EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC.

, Petitioner
vs.
BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., and
MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE
CO., LTD.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 193986 | 2014-01-15

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 88361, which affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), ofMakati City, Branch 138 in Civil Case No. 04-1005.

The facts follow:

On August 29, 2003, Sumitomo Corporation (Sumitomo) shipped through MV Eastern Challenger V-
9-S, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (petitioner), 31 various steel sheets in
coil weighing 271,828 kilograms from Yokohama, Japan for delivery in favor of the consignee
Calamba Steel Center Inc. (Calamba Steel).4 The cargo had a declared value ofUS$125,417.26
and was insured against all risk by Sumitomo with respondent Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.
(Mitsui). On or about September 6, 2003, the shipment arrived at the port of Manila. Upon unloading
from the vessel, nine coils were observed to be in bad condition as evidenced by the Turn Over
Survey of Bad Order Cargo No. 67327. The cargo was then turned over to Asian Terminals, Inc.
(ATI) for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending Calamba Steels withdrawal of the goods.
When ATI delivered the cargo to Calamba Steel, the latter rejected its damaged portion, valued at
US$7,751.15, for being unfit for its intended purpose.5

Subsequently, on September 13, 2003, a second shipment of 28 steel sheets in coil, weighing
215,817 kilograms, was made by Sumitomo through petitioners MV Eastern Challenger V-10-S for
transport and delivery again to Calamba Steel.6 Insured by Sumitomo against all risk with Mitsui,7
the shipment had a declared value of US$121,362.59. This second shipment arrived at the port of
Manila on or about September 23, 2003. However, upon unloading of the cargo from the said vessel,
11 coils were found damaged as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargo No.
67393. The possession of the said cargo was then transferred to ATI for stevedoring, storage and
safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof by Calamba Steel. When ATI delivered the goods, Calamba
Steel rejected the damaged portion thereof, valued at US$7,677.12, the same being unfit for its
intended purpose.8

Lastly, on September 29, 2003, Sumitomo again shipped 117 various steel sheets in coil weighing
930,718 kilograms through petitioners vessel, MV Eastern Venus V-17-S, again in favor of Calamba
Steel.9 This third shipment had a declared value of US$476,416.90 and was also insured by
Sumitomo with Mitsui. The same arrived at the port of Manila on or about October 11, 2003. Upon its
discharge, six coils were observed to be in bad condition. Thereafter, the possession of the cargo
was turned over to ATI for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof by
Calamba Steel. The damaged portion of the goods being unfit for its intended purpose, Calamba
Steel rejected the damaged portion, valued at US$14,782.05, upon ATIs delivery of the third
shipment.10

Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim with Mitsui through the latters settling agent, respondent
BPI/MS Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS), and the former was paid the sums of US$7,677.12,
US$14,782.05 and US$7,751.15 for the damage suffered by all three shipments or for the total
amount of US$30,210.32. Correlatively, on August 31, 2004, as insurer and subrogee of Calamba
Steel, Mitsui and BPI/MS filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioner and ATI.11

As synthesized by the RTC in its decision, during the pre-trial conference of the case, the following
facts were established, viz:

1. The fact that there were shipments made on or about August 29, 2003, September 13, 2003 and
September 29, 2003 by Sumitomo to
Calamba Steel through petitioners vessels;

2. The declared value of the said shipments and the fact that the shipments were insured by
respondents;

3. The shipments arrived at the port of Manila on or about September 6, 2003, September 23, 2003
and October 11, 2003 respectively;

4. Respondents paid Calamba Steels total claim in the amount of US$30,210.32.12

Trial on the merits ensued.

On September 17, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision,13 the dispositive portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. and Asian Terminals, Inc., jointly and severally, ordering the latter to pay
plaintiffs the following:

1. Actual damages amounting to US$30,210.32 plus 6% legal interest thereon commencing from the
filing of this complaint, until the same is fully paid;

2. Attorneys fees in a sum equivalent to 25% of the amount claimed;

3. Costs of suit.

The defendants counterclaims and ATIs crossclaim are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

Aggrieved, petitioner and ATI appealed to the CA. On July 9, 2010, the CA in its assailed Decision
affirmed with modification the RTCs findings and ruling, holding, among others, that both petitioner
and ATI were very negligent in the handling of the subject cargoes. Pointing to the affidavit of Mario
Manuel, Cargo Surveyor, the CA found that during the unloading operations, the steel coils were
lifted from the vessel but were not carefully laid on the ground. Some were even dropped while still
several inches from the ground while other coils bumped or hit one another at the pier while being
arranged by the stevedores and forklift operators of ATI and [petitioner]. The CA added that such
finding coincides with the factual findings of the RTC that both petitioner and ATI were both negligent
in handling the goods. However, for failure of the RTC to state the justification for the award of
attorneys fees in the body of its decision, the CA accordingly deleted the same.15 Petitioner filed its
Motion for Reconsideration16 which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution17 dated October 6,
2010.

Both petitioner and ATI filed their respective separate petitions for review on certiorari before this
Court. However, ATIs petition, docketed as G.R. No. 192905, was denied by this Court in our
Resolution18 dated October 6, 2010 for failure of ATI to show any reversible error in the assailed CA
decision and for failure of ATI to submit proper verification. Said resolution had become final and
executory on March 22, 2011.19
Nevertheless, this Court in its Resolution20 dated September 3, 2012, gave due course to this
petition and directed the parties to file their respective memoranda.

In its Memorandum,21 petitioner essentially avers that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the
RTC because thesurvey reports submitted by respondents themselves as their own evidence and
the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner clearly show that the cause of the damage was the
rough handling of the goods by ATI during the discharging operations. Petitioner attests that it had
no participation whatsoever in the discharging operations and that petitioner did not have a choice in
selecting the stevedore since ATI is the only arrastre operator mandated to conduct discharging
operations in the South Harbor. Thus, petitioner prays that it be absolved from any liability relative to
the damage incurred by the goods.

On the other hand, respondents counter, among others, that as found by both the RTC and the CA,
the goods suffered damage while still in the possession of petitioner as evidenced by various Turn
Over Surveys of Bad Order Cargoes which were unqualifiedly executed by petitioners own surveyor,
Rodrigo Victoria, together with the representative of ATI. Respondents assert that petitioner would
not have executed such documents if the goods, as it claims, did not suffer any damage prior to their
turn-over to ATI. Lastly, respondents aver that petitioner, being a common carrier is required by law
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it carries.22

Simply put, the core issue in this case is whether the CA committed any reversible error in finding
that petitioner is solidarily liable with ATI on account of the damage incurred by the goods.

The Court resolves the issue in the negative.

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that factual questions may not be raised before this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari as this Court is not a trier of facts. This is clearly stated in
Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.

Thus, it is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put in issue.
Questions of fact cannot be entertained.23

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question
of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.24

In this petition, the resolution of the question as to who between petitioner and ATI should be liable
for the damage to the goods is indubitably factual, and would clearly impose upon this Court the task
of reviewing, examining and evaluating or weighing all over again the probative value of the
evidence presented25 something which is not, as a rule, within the functions of this Court and
within the office of a petition for review on certiorari.

While it is true that the aforementioned rule admits of certain exceptions,26 this Court finds that none
are applicable in this case. This Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the
RTC which were duly affirmed by the CA. Unanimous with the CA, this Court gives credence and
accords respect to the factual findings of the RTC a special commercial court27 which has
expertise and specialized knowledge on the subject matter28 of maritime and admiralty
highlighting the solidary liability of both petitioner and ATI. The RTC judiciously found:

x x x The Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes (TOSBOC, for brevity) No. 67393 and Request
for Bad Order Survey No. 57692 show that prior to the turn over of the first shipment to the custody
of ATI, eleven (11) of the twenty-eight (28) coils were already found in bad order condition. Eight (8)
of the said eleven coils were already partly dented/crumpled and the remaining three (3) were
found partly dented, scratches on inner hole, crumple (sic). On the other hand, the TOSBOC No.
67457 and Request for Bad Order Survey No. 57777 also show that prior to the turn over of the
second shipment to the custody of ATI, a total of six (6) coils thereof were already partly dented on
one side, crumpled/cover detach (sic). These documents were issued by ATI. The said TOSBOCs
were jointly executed by ATI, vessels representative and surveyor while the Requests for Bad Order
Survey were jointly executed by ATI, consignees representative and the Shed Supervisor. The
aforementioned documents were corroborated by the Damage Report dated 23 September 2003
and Turn Over Survey No. 15765 for the first shipment, Damage Report dated 13 October 2003 and
Turn Over Survey No. 15772 for the second shipment and, two Damage Reports dated 6 September
2003 and Turn Over Survey No. 15753 for the third shipment.

It was shown to this Court that a Request for Bad Order Survey is a document which is requested by
an interested party that incorporates therein the details of the damage, if any, suffered by a shipped
commodity. Also, a TOSBOC, usually issued by the arrastre contractor (ATI in this case), is a form of
certification that states therein the bad order condition of a particular cargo, as found prior to its turn
over to the custody or possession of the said arrastre contractor.

The said Damage Reports, Turn Over Survey Reports and Requests for Bad Order Survey led the
Court to conclude that before the subject shipments were turned over to ATI, the said cargo were
already in bad order condition due to damage sustained during the sea voyage. Nevertheless, this
Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that there was also negligence on the part of the employees
of ATI and [Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.] in the discharging of the cargo as observed by plaintiffs
witness, Mario Manuel, and [Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc.s] witness, Rodrigo Victoria.

In ascertaining the cause of the damage to the subject shipments, Mario Manuel stated that
the coils were roughly handled during their discharging from the vessel to the pier of (sic) ASIAN
TERMINALS, INC. and even during the loading operations of these coils from the pier to the trucks
that will transport the coils to the consignees warehouse. During the aforesaid operations, the
employees and forklift operators of EASTERN SHIPPING LINES and ASIAN TERMINALS, INC.
were very negligent in the handling of the subject cargoes. Specifically, during unloading, the steel
coils were lifted from the vessel and not carefully laid on the ground, sometimes were even dropped
while still several inches from the ground. The tine (forklift blade) or the portion that carries the coils
used for the forklift is improper because it is pointed and sharp and the centering of the tine to the
coils were negligently done such that the pointed and sharp tine touched and caused scratches,
tears and dents to the coils. Some of the coils were also dragged by the forklift instead of being
carefully lifted from one place to another. Some coils bump/hit one another at the pier while being
arranged by the stevedores/forklift operators of ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. and EASTERN
SHIPPING LINES.29 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, it is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded generally remain
under the custody of the carrier.30 As hereinbefore found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA based
on the evidence presented, the goods were damaged even before they were turned over to ATI.
Such damage was even compounded by the negligent acts of petitioner and ATI which both
mishandled the goods during the discharging operations. Thus, it bears stressing unto petitioner that
common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Subject to
certain exceptions enumerated under Article 173431 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The extraordinary responsibility of
the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively,
by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.32 Owing to this
high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have
been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is,
unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to
avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they
observed such high level of diligence.33 In this case, petitioner failed to hurdle such burden.

In sum, petitioner failed to show any reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the ruling of
the RTC as to warrant the modification, much less the reversal of its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88361 is hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 113779-80 | 1995-02-23

D E C I S I O N


PUNO, J.:

The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For
even if the commission of the crime can be established, without proof of identity of the criminal
beyond reasonable doubt there can be no conviction. In the case at bench, the identification of the
petitioner cannot rest on an assured conscience. We rule that petitioner is entitled to a mandatory
acquittal.

Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City 1 with Robbery 2 (Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code) and Carnapping 3 (republic Act No. 6539).

Of the four (4) accused, only petitioner was apprehended. The other three (3) are still at-large.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges and was tried.

We come to the facts.

Complainant CIPRIANA F. TORRES is a public school teacher of Kaligayahan Elementary School,
Novaliches. Her work requires her to leave her maid, JOVINA MADARAOG TORRES, alone in her
house at Block 45, Lot 28, Lagro Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City. Her husband is in Australia
while her children go to school.

The incident transpired at around 8:45 in the morning of July 19, 1988. Somebody knocked at the
gate of the Torres residence pretending to buy ice. As the maid Madaraog handed the ice to the
buyer, one of the robbers jumped over the fence, poked a gun at her, covered her mouth, and
opened the gate of their house. 4 The ice buyer and his companions barged in. Numbering four (4),
they pushed her inside Torres' house and demanded the keys to the car and the safety vault. 5 She
told them she did not know where the keys were hidden. 6 They tied up her hands and dragged her
to thesecond floor of the house. Petitioner was allegedly left downstairs as their lookout. 7

On order of the accused, Madaraog sat on Torres' bed, her body facing the bedroom door with her
back on the vault. They also gagged her mouth and ransacked Torres' room. One of the accused
stumbled upon a box containing keys. They used the keys to open drawers and in the process found
the car key. Petitioner was then summoned upstairs and given the car key. He tried it on the car and
succeeded in starting its engine.

