DIGESTS

Procedural History:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December16, 2009 (the Second
Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the
COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act.
Statement of Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that
is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8- point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs and apparently advocates
sexual immorality.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being
truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply
with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not
conform to the teachings of our faith.
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution, while
three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration. The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie
and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and directs the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing
the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not
later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment. Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment
in support of petitioners application. Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we
required it to file its own comment. The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2,
2010.
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist
from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention. The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on
moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the
CHRs motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene which motion was granted on February 2,
2010.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma.
2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Answer:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that it was a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
1. No. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad.
Reasoning:
1. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed
Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings
beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in
ways that have primarily secular effects.
1. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the
groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts. Respondent has failed to explain what
societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Under our system of
laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position
through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions
should be distilled and deliberated upon. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that
offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. Laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors. The Supreme Courts decision is fully in accord with the international
obligations to protect and promote human rights. The principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to
electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR are explicitly recognized. The Constitution and laws
should be applied as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion. True democracy should be resilient enough to
withstand vigorous debate due to conflicting opinions.
Holding:
The Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and
December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT
petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a
petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their
decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance.
In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports
by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered

under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,
the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether
a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government
neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a
secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for
the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous,
at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property,
or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution
under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to
support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof,
and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a
judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.
ESTRADA VS. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR, 492 SCRA 1 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration), 408 SCRA 1
Puno, J.
Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253, Las Pinas City. Complainant requested for an investigation of
respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child within
this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image
of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act.
Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago when her husband was still
alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for
alleged grossly immoral conduct because:

She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society;

That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs;

That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.

Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a DECLARATION OF PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS in accordance with her
religion which allows members of the Jehovahs witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into
marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over
the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
HELD:
Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on
her fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms
including religious freedommay be enjoyed. IN THE AREA OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AS A PREFERRED FREEDOM,
HOWEVER, MAN STANDS ACCOUNTABLE TO AN AUTHORITY HIGHER THAN THE STATE, and so the stateinterest sought to
be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the
freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct.

http://ustlawreview.com/pdf/vol.LI/Cases/Estrada_v._Escritor.pdf
GARCES VS. ESTENZO
104 SCRA 510
Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed. These resolutions have been
ratified by 272 voters, and projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic
Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the
barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was
passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against thepriest for the recovery of the image.
Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the
constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends
that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue: Was any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased
in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering
with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a laymans custody so that it could
easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection withprayers and novena. It was the
councils funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is
their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution , since private
funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regardingseparation of church and state, freedom of worship
and banning the use of public money or property.

American Bible Society v. City of Manila

Facts:
In the course of its ministry, ABS has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospels throughout Philippines and
translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of Manila informed ABS
that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November 1945 without providing the city with
Mayor's permit and municipal license in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028,
3364 and required plaintiff to secure within three days the permit and license fees, together with
compromise covering the period from fourth quarter of 1945 to second quarter of 1952 in P5, 281.45. ABS protested
about the requirement but paid to the defendant the said permit and license fees in the said amount.
Issue:
Whether or no the Ordinances of Manila Nos. 3000 as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364 are applicable to the case at
bar.
Held:
Yes, the city ordinances mentioned are still in force and effect.
When the old statute is repealed in its entirety and by the same enactment re-enacts all or certain portions of the preexisting law, the majority view holds that the rights and liabilities whihc have accrued under the original statute are
preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizeds the repeal, therefore continueing the law in force
without interruption.
In the case at bar, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 of the city of Manila were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City
of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code,
superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila. The only essential difference between these two provisions is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes
that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m-2),
whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein,shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the
corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of
tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the

authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute
are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in
force without interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect.

Political Law Inviolability of the Separation of Church and State

In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Albuquerque, Bohol. He was also proclaimed
as a mayor therein. Pamil, a rival candidate file a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of
Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in the Revised Administrative Code; in no case shall there be elected or
appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation
from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality. In this case, the elected mayor
is a priest. However, Judge Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which
allowed the prohibitions of the revised administrative code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Revised Administrative Code is no longer operative?
HELD: Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the majority vote of eight
(8) which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this, the petition must be
granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the
mayoralty position. It is also pointed out that how can one who swore to serve the Churchs interest above all be in
duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of
the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Teehankee The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving salaries or compensation from
provincial or national funds are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective office because under Sec. 23 of the
Election Code of 1971 every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces shall ipso facto cease in their office or position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This
implies that they are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office. The Comelec further ruled that as to
the two remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code, ecclesiastics and contractors
for public works of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim, Inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius, they being not included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New Election Code.
The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election
code, are eligible to run for public office.

Political Law Primacy of the Constitution over Contractual Rights

Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory since 1958. He was also a
member of the EPWU. Under the CBA between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which means
that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said
factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that
as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because
apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation
from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to
his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement
because RA 3350 is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWUs and ERFs legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor
union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment
could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union
includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and
employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers right to join or not to join
union. But the RA recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.
Political Law Religious Freedom vs Clear and Present Danger
German et al went to JP Laurel St to pray and worship in St Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Barangan
and his underlings from entering the church because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacanang. And considering
that Germans group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with
clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the
ongoings within the Malacanang.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke is a violation of their freedom to
worship and locomotion.

