InternationalEconomics,8e(Krugman)

Chapter9ThePoliticalEconomyofTradePolicy
9.1TheCaseforFreeTrade
1)Theefficiencycasemadeforfreetradeisthatastradedistortionssuchastariffsaredismantledandremoved,
A)governmenttariffrevenuewilldecrease,andthereforenationaleconomicwelfarewilldecrease.
B)governmenttariffrevenuewilldecrease,andthereforenationaleconomicwelfarewillincrease.
C)deadweightlossesforproducersandconsumerswilldecrease,henceincreasingnationaleconomic
welfare.
D)deadweightlossesforproducersandconsumerswilldecrease,hencedecreasingnationaleconomic
welfare.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:C
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2)Theopportunitytoexploiteconomiesofscaleisoneofthegainstobemadefromremovingtariffsandother
tradedistortions.Thesegainswillbefoundbyadecreasein
A)worldpricesofimports.
B)theconsumptiondistortionlosstriangle.
C)theproductiondistortionlosstriangle.
D)BothBandC.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:E
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3)Judgingbythechangesintheheightoftariffratesinmajortradingcountries,theworldhasbeen
experiencingagreat
A)tradeliberalization.
B)surgeofprotectionism.
C)lackofprogressinthetrade-policyarea.
D)movetowardsregionalintegration.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:A
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4)TheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)wasorganizedasasuccessortothe
A)IMF.
B)UN.
C)UNCTAD.
D)GATT.
E)theWorldBank.
Answer:D
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5)TheWTOwasestablishedbythe________ofmultilateraltradenegotiations.
A)KennedyRound
B)TokyoRound
C)UruguayRound
D)DillonRound
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:C
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6)TheSmoot-HawleyTariffActof1930hasgenerallybeenassociatedwith
A)fallingtariffs.
B)freetrade.
C)intensifyingtheworldwidedepression.
D)recoveryfromtheworldwidedepression.
E)non-tariffbarriers.
Answer:C
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7)Atradepolicydesignedtoalleviatesomedomesticeconomicproblembyexportingittoforeigncountriesis
knowasa(n)
A)internationaldumpingpolicy.
B)countervailingtariffpolicy.
C)beggarthyneighborpolicy.
D)tradeadjustmentassistancepolicy.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:C
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8)TradetheorysuggeststhatJapanwouldgainfromasubsidytheUnitedStatesprovidesitsgrainfarmersif
thegainstoJapaneseconsumersofwheatproductsmorethanoffsetsthelossestoJapanesewheatfarmers.
ThiswouldoccuraslongasJapan
A)isanetimporterinbilateraltradeflowswiththeUnitedStates.
B)isanetimporterofwheat.
C)hasacomparativeadvantageinwheat.
D)hasanabsoluteadvantageinproducingwheat.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:B
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9)TheWorldTradeOrganizationprovidesforallofthefollowingexcept
A)theusageofthemostfavorednationclause.
B)assistanceinthesettlementoftradedisagreements.
C)bilateraltariffreductions.
D)multilateraltariffreductions.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:C
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10)Whichorganizationdeterminesproceduresforthesettlementofinternationaltradedisputes?
A)WorldBank
B)WorldTradeOrganization
C)InternationalMonetaryOrganization
D)InternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment
E)TheLeagueofNations
Answer:B
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11)TheWTOsinterventionagainstcleanairstandards
A)hasearnedituniversalapproval.
B)wasdoneinordertolimitnationalsovereignty.
C)hasresultedinmuchcriticism.
D)hasresultedinmuchcriticismamongprofessionaleconomists.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:C
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12)ItisarguedthattheUnitedStateswouldbefoolishtomaintainafree-tradestanceinaworldinwhichall
othercountriesexploitchildorprisonerlabor,orareprotectionist.Ontheotherhand,Ricardosclassic
demonstrationofthesourcesandeffectsofcomparativeadvantagecogentlydemonstratesthatregardlessof
othercountrypolicy,freetraderemainsthefirstbestpolicyforacountrytofollow,sinceitwillmaximizeits
consumptionpossibilities(conditionaluponothercountrypolicies).Explain.Discussthecontradictionwith
theargumentintheprecedingparagraph.
