Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159302

February 6, 2008

CITIBANK, N.A., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROSITA TAN
PARAGAS, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of this petition for review is the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Resolution dated October 24, 2001 granting the MOTION FOR PARTIAL
RECONSIDERATION of respondent Rosita Tan Paragas (Rosita) relative to her appeal in an
illegal dismissal case, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto by Decision of January 24,
2003 and Resolution of July 29, 2003.1
Rosita was found by Labor Arbiter Geobel Bartolabac to be an employee of petitioner Citibank,
N.A. for around eighteen (18) years from August 8, 1979 to September 4, 1997. At the time her
employment was terminated by petitioner for serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and
habitual neglect of duties and gross inefficiency, she was occupying the position of filing clerk.
The relevant facts pertaining to respondents employment history may be gleaned from the
following salient portions of the labor arbiters Decision of June 29, 1998:
On 8 August 1979, complainant Paragas joined respondent Citibank as Secretary to the
Premises Administration (up to 1981): Corporate Teller (1981-1982): Secretary to
Assistant Vice Presidents Ed Katigbak and Z.P. Molina (up to 1987); Secretary to VicePresident-Legal Counsel, Atty. Renato J. Fernandez (up [to] 1988); Secretary to the
Employer/Employee Relations Officer, Atty. Beatriz Alo and later to the Public Affairs
Director Vice President, Maximo J. Edralin, Jr. When the latter retired in 1992,
complainant was assigned to Cash Management Services as Remittance Processor.
Sometime in the early part of 1993, as a result of the reorganization, respondent bank
declared certain officers and employees, or their positions/functions, redundant. Among
these affected was complainant Paragas. However, to accommodate the union officers
request, complainants employment was not terminated but was assigned to Records
Management Unit of the Quality Assurance Division as bank statement retriever, a filing
clerk job described by complainant as "non-brainer job."

In the latter part of July 1994, complainant was assigned to file Universal Account
Opening Forms (UAOF) in file boxes and retrieving such UAOFs from the file boxes
upon internal customers request from time to time. In the same month, she was also
assigned to process or develop microfilms. However, on 20 February 1995, she
complained that the processing of microfilms was proving to be harmful to her health.
Thus, the job was reassigned to another clerk. Accordingly, beginning 21 February 1995,
complainants job in the bank was to file and retrieve UAOFs. x x x
xxxx
On 11 December 1996, complainant was assigned to undertake the special project of
reorganizing the UAOFs from 13 December 1996 to 15 May 1997. The work to be done
are as follows:
a. Review of existing files in order to verify misfiles
b. Pull-out of misfiles and file them in their proper places
c. Interfile new/incoming UAOFs received for the day
d. Add new file boxes and make an allowance of at least inch for each file box
for incoming UAOFs and for future explasion [sic]
e. Labelling of all file boxes and Corporate UAOFs and their actual contents
f. Transfer of the UAOFs from the Citicenter basement to the new compactors at
the third floor
g. Submit a status report (accomplishment for the week) every Monday
On 10 January 1997, AVP Narciso Ferrera issued a Memo to complainant calling her
attention on the following, to wit:
10 January 1997
TO Rosita T. Paragas
CC: Randy J. Uson
SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION OF THE UNIVERSAL ACCOUNT OPENING
FORMS (UAOFs)
In connection with the Reorganization of the Universal Account Opening Forms
(UAOFs), I would like to call your attention on the following, viz:

a. Various misfiling on the reorganized UAOF file I had the reorganized file
counter-checked by your co-employees and they came out with the following
misfiling, e.g.
1. Belo, Jose; Belo, Matilde, Belo William interfiled with BELLO
2. BARRAGER, RAYMOND misfiled
BARANUELO Box (BARBARO)

with

BARANGAN

and

3. EUGENIO BARAOIDANs interfiled with BARNUEVO AND

BARRAMEDA
4. VICTOR AGIUS filed with the AGUIRREs
5. Several AGUILAs interfiled with File box ALF-ALI
6. LETICIA AMANSEC filed with AMAR and AMARGO
7. Several BARON interfiled between BARROGA AND BARRON
8. AMANDA CAMELLO interfiled between CAMERO and CAMERON
9. PETER CARSON interfiled between CARR and CARRAD
They went thru 9 files boxes only and found 9 misfiles. This level of errors is not
acceptable. Remember a misfiled document is considered LOST and you will
have to go through the file one by one to be able to retrieve it.
b. Submission of a weekly status report every Monday. As per our
agreement, report every Monday effective January 6, 1997. As of
February 10, 1997; I have not received a single report from you.
c. Trimming/cutting of edges of attached documents like xerox copies of
Ids, Passports, Drivers license, etc. I would like to reiterate my previous
instructions to do away with the trimming and cutting of attached
documents as it only consumes valuable time and will prolong the
reorganization process. We started the reorganization last December 13,
1996 and as today 10 February 1997, you are still in letter C for a total of
163 file boxes. There are still 348 file boxes to reorganize
d. Accumulation of incoming newly received UAOFs. I have noticed that
you have accumulated two (2) boxes full of personal UAOFs at the
basement and at the third floor. Arce and Sammy are complaining on the
retrieval of these files. It is taking them more time and efforts. In the
monthly meeting we had last December, 1996, interfiling incoming
UAOFs is your responsibility.

