1. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Listana, Sr.

G.R. No. 152611, August 5, 2003

Facts:
Respondent Listana is an owner of a parcel of land. He voluntarily offered to sell his
land to the government through the DAR pursuant to RA 6657 or the CARL. When
the value of the land was determined, the PARAD issued a Writ of Execution ordering
the manager of Land Bank to pay respondent the value of the land as just
compensation. Subsequently, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the
PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of
Execution, which the PARAD granted.
Issue: Do Labor Arbiters have contempt powers?
Ruling:
Yes. However, it is important to note that quasi-judicial agencies that have the power
to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can
only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their
jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are
still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts.
2. Atlas Farms, Inc. vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 142244, November 18, 2002
Facts: Private respondents dela Pena (urinating and defecating in company premises)
and Abion (clogging the fishpond) were both terminated for violating company rules
and regulations and refusing to receive their formal notices and give explanations.
Subsequently, both filed complaints for illegal dismissal. On the other hand, petitioner
alleges that the labor arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination case,
claiming that the cases should have been resolved through the grievance machinery,
and eventually referred to voluntary arbitration, as prescribed in the CBA.
Issue: Is termination dispute a grievable issue over which Labor Arbiters have no
jurisdiction?
Ruling:

No. In Maneja vs. NLRC, the Supreme Court held that a dismissal or termination case
does not fall within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies." Hence, Labor Arbiters
have jurisdiction over dismissal or termination disputes.

11.Tanjay Water District vs. Gabaton, G. R. No. 63742, April 17, 1989
Facts: Petitioner Tanjay Water District filed in the RTC of Negros Oriental an action
for injunction with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, against respondent
Municipality of Pamplona and its officials to prevent them from interfering in the
management of the Tanjay Waterworks System. On March 25, 1983, respondent
Judge issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter (water) and over the parties (both being government instrumentalities)
by virtue of Art. 88 of PD No. 1067 and PD No. 242. He declared that the petitioner's
recourse to the court was premature because the controversy should have been
ventilated first before the National Water Resources Council pursuant to Arts. 88 and
89 of PD No. 1067. He further ruled that as the parties are government
instrumentalities, the dispute should be administratively settled in accordance with PD
No. 242.
Issues:
a) Whether or not local water districts are government owned or controlled
corporations whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law.
b) Whether or not respondent Judge acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
Rulings:
a) Yes. Petitioner being a local water district is considered as a quasi-public
corporation and, therefore, the dismissal of their employees are governed by the civil
service laws, rules and regulations. Significantly, Article XIB Section 2(l) of the 1987
Constitution provides that "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters." Inasmuch as PD No. 198, as amended,

is the original charter of the petitioner, Tanjay Water District, and respondent Tarlac
Water District and all water districts in the country, they come under the coverage of
the civil service law, rules and regulations. (Sec. 35, Art VIII and Sec. 37, Art. IX of
PD No. 807.)
b) Art. 88 of PD No. 1067 provides that the water Resources Council shall have
original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation, utilization,
exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters within the
meaning and context of the provisions of this Code. Inasmuch as the case involves the
appropriation, utilization and control of water, We hold that the jurisdiction to hear
and decide the dispute in the first instance, pertains to the Water Resources Council as
provided in PD No. 1067 which is the special law on the subject. The Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has only appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Additionally, P.D. No. 242 prescribes administrative procedures for the settlement of
all disputes, claims and controversies solely between or among the departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations but excluding constitutional offices or
agencies, arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or
agreements. P.D. No. 242 is inapplicable to this case because the controversy herein
did not arise from the "interpretation and application of statutes, contracts, or
agreements" of the parties herein. As previously stated, it involves the appropriation,
utilization, and control of water.
12. Zamboanga City Water District vs. Buat, [G. R. No. 104389, May 27, 1994
Facts: Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation engaged in the
business of supplying water in the City of Zamboanga. Private respondents are all
employees of petitioner. In March 1987, a strike occurred in the company. It was
conducted and participated in by private respondents, for which reason they were
separated from their employment. Petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter to declare the said strike illegal. The following day the Union (ZULU) to
which private respondents belonged filed before the Labor Arbiter, a complaint
against petitioner for illegal dismissal and unpaid wages. The Executive Labor Arbiter
then declared both the strike and the dismissal of private respondents illegal and
ordering the reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions, without
loss of seniority rights and privileges, but without back wages.
Issue: Whether or not the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: There is no dispute that petitioner, a water district with an original charter, is a
government-owned and controlled corporation. The established rule is that the hiring
and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled corporations are

governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. Jurisdiction over the strike and the dismissal of private respondents is
therefore lodged not with the NLRC but with the Civil Service Commission.
However, the court did not allow petitioner to belatedly raise the issue of jurisdiction
before it, considering that it never raised said issue before the Executive Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC or even before the Supreme Court in another related case. In fact,
it was petitioner itself which filed the complaint before the Executive Labor Arbiter
and sought affirmative relief therefrom and participated actively in the proceedings
therein. Although jurisdiction over strikes and dismissals of employees in local water
districts is lodged not with the NLRC but with the Civil Service Commission, here,
the petitioner is already estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the NLRC and is,
therefore, bound to respect all the proceedings therein.

16. PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTOR PHILS.vs. GALANG

September 24, 1991

Facts: The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were suspected
of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola bottles. On July 16,
1987, the petitioners filed a criminal complaint for theft against them but this was
later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal complaint for falsification of private
documents. After a preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court
of Tanauan, Leyte, the complaint was dismissed.
Allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private respondents were
dismissed by the petitioner company on November 23, 1987. As a result, they lodged
a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in
Tacloban City and decisions mandateed reinstatement with damages. In addition, they
instituted in the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, a separate civil complaint against the
petitioners for damages arising from what they claimed to be their malicious
prosecution.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee-employer relations that
were exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter. The motion was granted .On July 6,
1989, however, the respondent judge, acting on the motion for reconsideration,
reinstated the complaint, saying it was distinct from the labor case for damages now
pending before the labor courts. The petitioners then came to this Court for relief.

Issue: Whether or not it is the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the claim for
damages arising from the malicious prosecution of the petitioner company.
Held: No. It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and their
employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is a
reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and employee-employer
relations to put the case under the provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, the
complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of their
civil and criminal jurisdiction. The case now before the Court involves a complaint for
damages for malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Leyte by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is a
reasonable causal connection between the complaint and the relations of the parties
as employer and
employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations and in fact could have
arisen independently of an employment relationship between the parties. No such
relationship or any unfair labor practice is asserted. What the employees are alleging
is that the petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint
which the Municipal Trial Court said was intended to harass the poor employees
and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor for lack of
evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the respondents

16. Insular Life v. NLRC

(Nov. 15, 1989)

FACTS:
Insular Life (company) and Basiao entered into a contract by which Basiao was
authorized to solicit for insurance in accordance with the rules of the company. He
would also receive compensation, in the form of commissions. The contract also
contained the relations of the parties, duties of the agent and the acts prohibited to him
including the modes of termination.
After 4 years, the parties entered into another contract an Agency Managers
Contact and to implement his end of it, Basiao organized an agency while
concurrently fulfilling his commitment under the first contract.

The company terminated the Agency Managers Contract. Basiao sued the company
in a civil action. Thus, the company terminated Basiaos engagement under the first
contract and stopped payment of his commissions.
ISSUE: W/N an independent contractors claim for unpaid commission should be
litigated by the Labor Arbiter.
HELD: No. Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner, but a commission agent, an
independent contract whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated
in an ordinary civil action in a regular court. The Labor Arbiter erred in taking
cognizance of, and adjudicating, said claim, being without no jurisdiction to do so.

7. PAFLU vs. SALAS

G.R. No. L-39084
February 23, 1988
FACTS:
Gan Huns personal properties in his residential apartment unit were levied, pursuant
to a Writ of Execution, issued by the CIR, as a result of a decision rendered in favor of
PAFLU, to a complaint for unfair labor practice against Gan Hun and Northwest
Manufacturing Corp..
However, private respondent Wong King Yuen filed a complaint with the CFI for
damages against the sheriff, claiming that Gan Hun is his boarder and that the
properties inside the apartment unit levied belonged to him. Judge Salas, of the CFI,
issued an Injunctive Writ, restraining the sheriff from proceeding with the sale of the
properties in question.
PAFLU sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground that CFI had no jurisdiction
over the case, and argued that the case relates to an existing labor dispute cognizable
by the industrial court.
Wong contends that the case is not a labor dispute recognizable by the industrial
court, but an ordinary civil action for damages against the sheriff, directed against the

latters bond; and, that it is an entirely separate proceeding distinct from the labor case
filed with the CIR.
CFI denied the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration, thus this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI has the jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief questioned by
the petitioner
RULING:
Yes. The case filed by Wong is an ordinary civil action for damages, not a labor
dispute.
Even if the act complained of by Wong arose from a labor dispute between PAFLU
and another party, there is no labor dispute between PAFLU and Wong. The civil case
remains distinct from the labor dispute pending with the CIR.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 103, the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations is limited to labor disputes, i.e., problems and controversies pertaining to
employer-employee relationship.
8. SMC vs NLRC
G.R. No. 80774 May 31, 1988
FACTS:
Private respondent Rustico Vega submitted to SMC an innovation proposal, in line
with the Innovation Program sponsored by SMC. SMC, however, did not accept
Vegas proposal.
Vega filed a complaint with Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII (Cebu City),
alleging that his proposal had been accepted by the methods analyst and implemented
by SMC, and that the same ultimately and finally solved the problem of SMC in the
production of Beer Grande.
SMC answered that Vega had no cause of action. It denied the latters allegations, and
stated that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction, Vega having improperly bypassed
the grievance machinery procedure under an existing CBA and the administrative

