Security in large Networks Using

Mediator Protocols
INTRODUCTION:
About te Pro!ect:
KEY distribution protocols are used to facilitate sharing secret
session keys between users on communication networks. By using
these shared session keys, secure communication is possible on
insecure public networks. However, various security problems exist in
poorly designed key distribution protocols for example, a malicious
attacker may derive the session key from the key distribution process.
! legitimate participant cannot ensure that the received session key is
correct or fresh and a legitimate participant cannot con"rm the identity
of the other participant. #esigning secure key distribution protocols in
communication security is a top priority.
$n some key distribution protocols, two users obtain a
shared session key via a trusted center %&'(. )ince three parties %two
users and one &'( are involved in session key negotiations, these
protocols are called three*party key distribution protocols, as in
contrast with two*party protocols where only the sender and receiver
are involved in session key negotiations. $n classical cryptography,
three*party key distribution protocols utili+e challengeresponse
mechanisms or timestamps. However, challengeresponse mechanisms
re,uire at least two communication rounds between the &' and
participants, and the timestamp approach needs the assumption of
clock synchroni+ation which is not practical in distributed systems %due
to the unpredictable nature of network delays and potential hostile
attacks( .
-urthermore, classical cryptography cannot detect the
existence of passive attacks such as eavesdropping. .n the contrary, a
,uantum channel eliminates eavesdropping, and, therefore, replay
attacks. &his fact can then be used to reduce the number of rounds of
other protocols based on challenge*response mechanisms to a trusted
center %and not only three*party authenticated key distribution
protocols(.
$n ,uantum cryptography, ,uantum key distributionprotocols
%/K#0s( employ ,uantum mechanisms to distribute session keys and
public discussions to check for
eavesdroppers and verify the correctness of a session key.
However, public discussions re,uire additional communication rounds
between a sender and receiver and cost precious ,ubits. By contrast,
classical cryptography provides convenient techni,ues that enable
e1cient key veri"cation and user authentication. 0reviously proposed
/K#0s are the theoretical design, security proof and physical
implementation. &hree important theoretical designs have been
proposed Bennett and Brassard employed the uncertainty of ,uantum
measurement2 and four ,ubit states to distribute a session key
securely between legitimate participants.
Bennett utili+ed two nonorthogonal ,ubit
states to establish a session key between legitimate users. Ekert
presented a /K#0 based on Einstein*0odolsky* 3osen %E03( pairs,
which re,uires ,uantum memories to preserve ,ubits of legitimate
users. !lthough, allow legitimate participants to establish a session
key without initially sharing secret keys and do not need a &', their
security is based on the assumption of well authenticated participants.
$n other words, without this assumption, these protocols can su4er
man*in*the*middle attacks. Hwang et al. proposed a modi"ed ,uantum
cryptography protocol that re,uires every pair of participants to
preshare a secret key %a similar idea that is this work( for measuring
bases selection.
However, the participants have to perform
public discussions to verify session key correctness. ! three*party
/K#0 proposed in re,uires that the &' and each participant preshare a
se,uence of E03 pairs rather than a secret key. 'onse,uently, E03
pairs are measured and consumed, and need to be reconstructed by
the &' and a participant after one /K#0 execution.
"ene#ts o$ Tree Party Autentications $or key Distributed
Protocol using I%&licit and '(&licit )uantu% Cry&togra&y:
!dvantage of combining implicit and explicit ,uantum
cryptography is to used to verify the session key from
trusted center and sender which improve key veri"cation
and secure the communication. !lso identify the security
threads in session key veri"cation.
!nother advantage of this pro5ect is to avoid the network
noise in message transmission by identifying the si+e of
bytes transmitted over the network from sender to receiver
and remove the extra byte content received from network
Abstract:
&he combination of 6!/K#0 %implicit( and 6!/K#07!
%explicit( ,uantum cryptography is used to provide authenticated
secure communication between sender and receiver.
$n ,uantum cryptography, ,uantum key distribution
protocols %/K#0s( employ ,uantum mechanisms to distribute
session keys and public discussions to check for eavesdroppers
and verify the correctness of a session key. However, public
discussions re,uire additional communication rounds between a
sender and receiver. &he advantage of ,uantum cryptography
easily resists replay and passive attacks.
! 6!/K#0 with implicit user authentication, which ensures
that con"dentiality, is only possible for legitimate users and
mutual authentication is achieved only after secure
communication using the session key start.
$n implicit ,uantum key distribution protocol%6!/K#0( have
two phases such as setup phase and distribution phase to
provide three party authentication with secure session key
distribution. $n this system there is no mutual understanding
between sender and receiver. Both sender and receiver should
communicate over trusted center.
$n explicit ,uantum key distribution protocol %6!/K#07!(
have two phases such as setup phase and distribution phase to
provide three party authentications with secure session key
distribution. $ have mutual understanding between sender and
receiver. Both sender and receiver should communicate directly
with authentication of trusted center.
#isadvantage of separate process 6!/K#0 and 6!/K#07!
were provide the authentication only for message, to identify the
security threats in the message. 8ot identify the security threats
in the session key.
Pur&ose o$ te syste%:
&he main purpose of the system is to introduce ,uantum cryptography
in the mediator protocols so that the security mechanisms will be
improved for the message transmissions and public discussions.
0roposed system introduces key distribution protocols which are used
to facilitate sharing secret session keys between users on
communication networks. By using these shared session keys, secure
communication is possible on insecure public networks.
$n ,uantum cryptography, ,uantum key distributionprotocols
%/K#0s( employ ,uantum mechanisms to distribute session keys and
public discussions to check for eavesdroppers and verify the
correctness of a session key.
Ob!ecti*e o$ te syste%:
$n classical cryptography provides convenient techni,ues that
enable e1cient key veri"cation and user authentication but it is
not identify eavesdropping.