In view of the above, please concentrate on the filing process and stop trimming
the attachments. Our goal in the reorganization of the UAOFs is ACCURATE
FILING so that these documents could be located when requested. I hope you
exhaust all means and efforts to finish the project within the given time frame.
Please be guided accordingly.
(Sgd.)
Narciso
Assistant Vice President

M.

Ferrera

Again, on 2 April 1997, complainant received another memo from AVP Ferrera called
her attention (a) to the same nine (9) cases misfiled UAOFs in Annex 16, (b) to three (3)
other cases of misfiled UAOFs (c) her persistent failure to submit weekly report on the
progress of her work under the Special Project, and (d) that despite the lapse of three (3)
months, she was still in letter D (or UAOFs covering clients whose surnames begin with
letter D).
As she failed to complete the project on 30 May 1997, complainant was given another 30
days to complete it. However, by the end of June 1997, her accomplishment was only
30% of the total work to be done.
On 25 July 1997, AVP Ferrera directed complainant to explain in writing why her
employment should not be terminated on the ground of serious misconduct, willful
disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of her duties and gross inefficiency.
Correspondingly, complainant was placed under Preventive suspension. Complainant
submitted her written explanation on 31 July 1997.
On 29 August 1997, an administrative conference took place with the complainant, her
counsel and the Union President in attendance.
Finally, on 4 September 1997, the respondent bank thru AVP Ferrera notified
complainant that her written explanation and those which she ventilated during the
administrative conference held on 29 August 1997 were found self-serving, and
consequently, terminating her employment on the ground of serious misconduct, willful
disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties and gross inefficiency.2
Following the termination of her services, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
praying forreinstatement, backwages, damages and attorneys fees.3 By the aforementioned
Decision of June 29, 1998, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, finding
that her dismissal on the ground of work inefficiency was valid.
On appeal, the NLRC, by Resolution of October 24, 2000, affirmed the decision of the labor
arbiter with the modification that respondent should be paid separation pay "as a form of
equitable relief" in view of her length of service with petitioner.

Respondent filed a MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION of the NLRC Resolution.

She no longer challenged her dismissal on the ground of work inefficiency, but prayed that
petitioner be ordered to pay her the "Provident Fund" benefits under its retirement plan for
which she claimed to be qualified pursuant to petitioners "Working Together" Manual,
specifically the provision on page 12.5 thereof which states:
Should you (employee) resign or be discharged for reasons other than misconduct prior
to your earliest retirement date, you will be paid a percentage of your share in the Fund
according to the following schedule:
Completed
Years
Continuous Service

of Vesting

20 or more years

100%

19 years

95%

18 years

90%

xxxx

x x x x4

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent, claiming that the labor arbiter upheld her dismissal on the ground of merely "work
inefficiency" and not for any misconduct on her part, asserted that she is entitled to 90% of the
retirement benefits.
Petitioner did not move to reconsider the NLRC October 24, 2000 Resolution.
Finding that respondents dismissal was "for causes other than misconduct," the NLRC, by the
above-mentioned October 24, 2001 Resolution granted respondents motion for partial
reconsideration.5 Petitioner moved to reconsider this Resolution, but the same was denied by the
NLRC.
Petitioner thereupon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside and
nullify the October 24, 2001 NLRC Resolution. The appellate court, by Decision dated January
24, 2003, dismissed petitioners petition for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the challenged
NLRC Resolution. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by
Resolution of July 29, 2003, the present petition6 was filed, petitioner asserting as follows:
1. The NLRC has no authority to pass upon and resolve issues and grant claims not
pleaded and proved before the Labor Arbiter.
2. The NLRC acted without authority or without or in excess of jurisdiction when it
granted the entirely new/subsequent claim (for payment of retirement benefits) of
Paragas.