HELD: In the case at bar, German et al are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. There has been a clear
manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow the German et al to practice their religious belief but not in the
manner that German et al impress. Such manner impresses clear and present danger to the executive of the state
hence the need to curtail it even at the expense of curtailing ones freedom to worship.
Dissenting Opinions
J. Fernando - It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes
decision if on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled to the highest
priority among human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will be less vigilant
in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that
deeply-held faith that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of mankind. Without that
faith, mans very existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of significance.
J. Teehankee - The right to freely exercise ones religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of
worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the
judiciary -even more so than on the other departments -rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect
for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what
has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the
presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do
precedence and primacy.
J. Makasiar With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present
danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of Malacaang and the adjacent
areas, as the respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public disturbance or violence.
FACTS:
RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremonycompulsory for schools. The implementing rules(Department Order 8)says
that the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone must salute the flag and no one is to
do anything whilethe ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge (panatang
makabayan).Petitioners children attending the BuenavistaCommunity School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute the
flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses.
They followed Exodus 20:4-5 'thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in
heaven above, or that is in earth beneath or that is in the water under the earth. They consider the flag to be an image
in this context. Because of this they were expelled from the school in Sep 1955.Petitioners thru counsel petitioner Sec
Ed that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention. Sec Ed
denied petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued.
ISSUE:
WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional
HELD:
Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non-discriminatory. Therefore it is constitutional
RATIONALE:
The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but it's exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the former
must yield. What is the nature of the flag? Petitioners maintain that it is an image but that is not so. It is the symbol
of Republic of the Philippines. It is not a religious
symbol.Saluting it is not therefore a religious ceremony. Thedetermination whether a ceremony is religious or not is
left to the courts not to any religious group. Petitioners are willing to remain silent and stand during flag ceremony.
Petitioners salute the flag during boy scout activities. Their objection then rests on the singing of anthem and
recitation of pledge. The pledge is judged to be completely secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag or
to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting to force, military
service, or duty to defend the country. There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement
of the flag salute. They were not criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the salute
regulation they merely lost the benefits of public education. Take it or leave it. Hamilton vs Univ of California:
Appellants were members of Methodist Episcopal Church who believed that war and preparations for war
are against God's wishes. They did not take required military service training which was requirement to graduate. Court
said that they were not being drafted to attend university. University did not violate due process when it required the
mil service. Minersville School District vs Gobitis: two Jehovahs Witness children were expelled

from school for refusing to salute flag. Requirement of participation of all pupils in flag ceremony did not infringe due
process. West Virginia State Board of Education. vs. Barnette: reversed the former decision at a divided
court. This court leans towards Gobitis decision. Specialcircumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled the
students although attendance in schools is mandatory turning them all into truants headed for reformatories.
Fortunately, the law requiring compulsory enrollment there in the Philippines is so riddled with exceptions and
exemptions that there is no crisis if the children didn't attend school. There is no penal sanction for failing to attend
school. Whenever a man enjoys the benefits of society and community life he becomes a member and must give
upsome of his rights for the general
welfare just likeeverybody else. The practice of religion is subject toreasonable and nondiscrimantory regulation by th
estate.Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusets: SarahPrince (Jehovahs Witness again)was convicted under the Child
Labor law because her hiece distributed religious pamphlets. Court said that state can
limit control of parent/guardian. The right of practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose child to ill
health. This case was decided after Barnette, supra. SecEd was not imposing a religious belief with the
flagsalute. It was merely enforcing a non-discriminatoryregulation applicable to members of all religions. State
carried out duty to supervise educational institutions and teach civic duty. Petitioners do not question the right of the
school toconduct the flag Salute ceremony but question theattempt to compel them. The trouble of exempting the
petitioners is that it would disrupt school discipline and demoralize the greater student population. There are
exemptions for cases of religious belief like an understanding that anti-war religious believers will not be made to fight
but help war effort in other non-combat ways. But that is for the legislature to decide, not the courts.

Ebralinag vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu

G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
Facts:
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu
for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No.
1265 and DECS Department Order No. 8 which stipulated compulsory flag ceremonies in all educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot
conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the
State. They allege that the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution
protects against official control. In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary
of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a
non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, Any teacher or
student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be dismissed after due investigation. In
1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's
Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem,
salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge. Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to
persuade the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School, the
children were asked to sign an Agreement promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their breast
until the end of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag. However, things took a turn for the worst. In
the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of

students who "opted to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they
forfeited their right to attend public schools." 43 students were subsequently expelled after refusing to sing. The
petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who
succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his
predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of Jehovah's Witnesses. The petitioning
students filed on account of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in violating their due process and
their right to education. They alleged for the nullity of the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of petitioners from
their respective schools, prohibiting respondents from further barring the petitioners from their classes, and
compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission of petitioners to their
respective schools. They also prayed for a TRO. On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a TRO and a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their
respective classes until further orders from this Court. The OSG commented on the defense of the expulsion orders and
claimed that the flag salute was devoid of any religious significance and the State had compelling interests to expel the
children.

Issue:
Whether school children who are members of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public
and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes
playing or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

Held:
No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief
is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare. Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. The sole justification for a prior
restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State has a right and a duty to prevent. We are not persuaded that by exempting
the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this
religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the
globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,
patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine
schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through
the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to
love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities. Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty
even to the country, assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion, is not a goal that is
constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited
means. Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will
violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of
the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education
accessible to all. We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the
observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to
others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such
patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, while the highest regard must be
afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are
powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both
religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how
such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent.