Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Committees
Alex Navab
July 17, 2012
Process Overview
Investment Committee
Main decision making forum for all new investments for private equity
Meets formally two times per week Monday and Thursday mornings (NY time)
Iterative process not just the last step
All key decision points should come to the Committee
Initial bid proposal (excluding early stage and exploratory first round bids)
Committee should also be used as sounding board, and we are actively encouraging coming to the
Committee earlier in your evaluation/thinking
Controversial issues
Most investments will be discussed with the Committee four or more times before a final decision
Also encouraging using regional heads/other IC members as a sounding board before coming to the
Committee
Memos to be submitted Friday for Monday meeting and Tuesday for Thursday meeting
Email Erika Stadtlander prior to memo submission, copying Alex Navab and Johannes Huth, to get
on the agenda
3
European
IC
Asian
IC
China Growth
IC
Henry Kravis
Henry Kravis
Henry Kravis
Henry Kravis
George Roberts
George Roberts
George Roberts
George Roberts
Paul Raether
Mike Michelson
Mike Michelson
Joe Bae
Mike Michelson
Johannes Huth*
Johannes Huth*
David Liu
Johannes Huth*
Alex Navab*
Alex Navab*
Ming Lu
Todd Fisher
Mike Calbert
Mike Calbert
Alex Navab*
Brian Carroll
Joe Bae
Mike Calbert
Dominic Murphy
David Liu
Ming Lu
* Co-Chairs
4
What to Cover
1 Macro Perspective
2 Industry Thesis
3 Long Term Industry Analysis and Performance
4 Company Thesis and Long Term Performance
5 Competitive Positioning
6 Management
7 Scenario Analysis
8 Exhaustive Risk Analysis / Downside Case
9 Evolution of Cases
10 Exit and Entry Valuation Assumptions
11 Rationale for Investment
12 Disaggregate Source of Returns
13 Financing
Other
Mid Stage
Late Stage
Early-Mid
Macro
Perspective
Industry
Thesis(1)
Walk-though how value has been created in the industry historically (including
how private equity has been involved in the sector)
Outperforming and underperforming deals have often captured or missed
potential technological / industry shifts. Include view on ability to create value
through (or defensibility of industry to) technological / industry shifts
Early (Updated
Frequently)
Discuss other big risk areas (regulatory, competition from overseas, etc.)
(1)
(1) When presenting the above items, keep in mind guidelines provided by the legal team on the appropriate
language, tone and descriptions to use. Additionally, remember that sensitive topics should be discussed verbally.
Mid
Long Term
Industry
Analysis and
Performance
Competitive
Positioning(1)
Mid-Late
Management
Mid (Updated
Frequently)
Mid
Company
Thesis and
Long Term
Performance
(1) When presenting the above items, keep in mind guidelines provided by the legal team on the appropriate
language, tone and descriptions to use. Additionally, remember that sensitive topics should be discussed verbally.
(2) Colorful characterizations of management are better handled verbally, as IC decks can be produced in litigation and seen by managers
and descriptions of mangers can be requested by managers in some countries under data privacy laws.
Mid-Late
Mid-Late
Exhaustive
Risk
Analysis /
Downside
Case
Evolution of
Cases
10
Mid-Late
Explicitly show reasons for movements of forecast cases up and down through
IC process and rationale (only after early stage)
Mid-Late
Exit and
Entry
Valuation
Assumptions
Present thinking around exit alternatives (strategic sale, IPO, etc.) as well as
impact of exit alternatives to returns (for example, multiple share sales)
Attractiveness of return opportunity given risk profile
Rationale for
Investment
Early (Updated
Frequently)
Break down returns into value generation components and provide basis for
assumptions
Source of EBITDA Growth: Industry growth, market share gain, pricing
growth, operating leverage, cost takeout / rationalization, etc.
Debt Paydown: Incorporate commentary around changes in operations
(cash flow conversion) and impact of refinancings / recapitalizations
Mid-Late
Disaggregate
Source of
Returns
Financing
11
Throughout
IC Process Suggestions
Cross
Function /
Geography
Involvement
Throughout
Include other geographic / industry vertical teams that have had significant
experience in the space and / or cover suppliers or customers of the Company
Follow Up
Items
12
Deal teams to respond to each follow-up item from prior session during every
IC meeting
Throughout
Throughout
Deal
Process,
Partnership/
Consortia &
Other
13
Objective:
Show impact of broader economy on the insurance industry and
outline a specific thesis on industry growth.