In twenty (20) minutes, accused were able to loot the vault and other valuable items in the house.
They then tied Madaraog's hands and feet to the bed's headboard and escaped using Torres' car.

Still gripped with fear, Madaraog loosened her ties with her fingers, hopped to the stairs and cried for
help. 8 Her neighbor Semia Quintal responded and untied her. They also sought the help of
Angelina Garcia, another neighbor. It was Garcia who informed Torres that her house was
burglarized.

Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities at Fairview, Quezon City and the
National Bureau of Investigation(NBI). On July 25, 1988, Madaraog and Quintal described the
physical features of the four (4) robbers before the NBI cartographer. One of those drawn by the
artist was a person with a large mole between his eyebrows. 9 On August 30, 1988, petitioner was
arrested by the NBI agents. The next day, at the NBI headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraog
and the other prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crimes at bench.

SEMIA QUINTAL 10 averred that she saw petitioner allegedly among the three (3) men whiling away
their time in front of Alabang's store some time before the crimes were committed. Quintal is a
neighboring maid.

MARY BARBIETO 11 likewise declared that she saw petitioner allegedly with several companions
standing by at Torres' house that morning of July 19, 1988. She is a teacher and lives within the
block where the crimes were committed.

Petitioner ALVIN TUASON, 12 on the other hand, anchored his defense on alibi and insufficient
identification by the prosecution. he has lived within the neighborhood of the Torres family since
1978. He averred that on July 19, 1988, he was mixing dough and rushing cake orders from 7:00
o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon at his sisters' TipTop Bakeshop in Antipolo
Street, Tondo, Manila. It takes him two (2) hours to commute daily from Lagro, Novaliches to Tondo.

He was arrested more than one (1) month after the robbery. On August 30, 1988 at about 8:00
o'clock in the evening, he was in their house watching a basketball game on T.V. and went out to
buy a cigarette. On his way back, a person accosted him and asked his name. After he identified
himself, 13 a gun was poked at his right side, a shot was fired upward, and five (5) men swooped on
him without any warrant of arrest. He asked them if he could wear t-shirt as he was naked from waist
up. They refused. They turned out to be NBI agents of one of whom a certain Atty. Harwin who lived
in Lagro, Novaliches. He was shoved into the car and brought to the NBI headquarters. 14 He was
surprised when an NBI agent, whose identity was unknown to him, pointed to him as one of the
suspects in the robbery in the presence of Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses.

Petitioner's sister ANGELI TUASON, 15 part-owner of TipTop Bakeshop corroborated his story. She
testified that on July 17, 1988 she asked her sister Mary Ann to remind petitioner to work early on
July 19, 1988 since Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays are busy days as she caters to schools.

The trial court in a Joint Decision convicted petitioner of the crimes charged and sentenced him as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"In Q-88-396 (carnapping) or an indeterminate term of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS as minimum and TWENTY (20) YEARS as maximum; and in Q-88-397 (robbery) for a
term of ONE (1) YEAR, SEVEN (7) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as minimum and TWO (2)
YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS as maximum.

On the civil aspect, the court hereby orders Alvin Tuason y Ochoa as follows:

1. In Q-88-396 (carnapping) to return to Mrs. Cipriana Torres and her husband the carnapped
Toyota Corona Sedan, Model 1980 with Plate No. NPZ 159 or to pay its value of P180,000.00 which
the court finds to be the reasonable value of said car; and.

2. In Q-88-397 (robbery) to return to Mrs. Cipriana Torres and her husband the stolen items
mentioned in the information filed in said case and hereinabove stated or pay the corresponding
values thereof or a total of P280,550.00 which the court finds to be the reasonable values.

The civil liability is joint and solidary with the co-conspirators of accused Alvin Tuason.

In case of appeal, the bail bonds are fixed at TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P280,000.00) fro criminal case No. Q-88-396 and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) for criminal case No. Q-88-397.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED." 16

Petitioner appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On December 16, 1993, the Eleventh Division
of the appellate court gave no credence to the exculpatory allegations of petitioner and affirmed in
toto the assailed Decisions. 17 On February 4, 1994, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit. 18

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred:

A.
[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE CASE AT BAR THE PRINCIPLE THAT FINDINGS OF TRIAL
COURTS ARE GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL, PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING
THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS CASE ARE BASED ON CERTAIN
REFUTABLE REASONS EXPRESSLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.

B.
[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE TESTIMONY OF HEREIN PETITIONER THE CONCEPT AND
ATTENDING INFIRMITY OF "SELF-SERVING EVIDENCE."

C.
[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE TESTIMONY OF HEREIN PETITIONER THE CONCEPT AND
ATTENDING INFIRMITY OF "NEGATIVE EVIDENCE."

D.
[F]OR IGNORING OR DISREGARDING THE GLARING AND FATAL INFIRMITIES OF THE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES, SPECIALLY AS IDENTIFICATION, AS WELL AS
TO THE PALPABLE IMPROBABILITY OF HEREIN PETITIONER HAVING BEEN A SUPPOSED
PARTICIPANT IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED, THE ERROR BEING TANTAMOUNT TO GROSS
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE RECORD.

E.
[I]N AFFIRMING THE CLEARLY REVERSIBLE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.

We reverse.

Time and again, this Court has held that evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the
mouth of a credible witness but the same must be credible in itself. 19 The trial court and respondent
appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of prosecution witness Madaraog that from her
vantage position near the door of the bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner allegedly participated
in the robbery. After a careful review of the evidence, we find that the identification of petitioner
made by Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis for conviction of
petitioner.

Firstly, it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid Madaraog
actually saw petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench. Witnesses Quintal and Barbieto
testified they only saw petitioner at the vicinity of the crimes before they happened. There is,
however, a serious doubt whether Madaraog and Quintal have correctly identified petitioner. At the
NBI headquarters, Madaraog described petitioner as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between his
eyebrows. 20 While Quintal also described petitioner as 5'3" and with a black mole between his
eyebrows. 21 On the basis of their description, the NBI cartographer made a drawing of petitioner
showing a dominant mole between his eyes. 22 As it turned out, petitioner has no mole but only a
scar between his eyes. Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall. There is a big difference between a
mole and a scar. A scar is a mark left in the skin by a new connective tissue that replaces tissue
injured. 23 On the other hand, a mole is a small often pigmented spot or protuberance on the skin.
24 If indeed Madaraog and Quintal had a good look at petitioner during the robbery, they could not
have erroneously described petitioner. Worthy to note, petitioner was not wearing any mask in the
occasion. Madaraog's attempt to explain her erroneous description does not at all convince, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: We come now to the third person 'iyong namang isa ay mga 28 o 29 ang edad, mga 5'2" o 5'3"
ang taas, payat, medyo kulot ang buhok at maiksi at mayroong malaking bilog na nunal sa pagitan
ng kilay sa noo. Mahaba at malantik ang pilikmata,' who is that?

Interpreter:
Witness referring to Exhibit "J-3."

Q: Madam witness where is that round mole that appears in the two eyebrows of the person?
A: It is probably the cartographer that made a mistake.

Q: I am referring to you now Exhibit "J". I call your attention to that black rounded figure at the middle
of the bridge of the nose between the two eyebrows, what was that represent?
A: A mole, sir." 25

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: Among the four drawings prepared by the cartographer section of the NBI, you will agree with
me Madam Witness that it is only on Exhibit "J" when that rounded mole appear?
A: No sir, it is the third one." 26

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: You did not call the attention of the NBI that the third one whom you identified as Exhibit "J-3" did
not bear that rounded mole as mentioned by you, did you?
A: I did not remember.

Q: Why did you not remember having called the attention of the NBI to that deficiency in the
drawing?
A: I was not able to call the attention of the NBI (sic) because there were four of us who made the
description." 27

Secondly, the trial court and the respondent appellate court unduly minimized the importance of this
glaring discrepancy in the identification of the petitioner. The trial court resorted to wild guesswork. It
ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

"[T]he court has observed that Alvin has a prominent scar in between his two (2) eyebrows. It is not
within the realm of improbability that Alvin covered up that scar with a black coloring to make it
appear that he has a 'nunal' which was therefore the one described by Jovina and, which reinforces
her testimony that she had a good eye view of Alvin from the start of the robbery to its conclusion."
28

This is a grave error. The trial court cannot convict petitioner on the basis of a deduction that is
irrational because it is not derived from an established fact. The records do not show any fact from
which the trial court can logically deduce the conclusion that petitioner covered up his scar with black
coloring to make it appear as a mole. Such an illogical reasoning cannot constitute evidence of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. This palpable error was perpetrated by respondent appellate court when it
relied on the theory that this "fact" should not be disturbed on appeal because the trial court had a
better opportunity to observe the behavior of the prosecution witnesses during the hearing. This is a
misapplication of the rule in calibrating the credibility of witnesses. The subject finding of the trial
court was not based on the demeanor of any witness which it had a better opportunity to observe.
Rather, it was a mere surmise, an illogical one at that. By no means can it be categorized as a fact
properly established by evidence.

And thirdly, corroborating witness Barbieto has serious lapses in her testimony that diluted her
credibility, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: I am showing to you Exhibit "M" and please point to this Honorable Court that portion where the
accused (Alvin Tuason) allegedly asked from you the price of that plastic pack of ice.
A: I did not state it in my statement.

Q: Why did you say a moment ago that you place it there (Sinumpaang Salaysay)?
A: But that is the truth, sir.

Q: I am not asking you the truth or falsehood . . . I am only asking you why you said a moment ago
that the portion of your testimony now is incorporated in Exhibit "M."
A: [B]ecause they asked the price of the ice." 29

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: After reading Exhibit "M", did you or did you not call the attention of the investigator that some of
your narrations were not incorporated therein?
A: No, I did not because he did not ask me.

Q: [Y]ou did not come forward to volunteer that some portions of your narration were not
incorporated therein?
A: [T]he investigator knew it.

Q: You mean to tell the Honorable Court that after reading Exhibit "M", the NBI investigator knew
that there were some lapses or omissions in your statement?"
A: It's up to the investigator." 30

Barbieto is a school teacher and the kind of excuses she proffered does not enhance her credibility.
Moreover, she and Quintal merely testified they saw petitioner within the vicinity where the crimes
were committed. By itself, this circumstance cannot lead to the conclusion that petitioner truly
committed the crimes at bench. Petitioner, we note, lives in the same vicinity as the victim. To use
his words, he lives some six (6) posts from the house of Torres. His presence in the said vicinity is
thus not unnatural.

The doubtful identification of petitioner was not at all cured by the process followed by the NBI
agents when petitioner was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses in their
headquarters. Madaraog's identification of petitioner from a line-up at the NBI was not spontaneous
and independent. An NBI agent improperly suggested to them petitioner's person. Petitioner thus
testified:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: Mr. Witness (Alvin Tuason) do you know of any reason why these two witnesses in the persons
of Jovina Madaraog Torres and Mary Barbieto would be testifying in the manner that they did against
you?
A: At the NBI, I saw them with the NBI agent. After the agent pointed at me, later on they also
pointed at me." 31

On cross-examination, he declared:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: Do you know the reason why they testified and pointed to you as one of the robbers of July 19,
1988?
A: Because when I was at the NBI, the NBI agent pointed at me.

Q: Did you see them at the NBI when they pointed at you?
A: They were outside a room where there was a glass window.

Q: So you can see those persons outside the room?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: When they pointed you and identified you were there other persons with you when you were lined
up during that time?
A: In the second line I was in the line-up.

Q: When was the first time they pointed you as one of the suspects?
A: In the Office of the Chief Unit there, to the third floor of the NBI building." 32

This damaging testimony of the petitioner was not rebutted by the prosecution. The NBI agent
present during the identification of petitioner was not presented to belie petitioner's testimony.
Consequently, the identification of the petitioner in the NBI headquarters is seriously flawed.
According to writer Wall, the mode of identification other than an identification parade is a show-up,
the presentation of a single suspect to a witness for purposes of identification. Together with its
aggravated forms, it constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever
used by the police. 33

The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this claim of petitioner as self-serving. Again,
the ruling misconstrues the meaning of self-serving evidence. Self-serving evidence is not to be
literally taken as evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under our law of evidence, self-serving
evidence is one made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a
witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of
opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission
would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's testimony
in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination. 34 Clearly,
petitioner's testimony in court on how he was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI
headquarters is not self-serving.

