Law 126 Evidence

Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-55436 November 25, 1983
NICASIO BORJE, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Corpuz & Padlan Law Offices and Nicodemo T.
Ferrer for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents

GUERRERO, J.:+.wph!1
That the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused
has not been satisfactorily overcome by the prosecution evidence in the
case at bar where the conviction of petitioner for falsification of public
documents was based principally on the mere assumption that as
possessor of the falsified documents, he is presumed to be the author of
the falsification, is stoutly raised in this appeal by certiorari. Since there
is no direct proof showing that accused-appellant, being then the
Provincial Plant Industry Officer with many subordinate employees and
personnel under him engaged in agricultural field work and assigned in

Page 1 of 103

the rural areas like the complainant Rodrigo Ducusin, had personally
and actually falsified the public documents in question (Timebook and
Payroll, Exhibit "A"; Daily Time Record, Exhibit "B"; and Certification,
Exhibit "C") which under normal office procedures pass through
numerous hands at several government offices for typing, attestations,
funding, accounting, and payment of the check for P225.00, the legal
issue thus raised merits Our careful consideration and resolution, in the
face of accused-appellant's vigorous denial.
The information filed against the accused-appellant reads as
follows: t.hqw
The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses NICASIO
BORJE of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENT committed as follows:
That on or about the period from January, February and
March, 1977, and sometime thereafter, in the
Municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the
Provincial Plant Industry Officer of Bureau of Plant
Industry, Provincial Office at San Fernando, La Union and
in relation by his performance of the duties of his office,
taking advantage of his position as such, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify the
Timebook and Payroll of his office for the periods
January to March, 1977, Daily Time Record for the same
period of Rodrigo Ducusin and Certification for P225.00
by causing it to appear in the said documents that
Rodrigo Ducusin have participated in the same and
affixed his signatures thereon when in truth and in fact
he did not so sign the said documents nor otherwise

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

participated in their execution to the damage and

prejudice of the and Rodrigo Ducusin and the Republic.

Page 2 of 103
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Manila, Philippines, October 23, 1980.

CONTRARY to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, in

relation to P.D. 1606.

The decision appealed from recites the evidence for the government as
follows: t.hqw

Manila, August 31, 1979.

(SGD.) FRANCISCO M. TEJANO Special Prosecutor
APPROVED: t.hqw
(SGD.) VICENTE ERICTA
TANODBAYAN
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and the
trial commenced on August 7, 1980 after the. case was reinvestigated by
the Tanodbayan on petition of said accused-appellant, herein petitioner.
On October 23, 1980, the respondent court rendered a decision
promulgated on October 29, 1980, finding the petitioner guilty as per the
dispositive portion thereof, to wit: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, accused is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal for the crane of
Falsification of Public Documents as defined and
penalized under Article 171, paragraph 2, of the Revised
Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance
to consider, the Court hereby sentences him to an
indeterminate imprisonment ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,500.00 and to pay
the costs.

The gist of the evidence of the prosecution, which consist

of the testimonies of Ducusin, Edgardo Olivares, 43 years
old, married, agronomist and Provincial Plant Officer,
Manuel Varquez, 45 years old, married and Regional
Director and Remedios Lorenzo, 47 years old, married
and Cashier, all of the Bureau of Plant Industry in San
Fernando, La Union, shows that Ducusin was employed
as Plant Pest Officer with the Bureau of Plant Industry
stationed in San Fernando, La Union from February 2,
1975 up to his resignation on April 30, 1978. From
February 2, 1975 up to December 1976, he was detailed
as production technician in the Program of the Bureau of
Plant Industry and the Bureau of Agricultural Extension
receiving incentive pay from the National Food and
Agricultural Council (NFAC) during said period. In 1977,
however, Ducusin was no longer entitled to the NFAC
incentive pay as he was detailed to the Surveillance Team
of the Bureau of Plant Industry on January 1977 up to
April 30, 1978.
Before one can receive his NFAC incentive pay, he must
prepare his Daily Time Record (CS Form 48) for the
month and a certification that he is detailed with the
Program. In February 1978, Ducusin was informed by
one Roberto Castro that he is supposed to receive NFAC
incentive pay because his name is included in the special
order enumerating those included in the program. This

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

prompted Ducusin to go to the Accounting Division of the

Bureau of Plant Industry, Region I in San Fernando, La
Union to verify the information relayed to him by Castro
and there he discovered that in the payroll for January,
February and March 1977 (Exhibit A) his name and
signature appeared. Attached to said payroll were a
certification that he was detailed to the Program (Exhibit
C) and the corresponding Daily Time Records for said
months (Exhibit D) which appeared to have been all
signed by him. Actually, however, he did not sign the said
payroll, certification and time records nor did he
authorize anybody to sign for him. Ducusin referred the
aforesaid falsification to the accused in the last week of
February 1978 and accused, confessing to him that he got
the money, repeatedly offered him Two Hundred Twenty
Five (P225.00) Pesos to cover his incentive pay but he
remained silent and refused to receive the amount. He
finally brought the matter to Regional Director Manuel
Varquez who assigned Olivares to investigate the case.
But inasmuch as no further action was taken, he brought
the case to the attention of the President and the Director
of the Bureau of Plant Industry. Ducusin likewise
submitted his written resignation to the Regional
Director (Exhibit E) on April 28, 1978 because he felt
'utterly' demoralized because of undesirable actuations
which he recently discovered ... On May 18, 1978, he
received a reply from Regional Director Varquez dated
May 15, 1978 (Exhibit F) stating that his aforesaid letter
of resignation had been endorsed to the accused and
attached therewith was the reply of the latter (Exhibit F1).
Similarly, the decision condensed the evidence of the defense in the
following manner: t.hqw

Page 3 of 103
On the other hand, accused, in brief, claimed that Ducusin
was one of those involved in the Program for the months
of January, February and March 1977 as shown in Special
Order No. 172 of the Bureau of Plant Industry Director
Domingo E. Panganiban (Exhibits 6 and 6-A) and actually
paid of his incentive pay and that it is not true that he
received the payroll (Exhibit A) and the corresponding
checks from Remedios Lorenzo for delivery to the
persons whose names appear in said payroll. Accused
denied that he instigated the filing of two cases of
falsification against Ducusin and to bolster said denial
accused presented Jacinto Costales, 54 years old, married
and Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal of La Union.

In fairness to the accused, We are constrained to include hereunder the

more detailed statement of facts submitted by him in his
Brief, viz. t.hqw
The Province of La Union undertook as one of its projects
the program known as the Gulayan sa Kalusugan and
Masagana '99 Program, the implementation of which
became a joint program of its Bureau of Plant Industry
and its Bureau of Agricultural Extension. Government
employees detailed as production technicians in the
Gulayan Program received incentive allowances from the
NFAC during the covered period. Their detail as
production technicians of the said program was effected
only by a special order emanating from the Bureau of
Plant Industry Door; and before the employee received
his incentive pay, he was required to prepare his Daffy
Time Record for the particular month and submit a
Certification attesting to the fact that he was detailed to
the program.

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In the case-at-bar, complainant Rodrigo Ducusin, an

employee of the Bureau of Plant Industry, was detailed to
the program from February 2,1975 up to December
1977, his assignment of work being contained in the
NFAC Order captioned 'Detail and Designation of
Personnel to NFAC, in connection with the Gulayan
Program where his name appeared opposite item 60
thereof. (Exhibit 6)
Making it appear that he was surprised to learn that he
was supposed to receive his NFAC incentive pay for the
months of January, February and March 1977 because he
was not entitled thereto as he was not anymore
connected with the Gulayan Program; and falsely making
it appear that some person other than himself received
his incentive pay by allegedly forging his signature on the
Daily Time Records, the Payroll and the Certification
required and submitted complainant Rodrigo Ducusin
caused to be filled a complaint against the petitioner,
Nicasio Borje, supervising agronomist of the Bureau of
Plant Industry, Region I, before the Tanodbayan ...
Accused-appellant contends that complainant Ducusin was paid his
incentive pay for the months of January to March, 1977 in the total sum
of P225.00 as Ducusin was included in the payroll since he has worked
with the Program as shown by Special Order No. 72 issued by the BPI
Director and concurrent Executive Director of NFAC, Domingo
Panganiban, and that said Special Order, Exhibit 6 entitled "Detail and
Designation of BPI Personnel to NFAC in Connection with the Masagana
'99 Program effective January to December 1977" and dated May 17,
1977, included the name Rodrigo Ducusin, herein complainant, opposite
item No. 60 in page 2 of the Exhibit and marked Exhibit 6-A (TSN, Aug.
27, 1980, pp. 43-46). He confirms substantially the official procedure in
the preparation of the payroll and subsequent payment of the incentive

Page 4 of 103

pay to the production technicians as described by witness Remedios

Lorenzo, disbursing officer and cashier for the BPI office in San
Fernando, La Union. However, he vigorously denies having received the
payroll and the corresponding checks from witness Lorenzo as his
participation in the preparation of the said payroll ended with his
signing thereof after which the payroll goes to the disbursing officer for
the preparation and issuance of the checks to the payees.
The defense also presented in evidence certified true copies of two (2)
criminal informations for falsification dated August 13, 1979 filed by
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jacinto Costales against complainant Ducusin
before the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, Agoo, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. A-893 (Exhibit 1) and A-894 (Exhibit 2). The
accused contends that the instant case against him was initiated by
Ducusin to get even with the petitioner as the complainant admitted in
cross-examination that he believes that Borje instigated said two
criminal cases against him (TSN, Aug. 25,1980, pp. 21-27).
Further contending that complainant Ducusin was doing dual work from
July, 1976 up to December, 1977, the defense presented Exhibits 5 to 5-C
which is Memorandum Order No. 56, Series of 1976, dated June 11,
1976, issued by BPI Director Panganiban for the implementation of the
Plant Pest and Disease Surveillance and Early Warning Monitoring
Project under the Philippine-German Crop Protection Program which
shows that complainant Ducusin was included in the list of personnel
assigned to the Surveillance and Early Warning System SEWS team as
Plant Pest Control Officer. The accused-appellant declared that although
Ducusin was named to this SEWS team, he continued working with the
Gulayan Program as production technician during said work.
The defense disclaims the authenticity of the prosecution's Exhibit H
which is purportedly the original Borje reply letter to BPI Regional
Director Varquez' endorsement of Ducusin's resignation letter. Instead,
Exhibit 8 was presented in evidence as the genuine carbon copy of

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 5 of 103

Borje's signed letter reply dated May 5,1978 in response to Varquez'

memorandum of May 3, 1978 wherein petitioner recommended
disapproval of Ducusin's resignation in order that Ducusin could face the
charges against him in connection with his work with the Gulayan
Program. (TSN, Aug. 27,1980, pp. 56- 58,90).

C. The testimony of complainant's

witness, Remedios Lorenzo, was
sufficiently impeached by her own
conflicting testimony previously given
before the Tanodbayan;

The Sandiganbayan in its decision formulated two issues determinative

of the innocence or guilt of the accused, to wit: (1) Whether or not the
Time Book and Payroll (Exhibit A), the certification (Exhibit C) and the
Daily Time Records (Exhibit D) in support of said payroll were falsified,
and (2) If they were, the liability of the accused, if any. As indicated
earlier, the accused- appellant was found guilty by respondent court.

D. The respondent court erred in finding

as a fact that complainant was not
entitled to the NFAC incentive pay, in total
disregard to the documentary evidence
proving that he was doing dual work,
both with the Gulayan Program as wen as
the SEWS and therefore, still entitled to
the NFAC allowance.

Hence, the instant appeal by way of certiorari.

Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors: t.hqw
I. The respondent court erred in holding that the
petitioner is guilty of the offense of falsification of public
documents, the same not having began established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, considering
that:t.hqw
A. the originals of the alleged falsified
documents were not presented in court
and, hence, the corpus delicti has not
been established as held in the case of U S.
vs. Gregorio
B. There is no iota of evidence that the
petitioner falsified the complainant's
signature on the alleged falsified
documents;

II. The respondent court erred in not holding that

complainant falsely ascribed the offense to the petitioner,
there being proof that complainant was possessed of ill
motives against petitioner.
Before resolving the above assigned errors, We find it imperative and
compelling to describe and detail the nature and contents of the vital
documentary exhibits of the prosecution alleged to have been falsified
by the accused-appellant. These are official forms and they are (1)
Exhibit A, Timebook and Payroll of accused-appellant's office for the
period January to March 1977; (2) Exhibit D, Daily Time Record for the
same period of Rodrigo Ducusin; and (3) Exhibit C, Certification that
Ducusin was detailed to the Program.
As appearing on the face of these exhibits, the act or participation of the
petitioner thereon is indicated below: t.hqw

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 6 of 103

In Exhibit A (Timebook and Payroll), the printed

certification below which the signature of petitioner is
affixed, reads thus:
2. I certify that this roll is correct; every person whose
name appears hereon rendered service for the nine and
at the rates stated under my general supervision, and I
approve payment of this roll
CERTIFIED CORRECT:
(SGD.) NICACIO B. BORJE NFAC, Prov'l Chairman
In Exhibit D (Daily Time Record, Service Form No. 18),
the signature of the accused-appellant appears below the
following words:
Certified true copy of the original:
Verified as to the prescribed office hours. t.hqw

Exhibit C (Certification) indicates no participation

whatsoever of appellant Borje. It simply states, thus:
(
S
I hereby certify that the amount of Gtwo hundred twenty
five pesos (P225.00) herein claimedDis only in
. transportation
reimbursement of representation and
) to office and viceexpenses (excepting trips from home
CERTIFICATION

versa) actually incurred by me in the performance of my

N while on detailed
official duties as Production technician
I
with the National Food and Agriculture
Council, during
C
the period from Jan. 1977 to March 1977 that I did not
A
use any government vehicle or transportation
furnished
C
paid by the government nor did I collect similar
transportation and representation Iexpenses from my

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Page 7 of 103

mother organization Bureau of Plant Industry during the

period.
Certified true copy of the original: t.hqw
(
S
G
D
.
)
R
o
d
r
i
g
o
D
u
c
u
s
i
n
(
S
i
g
n
a

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

On the face of the above documentary evidence, Exh. "A" and "D", the
liability of petitioner as head of the office who had signed the
certification and verification printed thereon must be limited to the
contents of said verification and certification for which he does not
necessarily incur criminal responsibility if the entries, data or
statements certified and verified turn out not to be true in which case
the employee or personnel making the entries, data or statements as to
his services and attendance is solely and separately responsible therefor.
In the instant case, since there is the Special Order No. 172 of Executive
Director Domingo Panganiban, concurrently BPI Director, marked Exh.
6, "Detail and Designation of BPI personnel to NFAC in connection with
the Masagana-99 Program effective January to December, 1977" listing
complainant for the assignment and detail, the inclusion of Ducusin's
name in the payroll was not irregular. Besides, the payroll is prepared by
the Budget Office based on the Special Order and not by the petitioner's
office.
According to complainant Ducusin, he was no longer connected with the
Masagana Program during the period of January to March 1977 because
his assignment thereto had been terminated. But he was asked this
question by the Sandiganbayan, thus: t.hqw
JUSTICE ESCAREAL: t.hqw
Q What evidence do you have that you
were removed in 1977 and you were no
longer performing your duties as
technician?
A It is only verbal. (TSN, p. 47, Aug. 25,
1980)

Page 8 of 103

The alleged verbal order is doubtful

e for under normal and usual official
procedure, a written special order )issued by a government office is
cancelled, amended or modified only by another written special order,
not only for purposes of record on file but also to prevent conflict and
confusion in government operations. Moreover, under the best evidence
rule, Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the supposed verbal order
cannot prevail over the written Special Order No. 172 stated above.
Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, justified the conviction of the
accused on the basis of the testimony of witness Remedios Lorenzo,
Regional Disbursing Officer and Cashier, to the effect that she delivered
the payroll and checks to petitioner accused- appellant, relying further
on the presumption that as possessor of the document, accusedappellant is presumed to have falsified it.
But reviewing the testimony of witness Lorenzo, the records disclose
that her original testimony at the reinvestigation of the case before the
Tanodbayan was favorable to the accused, saying that she delivered the
payroll and the checks to the complainant Ducusin, even Identifying the
genuine signature of Ducusin on the payroll. We quote hereunder
excerpts of her testimony: t.hqw
Prosecutor Ferrer:
Q: What is your SOP in the preparation of
timebook and payroll, do you have to sign
as Regional Disbursing Officer?
A: I don't sir. It is only the Budget Officer
who prepares the payroll. After the
budget officer has prepared it will go to
the accounting for funding and after the
accounting it will go to my office.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Q: All in all how many signatures are to be

signed in the payroll for its validity under
your standard operation procedure?

Page 9 of 103
Q: And that will be the time that the payee
will receive the amount, is that correct?
A: We prepare the check for them.

A: There are four, sir. The provincial

officer, the accountant for funding, then
the Director and after the signed it, it will
go to my office.

Q: When do the payee affix their signatures

in the payroll if you know?
A: When I will issue them the check that is
the time that they affix their signatures in
the payroll.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxxt.hqw
Q: Under your standard operating
procedure who win sign first the payroll.
The payee or the provincial plant officer?

Q: So after that the check will go back to

the Provincial Plant Officer?
A: It will not go back to the Provincial
Plant Officer.

A: Provincial plant officer.

Q: After the Provincial Plant Officer, the
payroll will go to the regional accountant,
is that correct?

Q: After the Provincial Plant Officer has

fixed his signature he has no further
participation in this payroll?
A: No more, sir.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after the Regional accountant it
will go to the Director?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after the Regional Director, it will
go to the Disbursing Officer?
A Yes, sir.

Q: Now, Mrs. Lorenzo, you also brought

with you . . . . . . . . By the way, who is
supposed to sign first this timebook and
payroll under your Standard Operation
Procedure. Is it the Provincial Plant
Officer?
A: Yes, sir. Then after that it will go to the
office of the Regional Accountant, and
after the regional accountant have signed,

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Page 10 of 103

it will go to the regional director for

approval, and from there it win go to my
office.

Q: By the way, before you answer that

question do you know personally Mr.
Rodrigo Ducusin?

Q: You are the same time cashier?

A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir. My item is Cashier I.

Q: Why do you know him?

Q: So, do you have any participation in

this Exhibit "X" by way of issuing the
check to corresponding payee in this
timebook and payroll?

A: He is also our employee in the office.

He is one of the technicians under M-99.
Q: Since when have you known Mr.
Rodrigo Ducusin ?

A: In the preparation of the check, sir.

Q: Who delivers the check to the payee?

A: I could not exactly remember, sir.

Because I have come across their names
when they got their checks from me.

A: After we have prepared the check, they

will just go to my office to get the check
and that is the nine they will affix their
signature.

Q: But before January 1977, you have

already known him?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And they sign their names after

delivering to them their respective checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you familiar with any of these
signatures appearing in this timebook and
payroll, particularly that of Mr. Ducusin?
PROSECUTOR FERRER:

Q: How long before January 1977 have

you been a cashier or Regional Disbursing
Officer?
A: I was already a cashier since 1976, July
1975.
Q: As a cashier since that time, are you f
with the signature of Mr. Ducusin?

