FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147549. October 23, 2003]

JESUS DELA ROSA and LUCILA DELA ROSA, petitioners, vs.
SANTIAGO CARLOS and TEOFILA PACHECO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari
[1]
seeking to set aside the
Decision
[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54055 dated 20 July
2000 and the Resolution dated 23 February 2001 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision
[3]
of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 22, of Malolos, Bulacan (RTC) and dismissed the
complaint of Jesus Dela Rosa and Lucila Dela Rosa for forcible entry against
Santiago Carlos and Teofila Pacheco.
The Antecedents
This case stemmed from a complaint
[4]
for forcible entry filed by Jesus Dela
Rosa and Lucila Dela Rosa (Spouses Dela Rosa) against Santiago Carlos
(Santiago) and Teofila Pacheco (Teofila) with the Municipal Trial Court
[5]
of
Paombong, Bulacan (MTC).
In their complaint filed on 25 February 1998, the Spouses Dela Rosa
alleged that they are the owners of a house and lot (Property) with an area
of 352 square meters located at No. 25 San Roque, Paombong,
Bulacan. The Spouses Dela Rosa claimed that Leonardo Carlos (Leonardo)
transferred to them the ownership of the Property under the Absolute Deed of
Sale (Deed of Sale) executed on 1 September 1966. The Spouses Dela
Rosa registered on 6 October 1966 the Deed of Sale under Act No. 3344 with
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. The Spouses Dela Rosa asserted that they
renovated the house, furnished and occupied the same from 1966 to the
present. Since the Spouses Dela Rosa work and their children study
in Manila, they reside in the Property only during weekends and
holidays. However, they padlock the house on the Property while they are
away and instruct relatives who live nearby to watch over the Property.
The Spouses Dela Rosa further asserted that they have been paying the
taxes for the land since 1966 to 1997, and for the house from 1966 to
1993. In addition, the Spouses Dela Rosa had a perimeter fence built to
separate the Property from the municipal road and to protect it from
trespassers.
The Spouses Dela Rosa also asserted that in October 1997, they
discovered that, through stealth and without their knowledge and
consent, Santiago had built a house of strong materials on a vacant lot of the
Property. Santiago did not secure the necessary building permit from the
Municipal Engineers Office. Teofila had also been transferring furniture to
the house and sleeping there. On 20 November 1997, the Spouses Dela
Rosa, through their counsel, demanded that Santiagoand Teofila demolish the
house, remove their furniture and vacate the premises within ten days from
receipt of the letter. However, Santiago and Teofila did not heed the
Spouses Dela Rosas demand.
In their answer, Santiago and Teofila alleged that they are the surviving
heirs of the Spouses Leonardo and Benita Carlos (Spouses Carlos). As
heirs of the Spouses Carlos, they, along with Lucila Dela Rosa, are co-owners
of the Property. They contended that the Spouses Dela Rosa obtained the
Deed of Sale through fraud and undue influence and that their mother did not
consent to the sale of the Property which they claimed as conjugal. They
maintained that the Spouses Dela Rosa were never in possession of the
Property because the latter only went there to visit their parents, and not as
owners. Insisting that they have been occupying the Property since
birth, Santiago claimed that he constructed the house on the Property in the
concept of a co-owner.