Petitioner's main defense is alibi. He professed that on July 19, 1988 he was mixing dough at TipTop
Bakeshop from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. With the usual traffic
jam, it takes him two (2) hours to commute from Lagro to Tondo. It was thus physically impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis. He said he learned about the robbery thru his neighbor three (3)
days thereafter. He did not flee. He was arrested by the NBI agents more than one (1) month after
the crimes were perpetrated.

Angeli Tuason's corroborative testimony established that her brother had an eye examination on July
17, 1988 35 and she reminded him to work early on July 19, 1988 which he did.

Judges should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi. Alibi should be considered in the
light of all the evidence on record for it can tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused. 36 In
People vs. Omega, 37 we held:

"Although alibi is known to be the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove, nevertheless, where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and betrays lack of
concreteness on the question of whether or not the accused committed the crime charged, the
defense of alibi assumes importance."

The case at bench reminds us of the warning that judges seem disposed more readily to credit the
veracity and reliability of eyewitnesses than any amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf of the
accused, whether by way of alibi, insufficient identification, or other testimony. 38 They are
unmindful that in some cases the emotional balance of the eyewitness is disturbed by her
experience that her powers of perception becomes distorted and her identification is frequently most
untrustworthy. Into the identification, enter other motives, not necessarily stimulated originally by the
accused personally - the desire to requite a crime, to find a scapegoat, or to support, consciously or
unconsciously, an identification already made by another. 39

IN VIEW THEREOF, the Decision of December 16, 1993 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
petitioner Alvin Tuason is ACQUITTED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

CAMELO CABATANIA, Petitioner, versus COURT OF APPEALS and
CAMELO REGODOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 124814 | 2004-10-21

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the March 15, 1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No.
88-C which compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent
Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P
500 per month.

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was
born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted
that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros
Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as petitioner's household help. It was
while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod
City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner
promised to support her if she got pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner's child 27 days after their
sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City.
Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner's wife sent her home. But
petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her.
On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt's house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she
gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatania's version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter
and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home.
During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the
afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner's wife, hence
she was told to look for another job.

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New
Year's Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos
City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up
and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City
and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her
about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the
following day.

In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner's
house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner's wife was in need of
one, she was re-hired. However petitioner's wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and
inquired about the father of the unborn child. She told petitioner's wife that the baby was by
her husband. Because of her condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see
each other anymore.

Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia's
counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner
refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had
sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He
vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite
its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was
alive. Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:

The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on
the personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-
minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor's mother, Florencia Regodos.

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the evidence of the
plaintiff in support of the claim to "be meritorious; defendant admitted having a sexual
intercourse with the plaintiff's mother, Florencia Regodos, but denied paternity to the child.
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on
the personal appearance of the child, then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-
minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor's mother, Florencia Regodos."[2]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:

The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a widow should not
prejudice the right of petitioner-appellee. As held by the Supreme Court, even where a
witness has been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not
required that the whole of her testimony be rejected (People vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is
perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts (People vs. Delas, 199 SCRA 574, 575). There is
therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that her first intercourse with appellant occurred
on January 2, 1982 and nine (9) months later or on September 9, 1982, she gave birth to
appellee (TSN, Hearing of June 10, 1991 and Exhibit "A").

In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced before the trial
court and there being no evidence that the latter had overlooked or misappreciated, we find
no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's findings.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.[3]

Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE CIVIL
CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[4]

Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As a
general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual findings of the
trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal except (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (4) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, goes
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooks certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, justifies a different
conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court is convinced
that this case falls within one of the exceptions.[5]

The trial court's finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent
was based on the testimony of the child's mother and "the personal appearance of the
child."

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation.[6] An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.[7]

The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.

xxx xxx xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation
of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.
The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on
the information of a third person.[8]

In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a
public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on
the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity.[9]
Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se
inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.[10]

Aside from Florencia's self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary
recognition.

We now proceed to the credibility of Florencia's testimony. Both the trial court and the
appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for
recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not
affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencia's husband is living and
there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child
born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[11] The presumption of
legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is
grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[12]

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence
to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is reversed and set aside. Private
respondent's petition for recognition and support is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

THERESITA, JUAN,
ASUNCION, PATROCINIA,
RICARDO, and GLORIA, all
surnamed DIMAGUILA,
Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE and SONIA A.
MONTEIRO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 201011 | 2014-01-27

THIRD DIVISION

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 15,
2011 Decision 1 and the March 5, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV
No. 92707, which affirmed the August 23, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
Santa Cruz, Laguna (RTC), in Civil Case No. SC-3108.

The Facts

On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro (Spouses Monteiro), along with
Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa, and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before
the RTC, against the petitioners, Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria
Dimaguila (The Dimaguilas), together with Rosalina, Jonathan, Eve, Sol, Venus, Enrique, Nina,
Princess Arieta, and Evangelina Borlaza. The complaint alleged that all the parties were co-owners
and prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna,
with an area of 489 square meters, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. Spouses Monteiro
anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila
(Pedro).

In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no co-ownership
to speak of in the first place. They alleged that the subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio
Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano
Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern-half portion assigned to
Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano
and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they were not heirs of either
Perfecto or Vitaliano.

During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were initiated, namely: (a) Motion to
Dismiss for lack of legal capacity to sue of Spouses Monteiro and for lack of cause of action; (b)
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of denial thereof, which was denied; ( c) Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents; (d) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order granting the
same, which was denied; (e) Motion to Defer Pre-trial; (f) Notice of Consignation by the petitioners in
the exercise of their alleged right of redemption of the share being claimed by the Spouses Monteiro
in light of the deed of sale they produced and claimed to have been executed by the heirs of Pedro
in their favor; (g) Motion to Remove Sonia Monteiro (Sonia) as plaintiff, which was denied; (h) Motion
for Reconsideration thereof, which was also denied; (i) Motion for Clarification and/or Extended
Resolution; and U) Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to a pending Petition for Certiorari before
the CA assailing several of the RTC orders. The proceedings resumed after the promulgation by the
CA of its April 5, 2000 Resolution in CA-G.R. No. SP 52833, which upheld the assailed RTC orders.

On January 2, 2001, upon resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for
Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint. 4 The RTC granted their motion. The amended
complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of possession
of a portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other defendants, specifically,
the portion sold to the couple by the heirs of Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro were
retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants.

In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their original
answer that the subject propety had already been partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano,
through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, and that during their lifetime, the
brothers agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern-half portion and Vitaliano of
the northern-half portion, which division was observed and respected by them as well as their heirs
and successors-in-interest.

Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro,
who had divided the southern-half portion equally amongst themselves, with their respective 1 /3
shares measuring 81.13 square meterseach; that Pedro's share pertains to the 1 /3 of the southern-
half immediately adjacent to the northern-half adjudicated to the Dimaguilas as heirs of Vitaliano;
that on September 29, 1992, Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat
Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro appearing
in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver; and that when they attempted to take possession of the
share of Pedro, they discovered that the subject portion was being occupied by the Dimaguilas.

In their Answer5 to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was
inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their
original answer that it had been actually divided into southern and northern portions. Instead, they
argued that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two
and share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a co-owenrship, contrary to their
original position. The Dimaguilas further argued that the Bilihan did not specify the metes and
bounds of the property sold, in violation of Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Even assuming that such
had been specified, they averred that the sale of a definite portion of a property owned in common
was void since a co-owner could only sell his undivided share in the property.

During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta, brother of Sonia Monteiro (Sonia), who
testified that Perfecto was his grandfather
and that at the time of Perfecto's death, he had two properties, one of which was the subject
property in Liliw, Laguna, which went to his children, Esperanza, Leonardo and Pedro. Pedro was
survived by his children Pedrito, Theresita, Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their rights over
the subject propety to Sonia.

Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedro's son, Francisco, and was asked if she was
interested in purchasing Pedro's 1/3 share of the
southern portion of the Bahay na Sato, and that he showed her a deed of extrajudicial partition
executed by and between Perfecto and Vitaliano, as well as the tax declaration of the property to
prove that the property had already been partitioned between the two brothers.

Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic engineer hired by Spouses Monteiro
to survey the property in Liliw, and recounted that he checked the boundary of the subject property,
subdivided the lot into two and came up with a survey plan.

Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true
copy of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.

Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed land,
including cadastral maps from the region.

One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the sole witness for the defendants. She testified that their
first counsel made a mistake when he alleged in their original answer that the prope1iy had already
been partitioned into n0rthern and southern portions between the two brothers, as the original
answer had been rushed and they were never given a copy of it. She claimed that the mistake was
only pointed out to her by their new counsel after their former counsel withdrew due to cancer. She
further testified that there was no intention to partition the "bahay na bato" which stood on the
subject property, in order to preserve its historical and sentimental value.

Ruling of the RTC

In its August 23, 2007 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the
Dimaguilas to turn over the possession of the subject 1 /3 portion of the southern-half of the
property, to wit:

WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

a. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to peacefuly vacate and
turnover possession of 1/3 of the southern portion of the property covered by Tax Declaration No.
1453, specifically described as "A" of Lot 877 in the sketch plan marked as Exhibit "I", within 60 days
from the finality of this Decision, failing which let a writ of possession issue;

b. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, the amount of P500 per month
in the form of rent for the use of the property from July 1993 until the property is vacated;

c. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, attorney's fees of P30,000 and
litigation expense of P20,000.

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided the property into two share
and share alike, evidence aliunde was appreciated to show that there was an actual division of the
property into south and north between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was observed
and honored by their heirs. These pieces of evidence were the cadastral map of Liliw7 and a
corresponding list of claimants, which showed that the subject property had long been registered as
Lot 876 (northern-half), claimed by Buenaventura Dimaguila (Buenaventura), an heir of Vitaliano,
and Lot 877 (southern-half), claimed by Perfecto.

The RTC held that the manner of partition was admitted by the Dimaguilas themselves in their
original answer. It gave no credence to the claim of Asuncion that such admission was an error of
their former counsel and that she was unaware of the contents of their original answer. It noted that
the Dimaguilas had strongly maintained their theory of partition from 1992 when the complaint was
first filed, and only changed their defense in 2001 when Spouses Monteiro filed their amended
complaint. It keenly observed that it was precisely their admission which propelled Spouses Monteiro
to amend their complaint from one of partition to recovery of possession. Thus, the RTC concluded
that there was indeed a partition of the subject property into southern-half and northern-half portions
between Perfecto and Vitaliano and that the Dimaguilas were estopped from denying the same.

As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, where the 1 /3 share of Pedro was sold to Spouses Monteiro,
the RTC found the document to be regular and authentic absent any piece of evidence to the
contrary. It stated that the proper persons to contest the sale were not the Dimaguilas, who were the
heirs of Vitaliano, but the heirs of Perfecto. It noted that the records showed that the heirs of
Esperanza and Leandro (Pedro's siblings), had signified their conformity to the pa1iition and to the
sale of Pedro's 1 /3 portion.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed August 15, 2011 Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of evidence
thru their presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, 8 the cadastral map and the municipal
assessor's records. 9 It noted, more importantly, that the Dimaguilas themselves corroborated the
claim of partition in their original answer. It likewise ruled that the petitioners were estopped from
denying their admission of partition after the respondent spouses had relied on their judicial
admission.

The Dimaguilas also insisted on their argument, which was raised before the RTC, but not
addressed, that the Bilihan should not have been admitted as evidence for lack of a documentary
stamp tax, in accordance with Section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Citing
Gabucan v. Manta 10 and Del Rosario v. Hamoy, 11 the CA, however, ruled that if a document
which did not bear the required documentary stamp was presented in evidence, the court should
require the proponent to affix the requisite stamp. The CA noted that the RTC had failed to direct
Spouses Monteiro to affix the stamp and merely reminded the presiding judge to be more vigilant on
similar situations in the future. Nonetheless, it held that the petitioners did not possess the necessary
personality to assail the sale between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro because it pe1iained
to the southern-half of the property to which they had no claim.

The CA likewise found sufficient basis for the award of rentals as compensatory damages since
Spouses Monteiro were wrongfully deprived of possession of the 113 portion of the southern-half of
the subject property. It also upheld the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses by the RTC,
considering that Spouses Monteiro were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their
rights and interest.