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

A: I could not remember their signatures

because there are plenty of personnel in
the Bureau of Plant Industry.
Q: Were you the one who issued the check
to the complainant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In issuing the checks did you issue
them individually to the personnels in the
BPI?
A: Yes, sir. As soon as we pay the check to
anyone, they have to affix their signature
first.
Q: Where do you deliver the checks to the
payees?
A: In my office.
Q: At San Fernando, La Union?
A: Yes, sir.
(TSN December 21, 1979, pp. 5-14, Tanodbayan,
Emphasis supplied.)
The contradictory and conflicting testimonies of this witness only proves
her unreliability and unworthiness in respect to the sanctity of the
witness' oath. Although she tried to explain her complete "turn-about"
by saying during the Sandiganbayan hearing: "They told me that if I win
testify against them, I will be accessory and I don't want to be involved

Page 11 of 103

in the case because I am not the one really who delivered the checks to
the production technician, sir." (TSN, p. 18, Aug. 27, 1980), the
conclusion of the respondent court that she was intimidated to testify in
favor of the accused during the reinvestigation is not warranted,
considering that the witness herself is a high regional official, being the
Regional Disbursing Officer and Cashier and not subordinate to but
perhaps co-equal in rank to the petitioner and, therefore, may not be so
easily intimidated by the accused who was in no position or power to
include her as accessory in the case. Lorenzo's testimony given at the
Sandiganbayan hearing is not worthy of belief and must be rejected.
We also reject respondent court's reliance on the presumption that as
possessor of the document, the accused is presumed to be the author of
the falsification. In the first place, the factual basis which is the Lorenzo
testimony which We have reviewed as doubtful and variable, cannot be
credited. Petitioner has denied vigorously the testimony of Lorenzo that
he received the payroll and the checks from her. He said that his
participation in the preparation of the payroll ended with his signing
thereof after which the payroll goes to the Disbursing Officer for the
preparation and issuance of the checks to the payees at which time the
payee affix their signatures on the payroll, which is substantially
corroborated by the original testimony of the witness Lorenzo during
the reinvestigation of the case before the Tanodbayan.
In the second place, Exhibit "A" appears to be also signed by ten (10)
other production technicians fisted in the payroll, besides complainant
Ducusin. It is initialled by three (3) personnel in the Accounting Services
Unit and further signed by the Regional Accountant and for the Regional
Director. All of these persons were at one time or another in possession
of the document, all of them had the same opportunity impliedly
imputed to the accused, The payroll must have been carried and passed
by messengers and other employees from one office to another, from
one desk to another for purposes of typing, funding, initialling,
verification, certification, accounting, recording, drawing of the check

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

and finally, issuing of the check. In Our view, the respondent court's
reliance on the presumption which is only presumptive, is misplaced and
unwarranted, there being no sufficient reason to apply the same.
The defense contends that the prosecution, having presented xerox
copies only of the falsified documents, Exhs. "D" and "C", fatted to prove
the corpus delicti of the crime charged, citing the case of U.S. vs. Gregorio,
17 Phil. 522. In this case of Gregorio, the Supreme Court
held: t.hqw
In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is
indispensable that the judges and the courts have before
them the document alleged to have been simulated,
counterfeited or falsified, in order that they may find,
pursuant to the evidence produced at the trial, whether
or not the crime of falsification was actually committed;
in the absence of the original document, it is improper to
conclude, with only a copy of the said original in view,
that there has been a falsification of a document which
was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case,
even the existence of such original document may be
doubted.
Reacting to the defense contention, the Sandiganbayan held that
"(a)ccused's claim that in the absence of the original documents it is
improper to conclude that there is falsification of document in
accordance with the case of U.S. vs. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522, is sleazy for
the case referred to is not in point," and then attempted to differentiate
said case with the case at bar by holding that "(h)ad the issue
confronting the Court been one of alteration or superimposition of
signatures or word or figure, then the issue of bringing out the original
may have relevance. " The Sandiganbayan further added: "At any rate, it
is worthwhile to note that with the development of modem copying
devices which virtually eliminate the possibility of error in reproduction

Page 12 of 103

of the original, the relevancy of the doctrine inU.S. vs. Gregorio is now
open to question.
We do not agree with the respondent court. Firstly the Gregorio ruling
makes no distinction for the doctrine itself applies in criminal
proceedings for the falsification of a document, whether simulated,
counterfeited, or falsified. Secondly, the Gregorio doctrine is still tenable
notwithstanding modern copying devices for a falsified document,
passed off as an original can also be duplicated by xeroxing and
thereafter, certified as true copy of the original as in Exh. "D". And
thirdly, considering that in the case at bar, the xeroxing was done or
caused to be done by complainant Ducusin (TSN, pp. 189-191, Aug. 25,
1980) after taking out the original documents without the official
authority and permission of the Disbursing Officer and Cashier,
Remedios Lorenzo, who was then out on rural service and thereafter the
originals were lost, misplaced and are now missing, the failure to
present the originals is suspicious for complainant had ulterior and ill
motives in accusing the petitioner as will be shown hereunder.
The ill motives of the complainant in falsely accusing the accusedappellant is easily discernible herein. There is presented Exhibit " 1 ",
certified true copy of the information filed against complainant Rodrigo
Ducusin in Criminal Case No. A-893, CFI, Agoo, La Union, for falsification
committed on or about July 24, 1975 in relation to the grant of farmer's
loan under the Gulayan Sa Kalusugan Food Production Program when
complainant was assigned to the Agoo Rural Bank, and a similar
information for falsification against Ducusin in Criminal Case No. A-894,
Exh. "2". Referring to these two (2) cases, Ducusin declared that
petitioner Borje motivated the filing of the cases; that in the filing of the
case in the Fiscal's Office in San Fernando, La Union, there is an affidavit
of Mr. Nicasio Borje and that because of that affidavit, it was Mr. Borje
who motivated the filing of the charge against him. (TSN, pp. 26-27, Aug.
25, 1980). There is also the refusal of the petitioner to recommend
acceptance of the resignation of Ducusin until he shall have cleared

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

matters with the Rural Bank of Agoo, La Union considering that the total
amount of P52,047.73 is involved. (Exhibit "8").
The rule is established that the absence of evidence as to an improper
motive actuating the offended party and the principal prosecution
witness tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive
existed and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.
(People vs. Amiscua 37 SCRA 813; People vs. Mercado, 38 SCRA 168;
People vs. Valdemoro, 102 SCRA 170). Conversely, where there is
showing as to improper motives, as in the case at bar, the testimony of
complainant Ducusin is unworthy of faith and credit and, therefore,
deserves scant consideration. And since the prosecution theory is built
or based on such testimony, the cause of the prosecution collapses or
falls with it.
According to respondent court, its conclusion that the accused falsified
or caused to be falsified the document in question is further supported
by the following facts: (1) that the accused confessed to him that he was
the one who got the money and offered immediately to Ducusin the sum
of P225.00 to cover the incentive pay so that Ducusin will just keep
silent but Ducusin did not accept the money; and (2) that in his reply to
the letter of Ducusin denouncing the forging of his signature that he
received his incentive pay from January to March, 1977, the accused
tried to justify the falsification of the time record as shown in the portion
of said reply, Exhibit "H".
In the light of the ill-motives of the complainant as shown above, this
particular assertion of Ducusin which is uncorroborated is sleazy, that is,
flimsy, shabby, cheap or unsubstantial. Moreover, petitioner's reply
marked Exh. "H" is not an admission of the accused that he falsified or
caused to be falsified the documents in question. In fact, examining Exh.
"H", it says that "his Ducusin daily time record (was) prepared by other
employees in order to justify such payment. The authenticity of Exh. "H"
is denied by the petitioner who presented Exh. "8" as the real and

Page 13 of 103

correct copy duly received and initialed by the Regional Office, and
therein, he wrote: "I therefore deny knowledge of the alleged forgery of
the signature of Mr. Ducusin in the same payroll."
Finally, the defense puts forth the exemplary and distinguished record of
the petitioner as a public servant, having been in the government service
for more than twenty (20) years and multi-awarded and commended for
meritorious services, among them as scholar under the Colombo Plan
specializing in pest management in England; Diploma of Merit as Most
Outstanding Employee in Ilocos Sur; Award as one of the Most
Outstanding Green Revolutionist in the Philippines, 1976; and Award as
one of the Most Outstanding Bureau of Plant Industry Employees, 1978.
And citing the case of Manero vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 817
wherein the Supreme Court said: t.hqw
(T)he petitioner exhibited an exemplary record as a
policeman; he was thrice cited by his superiors for
refusing to accept a bribe, was commended for
minimizing armed robberies, was twice the recipient to
Letters of Appreciation and has been recommended for
promotion on the basis of known honesty and integrity ...
in sustaining the innocence of the accused, petitioner also prays for his
acquittal.
The record and services of the accused-appellant is, indeed praiseworthy
and commendable. But an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply
because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct if
the court believes he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved
on the basic issue of whether the prosecution has discharged its duty of
proving his guilt beyond peradventure of doubt, of convincing the court
as to the moral certainty of his guilt.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Considering that, on the whole, the evidence presented against the

accused in the case at bar is not clear, competent and convincing, and
considering further that there is jurisprudence which, by analogy,
supports the defense in U.S. vs. Balais, 17 Phil. 503 wherein We
held: t.hqw
The municipal treasurer who 'certifies that the official
payroll he signs is correct, that the services have been
rendered and the payments made as stated,' does not
pervert the truth in the narration of the facts, if the
persons certified as municipal secretary and clerk to the
municipal president were duly appointed and qualified
as such municipal secretary and clerk to the municipal
president, discharging the duties of their respective
offices, the services certified having been rendered at the
time referred to in the payroll, and both persons having
received their respective salaries from the municipal
treasurer certifying the payroll. Nor can it be taken as
proving the falsification of the document if it is
subsequently discovered that the services were really not
rendered by the aforementioned persons themselves but
by substitutes; for it is not the mission of the municipal
treasurer to take upon himself to investigate whether the
persons accredited to him as secretary and clerk, by the
municipal council and whom he, in turn, acknowledges
and pays their monthly salary, really or apparently
perform the duties of such offices,
in resume Our review of the case at bar concludes that the prosecution
failed in discharging its sworn duty to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It has not overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Consequently,
accused-appellant must be acquitted.

Page 14 of 103

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the

Sandiganbayan convicting the accused is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. We find the accused-appellant NOT GUILTY. No costs.
Judgment reversed.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Fernando, CJ., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., De Castro, Plana, Escolin, Relova
and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Aquino, Melencio-Herrera, JJ. and Teehankee, J., took no part.
Abad Santos, J., I vote to affirm the judgment of conviction for the reasons
stated by the Sandiganbayan.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Page 15 of 103

possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the
petitioner the tree that stood near the principals office. The Cardaas
averred that petitioners gross negligence and lack of foresight caused
the death of their daughter.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157906

November 2, 2006

JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner,

vs.
SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAA and ROSALITA CARDAA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review assailing the Decision1 dated October
18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412, declaring
petitioner liable for negligence that resulted in the death of Jasmin
Cardaa, a school child aged 12, enrolled in Grade 6, of San Roque
Elementary School, where petitioner is the principal. Likewise assailed is
the Resolution2 dated March 20, 2003 denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter
fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of
a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing her
instantaneous death. Thus, her parents - Dominador and Rosalita
Cardaa - filed a case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Palo, Leyte against petitioner.
The Cardaas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December
15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the

Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had
only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was
dead and rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses who
attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers
during a meeting on December 15, 1992 and assigned Remedios Palaa
to negotiate the sale.
In a Decision3 dated February 5, 1996, the trial court dismissed the
complaint for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the
part of the petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision. The
appellate court found the appellee (herein petitioner) liable for Jasmins
death, as follows:
Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
Appellee Joaquinita Capili is hereby declared liable for negligence
resulting to the death of Jasmin D. Cardaa. She is hereby ordered to
indemnify appellants, parents of Jasmin, the following amounts:
1. For the life of Jasmin D. Cardaa P50,000.00;
2. For burial expenses 15,010.00;
3. For moral damages 50,000.00;
4. For attorneys fees and litigation 10,000.00.
expenses

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SO ORDERED.4

Page 16 of 103

that moral damages should not be granted against her since there was
no fraud nor bad faith on her part.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now

comes before us submitting the following issues for our resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIS--VIS THE SET
OF FACTS STATED IN THE CHALLENGED DECISION, ERRED IN
FINDING THE PETITIONER NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE
LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2206 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AND IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES
TO THE RESPONDENTS; AND
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.5
On the other hand, respondents posit the following issue:
Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Twelfth
Division, in CA G.R. CV. No. 54412 promulgated on October 18, 2002
should be affirmed and respected, thus remain undisturbed.6
Primarily, the issue is whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the
death of Jasmin Cardaa.
Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the
tree since she had assigned her next-in-rank, Palaa, to see to its
disposal; that despite her physical inspection of the school grounds, she
did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor did
any of her 15 teachers inform her that the tree was already rotten;7 and

On the other hand, respondents insist that petitioner knew that the tree
was dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary prudent person would have done in the same
situation.
To begin, we have to point out that whether petitioner was negligent or
not is a question of fact which is generally not proper in a petition for
review, and when this determination is supported by substantial
evidence, it becomes conclusive and binding on this Court.8 However,
there is an exception, that is, when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are incongruent with the findings of the lower court.9 In our view, the
exception finds application in the present case.
The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had no
knowledge that the tree was already dead and rotting and that Lerios
merely informed her that he was going to buy the tree for firewood. It
ruled that petitioner exercised the degree of care and vigilance which
the circumstances require and that there was an absence of evidence
that would require her to use a higher standard of care more than that
required by the attendant circumstances.10 The Court of Appeals, on the
other hand, ruled that petitioner should have known of the condition of
the tree by its mere sighting and that no matter how hectic her schedule
was, she should have had the tree removed and not merely delegated the
task to Palaa. The appellate court ruled that the dead caimitotree was a
nuisance that should have been removed soon after petitioner had
chanced upon it.11
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done
from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a
situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of

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Page 17 of 103

nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in

the actors position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee
such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the
act or to do it in a more careful manner.12

tree which caused the death of respondents daughter was a result of

petitioners negligence, being in charge of the school.

The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall
and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school
principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school
grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises.
That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch
had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the
responsibility of her position.

As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the

law of negligence which recognizes thatprima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific
proof of negligence.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has
to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by
the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other
person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.13
The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of
the dead and rotting tree within the schools premises shows that the
tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for
application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of
such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must
have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.14
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption
or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting

In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court held:

The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the
mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an
inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants
part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the
thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing
or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at
least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or
some other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused
the injury complained of was under the control or management of the
defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in
the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its
control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or,
as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation
by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendants want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that
petitioners negligence is presumed once respondents established the
requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the
inference.16
Was petitioners explanation as to why she failed to have the tree
removed immediately sufficient to exculpate her?
As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance
of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its
premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of the tree calls for
an explanation on her part as to why she failed to be vigilant.
Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting
tree because Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not inform
her of its condition. Neither did any of her teachers inform her that the
tree was an imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she could not
see the immediate danger posed by the tree by its mere sighting even as
she and the other teachers conducted ground inspections. She further
argues that, even if she should have been aware of the danger, she
exercised her duty by assigning the disposition of the tree to another
teacher.
We find petitioners explanation wanting. As school principal, petitioner
is expected to oversee the safety of the schools premises.1wphi1 The
fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and
rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by
her position.

incident occurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly, she failed to check

seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had been removed.
Thus, we cannot accept her defense of lack of negligence.
Lastly, petitioner questions the award of moral damages. Moral damages
are awarded if the following elements exist in the case: (1) an injury
clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) a wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the
award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219
of the Civil Code.18However, the person claiming moral damages must
prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the
law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely
suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, and serious anxiety as the
result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably, such action must
be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill
motive.19 Under the circumstances, we have to concede that petitioner
was not motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis--vis respondents
daughters death. The award of moral damages is therefore not proper.
In line with applicable jurisprudence, we sustain the award by the Court
of Appeals of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of
Jasmin,20 and P15,010 as reimbursement of her burial expenses.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 18,
2002 and the Resolution dated March 20, 2003, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that
the award of moral damages is hereby deleted.
Costs against petitioner.

Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another

teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee.17 The record shows
that more than a month had lapsed from the time petitioner gave
instruction to her assistant Palaa on December 15, 1992, to the time the

Page 18 of 103

SO ORDERED.
Footnotes

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 19 of 103

Rollo, pp. 34-40.

16

Id. at 53.

17

CA rollo, pp. 67-73.

Id. at 260.

See Panuncio v. Icaro-Velasco, A.M. No. P-98-1279, October 7,

1998, 297 SCRA 159, 161.

Rollo, p. 39.

Quezon City Government v. Dacara, G.R. No. 150304, June 15,

2005, 460 SCRA 243, 254.

Id. at 152.

19

Id. at 169.

18

Ace Haulers Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127934,

August 23, 2000, 338 SCRA 572, 580-581.
See San Miguel Corporation v. Heirs of Sabiniano Inguito, G.R.
No. 141716, July 4, 2002, 384 SCRA 87, 104.
20

Id. at 156.

Heirs of Simeon Borlado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114118,

August 28, 2001, 363 SCRA 753, 756.
8

See Vera Cruz v. Calderon, G.R. No. 160748, July 14, 2004, 434
SCRA 534, 538-539.
9

10

Rollo, pp. 192-193.

11

Id. at 11-12.

12

65 C.J.S. 1(14), p. 462.

Child Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagorio, G.R. No. 150920,

November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 236, 242.
13

14

Id. at 244.

G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 257-258 citing
57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence 1819.
15

See People v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 157669, April 14, 2004, 427
SCRA 673, 684.
21

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171129
ENRICO SANTOS, Petitioner,
VS.
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent.
April 6, 2011
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The lessee in this case resists ejectment by the lessor on the ground that
the leased property has already been foreclosed and is now owned by a third
person.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated
September 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89464 which
recalled and set aside the Decision[2] dated April 1, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. 651-M04. Likewise assailed is the CAs Resolution[3] dated January 3, 2006 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On February 10, 2004, petitioner Enrico Santos filed a Complaint[4] for

Unlawful Detainer in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. He

Page 20 of 103

claimed therein that he is the registered owner of the property located at No.
49, National Road, Barrio Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. On January 2, 1998,
he entered into a Contract of Lease[5]with respondent National Statistics Office
for the lease of 945 square meters (sq m) of the first floor of the structure on
said property for a monthly rental of P74,000.00. Subsequently, the parties
agreed to renew the lease for a period of one year from January 1, 2003 to
December 31, 2003, covering a bigger area of the same floor for an increased
monthly rental of P103,635.00.[6] As the area leased by respondent was not
sufficient for its use, petitioner and respondent again entered into another
Contract of Lease[7] dated September 11, 2003 which covered an additional
space for a monthly rental of P45,000.00. For failing to pay despite demand the
rentals for the months of December 2003 and January 2004 in the total amount
of P297,270.00, and for its refusal to vacate the property even after the
termination of the lease contracts on December 31, 2003, petitioner sent
respondent a formal demand[8] for the latter to pay its unpaid monthly rentals
and to vacate the property. Notwithstanding receipt, respondent still refused
to pay and to vacate the property. Hence, the complaint.
In its Answer,[9] respondent through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) alleged that petitioner and his wife obtained a loan[10] from China
Banking Corporation (China Bank) in the amount of P20 million, the payment
of which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage[11] constituted over the subject
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-95719(M). It
claimed that when petitioner entered into a contract of lease with it in 1998, he
did not inform respondent of the existence of said loan. When petitioner failed
to pay his obligation with China Bank, the property was eventually sold in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale where said bank emerged as the highest
bidder. Since petitioner likewise failed to redeem the property within the
redemption period, title to the same was consolidated in favor of China Bank
and TCT No. T-370128(M) was issued in its name on August 21, 2000. Despite
this and again without informing respondent, petitioner misrepresented
himself as still the absolute owner of the subject property and entered into the
second and third contracts of lease with respondent in February and
September 2003. According to respondent, it was only in November 2003 that

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

it knew of the foreclosure of the subject property when it received a

letter[12] from China Bank informing it that as early as August 2000, title to the
property had already been effectively consolidated in the name of the
bank. Hence, China Bank advised respondent that as the new and absolute
owner of the subject property, it is entitled to the rental payments for the use
and occupancy of the leased premises from the date of
consolidation. Petitioner having ceased to be the owner of said property,
respondent believed that the second and third contracts of lease it entered with
him had ceased to be in effect. Hence, petitioner has no legal right to demand
that respondent pay him said rentals and vacate the leased
premises. Conversely, respondent has no legal obligation to pay to petitioner
the rentals for the use and occupancy of the subject property. Moreover,
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as there was no indication
that he filed a money claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) as required
by Act No. 3083[13] as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1445.[14] Lastly, respondent alleged that petitioner is without any legal
personality to institute the complaint because he is neither the owner, coowner, legal representative or assignee of China Bank, landlord or a person
entitled to the physical possession of the subject property. By way of
counterclaim, respondent asserted that petitioner is obligated under the law
and the equitable principle of unjust enrichment to return to respondent all
rental payments received, with legal interests, from August 2000 to November
2003 in the total amount of P4,113,785.00.
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court
The MTC rendered its Decision[15] on September 6, 2004. It held that
while it can provisionally resolve the issue of ownership as raised by
respondent, it did not do so because of the latters admission that it originally
leased the subject property from petitioner. According to said court, when
respondent admitted that it was a lessee of the premises owned by petitioner, it
took away its right to question petitioners title and ownership thereof. The
MTC then reiterated the well settled rule that a tenant cannot, in an action
involving the possession of leased premises, controvert the title of his

Page 21 of 103

landlord. As the evidence showed that respondent was no longer paying rents
in violation of its obligation under the second and third contracts of lease, and
since said contracts already expired and no new contract was entered into by
the parties, the MTC declared respondent a deforciant lessee which should be
ejected from the property. The dispositive portion of the MTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, ordering the latter to:
1. Vacate the premises known as No. 49 National
Road, Bagbaguin, Santa Maria, Bulacan and peacefully
surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. Pay the plaintiff rental arrearages amounting to
Two Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Two Hundred Seventy
Pesos (P297,270.00) for the period up to January 2004;
3. Pay the plaintiff the monthly amount of Seventy
Four Thousand Pesos (P74,000.00) from February 2004 up to
the time that it finally vacates the subject premises;
4. Pay the plaintiff the amount of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) as and by way of attorneys fees, and
5.
Cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence, respondent appealed to the RTC.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Respondent faulted the MTC in not resolving the issue of ownership in
order to determine who has the better right of possession. It emphasized that it

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

is not an ordinary entity which may be compelled to pay under private

contracts. As an agency of the government tasked in generating general
purpose statistics, it is bound by government auditing rules to make payments
only for validly executed contracts with persons lawfully entitled thereto. Thus,
it is necessary to ascertain the ownership of the subject property in order to
determine the person lawfully entitled to the rental payments. And as it is clear
in this case that title to the property had already been consolidated in the name
of China Bank, respondent properly paid the rentals to said bank. Respondent
argued that as between petitioner, who had ceased to have legal title to the
property, and itself, which continuously pays rentals to China Bank, it is the one
which has the better right of possession. In addition, respondent insisted that
petitioner should return the amount of P4,113,785.00 wrongfully paid to him,
with legal interest, until fully paid.