Answer:InthecontextoftheRicardianmodel,itistruethatgainsfromtradearestrictlyaresultofworldterms
oftrade,whichdifferfromdomesticmarginalratesofsubstitution.Insuchaworld,thereasonwhy
foreigngoodsarecheapisofnoconcerntodomesticconsumers.However,inaworldwhichallows
forlarge-scalelabormigration,ignoringlaborconditionsabroadmayultimatelyresultinliving
standardsfordomesticworkerstobedraggeddown.
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9.2NationalWelfareArgumentsAgainstFreeTrade
1)Theoptimumtariffis
A)thebesttariffacountrycanobtainviaaWTOnegotiatedroundofcompromises.
B)thetariff,whichmaximizesthetermsoftradegains.
C)thetariff,whichmaximizesthedifferencebetweentermsoftradegainsandtermsoftradeloses.
D)notpracticalforasmallcountryduetothelikelihoodofretaliation.
E)notpracticalforalargecountryduetothelikelihoodofretaliation.
Answer:E
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2)Theoptimumtariffismostlikelytoapplyto
A)asmalltariffimposedbyasmallcountry.
B)asmalltariffimposedbyalargecountry.
C)alargetariffimposedbyasmallcountry.
D)alargetariffimposedbyalargecountry.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:B
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3)Theprohibitivetariffisatariffthat
A)issohighthatiteliminatesimports.
B)issohighthatitcausesundueharmtotrade-partnereconomies.
C)issohighthatitcausesundueharmtoimportcompetingsectors.
D)issolowthatthegovernmentprohibitsitsusesinceitwouldloseanimportantrevenuesource.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:A
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4)Theexistenceofmarginalsocialbenefitswhicharenotmarginalbenefitsfortheindustryproducingthe
importsubstitutes
A)isanargumentsupportingfreetradeandnon-governmentalinvolvement.
B)isanargumentsupportingtheuseofanoptimumtariff.
C)isanargumentsupportingtheuseofmarketfailuresasatrade-policystrategy.
D)isanargumentrejectingfreetradeandsupportinggovernmentalinvolvement.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:D
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5)Thedomesticmarketfailureargumentisaparticularcaseofthetheoryof
A)theoptimum,orfirst-best.
B)thesecondbest.
C)thethirdbest.
D)thesufficingprinciple.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:B
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6)Thedifficultyofascertainingtherightsecond-besttradepolicytofollow
A)reinforcessupportforthethird-bestpolicyapproach.
B)reinforcessupportforincreasingresearchcapabilitiesofgovernmentagencies.
C)reinforcessupportforabandoningtradepolicyasanoption.
D)reinforcessupportforfree-tradeoptions.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:D
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7)ThereasonprotectionismremainsstrongintheUnitedStatesisthat
A)economistscanproduceanyresulttheyarehiredtoproduce.
B)economistscannotpersuadethegeneralpublicthatfreetradeisbeneficial.
C)economistsdonotreallyunderstandhowtherealworldworks.
D)thelossesassociatedwithprotectionismarediffuse,makinglobbyingbythepublicimpractical.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:D
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8)TheUnitedStatesappearsattimestohaveatotallyschizophrenicattitudetowardprotectionism.TheUnited
StateswasthecountrythatproposedtheestablishmentoftheWorldTradeOrganizationasearlyasthelate
1940s,andwasalsotheonlyindustrializedcountrythatrefusedtoratifythisatthattime.TheUnitedStates
hasconsistentlyarguedonthesideofmultinationalfreetradeinGATTRounds,andyetmaintainsmany
protectionistlawssuchasthosewhichreserveoilshipmentsfromAlaskatoU.S.flagcarriers.Howcanyou
explainthisapparentlackofnationalconsistencyonthisissue?
Answer:Thisreflectsthefactthatinternationaltradetypicallyhasmanywinnersandrelativelyfewer,but
politicallypowerfullosers.Shortofguaranteed(constitutional?)non-conditionalcompensatory
mechanisms,thebasicconflictbetweenthesetwogroupswillalwaysbethere.