After submission of the parties position papers, the MTC rendered a
Decision dated 30 July 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Plaintiffs to be entitled to
physical possession of Lot 147-Part particularly described in Tax Declaration No. 97-
0297-00342 (Exhibit F) situated at San Roque, Paombong, Bulacan and this Court
orders:
1. The Defendants, their heirs, assigns or any other persons claiming any right or
interest over the subject parcel of land under or in their names to vacate the same
and surrender peaceful possession thereof in favor of the Plaintiffs;
2. The Defendants to pay the Plaintiffs damages limited to the fair rental value for the
use and occupation of the premises in the amount of Two Thousand and Five
Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) a month from the date of the discovery of the
construction of the improvement (October 1997) until they finally vacate and restore
full possession thereof to the Plaintiffs;
3. The award of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) in favor of the Plaintiffs as and
by way of attorneys fees and costs;
4. The Defendants counter-claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[6]

Aggrieved, Santiago and Teofila appealed
[7]
to the RTC which rendered a
Decision
[8]
dated 31 May 1999 affirming in toto the decision of the MTC.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the RTC, Santiago and Teofila filed a
petition for review
[9]
with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered
a Decision dated 20 July 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
rendered DISMISSING respondents complaint for forcible entry against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[10]

Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Trial Courts
The MTC, in ruling in favor of the Spouses Dela Rosa, held in part:
The evidence at hand disclose [sic] that the Plaintiffs took possession of the subject
premises upon the execution of the sale on September 1, 1966 and have been in
occupancy thereof since then up to the present. Under the law, possession is
transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under
Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, when the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly
be inferred. (Ong Ching Po, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341)
In the same vein, Article 531 of the statute is explicit, thus: Possession is acquired
by the material possession of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is
subject to the action of our will or by the proper acts or legal formalities established
for acquiring such right. Aside from the legal formalities as mentioned, Plaintiffs
prior material occupation or possession is supported by photographs depicting their
residence (Exhibit Q) and their furnishings (Exhibits O and O-1) thereon. Possession
in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that
petitioner (in this case, the Plaintiffs) was able to subject the property to the action of
his will (Somodio vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 307).
xxx
[11]

Finding that the MTCs factual findings are clear and supported by more
than mere preponderance of evidence,
[12]
the RTC affirmed in toto the decision
of the MTC. Consequently, Santiago and Teofila filed a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the execution of the deed of sale did not
transfer physical possession of the Property despite Article 1498 of the Civil
Code, which contemplates of constructive, not physical possession. The
appellate court also found that there was an obstacle to the delivery of
possession because the Spouses Carlos, Santiago and Teofila were residing
and continued to reside in the Property.
Noting that the Spouses Dela Rosas position paper did not attach the
affidavits of witnesses required under Section 10 of Rule 70, the appellate
court ruled that the Spouses Dela Rosa failed to prove prior possession of the
Property. The appellate court pointed out that instead of proving prior
possession, the Spouses Dela Rosa admitted the contrary. In their opposition
to the motion to dismiss,
[13]
the Spouses Dela Rosa stated that they do not
actually reside in the Property but inManila and visit the Property only during
weekends and vacations. The Court of Appeals held that this admission
confirms Santiago and Teofilas claim that they have always been in physical
possession of the Property since birth.
The Court of Appeals also held that the Spouses Dela Rosa did not verify
their complaint in violation of Section 4 of Rule 70. Neither did they attach a
certification against forum shopping in violation of Section 5 of Rule
7. Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the sale, without the consent of
Benita Carlos, is void. Since the sale is void, no title passed to the Spouses
Dela Rosa.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that assuming the sale is valid, the sale
would apply only to Leonardos share in the Property. Benita retained her
one-half share in the Property that her children Santiago, Teofila, Lucila and
Francisco acquired by succession on her death. Thus, Lucila Dela Rosa may
not dispossess her co-owners Santiago and Teofila of the Property.
The Issues
The Spouses Dela Rosa assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the
following grounds:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ONE OF
THE GROUNDS FOR REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT AND OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT THE ERRONEOUS
ASSUMPTION THAT THE COMPLAINT APPENDED TO THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW FILED BY RESPONDENTS LACKED VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ALLOWING A COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE IN AN
EJECTMENT PROCEEDING AND RULING THAT THE SAME IS VOID FOR LACK
OF MARITAL CONSENT OF BENITA CARLOS.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION OVER THE
PROPERTY DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULES OF
CO-OWNERSHIP OVER THE PROPERTY.
[14]

The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition.
Before resolving the main issue, we shall first dispose of the procedural
issues in the instant case.
There is no longer any issue on the lack of verification and certification
against forum shopping of the complaint for forcible entry. The Court of
Appeals itself stated in its assailed Resolution that it was a mere
omission
[15]
by Santiago and Teofila in their petition for review. Santiago and
Teofila failed to append to their petition for review with the Court of Appeals
the last page of the complaint containing the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping.
[16]
For the failure ofSantiago and Teofila to attach to their
petition the page of the complaint containing the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping, the appellate court should have faulted Santiago and
Teofila and not the Spouses Dela Rosa.