In its assailed March 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN ACTUAL
PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY COVERED BY TAX DECLARATION NO. 1453.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE
SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD TO THE RESPONDENTS.

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE EXHIBIT C, THE
BILIHAN NG LAHA T NAMING KARAPATAN.

IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE SOUTHERN HALF OF
THE PROPERTY.

V
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE PROPERTY FROM JULY 1993 UNTIL VACATED.

VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.

VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
PETITIONERS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO GRANT THE
COUNTERCLAIMS INTERPOSED THEREIN. 12

The Dimaguilas argue that their original allegation regarding the pa1iition of the subject prope1iy into
northern and southern portions was a mistake of their former counsel, and it was not their intention
to partition the property because to do so would damage the house thereon. Even assuming an
admission was made, the petitioners aver that such was made only by some, but not all, of the co-
owners; and that pa1iition can only be made by all co-owners, and allowing the admission is
tantamount to effecting paiiition by only some co-owners. Spouses Monteiro themselves, in their
original complaint, made an admission that they were co-owners of the property and asse1ied that
there was no partition. The evidence a/iunde considered by the RTC, consisting of the cadastral map
and the list of claimants, were timely objected to during the trial as hearsay and a violation of the
best evidence rule.

The petitioners reiterate that the Bi/ihan should not have been admitted into evidence because it
lacked the documentary stamp tax required by Section 201 of the NIRC, providing that no document
shall be admitted in evidence until the requisite stamps have been afiixed thereto. They argue that
the ruling of petitioners' lack of personality to assail the deed of sale is different from the issue of the
deed of sale's admissibility as evidence. They conclude that considering that no documentary stamp
was ever affixed on the deed of sale, such should never have been admitted into evidence and
consequently, should not have been relied upon by the lower courts to prove the sale of 113 of the
southern portion; and that considering that the Bilihan is inadmissible as evidence, the respondent
spouses have no basis for their claim to the subject 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property.
Thus, they insist that the lower courts erred in awarding to Spouses Monteiro the possession of the
subject prope1iy, the rentals, attorney's fees and litigation expenses, and in failing to rule on their
counterclaim for demolition of improvements and payment of damages.

The assignment of errors boils down to two main issues:

I. Whether there was a pa1iition of the subject property; and

2. Whether the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the subject property was sold to the respondent
spouses.

Ruling of the Court

At the outset, it must be pointed out that the petitioners' assignment of errors calls for the Court to
again evaluate the evidence to determine whether there was a partition of the property and whether
the I /3 portion of the southern half was sold to the respondent spouses. These clearly entail
questions of fact which are beyond the Court's ambit of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
especially considering that the findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. 13 On this
ground alone, the present petition must be denied. Nonetheless, the Court shall delve into these
factual issues to finally put this case to rest.

Partition of the Subject Property

Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish their case by
a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side, synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence." Preponderance of evidence
is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. 14

To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses presented the following: (1) the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, executed by and between the brothers Perfecto and
Vitaliano; (2) the cadastral map of Liliw Cadm-484, 15 dated August 6, 1976, showing that the
subject property had been divided into southern and n0rthern portions, registered as Lot Nos. 876
and 877; and (3) the Municipal Assessor's records 16 showing that the said lots were respectively
claimed by Buenaventura and Perfecto.

It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated that Perfecto and Vitaliano agreed "to
divide between them into two and share and share alike" the subject property, including the house
situated thereon. It appears, however, that the property was actually partitioned into definite
p01iions, namely, southern and n01ihern halves, as refiected in the cadastral map of Liliw, which
were respectively claimed by an heir of Vitaliano and Perfecto himself. It, thus, appears that the
subject property had already been partitioned into definite portions more than 20 years prior to the
original complaint for partition filed in 1993, and that such division had been observed by the
brothers' heirs. As earlier pointed out, the petitioners themselves admitted to this very fact in their
original answer, to wit:

(b) On September 5, 1945 the brothers PERFECTO and VITALIANO DIMAGUILA executed a deed
of EXTRA JUDICIAL PARTITION of the aforedescribed property dividing the same into two (2) equal
parts as indicated in the aforesaid deed as follows, to wit:

xxx

(c) As a result of the foregoing partition and as known by all the parties in this case from the
beginning or as soon as they reached the age of discernment PERFECTO DIMAGUILA became the
sole and exclusive owner of the southern half of the aforedescribed property and VITALIANO
DIMAGUILA became the sole owner of the northern half of the same property; the house that was
built thereon and still existing up to this time was likewise equally divided between the two (2)
DIMAGUILA brothers in accordance with the extrajudicial partition
of half equal shares;

xxx

2. In other words, the share of VITALIANO DIMAGUILA in the above described property has already
been long segregated and had passed on to his heirs as is very well known by all the parties in this
case; 17

xxx

(Emphases in the Original)

Section 4 18 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a partly in the
course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was
the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not
provided to them. Petitioner Asuncion testified:

Q So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the Answer?

A May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed the same without giving us a copy ...
19

This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of
evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.2 Furthermore,
the Court notes that this position was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after
their original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint of the respondent spouses. In
their original answer to the complaint for partition, their claim that there was already a partition into
northern-half and souther-nhalf portions, was the very essence of their defense. It was precisely this
admission which moved the respondent spouses to amend their complaint. The petitioners cannot
now insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a palpable mistake.

Article 1431 21 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so
amended their original complaint for paiiition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the
subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that
there was no partition of the property.

Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would actually
be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the respondent
spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate the
petitioners' admission.

The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the list of claimants
presented by the respondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and the
best evidence rule.

Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office. 22 Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. 23 Section 24 of Rule 132
provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by 7'1 a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody or the record.24

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area
covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III
of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents. The second was Dominga
Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed
land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies
of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in
official records are an exception to the rule. 25 The rule provides that entries in official records made
in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's
attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The
document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
26

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute,
supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. 27 It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral
map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were
prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and
are primafacie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented no evidence to
contradict the evidence of the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the
petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of evidence that there had indeed
been a partition of the subject property.

Sale of 1/3 Portion of the Southern-half

To prove that 113 of the southern-half portion of the subject property was sold to them, Spouses
Monteiro presented a deed of sale entitled Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan,28 dated September
29, 1992, wherein Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them, with the acquiescence of the heirs of
Esperanza and Leandro in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver.29 The petitioners argue that the
Bilihan should not have been admitted into evidence because it lacked the documentary stamp tax
required by Section 201 of the NTRC.

On August 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the production and/or inspection of
documents,30 praying that Spouses Monteiro be ordered to produce the deed of sale, which they
cited as the source of their rights as co-owners. On November 20, 1995, Spouses Monteiro
submitted their compliance,31 furnishing the RTC and the petitioners with a copy32 of the Bilihan.
On January 3, 1996, the petitioners filed a notice of consignation,33 manifesting that they had
attempted to exercise their right of redemption as co-owners of the 113 portion of the southern half
of the property under Article 1623 34 of the Civil Code by sending and tendering payment of
redemption to Spouses Monteiro, which was, however, returned.

By filing the notice of consignation and tendering their payment for the redemption of the 1/3 portion
of the southern-half of the property, the petitioners, in effect, admitted the existence, due execution
and validity of the Bilihan. Consequently, they are now estopped from questioning its admissiblity in
evidence for relying on such for their right of redemption. Additionally, the Court notes that the copy
35 of the Bilihan which was originally submitted by Spouses Monteiro with its compliance filed on
November 20, 1995, does in fact bear a documentary stamp tax. It could only mean that the
documentary stamp tax on the sale was properly paid. The Bilihan was, therefore, properly admitted
into evidence and considered by the RTC.

In any case, as correctly held by the lower courts, the petitioners, as heirs of Vitaliano, who inherited
the northern-half portion of the subject property, do not possess the necessary personality to assail
the sale of the southern-half portion between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro. They are not
real parties-in-interest who stand to be benefited or injured by the sale of the 1/3 portion of the
southern-half over which they have absolutely no right. As correctly ruled by the courts below, only
fellow coowners have the personality to assail the sale, namely, the heirs of Pedro's siblings,
Esperanza and Leandro. They have, however, expressly aquiesced to the sale and waived their right
to the property in the afiidavit presented by Spouses Monteiro. 36 As such, the petitioners have no
right to their counterclaims of demolition of improvements and payment of damages.

With Spouses Monteiro having sufficiently proved their claim over the subject 1/3 portion of the
southern-half of the property through the Bilihan, the lower courts did not err in awarding possession,
rentals, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to them.

The Court, however, finds that the award of rentals should be reckoned from January 2, 2001, the
date the Spouses Monteiro filed their Amended Complaint seeking recovery of the subject portion.
Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall also be imposed on the total amount of rent due from
finality of this Decision until fully paid.37

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 15, 2011 Decision and the March 5, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CAG .R. CV No. 92707 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,
in that:

a. The award of rent at the rate of P500.00 per month shall be reckoned from January 2, 2001 until
the property is vacated; and

b. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on the total amount of rent due from finality
of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMIL MARCOS Y
ISIDRO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 91646 | 1992-08-21

D E C I S I O N


GUTIERREZ, J.:

Appellant Romil Marcos y Isidro was charged with the crime of Violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 in an
information filed by the Office of the City Fiscal ofZamboanga City with the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga
City. The information alleged:

"That on or about June 7, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI six (6) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes, knowing same to be a prohibited drug." (Rollo, p. 7)

When arraigned the appellant pleaded not guilty.

After trial on the merits. the appellant was found by the court guilty as charged and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua at the San Ramon Penal Colony and to pay the costs.

The trial court gave credence to the buy-bust operation conducted by the prosecution witnesses, all
of them Narcom agents, wherein the appellant sold six (6) sticks of marijuana to Sgt. Amado Ani, a
member of the operation, who acted as the poseur-buyer. The other target of the operation, a
certain
Ballena eluded arrest and escaped.

The trial court summarized the buy-bust operation leading to the arrest of the appellant as follows:

" . . . The arrest of the accused was carefully planned. After receiving the information from the
civilian informant named 'Bobby' that the accused and another person was selling marijuana at
Talon-Talon more particularly at Lucy's Store. the Narcom Agents conducted a surveillance in said
place riding on two motorcycles a day before the raid. They saw the accused selling marijuana. The
following day, again, the Narcom Agents held a conference and each of them was briefed by
their team leader. One of them who was Sgt. Amado Ani was to act as poseur buyer while others,
namely: Sgt. Jesus Belarga, Sgt. Bernardo Lego and Sgt. Julieto Vega as arresting officers. The
following day, June 7, 1989, at about 11:00 a.m., said team consisting of Narcom Agents proceeded
to the place. Three were left at a vulcanizing shop, namely, Sgts. Belarga, Lego, and Vega; while
Sgt. Amado Ani, the poseur buyer, proceeded to the Lucy's Store. There he met the accused Romil
Marcos who asked said poseur buyer how much he was buying and the latter answered him P10.00
worth. The accused entered the store, gave the P10.00 marked money given by Sgt. Ani to his
companion Ballena and the latter gave the accused Romil Marcos the six sticks of marijuana
cigarettes which were wrapped. Sgt. Ani examined the same and upon verifying that it was
marijuana, he proceeded to the street and made the pre-arranged signal by wiping his face with a
handkerchief. The three Narcom Agents rushed to the place where Sgt. Amado Ani was. However,
after Sgt. Ani gave the signal, he returned to where the accused Romil Marcos and alias Ballena
were, introduced himself as Narcom Agent and grabbed the accused Romil Marcos but the latter
was able to escape. While escaping, the Narcom Agents saw him throw a stick of marijuana
cigarette which Sgt. Belarga retrieved. Later, they apprehended Romil Marcos and brought him to
their office at Upper Calarian, this City. He was turned over to the chief investigator Sgt. Mihasun
together with the six sticks of marijuana cigarettes that were sold by the said accused Romil Marcos
to the poseur buyer, Sgt. Ani. The six sticks were examined by the PCCI and found the same to be
positive of marijuana." (Rollo. p. 24)

The trial court rejected the appellant's defense that he was not the object of the buy-bust operation
and that he was arrested when he refused to testify against Ballena who was actually the target of
the buy-bust operation. He testified as follows:

" . . . That on June 7, 1989, past 11:00 o'clock in the morning, he was at Lucy's Store waiting for a
jeep going to Sta. Catalina to find out en he was going to work at the Peninsula Construction
Company because he was temporarily laid off. That while he was at the Lucy's Store, a motorcycle
stopped in the store. Immediately, the people on board said motorcycle chased a certain Ballena
who is his neighbor. That Ballena's complete name is Romeo Ballena who is known as Mimi or Mi.
Then he heard a shot when they were chasing Ballena but does not know who fired the same. The
people on board the motorcycle were not able to catch up with Ballena, so they returned to the store.
Upon returning to the store, one of them pointed at him and said that he was a companion of Ballena
at the same time handcuffing him. At that time there were many people at the Lucy's Store
numbering about thirty; that there were three CAFGUs who arrived in the place and one of them
asked the people who were riding earlier in the motorcycle what were those shots for. One of them
in the motorcycle answered that they must not interfere as they are Narcom Agents, and the CAFGU
did not interfere. After that they placed him between the motorcycle driver and the other person and
took him with them to Calarian; that the persons who took him were the same people who chased
Ballena; that while on their way to Calarian, one of the two persons who chased Ballena in a
motorcycle told him that he must act as witness against Ballena. However, said accused told them
that he would not like to testify because he does not know what was that about. They said that they
are going to place him in jail because he does not want to be a witness against Ballena." (RTC
Decision, p. 6, Rollo, p. 21)

In his appeal the appellant assigns the alleged errors of the trial court as follows:

"A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE AND ON
REAL EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF SIX (6) STICKS OF MARIJUANA WHICH WERE NOT ALSO
OFFERED IN EVIDENCE.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE WITNESSES, FOR THE PROSECUTION WHICH WERE FRAUGHT WITH SERIOUS
DOUBT, AND THEREFORE, CLEARLY APPEAR TO BE INCREDIBLE AND UNBELIEVABLE.

C. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Appellant's Brief, p. 20)

In the first assigned error, the appellant contends that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Sgt.
Jesus Belarga, Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. and Mrs. Athena Elias Anderson were not formally offered,
hence, the trial court erred in considering their testimonies. He cites sections 34 and 35, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court to prove his point, to wit:

"SEC. 34. Offer of Evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

SEC. 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the
time the witness is called to testify."

xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to the assertion of the appellant, Sgt. Amado Ani's testimony was formally offered by the
prosecution. Hence, when Sgt. Ani was called to testify for the prosecution, Prosecuting Fiscal
Deogracias Avecilla said that Sgt. Amado Ani's testimony was being offered "to the effect that he
was the poseur-buyer of this case." (TSN October 23, 1989. p. 15)

As regards the other mentioned prosecution witnesses, we agree with the appellant that their
testimonies were not formally offered at the time the said witnesses were called to testify. However,
the records reveal that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were offered during the formal
offer of documentary evidence by the prosecuting Fiscal. The appellant did not object to such offer.
In such a case, we rule that the appellant is now estopped from questioning the inclusion of the
subject testimonies by the trial court in convicting him of the crime charged.

At any rate, the appellant was not deprived of any of his constitutional rights in the inclusion of the
subject testimonies. The appellant was not deprived of his right to cross-examine all these
prosecution witnesses.

The appellant also faults the trial court for considering the six (6) marijuana sticks as evidence for
the prosecution despite the fact that they were not offered as evidence.

The record reveals that when the prosecuting Fiscal offered the prosecution's documentary evidence
among those offered was Exhibit "E" which was described as "the wrapper containing the six (6)
sticks handrolled cigarette which were sold by the accused Romil Marcos to the poseur-buyer Sgt.
Ani, and as part of the testimony of the Forensic Chemist Athena Anderson and Sgt. Belarga and
also Sgt. Mihasun" Marcos alleges that nowhere in the offer of documentary evidence is there a
mention as regards the six (6) sticks of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-
bust operation. Under these circumstances, the appellant argues that the appellant should be
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to offer the six (6) sticks of marijuana sold by the appellant to
Sgt. Ani.

This argument is not well taken.

We rule that Exhibit "E" does not refer to the wrapper alone but also refers to the six (6) marijuana
sticks sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-bust operation. It is to be noted that Exhibit "E"
was offered as evidence in relation to the testimonies of Sgt. Belarga, Forensic Chemist Athena
Anderson and Sgt. Mihasun. The record is clear to the effect that in their testimonies, Sgt. Belarga,
Forensic Chemist Athena Anderson and Sgt. Mihasun referred to Exhibit "E" as the six (6) sticks of
marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-bust operation conducted by the Narcom
agents led by Sgt. Belarga at Talon-Talon, Zamboanga City on June 7, 1989.

The second and third assignment errors raise the issue on credibility of witnesses. In this regard the
appellant points out alleged circumstances of the prosecution witnesses which "render their
testimonies lacking in probative weight or value." The appellant focuses on the alleged inconsistent
statements of the Narcom agents as regards how long they have known their informant named
"Bobby" to the point that the appellant suggests that there was no informant and that the surveillance
on June 6, 1989 and the buy-bust operation conducted on June 7, 1989 never took place at all.

Whether or not the prosecution witnesses, particularly the Narcom agents have known their
informant Bobby for one year is not a material point in the crime of illegal sale of marijuana drug
under Section 4, Art. II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. This crime requires merely the consummation of
the selling transaction. (People v. Dekingco, 189 SCRA 512 [1990]; and People v. Catan, G.R. No.
92928, January 21, 1992) In case of a "buy-bust operation", the crucial point is that the poseur-buyer
received the marijuana from the appellant and the same was presented as evidence in court. Proof
of the transaction is sufficient. (People v. Catan, supra; and People v. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136
[1990])

In the case at bar, the transaction was established by the evidence on record. Prosecution witness
Sgt. Ani who acted as poseur-buyer positively identified the appellant as the one who sold him six
(6) sticks of marijuana for the amount of P10.00. He testified as follows:

"Q. On June 7, 1989, at 11:00 o'clock in the morning, who were those who proceeded to Bandariba,
Talon-Talon, this City?
A. We were together with Sgt. Belarga, Sgt. Lago and Sgt. Vega.

Q. And from your headquarters to Talon-Talon, this City, how did you go?
A. We went there to Bandariba by using the motorcycle.

Q. What particular place at Bandariba, Talon-Talon, Zamboanga City, did your group go?
A. We stopped first at a little vulcanizing area near the road.

Q. What did you do there in that area of vulcanizing?
A. Our team leader, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Vega left at the vulcanizing area.

Q. How about you?
A. I proceeded to the vicinity where the Lucy store is located.

Q. How far is this vulcanizing to Lucy store where you proceeded?
A. About 30 to 40 meters.

Q. You were able to proceed to the Lucy store?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What happened when you were at the Lucy Store?
A. In front of the store I was met by Romil Marcos and he asked me what I want.

Q. In what dialect did Romil Marcos ask to what you like for?
A. In Tagalog dialect.

Q. What did you say to this question of Romil Marcos?
A. I said 'mayroon ba tayong stock?'

COURT:
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. 'If you have marijuana stock.'

FISCAL AVECILLA:
Q. Did Romil answer you when you asked that question?
A. Yes, he answered.

Q. What did he say to you?
A. He asked me. 'How much?

Q. What did you do when he asked 'How much?'
A. I handed the P10.00.

Q. When, you handed that P10.00, what happened next?
A. He said 'you wait for me near the waiting shed?

Q. What happened when you were told to wait in the waiting shed?
A. After a while, Romil Marcos left and went inside in a portion of the store.

Q. What happened there, if any?
A. When he came back, he brought a paper wrapper where the six (6) sticks of marijuana cigarettes
were found inside.

Q. How did you know inside that wrapper are the six sticks of marijuana?
A. I opened the wrapper and I found these six sticks of marijuana cigarettes inside.

Q. Do you know where Romil got this wrapper in which you found the six sticks of marijuana
cigarettes?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please tell the court.
A. Romil told me, 'you wait for a while'. I saw he approached a certain fellow whom we later came to
know as Ballena. Then that person got the money from Romil Marcos, placed inside his pocket and
he got inside from his pocket the paper wrapper containing several sticks of marijuana. p

Q. You have been talking about this Romil Marcos. Would you be able to recognize if you see him
again?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please look inside the courtroom and see around, and go down from the witness stand and tap
him on his shoulder.(Witness pointed to a man in court who identified himself as Romil Marcos when
asked)" (TSN. October 23, 1989, pp. 18-19).

Second, the appellant points out the supposed inconsistency of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani, the
poseur buyer and prosecution witness Athena Elias Anderson, document examiner and forensic
chemist of the PC/INP Crime Laboratory Service, Recom IX, Zamboanga City, who examined the six
(6) marijuana sticks (Exhibit "E") submitted for analysis as regards the wrapper containing the six (6)
marijuana sticks which were sold to the former by the appellant Thus, while Sgt. Ani testified that the
six (6) sticks of marijuana sold to him by the appellant were wrapped in a newspaper, Anderson
declared that the wrapper used and submitted to her containing the six (6) sticks of marijuana was a
primary ruled pad and not a newspaper. The appellant submits that what was obtained from the
appellant is different from the one submitted for examination by Anderson.

We are not impressed.

The records show that when Sgt. Ani turned over the six (6) marijuana sticks wrapped in paper sold
to him by the appellant, Sgt. Belarga placed his initial, the date as well as the sign of a star on the six
(6) sticks for identification purposes. (TSN, p. 8, October 23, 1989) The records further reveal that
the six (6) sticks of marijuana examined and analyzed by Anderson were identified in court by Sgt.
Belarga as the same six (6) sticks of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-bust
operation conducted at Talon-Talon, Zamboanga City. (TSN, p. 6, October 25, 1989 in relation to
TSN pp. 12-13, October 25, 1989)

In sum we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of facts of the trial court. We give
credence to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses who are police officers and
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary. (People v. Napat-a, 179 SCRA 403 [1989]; People v. Castillo y Martinez, G.R. No. 93408,
April 10, 1992.) Moreover, the buy-bust operation was methodically executed with surveillance
operations done one (1) day before the arrest of the appellant. We find the procedure adapted by the
police officers in consonance with the application of regularity in the performance of official duties.
(People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 93852, January 24, l992; People v. Castillo y Martinez, supra).

However, the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. The proper penalty to be imposed on appellant should be life imprisonment, not reclusion
perpetua and a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) in accordance with Sec. 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. (People v. Catan, supra).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED except for the MODIFICATION that the
penalty shall be life imprisonment and a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) instead
of reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CONRADO DE LEON,
ANDRING DE LEON, JOHN DOE (at large), accused. / CONRADO DE LEON,
appellant.
G.R. No. 144052 | 2002-03-06

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Minor inconsistencies between sworn statements and testimonies do not affect the credibility of
witnesses. The assessment of these inconsistencies is best left to the discretion of the trial judge
who had the unique opportunity to observe their demeanor and conduct while they were testifying.

The Case

Before this Court is an appeal from the June 5, 2000 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon (Branch 170) in Criminal Case No. 16265-MN, convicting Conrado de Leon of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

The decretal portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused CONRADO DE LEON guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery and hereby imposes upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, accused is hereby ordered to indemnify heirs of
Crispin dela Pea in the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity for the death of said victim,
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages, P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages and cost of the
suit.

"In the meantime, send the record of this case to the archives until and after the arrest of the other
two (2) accused."[2]

The Information[3] dated October 19, 1995, charged appellant and his co-accused Andring de Leon
and one John Doe, as follows:

"That on or about the 23rd day of June 1995, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring [and]
confederating [with] and mutually helping x x x one another, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
said weapon one CRISPIN DELA PE'A y AGUILAR, hitting the victim on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon the victim stab wounds, which caused his immediate death."[4]

On October 30, 1995, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest[5] against the accused. Appellant was
arrested on April 21, 1997[6] but his co-accused, Andring de Leon and one John Doe, remained at
large. When arraigned on July 3, 1997, appellant pleaded[7] not guilty after the Information had been
read and interpreted to him in a language that he fully understood.[8] After pretrial, trial on the merits
ensued against him alone. Thereafter, the lower court promulgated its assailed Decision. The Public
Attorney's Office, counsel for appellant, filed directly with this Court, the Notice of Appealdated July
7, 2000.[9]

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,[10] the Office of the Solicitor General adopts the version of the facts "synthesized by the
trial court," as follows:

"Simeona de la Pea narrated that around 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of June 23, 1995, the
bloodied body of her son, Crispin de la Pea was brought to their house at Emergency Relocation
Center in Tangos, Navotas, Metro Manila. She immediately embarked Crispin on a tricycle before
transferring him into a jeepney to bring him to the nearest hospital. Passing along Bacog Street,
Crispin related to her that he was ganged up and stabbed by three persons at the corner of M. Naval
Street, Tangos near a videoke joint. He was at that time urinating and in fact his zipper was still open
when apparently somebody tapped his shoulder. It turned out, however, that it was a stab thrust.
When Crispin backslided, he was again stabbed on the stomach while his hands were being held as
the battering continued. Crispin identified accused Conrado de Leon, along with the other accused,
as among the persons who stabbed and ganged up [on] him. From the time Crispin was brought to
her and on board the tricycle, he was repeatedly mentioning the names of the persons who
assaulted him without any apparent reason. Crispin told her that he did not quarrel with anyone of
the three (3) accused who ganged up on him. While traversing Bacog Street, Crispin was already
having difficulty in saying a word because he was speaking very softly and in fact ha[d] to move his
mouth near her ears in order to communicate. His eyes were drooping close unlike earlier [when] the
same were wide open when he was brought home.