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AssumethatBoeing(U.S.)andAirbus(EuropeanUnion)bothwishtoentertheHungarianmarketwiththenextnew
generationairliner.Theybothhaveidenticalcostanddemandconditions(asindicatedinthegraphabove).

9)Refertoabovefigure.AssumethatBoeingisthefirsttoentertheHungarianmarket.Withoutagovernment
subsidywhatpricewouldtheydemand,andwhatwouldbetheirtotalprofits?
Answer:$12Million,$16.
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10)Refertoabovefigure.WhatistheconsumersurplusenjoyedbyHungarianconsumersofBoeingaircraftin
thesituation?
Answer:$8Million.
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11)Refertoabovefigure.SupposetheEuropeangovernmentprovidesAirbuswithasubsidyof$4foreach
airplanesold,andthatthesubsidyconvincesBoeingtoexittheHungarianmarket.NowAirbuswouldbe
themonopolistinthismarket.Whatpricewouldtheycharge,andwhatwouldbetheirtotalprofits?
Answer:$10Million,and$36Million.
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12)Refertoabovefigure.WhatwouldbethecostofthesubsidytoEuropeantaxpayers?
Answer:$24Million.
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13)Refertoabovefigure.WhathappenstotheConsumerSurplusofHungariancustomersasaresultofthis
subsidy?
Answer:Anincreaseof$10Million.
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14)Refertoabovefigure.WhatistherevenuegainorlossforEuropeasawhole(includingtaxpayers)?
Answer:Againof$12Million.
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9.3IncomeDistributionandTradePolicy
1)Itisarguedthatspecialinterestgroupsarelikelytotakeoverandpromoteprotectionistpolicies,whichmay
leadtoadecreaseinnationaleconomicwelfare.Thisargumentleadsto
A)apresumptionthatinpracticeafreetradepolicyislikelytobebetterthanalternatives.
B)apresumptionthattradepolicyshouldbeshiftedtoNon-GovernmentalOrganizations,soastolimit
taxpayerburden.
C)apresumptionthatfreetradeisgenerallyasecond-bestpolicy,tobeavoidediffeasiblealternativesare
available.
D)apresumptionthatfreetradeisthelikelyequilibriumsolutionifthegovernmentallowsspecialinterest
groupstodictateitstradepolicy.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:A
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2)Theauthorsofthetextbelievethat
A)second-bestpolicyisworsethanoptimalpolicy.
B)specialinterestgroupsgenerallyenhancenationalwelfare.
C)nationalwelfareislikelytobeenhancedbytheimpositionofanoptimaltariff.
D)marketFailureargumentstendtosupportfree-tradepolicy.
E)thereisnosuchthingasnationalwelfare.
Answer:E
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3)Themedianvotermodel
A)workswellintheareaoftradepolicy.
B)isnotintuitivelyreasonable.
C)tendstoresultinbiasedtariffrates.
D)doesnotworkwellintheareaoftradepolicy.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:D
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4)Thefactthattradepolicyoftenimposesharmonlargenumbersofpeople,andbenefitsonlyafewmaybe
explainedby
A)thelackofpoliticalinvolvementofthepublic.
B)thepowerofadvertisement.
C)theproblemofcollectiveaction.
D)thebasicimpossibilityofthedemocraticsystemtoreachafairsolution.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:C
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5)Protectionismtendstobeconcentratedintwosectors
A)agricultureandclothing.
B)hightechandnationalsecuritysensitiveindustries.
C)capitalandskillintensiveindustries.
D)industriesconcentratedintheSouthandintheMidwestofthecountry.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:A
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6)Exportembargoescausegreaterlossestoconsumersurplusinthetargetcountry
A)thelesseritsinitialdependenceonforeignproducedgoods.
B)themoreelasticisthetargetcountrysdemandschedule.
C)themoreelasticisthetargetcountrysdomesticsupply.
D)themoreinelasticthetargetcountryssupply.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:D
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7)Thestrongestpoliticalpressureforatradepolicythatresultsinhigherprotectionismcomesfrom
A)domesticworkerslobbyingforimportrestrictions.
B)domesticworkerslobbyingforexportrestrictions.
C)domesticworkerslobbyingforfreetrade.