Conclusions:
a) The insurance sector follows the economy over the long-term, but
has industry-specific cycles.
b) Timing the insurance cycle is important to generating attractive
returns in the insurance brokerage space given the tying of the
growth of the broker space to commercial P&C premiums.
c) Q: Why is it good to invest in the sector today?
A: Visibility on hardening cycle in the medium term, opportunity to
enter market before valuations reset when insurance cycle
hardening is more visible.
d) No visible positive or negative technological / industry shifts
expected to impact the industry.
14
18%
20%
15%
12%
15%
10%
8%
5%
5%
5%
3%
4%
2007
2008
4%
2%
(5%)
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2006
2009
YTD 6/10
25%
14,000
20%
4.0%
3.8%
3.6%
12,000
350
300
10,000
250
8,000
15%
3.4%
3.2%
10%
3.0%
5%
200
2.8%
6,000
150
4,000
100
2,000
50
-
'67 '70 '73 '76 '79 '82 '85 '88 '91 '94 '97 '00 '03 '06 '09
Source: KKR Analysis, Company Filings, A.M. Best, SNL, Bureau of Economic Analysis
15
2005
2.6%
(5%)
2.4%
2.2%
(10%)
2.0%
'67 '70 '73 '76 '79 '82 '85 '88 '91 '94 '97 '00 '03 '06 '09
1998
1999
2000
2001
200
2002
2003
2004
Revenue
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
EBITDA
YTD 6/10
40
150
30
100
50
20
10
(0.9%)
5.9%
5.0%
(1.8%)
6.0%
4.2%
0.3%
6.5%
6.8%
5.4%
2.4%
7.8%
9.5%
0.3%
9.8%
21.3%
(5.7%)
15.6%
12.8%
(0.7%)
12.2%
7.2%
(6.2%)
1.0%
2.5%
(3.6%)
(1.2%)
6.7%
(3.6%)
3.1%
(0.9%)
3.1%
2.2%
(3.6%)
5.0%
1.4%
(6.9%)
6.4%
(0.5%)
(3.6%)
3.8%
0.2%
16.6%
+0.2%
5.5%
16.9%
+0.3%
8.7%
17.3%
+0.4%
10.3%
18.1%
+0.8%
14.9%
18.7%
+0.6%
19.4%
19.5%
+0.8%
17.0%
20.2%
+0.7%
4.7%
21.0%
+0.8%
2.7%
21.9%
+0.9%
7.5%
23.0%
+1.1%
7.4%
23.2%
+0.2%
2.3%
23.7%
+0.5%
1.7%
24.1%
+0.4%
1.9%
Most Significant Value Creation Event in Recent History Was Willis' Initial Buyout
Broker Ind Rev Growth
20%
6%
15%
4%
10%
2%
5%
0%
(2%)
(4%)
(6%)
(8%)
(10%)
16
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
0%
YTD 6/10 (5%)
(10%)
(15%)
(20%)
(25%)
Revenue Growth
Wills Out/Underperformance
Willis Out/Underperformance
8%
22%
12% 12%
25%
19% 20%
18%
6%
5%
3% 4%
13%
8% 7% 7%
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
YTD
6/10
20
15
10
120%
115%
115% 114%
109% 110%
110%
114%
103%
110%
105%
100%
-
95%
(5)
90%
(10)
85%
97%
96%
93% 95%
92%
80%
(15)
1996
(20)
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
Source: KKR Analysis, SNL, The Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers
17
100%
95%
2005
2007
2009
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
The '00-'03 cycle was magnified by the tech bust and 9/11
30%
4.0%
25%
129%
126%
125%
20%
109%
87%
7%
0%
3.0%
89%
85%
83%
87% 87%
-5%
-10%
75%
3%
9%
5%
98%
100%
12%
9%
10%
106%
103%
100%
15%
12%
15%
3.5%
115%
19%
24%
2%
(1%)
Tech Bust /
Sept. 11th
(5%)
Katrina /
Rita / Wilma
(7%)
-15%
2.5%
1996
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
(13%)
2007
2008
2009
YTD
6/10
Based On This Analysis, We Have Formed Three Cases For P&C Cycle Assumptions
Conservative Case: Pricing does not harden, but flattens over three years; volumes grow at 2%
Base Hardening Case: '11-'13 same as Conservative Case; '14, '15 and '16 grow at 10%, 10% and 7%, respectively
Aggressive Hardening Case: '11-'12 same as Conservative Case; '13-'16 replicate growth in '01-'03 (10% / 21% / 13% / 7%)
Projected P&C Industry Net Premiums Written:
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
Conservative Case
(5%)
(10%)
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
18
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
19
Objective:
Outline key competitors, positioning and relative trends.