Another procedural question was the alleged non-submission of affidavits
of witnesses that the Spouses Dela Rosa should have attached to their
position paper. Section 10 of Rule 70 provides:
SEC. 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. Within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit
the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the
order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied
upon by them.
Section 10 should be read in relation to Section 14 of the same Rule,
which states:
SEC. 14. Affidavits. The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall
state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in
evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.
xxx
The Spouses Dela Rosa jointly verified their position paper by stating that
all the allegations in the position paper are true and correct of their own
personal knowledge.
[17]
The verification itself is an affidavit.
[18]
Section 4 of
Rule 7 states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit. Thus, the verified
position paper constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required under Rule
70. Certainly, the Spouses Dela Rosa qualify as witnesses to their own
complaint. While there are no affidavits of other witnesses that support the
complaint, the Spouses Dela Rosa attached to their position paper
documentary evidence that bolster their claim of prior possession.
Santiago and Teofila never raised as an issue the alleged non-attachment
to the complaint of affidavits of witnesses, either in the MTC or in the RTC. In
their petition for review before the Court of Appeals, Santiago and Teofila did
not also raise this issue. The MTC and RTC apparently understood correctly
that the verified complaint of the Spouses Dela Rosa constitutes the affidavit
of witnesses required under Rule 70. We rule that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that the Spouses Dela Rosa failed to attach to their complaint the
affidavits required in Sections 10 and 14 of Rule 70.
In a forcible entry case, the principal issue for resolution is mere physical
or material possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession
(possessionde jure) nor ownership of the property involved.
[19]
In the present
case, both parties claim prior possession of the Property. The Spouses Dela
Rosa claim that they have been in possession of the Property since 1966
upon the execution of the deed of sale by Leonardo in their favor. On the
other hand, Santiago and Teofila claim that they have been continuously
occupying the Property since birth and the Spouses Dela Rosa were never in
possession of the Property.
While admitting that Santiago and Teofila used to reside in the Property
since birth, the Spouses Dela Rosa contend that Santiago and Teofila moved
out when they married in 1961 and 1959, respectively. According to the
Spouses Dela Rosa, Santiago and his family live in Manila (at 3500-F
Magsaysay Blvd., Sta. Mesa,Manila)
[20]
while Teofila occupies the lot adjacent
to the Property bearing, however, the same address.
[21]
Santiago and Teofila
did not dispute these allegations by the Spouses Dela Rosa.
On the other hand, Santiago and Teofila admit that the Spouses Dela
Rosa visit the Property. Visiting the Property on weekends and holidays is
evidence of actual or physical possession. Even if the Spouses Dela Rosa
were already residing in Manila, they could continue possessing the Property
in Bulacan. The fact of their residence in Manila, by itself, does not result in
loss of possession of the Property in Bulacan. The law does not require one
in possession of a house to reside in the house to maintain his possession.
In Somodio v. Court of Appeals,
[22]
which the Spouses Dela Rosa cited,
the petitioner there began construction of a structure on his lot. His
employment, however, took him to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and he left
the unfinished structure to the care of his uncle. He would visit the property
every three months or on weekends when he had time. The Court ruled that
possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession.
[23]
There is no cogent reason to deviate from this doctrine.
Santiago and Teofila likewise do not deny that the Spouses Dela Rosa
renovated the house, furnished the same and constructed a perimeter fence
around the Property. Santiago and Teofila contend that these acts did not
include the right to possess physically the Property.
[24]
These acts of dominion
are clear indications that the Spouses Dela Rosa were in possession of the
Property. Santiago and Teofila failed to explain convincingly how the Spouses
Dela Rosa were able to renovate, furnish the house and construct a perimeter
fence around the Property without physically possessing the Property. It is
quite improbable to perform these acts without the Spouses Dela Rosa
physically possessing the Property.
Santiago and Teofila likewise challenged the validity of the sale between
their father Leonardo and the Spouses Dela Rosa. The sale transpired on 1
September 1966, before Leonardos death. The Spouses Dela Rosa
registered on 6 October 1966 the Deed of Sale under Act No. 3344 with the
Registry of Deeds of Paombong, Bulacan. If Santiago and Teofila truly
believed that the Deed of Sale is void, they should have filed an action to
annul the same, but they did not. Santiago and Teofila questioned the validity
of the Deed of Sale only when the Spouses Dela Rosa filed the forcible entry
case.