remedies provided under the rules of the Innovation Program. It also invoked Art. 217
of the Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but the NLRC
ordered otherwise, thus this present Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether money claims arising out of or in connection with employment are within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters
RULING:
The money claims of workers referred to in paragraph 3 of Art. 217 embrace those
which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship, or some
aspect or incident of such relationship.
However, in Molave Motor Sales, Inc. v. Laron, Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome and
Singapore Airlines Limited v. Pao, where the claim to the principal relief sought is to
be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a
CBA but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the
regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such
situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise in the application of the general
civil law.
SMCs Innovation Program, an employee incentive undertaking, though unilateral in
origin, could nonetheless ripen into an enforceable contractual (facio ut des)
obligation on the part of SMC under certain circumstances. Thus, whether or not an
enforceable contract, albeit implied arid innominate, had arisen between SMC and
Vega in the circumstances of this case, and if so, whether or not it had been breached,
are preeminently legal questions, questions not to be resolved by referring to labor
legislation and having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions of
employment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts.

7. DFA vs. NLRC, et al., G. R. No. 113191, September 18, 1996

FACTS:

Private respondent Magnayi intiated a case before the NLRC for his alleged illegal
dismissal by the Asian Devt Bank (ADB) and the latters violation of the laboronly contracting law. Summonses were served both to ADB and DFA. ADB and
DFA notified the Labor Arbiter that ADB, as well as its President and Office, were
covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or sale
of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the ADB Charter, in relation
to Sec. 5 and Sec. 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and the Govt of the Phils.
Regarding The Banks Headquarters.
The LA took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived
its diplomatic immunity from suit and rendered decision declaring complainant
private respondent as ADBs regular employee and the latters termination is illegal.
DFA referred the matter to the NLRC which ruled that the controversy was within the
Commissions jurisdiction, referring to a labor dispute within Art. 217. The NLRC
also ruled that ADB failed to raise the defense of immunity before the LA and that it
does not have competence to investigate/review any decision of a LA.
ISSUE:
W/N ADB falls under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters?
RULING:
No, ADB was correct in invoking its immunity from suit under the Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement. Except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee
operations, purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity
from legal process of every form. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity
in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty
covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government
which must be respected.
Diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to
look beyond a determination by the executive branch. In such cases where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, the judicial
department of govt follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass
the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction. The executive branchs
determination is conclusive upon the courts. The filing of the petition by the DFA, in
behalf of ADB, is itself an affirmance of the governments own recognition of ADBs
immunity.

ADB, being an international organization that has been extended diplomatic

status, is independent of the municipal law and is immune from local jurisdiction.
Note the provisions in the Charter and Headquarters Agreement:
* Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:
The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases
arising out of or in
connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations,
or to buy and
sell or underwrite the sale of securities. 3
* Under Article 55 thereof
All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, including
experts
performing missions for the Bank:
(1) shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts performed by them in
their official
capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity.
* Headquarters Agreement. Thus, its Section 5 reads:
The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases
arising out of, or in
connection with, the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations,
or to buy and
sell or underwrite the sale of securities.
* Section 44 of the agreement states:
Governors, other representatives of Members, Directors, the president, Vice-President
and executive

officers as may be agreed upon between the Government and the Bank shall enjoy,
during their stay
in the Republic of the Philippines in connection with their official duties with the
Bank:
(b) Immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or written
and all acts done
by them in their official
capacity.

13.) Tolosa vs. NLRC; GR No. 149578

Facts:
Captain Virgilio Tolosa was hired by Qwana-Kaiun, through its agent, ASIA BULK,
to be the captain of the vessel named M/V Lady Dona. At the time of embarkation,
Capt. Tolosa was to be in good health. During channeling activities upon the
vessels departure from Yokohama, Capt. Tolosa was drenched with rainwater. The
following day, he had a slight fever and in the succeeding 12 days, his health
deteriorated resulting in his death. Because of such incident, his wife, Evelyn Tolosa
filed a Complaint/Position Paper before the POEA against Qwana-Kaiun, thru its
resident agent. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner. However, the NLRC
and CA, vacated such decision and ruled that the labor commission had no
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction?
Ruling:
No. While it is true that labor arbiters and NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only
reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code, these
reliefs must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with
the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or CBA. In the present case, petitioners claim
for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor statutes or

CBA. The loss she claims does not refer to the actual earnings of the deceased but to
his earning capacity based on a life expectancy of 65 years. This amount is
recoverable if the action is based on quasi-delict. Therefore, it is not the NLRC but the
regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in which employeremployee relation is merely incidental and which the cause of action proceeds from a
different source of obligation such as tort.
Part II
2.) Basaya, Jr. vs. Militante; GR No. 75837
Facts:
Petitioners constitute the crew of the fishing vessel chartered by Philippine Tuna
Ventures, Inc. (TUNA), with petitioner Dominador Basaya, Jr. as its captain. TUNA,
Inc. sought the remedy of Replevin against petitioners before the RTC praying that
petitioners be ordered to deliver to it the possession of its Vessel, which petitioners
possessed in violation of its rights. Petitioners argued that their possession was an
extension of the private respondent over the vessel and to deprive them of its
possession is tantamount to an illegal termination.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the Replevin Case?
Ruling:
Yes. Replevin is a possessory action. The relief sought therein is the return of the
property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is a proceeding
adjudicating rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of
whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved, whether
or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken said property as to require its return to
plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of labor tribunal, it is beyond the field of
specialization of Labor Arbiters. The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with
the issue of replevin case. The respective issue raised in each forum can be resolved
independently of the other. The Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining
avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws.
8. Lasco, et al. vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration
[UNRFNRE], et al., G. R. Nos. 109095-109107, February 23, 1995
FACTS:

Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent

UNRFNRE, a special fund and subsidiary organ of the UN. The UNRFNRE is
involved in a joint project with the Philippine Govt and the UN for exploration work
in Dinagat Island. Petitioners filed for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. UNRFNRE
alleged that NLRC had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic
immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
UN and it also attached a letter from the DFA which acknowledge its immunity from
suit. NLRC dismissed the complaint on the ground that UNRFNRE is protected by
diplomatic immunity.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari arguing that the acts of mining
exploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an international
agency protected by diplomatic immunity and even if UNRFNRE was entitled to
diplomatic immunity, it waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered
into a contract of employment with petitioners.
ISSUE:
W/N UNRFNRE is entitled to diplomatic immunity from suit. RULING:
Yes. The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by
the letter of the DFA, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in
accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN, to
which the Philippine Govt is a party. UNRFNRE is not engaged in a commercial
venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into
by the Philippine Govt and the UN for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its
mission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help
improve the quality of life of the people, including that of petitioners.
As a matter of State policy, the Philippine Govt adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law. Being a member of UN, and a party to the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the UN, the
Philippine Govt adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the UN and its
specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law.
We recognize the growth of international organizations dedicated to specific universal
endeavors, such as health, agriculture, science and technology and environment. It is
not surprising that their existence has evolved into the concept of
international immunities. The reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities to
international organizations, its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal and
practical independence in fulfilling their duties. Immunity is necessary to assure

unimpeded performance of their functions. There is no conflict between the

constitutional duty of the State to protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare and the grant of immunity to international organizations.

5.) Nacpil vs. Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation, [G. R. No. 144767, March
21, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner claimed to be the Assistant General Manager for Finance/Administration
and Comptroller of Respondent IBC. Petitioner claims that he was harassed, insulted,
humiliated and pressured into resigning until he was forced to retire. The new
president refused to pay him his retirement benefits, allegedly because he had not yet
secured the clearances from the PCGG and the COA and because the new president
refused to recognize his employment and position as Comptroller. This prompted
petitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits before
the Labor Arbiter.
IBC filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over
the controversy. IBC contended that petitioner was a corporate officer who was duly
elected by the BOD of IBC; hence, the case qualifies as an intra-corporate dispute
falling within the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Petitioner argued that he is not a corporate officer of the IBC but an employee thereof
since he had not been elected nor appointed as Comptroller and Assistant Manager by
the IBC's Board. He claims that he was appointed by IBCs General Manager. He
strengthens his claim by stating that IBC By-Laws do not provide for the position of
Comptroller as part of the corporations corporate officers. Hence, his dismissal is a
controversy within the jurisdiction of the labor courts.
The LA ruled in favour of petitioner. The NLRC ruled against IBC for the latters
failure to file the appeal bond. The CA, on petition for certiorari under Rule 65 ruled
in favour of IBC. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal
and non-payment of benefits filed by petitioner?
RULING:
The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the controversy.
Under PD No. 902-A (the Revised Securities Act), which was the law in force when
the complaint for illegal dismissal was instituted by petitioner in 1997, the SEC has
exclusive jurisdiction over controversies in the election or appointment of directors,
trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations. The
Court has consistently held that there are two elements to be considered in
determining whether the SEC has jurisdiction over the controversy, to wit: (1) the
status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the
subject of their controversy.
The fact that petitioner was merely appointed by the General Manager does not
remove him from being a corporate officer. Such appointment was subsequently
approved by the General Manager. Further, the fact that the position of Comptroller is
not found in the by-laws is no excuse as well. Section 25 of the Corporation Code
authorizes the BOD to appoint such other corporate officers as necessary. Hence,
petitioners appointment as General Manager requiring BOD approval falls within
controversies involving the appointment of corporate officers, which are under the
SECs jurisdiction.
6.) Prudential Bank and Trust Company vs. Reyes, [G. R. No. 141093, February 20,
2001
FACTS:
Respondent Reyes filed a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal against
petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. Before her dismissal she occupied the position of
Assistant Vice President in the foreign department of the Bank.
Petitioner claims that there was sufficient basis to terminate respondents employment
based on its loss of trust and confidence in the latter. Petitioner claims that respondent
Reyes is a corporate officer, an elective position under the corporate by-laws and her
non-election is an intra-corporate controversy cognizable by the SEC.
The LA ruled in favour of respondent. The NLRC reversed. The CA reversed the
NLRC and affirmed the LA. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal?
RULING:
While generally, the dispute is one intra-corporate in nature and hence, beyond the
jurisdiction of the NLRC, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise the issue of
jurisdiction under the principle of estoppel. The Bank actively participated in the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. While it is
true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of the
proceedings, this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened.
Further, the banks claim that respondent is merely holding an elective position and is
not a regular employee is belied by respondents work history with the bank, which
showed that she rose from the ranks of the employees. It has been said that "an
employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not
because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them. As Assistant VP, she
performs tasks integral to the operations of the bank and her length of service with the
bank totaling 28 years speaks volumes of her status as a regular employee of the bank.
As a regular employee, she is entitled to security of tenure; hence, dismissible only for
just cause.