Conclusions:
a) Share trends for grocery channel and Supervalu troubling and
unlikely to moderate.
b) Importance of banner / market level operating performance and
regional market share.
c) Meaningful investments in price likely needed across most
banners.
20
# of Stores
Share/Rank
Key Locations
Regional Competitors
#1
(2010)
ShopRite (co-op)
Stop&Shop (Ahold)
463
#3-4
(2010)
Kroger
Safeway
78
#2
(2010)
Minneapolis/St. Paul
Rainbow Foods
(Roundys)
Wal-Mart
44
#2
(2010)
Kroger
Wal-Mart
--
ND and MN
182
#1
(2010)
Chicago, IL
Dominicks (Safeway)
Wal-Mart
--
Southern CA
Kroger
Safeway
194
#2
(2009)
Stop&Shop (Ahold)
Hannaford (Delhaize)
41
#4
(2010)
St. Louis, MO
Schnucks (Private)
Wal-Mart
62
#3-4
(2010)
Giant (Ahold)
Safeway
Costco
Wal-Mart
Dollar Stores
21
--
Nearly all new food retail formats have consistently gained share from traditional grocers in recent history
SVU and SWY have been the largest share donors by size, while Kroger has been able to keep its share
However, recent trends seem to indicate donation of share seems to be slowing, although alternative format share
growth remains strong
The primary driver of this has been slowing store growth at Wal-Mart and others
It is unclear whether traditional retailers are narrowing the gap in terms of traffic
SVU(w/
Save-A- 11%
Lot)
SWY 8%
KR 11%
Other
large 23%
grocers
WMT
6%
9%
8%
7%
7%
-1.1%
flat
8%
8%
8%
7%
10%
11%
11%
11%
-4.4%
0.4%
0.6%
Alternatives
0.3%
0.7%
Clubs
0.4%
WMT
22%
22%
22%
-0.7%
9%
10%
11%
11%
+5.3%
11%
12%
12%
13%
+2.3%
4%
5%
5%
6%
+2.1%
26%
24%
24%
24%
-3.7%
22%
1.6%
0.1%
All other
majors
-0.2%
-0.4%
-0.2%
SWY
TGT)
SVU
2006
2007
2008
2009
-0.6%
-1.3%
'06-'09 Avg
2010
-2.0%
22
'09-'10
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
Strong
So-Cal
Weak
Consumer surveys suggest that Acme, Albertsons, and Shoppers (~50% of Supervalu grocer revenue)
elicit strong customer loyalty Jewel and Shaws currently score weak on customer loyalty and relative
(non-price) performance
Nor-West
Low
High
Customer Loyalty
Note: Arrow indicates trending of relative performance according to consumers; Relative performance measured on 28 attributes based on
topics such as convenience, service, merchandising
23
8.0%
6.0%
4.0%
2.7%
2.4%
5.6%
5.3%
5.0%
2.0%
2.4%
1.2%
4.0%
3.4%
3.3%
2.1%
2.0%
0.8%
(2.0%)
(2.0%)
(2.5%)
0.5%
0.4%
(3.1%)
(4.0%)
(2.0%)
(1.2%)
(4.1%)
(2.5%)
(4.9%)
(6.0%)
(4.0%)
(6.5%)
(5.1%)
(6.0%)
2006
2007
Kroger
2008
Safeway
(6.4%)
(6.8%)
(7.2%)
(8.0%)
2009
Q409
Q1 10
Supervalu
Q2 10
Kroger
EBITDA Margin
Safeway
Q3 10
Q4 10
Supervalu
7.5%
(0.1%)
7.0%
6.9%
7.0%
(2.0%)
6.7%
6.5%
6.3%
6.5%
6.0%
6.1%
6.0%
(4.0%)
5.5%
5.5%
5.4%
(6.0%)
5.6%
(5.9%)
5.1%
5.4%
5.2%
5.0%
(8.0%)
5.0%
4.5%
4.7%
(10.0%)
4.0%
2006
2007
2008
2009
LTM
(11.3%)
(12.0%)
Kroger
24
Safeway
Supervalu
Kroger
Safeway
Supervalu
25
Strongno issues
Under strengthto leave
New
Person 1
Chief Executive Officer
Person 2
Chief Operating Officer
Person
4
Unit A
Person
5
Unit B
Person
6
Unit C
Person 3
Chief Financial Officer
Person
7
Unit D
Person
8
Unit E
Person
9
Unit F
Searches in Progress
Position
26
Timing to Fill
Open Position 1
ASAP
Open Position 2
27
Executive
Position
Roll % /$
Early Assessment
Concerns/Action
Person 1
CEO
[ ]% / $[ ]mm
Person 2
COO
[ ]% / $[ ]mm
Person 3
CFO
[ ]% / $[ ]mm
Person 4
Unit A
[ ]% / $[ ]mm
Responsibility scope
declining as other leaders
step up. Not sufficiently
aggressive/commercial to
drive Unit A
Person 5
Unit B
[ ]% / $[ ]mm
Person 6
Unit C
[ ]% / $[ ]mm
Person 7
Unit D
[ ]% / $[ ]mm
Person 8
Unit E
[ ]% / $[ ]mm
Person 9
Unit F
[ ]% / $[ ]mm
28
EBITDA
Key Assumptions
Risk Level
At Acquisition
$200
Industry Growth
+$32mm
Macro
Secular
+$11mm
Op Leverage
+$31mm
Cost Takeout
+$30mm
Subtotal
$304mm
Cash Flow /
Deleveraging
$716mm
cash flow
Acquisition Information
Acquisition TEV (w/ Fees)
$1,700
EBITDA Multiple (Current)
8.5x
EBITDA Multiple (Forward)
7.8x
EBITDA - Capex (Current)
9.2x
EBITDA - Capex (Forward)
8.4x
Capitalization Information
Debt Funding
$1,200
Leverage
6.0x
Interest Coverage
2.1x
Equity Requirement
$500
% Equity
29.4%
5-Year
22.9%
32.2%
16.7%
1.2%
We believe that Company X represents an attractive investment opportunity given the return
profile of the investment relative to the risks
We have a high confidence level on most of the drivers of value (both controllable and
uncontrollable)
The upside opportunity is meaningful while our conservative case (which we have high
confidence we can exceed) still generates an attractive return profile
Finally, in a severe downside scenario, our capital investment is still preserved
29
Net
Debt
Equity
Value
in Eq
Value
% of
Total
5-Year
IRR
$1,000
$200
20.0%
8.5x
$1,700
($1,200)
$500
$1,159
$232
20.0%
8.5x
$1,971
($1,200)
$771
$271
22%
9.0%
3% estimated
$1,217
$243
20.0%
8.5x
$2,068
($1,200)
$868
$98
8%
11.7%
1% estimated
Operating Leverage
$1,217
$274
22.5%
8.5x
$2,327
($1,200)
$1,127
$259
21%
17.6%
2.5% margin e
Cost Takeout
$1,217
$304
25.0%
8.5x
$2,585
($1,200)
$1,385
$259
21%
22.6%
2.5% margin e
$304
25.0%
8.5x
$2,585
($1,200)
$1,385
$885
73%
22.6%
$1,217
$304
25.0%
8.5x
$2,585
($716)
$1,869
$484
40%
30.2%
$1,217
$304
25.0%
8.5x
$2,585
($716)
$1,869
$1,369
112%
30.2%
$1,217
$304
25.0%
8.0x
$2,433
($716)
$1,717
$1,217
$304
25.0%
8.0x
$2,433
($716)
$1,717
30
TEV
($152)
$1,217
(12%)
100%
28.0%
$15mm annua
Sale at 8.0x LT
28.0%
Operational
General
Description
Management
Restructuring
High
High
Execute on identified cost opportunities during diligence (primarily G&A and IT)
Implement KKR Capstone procurement program across expense base
Initiate more significant KKR Capstone efficiency review
High
Customer Wins
Action Plan
Cost Initiatives
Impact
Key
High
KKR
Capstone
Focus
High
Areas
Other
Opportunities
Sales Force
Effectiveness
There has historically not been a focus on professionalizing the sales force organization
Need to review current practices and monitoring/optimization methodologies
International
Market Entry
Mid
IT Initiatives
Mid
Monitoring
Current operating / monitoring packages are incomplete and lack true metrics/KPIs
Need to identify critical historical and forward-looking (i.e., pipeline) drivers and implement
Mid
M&A
31
High