Page 22 of 103
WHEREFORE, premises [considered], the assailed
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[20]

Petitioner promptly moved for the issuance of a writ of

execution.[21] This was, however, denied by the RTC[22] in view of the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the CA through its May 5, 2005
Resolution[23] in CA-G.R. SP No. 89464 - the Petition for Review brought by
respondent before said court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On the other hand, petitioner countered that even if respondent is a

government agency, it cannot be permitted to deny his title over the property,
he being the lessor of the same. To support this, he cited Section 2(b), Rule 131
of the Rules of Court[17] and Article 1436 of the Civil Code.[18] Petitioner thus
prayed
that the RTC affirm in toto the assailed MTC Decision.
In its Decision[19] dated April 1, 2005, the RTC agreed with the MTCs
declaration that respondent is a deforciant lessee which should be ejected from
the leased premises. This was in view of the settled rule that the fact of lease
and the expiration of its terms are the only elements in an action for ejectment,
which it found to have been established in this case. According to said court, a
plaintiff need not prove his ownership and defendant cannot deny it. If
defendant denies plaintiffs ownership, he raises a question which is
unessential to the action. The RTC further held that if there was an issue of
ownership, it is a matter between China Bank and petitioner to settle in an
appropriate proceeding. Hence, the RTC found the appeal to be without
merit, viz:

Before the CA, respondent asserted that the RTC and MTC cannot turn a
blind eye on the transfer of ownership of the subject property to China
Bank. As petitioner fraudulently executed the last two lease contracts with
respondent, he having entered into the same despite knowledge that
ownership of the subject property had already passed on to China Bank, the
rule that the lessee cannot deny the title of his landlord does not apply. This is
because petitioner was no longer the owner of the leased premises at the time
of the execution of the last two contracts. Respondent also believed that said
contracts are void because to hold otherwise would be to condone the
anomalous situation of a party paying rentals to one who is no longer the
owner and who no longer has the right of possession over the leased
property. It likewise insisted that it is entitled to recover the rentals paid to
petitioner from the time ownership of the subject property was transferred to
China Bank under the principle of solutio indebiti. Lastly, respondent
emphasized that petitioner failed to first file a money claim before the COA.
Petitioner, for his part, basically reiterated the arguments he raised before
the RTC. In addition, he pointed out that the defense of ownership is being
invoked by respondent on behalf of another party, China Bank. What

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

respondent therefore would want the lower courts to do was to rule that the
subject property is owned by another person even if said person is not a party
to the ejectment case. To petitioner, this cannot be done by the lower courts,
hence, there was no error on their part when they decided not to touch upon
the issue of ownership.
It is noteworthy that before the petition was resolved, the CA first issued a
Resolution[24] dated July 15, 2005 granting respondents prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction which enjoined the enforcement of the RTCs April 1,
2005 Decision. Thereafter, the CA proceeded to decide the case and thus issued
a Decision[25] dated September 6, 2005.
In its Decision, the CA recognized the settled rule that a tenant, in an
action involving the possession of the leased premises, can neither controvert
the title of his landlord nor assert any rights adverse to that title, or set up any
inconsistent right to change the relation existing between himself and his
landlord. However, it declared that said doctrine is subject to qualification as
enunciated in Borre v. Court of Appeals[26] wherein it was held that [t]he rule
on estoppel against tenants x x x does not apply if the landlords title has
expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been defeated by a title
paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee
relationship. In view of this, the CA concluded that the RTC erred when it
relied mainly on the abovementioned doctrine enunciated under Sec. 2(b), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court and skirted away from resolving the issue of
ownership. The CA noted that respondent was able to prove that title to the
subject property has already been effectively consolidated in the name of China
Bank. Hence, it found petitioner to be in bad faith and to have acted with malice
in still representing himself to be the owner of the property when he entered
into the second and third contracts of lease with respondent. Under these
circumstances, the CA declared that respondent was justified in refusing to pay
petitioner the rents and thus, the ejectment complaint against respondent
states no cause of action.

Page 23 of 103

In addition, the CA opined that there was no landlord-tenant

relationship created between the parties because the agreements between
them are void. The element of consent is wanting considering that petitioner,
not being the owner of the subject property, has no legal capacity to give
consent to said contracts. The CA, however, denied respondents prayer for the
return of the rentals it paid to petitioner by ratiocinating that to grant the same
would be to effectively rule on the ownership issue rather than merely
resolving it for the purpose of deciding the issue on possession.
The CA disposed of the case in this wise:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition for review is GRANTED, the assailed decision
is RECALLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 651-M-04 (MTC Civil Case
No. 1708). No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[27]

Both parties moved for reconsideration[28] of the above Decision but were,
however, unsuccessful as the CA denied their motions in a Resolution[29] dated
January 3, 2006.
Undeterred, petitioner now comes to us through this Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
overturning the respective decisions of the RTC-Malolos City,

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 24 of 103

Bulacan and MTC-Sta. Maria, Bulacan which both held that a

lessor has the better right of possession over a realty.

set aside the assailed CA Decision and Resolution and to reinstate the
respective Decisions of the MTC and RTC.

II. Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals - in

resolving the issue of who between the lessor and the lessee
has better possession of the premises known as No. 49,
National Road, Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan erred in
delving on the issue of ownership in resolving the issues raised
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 89464.

Respondent, for its part, negates petitioners claim that he has not yet lost
his title to the property by emphasizing that such title has already been
effectively consolidated in the name of China Bank. And, considering that
government auditing rules preclude respondent from paying rentals to a party
not entitled thereto, it was proper for it to pay the same to the new owner,
China Bank. Moreover, respondent imputes bad faith upon petitioner for not
informing it of the change in ownership of the property and for still collecting
rental payments despite such change. Thus, respondent prays that the petition
be denied for lack of merit.

III. Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals erred

in not awarding damages to the Petitioner, the lessor of the
premises known as No. 49, National Road, Bagbaguin, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan.[30]

The Parties Arguments

Petitioner contends that the ruling in Borre does not apply to this case
because here, there is nothing to show that his title to the subject property had
expired, or had been conveyed to another, or had been defeated by a title
paramount. In fact, petitioner informs this Court that the dispute between him
and China Bank concerning the ownership of the subject property is still
pending litigation before Branch 17 of RTC-Malolos, Bulacan. Hence, petitioner
asserts that there are yet no factual and legal bases for the CA to rule that he lost
his title over the property. Besides, petitioner believes that ownership is not an
issue in actions for ejectment especially when the parties thereto are the
landlord and tenant. Moreover, petitioner contends that based on Fige v. Court
of Appeals,[31] respondent as lessee cannot be allowed to interpose a defense
against him as lessor without the former first delivering to him the leased
premises. Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to payment of damages in
the form of fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property. In sum, petitioner wants this Court to reverse and

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

The conclusive presumption found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court known as estoppel against tenants provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are
instances of conclusive presumptions:
xxxx
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that [w]hat a tenant is

estopped from denying x x x is the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that
is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

relation, the presumption will not apply.[32] Hence, the tenant may show that
the landlords title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he
is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title
paramount.[33]
Thus, we declared in Borre v. Court of Appeals[34] that:
The rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to a
qualification. It does not apply if the landlords title has
expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been
defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the
commencement of lessor-lessee relationship [VII Francisco,
The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines 87 (1973)]. In
other words, if there was a change in the nature of the title of
the landlord during the subsistence of the lease, then the
presumption does not apply. Otherwise, if the nature of the
landlords title remains as it was during the commencement of
the relation of landlord and tenant, then estoppel lies against
the tenant. (Emphasis supplied.)

While petitioner appears to have already lost ownership of the

property at the time of the commencement of the tenant-landlord relationship
between him and respondent, the change in the nature of petitioners title, as
far as respondent is concerned, came only after the commencement of such
relationship or during the subsistence of the lease. This is precisely because at
the time of the execution of the second and third contracts of lease, respondent
was still not aware of the transfer of ownership of the leased property to China
Bank. It was only in November 2003 or less than two months before the
expiration of said contracts when respondent came to know of the same after it
was notified by said bank. This could have been the reason why respondent
did not anymore pay petitioner the rents for the succeeding months of
December 2003 and January 2004. Thus, it can be said that there was a change
in the nature of petitioners title during the subsistence of the lease that the rule

Page 25 of 103

on estoppel against tenants does not apply in this case. Petitioners reliance on
said conclusive presumption must, therefore, necessarily fail since there was no
error on the part of the CA when it entertained respondents assertion of a title
adverse to petitioner.
We also find untenable petitioners argument that respondent cannot
assert ownership of the property by a third person considering that China
Bank, as such third person, is not a party to the ejectment case. As earlier said, a
tenant in proper cases such as this, may show that the landlords title has been
conveyed to another. In order to do this, the tenant must essentially assert that
title to the leased premises already belongs to a third person who need not be a
party to the ejectment case. This is precisely what respondent was trying to do
when it endeavored to establish that the property is now owned by China
Bank.
From the above discussion, it is not difficult to see that the question of
possession is so intertwined with the question of ownership to the effect that
the question of possession cannot be resolved without resolving the question of
ownership. This is the reason why we are upholding the CAs resolution of the
issue of ownership in this ejectment case. It bears emphasizing that in
ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the party litigants.[35] However, [i]n cases where defendant raises the
question of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the court may proceed
and resolve the issue of ownership but only for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession. [Nevertheless], the disposition of the issue of ownership is
not final, as it may be the subject of separate proceeding[s] specifically brought
to settle the issue.[36] Hence, the fact that there is a pending case between
petitioner and China Bank respecting the ownership of the property does not
preclude the courts to rule on the issue of ownership in this case.
Paragraph 3 of the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer states that
petitioner is the registered owner of the property located at No. 49, National

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Road, Barrio Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[37] It is in fact by virtue of this

alleged ownership that he entered into contracts of lease with respondent and
was ejecting the latter by reason of the expiration of said contracts. However,
we note that petitioner, as plaintiff in the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer,
failed to discharge his burden of showing that he indeed owned the property.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he
must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.[38] On the
other hand, respondent has satisfactorily shown that title to the property has
already been conveyed to China Bank. It submitted the following documents:
(1) the Promissory Note[39] executed by petitioner and his spouse in favor of
China Bank for a loan of P20 million and the (Real Estate) Mortgage[40] over the
subject property; (2) the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of said Real
Estate Mortgage;[41] (3) the Notice of Auction Sale By Notary Public, Certificate
of Posting, Affidavit of Publication and Certificate of Sale in favor of China
Bank,[42] all in connection with the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the leased
premises; (4) the Affidavit of Consolidation[43] executed by China Banks VicePresident to inform the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan that the oneyear period of redemption has expired without petitioner redeeming the
property and to request said office to issue the corresponding TCT under the
banks name; and (5) TCT No. T-370128 (M)[44] issued on August 21, 2000 in
the name of China Bank covering the leased property. Said documents,
particularly TCT No. T-370128 (M), undeniably show that China Bank is the
owner of the property and not petitioner. As a matter of law, a Torrens
Certificate of Title is evidence of indefeasible title of property in favor of the
person in whose name the title appears. The title holder is entitled to all the
attributes of ownership of the property, including possession, subject only to
limits imposed by law.[45] Not being the registered titleholder, we hold that
petitioner does not have a better right of possession over the property as
against respondent who is in actual possession thereof and who claims to
derive its right of possession from the titleholder, China Bank, to whom it pays
rents for its use. Hence, petitioners action for unlawful detainer must fail. This
being settled, it is obvious that petitioner is likewise not entitled to payment of

Page 26 of 103

damages for the fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
September 6, 2005 and Resolution dated January 3, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89464 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[1]

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]

[11]
[12]
[13]

[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]

CA rollo, pp. 125-133; penned by Associate Justice Conrado M.

Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca De GuiaSalvador and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.
Records, pp.167-169; penned by Judge Alexander P. Tamayo.
CA rollo, p.158.
Records, pp. 1-5.
Id. at 6-12.
Id. at 13-17.
Id. at 18-23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 26-37.
See the corresponding Promissory Note dated January 31, 1997, id.
at 39.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 52-53.
AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED.
Approved on March 16, 1923.
GOVERNMENT AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Records, pp. 131-133.
Id. at 133.
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions:

Law 126 Evidence

[18]

[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]

[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]

[34]
[35]

[36]

[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]

Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

xxxx
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord
at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.
Art. 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to
the thing leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.
Records, pp. 167-169.
Id. at 169.
See petitioners Motion for Execution, id. at 171-174.
See RTCs Order dated May 23, 2005, id. at 288.
CA rollo, pp. 89-90.
Id. at 105-107.
Id. at 125-133.
242 Phil 345, 352 (1988).
CA rollo, p. 132.
See petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, id. at 134-136 and
respondents Motion for Partial Reconsideration, id. at 139-147.
Id. at 158.
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
G.R. No. 107951, June 30, 1994, 233 SCRA 586, 590.
HERRERA, REMEDIAL LAW, Volume VI, 1999 Ed., p. 49.
Id.; FRANCISCO, BASIC EVIDENCE, 1992 Ed., p. 35 citing 1 Jones on
Evidence, pp. 530-532.
Supra note 26 at 352.
Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc., G.R. No. 163495, May 8,
2009, 587 SCRA 442, 447.
Dela Rosa v. Roldan, G.R. No. 133882, September 5, 2006, 501 SCRA
34, 53.
Records, p. 1.
Umpoc v. Mercardo, 490 Phil. 118, 135 (2005).
Records, p. 95.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 101-105.

[43]
[44]
[45]

Page 27 of 103

Id. at 107-108.
Id. at 106.
Madrid v. Mapoy, G.R. No. 150887, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 14,
25-26.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 28 of 103

EN BANC
The Complaint
A.M. No. P-07-2358 (Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-138-MTC)
ISABEL D. MARQUEZ, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Caba, La
Union,
Complainant,
VS.
JOCELYN C. FERNANDEZ, Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Caba,
La Union,
Respondent.
October 19, 2010
DECISION

PER CURIAM:

We resolve the present administrative complaint dated

December 10, 2004[1] brought by Isabel D. Marquez (Marquez),
Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Caba, La Union against
Stenographer Jocelyn C. Fernandez (Fernandez) of the same court,
for frequent unauthorized absences or tardiness, and falsification
of public document. The complaint was filed with Executive Judge
Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim (Judge Molina-Alim), First Judicial
Region, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union.
The facts, well set out in the memorandum/report of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) dated May 10, 2007,[2] are summarized
below.

Marquez alleged that Fernandezs daily time records (DTRs)

from September to November 2004 showed that she had incurred
tardiness/undertime almost everyday. In a memorandum she issued on
October 3, 2004, Marquez asked Fernandez to explain her
tardiness/undertimes. She answered she had health problems due to
her fractured arm. Marquez sent Fernandez another memorandum
dated November 2, 2004,[3] but received no reply; a second
memorandum dated December 1, 2004[4] merited a reply where
Fernandez again claimed that she was having health problems.
Marquez found Fernandezs explanation unsatisfactory; he
dismissed it as a half-truth that does not justify her frequent
tardiness/undertime as Fernandez looked strong and healthy. She
claimed that Fernandez was often seen roaming the courts premises
and the municipal hall where their office is located.
Additionally, the clerk of court alleged that Fernandez incurred
unauthorized absences for three (3) months or from September to
November 2004.[5] Marquez noted that while Fernandez indicated in her
DTRs that she was on vacation leave, there were no prior notices for the
leaves as required by the rules.
In November 2004, Fernandez submitted a medical certificate
stating that she was treated at the Ilocos Training and Regional Medical
Center[6], San Fernando City, La Union on November 5, November 22 to
26; and November 30, 2004 and need medical attention for 20
days. Verification with the hospital however, revealed that Fernandez
was examined and treated at the hospital only on November 5,
2004.[7] It was obvious that Fernandez introduced details which were
not in the original certification the hospital issued on November 26,
2004.