"Sometime in the month of May prior to the incident, Crispin went home crying because he was
slapped by accused Rudy R. Manlapaz alias Talakitok who was asking fish out of their catch
entrusted to Crispin by their manager. Nonetheless, the victim told accused Manlapaz that he
[would] give them fish some other time. Accused Manlapaz got mad and slapped Crispin before
threatening to kill him.

"Rudy dela Pea related that he was drinking inside MC Kitchenette/Snack House at Naval Street,
Tangos, Navotas when his brother Crispin and Apollo Natividad arrived. The latter ordered and
consumed two bottles of beer, [after which], he gave them another bottle, which they did not drink
anymore. Crispin and Apollo told him that they could no longer drink more because they ha[d] each
consumed one bottle of beer so he told them to go home. When Crispin and Apollo proceeded
outside the MC Kitchenette, a commotion ensued which he did not bother to see because a melee
[was] a natural occurrence in the place. However, the trouble reached the kitchenette. It was there
when he saw a man x x x being held in both hands while accused Andring de Leon grabbed him by
the chin and delivered a stab thrust on his neck. At that juncture, the man turned his head to the
right. He readily recognized him to be his brother Crispin whose shirt was already tainted with blood
because of the several stab wounds he had sustained. On his recognition of his brother, he
immediately rushed towards him as Crispin was saying to his assailants 'Bakit, talu-talo na ba tayo?'
He then carried his brother with his left hand and us[ed] his right hand to parry x x x several stab
thrusts thrown by the assailants. He was able to destroy the wall of the comfort room despite the
presence of all the accused blocking their escape. The door led them outside the MC Kitchenette.
Seeing a pedicab, he immediately boarded his wounded brother therein. However, the driver was
hesitant to drive them away because of the trouble that took place so he decided to look for another
pedicab and brought Crispin home. His brother was still stable inside the pedicab because he
managed to divulge to him the names of his assailants. He immediately noticed the blood oozing
from the left side of the neck of Crispin as he was speaking. Upon reaching home, he woke up his
mother and they transferred Crispin to another vehicle. Two policemen later on blocked and asked
them where they were taking the victim. One of their companions instead uttered 'Putang-ina ninyo,
mamamatay na ang tao pinipigilan pa ninyo.' He knew the assailants of his brother because he was
once a fisherman like them. Accused Andring de Leon frequents the billiard hall in their place. He
remembers the incidents that transpired between Crispin and accused Rudy Manlapaz alias
Talakitok when his brother denied the request of the accused for some fish catch. Accused
Manlapaz threatened Crispin that should they see each other again he would kill him."[11] (Citations
omitted)

Version of the Defense

Denial and alibi are alleged by appellant.[12] He faults the trial court for having given probative value
to the supposed dying declaration of the victim. The court a quo, he adds, erred in giving too much
weight and credence to the allegedly doubtful testimony of the prosecution's principal witness.
Appellant presents the following version of the facts:[13]

"Accused CONRADO DE LEON testified that on June 23, 1995, he was in Montalban, Rizal with his
in-laws. He was particularly with his mother-in-law, his wife and his children. He started living in
Montalban since he was released from jail in July 31, 1994 up to August 1996 when he and his wife
separated. After his separation from his wife, he then went home to Navotas. On April 21, 1997, he
was arrested at Petron Gas station at Tangos, allegedly in connection with a stabbing incident that
took place in Navotas. He [did] not know at all, the victim in this case. He came to know that he was
being implicated in this case when the parole officer went to him at Montalban to inform him that he
was being accused of the stabbing incident in Navotas. Thereafter, he went to see Barangay
Captain Armando Roque and the latter told him that the killers of the victim at the Navotas stabbing
incident were already known and he (accused) was not involved. According to Brgy. Captain
Armando Roque, the killers were Alejandro de Leon, his (accused['s]) cousin and a certain Rudy
Talakitok whom he [did] not know personally at all.

"ARMANDO ROQUE testified that on June 23, 1995, at around 3:00 o'clock a.m., his attention was
called by the Barangay tanods regarding a stabbing incident that took place at M. Naval St., Tangos,
Navotas, Metro Manila. He went to the scene of the incident. There, he conducted an investigation of
the vicinity. A waitress at the KC Snack House told him that it was Andring de Leon and Talakitok
who stabbed the victim Crispin dela Pea. After he conducted the investigation, he went home as it
was already early morning. He was not able to prepare a report because their secretary was no
longer present at that time. He disclosed that he [was] related to Andring de Leon since the wife of
Andring de Leon [was] her relative. Two months after the incident, Conrado de Leon dropped by at
the Barangay to inquire about his alleged involvement in the stabbing incident. He told Conrado de
Leon that what he (appellant) was thinking [was] not true because he (witness) conducted his own
investigation and only 2 persons were implicated namely Andring de Leon and Talakitok.

"ELENITA LIRIO y VILLACARTA testified that she knows the accused Conrado de Leon because he
was her common law husband since 1986. They lived together in Montalban. On June 23, 1995, he
was in Montalban together with the accused Conrado de Leon, her mother and children."[14]
(Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

In finding appellant guilty of murder, the RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimony of the
prosecution's witness, Reynaldo de la Pea, who had positively identified the former as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. It likewise accepted the dying declaration of the victim regarding his death
and deemed such declaration to have been made under the consciousness of his impending death.
These circumstances were held to prevail over appellant's defense of denial and alibi. Finally, the
lower court also ruled that the killing was attended by treachery.

Not satisfied with the judgment, appellant has lodged this appeal.[15]

The Issues

In his appeal, appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:

"I

The trial court erred in giving probative value to the supposed dying declaration of the victim despite
the fact that the same was not made under the consciousness of an impending death.

"II

The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Reynaldo Dela
Pea.

"III

The trial court erred in not giving any probative value to the defense of alibi interposed by accused-
appellant.

"IV

The trial court erred when it directly participated in the active cross-examination of defense witness
Armando Roque.

"V

Assuming in arguendo that the accused-appellant is guilty, the trial court erred in convicting him as a
principal instead of just [as] an accomplice, in view of the fact that there is no evidence which shows
that he acted in conspiracy with his co-accused.

"VI

The trial court committed reversible error when it ruled that treachery attended the commission of the
crime."[16]

We shall discuss the assigned errors in the following sequence: (1) credibility of prosecution
witnesses, appellant's defenses and the alleged wrongful participation of the trial judge; (2) validity of
the antemortem statement; (3) proof of conspiracy; and (4) presence of treachery.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant is guilty of homicide only, not murder.

First Issue:

Credibility of the Witness

As in most criminal cases, the ultimate resolution of this case depends upon the evaluation of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses vis- -vis the denial presented by the defense.[17]

Appellant casts doubts on the testimony of Prosecution Witness Reynaldo de la Pea, arguing that
since the latter was in a state of excitement due to the incident in question, "he could have been
disillusioned as to what he observed, thus, the failure to see clearly what transpired and discern the
respective participation of each of the accused."[18]

We disagree. The testimony of De la Pea was categorical, convincing and unequivocal. He
positively pointed to appellant and the latter's co-accused as the culprits. This witness declared
thus:

PROS. NEPTHALI ALIPOSA:

"Pros. (witness)

Q What happened when your brother Crispin arrived?

A They ordered x x x two bottles of beer and when they consumed the same I gave them another
two bottles which they did not drink anymore, sir.

Q What happened next?

A They told me they will not drink the two bottles because they consumed one each already and I
told them to go home, sir.

Q Did your brother ac[c]ede when you told him to go home?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when he was going home?

A After the two went outside the MC Kitchenet[t]e [a] commotion took place and I did not bother to
see what was it considering that trouble [was] just natural in that kind of place but the trouble
reached inside MC Kitchenet[t]e, sir.

Q What happened when the commotion reached you?

A I saw a man being held by Conrado x x x alias Talakitok and I saw A[n]dring de Leon holding a
small balisong, sir.

Q What did Andring do with that balisong in his possession?

A While the man was being held in both hands and A[n]dring de Leon was in front of the person (the
victim herein) And[r]ing held the chin of the victim and stabbed him on the neck and at that juncture
the victim turned his head to the right and that was the time I recognized that the victim was my
brother. The victim had already [a] red t-shirt that was the reason I did not [recognize] him because
my brother was wearing [a] white t-shirt, sir.

Q You said that your brother was already wearing [red] t-shirt why did you say that?

A Because of [the] blood, he already had several stab wounds, sir.

Q When you recognized it was your brother what did you do next?

A I took my brother and my brother told them 'bakit, talo-talo na ba tayo,' sir.

Q What did you do to protect your brother?

A While I was holding my brother with my left hand I used my right hand in taking a chair to par[r]y
some more [thrusts] and I destroyed the wall of the comfort room because the assailants were at the
front door blocking it and in order to escape I destroyed a door which [was] proceeding to the
comfort room which was also proceeding outside the MC Kitchenet[t]e.

Q Were you a[b]le to evade the further pursuit of the assailants?

A Yes, sir."[19]

x x x x x x x x x

"Q The three assailants if they are inside the courtroom can you point to them?

A Only one is inside the courtroom, sir.

Q Will you point to the person who is inside the courtroom?

(Witness pointing to a person answering to the name of Conrado de Leon)

Q The other assailants - Andring and Talakitok if you see them again will you be able to identify
them?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you know these persons especially the one whom you identified?

A Because I used to see these fellows when I was a fisherman and A[n]dring frequents the billiard
hall in our place, sir."[20]

Appellant spiritedly argues that "[i]t is in moments of excitement and hurry, when our observation is
distracted, that we are most subject to fallacious illusions of memory."[21]

However, such "excitement and hurry" cannot be imputed to De la Pea. Being in the middle of the
scene when the stabbing incident occurred, he was in a natural situation in which to look at the
persons involved in the brawl. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of
violence committed right before their eyes, witnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability
the identity of criminals at any given time.[22]

More telling is the fact that the victim was the witness' very own brother. De la Pea could not just
have sat there and remained indifferent to the whole incident. In fact, he said in his testimony that he
had come to his brother's aid. With a chair, he tried to parry the further thrusts of the assailants.[23]
Because he was directly involved in the face-to-face assault, it would have been highly improbable
for him not to have observed their faces.

This Court has noted in many crimes of violence that the most natural reaction of persons involved in
an attack is to strive to see the faces and the appearances of the assailants,[24] to observe the
manner in which the crime was committed, and to approximate what might be the latter's next move,
either as an instinctive reaction or as a measure to fend off any further attack.[25]

Time and time again, this Court has declared that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court. That is,
unless it plainly overlooked certain facts or circumstances of substance and value which, if
considered, might well affect the result of the case.[26] This doctrine is premised on the undisputed
fact that, since the trial court had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
while on the stand, it was in a position to discern whether or not they were telling the truth.[27] The
unbending jurisprudence is that its findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses are entitled to the
highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.[28] Appellant has not given the Court
sufficient reason to deviate from this doctrine.

Discrepancy Between the Sworn Statement and the Court Testimony

Appellant also faults De la Pea for having made an assertion in his Sworn Statement that was
inconsistent with his court testimony. In his Affidavit, the question "Bakit talo-talo na ba tayo?"
supposedly came from him; in his testimony, he said that these words were uttered by his brother,
the victim.

