence of the properties during the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution.
[15]
He filed another motion in the same case, dated April 17,
2000, to hold GSIS and its local manager Arnulfo B. Cardenas in contempt of court for ordering the electric company
to cut off the electric services to the properties during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or to
quash the writ of execution.
[16]


To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC from resolving the pending incidents in Civil Case
No. 7802, GSIS moved to inhibit him for alleged partiality towards the petitioner as borne out by his failure to act on
the motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, motions for contempt of court, and motion
forissuance of break open order for more than a year from their filing, praying that the case be re-raffled to another
branch of the RTC.
[17]
Consequently, Civil Case No. 7802 was re-assigned to Branch 48, whose Presiding Judge then
denied the motions for contempt of court on July 30, 2001, and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-
implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession dated October 21, 1999.
[18]


The petitioner sought reconsideration,
[19]
but the Presiding Judge of Branch 48 denied his motion for
reconsideration on February 11, 2002.
[20]


Ruling of the CA


By petition for certiorari dated March 15, 2002 filed in the CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February
11, 2002, July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999.
[21]


On March 17, 2003, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit,
[22]
stating:

We find the instant petition patently devoid of merit. This Court is not unaware of the legal
tactics and maneuvers employed by the petitioner in delaying the disposition of the subject case
(Civil Case No. 7802) which has already become final and executory upon the final resolution by
the Supreme Court affirming the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. We construe the
actuation of the petitioner in resorting to all kinds of avenues accorded by the Rules of Court,
through the filing of several pleadings and/or motions in litigating this case, as running counter to
the intendment of the Rules to be utilized in promoting the objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

The issues raised in the present controversy have already been settled in our existing
jurisprudence on the subject. In the case of De Jesus vs. Obnamia, Jr., the Supreme Court ruled
that generally, no notice or even prior hearing of a motion for execution is required before a writ
of execution is issued when a decision has already become final.

The recent accretion to the corpus of our jurisprudence has established the principle of law,
as enunciated in Buaya vs. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. that once a judgment becomes final
and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a
Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.

The rule is also firmly entrenched in the aforecited Buaya case that the effective and
efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing
party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues
filed by the same parties. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to
prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial review
should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments.

As succinctly put in Tag Fibers, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme
Court is emphatic in saying that the finality of a decision is a jurisdictional event that cannot be
made to depend on the convenience of a party.

We find no cogent reason to discompose the findings of the court below. Thus, we sustain
the assailed Orders of the court a quo since no abuse of discretion has been found to have been
committed by the latter in their issuance. Moreover, this Court finds this petition to be part of the
dilatory tactics of the petitioner to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case
No. 7802 which has already been resolved with finality by no less than the highest tribunal of the
land.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[23]


Issues

Hence, this appeal.

The petitioner insists herein that the CA gravely erred in refusing to accept the nullity of the following
orders of the RTC, to wit:

1. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER 8, 1999, GRANTING THE EX-PARTE
MOTION FOR EXECUTION AND/OR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF POSSESSION
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT GSIS;

2. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER 21, 1999 GRANTING THE ISSUANCE
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENT GSIS;
3. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED JULY 30, 2001 DIRECTING TO CAUSE THE RE-
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF
THE RESPONDENT GSIS; and

4. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2002, DENYING THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2001, IN RELATION TO THE
COURT ORDER DATED JULY 30, 2001.
[24]


Ruling of the Court

The petition for review on certiorari absolutely lacks merit.

I
Petition for Certiorari in CA
Was Filed Beyond Reglementary Period

The petition assailed before the CA on certiorari the following orders of the RTC, to wit:

1. The order dated October 8, 1999 (granting the ex parte motion for execution and/or issuance
of the writ of execution cum writ of possession of GSIS);
[25]


2. The order dated October 21, 1999 (directing the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of
possession in favor of GSIS);
[26]


3. The order dated July 30, 2001 (requiring the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-
implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession, and dismissing the motions to
hold GSIS, et al. in contempt);
[27]
and

4. The order dated February 11, 2002 (denying the motion for reconsideration dated August 17,
2001 seeking the reconsideration of the order dated July 30, 2001).
[28]



The July 30, 2001 order denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of
execution, and motion to hold GSIS, Tony Dimatulac, et al. and Arnulfo Cardenas in contempt; and declared
GSISs motion for issuance of break open order and for designation of special sheriff from GSIS Legal Services
Group as premature. In turn, the motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution denied by the order
of July 30, 2001 had merely challenged the orders of October 8, 1999 and October 21, 1999(granting the writ of
execution cum writ of possession as a matter of course).

Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 denied by the order dated February
11, 2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for reconsideration vis--vis the orders dated October
21, 1999 and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could
no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already
improper and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended,
[29]
which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution, or, in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the
said motion.

It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered inextendible, because the limitation has
been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their cases.
[30]


II
Nature of the Writ of Possession
and its Ministerial Issuance


The petitioner claims that he had not been notified of the motion seeking the issuance of the writ of
execution cum writ of possession; hence, the writ was invalid.

As earlier shown, the CA disagreed with him.

We sustain the CA, and confirm that the petitioner, as defaulting mortgagor, was not entitled under Act
3135, as amended, and its pertinent jurisprudence to any prior notice of the application for the issuance of the writ
of possession.

A writ of possession, which commands the sheriff to place a person in possession of real property, may be
issued in: (1) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the
debtor is in possession of the mortgaged property, and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened; (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, pending redemption under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (4) execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court.
[31]

Anent the redemption of property sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale made pursuant to the special power
referred to in Section 1
[32]
of Act No. 3135,
[33]
as amended, the debtor, his successor-in-interest, or any judicial
creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage
or deed of trust under which the property is sold has the right to redeem the property at anytime within the term of
one year from and after the date of the sale, such redemption to be
governed by the provisions of Section 464 to Section 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the extent that said
provisions were not inconsistent with the provisions of Act 3135.
[34]


In this regard, we clarify that the redemption period envisioned under Act 3135 is reckoned from the date of
the registration of the sale, not from and after the date of the sale, as the text of Act 3135 shows. Although the
original Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1940) incorporated Section 464 to Section 466 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as its Section 25 (Section 464); Section 26 (Section 465); and Section 27 (Section 466) of Rule 39, with
Section 27 still expressly reckoning the redemption period to be at any time within twelve months after the sale;
and although the Revised Rules of Court (effective on January 1, 1964) continued to provide in Section 30 of Rule 39
that the redemption be made from the purchaser at any time within

twelve (12) months after the sale,
[35]
the 12-month period of redemption came to be held as beginning to run not
from the date of the sale but from the time of registration of the sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds.
[36]
This
construction was due to the fact that the sheriffs sale of registered (and unregistered) lands did not take effect as a
conveyance, or did not bind the land, until the sale was registered in the Register of Deeds.
[37]


Desiring to avoid any confusion arising from the conflict between the texts of the Rules of Court (1940 and
1964) and Act No. 3135, on one hand, and the jurisprudence clarifying the reckoning of the redemption period in
judicial sales of real property, on the other hand, the Court has incorporated in Section 28 of Rule 39 of the
current Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1997) the foregoing judicial construction of reckoning the redemption
period from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, to wit:

Sec. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions; notice to
be given and filed. The judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the
purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the
certificate of sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per
month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any
assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on
such last named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior
lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made,
the amount of such other lien, with interest.

Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty (60) days after the last
redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the last redemption, with two per centum thereon in
addition, and the amount of any assessments or taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid
thereon after redemption by him, with interest on such last-named amount, and in addition, the
amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The property
may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so disposed, redeemed from any previous
redemptioner within sixty (60) days after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the last
previous redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amounts of any
assessments or taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon, with
interest thereon, and the amount of any liens held by the last redemptioner prior to his own, with
interest.

Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a
duplicate filed with the registry of deeds of the place, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by
the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was
made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registry of
deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such
assessments, taxes, or liens. (30a) (Emphasis supplied).


Accordingly, the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest must redeem the foreclosed property within one year
from the registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds in order to avoid the title from consolidating in the
purchaser. By failing to redeem thuswise, the mortgagor loses all interest over the foreclosed property.
[38]
The
purchaser, who has a right to possession that extends beyond the expiration of the redemption period, becomes
the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made,
[39]
that it is no longer necessary for the purchaser
to file the bond required under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, considering that the possession of the land
becomes his absolute right as the lands confirmed owner.
[40]
The consolidation of ownership in the purchasers name
and the issuance to him of a new TCT then entitles him to demand possession of the property at any time, and the
issuance of a writ of possession to him becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his name.