D)domesticconsumerslobbyingforexportrestrictions.
E)domesticconsumerslobbyingforimportrestrictions.
Answer:A
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8)TheaveragetariffratetodataondutiableimportsintheUnitedStatesisapproximately
A)5%ofthevalueofimports.
B)15%ofthevalueofimports.
C)20%ofthevalueofimports.
D)25%ofthevalueofimports.
E)morethan25%ofthevalueofimports.
Answer:A
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9)In1990theUnitedStatesimposedtradeembargoesonIraqsinternationaltrade.Thiswouldinducesmaller
lossesinIraqsconsumersurplusthe
A)lesselasticIraqsdemandschedule.
B)moreelasticIraqsdemandschedule.
C)greaterisIraqsdependenceonforeignproducts.
D)moreinelasticisIraqssupplyschedule.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:B
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10)TodayU.S.protectionismisconcentratedin
A)hightechindustries.
B)labor-intensiveindustries.
C)industriesinwhichJapanhasacomparativeadvantage.
D)computerintensiveindustries.
E)capital-intensiveindustries.
Answer:B
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11)ThequantitativeimportanceofU.S.protectionofthedomesticclothingindustryisbestexplainedbythefact
that
A)thisindustryisanimportantemployerofhighlyskilledlabor.
B)thisindustryisanimportantemployeroflowskilledlabor.
C)mostoftheexportersofclothingintotheU.S.arepoorcountries.
D)thisindustryisapoliticallywellorganizedsectorintheU.S.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:D
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12)Itmaybedemonstratedthatanyprotectionistpolicy,whicheffectivelyshiftsrealresourcestoimport
competingindustriesorsectorswillharmexportindustriesorsectors.Thismay,forexample,happenbythe
strengtheningU.S.dollarintheforeignexchangemarket.Wouldyouproposethereforethatexport
industrieslobbyagainstprotectionisminInternationalTradeCommissionproceedings?Whatofconsumer
advocates?Discusstheprosandtheproblemsofsuchasuggestion.
Answer:Actuallythisisaninterestingidea.ItiswellknownthatthepublicinterestisputonholdastheITC
considersonlythesqueakywheelsofthoseallegedlyhurtbytrade.Whileconsumersmaybetoo
amorphousagrouptosuccessfullyorganizeandpursueapoliticalagenda,theexportersand
consumeradvocatesmaybeabletoformacounterweighttotheimportcompetingindustries.
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9.4InternationalNegotiationsandTradePolicy
1)Thesimplemodelofcompetitionamongpoliticalpartieslongusedbypoliticalscientiststendstoleadtothe
practicalsolutionofselectingthe
A)optimaltariff.
B)prohibitivetariff.
C)zero(free-trade)tariff.
D)thetariffratefavoredbythemedianvoter.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:D
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2)TheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTradeandtheWorldTradeOrganizationhaveresultedin
A)terminationofexportsubsidiesappliedtomanufacturedgoods.
B)terminationofimporttariffsappliedtomanufactures.
C)terminationofimporttariffsappliedtoagriculturalcommodities.
D)terminationofinternationaltheftofcopyrights.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:E
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3)TheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTradeandtheWorldTradeOrganizationhaveresultedin
A)theestablishmentofuniversaltradeadjustmentassistancepolicies.
B)theestablishmentoftheEuropeanUnion.
C)thereciprocaltradeclause.
D)reductionsintradebarriersviamultilateralnegotiations.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:D
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4)Countervailingdutiesareintendedtoneutralizeanyunfairadvantagethatforeignexportersmightgain
becauseofforeign
A)tariffs.
B)subsidies.
C)quotas.
D)Local-Contentlegislation.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:B
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5)In1980theUnitedStatesannouncedanembargoongrainexportstotheSovietUnioninresponsetothe
SovietinvasionofAfghanistan.Thisembargowasmainlyresistedby
A)U.S.grainconsumersofbread.
B)U.S.grainproducers.
C)foreigngrainproducers.
D)U.S.communists.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:B
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6)UnderU.S.commercialpolicy,theescapeclauseresultsin
A)temporaryquotasgrantedtofirmsinjuredbyimportcompetition.