This inconsistency is minor and does not shatter the credibility of the witness and his testimony. We
have repeatedly held that minor disparities in the narration of witnesses do not detract from their
essential credibility, as long as their testimonies are coherent and intrinsically believable on the
whole, particularly[29] when, as in this case, there is consistency in the narration of the principal
occurrence and in the positive identification of the accused.[30]

Neither does the alleged conflict between the Sworn Statement and the testimony of De la Pea in
open court vitiate his credibility. It has been held that affiants are not necessarily discredited by
discrepancies between their testimonies on the witness stand and their generally incomplete ex
parte statements.[31] Basic is the rule that affidavits taken ex parte are considered to be incomplete
and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions
and inquiries, without the aid of which witnesses may be unable to recall the connected
circumstances necessary for their accurate recollection.[32] Affidavits are generally subordinated in
importance to open court declarations, because the former are often executed when affiants' mental
faculties are not in such state as to afford them a fair opportunity to narrate in full the incidents that
have transpired.[33] Moreover, testimonial evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.[34]

What is clear is that the responsibility of appellant for the victim's death was indubitably established
by both his Sworn Statement and his testimony.

Denial and Alibi

Appellant vigorously denies any participation in the death of Crispin de la Pea, maintaining that he
was at the house of his mother-in-law in Montalban, Rizal when the stabbing incident occurred.

In the light of the positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, his denial and
alibi cannot be sustained.[35] Well-settled is the rule that the positive identification of the accused,
when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on
the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.[36] Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
such defenses are negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.[37]

In any event, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove. For it to prosper, proof that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed is insufficient; he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time.[38] We quote with approval the findings of the trial
court on this matter:

"In his defense, accused Conrado de Leon denied any involvement in the incident at issue. He
insinuated that he could not have committed the act complained of on June 23, 1995 because he
was staying at the house of his mother-in-law in Montalban, Rizal from the time he was released
from jail on July 31, 1994 and it was only in August 1996 when he returned to Navotas. It is by now a
stale and trite principle that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed. It must likewise be demonstrated that he was also
so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission. Aside from the fact that the evidence for the defense is bereft
of any showing that it is highly improbable for accused Conrado de Leon to be at M. Naval St.,
Tangos, Navotas at the time of the commission of the crime charged[,] considering [that] the
distance of the two places can be negotiated [in] just a matter of hours, nothing was established to
prove that the accused could not in any way have participated in the killing of the victim. The
defense suffers infirmity because it was only corroborated by the former live-in partner of the
accused whose previous relationship with him would not erase the motive of helping her common-
law-husband even to the extent of testifying falsely. Similarly, the declaration of Bgy. Tanod
Armando Roque should likewise be rejected not only on account of being hearsay but likewise his
relation to the wife of one of the accused is sufficient enough to cast doubt on his credibility."[39]

This finding of the trial court is based on the well-entrenched rule that when the alibi of the accused
can be confirmed only by relatives and friends who may not be impartial witnesses, a denial merits
scant consideration, especially in the face of an eyewitness' affirmative testimony on the presence of
the accused in the crime scene.[40]

Participation of the Trial Judge

Neither can appellant find solace in his attack against the trial judge who, allegedly "itching to convict
the accused-appellant[,] started cross-examining the witness even before the public prosecutor
could ask his first question, thereby taking over from the prosecution the task of impeaching
Armando Roque's credibility."[41]

As this Court has held, the participation of judges in the conduct of trials cannot be condemned
outrightly.[42] They cannot be expected to remain always passive and stoic during the
proceedings.[43] After all, they are not prohibited from asking questions when proper and necessary.
In fact, this Court has repeatedly ruled that judges "must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking
[witnesses] questions x x x as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth."[44]

This means that "questions designed to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are
not improper. Also, the judge, being the arbiter, may properly intervene in the presentation of
evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time."[45]

Trial judges may examine some of the witnesses for the defense for the purpose of ferreting out the
truth and getting to the bottom of the facts. That they do so would not justify the charge that they
assist the prosecution with the evident desire to secure a conviction, or that they intimidate the
witnesses.[46]

Verily, they are judges of both the law and the facts.[47] They would be negligent in the performance
of their duties if they permit a miscarriage of justice through their failure to propound questions that
have some material bearing upon the outcome.[48] In the exercise of sound discretion, they may
cross-examine these witnesses[49] or ask them such questions as will enable the former to
formulate sound opinions on the ability of the latter to tell the truth, and to draw out relevant and
material testimonies that may support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party.[50] Even
if the clarificatory questions they propound happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the
theory of one of the parties, bias is not necessarily implied.[51]

In the present case, the only purpose of the trial judge was to arrive at the truth and do justice to
both parties. An accusation of unfairness cannot be supported when his intention was merely to elicit
the truth.[52] As this Court has already ruled, judges may ask questions that would elicit the facts of
the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that may have
been overlooked by counsel.[53]

Second Issue:

Antemortem Statement

Equally important is the fact that the evidence for the prosecution is corroborated not only by De la
Pea's positive identification of appellant, but also by an antemortem statement of the victim given to
the latter's mother, Simeona de la Pea. The victim identified appellant and his co-accused as the
perpetrators of the crime.

Antemortem statements are governed by Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which we quote below:

"Sec. 37. Dying declaration - The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of
an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death."

A dying declaration, also known as an antemortem statement or a statement in articulo mortis, is one
that refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death and is made under
the consciousness of impending death.[54] Because of its necessity and trustworthiness, it is
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. Necessity, because the declarant's
death makes it impossible for him to take the witness stand;[55] and trustworthiness, for when a
person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the
most powerful consideration to speak the truth.[56]

An antemortem statement is admissible, provided the following requisites are present: (1) death is
imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to a fact that the victim is
competent to testify to; and (4) the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant's death is
the subject of the inquiry.[57]

Appellant disputes the victim's antemortem statement for not having been made under the
consciousness of impending death. This issue is a matter of evidence.[58] It must be shown that the
declaration was made under a realization that one's demise or at least its imminence, not so much
its rapid occurrence, was at hand.[59] This may be proven by the statement of the victim or inferred
from the nature and the extent of the victim's wounds or other relevant circumstances.[60]

The attendant circumstances in this case point to no other conclusion than that the victim must have
realized the seriousness of his condition and was therefore under an impression of impending death.
This was borne out by his physical condition, especially the nature and the extent of his wounds.
This much was found by the RTC which ruled:

"x x x. While the prosecution did not establish in so many words that the victim, when he spoke of
the incident, was conscious of his impending death, this Court believes that the exception of dying
declaration has been substantially complied with, it appearing that on the said occasion the victim
was in a serious condition, was speaking very softly, his eyes were already drooping and could
hardly communicate unless [he] moved closer to the ears of his mother. Furthermore, judged by the
nature of the stab wounds inflicted, the victim could not ignore the seriousness of his condition. It
may be deduced with certainty that although the victim's mind seemed clear, yet [he] did not express
that he felt he was dying and that he lost all hope of surviving the stabbing incident, still he was [in]
that condition. In fact, minutes after the victim made the statements, he expired."[61]

This finding is supported by the testimony of the mother[62] to whom the declaration was
communicated.

Third Issue:

Proof of Conspiracy

Appellant argues that there is no showing that he had any previous agreement or understanding with
his co-accused to kill the victim. Appellant then submits that, assuming he is guilty, his participation
in the crime is limited to holding the hands of the victim while the latter was being stabbed by the co-
accused. Thus, appellant argues that he can be held only as an accomplice.

We are not persuaded. There is no doubt that appellant and his co-accused acted in conspiracy
because of their concerted actions in attacking and stabbing the victim. Direct proof is not essential
to establish conspiracy; it may be inferred from the acts of the assailants before, during, and after
the commission of the crime.[63] In a conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators
actually hit and killed the victim; what is important is that all participants performed specific acts with
such closeness and coordination as to indicate an unmistakably common purpose or design to bring
about the death of the victim.[64] Thus, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the
accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.[65]

To be sure, there must be a showing that each co-accused cooperated in the commission of the
offense, either morally -- through advice, encouragement or agreement -- or materially through
external acts indicating a manifest intent to efficaciously supply aid in the perpetration of the
crime.[66]

Appellant held the hands of the victim and rendered the latter helpless while being stabbed by
Andring de Leon. These acts showed that appellant had knowledge of his companions' criminal
design, and that he had indispensable participation therein.[67] It is immaterial that he merely held
the hands of the victim while the latter was being stabbed by the co-accused. In view of the
presence of conspiracy, all the perpetrators of the crime bear equal responsibility.[68]

Fourth Issue:

Presence of Treachery

However, we do not agree with the finding of the trial court that treachery attended the killing. Well-
settled is the rule that treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as
the killing itself.[69] The same degree of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before
treachery may be considered as an aggravating or a qualifying circumstance.[70] Any doubt as to its
existence must be resolved in favor of the accused.[71]

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person while employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, tending directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[72] To prove treachery, the following must be shown: (1) the employment of such means of
execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation and (2) the
deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.[73]

Inevitably, where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven.[74] Without any
particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act that resulted in the
victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.[75] It is not sufficient that the victim was
unarmed and that the means employed by the malefactor brought about the desired result. The
prosecution must prove that appellant deliberately and consciously adopted such means, method or
manner of attack as would deprive the victim of an opportunity for self-defense or retaliation.[76]

In the case at bar, the prosecution's principal witness testified that he had actually witnessed the
stabbing, but not the commencement of the attack. In fact, he himself declared that the commotion
had begun outside the establishment he was in.[77]

Where, as in this case, there is no proof of the circumstances surrounding the manner in which the
aggression commenced, appellant should be given the benefit of the doubt and treachery cannot be
considered. Because there was no showing of the particulars on the manner in which the aggression
was commenced or how the act that resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, we
cannot hold that treachery has been established.[78]

Neither can the commencement of the aggression be established conclusively by the victim's
antemortem statement. Although, taken together with the witness' testimony, it indubitably
established the fact that the accused and his co-defendants were the victim's assailants, it did not
state how the attack began.

True, the essence of treachery is the swiftness and the unexpectedness of an attack upon an
unsuspecting and unarmed victim who has not given the slightest provocation.[79] However, the
suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia even if the
purpose is to kill, so long as the decision is sudden and the victim's helpless position is
accidental.[80] In order to appreciate treachery as a modifying circumstance in a continuous
aggression, as in the present case, it must be shown to have been present at the inception of the
attack.[81]

Since the presence of treachery at the commencement of the aggression was not conclusively
established by the prosecution, this circumstance cannot be applied.[82] Thus, appellant can be
convicted only of homicide,[83] for which the penalty that may be imposed under the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal.[84] There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance that can
properly be appreciated, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period,[85] after the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

As regards appellant's pecuniary liabilities, we affirm the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, consistent with current jurisprudence,[86] and P30,000 as moral damages. However, the
award of exemplary damages is deleted because of the absence of any aggravating
circumstance.[87]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant Conrado de Leon is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, not murder, and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of nine (9) years of prision mayor as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P30,000 as moral
damages. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.


hindi ko sure ito
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAULINO SEVILLENO
Y VILLANUEVA alias TAMAYO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 129058 | 1999-03-29

D E C I S I O N


BELLOSILLO, J.:

By pleading guilty to the rape and killing of a 9-year old girl a death sentence would seem inevitable.
But a mere plea of guilt is not sufficient for conviction as the court must first assure itself that the
accused fully understood the consequences of his plea. In the instant case, the trial court failed to
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his admission of guilt and that he fully
comprehended the implications thereof. As the court a quo inadequately discharged its duty of
conducting a searching inquiry, the plea of guilt to a capital offense therefore inevitably became null
and void.1 [People v. Bulalake, 106 Phil. 767 (1959)]

On 22 July 1995, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva alias
Tamayo went to Barangay Guadalupe, San Carlos City. He brought with him bread and ice candy for
his 9-year old and 8-year old nieces, Virginia and Norma, both surnamed Baquia. He then invited
Virginia to accompany him to Sitio Guindali-an "to see (a) beta show."2 [TSN, 21 November 1995, p.
11.] To reach the place, Paulino and Virginia passed through the sugarcane fields.

At around 11:00 o'clock that same morning, Rogelio Baquia, father of Virginia and Norma, arrived.
Not seeing Virginia in their house, Rogelio asked Norma where her sister was. After learning from
her that Virginia had gone with accused Paulino to Sitio Guindali-an, Rogelio immediately set out to
look for them.

Rogelio failed to find his daughter upon reaching Sitio Guindali-an; instead, he bumped into the
accused. When asked about Virginia the accused denied knowing where she was. However, Rogelio
noticed that the accused had nail scratches on his neck and a wound on his left cheek.