Metropolitan waterworks and sewage system vs. Hernandez

143 scra 602
August 19, 1986
Facts:
Petitioner Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) was haled before
the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region of the National Labor Relations
Commission on charges of willfull failure to pay wage differentials, allowances and
other monetary benefits to its contractual employees numbering 2,500 or so. On June
5, 1985, judgment was rendered by the labor Arbiter to whom the case was assigned,
adverse to MWSS. MWSS claims lack of jurisdiction of the NLRC over the case
because it is a GOCC.
Issue:

WON the contractual employees of the MWSS are governed by the labor code or the
Civil service law
Ruling:
the character of the MWSS as a government-owned or controlled corporation is not
contested; it is, in any case, a proposition that cannot be gainsaid. Republic Act No.
6234 created it as a "government corporation to be known as the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System." As in the case of the National Housing
Authority, therefore, employment in the MWSS is governed not by the Labor Code
but by the civil service law, rules and regulations; and controversies arising from or
connected with that employment are not cognizable by the NationalLabor Relations
Commission.

9. G.R. No. 73199 October 26, 1988

DR. RENATO SARA and/or ROMEO ARANA petitioners, vs. CERILA
AGARRADO and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
respondents.
Facts: Private respondent Cerila Agarrado was an attendant in the clinic of petitioner
Dr. Renato Sara. Four years later, petitioners Dr. Sara and Romeo Arabia, being
owners of a rice mill, entered into a verbal agreement with private respondent
Agarrado whereby it was agreed that the latter would be paid P2.00 commission per
sack of milled rice sold as well as a commission of 10% per kilo of palay purchased. It
was further agreed that private respondent would spend her own money for the
undertaking, but she was authorized to borrow money from other persons, as in fact
she did, subject to reimbursement by petitioners.
Later, private respondent file a complaint before the NLRC Regional Arbitration
Branch for unpaid commissions and reimbursements. Petitioners contend that the
labor arbiter has no jurisdiction since there was no employer-employee relationship
between the private parties so claims were cognizable by the regular courts. The labor
arbiter ordered petitioner to pay all claims. On appeal, labor arbiters decision was
affirmed. Thus this petition.
Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and
private respondent as to warrant cognizance by the Labor Arbiter.

Ruling: No. To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the

Court has applied the following four-fold test: [1] the selection and engagement of the
employee; [2] the payment of wages; [3] the power of dismissal; and [4] the power to
control the employee's conduct. Noticeably absent from the agreement between the
parties is the element of control. The means and methods of purchasing and selling
rice or palay by private respondent were totally independent of petitioners' control.
Note that private respondent was never given capital by his supposed employer but
relied on her own resources and if insufficient, she borrowed money from others. The
absence of control is made more evident by the fact that private respondent was not
even obliged to sell the palay she purchased to petitioners. Moreover, private
respondent worked for petitioners at her own pleasure and was not subject to definite
hours or conditions of work. Under the conditions set forth in their agreement, private
respondent was an independent contractor. The absence of employer-employee
relationship deprives the labor arbiter of jurisdiction.
10. G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN JUCO AND
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Facts: Private respondent Benjamin C. Juco was a project engineer of the National
Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. For having
been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds involving 214
pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the corporation, Juco's services were terminated
by NHC. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner NHC with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment. The NHC alleged that the NLRC,
is without authority to entertain the case for lack of jurisdiction, considering that the
NHC is a government owned and controlled corporation.
Issue: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) covered by the
Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?
Ruling: Employees of the NHC are covered by the CSC.
Applying the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the Labor Code as amended,
and the Civil Service Decree as amended and the precedent in the Alliance of
Government Workers decision, it is clear that the petitioner National Housing
Corporation comes under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, not the
Ministry of Labor and Employment.

This becomes more apparent if we consider the fact that the NHC performs
governmental functions and not proprietary ones. The petitioner points out that it was
established as an instrumentality of the government to accomplish governmental
policies and objectives and extend essential services to the people. It would be
incongruous if employees discharging essentially governmental functions are not
covered by the same law and rules which govern those performing other governmental
functions.
The fact that "private" corporations owned or controlled by the government may be
created by special charter does not mean that such corporations not created by special
law are not covered by the civil service. Nor does the decree repealing all charters and
special laws granting exemption from the civil service law imply that government
corporations not created by special law are exempt from civil service coverage. These
charters and statutes are the only laws granting such exemption and, therefore, they
are the only ones which could be repealed.
Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of
the Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. ...
The Labor Code, P. D. No. 442 as amended, provides:
ART. 277 Labor Code as amended. Government employees. The terms and
conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of
government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries shall be standardized by the National
Assembly as provided for in the New Constitution. However, there shall be reduction
of existing wages, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment being
enjoyed by them at the time of the adoption of the Code.