B)tariffsthatoffsetexportsubsidiesgrantedtoforeignproducers.
C)arefusaloftheU.S.toextraditeanyonewhoescapedpoliticaloppression.
D)taxadvantagesextendedtominority-ownedexportingfirms.
E)tariffadvantagesextendedtocertainCaribbeancountriesintheU.S.market.
Answer:A
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7)UnderU.S.commercialpolicy,whichclausepermitsthemodificationofatradeliberalizationagreementona
temporarybasisifseriousinjuryoccurstodomesticproducersasaresultoftheagreement?
A)adjustmentassistanceclause
B)escapeclause
C)mostfavorednationclause
D)prohibitivetariffclause
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:B
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8)AnissueneverconfrontedeffectivelybyGATT,butconsideredanimportantissueforWTOisthatof
A)thepromotionoffreerWorldtrade.
B)thepromotionoffreerWorldcommoditytrade.
C)thepromotionoffreerWorldservicestrade.
D)theloweringoftariffrates.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:C
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9)ThepoliticalwisdomofchoosingatariffacceptabletothemedianU.S.voteris
A)agoodexampleoftheprincipleofthesecondbest.
B)agoodexampleofthewayinwhichactualtariffpoliciesaredetermined.
C)agoodexampleoftheprincipleofpoliticalnegotiation.
D)notevidentinactualtariffdetermination.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:D
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10)Agame-theoryexplanationoftheparadoxthateventhoughallcountrieswouldbenefitifeachchosefree
trade,infacteachtendstofollowprotectionistpoliciesis
A)tradewar.
B)collectiveaction.
C)prisonersdilemma.
D)benefit-costanalysis.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:C
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11)WhentheU.S.placedtariffsonFrenchwine,FranceplacedhightariffsonU.S.chickens.Thisisanexample
of
A)deadweightlosses.
B)multilateralnegotiations.
C)bilateraltradenegotiations.
D)internationalmarketfailures.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:E
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12)Presumably,sincetheUnitedStatesisalargecountryinmanyofitsinternationalmarkets,apositive
optimumtariffexistsforthiscountry.Itfollowsthereforethatwhenanylegislatororgovernmentofficial
whopromoteszero-tarifffreetradepolicies,isbydefinitionnotactinginthepublicsbestinterest.Discuss.
Answer:Technicallythisistrue.However,thisistrueonlywithinthecontextofagenerallymyopicviewof
internationalrelations.Ifthetariffimposingcountryislargeenoughtomakeasubstantialdifference
initswelfarebyseekinganoptimumtariff,thenitcannothopetoremaininvisible,asitspoliciesare
substantiallyharmingitstradepartners.Foreignrepercussionsarealmostacertainty.Insuchagame
itisnotatallcertainthatseekingtheoptimumtariffdominatesalternativestrategies.
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13)IthasbeenclaimedthatforeigngovernmentshaveattemptedtoinfluencevotesintheU.S.thatwould
promotepoliciesofprotectionismwithintheU.S.Onthesurfacethisappearstobetotallyillogicaland
counterintuitive,asthiswouldpresumablylessenthepossibilitiesofforeignersexportstotheU.S.
Answer:Thiswouldmakesenseonlyiftheformofprotectionismisatariff.However,ifitisaquota,thenthe
scarcityrentsmaybecapturedbyestablishedforeignproducers.Hence,thereactionoftheJapaneseto
automobilequotaswastodramaticallyincreasethehigh-end,highlyprofitableautomobiles.This
wouldbeevenmoreself-evidentiftheprotectionismtooktheformofaVoluntaryExportRestraint
(VER),oradetailedformalizedbilateralcartel,suchastheoldMulti-FibreAgreement.
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14)TheU.S.producerBoeing,andtheEuropeanAirbusarecontemplatingthenextgenerationmid-sizedfuel
efficientgenerationofaircarrier.Ifbothproducetheirrespectivemodels,theneachwouldlose$50million
(becausetheworldmarketisjustnotlargeenoughtoenableeithertocapturepotentialscaleeconomiesif
theyhadtosharetheworldmarket).Ifneitherproduce,theneachonesnetgainwouldofcoursebezero.If
eitheroneproduceswhiletheotherdoesnot,thentheproducerwillgain$500million.