Here, the enhanced key distribution protocol using classical and
,uantum cryptography will improve the security and
authentication
De#nitions and Abbre*iations:
)ender
&'* &rusted 'enter
3eceiver
/K#0*/uantum Key #istribution 0rotocal.
O*er*iew:
/uantum key distribution protocol %/K#09s( which works on
network security by the use of key agreement. )ecrete Key which is
used by each user in the network. Each user has uni,ue )ecrete and
which will be shared by each user to &rusted 'enter. $n &rusted 'enter
we have generate a Key for network )ecurity with the Help of
!lgorithms and /uantum 7echanics. &hrough that we have to prove
how secure the data has been transmitted over network to receiver.
'(isting Syste%:
$n classical cryptography, three*party key distribution
protocols utili+e challengeresponse mechanisms or
timestamps to prevent replay attacks .
However, challengeresponse mechanisms re,uire at least two
communication rounds between the &' and participants, and
the timestamp approach needs the assumption of clock
synchroni+ation which is not practical in distributed systems
%due to the unpredictable nature of network delays and
potential hostile attacks( .
-urthermore, classical cryptography cannot detect the
existence of passive attacks such as eavesdropping. &his fact
can then be used to reduce the number ofrounds of other
protocols based on challenge*response mechanisms to a
trusted center %and not only three*party authenticated key
distribution protocols(.
+i%itations o$ '(isting Syste%
#isadvantage of separate process 6!/K#0 and 6!/K#07! were
provide the authentication only for message, to identify the
security threats in the message. 8ot identify the security threats
in the session key.
Pro&osed Syste%:
$n ,uantum cryptography, ,uantum key distribution protocols
%/K#0s( employ ,uantum mechanisms to distribute session keys and
public discussions to check for eavesdroppers and verify the
correctness of a session key. However, public discussions re,uire
additional communication rounds between a sender and receiver and
cost precious ,ubits. By contrast, classical cryptography provides
convenient techni,ues that enable e1cient key veri"cation and user
authentication.
&here are two types of /uantum Key #istribution 0rotocol, they
are
,- Te Pro&osed .A)/DP
&his section describes the details of the 6!/K#0 by using the
notations de"ned in previous sections. Here, we assume that every
participant shares a secret key with the &' in advance either by direct
contact or by other ways.
0- Te Pro&osed .)/DPMA:
&he proposed 6/K#07! can be divided into two phases:
the )etup 0hase and the Key #istribution 0hase. $n the )etup 0hase,
users preshare secret keys with the &' and agree to select polari+ation
bases of ,ubits based on the preshared secret key. &he Key #istribution
0hase describes how !lice and Bob could share the session key with
the assistance of &' and achieve the explicit user authentication
Proble% De#nition:
&his work presents combination of classical cryptography
%existing( and ,uantum cryptography %proposed (. &wo three*party
/K#0s, one with implicit user authentication and the other with explicit
mutual authentication which is used to make authentication using
,uantum mechanism.
$n classical cryptography provides convenient techni,ues
that enable e1cient key veri"cation and user authentication but it is
not identify eavesdropping. Here, the enhanced key distribution
protocol using classical and ,uantum cryptography will improve the
security and authentication.
classical cryptography cannot detect the existence of
passive attacks such as eavesdropping. &his fact can then be used to
reduce the number of rounds of other protocols based on challenge*
response mechanisms to a trusted center.
Sco&e o$ te syste%:
0roposed system is developed mainly for the large systems.
Existing cryptograpgy protocols are not providing complete or accurate
security to the public discussions or message transmissions. 0roposed
)ystem identi"es the problems in the existing system and uses
,uantum cryptography to solve the security issues.
$ts applications are in each and every domain especially
where communication has to be transmitted in a secure form. 7ainly it
addresses the problems in large scale networks rather than small scale
netwoks.
1unctional Re2uire%ents:
-unctional re,uirements describe the interaction between
the system and its environment independent of its implementation.
&he Environment includes the user and
the any other external system with which the system interaction.
Both sender and receiver authenticate each other using a
shared )ecret key.
&he &rusted 'enter issues a ,uantum key to both thesender
and the receiver after the veri"cation of the secret key. &he
generation of the ,uantum key involves the selection of ;*
bit random key and 3)! algorithm is used to
<enerate a )ession key.
=sing &his )ession key both )ender and 3eceiver Encrypts
and #ecrypts data 3espectively-
Non 1unctional Re2uire%ents:
8on -unctional 3e,uirements describe aspects of the
system that are not directly related to the functional behaviour of the
)ystem.
Usability:
=sability is the ease with which the user can learn
to operate,prepare
$nput for ,and interpret output of a system or 'omponent.
Reliability:
3eliability is the ability of a system or
component to perform its re,uired function under stated conditions for
a speci"c period of time.
Per$or%ance:
0erformance re,uirements are concerned with
,uanti"able attributes of the system such as response
time,throughput,availability and accuracy.
Su&&ortability:
)upportability re,uirements are concerned with the
ease of changes to the system after deployment including for
example,adaptability maintainability
$nternationali+ation.
Security Issues:
/uantum 'ryptography, or /uantum Key
#istribution %/K#(, uses ,uantum mechanics to guarantee
secure communication and also this pro5ect presents /uantum Key
#istribution 0rotocols %/K#09s( to safeguard security in large networks.
Pseudo Re2uire%ents:
3ardware and So$tware S&eci#cations:
3ardware Inter$ace
Hard disk : >? <B
3!7 : @2A 7B
0rocessor )peed : 6.??<H+
0rocessor : 0entium $B 0rocessor
So$tware Inter$ace
C#K 2.@
Cava )wing
7)*!ccessD)/E )erver