PNOC- exploration corporation vs NLRC

164 scra 501
August 18, 1988
Facts:

on April 14, 1976, the PNOC-EC was organized. On May 28, 1976, petitioner
employed Oscar Salvador as a driver mechanic for its project in the Cagayan Valley.
Upon completion of the project, private respondent's services were terminated. On
Oct. 1, 1978, private respondent was again hired as , this time in petitioner' s Gravity
Project in Samar. Hence, when the second project was completed, petitioner' s
employment was likewise terminated and was never renewed in the subsequent
projects of the company. Believing that he had become a regular employee and that
his termination was illegal, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for
illegal dismissal, backwages and allowances before the Labor Arbiter
issue:
WON the NLRC has jurisdiction to decide the case
Ruling:
The Court has squarely ruled that PNOC subsidiaries, whether or not originally
created as government owned or controlled corporations are governed by the Civil
Service Law. Petitioner PNOC-EC being admittedly a subsidiary affiliate of PNOC is
therefore unmistakably within the scope of the Civil Service Law and beyond the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor or any of its agencies. Having been rendered
without jurisdiction, the assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter which was affirmed by
respondent NLRC is null and void.

SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED v. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO

G.R. No. L-47739 June 22, 1983
Facts:
Private Respondent Carlos Cruz entered into a training agreement with Petitioner
Singapore Airlines Ltd. (SAL) where the company will provide him free training and
in return he will render his services to the company for 5 years, and in case of failure
to do so, a clause for liquidated damages was included. Carlos signed the agreement
together with Villanueva as surety. SAL claimed that Carlos had gone on leave
without approval, and for such, the Company filed a suit for damages for violation of
contract against private respondent and his surety. Cruz denied any breach of contract

as it was not stated that the 5 year service clause was required to be rendered straight.
Villanueva also averred that he was a guarantor and not a surety. During pre-trial,
Judge Pao dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction stating that since this is an issue
arising from an employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is within the Labor
Arbiters of the NLRC.
Issues:
1. WON a violation of a training agreement is cognizable by the regular courts.
2. WON the jurisdiction of the present case belongs to the Labor Arbiters.
3. WON the Labor Arbiters are competent to resolve the issue of liability of
suretyship.
Ruling:
1. No. Violation of a training agreement is an issue involving or arising from an
employer-employee relationship, which under 216 of the then Labor Code,
jurisdiction is vested with the Labor Arbiters.
2. No. In this case, the jurisdiction rightly belongs to the regular courts because the
relief sought of is for liquidated damages for breach of contract. This, and other reliefs
are not reliefs under the Labor Code but under the Civil Law. Breach of an obligation,
as is in this case, is intrinsically a civil dispute.
3. No. The Supreme Court held that the determination of is issue is beyond the
competence

Maneja v NLRCG.R. No. 124013. June 5, 1998

Facts:

Maneja worked for Manila Midtown Hotel as a telephone operator. She was also a
member of the Union (NUWHRAIN) with a CBA. A fellow telephone operator
named Lelong received a Request for Long Distance Call (RLDC) and a deposit from
a guest named Hiota Ieda. The call was unanswered and the P500 deposit was
forwarded to the cashier. Ieda made a second call and second P500 deposit but the call
was also unanswered. Loleng passed on the RLDC to Maneja for follow up. Maneja
monitored the call. A hotel cashier after inquired about the P1000 deposit made by
Ieda. After a search, Loleng found the first deposit in the guest folio and the second in
the folder for cancelled calls.
Finding that the second call was stamped with the wrong date, Maneja changed it
from Feb. 15 to Feb 13, 1990. Loleng then delivered the RLDC and money to the
cashier. The chief telephone operator issued a memorandum directing Maneja and
Loleng to explain the incident and recommended they be subject to disciplinary action
for forging falsifying official documents and culpable carelessness for failure to
follow specific instruction or established procedure. Maneja was served with a notice
of dismissal, and wrote instead under protest.
Petitioner filed for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter, who held that petitioner
was illegally dismissed, however he held that the complaint was on its face within the
juridical ambit of the grievance procedure under the CBA and if unresolved one for
proper voluntary arbitration.
The Hotel appealed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the case should have been
filed with the proper grievance procedure or voluntary arbitration. The NLRC
affirmed the decision.
Petitioners MR was denied, hence this petition for certiorari arise.
Issues: 1. WON the LA had jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.
2. Was there illegal dismissal?
Held: 1. Termination cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter as contemplated in LC 217, but it should be read in conjunction with
LC 261 which grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation of CBA or of
enforcement of personnel policies. In the Sanyo case, the Sol. Gen. argued that a
distinction should be made between interpreting the CBA and enforcing personnel
policies and a termination case. Dismissal does not involve CBA or personnel policy.
Where the dispute is just in interpretation, they could resort to the grievance
mechanism, but when there was actual termination, it was already cognizable by the