(a)
Whatisthecorrectstrategyforeithercompany?
(b)
Whatisthecorrectstrategyforagovernmentseekingtomaximizenationaleconomicwelfare?
(c)
Ifanationalgovernmentdecidestosubsidizeitsaircraftproducer,howhighshouldbethesubsidy?
Answer:(a)
enterthemarketfirst.Thentheothercompanyknowsthatifitalsoenters,itwillnotbeableto
covercosts.
(b)
Subsidizeitsproducer.Ifthisallowsittoenterfirst,thenwegetthesamesolutionasanswer
(a)above.
(c)
Anyfigureabove$50million(e.g.$55million).Thiswouldpromisepositiveprofitsregardless
ofthedecisionofthecompetitor.Thewinnerthenmayturnouttobethatcountrywhosevotersare
leastsensitivetoon-the-books,transparentsubsidiesgiventorichcorporations(thesesubsidieswill
havetocontinueyearafteryearuntiltheothercountrystopsitssubsidies).
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15)Inrecentcases,theU.S.placedquotasorprotectionisttariffsonimportedsteelandimportedmicrochips.In
bothcasesthedamagetodownstreamindustrieswasobvioustoallandrelativelyeasytoquantifyand
demonstrate.AssumingthattheU.S.lawmakersarenotplaindumb,whydidtheyenacttheseprotectionist
policies?
Answer:Thesystembywhichtheseprotectionistpoliciesaresetintolawisbiasedinfavoroftheproducersof
importcompetitivegoods.Othersectorsoftheeconomythatmaybeaffectedarenotpartiesinthe
petitionsmadetotheITCseekingredress.
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9.5TheDohaDisappointment
1)Formostdevelopingcountries
A)productivityishighamongdomesticworkers.
B)populationgrowthandilliteracyratesarelow.
C)savingandinvestmentlevelsarehigh.
D)agriculturalgoodsandrawmaterialsconstituteahighproportionofdomesticoutput.
E)Noneoftheabove.
Answer:D
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2)Developingcountrieshaveoftenattemptedtoestablishcartelssoastocountertheactualorperceived
inexorabledownwardpushonthepricesoftheirexportedcommodities.OPECisthebestwellknownof
these.Howaresuchcartelsexpectedtohelpthedevelopingcountries?Attimesimportingcountriesprofess
supportforsuchschemes.Canyouthinkofanylogicalbasisforsuchsupport?Howarecartelslike
monopolies,andhowaretheydifferentfrommonopolies.Whyisthereapresuppositionamongeconomists
thatsuchschemesarenotlikelytosucceedinthelongrun?
Answer:Suchcartelsareexpectedtoshifttheexporterstermsoftradeintheirfavor.Alsotheyareexpectedto
producethemaximumprofit,whichthemarketwillbear.Importingcountriesmaybenefitfromthe
pricestabilitygeneratedbythecartel.Cartelsarelikemonopoliesinthattheirtotaloutputisthesame
asthatwhichwouldbegeneratedbyasinglemonopoly.Theydifferfrommonopoliesinthatthe
monopolyprofitsneedtobedividedamongtheproducingcountries,whichhavedifferentcost
structures.
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3)TheU.S.isprobablythemostopeninternationalmarketamongtheindustrializedcountries.Whatthendoes
theU.S.havetogainbyjoiningtheWTO?
Answer:Therearetwoanswers.First,theU.S.exportersstandtogainprofitablemarketsifforeign
protectionisminareasofU.S.comparativeadvantage(e.g.soy)isremovedduetoWTOefforts.The
secondisthattheWTOofferstheU.S.governmentadministrationacounterweighttoregionaland
sectoralinterestsdemandingprotection.Itisalwayspoliticallyeasiertobringaboutmoreefficient
resourceallocationsifthecomplaintsofthelosersmaybedeflectedbythepresenceofabindingtreaty
withaninternationalorganization(ourhandsaretied).
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9.6AppendixtoChapter9:ProvingThattheOptimumTariffIsPositive
1)Therearenoquestionsforthissection.
Answer:TRUE
QuestionStatus:New

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