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Fernandezs Answer
In a memorandum dated December 14, 2004, Judge Molina-Alim
directed Fernandez to answer the complaint.[8]
Fernandez submitted her answer on February 1, 2005.[9] She
expressed dismay that Marquez could not understand the reason behind
her frequent tardiness and undertimes, as well as her absences. She
explained that it was due to mental anxiety arising from her medical
problems, brought about by the bone fracture in her lower left arm that
caused her extreme pain and mental stress. She sought treatment at the
Ilocos Training and Regional Medical Center, but the treatment was not
successful as she developed an infection and was cautioned that her arm
might require amputation if the infection spread. She was told it could
even be fatal. She claimed that she pleaded with Marquez to excuse her
from reporting for work until she had fully recovered, but Marquez
ignored her plea.
On the alleged falsification of her medical certificate, Fernandez
admitted that she had herself examined and treated on November 5,
2004, for which she was given a medical certificate for that day only. She
claimed that Marquez insisted that the certificate be changed to indicate
the specific days covering her healing period. For this reason, she
returned to the medical center, but her attending physician was not
around at the time; the nurse on duty at the orthopedic department of
the center named Rose told her to just type on the certificate the
period when she was getting medical attention and this could be signed
later on; she carried out the nurses suggestion, but because of
Marquezs pressure on her to submit the certification, she forgot to have
the certificate signed by the nurse before submitting the document to
Marquez.
Marquezs Reply

Page 29 of 103

Fernandezs answer elicited a quick reply from Marquez.[10] She

stressed that while there is no doubt that Fernandezs problem is
medical in nature in light of the bone fracture she suffered, it was
inconceivable that, she was in pain and suffering from anxiety from July
to December 2004 considering that, she received reports that Fernandez
was just gallivanting around Caba, La Union on the days that she was
absent; also, upon verification, the hospital where Fernandez was
treated had given her the information that Fernandez had refused to
obey and had neglected orders for the proper treatment of her bone
fracture. Marquez believed that Fernandezs claim of constant pain and
mental anxiety was simply a pretext to justify her frequent tardiness and
habitual absenteeism. In a span of six (6) months, Marquez pointed out,
Fernandez incurred ninety-three and a half (93 ) days of absences.
On the issue of falsification of a public document, Marquez noted
that a comparison of the copy of the medical certificate issued by the
Ilocos Training and Regional Medical Center and the one Fernandez
submitted showed the insertions Fernandez made in her copy of the
certificate, thus making her liable for falsification.
Judge Molina-Alims Investigation
Judge Molina-Alim conducted her own investigation of the
complaint and upon its conclusion rendered a Resolution (dated
February 28, 2006).[11] The judge found Fernandez liable for: (1)
absenteeism and tardiness and, (2) falsification of a public
document. Judge Molina-Alim recommended that Fernandez be
dismissed from the service for falsification of her medical certificate, the
penalty of six (6) months for habitual absenteeism and tardiness being
mooted by the penalty of dismissal.
Judge Molina-Alim referred her resolution, together with the
case records, to the OCA for action.[12]

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

The OCA Evaluation and Related Incidents

The OCA concurred with Judge Molina-Alims recommendation that
Fernandez be held liable as charged. However, it recommended that
Fernandez be merely suspended for one year without pay. It regarded
Fernandezs medical problems and her admission of guilt as factors
mitigating her liability. It also recommended that the complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative matter.
On July 11, 2007, the Court resolved to: (1) take note of the
submission of the parties; (2) re-docket the present complaint as a
regular administrative matter; and (3) require the parties to manifest if
they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
records.[13] The Court also noted the OCA report of May 10, 2007.[14]
On October 17, 2007, Marquez submitted the case for
resolution.[15] Fernandez failed to do so, notwithstanding the Courts
reiteration of its directive, prompting the Court to dispense with her
manifestation.[16]
The Courts Ruling
Except for the imposable sanction, we adopt the OCA
evaluation whose relevant portions we quote with approval, as follows:
The crux of the charge against respondent
Fernandez is her habitual tardiness and absenteeism, and
falsification of public document or dishonesty. Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998
provides that:
Any employee shall be considered
habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness,

Page 30 of 103
regardless of the member of minutes, ten
(10) times a month for at least two
consecutive months during the year.
Under Memorandum Circular No. 4, Series of
1991, of the Civil Service Commission, an officer or
employee in the civil service shall be considered
habitually absent if he incurs unauthorized absences
exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credits
under the leave law for at least three (3) months in a
semester or at least three (3) consecutive months during
the year.
Clearly, respondent Fernandez had violated the
rule on tardiness and absenteeism. As held by the Court
in A.M. No. 00-06-09-SC, moral obligation, performance
of household chores, traffic problems, health conditions,
domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient
reasons to excuse habitual tardiness. By being habitually
tardy, employees have fallen short of the stringent
standard of conduct demanded from everyone connected
with the administration of justice. By reason of the
nature and functions of their office, officials and
employees of the Judiciary must be role models in the
faithful observance of the constitutional canon that
public office is a public trust.
Respondent Fernandezs failure to notify her
office of her absences is sufficient cause to discipline
her. The Civil Service Rules require that in case of
absence because of sickness, the employee is required to
give a notice of absence because to the immediate
supervisor and/or the agency head. Since application for
leave is filed after the absent employee returns to work,

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

the office concerned should at least be properly notified

of the absence due to an illness.
The facts and evidence, coupled with
respondents admission, sufficiently established her
culpability. Respondents use of a false medical
certificate constitutes an act of dishonesty under Civil
Service Rules. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and
falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses
warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon
commission of the first offense.
Unauthorized absences are punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one day to one year for
the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the
second offense with the degree of absenteeism and
tardiness which would merit the supreme penalty of
dismissal characterized as frequent habitual and
unauthorized. By her habitual absenteeism respondent
has caused inefficiency in the public service.
We have no doubt that Fernandez deserves to be
sanctioned. Her habitual tardiness and absenteeism, coupled with her
submission of a falsified document to cover up some of her absences, do
not speak well of her fitness for employment in the public service,
especially in the judiciary. While she had injured her arm and the injury
caused her attendance problems, there were indications that not all
these problems were traceable to her injuries.
Marquez, for instance, revealed that for a three-month period
(September to November), she reported for work on time only twice and
was on unauthorized absence several times although she was seen at
these times at the court premises and at the municipal hall where the

Page 31 of 103

court is located;[17] Marquez also received reports that she was just
gallivanting around the town and in Caba, La Union on the days she
was absent.[18] To recall, in a span of six (6) months, Fernandez incurred
ninety-three and a half days of absences, or almost 50% of the time
Fernandez made her situation worse by making it appear that
she
stayed for treatment of her arm injury in the hospital for several
days. The copy of the medical certificate issued by the Ilocos Training
and Regional Medical Center showed that Fernandez was
seen/examined treated in this hospital on November 5, 2004. The copy
Fernandez submitted to Marquez stated that Fernandez was
seen/examined/treated in this hospital on November 5, 2004 to
November 22 to 26 in 30/04.[19] The entry, 22 to 26 in 30/04[20] was
inserted in the original certificate after its issuance a falsification for
which only Fernandez could have been responsible. She explained that it
was the nurse Rose, in the hospital who made the insertion. It was a
lame excuse. It could not have been Rose who did it. The insertion was
typed with a font smaller than the typed entries in the certificate issued
by the hospital. Whether it was Fernandez who falsified the document
or somebody else upon her behest is not established in the record. This
hanging question, however, is not enough to exculpate Fernandez. Upon
proof of a submitted falsified document, she carried the burden of
proving that she did not commit the serious administrative offense of
dishonesty. Although the falsification itself may not be enough basis to
sanction Fernandez for lack of definitive proof that she did it, we cannot
ignore the gross dishonesty involved in her submission of a falsified
document to cover up several unauthorized absences. This reason
prevents us from approving the OCA recommendation to accord her
leniency and to impose on her a lesser penalty. Dishonesty, as we said
in Office of the Court Administrator v. Bermejo,[21] is a serious offense
which reflects a persons character and exposes the moral decay which
virtually destroys his honor, virtue and integrity. Due to her dishonest
act, Fernandez has become unfit to remain in the judiciary.

Law 126 Evidence

Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Under Civil Service Rules, dishonesty is classified as a grave

offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense.[22] Quite obviously,
the penalty imposable for habitual tardiness and absenteeism is
subsumed to the penalty of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Ms. Jocelyn C. Fernandez,
Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Caba, La Union is found GUILTY OF
HABITUAL
TARDINESS, ABSENTEEISM and DISHONESTY, and
is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except
earned leaves, if any.
SO ORDERED.

On leave.
Rollo, pp, 82-83.
[2] Id. at 141-146.
[3] Id. at 85.
[4] Id. at 87.
[5] Id. at 86 and 90.
[6] Id. at 92.
[7] Id. at 94.
[8] Id. at 99.
[9] Id. at 102-104; memo to Judge Molina-Alim dated January 26, 2005.
[10] Id. at 114-115; memo to Judge Molina-Alim dated February 2, 2005.
[11] Id. at 2-17.
[12] Id. at 1.
[13] Id. at 149.
[14] Supra note 2.
[15] Id. at 151.
[16] Id. at 157; resolution dated September 8, 2008.
[17] Supra note 1, at 82, last paragraph.
[18] Id. at 114, penultimate paragraph.
[19] Supra note 7.
*

[1]

Page 32 of 103

Supra note 6.
A.M. No. P-05-2004, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 219.
[22] UNIFORM RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL
SERVICE, Section 52 A(1).
[20]
[21]

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

FIRST DIVISION

Page 33 of 103

mortgage[6] executed by respondents in favor of petitioner. The real

estate mortgages were constituted on parcels of land, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 201334 and 205596, in
respondents names. When respondents defaulted in the payment of
their loans by the latter part of 1999, petitioner initiated before the
notary public extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged
properties, pursuant to Act No. 3135, also known as An Act to Regulate
the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real
Estate Mortgages, as amended.

G.R. No. 176212

CENTURY SAVINGS BANK,
Petitioner,
VS.
SPOUSES DANILO T. SAMONTE and ROSALINDA M. SAMONTE,
Respondents.

Section 3 of Act No. 3135 provides for the following pre-requisites

for an extrajudicial sale:

October 20, 2010

SEC. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of
the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three
public places of the municipality or city where the
property is situated, and if such property is worth more
than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be
published once a week for at least three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality or city.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] dated

July 7, 2006 and the Resolution[2] dated January 10, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85730. The Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the Decision[3] dated May 30, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, City of Makati, Branch 58 (Makati RTCBranch 58), in Civil Case No. 01-1564, which dismissed for lack of merit
the Complaint[4] for the annulment of an extrajudicial foreclosure filed by
herein respondent spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda M. Samonte
against herein petitioner Century Savings Bank.

Hence, petitioner caused the publication of a Notice of

dated November 12, 1999, prepared by Notary Public Enriqueto I.
Magpantay (Magpantay), in the Challenger News a weekly newspaper
of general circulation on November 15, 22, and 29, 1999.[8] The
published Notice of Sale stated:
Sale[7]

NOTICE OF SALE
The present controversy stemmed from the two loans, in the
aggregate amount of Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P3,500,000.00), extended by petitioner to respondents. Each loan was
secured by a promissory note[5] and deed of real estate

Upon extrajudicial petition for sale under Act 3135,

as amended by Act 4118, filed by CENTURY SAVINGS
BANK, mortgagee, against SPOUSES DANILO T.

Law 126 Evidence

Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

SAMONTE AND ROSALINDA N. SAMONTE, mortgagors,

with residence and postal address at No. 7142 M.
Ocampo St., Pio del Pilar, Makati City, to satisfy the
mortgaged indebtedness, which, as [of] October 15, 1999,
amounts to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR PESOS AND
62/100 (P4,580,594.62) excluding penalties, interest,
and charges accruing from October 15, 1999 and
attorneys fees, legal fees and expenses for the
foreclosure and sale, the undersigned Notary Public for
Makati City will sell at PUBLIC AUCTION to the highest
bidder FOR CASH and in Philippine Currency, on
December 9, 1999 at 10:00 oclock in the morning, or
soon thereafter, at the main entrance of the City Hall of
Makati, the following described real estate properties,
together with all the improvement existing thereon to
wit:
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. 201334
REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR
CITY OF MAKATI
xxxx
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. 205596
REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR
CITY OF MAKATI[9]

Notary Public Magpantay also attested in a Certificate of

dated December 9, 1999, as follows:

Posting[10]

Page 34 of 103

CERTIFICATE OF POSTING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on the 15th day of
November 1999, I have caused the posting of three (3)
copies of Notice of Sale over the real estate properties
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 201334 and
205596 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Makati in
three (3) conspicuous places in Makati City, as required
by law.
Makati City, December 9, 1999.[11]

The public auction sale took place as scheduled on December 9,

1999, with petitioner as the winning and highest bidder. Notary Public
Magpantay subsequently issued on January 6, 2000 a Certificate of
Sale,[12] covering the subject properties, in favor of petitioner. This
Certificate of Sale mentioned, among other things, that the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties was only a partial
satisfaction of respondents total outstanding financial obligations to
petitioner. Consequently, on March 15, 2000, petitioner filed a
complaint against respondents for the collection of the deficiency of
their loans, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 67842 before the RTCBranch 263 of the City of Pasig.[13]
Sometime in 2001, the parties executed a Contract of
Lease[14] whereby petitioner leased one of the foreclosed properties to
respondents for a period of one year, from January 16, 2001 to January
16, 2002. It was acknowledged in said contract that petitioner acquired
the real property subject of the lease as the highest and winning bidder
in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, conducted pursuant to Act No. 3135,
as amended; that petitioner was in the process of consolidating its title
over the said real property as the redemption period expired without

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

respondents having exercised their right of redemption; and that

respondents had recognized the valid and legal right of petitioner as the
absolute owner of the leased real property. Petitioner eventually
consolidated its titles to the foreclosed properties. As a result, new
certificates of title, TCT Nos. 21780 and 21781,[15] were issued in the
name of petitioner.
A few months later, respondents filed a Complaint dated October
22, 2001, seeking the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of
their real properties. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 011564 and raffled to the Makati RTC-Branch 58. Among respondents
contentions was that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings initiated
by petitioner failed to comply with the posting requirements under
Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended. On the other hand, petitioner
insisted that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was duly conducted in
accordance with law.
The Makati RTC-Branch 58, after trial, rendered a Decision on May
30, 2005 dismissing respondents Complaint in Civil Case No. 011564. The trial court found that the Notice of Sale appears to have been
posted for twenty days before the scheduled public auction, as stated in
the Notary Publics Certificate of Posting;[16] and that even if the posting
requirement was not complied with, the publication of the Notice of Sale
in a newspaper of general circulation already satisfied the notice
requirement under Act No. 3135, as amended. The trial court added that
under the equitable principle of estoppel, respondents were precluded
from impugning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
as they already acknowledged the same in their 2001 Contract of Lease
with petitioner. The Makati RTC-Branch 58 decreed in the end,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing [herein respondents] Complaint for lack of merit.[17]
Respondents appeal before the Court of Appeals of the
aforementioned judgment of the Makati RTC-Branch 58 was docketed as

Page 35 of 103

CA-G.R. CV No. 85730. In its Decision dated July 7, 2006, the Court of
Appeals adjudged that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were
fatally defective because the Certificate of Posting failed to state that the
Notice of Sale was posted for twenty (20) days before the sale in at least
three (3) public places of the city where the properties sought to be
foreclosed [were] situated;[18] and that petitioner failed to satisfactorily
refute respondents contention that there was no faithful compliance
with the mandate of the law on the posting of the Notice of Sale. The
appellate court also held that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the notary publics duties did not apply because
petitioner did not present Notary Public Magpantay to testify on the
circumstances involving the posting of the Notice of Sale. The appellate
court lastly ruled that the principle of estoppel could not validate an act
prohibited by law, and so the Contract of Lease between petitioner and
respondents did not ratify a null and void extrajudicial foreclosure
sale. The Court of Appeals disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 30, 2005 is SET ASIDE and a
new one is entered annulling the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale of [herein respondents] properties
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
201334 and 205596 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City.[19]

Petitioner comes before this Court via the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari asserting that notices of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of respondents mortgaged properties were duly posted,
in compliance with Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended. Although
Notary Public Magpantays Certificate of Posting did not exactly state
that the notices of sale were posted for not less than twenty days and
in at least three public places where the properties sought to be
foreclosed were situated[,] the said certificate, nonetheless, affirmed

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

that copies of the Notice of Sale were posted on November 15, 1999 in
three (3) conspicuous places in Makati City. Since the public auction of
the mortgaged properties was held on December 9, 1999, the copies of
the Notice of Sale had been posted in three public places for 24 days,
even more than the 20 days required by law. The Certificate of
Posting prima facie proved compliance with the required posting of the
notices of sale, thus, the testimony of the notary public who issued the
certificate was not necessary in the absence of proof that irregularities
attended the performance of his duties.
Petitioner argues in the alternative that the publication of the
notice of sale already constitutes sufficient compliance with the notice
requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended. The absence of actual
posting of the notice of sale, or the lack of or defect in the certificate of
posting, should not invalidate a public auction when the same notice of
sale had been published. In this case, it is undisputed that the Notice of
Sale was duly published in the Challenger News.
Petitioner also posits that the facts of the case are
undisputed. There is no question that Notary Public Magpantay
conducted the foreclosure proceedings involving respondents
properties, and that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale took place. Such
proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity. The chief issue
involved in the case at bar is a question of law arising from the foregoing
undisputed facts, specifically, [s]hould the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
be declared invalid because the Certificate of Posting merely states that
the Notice of Sale was posted on 15 November 1999 in three
conspicuous places in Makati City. Petitioner submits that since it was
respondents who instituted the action for annulment of foreclosure, the
burden of proof is upon them to prove the invalidity of the foreclosure
proceedings for non-compliance with the law.
Respondents conclude that the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding was correctly nullified by the appellate court. Respondents

Page 36 of 103

counter that per Notary Public Magpantays Certificate of Posting, the

Notice of Sale was posted for only one day as said certificate failed to
state the duration of the posting prior to the public auction. Also, the
Notice of Sale referred to conspicuous places, which are not the same
as the public places required by law. Respondents maintain that the
law requires both posting and publication of the notice of sale, and that
the question of whether there had been actual compliance with the legal
requirements for a valid foreclosure sale is a question of fact not proper
for determination at this stage of the case.
The Court finds the instant Petition meritorious.
In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,[20] the Court elucidated on
the distinction between questions of law and fact:
The distinction between questions of law and
questions of fact is settled. A question of law exists when
the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a
certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though
this delineation seems simple, determining the true
nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes
problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume
that all cases where the facts are not in dispute
automatically involve purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is
capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or

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Prof. Avena

relevance of surrounding circumstances and their

relation to each other, the issue in that query is
factual. Our ruling in Paterno v. Paterno [G.R. No.
63680, 23 March 1990, 183 SCRA 630] is illustrative on
this point:
Such questions as whether certain
items of evidence should be accorded
probative value or weight, or rejected as
feeble or spurious, or whether or not the
proofs on one side or the other are clear
and convincing and adequate to establish
a proposition in issue, are without doubt
questions of fact. Whether or not the body
of proofs presented by a party, weighed
and analyzed in relation to contrary
evidence submitted by adverse party,
may be said to be strong, clear and
convincing; whether or not certain
documents presented by one side should
be accorded full faith and credit in the
face of protests as to their spurious
character by the other side; whether or
not inconsistencies in the body of proofs
of a party are of such gravity as to justify
refusing to give said proofs weight all
these are issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts
alleged by petitioners. But this situation does not
automatically transform all issues raised in the petition
into questions of law. The issues must meet the tests
outlined in Paterno.[21]

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 37 of 103

The main issue in the case at bar is whether the extrajudicial

foreclosure sale of respondents mortgaged properties was valid. The
resolution of said issue, however, is dependent on the answer to the
question of whether the legal requirements on the notice of sale were
complied with. Necessarily, the Court must review the evidence on
record, most especially, Notary Public Magpantays Certificate of Posting,
to determine the weight and probative value to accord the same. Noncompliance with the requirements of notice and publication in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual issue. The resolution thereof by
the lower courts is binding and conclusive upon this Court. However,
this rule is subject to exceptions, as when the findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are in conflict. Also, it must be noted that noncompliance with the statutory requisites could constitute a jurisdictional
defect that would invalidate the sale.[22]
After a review of the evidence on record, the Court declares that the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of respondents properties is valid, having
complied with the legal requirements for the same.
It is an elementary rule that the burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.[23] In Cristobal v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court explicitly ruled that
foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity and that
the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of
proving such fact, to wit:
Further, as respondent bank asserts, a
mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the
burden of establishing that fact. Petitioners failed in
this regard. Foreclosure proceedings have in their
favor the presumption of regularity and the burden

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

of evidence to rebut the same is on the

petitioners. As well said by the respondent appellate
court:
". . . Under the circumstances, there is a
basis for presuming that official duty has
been regularly performed by the sheriff.
Being a disputable presumption, the same
is valid unless controverted by evidence.
The presumption has not been rebutted
by any convincing and substantial
evidence by the appellee who has the
onus to present evidence that appellant
has not complied with the posting
requirement of the law. In the absence
therefore of any proof to the contrary, the
presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed stays."[25] (Emphases
supplied.)

In this case, it was respondents who instituted Civil Case No. 011564 seeking the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure of their
mortgaged properties on the ground of non-compliance with the
requirements of the law on the posting of the notices of sale. Thus, the
burden falls upon respondents to prove the fact of non-compliance; but
respondents miserably failed in this regard. Respondents did not
present any evidence at all to establish that the notices of sale were not
posted as required under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as
amended. Instead, respondents merely focused on
how Notary
Public Magpantays Certificate of Posting was worded, and emphasized
on technicalities and semantics.

Page 38 of 103

Respondents insist that the phrase on the 15th day of November

1999, I have caused the posting of three (3) copies of Notice of Sale in
the Certificate of Posting meant that Notary Public Magpantay posted the
notices for only one day, i.e., on November 15, 1999. This is a rather
specious interpretation of the aforequoted phrase. It is more logical and
reasonable to understand the same phrase as to mean that the notices
were posted beginning November 15, 1999 until the issuance of the
certificate on December 9, 1999. There is also no basis to require the
notary publics certificate to exactly state that the notices of sale were
posted at public places. Notary Public Magpantays use of the words
conspicuous places in his certificate already satisfactorily complies
with the legal requirement for posting. The adjective public may refer
to that which is exposed to general view, and conspicuous is a
synonym thereof.[26]
Moreover, it bears to stress that the Certificate of Posting is
actually evidence presented by the petitioner to establish that copies of
the Notice of Sale were indeed posted as required by Act No. 3135, as
amended. Without presenting their own evidence of the alleged lack of
posting, respondents contented themselves with challenging the
contents of said certificate. As plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 01-1564,
respondents must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the petitioners.[27]
In addition, despite any defect in the posting of the Notice of Sale,
the Court reiterates its ruling in previous jurisprudence that the
publication of the same notice in a newspaper of general circulation is
already sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law.
In Olizon v. Court of Appeals,[28] the Court expounded on the
purpose for giving notice of the foreclosure sale; and if such purpose
could be attained by publication alone, then the absence of actual
posting should not nullify the sale. Thus:

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Prof. Avena

We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper

publications have more far-reaching effects than posting
on bulletin boards in public places. There is a greater
probability that an announcement or notice published in
a newspaper of general circulation, which is distributed
nationwide, shall have a readership of more people than
that posted in a public bulletin board, no matter how
strategic its location may be, which caters only to a
limited few. Hence, the publication of the notice of
sale in the newspaper of general circulation alone is
more than sufficient compliance with the noticeposting requirement of the law. By such publication, a
reasonably wide publicity had been effected such that
those interested might attend the public sale, and the
purpose of the law had been thereby subserved.
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the
public of the nature and condition of the property to
be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the
sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing
bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If
these objects are attained, immaterial errors and
mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice;
but if mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of
sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead
bidders, to depreciate the value of the property, or to
prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or
omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice,
and also to the sale made pursuant thereto.
In the instant case, the aforesaid objective was
attained since there was sufficient publicity of the sale
through the newspaper publication. There is completely
no showing that the property was sold for a price far

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 39 of 103
below its value as to insinuate any bad faith, nor was
there any showing or even an intimation of collusion
between the sheriff who conducted the sale and
respondent bank. This being so, the alleged noncompliance with the posting requirement, even if
true, will not justify the setting aside of the
sale.[29] (Emphases supplied.)

Olizon squarely applies in this case. It is not disputed that the

Notice of Sale was duly published in a newspaper of general circulation
once a week for three consecutive weeks. Respondents did not allege,
much less prove, any mistake or omission in the published Notice of Sale
calculated to deter or mislead bidders, depreciate the value of the
property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price; or sale of the
mortgaged properties for a price far below their value as to insinuate
bad faith; or collusion between Notary Public Magpantay, who
conducted the sale, and petitioner. Hence, the alleged non-compliance
with the posting requirement, even if true, shall not justify the setting
aside of the foreclosure sale.
Finally, the Court agrees with the RTC that respondents are already
estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale, after
entering into a Contract of Lease with petitioner over one of the
foreclosed properties. The title of the landlord is a conclusive
presumption as against the tenant or lessee. According to Section 2(b),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, [t]he tenant is not permitted to deny the
title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them. The juridical relationship between
petitioner as lessor and respondents as lessees carries with it a
recognition of the lessors title. As lessees, then respondents are
estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only
in themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in
possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to
the landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be
asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to
his title.[30]

Page 40 of 103

City of Makati, Branch

is REINSTATED. No costs.

58, in Civil

Case

No.

01-1564,

SO ORDERED.
The Court quotes with approval the following findings of the RTC:
Further, this Court upholds the validity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding under the equitable
principle of estoppel. [Herein respondents] admitted
execution of the Contract of Lease alone establishes that
they do not have any cause of action or are estopped
from impugning the validity of the subject extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings. In the Contract of Lease,
[respondents] clearly acknowledge that the subject
extrajudicial foreclosure sale was conducted in
accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended; that they
failed to redeem the foreclosed properties within the
redemption period; and that [petitioner] has valid and
legal right and title as absolute owner of the foreclosed
properties. [Respondents] failed to mention or question
the validity of the Contract of Lease in their
Complaint. There being no evidence presented that
[respondents] executed the Contract of Lease by mistake
or through violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
fraud, [respondents] are bound by the stipulations
therein and to the consequences thereof.[31]

*
[1]

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 7, 2006 and the
Resolution dated January 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 85730 are SET ASIDE and the Decision dated May 30,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,

[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]

Per Raffle dated October 20, 2010.

Rollo, pp. 40-50; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E.
Veloso with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and
Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court), concurring.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 166-176.
Id. at 76-91.
Id. at 126-127.
Id. at 128-132.
Id. at 153-154.
Id. at 155-162.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id. at 150-151.
Id. at 123-125.
Id. at 99-102.
Id. at 104-105.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 176-A.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 49-50.
G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 224.
Id. at 230-232.
Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 807, 814 (2000).
Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court.
Supra note 22.
Id. at 815.

Law 126 Evidence

[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]

Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Websters Third New International Dictionary.

Ong v. Yap, 492 Phil. 188, 197 (2005).
G.R. No. 107075, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 148.
Id. at 155-156.
Geminiano v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 682, 688-689 (1996).
Rollo, p. 175.

Page 41 of 103

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

SECOND DIVISION

Page 42 of 103

Based on a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues[3] of the parties, the

CTA Second Division summarized the factual and procedural
antecedents of the case, the pertinent portions of which read:

G.R. No. 185371

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Petitioner,

Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly

organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines,
x x x.

VS.
METRO STAR SUPERAMA, INC.,
Respondent.
December 8, 2010
DECISION

On January 26, 2001, the Regional Director of

Revenue Region No. 10, Legazpi City, issued Letter of
Authority No. 00006561 for Revenue Officer Daisy G.
Justiniana to examine petitioners books of accounts and
other accounting records for income tax and other
internal revenue taxes for the taxable year 1999. Said
Letter of Authority was revalidated on August 10,
2001 by Regional Director Leonardo Sacamos.

MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court
filed
by
the
petitioner Commissioner
of
Internal
Revenue (CIR) seeks to reverse and set aside the 1] September 16, 2008
Decision[1] of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA-En Banc), in C.T.A.
EB No. 306 and 2] its November 18, 2008 Resolution[2] denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The CTA-En Banc affirmed in toto the decision of its Second

Division (CTA-Second Division) in CTA Case No. 7169 reversing the
February 8, 2005 Decision of the CIR which assessed respondent Metro
Star Superama, Inc. (Metro Star) of deficiency value-added tax and
withholding tax for the taxable year 1999.

For petitioners failure to comply with several

requests for the presentation of records and Subpoena
Duces Tecum, [the] OIC of BIR Legal Division issued an
Indorsement dated September 26, 2001 informing
Revenue District Officer of Revenue Region No.
67, Legazpi City to proceed with the investigation based
on the best evidence obtainable preparatory to the
issuance of assessment notice.
On November 8, 2001, Revenue District Officer
Socorro O. Ramos-Lafuente issued a Preliminary 15-day
Letter, which petitioner received on November 9, 2001.
The said letter stated that a post audit review was held
and it was ascertained that there was deficiency valueadded and withholding taxes due from petitioner in the
amount of P 292,874.16.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

On April 11, 2002, petitioner received a Formal

Letter of Demand dated April 3, 2002 from Revenue
District No. 67, Legazpi City, assessing petitioner the
amount of Two Hundred Ninety Two Thousand Eight
Hundred Seventy Four Pesos and Sixteen Centavos
(P292,874.16.) for deficiency value-added and
withholding taxes for the taxable year 1999, computed as
follows:

ASSESSMENT NOTICE NO. 067-99-003-579-072

VALUE ADDED TAX
Gross Sales
P1,697,718.90
Output Tax
P 154,338.08
Less: Input Tax
VAT
Payable
P 154,338.08
Add: 25% Surcharge
P 38,584.54
20% Interest
79,746.49
Compromise Penalty
Late Payment
P16,000.00
Failure
to
File
VAT
returns 2,400.00 18,400.00 136,731.01
TOTAL
P 291,069.09

WITHHOLDING TAX
Compensation
Expanded
Total Tax Due

2,772.91
110,103.92
P 112,876.83

Page 43 of 103

Less:
Withheld
Deficiency Withholding Tax
Add: 20% Interest p.a.
Compromise Penalty
TOTAL

Tax
111,848.27
P
1,028.56
576.51
200.00
P
1,805.07

*Expanded
Withholding
Tax P1,949,334.25
x 5%
97,466.71
Film Rental
10,000.25
x 10%
1,000.00
Audit Fee
193,261.20
x 5%
9,663.00
Rental
Expense
41,272.73
x 1%
412.73
Security
Service
156,142.01
x 1%
1,561.42
Service
Contractor
P 110,103.92
Total
SUMMARIES OF DEFICIENCIES
VALUE ADDED TAX
WITHHOLDING TAX
TOTAL

P 291,069.09
1,805.07
P 292,874.16

Subsequently, Revenue District Office No. 67 sent

a copy of the Final Notice of Seizure dated May 12, 2003,
which petitioner received on May 15, 2003, giving the
latter last opportunity to settle its deficiency tax
liabilities within ten (10) [days] from receipt thereof,
otherwise respondent BIR shall be constrained to serve
and execute the Warrants of Distraint and/or Levy and
Garnishment to enforce collection.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

On February 6, 2004, petitioner received from

Revenue District Office No. 67 a Warrant of Distraint
and/or Levy No. 67-0029-23 dated May 12, 2003
demanding payment of deficiency value-added tax and
withholding tax payment in the amount of P292,874.16.

On July 30, 2004, petitioner filed with the Office

of
respondent
Commissioner
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration pursuant to Section 3.1.5 of Revenue
Regulations No. 12-99.
On February 8, 2005, respondent Commissioner,
through its authorized representative, Revenue Regional
Director of Revenue Region 10, Legaspi City, issued a
Decision
denying
petitioners
Motion
for
Reconsideration. Petitioner, through counsel received
said Decision on February 18, 2005.
x x x.

Denying that it received a Preliminary Assessment

Notice (PAN) and claiming that it was not accorded due process, Metro
Star filed a petition for review[4]with the CTA. The parties then stipulated
on the following issues to be decided by the tax court:
1. Whether the respondent complied with the due
process requirement as provided under the National
Internal Revenue Code and Revenue Regulations No.
12-99 with regard to the issuance of a deficiency tax
assessment;

Page 44 of 103
1.1 Whether petitioner is liable for the
respective amounts of P291,069.09
and P1,805.07 as deficiency VAT and
withholding tax for the year 1999;
1.2. Whether the assessment has become
final and executory and demandable for
failure of petitioner to protest the same
within 30 days from its receipt thereof
on April 11, 2002, pursuant to Section
228 of the National Internal Revenue
Code;
2. Whether the deficiency assessments issued by the
respondent are void for failure to state the law
and/or facts upon which they are based.
2.2 Whether petitioner was informed of the
law and facts on which the assessment
is made in compliance with Section 228
of the National Internal Revenue Code;
3. Whether or not petitioner, as owner/operator of a
movie/cinema house, is subject to VAT on sales of
services under Section 108(A) of the National
Internal Revenue Code;
4. Whether or not the assessment is based on the best
evidence obtainable pursuant to Section 6(b) of the
National Internal Revenue Code.

The CTA-Second Division found merit in the petition of Metro

Star and, on March 21, 2007, rendered a decision, the decretal portion of
which reads:

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition

for Review is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision dated February 8, 2005 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and respondent is ORDERED TO DESIST
from collecting the subject taxes against petitioner.
The CTA-Second Division opined that [w]hile there [is] a
disputable presumption that a mailed letter [is] deemed received by the
addressee in the ordinary course of mail, a direct denial of the receipt of
mail shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to
prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee.[5] It
also found that there was no clear showing that Metro Star actually
received the alleged PAN, dated January 16, 2002. It, accordingly, ruled
that the Formal Letter of Demand dated April 3, 2002, as well as the
Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy dated May 12, 2003 were void, as
Metro Star was denied due process.[6]
The CIR sought reconsideration[7] of the decision of the CTA-Second
Division, but the motion was denied in the latters July 24,
2007 Resolution.[8]
Aggrieved, the CIR filed a petition for review[9] with the CTA-En
Banc, but the petition was dismissed after a determination that no new
matters were raised. The CTA-En Banc disposed:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is

hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, the March 21, 2007 Decision and July
27, 2007 Resolution of the CTA Second Division in CTA
Case No. 7169 entitled, Metro Star Superama, Inc.,
petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
respondent are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Page 45 of 103

SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration[10] filed by the CIR was likewise
denied by the CTA-En Banc in its November 18, 2008 Resolution.[11]
The CIR, insisting that Metro Star received the
PAN, dated January 16, 2002, and that due process was served
nonetheless because the latter received the Final Assessment Notice
(FAN), comes now before this Court with the sole issue of whether or not
Metro Star was denied due process.
The general rule is that the Court will not lightly set aside the
conclusions reached by the CTA which, by the very nature of its
functions, has accordingly developed an exclusive expertise on the
resolution unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of
authority.[12] In Barcelon, Roxas Securities, Inc. (now known as UBP
Securities, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[13] the Court wrote:
Jurisprudence has consistently shown that this
Court accords the findings of fact by the CTA with the
highest respect. In Sea-Land Service Inc. v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 122605, 30 April 2001, 357 SCRA 441,
445-446], this Court recognizes that the Court of Tax
Appeals, which by the very nature of its function is
dedicated exclusively to the consideration of tax
problems, has necessarily developed an expertise on the
subject, and its conclusions will not be overturned unless
there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of
authority. Such findings can only be disturbed on appeal
if they are not supported by substantial evidence or there
is a showing of gross error or abuse on the part of the
Tax Court. In the absence of any clear and convincing

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

proof to the contrary, this Court must presume that the

CTA rendered a decision which is valid in every respect.
On the matter of service of a tax assessment, a further perusal of
our ruling in Barcelon is instructive, viz:
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that if
the taxpayer denies ever having received an
assessment from the BIR, it is incumbent upon the
latter to prove by competent evidence that such
notice was indeed received by the addressee.
The onus probandi was shifted to respondent to
prove by contrary evidence that the Petitioner
received the assessment in the due course of
mail. The Supreme Court has consistently held that while
a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in
the course of mail, this is merely a disputable
presumption subject to controversion and a direct denial
thereof shifts the burden to the party favored by the
presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed
received by the addressee (Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
149 SCRA 351). Thus as held by the Supreme Court
in Gonzalo P. Nava vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
13 SCRA 104, January 30, 1965:
"The facts to be proved to raise
this presumption are (a) that the letter
was properly addressed with postage
prepaid, and (b) that it was
mailed. Once these facts are proved, the
presumption is that the letter was
received by the addressee as soon as it
could have been transmitted to him in the
ordinary course of the mail. But if one of

Page 46 of 103
the said facts fails to appear, the
presumption does not lie. (VI, Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed,
56-57 citing Enriquez vs. Sunlife
Assurance of Canada, 41 Phil 269)."
x x x. What is essential to prove the fact of
mailing is the registry receipt issued by the Bureau of
Posts or the Registry return card which would have
been signed by the Petitioner or its authorized
representative. And if said documents cannot be
located, Respondent at the very least, should have
submitted to the Court a certification issued by the
Bureau of Posts and any other pertinent document
which is executed with the intervention of the
Bureau of Posts. This Court does not put much credence
to the self serving documentations made by the BIR
personnel especially if they are unsupported by
substantial evidence establishing the fact of mailing.
Thus:
"While we have held that an
assessment is made when sent within the
prescribed period, even if received by the
taxpayer after its expiration (Coll. of Int.
Rev. vs. Bautista, L-12250 and L-12259,
May 27, 1959), this ruling makes it the
more imperative that the release, mailing
or sending of the notice be clearly and
satisfactorily proved. Mere notations
made without the taxpayers intervention,
notice or control, without adequate
supporting evidence cannot suffice;
otherwise, the taxpayer would be at the

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

mercy of the revenue offices, without

adequate protection or defense." (Nava
vs. CIR, 13 SCRA 104, January 30, 1965).

Page 47 of 103

The answer to these questions require an examination of Section

228 of the Tax Code which reads:

x x x.
The failure of the respondent to prove receipt of
the assessment by the Petitioner leads to the conclusion
that no assessment was issued. Consequently, the
governments right to issue an assessment for the said
period has already prescribed. (Industrial Textile
Manufacturing Co. of the Phils., Inc. vs. CIR CTA Case
4885, August 22, 1996). (Emphases supplied.)

The Court agrees with the CTA that the CIR failed to discharge its
duty and present any evidence to show that Metro Star indeed received
the PAN datedJanuary 16, 2002. It could have simply presented the
registry receipt or the certification from the postmaster that it mailed
the PAN, but failed. Neither did it offer any explanation on why it failed
to comply with the requirement of service of the PAN. It merely accepted
the letter of Metro Stars chairman dated April 29, 2002, that stated that
he had received the FAN dated April 3, 2002, but not the PAN; that he
was willing to pay the tax as computed by the CIR; and that he just
wanted to clarify some matters with the hope of lessening its tax
liability.
This now leads to the question: Is the failure to strictly comply
with notice requirements prescribed under Section 228 of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997 and Revenue Regulations (R.R.) No. 1299 tantamount to a denial of due process? Specifically, are the
requirements of due process satisfied if only the FAN stating the
computation of tax liabilities and a demand to pay within the prescribed
period was sent to the taxpayer?

SEC. 228. Protesting of Assessment. - When the

Commissioner or his duly authorized representative
finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall
first notify the taxpayer of his findings: provided,
however, that a preassessment notice shall not be
required in the following cases:
(a) When the finding for any deficiency tax is the
result of mathematical error in the computation of the
tax as appearing on the face of the return; or
(b) When a discrepancy has been determined
between the tax withheld and the amount actually
remitted by the withholding agent; or
(c) When a taxpayer who opted to claim a refund
or tax credit of excess creditable withholding tax for a
taxable period was determined to have carried over and
automatically applied the same amount claimed against
the estimated tax liabilities for the taxable quarter or
quarters of the succeeding taxable year; or
(d) When the excise tax due on exciseable articles
has not been paid; or
(e) When the article locally purchased or
imported by an exempt person, such as, but not limited
to, vehicles, capital equipment, machineries and spare
parts, has been sold, traded or transferred to non-exempt
persons.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

The taxpayers shall be informed in writing of

the law and the facts on which the assessment is
made; otherwise, the assessment shall be void.
Within a period to be prescribed by
implementing rules and regulations, the taxpayer shall be
required to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to
respond, the Commissioner or his duly authorized
representative shall issue an assessment based on his
findings.
Such
assessment
may
be
protested
administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or
reinvestigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of
the assessment in such form and manner as may be
prescribed by implementing rules and regulations.
Within sixty (60) days from filing of the protest, all
relevant supporting documents shall have been
submitted; otherwise, the assessment shall become final.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is
not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days
from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely
affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the
Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the said decision, or from the lapse of one hundred
eighty (180)-day period; otherwise, the decision shall
become final, executory and demandable. (Emphasis
supplied).