Labor Arbiter. In this case, there has been an actual termination. The LA does have
jurisdiction under LC 217, otherwise an employee who was on AWOL or committed
offenses would no longer be able to file illegal dismissal cases because the discharge
would be premised on the interpretation enforcement of company policies. The Hotel
also voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
2. Yes. Given the factual circumstances there was no dishonesty. The money was all
eventually found and the date was a correction, not falsification. There was also no
hearing, merely a request for written explanation.

Maneja v NLRCG.R. No. 124013. June 5, 1998

Facts:
Maneja worked for Manila Midtown Hotel as a telephone operator. She was also a
member of the Union (NUWHRAIN) with a CBA. A fellow telephone operator
named Lelong received a Request for Long Distance Call (RLDC) and a deposit from
a guest named Hiota Ieda. The call was unanswered and the P500 deposit was
forwarded to the cashier. Ieda made a second call and second P500 deposit but the call
was also unanswered. Loleng passed on the RLDC to Maneja for follow up. Maneja
monitored the call. A hotel cashier after inquired about the P1000 deposit made by
Ieda. After a search, Loleng found the first deposit in the guest folio and the second in
the folder for cancelled calls.
Finding that the second call was stamped with the wrong date, Maneja changed it
from Feb. 15 to Feb 13, 1990. Loleng then delivered the RLDC and money to the
cashier. The chief telephone operator issued a memorandum directing Maneja and
Loleng to explain the incident and recommended they be subject to disciplinary action

for forging falsifying official documents and culpable carelessness for failure to
follow specific instruction or established procedure. Maneja was served with a notice
of dismissal, and wrote instead under protest.
Petitioner filed for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter, who held that petitioner
was illegally dismissed, however he held that the complaint was on its face within the
juridical ambit of the grievance procedure under the CBA and if unresolved one for
proper voluntary arbitration.
The Hotel appealed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the case should have been
filed with the proper grievance procedure or voluntary arbitration. The NLRC
affirmed the decision.
Petitioners MR was denied, hence this petition for certiorari arise.
Issues: 1. WON the LA had jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.
2. Was there illegal dismissal?
Held: 1. Termination cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter as contemplated in LC 217, but it should be read in conjunction with
LC 261 which grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation of CBA or of
enforcement of personnel policies. In the Sanyo case, the Sol. Gen. argued that a
distinction should be made between interpreting the CBA and enforcing personnel
policies and a termination case. Dismissal does not involve CBA or personnel policy.
Where the dispute is just in interpretation, they could resort to the grievance
mechanism, but when there was actual termination, it was already cognizable by the
Labor Arbiter. In this case, there has been an actual termination. The LA does have
jurisdiction under LC 217, otherwise an employee who was on AWOL or committed
offenses would no longer be able to file illegal dismissal cases because the discharge
would be premised on the interpretation enforcement of company policies. The Hotel
also voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
2. Yes. Given the factual circumstances there was no dishonesty. The money was all
eventually found and the date was a correction, not falsification. There was also no
hearing, merely a request for written explanation.

CELESTINO VIVERO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HAMMONIA MARINE

SERVICES, ET AL., (G. R. NO. 138938, OCTOBER 24, 2000)
Facts: Petitioner Vivero, a licensed seaman, is a member of the Associated Marine
Officers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP).
On grounds of very poor performance and conduct, refusal to perform his job, refusal
to report to the Captain or the vessels Engineers or cooperate with other ship officers
about the problem in cleaning the cargo holds or of the shipping pump and his dismal
relations with the Captain of the vessel, complainant was repatriated on 15 July 1994.
On 01 August 1994, complainant filed a complaint for illegal dismissal at AMOSUP
of which complainant was a member. Pursuant to Article XII of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, grievance proceedings were conducted; however, parties
failed to reach and settle the dispute amicably, thus, on 28 November 1994,
complainant filed the complaint with the POEA. While the case was pending before
the POEA, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
POEA had no jurisdiction over the case considering petitioner Vivero's failure to refer
it to a Voluntary Arbitration Committee in accordance with the CBA between the
parties. Upon the enactment of RA 8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, the case was transferred to the Adjudication Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission.
Labor Arbiter, on the basis of the pleadings and documents available on record,
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. NLRC set aside
the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the record was clear that
petitioner had exhausted his remedy by submitting his case to the Grievance
Committee of AMOSUP. NLRC then remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for
further proceedings. On 3 July 1998 the MR of the private respondent was denied,
thus it raised the case to the CA. Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private
respondents holding that the CBA is the law between the parties and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
Hence petition for review was filed by the herein petitioner.
Issue: Whether the NLRC is deprived of jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases
whenever a CBA provides for grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration
proceedings.
Held: No.