3. In any case, (a) the actuations of Paragas narrated in petitioners motion for
reconsideration [of the NLRC Resolution dated October 24, 2001] for which petitioner
had dismissed her on the ground of Serious Misconduct, among other grounds and (b) the
decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing Paragas complaint for illegal dismissal for lack
of merit, which the NLRC affirmed, show that Paragas is not entitled to her new claim for
retirement benefits; for as Paragas herself has shown in her motion for partial
reconsideration, under the Retirement Plan of the bank a bank employee who has been
dismissed for misconduct is not entitled to retirement benefit.
4. In any event, even assuming that Paragas was entitled to retirement benefit, her claim
therefor is already time-barred.
5. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed petitioners petition in CA-G.R.
No. SP 69642.7
The petition is impressed with merit.
That respondent did not expressly claim retirement benefits in the proceedings before the labor
arbiter is not disputed. Indeed, she admits that the first time she explicitly prayed for such
benefits was in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed with the NLRC. She argues,
nonetheless, that the grant thereof by the NLRC was warranted based on the principle that rules
of procedure and evidence should not be applied rigidly and technically in labor cases.
Moreover, she alleges that her claim for retirement benefits was implicit in her general prayer in
her position paper for "such other reliefs as may be just and equitable."
While it is established that technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases, Maebo v.
NLRC8 instructs
We wish, however, to stress some points. Firstly, while it is true that the Rules of the
NLRC must be liberally construed and that the NLRC is not bound by the technicalities
of law and procedure, the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC itself must not be the first to
arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to
assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious, and inexpensive settlement of labor
disputes. One such provision is Section 3, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC which requires the submission of verified position papers within fifteen days
from the date of the last conference, with proof of service thereof on the other parties.
The position papers "shall cover only those claims and causes of action raised in the
complaint excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall
be accompanied by all supporting documents including the affidavits of their respective
witnesses which shall take the place of the latters testimony." After the submission
thereof, the parties "shallnot be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove
facts, not referred to and any cause or causes of action not included in the complaint or
position papers, affidavits and other documents."(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent indeed prayed for "other just and equitable relief," but the same may not be
interpreted so broadly as to include even those which are not warranted by the factual premises

alleged by a party. Thus the January 24, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals correctly stated:
"It has been ruled in this jurisdiction that the general prayer for other reliefs is applicable to
such other reliefs which are warranted by the law and facts alleged by the respondent in her basic
pleadings and not on a newly created issue."9 (Underscoring supplied) Particularly inPeople v.
Lacson,10 this Court held:
x x x Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the petition
states facts which will authorize the court to grant such relief. A court cannot set itself
in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their
pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and
void. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents assertion that she mentioned the matter regarding the Provident Fund even prior to
her Motion for Partial Reconsideration on page 14 of her position paper and again on pages 2
and 7 of her "Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum" is unavailing.
Her "Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum" was filed after she had already submitted her
position paper. Thus, any mention of the Provident Fund therein would fail to adhere to the
above-ruling in Maebo, the thrust of which was precisely that all facts, evidence, and causes of
action should already be proffered in the position papers and the supporting documents thereto,
not in any later pleading.
As to respondents position paper, there was only the mere mention of "Provident A & C," with
the corresponding amount of P1,086,335.43, among the actual damages that she was allegedly
suffering from her continued severance from employment.11 Respondent made no attempt to
define what this "Provident A & C" was, nor offer any substantiation for including it to be
among her actual damages. She did not even hint how "Provident A & C" had a bearing on
retirement benefits. Thus, while respondent did refer to the Provident Fund in her position paper,
such reference was too vague to be a basis for any court or administrative body to grant her
retirement benefits.
Respondent justifies her failure to claim for retirement benefits before the labor arbiter by
alleging that it would be inconsistent with her prayer for reinstatement. Respondent, however,
could have easily claimed such benefits as an alternative relief.
In any event, respondent is not entitled to retirement benefits as this Court finds that she was
validly dismissed for serious misconduct and not merely for work inefficiency.
While findings of fact in administrative decisions such as those rendered by the NLRC are to be
accorded not only great weight and respect, but even finality, the rule only applies for as long as
these findings are supported by substantial evidence.12 In the present case, the NLRC
was absolutely silent on why it did not give credence to petitioners evidence on respondents
misconduct. It was content merely to state that "the separation is not for reasons of misconduct
but for other grounds"13 without any substantiation and in total disregard of the evidence
proffered by petitioner. Colegio de San Juan de Letran-Calamba v. Villas14 instructs:

Likewise, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which

have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this
Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly
shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on
record. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
True, the NLRC adopted the findings of the labor arbiter, but the labor arbiter did not
expressly rule on the issue of respondents alleged misconduct which is not surprising, for a
ruling thereon was not then strictly necessary. At that stage, the main issue which had to be
resolved was only whether respondents dismissal was valid, and not whether she was qualified
for retirement benefits. Only when respondent raised the claim of retirement benefits did it
become crucial to determine whether she was validly dismissed on the specific ground of serious
misconduct, not only on the ground of poor work performance.
As reflected above, this Court, after a review of the NLRC finding that respondent did not
commit serious misconduct, finds otherwise.
While the labor arbiter did not explicitly rule that respondent committed serious misconduct, his
decision leads to that conclusion, for the documentary evidence which it cites as basis to prove
her work inefficiency shows, upon close examination, also her commission of serious
misconduct.
In support of its ruling that respondents dismissal was valid, the labor arbiter relied on the
performance appraisals of respondent from July to December 1994, from January to June
1995, and from July to December 1996, all of which were submitted by petitioners Assistant
Vice-President, Narciso M. Ferrera. The labor arbiter noted that Ferreras evaluation of
respondent was not lacking in objectivity.
These performance appraisals, however, did not merely show that respondent was not able to
meet performance targets. More relevantly, they also consistently noted significant behavioral
and attitudinal problems in respondent. In particular, respondent was found to be very
argumentative;15 she had difficulty working with others;16 she was hard to deal with;17 and she
never ceased being the subject of complaints from co-workers.18
Moreover, beyond the documents referred to in the labor arbiters decision, there are other pieces
of evidence on record which further establish that respondent was validly dismissed not only for
work inefficiency but for serious misconduct. The Court sees no reason why these should not be
accorded credibility along with those cited by the labor arbiter.
The assessment of respondents performance by Randy Uson, another superior of respondent,
was given weight by the labor arbiter who noted that Uson was "described as [a] very
professional and fair person by complainant [herein-respondent] herself."19 Significantly, Uson
later commented on respondents behavior as follows:

"Less tangible but none the less real, are the common concerns raised by her peers and
supervisor, on the stress and tension created when Rose is around. The conscious
effort to get out of her way and avoid conflict, hinders productivity and efficiency
and has adversely affected the morale of the entire unit. x x x"20 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
More. For the appraisal period from June to December 1995, respondents performance
appraisal report stated that her attitude towards her work, the bank, and superiors needed
reformation.21 The report for January to June 1996 made the same observation,22 indicating that
there was no improvement on her part.
The performance appraisal report of respondent for the period of January to June 1997, besides
stating that she was still "hard to deal with," described her as "belligerent," one who had "a
negative presence which affects the morale of the entire unit," and who "pick[ed] fights with
peers and other employees even without provocation."23
The evaluation of respondent cited above finds corroboration in her admission that "she may
have been tactless and insolent in dealing with her superior but it does not allegedly warrant the
supreme penalty of dismissal."24
Finally, even the NLRC, its later ruling that respondent was not guilty of misconduct
notwithstanding, was aware that the problem with respondent was not merely her poor work
output, but her unreasonable behavior and unpleasant deportment. Thus, as its Resolution of
October 24, 2000 drew to a close, it stated that petitioner was "correct" in invoking Cathedral
School of Technology v. NLRC,25 specifically the following portion of this Courts decision
therein:
An evaluative review of the records of this case nonetheless supports a finding of a just
cause for termination. The reason for which private respondents services were
terminated, namely, her unreasonable behavior and unpleasant deportment in dealing
with the people she closely works with in the course of her employment, is analogous to
the other "just causes" enumerated under the Labor Code. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears noting that petitioner cited Cathedral School of Technology in its Comment/Reply to
Complainant-Appellants Appeal Memorandum precisely to show that its dismissal of
complainant on the ground of "gross inefficiency and unreasonable behavior" (emphasis
supplied) was correctly upheld by the labor arbiter.26
When an employee, despite repeated warnings from the employer, obstinately refuses to curtail a
bellicose inclination such that it erodes the morale of co-employees, the same may be a ground
for dismissal for serious misconduct.
As this Court held in National Service Corp. v. Leogardo, Jr.,27 "[a] series of irregularities when
put together may constitute serious misconduct, which under Article 283 of the Labor Code, is a
just cause for termination." And as it held in Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation v.