Indeed, Section 228 of the Tax Code clearly requires that the
taxpayer must first be informed that he is liable for deficiency taxes
through the sending of a PAN. He must be informed of the facts and the
law upon which the assessment is made. The law imposes a substantive,

Page 48 of 103

not merely a formal, requirement. To proceed heedlessly with tax

collection without first establishing a valid assessment is evidently
violative of the cardinal principle in administrative investigations - that
taxpayers should be able to present their case and adduce supporting
evidence.[14]
This is confirmed under the provisions R.R. No. 12-99 of the BIR
which pertinently provide:
SECTION 3. Due Process Requirement in the
Issuance of a Deficiency Tax Assessment.
3.1 Mode of procedures in the issuance of a
deficiency tax assessment:
3.1.1 Notice for informal conference. The
Revenue Officer who audited the taxpayer's records shall,
among others, state in his report whether or not the
taxpayer agrees with his findings that the taxpayer is
liable for deficiency tax or taxes. If the taxpayer is not
amenable, based on the said Officer's submitted report of
investigation, the taxpayer shall be informed, in writing,
by the Revenue District Office or by the Special
Investigation Division, as the case may be (in the case
Revenue Regional Offices) or by the Chief of Division
concerned (in the case of the BIR National Office) of the
discrepancy or discrepancies in the taxpayer's payment
of his internal revenue taxes, for the purpose of "Informal
Conference," in order to afford the taxpayer with an
opportunity to present his side of the case. If the taxpayer
fails to respond within fifteen (15) days from date of
receipt of the notice for informal conference, he shall be
considered in default, in which case, the Revenue District
Officer or the Chief of the Special Investigation Division

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of the Revenue Regional Office, or the Chief of Division in

the National Office, as the case may be, shall endorse the
case with the least possible delay to the Assessment
Division of the Revenue Regional Office or to the
Commissioner or his duly authorized representative, as
the case may be, for appropriate review and issuance of a
deficiency tax assessment, if warranted.
3.1.2 Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN). If
after review and evaluation by the Assessment Division
or by the Commissioner or his duly authorized
representative, as the case may be, it is determined that
there exists sufficient basis to assess the taxpayer for any
deficiency tax or taxes, the said Office shall issue to the
taxpayer, at least by registered mail, a Preliminary
Assessment Notice (PAN) for the proposed assessment,
showing in detail, the facts and the law, rules and
regulations, or jurisprudence on which the proposed
assessment is based (see illustration in ANNEX A hereof).
If the taxpayer fails to respond within fifteen (15) days
from date of receipt of the PAN, he shall be considered in
default, in which case, a formal letter of demand and
assessment notice shall be caused to be issued by the
said Office, calling for payment of the taxpayer's
deficiency tax liability, inclusive of the applicable
penalties.
3.1.3 Exceptions to Prior Notice of the
Assessment. The notice for informal conference and
the preliminary assessment notice shall not be required
in any of the following cases, in which case, issuance of
the formal assessment notice for the payment of the
taxpayer's deficiency tax liability shall be sufficient:

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 49 of 103
(i) When the finding for any deficiency tax
is the result of mathematical error in
the computation of the tax appearing
on the face of the tax return filed by
the taxpayer; or
(ii) When a discrepancy has been
determined between the tax withheld
and the amount actually remitted by
the withholding agent; or
(iii) When a taxpayer who opted to claim
a refund or tax credit of excess
creditable withholding tax for a
taxable period was determined to
have carried over and automatically
applied the same amount claimed
against the estimated tax liabilities for
the taxable quarter or quarters of the
succeeding taxable year; or
(iv) When the excise tax due on excisable
articles has not been paid; or

(v) When an article locally purchased or

imported by an exempt person, such
as, but not limited to, vehicles, capital
equipment, machineries and spare
parts, has been sold, traded or
transferred to non-exempt persons.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

3.1.4 Formal Letter of Demand and Assessment

Notice. The formal letter of demand and assessment
notice shall be issued by the Commissioner or his duly
authorized representative. The letter of demand calling
for payment of the taxpayer's deficiency tax or taxes shall
state the facts, the law, rules and regulations, or
jurisprudence on which the assessment is based,
otherwise, the formal letter of demand and assessment
notice shall be void (see illustration in ANNEX B hereof).
The same shall be sent to the taxpayer only by
registered mail or by personal delivery.
If sent by personal delivery, the taxpayer or his
duly authorized representative shall acknowledge receipt
thereof in the duplicate copy of the letter of demand,
showing the following: (a) His name; (b) signature; (c)
designation and authority to act for and in behalf of the
taxpayer, if acknowledged received by a person other
than the taxpayer himself; and (d) date of receipt thereof.
x x x.
From the provision quoted above, it is clear that the sending of a
PAN to taxpayer to inform him of the assessment made is but part of the
due process requirement in the issuance of a deficiency tax
assessment, the absence of which renders nugatory any assessment
made by the tax authorities. The use of the word shall in
subsection 3.1.2 describes the mandatory nature of the service of a
PAN. The persuasiveness of the right to due process reaches both
substantial and procedural rights and the failure of the CIR to strictly
comply with the requirements laid down by law and its own rules is a
denial of Metro Stars right to due process.[15] Thus, for its failure to send
the PAN stating the facts and the law on which the assessment was made

Page 50 of 103

as required by Section 228 of R.A. No. 8424, the assessment made by the
CIR is void.
The case of CIR v. Menguito[16] cited by the CIR in support of its
argument that only the non-service of the FAN is fatal to the validity of
an assessment, cannot apply to this case because the issue therein was
the non-compliance with the provisions of R. R. No. 12-85 which sought
to interpret Section 229 of the old tax law. RA No. 8424 has already
amended the provision of Section 229 on protesting an assessment. The
old requirement of merely notifying the taxpayer of the CIRs findings
was changed in 1998 to informing the taxpayer of not only the law, but
also of the facts on which an assessment would be made. Otherwise, the
assessment itself would be invalid.[17] The regulation then, on the other
hand, simply provided that a notice be sent to the respondent in the
form prescribed, and that no consequence would ensue for failure to
comply with that form.
The Court need not belabor to discuss the matter of Metro Stars
failure to file its protest, for it is well-settled that a void assessment
bears no fruit.[18]
It is an elementary rule enshrined in the 1987 Constitution that
no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.[19] In
balancing the scales between the power of the State to tax and its
inherent right to prosecute perceived transgressors of the law on one
side, and the constitutional rights of a citizen to due process of law and
the equal protection of the laws on the other, the scales must tilt in favor
of the individual, for a citizens right is amply protected by the Bill of
Rights under the Constitution. Thus, while taxes are the lifeblood of the
government, the power to tax has its limits, in spite of all its plenitude.
Hence inCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue, Inc.,[20] it was said
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so
should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. On

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the other hand, such collection should be made in

accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the
very
reason
for
government
itself. It
is
therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently
conflicting interests of the authorities and the taxpayers
so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the
promotion of the common good, may be achieved.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is said that taxes are what we pay for civilized

society. Without taxes, the government would be
paralyzed for the lack of the motive power to activate
and operate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance to
surrender part of ones hard-earned income to taxing
authorities, every person who is able to must contribute
his share in the running of the government. The
government for its part is expected to respond in the
form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to
improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral
and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the
rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous
notion that it is an arbitrary method of exaction by those
in the seat of power.
But even as we concede the inevitability and
indispensability of taxation, it is a requirement in all
democratic regimes that it be exercised reasonably
and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it
is not, then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the
courts will then come to his succor. For all the awesome
power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his
tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate x x x that the law
has not been observed.[21] (Emphasis supplied).

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 51 of 103

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Rollo, pp. 32-75. Penned by Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova, with

Associate Justices Erlinda P. Uy,
Olga Palanca-Enriquez, concurring and Associate Justices Ernesto D.
Acosta and Lovell R. Bautista, dissenting.
[2] Id. at 88-96.
[3] Id. at 308-311.
[4] Id. at 97-110.
[5] Id. at 85, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 233 Phil. 359, 364 (1987).
[6] Id. at 86.
[7] Id. at 111-119.
[8] Id. at 120-122.
[9] Id. at 123-138.
[10] Id. at 139-152.
[11] Id. at 88-96.
[12] Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils), Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 157594
March 9, 2010.
[13] G.R. No. 150764, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 126, 135-136.
[14] Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[15] Tupas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89571, February 6, 1991, 193 SCRA
597, 600.
[16] G.R. No. 167560, September 17, 2008, 461 SCRA 565.
[17] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Azucena T. Reyes, G.R. No. 159694
& G.R. No. 163581 January 27, 2006, 382 SCRA 480.
[18] Id.
[19] Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
[20] 241 Phil. 829 (1988).
[21] Id. at 830, 836.
[1]

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 52 of 103

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

SECOND DIVISION

Page 53 of 103

Co.[4] Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered the following

documentary evidence:

G.R. No. 182301

1.
JAIME ALFEREZ,
Petitioner,

2.

VS.

3.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PINGPING CO,

Respondents.

4.

January 31, 2011

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated December
13, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated March 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No.
00300.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

BPI Check No. 492089 dated 29 April 1994 in the

sum of P78, 889.95;
BPI Check No. 492010 dated 22 June 1994 in the
sum of P30,745.90;
BPI Check No. 492011 dated 22 June 1994 in the
sum of P721,362.55;
The demand letter dated 7 July 1994 addressed to
petitioner;
The registry receipt of the Post Office;
The face of the Registry Return Receipt;
The dorsal side of the Registry Return Receipt;
The Returned Check Ticket dated 23 June 1994; and
The reason for the dishonor.[5]

Instead of presenting evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to

Evidence[6] on August 8, 2003, or approximately ten (10) months after
the prosecution rested its case. Petitioner averred that the prosecution
failed to show that he received the notice of dishonor or demand letter.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner Jaime Alferez purchased construction materials from
Cebu ABC Sales Commercial. As payment for the goods, he issued three
(3) checks for the total amount of P830,998.40. However, the checks
were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.
Petitioner was thus charged with three (3) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cebu City. The cases were raffled to Branch 3 and docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 40985-R to 40987-R.[3] During the trial, the
prosecution presented its lone witness, private complainant Pingping

On March 4, 2005, the MTCC issued a resolution[7] denying

petitioners Demurrer to Evidence, and rendering judgment finding
petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of issuing
bouncing checks as defined and penalized under Section
1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and hereby sentences the
accused the following:

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 54 of 103

1. To pay a fine of Php830,998.40 and in case of

insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment;

on the part of the RTC since it was shown that petitioner acted in bad
faith.[11]

2. To pay private complainant the total face value

of the checks in the amount of Php830,998.40
plus 1% interest per month beginning from
the filing of the complaint.

On March 4, 2008, the CA denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration. Hence, this petition anchored on the following issues:

SO ORDERED.[8]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Branch 21, Cebu City. The RTC rendered Judgment[9] affirming in toto the
MTCC decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was denied
in an Order[10] dated December 16, 2005. In the same Order, the RTC
modified the MTCC resolution by sentencing petitioner to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months for each count of violation of
B.P Blg. 22, instead of fine as originally imposed.
Undaunted, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In the assailed
Decision, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It sustained
petitioners conviction as the elements of the crime had been sufficiently
established. As to the service on petitioner of the notice of dishonor, the
appellate court pointed out that petitioner did not testify, and that he did
not object to the prosecutions evidence aimed at proving the fact of
receipt of the notice of dishonor. Consequently, the registry receipt and
the return card adequately show the fact of receipt. As to petitioners
contention that he was denied his right to present evidence after the
denial of his demurrer to evidence, the CA held that there was no such
denial since it was merely the consequence of the filing of demurrer
without leave of court. Finally, as to the imposition of the penalty of
imprisonment instead of fine, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion

Whether the Registry Receipt and Registry Return

Receipt alone without presenting the person who mailed
and/or served the demand letter is sufficient notice of
dishonor as required by BP 22.
Whether the filing of the Demurrer of (sic) Evidence
without leave and denied by the trial court is a waiver of
the right of the petitioner (the accused before the trial
court) to present his evidence in support and to rebut the
evidence of the respondent particularly with respect to
the civil aspect of the case.
On the alternative (if the petitioner is guilty), whether
the accused should only be mete[d] the penalty of fine as
imposed by the trial court (MTCC).[12]
The petition is partly meritorious.
After a careful evaluation of the records of the case, we believe
and so hold that the totality of the evidence presented does not support
petitioners conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 defines the offense, as follows:[13]
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds.Any
person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in

full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any
person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a
check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation,
company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.

Accordingly, this Court has held that the elements of the crime
are, as follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer,
or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the

Page 55 of 103

drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the

same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.[14]
In this case, the first and third elements of the crime have been
adequately established. The prosecution, however, failed to prove the
second element. Because this element involves a state of mind which is
difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds under the following
circumstances:[15]
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.
The making, drawing, and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety days from the date of the check,
shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon,
or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.

In Suarez v. People,[16] which is on all fours with the instant case,

two Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against
petitioner therein. After the prosecution presented its evidence,
petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court on the
ground that no notice of dishonor had been sent to and received by
him. When the case reached this Court, we acquitted petitioner on
reasonable doubt as there was insufficient proof that he received notice
of dishonor. We explained that:

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

The presumption arises when it is proved that the issuer

had received this notice, and that within five banking
days from its receipt, he failed to pay the amount of the
check or to make arrangements for its payment. The full
payment of the amount appearing in the check within
five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete
defense. Accordingly, procedural due process requires
that a notice of dishonor be sent to and received by the
petitioner to afford the opportunity to avert prosecution
under B.P. Blg. 22.
x x x. [I]t is not enough for the prosecution to
prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the petitioner.
It is also incumbent upon the prosecution to show that
the drawer of the check received the said notice because
the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned
from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of
the check.
A review of the records shows that the prosecution
did not prove that the petitioner received the notice of
dishonor. Registry return cards must be authenticated to
serve as proof of receipt of letters sent through
registered mail.[17]

In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the

demand letter, together with the registry receipt and the return card,
allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there was no attempt to
authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return
card.[18] Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by
themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve
as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor.[19] To
be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated

Page 56 of 103

signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner received such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution
to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check.
The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because
the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of
such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check.[20] The burden of
proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal
cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear
proof of notice.[21] Moreover, for notice by mail, it must appear that the
same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the
addressee. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioner
or his authorized agent did receive the demand letter.[22] Possibilities,
however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.[23] The
consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused.[24] The absence of a notice
of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to preclude
a criminal prosecution.[25] As there is insufficient proof that petitioner
received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge
of insufficiency of funds cannot arise.[26]
This is so even if petitioner did not present his evidence to rebut
the documentary evidence of the prosecution as he had waived his right
to present evidence for having filed a demurrer to evidence without
leave of court. We must emphasize that the prosecution has the burden
of proving beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime as its
case will rise or fall on the strength of its own evidence, never on the
weakness or even absence of that of the defense.[27] The failure of the
prosecution to prove the receipt by petitioner of the requisite notice of
dishonor and that he was given at least five (5) banking days within
which to settle his account constitutes sufficient ground for his
acquittal.[28]

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Nonetheless, petitioners acquittal for failure of the prosecution

to prove all elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt does not
include the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored
checks.[29] In case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly
liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the
court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused was acquitted.[30] In a number of similar
cases, we have held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not
preclude the award of civil damages.[31]
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the CA, as to petitioners civil liability.
Finally, in answer to petitioners insistence that he should have
been allowed by the trial court to present his evidence on the civil aspect
of the case, suffice it to state that when petitioner filed a demurrer to
evidence without leave of court, the whole case was submitted for
judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution as
the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At
that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its
civil aspect.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals
Decision dated December 13, 2007 and Resolution dated March 4, 2008
in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 00300 are MODIFIED. Petitioner Jaime Alferez
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However,
the civil liability imposed on petitioner is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Page 57 of 103

Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with Associate

Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, concurring; rollo,
pp. 16-25.
[2]
Id. at 26-27.
[3]
CA rollo, p. 18.
[4]
Rollo, p. 17.
[5]
CA rollo, pp. 22-23.
[6]
Id. at 28-31.
[7]
Penned by Presiding Judge Gil R. Acosta; id. at 18-21.
[8]
Id. at 21.
[9]
Penned by Presiding Judge Eric F. Menchavez; id. at 14-15.
[10]
Id. at 16-17.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 19-24.
[12]
Id. at 6.
[13]
King v. People, 377 Phil. 692, 706 (1999).
[14]
Suarez v. People, G.R. No. 172573, June 19, 2008, 555 SCRA
238, 245; Moster v. People, G.R. No. 167461, February 19, 2008, 546
SCRA 287, 296.
[15]
Suarez v. People, supra, at 245; King v. People, supra note 13, at
708-709.
[16]
Supra.
[17]
Id. at 246.
[18]
Moster v. People, supra note 14, at 297-298.
[19]
Id. at 298, citing Rico v. People, G.R. No. 137191, November 18,
2002, 392 SCRA 61, 73.
[20]
Moster v. People, supra, at 299, citing Cabrera v. People, 454
Phil. 759, 774 (2003).
[21]
Cabrera v. People, supra, at 774.
[22]
Ting v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 481, 494 (2000).
[23]
Moster v. People, supra note 14, at 299.
[24]
Ambito v. People, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, 579
SCRA 69, 94.
[25]
Id. at 92.
[26]
Suarez v. People, supra note 14, at 247.
[1]

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Moster v. People, supra note 14, at 299; King v. People, supra

note 13, at 711.
[28]
Moster v. People, supra, at 299.
[29]
Ambito v. People, supra note 24, at 94.
[30]
Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February
12, 2007, 515 SCRA 502, 513.
[31]
Ambito v. People, supra note 24, at 94, citing Bax v. People, G.R.
No. 149858, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 284, 292-293; Rico v. People,
supra note 19, at 74; Domangsang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139292,
December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 75, 84-85.
[32]
Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, supra note 30, at 512-513.
[27]

Page 58 of 103

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170071

July 16, 2012

HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA,

MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA, Petitioners,
vs.
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Respondent.

Page 59 of 103

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 164 on account of Jose
Marcials death while onboard a taxicab owned and operated by G & S.
The RTC adjudged G & S guilty of breach of contract of carriage and
ordered it to pay the heirs the following amounts:
1. P50,000 as civil indemnity;
2. P6,537,244.96 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased;
3. P100,000.00 for attorneys fees; and,
4. costs of litigation.6

x-----------------------x
Acting upon the heirs Partial Motion for Reconsideration,7 the RTC also
ordered G & S to pay the heirs the following:

G.R. No. 170125

G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA,
MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA, Respondents.

1. P300,000.00 as moral damages;

2. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.8

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision but with
the modifications that the awards for loss of income in the amount of
P6,537,244.96 be deleted and that moral damages be reduced to
P200,000.00.9

Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration1 of our March 9, 2011

Decision filed by G & S Transport Corporation (G & S).