The court can neither halt nor hesitate to issue the writ of possession. It cannot exercise any discretion to
determine whether or not to issue the writ, for the issuance of the writ to the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale becomes a ministerial function.
[41]
Verily, a marked distinction exists between a discretionary act and
a ministerial one. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not ministerial.
The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of
judgment.
[42]


The proceeding upon an application for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for
the benefit of one party only and without notice being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief
is granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is sought.
[43]
Its
nature as anex parte petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the application for the issuance of a writ of
possession a non-litigious proceeding.
[44]


It is clear from the foregoing that a non-redeeming mortgagor like the petitioner had no more right to
challenge the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possessionupon the ex parte application of GSIS. He could
not also impugn anymore the extrajudicial foreclosure, and could not undo the consolidation in GSIS of the
ownership of the properties covered by TCT No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R, which consolidation was already
irreversible. Hence, his moves against the writ of execution cum writ of possession were tainted by bad faith, for he
was only too aware, being his own lawyer, of the dire consequences of his non-redemption within the period
provided by law for that purpose.

III
Dismissal of Petitioners Motion for Indirect Contempt
Was Proper and In Accord with the Rules of Court

The petitioner insists that the RTC gravely erred in dismissing his charges for indirect contempt against
GSIS, et al.; and that the CA should have consequently granted his petition for certiorari.

The petitioners insistence is plainly unwarranted.

First of all, Section 4, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:

Section 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a
verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges
arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided
separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (n) (Emphasis supplied).

Indeed, a person may be charged with indirect contempt only by either of two alternative ways, namely: (1)
by a verified petition, if initiated by a party; or (2) by an orderor any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court against which the contempt is
committed. In short, a charge of indirect contempt must be initiated through a verified petition, unless the charge is
directly made by the court against which the contemptuous act is committed.

Justice Regalado has explained why the requirement of the filing of a verified petition for contempt is
mandatory:
[45]


1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing
contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under
the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to
file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with
the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this
amended section. Worse, and as a consequence of unregulated motions for contempt, said
incidents sometimes remain pending for resolution although the main case has already been
decided. There are other undesirable aspects but, at any rate, the same may now be eliminated by
this amendatory procedure.


Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by
order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a
verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be
disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this section. (Emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the petitioners charging GSIS, et al. with indirect contempt by mere motions was not permitted
by the Rules of Court.

And, secondly, even assuming that charges for contempt could be initiated by motion, the petitioner should
have tendered filing fees. The need to tender filing fees derived from the fact that the procedure
for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Rules of Court was an independent special civil action. Yet, the petitioner did
not tender and pay filing fees, resulting in the trial court not acquiring jurisdiction over the action. Truly, the omission
to tender filing fees would have also warranted the dismissal of the charges.

It seems to be indubitable from the foregoing that the petitioner initiated the charges for indirect contempt
without regard to the requisites of the Rules of Court simply to vex the adverse party. He thereby disrespected the
orderly administration of justice and committed, yet again, an abuse of procedures.

IV
Petitioner Was Guilty of
Misconduct As A Lawyer

The CA deemed it unavoidable to observe that the petition for certiorari brought by the petitioner to the CA
was part of the dilatory tactics of the petitioner to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case
No. 7802 which has already been resolved with finality by no less than the highest tribunal of the land.
[46]

The observation of the CA deserves our concurrence.

Verily, the petitioner wittingly adopted his aforedescribed worthless and vexatious legal maneuvers for no
other purpose except to delay the full enforcement of the writ of possession, despite knowing, being himself a
lawyer, that as a non-redeeming mortgagor he could no longer impugn both the extrajudicial foreclosure and the ex
parte issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession; and that the enforcement of the duly-issued writ of
possession could not be delayed. He thus deliberately abused court procedures and processes, in order to enable
himself to obstruct and stifle the fair and quick administration of justice in favor of mortgagee and purchaser GSIS.

His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he was
enjoined as a lawyer to observe the rules of procedure and xxx not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice. By his dilatory moves, he further breached and dishonored his Lawyers Oath, particularly:
[47]


xxx I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients xxx


We stress that the petitioners being the party litigant himself did not give him the license to resort to
dilatory moves. His zeal to defend whatever rights he then believed he had and to promote his perceived remaining
interests in the property already lawfully transferred to GSIS should not exceed the bounds of the law, for he
remained at all times an officer of the Court burdened to conduct himself with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to [his] clients.
[48]
His true obligation as a lawyer should not be warped by any misplaced sense of his rights and
interests as a litigant, because he was, above all, bound not to unduly delay a case, not to impede the execution of a
judgment, and not to misuse Court processes.
[49]
Consequently, he must be made to account for his misconduct as a
lawyer.

WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, and affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on March 17, 2003, with the costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.

The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is directed to investigate the
petitioner for what appear to be (a) his deliberate disregard of theRules of Court and jurisprudence pertinent to the
issuance and implementation of the writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as amended; and (b) his witting
violations of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

SO ORDERED.


Lawyers Oath

I___________ of ___________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution
and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will
not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.