Rogelio continued his search. He was accompanied by Eugenio Tiongson, a relative of the accused.
The next day they met the accused at the house of the former barangay captain of Sitio Guindali-an,
Paeng Lopez. Eugenio asked Paulino where Virginia was. This time the accused replied that she
was in a sugarcane field known as "Campo 9," still a part of Guadalupe, like Sitio Guindali-an.
Accompanied by some police officers, Rogelio and Eugenio proceeded to "Campo 9." There they
found Virginia covered with dried leaves, her dress raised to her armpits; the lower portion of her
torso was naked; her legs were spread apart. She had wounds on various parts of her body. She
was dead.3 [TSN, 17 July 1996, p. 10.]

Dr. Arliel Laurence Q. Portuguez, City Health Officer of San Carlos City, autopsied the body of
Virginia. His postmortem examination showed these findings: linear abrasion over hematoma, 3.0 x
2.0 cm., right superior anterior neck; linear abrasion over hematoma, 2.5 x 3.0 cm., left superior
anterior neck; hematoma 9.0 x 4.0 cm., right inguinal area; hematoma 9.0 x 5.0 cm., left inguinal
area; superficial hymenal laceration 0.5 cm., at 12 o'clock position, with clot formation at intuitus;
abrasion 5.5 x 4.0 cm., left superior gluteal area; abrasion 5.0 x 3.0 cm., right superior gluteal area;
abrasion 6.0 x 2.0 cm., right inferior lateral gluteal area; vaginal smear showing absence of sperm
cells except pus cells and epithelial cells. Cause of death: asphyxia secondary to strangulation.4
[Exhibit "A", Records, p. 11.] Based on his findings, Dr. Portuguez concluded that Virginia was raped
and then strangled to death.

When news of the gruesome rape and killing spread around the community, the local residents
immediately arrested the accused Paulino Sevilleno and turned him over to the police authorities.
Thereafter, on 25 July 1995, the accused was charged with rape with homicide for having carnal
knowledge of Virginia Baquia, a minor, 9 years of age, by means of force, violence and intimidation
and against her will, and after ravishing her, with intent to hide his identity and to prevent discovery
thereof, with intent to kill, strangled her which directly caused her death.5 [Rollo, p. 10.]

The arraignment where the accused was represented by Atty. Vic Agravante of the Public Attorney's
Office proceeded thus -

Court: Call thecase x x x x

Interpreter: Appearances?.

Pros. Tabinas: Appearing for the government, ready for arraignment.

Atty. Agravante: Respectfully appearing for the accused, ready, you Honor.

Court: Arraign the accused.

Stenographer's Observation: Accused was arraigned in a Cebuano language duly known and
understood by him, pleaded GUILTY.

COURT (to accused): Do you understand your plea of guilty?

Accused: Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know that your plea of guilty could bring death penalty?

A. Yes, sir.

Court (to Pros. Tabinas): You still have to present your evidence.

Pros. Tabinas: Yes, your honor.6 [TSN, 15 August 1995, pp. 1-2.]

The hearing for the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution was scheduled on 31 August
1995. It was however reset several times. On 10 October 1995 the accused manifested that he had
no counsel. Thus, the trial court orderedthe Public Attorney's Office to provide a counsel de oficio for
him. The next hearing was set on 21 November 1995.7 [Records, p. 33.]

On 28 October 1995, taking advantage of typhoon "Pepang" that struck the island of Negros, the
accused escaped from detention, of which the Presiding judge was accordingly informed.

The records show that Atty. Vic Agravante assisted the accused during the arraignment only. In the
succeeding hearings, Atty. Danilo Pabalinas, another lawyer of PAO, represented the accused. But
after the escape Atty. Pabalinas sought permission from the court to be released from his duty to
assist the accused. The court then directed that the accused be tried in absentia and counsel was
relieved from his responsibility to his client and the court.8 [Id., p. 39.]

The prosecution presented the examining physician as well as Maria Lariosa and Norma Baquia.
Notably, these witnesses were not cross-examined because, as already adverted to, Atty. Pabalinas
earlier excused himself from the case. Neither did the court appoint another counsel for the
accused.

The next hearing was set on 30 January 1996. However, for various reasons, the hearing was reset
to 13 March 1996, 21 April 1996, 18 June 1996 and 17 July 1996.

Meanwhile, on 10 July 1996 the Jail Warden of San Carlos City reported to the court that the
accused had been recaptured.9 [Id., p. 72.]

Atty. Florentino Saldavia, also of PAO, was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused. On 17 July
1996 the prosecution presented Rogelio Baquia as its last witness. Atty. Saldavia cross-examined
Rogelio but his questions were only considered token, and even irrelevant. Then the prosecution
rested.

On 28 August 1996, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for the defense, Atty. Saldavia
moved that the hearing be reset as he was not feeling well. On 19 November 1996, Atty. Saldavia
again moved for postponement and the hearing was reset to 3 December 1996 on which date,
instead of presenting evidence, Atty. Saldavia manifested that he was submitting the case for
decision but invoking the plea of guilt of the accused as a mitigating circumstance. As recorded, the
hearing proceeded thus -

Court: Call the case x x x x

Interpreter: Appearances.

Pros. Tabinas: Appearing for the government.

Atty. Saldavia: For the accused. Your honor please, this is already the turn of the defense to present
evidence. He already pleaded GUILTY. We have no mitigating circumstance to prove except the
plea of guilty. I believe there is no need of presenting evidence, he already pleaded guilty.

Court: (to Atty. Saldavia): You will rest the case?

Atty. Saldavia: Yes, your honor.

Pros. Tabinas: You will invoke the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty?

Atty. Saldavia: Yes.

Pros. Tabinas: We have no objection to that.

Court: Order.

When this case was called for the presentation of evidence for the accused, counsel for the accused
manifested that he had no evidence to present in favor of the accused except the plea of GUILTY
made in open court.

In view thereof, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for decision based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution without the accused presenting evidence in his behalf except the plea
of GUILTY which is admitted by the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for decision.

SO ORDERED.10 [TSN, 3 December 1996, pp. 1-2.]

On 6 March 1997 the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos City, rendered its decision finding the
accused guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to death and to pay the heirs of Virginia
Baquia -P50,000.00 plus costs.11 [Rollo, p. 26.]

This case is now on automatic review. The defense contends that the court a quo erred in convicting
the accused and imposing upon him the penalty of death as it failed to observe the required
procedure for cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense when arraigned.12 [Id., p.
49.] The defense also argues that the arraignment conducted by the trial court was null and void as it
did not conduct a "searching inquiry" before accepting the plea of guilt and sentencing the accused
to death. It concludes that since the arraignment was fatally defective and not in accordance with
law, the case must be remanded to the court of origin for the proper arraignment of the accused
before the capital punishment may be imposed.

We sustain the defense. Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. It must also require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability. If the accused so desires he
may also present evidence in his behalf. This procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to
observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.13 [People v. Dayot, G.R. No. 88281, 10 July 1990,
187 SCRA 641.]

The questions propounded by the trial judge during arraignment hardly satisfied the requisite
searching inquiry. Regrettably, there were only two (2) questions propounded to the accused: First.
Do you understand your plea of guilt? Second. Do you know that your plea of guilt could bring death
penalty? In every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially
where he is an ignorant person with little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is
to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the
information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial
judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.14 [See
Note 1.]

In the instant case, the trial court did not bother to explain the essential elements of the crime of rape
with homicide with which the accused was charged. On the same note, the trial judge also failed to
inform the accused the certainty by which the death penalty would be imposed on him and the fact
that he would also be made to indemnify the heirs of his victim. As a result, the accused was not
properly accorded his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
leveled against him.15 [People v. Estomaca, G.R. Nos. 117485-86, 22 April 1996, 256 SCRA 429.]
Thus, it is with apprehension that ruling for the affirmance of the decision in this case will prejudice
the due observance of the fundamental requirements of fairness and due process.16 [People v.
Gonzaga, No. L-48373, 30 January 1984, 127 SCRA 158.]

The constitutional rights of the accused are for the protection of the guilty and of the innocent alike.
Only with the assurance that even the guilty shall be given the benefit of every constitutional
guaranty can the innocent be secure in the same rights.17 [Ibid.]

Trial courts must exercise meticulous care in accepting a plea of guilty in a capital offense. Judges
are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he
understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of his inevitable conviction.18 [Ibid.] Courts
must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form - death - for the
reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown that innocent
persons have at times pleaded guilty.19 [People v. Albert, G.R. No 114001, 14 December 1995, 251
SCRA 136.] Only a clear, definite and unconditional plea of guilty by the accused must be accepted
by trial courts.20 [Ibid.] There is no such rule which provides that simply because the accused
pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction should automatically follow.21 [People v. Mendoza,
G.R. No. 80845, 14 March 1994, 231 SCRA 264.] A judge should always be an embodiment of
competence.22 [Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct.] As an administrator of justice, it is
imperative that the trial judge carry out his duties ably and competently so as not to erode public
confidence in the judiciary.

It is quite unfortunate that Attys. Vic Agravante, Danilo Pabalinas and Florentino Saldavia, all of
PAO, were remiss in their duties as defenders of the accused. Atty. Agravante did not take time to
explain to his client the nature of the crime of which he was charged and the gravity of the
consequences of his plea. Instead, he readily agreed to the accused pleading guilty to a capital
offense. In the succeeding hearings, Atty. Pabalinas was supposed to assist the accused ably but
miserably failed. When the case was called and appearances noted, the trial judge informed the
parties that the accused had escaped from detention. It was then that the prosecution and the
defense, including the trial court, agreed that the accused would be tried in absentia. Then, at this
juncture, Atty. Pabalinas sought to be relieved of his responsibilities as counsel de oficio which,
unfortunately, the court also granted. The court proceeded with the presentation of three (3)
prosecution witnesses who testified but were never cross-examined because Atty. Pabalinas already
left the courtroom, apparently with the consent of the trial court. Nobody was assigned to replace
Atty. Pabalinas. Consequently, not only was the accused tried in absentia, he was also tried without
the assistance of counsel.

When the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Saldavia of the PAO asked for the postponement of the
succeeding hearings not only once but thrice allegedly because he was not feeling well.
Interestingly, when the time came for him to adduce evidence in behalf of the accused, he
manifested that since his client had already pleaded guilty he would no longer present any evidence.
He only invoked the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.

The plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance is misplaced. Not under any circumstance would any
admission of guilt affect or reduce the death sentence.23 [See Note 15, p. 434.] Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
a homicide is committed. Death is a single indivisible penalty and corollary to Art. 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, in all cases in which a single indivisible penalty is prescribed, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of the offense.

The court below also erred in disregarding the testimony of Norma Baquia "for the reason that her
testimony failed to establish that the incident happened within the territorial jurisdiction of this
court."24 [Rollo, p. 23.] The court did not consider her testimony purportedly because she only
testified that her sister Virginia went with the accused to Guindali-an without specifying as to what
municipality or city it was part of.25 [Ibid.] Again, this is error. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court requires courts to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and geographical divisions of our country. There is only one Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe, San
Carlos City (Negros Occidental).

We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the manner by
which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest
disinterest on the plight of their client. They lacked vigor and dedication to their work. Atty. Agravante
did not explain to the accused the nature of the crime of which he was charged and the
consequences of his plea. Atty. Pabalinas, instead of assisting the accused, hastily left the
courtroom after obtaining leave while the prosecution was presenting its three (3) witnesses.
Resultingly, all three (3) witnesses were never cross-examined. On the other hand, Atty. Saldavia
moved for the postponement of the scheduled hearings during which he was supposed to present
evidence for the defense; worse, on the last scheduled hearing he submitted the case for decision
without presenting evidence. In short, no evidence was ever presented for the defense. And, as if to
compound his deficiency with ignorance, Atty. Saldavia relied on his client's plea of guilt in the
mistaken belief that it would modify and reduce to reclusion perpetua the imposable penalty of
death.

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with
utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable.26 [Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Code
of Professional Responsibility.] Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did
not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly
performed their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno,
however guilty he might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys.
Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the
Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future will be
severely sanctioned.

WHEREFORE, the 6 March 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos City
(Negros Occidental), in Crim. Case No. 129058, convicting the accused PAULINO SEVILLENO Y
VILLANUEVA alias Tamayo of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to DEATH is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper arraignment and
trial of the accused until terminated.


SO ORDERED.