The instant case is a termination dispute falling under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, and does not specifically involve the application,
implementation or enforcement of company personnel policies contemplated in Policy
Instruction No. 56. Consequently, Policy Instruction No. 56 does not apply in the case
at bar.
It is clear from the claim/assistance request form submitted by petitioner to AMOSUP
that he was challenging the legality of his dismissal for lack of cause and lack of due
process. The issue of whether there was proper interpretation and implementation of
the CBA provisions comes into play only because the grievance procedure provided
for in the CBA was not observed after he sought his Unions assistance in contesting
his termination. Thus, the question to be resolved necessarily springs from the primary
issue of whether there was a valid termination; without this, then there would be no
reason to invoke the need to interpret and implement the CBA provisions properly.
Under their CBA, both Union and respondent companies are responsible for selecting
an impartial arbitrator or for convening an arbitration committee; yet, it is apparent
that neither made a move towards this end. Consequently, petitioner should not be
deprived of his legitimate recourse because of the refusal of both Union and
respondent companies to follow the grievance procedure.
Under Article 262, the Voluntary Arbitrator may assume jurisdiction only when
agreed upon by the parties. Policy Instructions No. 56 issued by DOLE Secretary
Confesor clarifying the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and Voluntary Arbitrations does
not apply. It reiterated the ruling that dismissal is not a grievable issue.

GREPA Life Assurance Corporation vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 73887
December 21, 1989
Facts:
On June 9, 1976, private respondent Judico entered into an agreement of agency with
petitioner Grepalife to become a debit agent attached to the industrial life agency in
Cebu City. Being a debit agent, private respondent Judico had definite work

assignments including but not limited to collection of premiums from policy holders
and selling insurance to prospective clients. Complainant initially received an
allowance of P 200.00 for 13 weeks. Sometime in September 1981, complainant was
promoted to the position of Zone Supervisor and was given additional allowance fixed
at P110.00 per week. During the third week of November 1981, he was reverted to his
former position as debit agent but, for unknown reasons, not paid so-called weekly
sales reserve of at least P 200.00. Finally on June 28, 1982, complainant was
dismissed by way of termination of his agency contract. Consequently, Judico filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against Grepalife. Both parties appealed to the NLRC
when a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the employer-employee relations did not exist between the parties. The
NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter ruling that complainant is a regular
employee of petitioner. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not employer-employee relationship exists between insurance agents and
their principal, and hence they are to be governed by the Labor Code
Ruling:
As the Court held in Investment Planning Corp. vs. SSS, 21 SCRA 294, an insurance
company may have two classes of agents who sell its insurance policies: (1) salaried
employees who keep definite hours and work under the control and supervision of the
company; and (2) registered representatives who work on commission basis. The
agents who belong to the second category are not required to report for work at
anytime, they do not have to devote their time exclusively to or work solely for the
company since the time and the effort they spend in their work depend entirely upon
their own will and initiative; they are not required to account for their time nor submit
a report of their activities; they shoulder their own selling expenses as well as
transportation; and they are paid their commission based on a certain percentage of
their sales.
In the determination of employer-employee relationship is the fact that the
compensation that these agents on commission received is not paid by the insurance
company but by the investor (or the person insured). The test therefore is whether the
"employer" controls or has reserved the right to control the "employee" not only as to
the result of the work to be done but also as to the means and methods by which the
same is to be accomplished.
In the case at bar, the element of control by the petitioner on Judico was very much
present. He was controlled by petitioner insurance company not only as to the kind of

work; the amount of results, the kind of performance but also the power of dismissal.
Undoubtedly, private respondent, by nature of his position and work, had been a
regular employee of petitioner and is therefore entitled to the protection of the law and
could not just be terminated without valid and justifiable cause.

COSMOPOLITAN FUNERAL HOMES vs. MAALAT

G.R. No. 86693
July 2, 1990
Facts:
Petitioner Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Inc. engaged the services of private
respondent Noli Maalat as a "supervisor" to handle the solicitation of mortuary
arrangements, sales and collections. The funeral services which he sold refer to the
taking of the corpse, embalming, casketing, viewing and delivery. The private
respondent was paid on a commission basis of 3.5% of the amounts actually collected
and remitted. On January 15, 1987, respondent Maalat was dismissed by the petitioner
for commission of several violations despite previous warnings. Maalat filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of commissions. The Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision declaring Maalat's dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not a "funeraria" supervisor is an employee or a commission agent
Ruling:
Under the "right of control" test, an employer-employee relationship exists where the
person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the
end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end. In
the case at bar, the fact that the petitioner imposed and applied its rule prohibiting

superiors from engaging in other funeral business which it considered inimical to

company interests proves that it had the right of control and actually exercised its
control over the private respondent. In other words, Maalat worked exclusively for the
petitioner. He was also prohibited from engaging in part-time embalming business
outside of the company and a violation thereof was cause for dismissal. Incurring
absences without leave was likewise subject to disciplinary action. Moreover, the
payment of compensation by way of commission does not militate against the
conclusion that private respondent was an employee.