(i PARi I ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

O\\ll sl'l f:.intt.-rel'\l, the interaction of i ndiviclual C:'gois would t' nhar t<.:c n .
S() illtC?nleltiOilal reJatl011S theOriSts have lhUl l'V(-'11 if <.: Vel)' Stat;lhOI)aj
}X)wer at the expense of the others, no one '"rdl. ln hotJ
1

ueneral good can be tl1e unintendeJ product of selfl"h llldtVtdual a<:tions M sa
(;'- . - I . k I . . t} t h. tJ \ . . . I Or(!OV(!
e,en if mo t states desm" otuy to Wtlat le) ;we ... 1< 11 own llttcrcsts dictate tl r,
the, togetJ1er in order to resist any state or coaution of states that thre t )at
. a ens to
dominate them.
The balance-of-power system is likely to prevent any one state's a<..:qnitin h
mom. It will not, however, benefit all states equally nor maintain the egc.
I b f al'ti cl I erma.
nently. Rewards will be unequa ecause o mequ 1 es tn power an Wa
"'rill occur because they are one of ilie means by whkh states can presetve what th rs
have or acquire what they covet. states m.ay even be eliminated by their
powerfUJ neighbors. The intemational "'ilJ be however, only if states
Aock to what they tl1ink is the strongest s1de. \i\That IS called handwagoning or th
domino theory argues tl1at the international is precarious because
aggression will attract many followers, either out of fear or out of a desire to share the
spoils of victory. Stephen M. Wait disagrees, dra,ving on theory
and histOJical evidence to argue that, ratl1er tl1an bandwagonmg, under most condi-
tions states balance against emerging threats. They do not throw in their lot the
stronger side. Instead they join witl1 otl1ers to prevent any state from becorniJ)g
50
strong that it could dominate the system.
Power balancing is a strategy followed by individual states acting on their own.
Oilier ways of coping \vith anarchy, which may supplement or exist alongside this
impulse, are more explicitly collective. Regimes and institutions can help over-
come anarchy and facilitate cooperation. When states agree on the plinciples,
ruJes, and norms that should govern behavior, iliey can often ameliorate the secu-
rity dilemma and increase the scope for cooperation. Institutions may not only
embody common understandings but, as Robert 0 . Keohane argues, they can also
help states work toward mutually desired outcomes by providing a framework for
long-run agreements, making it easier for each state to see whether oiliers are liv-
ing up to their promises, and increasing the costs the state will pay if it cheats.
. In the area, the United Nations has the potential to be an especially
Adam Roberts assesses the United Nations' role in coping
with confltct wttlun states through the mechanism of peacekeeping missjons. He
finds that the demand for such missions since the end of the Cold War has
expanded dramatically, but notes the formidabl e obstacles that must be overcome
if UN is to fulfil! the hopes that so many state leaders and citizens have for it in
this area.
t'OWER AND PRINCIPLE
IN STATECRAFT
Six Principles of Political Realism
HANS). MORGENTHAU
1. Politic:al realism believes that politics, like society in general , is governed hy
objective laws that have their roots in human nature. [n order to improve society it
is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of
these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at
the risk of fai lure.
Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politic , must also
believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects. however
imperfectly and onc-sidedly, these objective laws. 1t believes also, then, in the pos-
sibili ty of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion-between what is
true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason.
and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and
informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.
Hu man nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed
since the classic:al philosophies of China, [ndja, and Greece endeavored to discover
these laws. I Ience, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old
age a defect. The fat:t that a theory of politics, if there be such a theory. has never
been heard of before tends to <:reate a presumption against, rather than in favor of,
its soundness. Conversely, the fact that a theory of politics was developed huudreds
or even thousands of years ago-as was tJ1e theory of ilie balanc:e of power--does
not create a presumption Ulat it must be outmoded and obsolete ....
For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving U1em meaning
through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained
fro111 .PoliliCII Among Nations, 5th edition hy llans J. Morgeuthau. Copyright C l9i2 bv Alfred A.
Knopf, .a division of Randc,m llou!.e, Inc. Reprinted by pennission of Alfred A. Knopf. a di\ision of
Hundom Inc. Portions of the text and some footnotes have been omitted.
7