The deletion was ordered on the ground that the income certificate
issued by Jose

Brief Background

Marcials employer, the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID), is self-serving, unreliable and biased, and that the
same was not supported by competent evidence such as income tax
returns or receipts. With respect to moral damages, the CA found the

RESOLUTION

On March 9, 2011, we rendered a Decision2 in the consolidated petitions

of G & S3 and of the heirs.4 These petitions stemmed from a
Complaint5 for Damages filed by the heirs against G & S with the

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

same excessive and disproportionate to the award of P50,000.00

exemplary damages. Thus, the same was reduced to P200,000.00.10
The parties respective appeals11 from the CA Decision became the
subject of this Courts March 9, 2011 Decision which denied G & Ss
petition and partly granted that of the heirs. The Court affirmed the
assailed CA Decision with the modifications that G & S is ordered to pay
the heirs P6,611,634.59 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased, as
well as moral damages in the reduced amount of P100,000.00. The
dispositive portion of our March 9, 2011 Decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 170071 is
PARTLY GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 170125 is DENIED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution dated June 29, 2005 and October 12,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75602 are AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATIONS that G & S is ordered to pay the heirs of Jose
Marcial K. Ochoa the sum of P6,611,634.59 for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.12
G & Ss Motion for Reconsideration
G & S filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 arguing that the USAID
Certification used as basis in computing the award for loss of income is
inadmissible in evidence because it was not properly authenticated and
identified in court by the signatory thereof; that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its employees and, hence, was able to overcome the presumption of fault
imputed to it; and, that while settled is the rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts, G & S can seek a review of facts even if it did not
particularly state under which exception to such rule its case falls.
The heirs Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration

Page 60 of 103

In their Comment,14 the heirs point out that G & Ss arguments have
already been squarely passed upon by this Court and by the lower
courts. Moreover, these arguments involve questions of fact which
cannot be reviewed in a petition for review on certiorari. As to the
USAID Certification, the heirs aver that the same was properly admitted
in evidence. This is because Jose Marcials widow, witness Ruby Bueno
Ochoa, was able to competently testify as to the authenticity and due
execution of the said Certification since the signatory thereof, Jonas Cruz
(Cruz), personally issued and handed the same to her. In addition, the
accuracy of the contents of the Certification was never questioned by G &
S as, in fact, it did not present evidence to dispute its contents.
The Courts Ruling
The Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
The requirement of authentication of documentary evidence applies only
to a private document.
It is true that before a private document offered as authentic be received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must first be
proved.15 However, it must be remembered that this requirement of
authentication only pertains to private documents and "does not apply
to public documents, these being admissible without further proof of
their due execution or genuineness. Two reasons may be advanced in
support of this rule, namely: said documents have been executed in the
proper registry and are presumed to be valid and genuine until the
contrary is shown by clear and convincing proof; and, second, because
public documents are authenticated by the official signature and seals
which they bear and of which seals, courts may take judicial
notice."16 Hence, in a case, the Court held that in the presentation of
public documents as evidence, due execution and authenticity thereof
are already presumed.17

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 61 of 103

The subject USAID Certification is a public document, hence, does not

require authentication.

is an independent federal government agency that receives over-all

foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State of the United States.18

It therefore becomes necessary to first ascertain whether the subject

USAID Certification is a private or public document before this Court can
rule upon the correctness of its admission and consequent use as basis
for the award of loss of income in these cases.

A further research on said agency shows that it was created through

Executive Order 1097319 by President John F. Kennedy on November 3,
1961 pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.20 It is headed by an
Administrator and Deputy Administrator, both appointed by the
President of the Unites States and confirmed by its Senate.21 From these,
there can be no doubt that the USAID is an official government agency of
a foreign country, the United States. Hence, Cruz, as USAIDs Chief of the
Human Resources Division in the Philippines, is actually a public officer.
Apparently, Cruzs issuance of the subject USAID Certification was made
in the performance of his official functions, he having charge of all
employee files and information as such officer. In view of these, it is clear
that the USAID Certification is a public document pursuant to paragraph
(a), Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Hence, and consistent with
our above discussion, the authenticity and due execution of said
Certification are already presumed. Moreover, as a public document
issued in the performance of a duty by a public officer, the subject USAID
Certification is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.22

Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court classifies documents as either
public or private, viz:
Sec. 19. Classes of Documents For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the
Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)
Paragraph (a) of the above-quoted provision classifies the written
official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country, as public documents. As mentioned
in our March 9, 2011 Decision, USAID is the principal United States
agency that extends assistance to countries recovering from disaster,
trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms and that it

And, there being no clear and sufficient evidence presented by G & S to

overcome these presumptions, the RTC is correct when it admitted in
evidence the said document. The USAID Certification could very well be
used as basis for the award for loss of income to the heirs.
G & S failed to overcome the presumption that "the common carrier is at
fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured."23
G & S insists that it exercised the required diligence of a good father of a
family when it hired and continued to employ Bibiano Padilla, Jr. (the
driver of the ill-fated Avis taxicab). It claims that it was able to prove this
through the documentary exhibits it submitted before the trial court and
that the same are sufficient to relieve it from liability to the heirs.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

The reasons advanced by G & S in support of this argument are mere

rehash if not a repetition of those raised in its petition which have
already been considered and passed upon in our March 9, 2011 Decision
and, hence, do not require reconsideration. The conclusion therefore
that G & S failed to overcome the presumption that the common carrier
is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured stands.
There is no compelling reason to re-examine the factual findings of the
lower courts.
G & S questions the portion of our March 9, 2011 Decision which reads:
In this case, the said three issues boil down to the determination of the
following questions: What is the proximate cause of the death of Jose
Marcial? Is the testimony of prosecution witness Clave credible? Did G & S
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees? Suffice it to say that these are all questions
of fact which require this Court to inquire into the probative value of the
evidence presented before the trial court. As we have consistently held,
"[t]his Court is not a trier of facts. It is not a function of this court to
analyze or weigh evidence. When we give due course to such situations,
it is solely by way of exception. Such exceptions apply only in the
presence of extremely meritorious cases." Here, we note that although
G & S enumerated in its Consolidated Memorandum the exceptions to
the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should only raise
questions of law, it nevertheless did not point out under what
exception its case falls. And, upon review of the records of the case,
we are convinced that it does not fall under any.Hence, we cannot
proceed to resolve said issues and disturb the findings and conclusions
of the CA with respect thereto. x x x24 (Emphasis supplied.)
G & S avers that its failure to indicate the specific ground/exception for
this Court to review the facts of the case should not be taken against it. It
contends that even if it failed to specify which of the exceptions is

Page 62 of 103

applicable here, the Court should have nonetheless determined the

existence of any of the said exceptions on its own.
This matter has been properly addressed in our March 9, 2011
Decision.1wphi1 While we indeed mentioned that G & S failed to
indicate under which of the exceptions its case falls, the line following
that portion states that "And, uponreview of the records of the case, we are
convinced that it does not fall under any." It is plain from this statement
that although G & S failed to specify the reason why we should resolve
factual questions in these cases, we nevertheless have carefully studied
the records to ascertain whether there exists sufficient justification for
us to re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts. And convinced
that there is none, we adhered to the settled principle that a review of
the factual findings of the lower courts is outside the province of a
Petition for Review onCertiorari.
The award of attorneys fees and cost of litigation should be deleted.
While we are constrained to deny the present Motion for
Reconsideration for the reasons above-stated, we cannot, however, end
without discussing the awards of attorneys fees and costs of litigation.
In Mercury Drug Corporation v. Banking,25 the Court held, viz:
On the matter of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, it is settled
that the reasons or grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in
the decision of the court. Since the trial courts decision did not give the
basis of the award, the same must be deleted. In Vibram Manufacturing
Corporation v. Manila Electric Company, we held:
Likewise, the award for attorneys fees and litigation expenses should de
deleted. Well-enshrined is that an award for attorneys fees must be
stated in the text of the courts decision and not in the dispositive
portion only(Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation Solidbank v. Court

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

of Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 1995 and Keng Hua Paper Products, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals. 286 SCRA 257 1998). This is also true with the
litigation expenses where the body of the decision discusses nothing for
its basis.
The text of the court a quos Decision is bereft of any factual or legal
justification for the awards of attorneys fees and costs of litigation. It
merely declared the grant of said awards to the heirs in the dispositive
portion of its decision. Hence, the same should be declared.
WHEREFORE, the awards of attorneys fees and costs of litigation are
DELETED. G & Ss Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
Vice Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, per
Special Order No. 1252 dated July 12, 2012.
*

Page 63 of 103
4

Docketed as G.R. No. 170071.

Records, pp. 1-8.

See RTC Decision dated December 27, 2001, id. at 298-303.

Id. at 316-323.

See RTC Order dated March 5, 2002, id. at 342-343.

See CAs June 29, 2005 Decision, CA rollo, pp. 216-233.

10

Id.

11

Supra notes 3 and 4.

12

645 SCRA 120.

13

Supra note 1.

14

Id. at 399-409 and 489-498.

15

Sec. 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

**

Vice former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, per raffle dated

June 27, 2012.

Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private

document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

Rollo (G.R. No. 170071, pp. 358-397 and G.R. No. 170125, pp.
449-487).

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or

written; or

Id. at 326-350 and 424-448; 645 SCRA 93.

Docketed as G.R. No. 170125

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Any other private document need only be identified as

that which it is claimed to be.
16

FRANCISCO, RICARDO, J., Basic Evidence, 1992 Ed., p. 274.

Teoco v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No.

162333, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 82, 97.
17

18

March 9, 2011 Decision, p. 9. Citations omitted; 645 SCRA 115.

Administration of Foreign Assistance and Related Functions

<http://www.thecre.com/fedlaw/legal20eo10973.htm> (visited
January 16, 2012).
19

USAID History, USAID Website

<http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html> (visited
January 16, 2012).
20

USAID Organization, USAID Website

<http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidorg.html> (visited
January 16, 2012).
21

RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Section 23. Public documents as

evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
22

Diaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149749, July 25, 2006, 496
SCRA 468, 472.
23

March 9, 2011 Decision, pp. 14-15. Citations omitted; emphasis

supplied; 645 SCRA 109-110.
24

Page 64 of 103
25

G.R. No. 156037, May 25, 2007, 523 SCRA 484, 492.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

FIRST DIVISION

Page 65 of 103

We affirm the CA in keeping with the principle of non-interference with

the prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of
the public prosecutor in the latters determination of the existence of
probable cause, absent any showing that the Secretary of Justice thereby
commits grave abuse of his discretion.

G.R. No. 177780

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented

by ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO,
Petitioner,

Antecedents

VS.

ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III,

Respondent.
January 25, 2012

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal assails the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA)1 that dismissed the petition for certiorari brought by the petitioner
to nullify and set aside the resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice
on July 20, 20042 and November 18, 20053 directing the City Prosecutor
of Malabon City to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. 27020
entitled People v. Antonino O. Tobias III.

In 1997, Rosella A. Santiago, then the OIC-Branch Head of Metropolitan

Bank & Trust Company (METROBANK) in Valero Street, Makati City, was
introduced to respondent Antonino O. Tobias III (Tobias) by one Jose
Eduardo Gonzales, a valued client of METROBANK. Subsequently, Tobias
opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam
Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later, Tobias
applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course conducted
trade and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings.
METROBANK next proceeded to appraise the property Tobias offered as
collateral by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other related
documents.4 The property consisted of four parcels of land located in
Malabon City, Metro Manila with a total area of 6,080 square meters and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-16751.5 Based on
the financial statements submitted by Tobias, METROBANK approved a
credit line forP40,000,000.00. On August 15, 1997, Joselito Bermeo
Moreno, Lead Internal Affairs Investigator of METROBANK, proceeded to
the Registry of Deeds of Malabon to cause the annotation of the deed of
real estate mortgage on TCT No. M-16751. The annotation was Entry No.
26897.6

Thereafter, Tobias initially availed himself of P20,000,000, but took out

the balance within six months.7 He paid the interest on the loan for about

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

a year before defaulting. His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his
request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage
was foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone
bidder.8 On June 11, 1999, the certificate of sale was issued in favor of
METROBANK.9

When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the

Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No.
M-16751 was found in the registry vault. Atty. Sarah Principe-Bido,
Deputy Register of Deeds of Malabon, went on to verify TCT No. M16751 and learned that Serial No. 4348590 appearing therein had been
issued for TCT No. M-15363 in the name of one Alberto Cruz; while TCT
No. 16751 (now TCT No. 390146) appeared to have been issued in the
name of Eugenio S. Cruz and Co. for a parcel of land located in Navotas.10

Given such findings, METROBANK requested the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to investigate.11 In its report
dated May 29, 2000,12 PAOCTF concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the
tax declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF
recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint forestafa
through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article
315, in relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.13

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias

with estafa through falsification of public documents through the
following information,14 viz:

Page 66 of 103
xxx
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1997 in the
Municipality of Malabon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of deceit, false pretense, fraudulent
acts and misrepresentation executed prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of fraud, represented
to METROBANK, as represented by MS. ROSELLA S.
SANTIAGO, that he is the registered owner of a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. M-16751 which he represented
to be true and genuine when he knew the Certificate of
Title No. M-16751 is fake and spurious and executed a
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Metrobank and offered
the same as collateral for a loan and Rosella S. Santiago
relying on said misrepresentation gave to accused, the
amount of P20,000,000.00 and once in possession of the
amount, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously failed to deliver the land covered by spurious
title and misappropriate, misapply and converted the
said amount of P20,000,000.00 to his own personal use
and benefit and despite repeated demands accused failed
and refused and still fails and refuses to return the
amount to complainant METROBANK, and/or delivered
the land covered in the spurious title in the
aforementioned amount of P20,000,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Tobias filed a motion for re-investigation,16 which was granted.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

In his counter-affidavit submitted during the re-investigation,17 Tobias

averred that he had bought the property from one Leonardo Fajardo
through real estate brokers Augusto Munsuyac and Carmelito Pilapil;
that Natalio Bartolome, his financial consultant from Carwin
International, had convinced him to purchase the property due to its
being an ideal site for his meat processing plant and cold storage
business; that the actual inspection of the property as well as the
verification made in the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City had
ascertained the veracity of TCT No. 106083 under the name of Leonardo
Fajardo; that he had applied for the loan from METROBANK to pay the
purchase price by offering the property as collateral; that in order for
the final application to be processed and the loan proceeds to be
released, METROBANK had advised him to have the title first transferred
to his name; that he had executed a deed of absolute sale with Fajardo
covering the property, and that said instrument had been properly
registered in the Registry of Deeds; that the transfer of the title, being
under the account of the seller, had been processed by seller Fajardo and
his brokers Munsuyac and Pilapil; that his title and the property had
been inspected and verified by METROBANKs personnel; and that he
did not have any intention to defraud METROBANK.

Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still

found probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being
charged with estafa through falsification of public document.18

Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Page 67 of 103

On July 20, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas

N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the
information filed against Tobias,19to wit:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of
Malabon City is directed to cause the withdrawal of the
Information in Crim. Case No. 27020 against respondent
Antonino O. Tobias III, and report the action taken
thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez opined that Tobias had sufficiently

established his good faith in purchasing the property; that he had even
used part of the proceeds of the loan to pay the seller; that it was
METROBANK that had caused the annotation of the mortgage on the
TCT, thereby creating an impression that the title had been existing in
the Registry of Deeds at that time; that, accordingly, the presumption
that the possessor of a falsified document was the author of the
falsification did not apply because it was always subject to the
qualification or reference as to the approximate time of the commission
of the falsification.

METROBANK moved to reconsider,20 arguing that Tobias had employed

deceit or false pretense in offering the property as collateral by using a
fake title; and that the presumption that the possessor of the document
was the author of the falsification applied because no other person could

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

have falsified the TCT and would have benefitted therefrom except
Tobias himself.

Page 68 of 103
used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People vs.
Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly
then, a satisfactory explanation could render ineffective
the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable
one.

On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez

denied METROBANKs motion for reconsideration.21

Ruling of the CA

It is in this score that We affirm the resolution of the

Department of Justice finding no probable cause against
private respondent Tobias for estafa thru falsification of
public document. The record speaks well of Tobias good
faith and lack of criminal intention and liability. Consider:

METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions

through certiorari.

On December 29, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision,22 dismissing

METROBANKs petition for certiorari by holding that the presumption of
authorship might be disputed through a satisfactory explanation, viz:

We are not unaware of the established presumption and

rule that when it is proved that a person has in his
possession a falsified document and makes use of the
same, the presumption or inference is that such person is
the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639,
651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA
533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared
that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who
is found in possession of a forged document and who

(a) Tobias has in his favor a similar

presumption that good faith is always
presumed. Therefore, he who claims bad faith
must prove it (Prinsipio vs. The Honorable
Oscar Barrientos, G.R. 167025, December 19,
2005). No such evidence of bad faith of Tobias
appears on record;

(b) Tobias actuation in securing the loan

belies any criminal intent on his part to deceive
petitioner Bank. He was not in a hurry to obtain
the loan. He had to undergo the usual process
of the investigative arm or machine of the Bank
not only on the location and the physical
appearance of the property but likewise the
veracity of its title. Out of the

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

approvedP40,000,000.00 loan he only availed

of P20,000,000.00, for his frozen meat business
which upon investigation of the Bank failed to
give negative results;

(c) Tobias paid the necessary interests for

one (1) year on the loan and two (2)
installments on the restructured loan; and

(d) More importantly, the loan was not

released to him until after the mortgage was
duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Malabon City and even paid the amount
ofP90,000.00 for the registration fees therefor.

These actuations, for sure, can only foretell that Tobias

has the least intention to deceive the Bank in obtaining
the loan. It may not be surprising to find that Tobias
could even be a victim himself by another person in
purchasing the properties he offered as security for the
loan.23

The CA stressed that the determination of probable cause was an

executive function within the discretion of the public prosecutor and,
ultimately, of the Secretary of Justice, and the courts of law could not
interfere with such determination;24 that the private complainant in a

Page 69 of 103

criminal action was only concerned with its civil aspect; that should the
State choose not to file the criminal action, the private complainant
might initiate a civil action based on Article 35 of the Civil Code, to wit:

In the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice refuses to

file the criminal complaint, the complainant, whose only
interest is the civil aspect of the case and not the criminal
aspect thereof, is not left without a remedy. In Vda. De
Jacob vs. Puno, 131 SCRA 144, 149 [1984], the Supreme
Court has this for an answer:

The remedy of complainant in a case where

the Minister of Justice would not allow the filing
of a criminal complaint against an accused
because it is his opinion that the evidence is not
sufficient to sustain an information for the
complaint with which the respondents are
charged of, is to file a civil action as indicated in
Article 35 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be

injured by a criminal offense, charges
another with the same, for which no
independent civil action is granted in
this Code or any special law, but the
justice of the peace finds no reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has
been committed, or the prosecuting

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

attorney refuses or fails to institute

criminal proceedings, the complainant
may bring a civil action for damages
against the alleged offender. Such civil
action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the
defendants motion, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to
indemnify the defendant in case the
complainant should be found to be
malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil

action, an information should be
presented by the prosecuting attorney,
the civil action shall be suspended until
the termination of the criminal
proceedings.25

METROBANK sought reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion for

that purpose, emphasizing that the presumption that METROBANK
firmly relied upon was overcome by Tobias sufficiently establishing his
good faith and lack of criminal intent. The CA relevantly held:

Petitioner should be minded that the subject

presumption that the possessor and user of a forged or
falsified document is presumed to be the falsifier or
forger is a mere disputable presumption and not a

Page 70 of 103
conclusive one. Under the law on evidence, presumptions
are divided into two (2) classes: conclusive and
rebuttable. Conclusive or absolute presumptions are
rules determining the quantity of evidence requisite for
the support of any particular averment which is not
permitted to be overcome by any proof that the fact is
otherwise, if the basis facts are established (1 Greenleaf,
Ev 44; 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 164; 1 Jones on Evidence 6
ed, page 132). Upon the other hand, a disputable
presumption has been defined as species of evidence that
may be accepted and acted on when there is no other
evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or
one which may be overcome by other evidence (31A
C.J.S., p. 197; People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, Feb.
9, 1994; Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. VI, 1999 Edition, pp.
40-41). In fact, Section 3 of Rule 131 provides that the
disputable presumptions therein enumerated are
satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted
and overcome by other evidence. Thus, as declared in
Our decision in this case, private respondent had shown
evidence of good faith and lack of criminal intention and
liability that can overthrow the controversial disputable
presumption.26
Issue

In this appeal, METROBANK raises the lone issue of

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

AND THUS, COMMITTED PATENT ERROR IN

RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION DATED 29
DECEMBER 2006, DISMISSING METROBANKS PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI AND AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS
DATED 20 JULY 2004 AND 18 NOVEMBER 2005 OF THE
HON. SECRETARY OF JUDTICE AND IN DENYING
METROBANKS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

METROBANK submits that the presumption of authorship was sufficient

to establish probable cause to hold Tobias for trial; that the presumption
applies when a person is found in possession of the forged instrument,
makes use of it, and benefits from it; that contrary to the ruling of the CA,
there is no requirement that the legal presumption shall only apply in
the absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have
possessed, used and benefited from the forged document; that the CA
erred in declaring that Tobias was in good faith, because good faith was
merely evidentiary and best raised in the trial on the merits; and that
Tobias was heavily involved in a modus operandi of using fake titles
because he was also being tried for a similar crime in the RTC, Branch
133, in Makati City.
METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to
determine the innocence of the accused, which should not be done
during the preliminary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such
lapse.