However, Santiago and Teofila cannot properly challenge the validity of
the Deed of Sale in the ejectment case because ejectment cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership.
[25]
Santiago and Teofila claim that the
Deed of Sale was executed without the consent of Benita, Leonardos
spouse. They also claim that the Deed of Sale was executed through fraud
and undue influence. However, these issues cannot properly be addressed in
the present action. These issues can only be resolved in a separate action
specifically for the annulment of the Deed of Sale. Resolution of these issues,
in turn, will determine whether the surviving heirs of the Spouses Carlos are
co-owners of the Property who are likewise entitled to its possession. Co-
ownership is only a necessary consequence of the heirs successional rights
to the Property, if any.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision dated 20 July
2000 and Resolution dated 23 February 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54055 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 May 1999 of the
Regional of Trial Court, Branch 22, of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 878-
M-98, affirming the Decision dated 30 July 1998 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Paombong, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 98-720, is REINSTATED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918
CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.
Basilio Aromin for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J .:
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner),
marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the Government.
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land located
in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took advantage of the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory information title to the land, registered as
such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information title
of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his
wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered by the
Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The
trial court agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the
facts.
As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the provisions of the
Spanish Mortgage Law and of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly known as the
Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize that for land to come under the protective gis
of the Maura Law, it must have been shown that the land was cultivated for six years previously, and
that it was not land which pertained to the "zonas forestales." As proof that the land was, even as
long ago as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not agricultural in nature is the fact that there are
yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of age.
We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following the doctrine laid
down by the United States Supreme Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish grantes within the
United States, where some recital is claimed to be false, to say that the possessory information,
apparently having taken cognizance of the requisites for title, should not now be disturbed.
(Hancock vs. McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs. United States [1869], 10 Wall.,
224.) It is sufficient, as will later appear, merely to notice that the predecessor in interest to the
petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.
Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No.
1908, reads as follows:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands,
as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide
claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next
preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four, except when prevented
by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed. The first relates to the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of what, for present
purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural public land, under a bona fide claim of ownership.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. Relative to actuality of possession, it is
admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only about one fourth of the entire tract. This is graphically
portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the Government, following:

The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the
instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?lawphil. net
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the
possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. (Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs
[1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.)
Of course, there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the size of the
tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. It is here only
necessary to apply the general rule.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and
notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world
that the land was for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the eyes of the
law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the
law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.
The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public land." The law
affirms that the phrase is denied by the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, known as the Philippine
bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find in sections 13 to 18 thereof that three classes of land are
mentioned. The first is variously denominated "public land" or "public domain," the second "mineral
land," and the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of Congress comes nearest to a precise
definition, when it makes the determination of whether the land is more valuable for agricultural or for
forest uses the test of its character.
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on numerous occasions,
what was said in the case of Jones vs. Insular Government ([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is still true, namely:
"The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that will be
entirely free from objection." In the case which gave most serious consideration to the subject
(Mapa vs. Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it was found that there does exist in the Act of
Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands." It was said that the phrase
"agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means "those public lands acquired from Spain
which are not timber or mineral lands."
The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral in nature
and, if not so found, to consider it to be agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is not very
helpful. For instance, section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For the purposes of
this chapter, 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public
land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." This
definition of "public forest," it will be noted, is merely "for the purposes of this chapter." A little further
on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the
certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest,
shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands." With reference to the last
section, there is no certification of the Director of Forestry in the record, as to whether this land is
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and
underbrush; a large wood." The authorities say that he word "forest" has a significant, not an
insignificant meaning, and that it does not embrace land only partly woodland. It is a tract of land
covered with trees, usually of considerable extent. (Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y.
Supp., 262; People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N. Y. Supp., 512.)