Deputy Minister of Labor, acts destructive of the morale of ones co-employees may be
considered serious misconduct.28
It is respondents obstinate refusal to reform herself which ultimately persuades this Court to find
that her dismissal on the ground of serious misconduct was valid. Clearly, the following
statement of Jaime R. Paraiso, head of petitioners Records Management Unit, quoted with
approval both by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, relates not only to respondents inefficiency
but also to her admittedly tactless and insolent dealings with her superior.
While we all have strengths and good points we also have weaknesses and shortcomings.
However, the first step towards self-improvement is acknowledging and accepting
ones weaknesses and shortcomings. This is followed by a resolve to change for the
better, in turn followed by appropriate action. These elements are not evident in the
responses given [by respondent to the performance appraisal report] and there is no
clear indication of a desire for self-improvement or any plans in that
direction. There continues to be a need to address this situation.29(Emphasis supplied)
Having been validly dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct, respondent is thus
disqualified from receiving her retirement benefits pursuant to the provision of petitioners
"Working Together" Manual quoted earlier.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of January 24, 2003
and Resolution of July 29, 2003 are SET ASIDE. The NLRC Resolution dated October 24, 2001
granting private respondents MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION is thus
VACATED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,Chairperson, Carpio, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Both penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Eugene S. Labitoria, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Danilo B. Pine. CA rollo, pp.
281-287 and 325-326, respectively.
2

Rollo, pp. 130-133.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, it is most respectfully prayed

that judgment be rendered against Respondents/Citibank, N.A., Suresh Maharaj, Narciso
M. Ferrera, Beatriz C. Alo, Raul (Randy) J. Uson, Atul R. Patel jointly and severally as
follows:

1. Ordering the immediate reinstatement of complainant to her original or

equivalent position without loss of seniority, with backwages from the time she
was suspended and terminated from the services until reinstatement.
2. Ordering the payment to complainant the sum of P50,754.00 representing
Christmas bonus and 13th month pay.
3. Ordering respondents to pay complainant all the monetary benefits accruing to
her under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
4. Ordering the respondents to pay actual damages in the sum of One Hundred
Forty Six Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Four & 50/100 (P146,494.50) and
medical bills of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).
5. Ordering respondent to pay moral damages in the sum Two Million Pesos
P2,000,000.00.
6. Ordering respondent to pay the sum of Two Hundred Thousand P200,000 by
way of exemplary damages.
7. Ordering respondent to pay the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos P50,000.00 by
way of nominal damages.
8. Ordering the respondent to pay the sum of P50,000 by way of temperate or
moderate damages.
9. Ordering respondents to pay complainant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos only (P200,000.00) by way of attorneys fees.
10. Enjoining respondents from declaring complainants housing loan due and
payable and ordering it to cease and desist from foreclosing the real estate
mortgage of complainant should respondents planned to do so, until the
termination of instant case;
11. Ordering respondents to cease and desist from declaring due and payable all
the company loans extended to complainant by reason of her employment, until
final termination of instant case.
Complainant further prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable.
(Rollo, pp. 81-82)
4

Annex "A" of Motion for Partial Reconsideration, NLRC records (Vol. II), no page
number indicated.
5

The NLRC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated October 24, 2000 is PARTIALLY

RECONSIDERED and the respondents are further ORDERED to pay the
complainant her retirement benefits equivalent to 90% of the total retirement
benefits had she completed twenty years of service to respondent Bank pursuant
to the Citibank N.A. Retirement Plan for Philippine Branches and consistent with
the existing guidelines and regulations of respondent Bank. (Rollo, p. 158)
6

The petition was earlier denied by this Courts Resolution dated September 24, 2003
(rollo, p. 237) on procedural grounds, but was reinstated on petitioners motion by
Resolution dated August 17, 2005 (rollo, p. 311).
7

Rollo, p. 36.

G.R. No. 107721, January 10, 1994, 229 SCRA 240, 248.

Rollo, p. 61.

10

459 Phil. 330, 366 (2003).

11

Page 14 of Position Paper of respondent-complainant, NLRC records (Vol. I), p. 40.

12

Agoy v. NLRC, 322 Phil. 636, 644-645 (1996).

13

Page 5 of NLRC Resolution dated October 24, 2001, rollo, p. 154.

14

447 Phil. 692, 700 (2003).

15

NLRC records (Vol. I), pp. 118, 123.

16

Id. at 118, 123.

17

Id. at 134

18

Ibid.

19

Rollo, p. 100.

20

NLRC records (Vol. I), p. 140.

21

Id. at 127.

22

Id. at 130.

23

Id. at 54.

24

Id. at 258.

25

G.R. No. 101438, October 13, 1992, 214 SCRA 551, 559.

26

CA rollo, p. 167.

27

215 Phil. 450, 457 (1984).

28

226 Phil. 20, 23 (1986).

29

Rollo, p. 138.