The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H. Baden-Powell, in
his work on Forest Law of India, states as follows:
Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be found either to
exclude some cases to which the law ought to apply, or on the other hand, to include some
with which the law ought not to interfere. It may be necessary, for example, to take under the
law a tract of perfectly barren land which at present has neither trees, brushwood, nor grass
on it, but which in the course f time it is hoped will be "reboise;" but any definition wide
enough to take in all such lands, would also take in much that was not wanted. On the other
hand, the definition, if framed with reference to tree-growth, might (and indeed would be
almost sure to) include a garden, shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was not designed
to deal with.
B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as follows:
A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by no means a
mere collection of trees, but an organic whole in which all parts, although apparently
heterogeneous, jumbled together by accident as it were and apparently unrelated, bear a
close relation to each other and are as interdependent as any other beings and conditions in
nature.
The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:
During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this question of forest
and agricultural lands was beginning to receive some attention and it is clearly shown in
section 18 of the above mentioned Act; it leaves to the Bureau of Forestry the certification as
to what lands are for agricultural or forest uses. Although the Act states timber lands, the
Bureau has in its administration since the passage of this act construed this term to mean
forest lands in the sense of what was necessary to protect, for the public good; waste lands
without a tree have been declared more suitable for forestry in many instances in the past.
The term 'timber' as used in England and in the United States in the past has been applied to
wood suitable for construction purposes but with the increase in civilization and the
application of new methods every plant producing wood has some useful purpose and the
term timber lands is generally though of as synonymous with forest lands or lands producing
wood, or able to produce wood, if agricultural crops on the same land will not bring the
financial return that timber will or if the same land is needed for protection purposes.
x x x x x x x x x
The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of duly appointed
boards and leave it in the hands of these boards to decide what lands are more valuable for
forestry purposes or for agricultural purposes.
In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent as allowable under the
law. In many cases, in the opinion of the Bureau of Forestry, lands without a single tree on
them are considered as true forest land. For instance, mountain sides which are too steep for
cultivation under ordinary practice and which, if cultivated, under ordinary practice would
destroy the big natural resource of the soil, by washing, is considered by this bureau as
forest land and in time would be reforested. Of course, examples exist in the Mountain
Province where steep hillsides have been terraced and intensive cultivation practiced but
even then the mountain people are very careful not to destroy forests or other vegetative
cover which they from experience have found protect their water supply. Certain chiefs have
lodged protests with the Government against other tribes on the opposite side of the
mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent other tribes from cutting timber or destroy
cover guarding their source of water for irrigation.
Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that if mankind
could not devise and enforce ways dealing with the earth, which will preserve this source of
like "we must look forward to the time, remote it may be, yet equally discernible, when out kin
having wasted its great inheritance will fade from the earth because of the ruin it has
accomplished."
The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making inspection of lands, in order to
determine whether they are more adapted for agricultural or forest purposes by a technical
and duly trained personnel on the different phases of the conservation of natural resources,
is based upon a previously prepared set of questions in which the different characters of the
land under inspection are discussed, namely:
Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.
Exposure: North; South; East; West.
Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.
Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and timber mixed,
dense forest.
If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares under cultivation.
(Indicate on sketch.)
For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?
State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species and estimate of
stand in cubic meters per hectare, diameter and percentage of each species.
If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable for agriculture in
vicinity, which is not covered with timber.
Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State reasons in full.)
Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve or communal
forest? Description and ownership of improvements.
If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the claimant, his place of
residence, and state briefly (if necessary on a separate sheet) the grounds upon which he
bases his claim.
When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been applied for, the
corresponding certificate is forwarded to the Director of Lands; if it is made on a privately
claimed parcel for which the issuance of a title is requested from the Court of Land
Registration, and the inspection shows the land to be more adapted for forest purposes, then
the Director of Forestry requests the Attorney-General to file an opposition, sending him all
data collected during the inspection and offering him the forest officer as a witness.
It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the limited time
intervening between the notice for the trial on an expediente of land and the day of the trial,
and the difficulties in communications as well as the distance of the land in question greatly
hinder the handling of this work.
In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by means of his
delegate the examining officer, submits before the court all evidence referring to the present
forest condition of the land, so that the court may compare them with the alleged right by the
claimant. Undoubtedly, when the claimant presents a title issued by the proper authority or
evidence of his right to the land showing that he complied with the requirements of the law,
the forest certificate does not affect him in the least as such land should not be considered
as a part of the public domain; but when the alleged right is merely that of possession, then
the public or private character of the parcel is open to discussion and this character should
be established not simply on the alleged right of the claimant but on the sylvical condition
and soil characteristics of the land, and by comparison between this area, or different
previously occupied areas, and those areas which still preserve their primitive character.
Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be conservation
of the natural resources of the Philippines. The prodigality of the spendthrift who squanders his
substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment must be restrained for the less spectacular but
surer policy which protects Nature's wealth for future generations. Such is the wise stand of our
Government as represented by the Director of Forestry who, with the Forester for the Government of
the United States, believes in "the control of nature's powers by man for his own good." On the other
hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in nature. One
very apparent reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine Islands to have the large public
domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the sagacious citizen.
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in
the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided
by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of
property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the
Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly
will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry
matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of
Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant.
We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he
asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended
by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894,
and his possessory information.
Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract
in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 3088 February 6, 1907
EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JAMES PETERSON, sheriff of the city of Manila, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Del-Pan, Ortigas & Fisher for appellant.
Hartigan, Marple, Rohde, & Gutierrez for appellees.
TORRES, J .:
On the 24th of October, 1905, the Spanish-Filipino Bank, a corporation, through its attorneys, Del-
Pan, Ortigas and Fisher, filed a complaint against the sheriff of the city of Manila and the other
defendant, Juan Garcia, praying that judgment be rendered against the said sheriff, declaring that
the execution levied upon the property referred to in the complaint, to wit, wines, liquors, canned
goods, and other similar merchandise, was illegal, and directing the defendants to return the said
goods to the plaintiff corporation, and in case that he had disposed of the same, to pay the value
thereof, amounting to P30,000, Philippine currency, and further that it be declared that the said
plaintiff corporation, under the contract of pledge referred to in the complaint had the right to apply
the proceeds of the sale of the said goods to the payment of the debt of P40,000, Philippine
currency, for the security of which the said merchandise was pledged, with preference over the claim
of the other defendant, Juan Garcia and that both defendants be held jointly liable to the plaintiff for
the sum of P500, Philippine currency, as damages, and the said defendants to pay the costs of the
proceedings, and for such other and further relief as the plaintiff might be entitled to under the law.
Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that under the contract entered into on the 4th of March, 1905, by
and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes, the former, loaned to the latter the
sum of P141,702, Philippine currency; that on the same date Francisco Reyes was already indebted
to the bank in the sum of P84,415.38, Philippine currency, which, added to the amount of the loan,
made a total of P226,117.38, Philippine currency, received by the said Reyes as a loan from the
plaintiff bank, the entire sum at an annual interest of 8 per cent; that to secure the payment of these
two sums and the interest thereon, the debtor, Francisco Reyes, by a public instrument executed
before a notary on the aforesaid date mortgaged in favor of the plaintiff bank several pieces of
property belonging to him, and pledged to the said bank part of his personal property, specifying the
proportion on which the said real and personal property thus mortgaged and pledged in favor of the
plaintiff corporation would be respectively liable for the payment of the debt; that the property
pledged by the debtor to the bank included a stock or merchandise, consisting of wines, liquors,
canned goods, and other similar articles valued at P90,591.75, Philippine currency, then stored in
the warehouses of the debtor, Reyes, No. 12 Plaza Moraga, in the city of Manila, which said goods
and merchandise were liable for the payment of the said sum of P90,591.75, Philippine currency;
that in the aforesaid deed of pledge it was agreed by and between the bank and the debtor, Reyes,
that the goods should be delivered to Ramon Garcia y Planas for safe-keeping, the debtor having
actually turned over to the said Garcia y Planas the goods in question by delivering to him the keys
of the warehouse in which they were kept; that in a subsequent contract entered into by and
between the debtor, Reyes, and the plaintiff bank on the 29th of September, 1905, the said contract
executed on the 4th of March was modified so as to provide that the goods then (September 29) in
possession the depositary should only be liable for the sum of P40,000, Philippine currency, the said
contract of the 4th of March remaining in all other respects in full force and effect, Luis M.a Sierra
having been subsequently appointed by agreement between the bank and the debtor as depositary
of the goods thus pledged in substitution for the said Ramon Garcia y Planas.
On the 19th of October, 1905, in an action brought in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
by Juan Garcia y Planas against Francisco Reyes and Ramon Agtarat, judgment was rendered
against the last-mentioned two for the sum of P15,000, Philippine currency, to be paid by them
severally or jointly, upon which judgment execution was issued against the property of the
defendants, Reyes and Agtarap. On the aforesaid 19th day of October, for the purpose of levying
upon the property of the defendants, the sheriff at the request of Garcia, the plaintiff in that case,
entered the warehouse where the goods pledged to the plaintiff bank were stored under the custody
of the depositary, Sierra, and levied upon them as per list attached to the complaint marked "Exhibit
A." The sheriff seized the goods which had been pledged to the bank, depriving the latter of the
possession of the same, to which said contract executed on the 4th of March, 1905. Without the
authority of the bank, Reyes could not dispose of the said goods. The value of the goods seized by
the sheriff was P30,000, Philippine currency, the said sheriff, having refused, and still refusing, to
return to the same to the bank, notwithstanding repeated demands made upon him to this effect, and
it being alleged in the complaint that unless prohibited by the court the sheriff would proceed to sell
the said goods at public auction and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction of the judgment rendered
in favor of the Juan Garcia y Planas, while the other debtor Reyes had not paid to the bank the
P40,000, Philippine currency, to secure the payment of which the goods mentioned in Exhibit A had
been pledged to the bank, that is, to secure the payment of a sum in excess of the actual value of
the goods in the hands of the sheriff.
The defendant sheriff, James J. Peterson, and Juan Garcia, his codefendant, through their
attorneys, Hartigan, Marple, Rohde and Gutierrez, answering the complaint, stated that they
admitted the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, and 17 of the complaint, but
denied the allegations contained in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18. They further denied
the allegations contained in paragraph 12, with the exception that the defendant sheriff levied upon
the goods mentioned in Exhibit A attached to the complaint for the purpose of satisfying the
judgment referred to therein; and also the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint,
with the exception that the sheriff seized the property mentioned in Exhibit A under the execution
referred to therein; and finally defendants denied the allegation contained in paragraph 15 of the
complaint, with the exception of the allegation that the value of the property seized is P30,000. They
accordingly asked that the action be dismissed and that it be adjudged that the plaintiff had no
interest whatever in the property described in the complaint, and that the plaintiff be taxed with the
costs of these proceedings.
The testimony introduced by the parties having been received, and the exhibits having been
attached to the record, the court below entered judgment on the 4th of January, 1906, dismissing
plaintiff's action and directing that the defendant recover from the Spanish-Filipino Bank the costs of
this action, for which execution was duly issued. To this judgment counsel for plaintiff excepted and
announced his intention of prosecuting a bill of exceptions, and further made a motion for a new trial
on the ground that the judgment of the court below was contrary to law and that the findings of fact
were plainly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.
The decision of this case depends mainly upon the question as to whether the contract of pledge
entered into by and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes to secure a loan made
by the former to the latter was valid, all the requisites prescribed by the Civil Code having been
complied with.
If so, the bank's claim had preference over the claim of a third person not secured, as was the
bank's, by a pledge, with reference to the property pledged to the extent of its value, and therefore
such property could not have been legally levied upon by the sheriff at the request of the defendant,
Juan Garcia. (Arts. 1921, 1922, Civil Code.)
The contract in question complies with all the requisites provided in article 1857 of the Civil Code,
such as that the property was pledged to secure a debt, the date of the execution, the terms of the
pledge, and the property pledged, all of which appears in a public document, and the property
pledged was placed in the hands of a third person by common consent of the debtor and creditor,
under the supervision of an agent of the bank. (Arts. 1863, 1865, 1866, 1869, 1871, Civil Code.) The
defect alleged to exist in the said contract is that the debtor, Reyes, continued in possession of the
property pledged; that he never parted with the said property, and that neither the creditor nor the
depositary appointed by common consent of the parties were ever in possession of the property
pledged, and for this reason, and upon the further ground that the contract was fraudulent, the court
below dismissed the complaint with the costs against the plaintiff.
In the motion for a new trial it was alleged by the plaintiff that the judgment of the court below was
contrary to law, and that the findings of fact contained therein were plainly and manifestly against the
weight of the evidence. If plaintiffs contention is correct, then the judgment of the court below should
be reversed.
From the evidence introduced at the trial, both oral and documentary, it appears that a third person,
appointed by the common consent of the debtor and creditor, was in possession of the goods
pledged in favor of the bank under the direct supervision of an agent of the bank expressly
appointed for this purpose, and it has not been shown that the said Reyes continued in the
possession of the goods after they had been pledged to the plaintiff bank.
Exhibit C and the testimony of Francisco Reyes, Luis M.a Sierra, and Mariano Rodriguez
corroborate the existence and authenticity of the contract of pledge recorded in a public instrument
and conclusively and satisfactorily show that the debtor, after the pledge of the property, parted with
the possession of the same, and that it was delivered to a third person designated by common
consent of the parties. For the purpose of giving this possession greater effect, the pledgee
appointed a person to examine daily the property in the warehouse where the same was kept.
The witness Matias Garcia also testified as to the status of these goods, and informed Juan Garcia
of such status before the same were levied upon.
The sheriff's testimony supports the allegation that the depositary, Sierra, was present at the place
where the goods were kept, as well as the representative of the bank, Rodriguez, when he, the
sheriff, went there for the purpose of levying upon the said property. He further testified that
Rodriguez, the representative of the bank, then protested and notified him that the property in
question was pledged to the Spanish-Filipino Bank.
The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857 and 1863 of
the Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the pledgee took charge and possession of
the goods pledged through a depository and a special agent appointed by it, each of whom had a
duplicate key to the warehouse wherein the said goods were stored, and that the pledgee, itself,
received and collected the proceeds of the goods as they were sold.
The fact that the said goods continued in the warehouse which was formerly rented by the pledgor,
Reyes, does not affect the validity and legality of the pledge, it having been demonstrated that after
the pledge had been agreed upon, and after the depository appointed with the common consent of
the parties had taken possession of the said property, the owner, the pledgor, could no longer
dispose of the same, the pledgee being the only one authorized to do so through the depositary and
special agent who represented it, the symbolical transfer of the goods by means of the delivery of
the keys to the warehouse where the goods were stored being sufficient to show that the depositary
appointed by the common consent of the parties was legally placed in possession of the goods.
(Articles 438, 1463, Civil Code.)
The fact that the debtor, Reyes, procured purchasers and made arrangements for the sale of the
goods pledged and that the bills for the goods thus sold were signed by him does not affect the
validity of the contract, for the pledgor, Reyes, continued to be the owner of the goods, (art. 1869,
Civil Code), he being the one principally interested in the sale of the property on the best possible
terms.
As to the reservation stipulated in paragraph 13 of the contract executed on the 4th of March, 1905,
it could not affect the contract in question for the reason that reservation referred to the rent from the
property mortgaged, to the bank and the dividends from the shares of stock also pledged to the
bank, and not the merchandise so pledged, and such reservation could not have rendered the
contract of pledge null.
If the case is to be decided in accordance with the facts alleged and established, the defendant not
having introduced any evidence to show that the said contract of pledge was fraudulent as to other
creditors, there was no legal ground upon which the court below could have held that the contract
evidenced by the instrument in question was entered into to defraud other creditors of the pledgor.
For the reason hereinbefore set out, and the judgment of the court below being contrary to the
evidence, the said judgment is hereby reversed, and it is hereby adjudged that the plaintiff
corporation, under and by virtue of the contract of pledge in question, had a preferential right over
that of the defendant, Juan Garcia, to the goods pledged or the value thereof, the value to be applied
to the payment of the debt of P40,000, Philippine currency, for the security of which the said property
was pledged, and the defendants are accordingly hereby ordered to return to the plaintiff corporation
the property improperly levied upon, or to pay its value, amounting to P30,000, Philippine currency,
without special provision as to costs. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in
accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the case be remanded to the court below for
execution. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Carson and Willard, JJ,. concur.