On the other hand, Tobias posits that the core function of the
Department of Justice is to prosecute the guilty in criminal cases, not to
persecute; that although the prosecutors are given latitude to determine
the existence of probable cause, the review power of the Secretary of

Page 71 of 103

Justice prevents overzealous prosecutors from persecuting the innocent;

that in reversing the resolution of Malabon City Assistant Prosecutor
Ojer Pacis, the Secretary of Justice only acted within his authority; that,
indeed, the Secretary of Justice was correct in finding that there was lack
of evidence to prove that the purported fake title was the very cause that
had induced the petitioner to grant the loan; and that the Secretary
likewise appropriately found that Tobias dealt with the petitioner in
good faith because of lack of proof that he had employed fraud and
deceit in securing the loan.

Lastly, Tobias argues that the presumption of forgery could not be

applied in his case because it was METROBANK, through a
representative, who had annotated the real estate mortgage with the
Registry of Deeds; and that he had no access to and contact with the
Registry of Deeds, and whatever went wrong after the annotation was
beyond his control.

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to
directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government,27 or to substitute
their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch,28 represented in
this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the
courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

abuse of discretion.29That abuse of discretion must be so patent and

gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law,
such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.30 For instance, in Balanganan v.
Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City,31 the Court
ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he
required hard facts and solid evidence in order to hold the defendant
liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement should have been
left to the court after the conduct of a trial.

In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose

of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial.32 At a
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary
of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.33 Probable cause refers to facts and
circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.34 There is
no definitive standard by which probable cause is determined except to
consider the attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause
depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the
examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts presented,
and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear
dictates of reason.35

Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public

document the elements of which are: (a) the accused uses a fictitious
name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs
other similar deceits; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or

Page 72 of 103

fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously

with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is,
he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage.36 It is required that the false
statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the
only motive that induced the complainant to part with the thing.37

METROBANK urges the application of the presumption of authorship

against Tobias based on his having offered the duplicate copy of the
spurious title to secure the loan; and posits that there is no requirement
that the presumption shall apply only when there is absence of a valid
explanation from the person found to have possessed, used and
benefited from the forged document.

We cannot sustain METROBANKs urging.

Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged

in the State.38 The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima faciecase that shall prevail in the absence of proof to
the contrary.39 As such, a presumption of law is material during the
actual trial of the criminal case where in the establishment thereof the
party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to
rebut the presumption and demolish the prima facie case.40 This is not so
in a preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only
determines the existence of a prima facie case that warrants the
prosecution of a criminal case in court.41

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be

accepted and acted upon where no evidence upholds the contention for
which it stands.42 It is not correct to say, consequently, that the
investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the
presumption during preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the
evidence offered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation is an executive function does
not excuse the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice from
discharging the duty to weigh the evidence submitted by the parties.
Towards that end, the investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the
Secretary of Justice have ample discretion to determine the existence of
probable cause,43 a discretion that must be used to file only a criminal
charge that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant.

Page 73 of 103
case in court by the investigating officer, for any such
good explanation or defense can only be threshed out in
the trial on the merit. We are not to be persuaded. To
give meaning to such argumentation will surely defeat
the very purpose for which preliminary investigation is
required in this jurisdiction.

The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document

is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation.44 Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice
erred in dismissing the information in the face of the controverting
explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess the spurious
document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse
of discretion, least of all grave. We concur with the erudite exposition of
the CA on the matter, to wit:

A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the

respondent involved against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation is an
inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed, and (b) whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof (De Ocampo vs.
Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 [2006]). It is a means of
discovering the person or persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime (Preferred Home
Specialties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 478 SCRA 387, 410
[2005]). Prescindingly, under Section 3 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the respondent must be
informed of the accusation against him and shall have the
right to examine the evidence against him and submit his
counter-affidavit to disprove criminal liability. By far,
respondent in a criminal preliminary investigation is
legally entitled to explain his side of the accusation.

It would seem that under the above proposition of the

petitioner, the moment a person has in his possession a
falsified document and has made use of it, probable cause
or prima facie is already established and that no amount
of satisfactory explanation will prevent the filing of the

We are not unaware of the established presumption and

rule that when it is proved that a person has in his
possession a falsified document and makes use of the
same the presumption or inference is that such person is
the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639,

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA
533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared
that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who
is found in possession of a forged document and who
used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People vs.
Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly
then, a satisfactory explanation could render ineffective
the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable
one.45
We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank
dealing in real property, had the duty to observe due diligence to
ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity
and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty.46 Its duty included
the responsibility of dispatching its competent and experience
representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition,
and of investigating who was its real owner.47 Yet, it is evident that
METROBANK did not diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and
the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As
such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to
exercise greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because
their business is impressed with public interest.48 Their failure to do so
constitutes negligence on its part.49

* Vice Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, who took part in the
proceedings in the Court of Appeals, per raffle of October 19, 2011.
1 Rollo, pp. 40-51; penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
(later Presiding Justice, but retired), with Associate Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo (now a Member of the Court) and Associate Justice Ricardo
R. Rosario concurring.
2 Id., pp. 54-57.
3Id., p. 58.
4 Id., p. 79.
5 Id., p. 61-64.
6 Id., p. 71.
7 Id., p. 80.
8 Id., p. 80.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari,

and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
December 29, 2006. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

9 Id., pp. 65-67.

10 Id., pp. 72-73.
11 Id., pp. 79-81.

SO ORDERED.

Page 74 of 103

12 Id., pp. 68-78.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

13 Id., p. 76.
14 Id., pp. 85-86.
15 Id., p. 85.

Page 75 of 103

29 Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 171435, July 30, 2008, 560
SCRA 518, 535; Insular Life Assurance Company, Limited v. Serrano, G.R.
No. 163255, June 22, 2007, 525 SCRA 400, 410.

16 Id., pp. 87-88.

30 Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G.R. No. 166797, July

10, 2007, 527 SCRA 190, 204, 205; First Womens Credit Corporation v.
Perez, G.R. No. 169026, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 774, 777-778.

17 Id., pp. 89-93.

31 G.R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 184.

18 Id., p. 60.

32 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado, G.R. No. 164538,

August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 88.

19 Id., pp. 54-57.

20 Id., pp. 106-125.
21 Id., p. 58.
22Id., pp. 40-51.
23 Id., pp. 45-47.
24 Id., pp. 47-49.
25 Id., pp. 50-51.
26 Id., p. 53.
27 Public Utilities Department, Olongapo City v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No.
130399, September 20, 2001, 365 SCRA 467, 474.
28 Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 164715, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA
518, 529.

33 Id., p. 103; also, Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 162187,

November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 495, 511.
34 Osorio v. Desierto, G.R. No. 156652, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 559,
573; Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132422, March
30, 2004, 426 SCRA 460, 470.
35 Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 324,
347.
36 Ambito v. People, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 69,
97; Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 337,
347.
37 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II (2006), p. 773.
38 Wa-acon v. People, G.R. No. 164575, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 429,
438.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

39 Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 324,
342-342; Salonga v. Pao, G.R. No. 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA
438, 450.
40 Wa-acon v. People, supra, note 38.
41 Alonzo v. Concepcion, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879, January 17, 2005, 448
SCRA 329, 337.
42 Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428,
442-443; citing People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994,
229 SCRA 795, 798-799.
43United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 156337, September
28, 2007; First Womens Credit Corporation v. Perez, G.R. No. 169026,
June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 774, 777.
44 Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 324,
342; People v. Enfermo, G.R. Nos. 148682-85, November 30, 2005, 476
SCRA 515, 532.
45 Rollo, pp. 44-45.
46 Cruz v. Bancom, G.R. No. 147788, March 19, 2002, 379 SCRA 490, 505.
47 Rural Bank of Siaton (Negros Oriental), Inc. v. Macajilos, G.R. No.
152483, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 127; Rural Bank of Sta. Ignacia, Inc. v.
Dimatulac, G.R. No. 142015, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 742.
48 Cavite Development Bank v. Sps. Lim, G.R. No. 131679, February 1,
2000, 324 SCRA 346, 359; Rural Bank of Siaton (Negros Oriental), Inc. v.
Macajilos, G.R. No. 152483, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 127, 140.
49 Rural Bank of Sta. Ignacia, Inc. v. Dimatulac, supra, note 47, at p. 752.

Page 76 of 103

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896

January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which
reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the
CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria GooAbbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 030382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a
marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was

Page 77 of 103

presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial

to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a
Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9,
1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in
December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the
afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F.
Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two
men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but
was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and
Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and
that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The
Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage
License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license
issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said
certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this
office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR.
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19,
1993.

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED

AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever
legal purpose or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases
against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not
there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a
letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967,
which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage
licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified
that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by
Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite,
certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office
had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely
9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend
Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the
Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize
marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the
marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the

Page 78 of 103

bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty.

Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified
that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty.
Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual
wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the
wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure
the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the
license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further
testified that he did not know where the marriage license was
obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993,
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of
the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the
other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar
Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding
ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she
sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the
marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place,
a male person went to their house with the application for marriage
license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez
who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further
testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license,
and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from
Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria
against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch
47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria
Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding
photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos;
and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty.
Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented
the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her
mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license,
and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their
house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them
to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage
license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married
on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28

Page 79 of 103
The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had
been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no
marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into
account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of
Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those
exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of
Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner,
and against the respondent declaring as follows:

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June
15, 1993.29

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed

Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of
the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the

petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage
of the parties.

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9,
1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been
celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were
Chinese.31

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar

General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel
from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas
on January 9, 1993 in Manila.

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but
the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN
TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35

Page 80 of 103

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It

held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed
had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the
marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic]
Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993
remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but
the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS

ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS
THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY
TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS
CASE.

Page 81 of 103
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall

render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.42

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993,
Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the
applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the

preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family
Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing
officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage
one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license
under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case,
thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued
for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been
issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued
said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such
license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided,
is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar
of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office
or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil
registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to
the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued,
and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another

Page 82 of 103

couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy

of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear
in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification,
stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent
search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated that no
marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had
been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative
value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was
lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely
necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was
lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus
the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search
having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn
the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither
could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona,
Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the
contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents.
Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing
where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the
license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative.
As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have
simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court.
However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim
that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was
held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had
no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity

Page 83 of 103

of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the
burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage
was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was
issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no
license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was
proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its
conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and
there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both
parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity
was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The
parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the
signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the
solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellants
family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of
all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has
[sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June
1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01
August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition
appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for
Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure
the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is
clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34,
Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it
may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a
bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure
of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given
the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took
steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July
24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,

Page 84 of 103

Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9,
1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Footnotes
Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and
concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and
Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.
1

Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.

Rollo, p. 13.

Id. at 47.

Id.

Id. at 12.

Id. at 10.

Id. at 48.

Id. at 49, "January 19, 1993" in some parts of the records.

10

Id.

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 85 of 103

11

Id. at 49-50.

29

Id. at 56.

12

Id. at 50.

30

Id. at 57.

13

Id.

31

Id.

14

Id.

32

Id. at 58.

15

Id.

33

16

Id. at 51.

17

Id.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

34

Rollo, pp. 58-59.

35

Id. at 122.

36

Id. at 128.

37

Id. at 129.

38

Id. at 130.

39

Id. at 131.

40

Id. at 135-146.

41

Id. at 173-174.

42

Id. at 31.

43

G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.

44

Id. at 262.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 55.

28

Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil

Registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is
required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.

Id.

Law 126 Evidence

45

Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Supra note 43.

Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007, 531

SCRA 446, 456.

Page 86 of 103
of the contracting parties and the absence of legal
impediment to the marriage.

46

47

403 Phil. 861, 869 (2001).

48

Supra note 43.

49

Supra note 47, at 870.

50

Rollo, pp. 129-130.

Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at

the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the
ailing party subsequently survives.
51

Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that

there is no means of transportation to enable such party
to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the
marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a
marriage license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding
articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit
executed before the local civil registrar or any other
person legally authorized to administer oaths that the
marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the
residence of either party, specifying the barrio or
barangay, is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally
before the local civil registrar and that the officer took
the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship

Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last

preceding article, together with a legible copy of the
marriage contract, shall be sent by the person
solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the
municipality where it was performed within the period
of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between
passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by
a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the
ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during
stopovers at ports of call.
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a
commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons
within the zone of military operation, whether members
of the armed forces or civilians.
Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of
the ethnic cultural communities may be performed
validly without the necessity of marriage licenses,
provided they arc solemnized in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of
a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he

ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Page 87 of 103

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188299

January 23, 2013

HEIRS OF LUIS A. LUNA and REMEGIO A. LUNA, and LUZ LUNASANTOS, as represented by their Attorney-in-fact, AUREA B.
LUBIS, Petitioners,
vs.
RUBEN S. AFABLE, TOMAS M. AFABLE, FLORANTE A. EVANGELISTA,
LEOVY S. EVANGELISTA, JAIME M. ILAGAN ET, AL., Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The power of local government units to convert or reclassify lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the passage of Republic Act (RA)
No. 6657 the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) is not
subject to the approv3l of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).1 In
this sense, the authority of local government units to reclassify land
before 15 June 1988 the date of effectivity of the CARL may be said to
be absolute.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse
and set aside the 13 March 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 101114 and its 10 June 2009 Resolution3 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts

Page 88 of 103

Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. J-7205 (T-54199), with an area of 158.77
hectares, located in Barangay Guinobatan, Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro.4 100.2856 hectares of the landholding was subjected to
compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) through a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition
dated 20 August 1998 issued by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) and published in a newspaper of general circulation on 29, 30
and 31 August 1998.5
Respondents were identified by the DAR as qualified farmerbeneficiaries; hence, the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) were generated, issued to respondents and duly
registered in their names on 12 October 1998.6
On 21 October 1998, petitioners filed before the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) Oriental Mindoro a Petition for "Cancellation of CLOAs,
Revocation of Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and Upholding and
Affirming the Classification of Subject Property and Declaring the same
outside the purview of RA No. 6657."7 The petition was anchored mainly
on the reclassification of the land in question into a light intensity
industrial zone pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series of 1981,
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan, thereby excluding the
same from the coverage of the agrarian law.
The Ruling of the DARAB Calapan City
In a Decision dated 26 August 1999, the DARAB disposed of the petition
in the following manner:
IN THE LIGHT OF the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the Cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership
Award x x x issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform in

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

favor of private respondents pursuant to RA No. 6657 covering

the subject parcel of land under TCT No. 5-7205 [sic] (T-54199)
of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Oriental Mindoro, in
the name of Luis Luna, et. al.,
2. Upholding and affirming the classification of the subject parcel
of land into residential, commercial and institutional uses
pursuant to RA No. 2264 (Autonomy Act of 1959) and the Local
Government Code of 1991;
3. Declaring the farmholding in question outside the purview of
Republic Act No. 6657;
xxx

x8

The DARAB found that petitioners property is exempt from the CARP as
it has been reclassified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657. According to the DARAB, the records of the
case indicate that subject parcel of land was classified as within the
residential, commercial and industrial zone by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro through Resolution No. 139, Series of 1981,
enacted on 14 April 1981 as Municipal Ordinance No. 21. Moreover, the
Office of the City Assessor has also classified the property as residential,
commercial and industrial in use under the tax declaration covering the
same. Finally, the Office of the Deputized Zoning Administrator, Urban
Planning and Development Office, Calapan City, issued a Certification on
25 September 1998 stating that "under Article III, Section 3, No. 7 of
Resolution No. 139, Municipal Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1981, areas
covered by this [sic] provisions has [sic] been declared as Light Intensity
Industrial Zone prior to the approval of RA 6657 x x x."9
The DARAB cited Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of
1990, which provides that a parcel of land is considered non-agricultural
and, therefore, beyond the coverage of the CARP, if it had been classified

Page 89 of 103

as residential, commercial, or industrial in the city or municipality where

the Land Use Plan or zoning ordinance has been approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before 15 June 1988,
the date of effectivity of RA No. 6657. The aforementioned Opinion of the
DOJ further states that all lands falling under this category, that is, lands
already classified as commercial, industrial or residential, before 15 June
1988 no longer need any conversion clearance from the DAR.10
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the DARAB Central Office.
The Ruling of the DARAB Central Office
The Central Office of the DARAB found that its local office in Calapan City
erred in declaring petitioners property outside the coverage of the CARP
by relying solely on the assertion of the landowners that the land had
already been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to
15 June 1988.11
The DARAB held that the local Adjudicator misconstrued DOJ Opinion
No. 44, Series of 1990 and, in the process, overlooked DAR
Administrative Order (AO) No. 2, Series of 1994 which provides the
grounds upon which CLOAs may be cancelled, among which is that the
land is found to be exempt or excluded from CARP coverage or is to be
part of the landowners retained area as determined by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative. Thus, the DARAB
concluded, the issue of whether or not petitioners land is indeed exempt
from CARP coverage is still an administrative matter to be determined
exclusively by the DAR Secretary or his authorized representative. In
short, an exemption clearance from the DAR is still required. In this
connection, DAR AO No. 6 was issued on 27 May 1994 setting down the
guidelines in the issuance of exemption clearance based on Section 3(c)
of RA No. 6657 and DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. Pursuant thereto,
"any landowner or his duly authorized representative whose lands are
covered by DOJ Opinion No. 44-S-1990, and desires to have an

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

exemption clearance from the DAR, should file the application with the
Regional Office of the DAR where the land is located."12 (Underlining
omitted)
Accordingly, the DARAB set aside the Decision dated 26 August 1999 of
the DARAB Calapan City for lack of jurisdiction and referred13 the case to
the Regional Office of DAR Region IV for final determination as to
whether the land covered by TCT No. J-7205 (T-54199) in the names of
Luis Luna, et al. is exempt from CARP coverage.14
In an apparent response to the above ruling of the DARAB holding that
petitioners still need an exemption clearance from the DAR, petitioners
filed an application for exemption from CARP coverage of subject land.
The Ruling of the DAR
(On Petitioners Application for Exemption from CARP coverage)
In an Order dated 16 December 2003, then DAR Secretary Roberto M.
Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan) granted petitioners application for
exemption based on the following findings:
In a joint ocular inspection and investigation conducted by the
representatives of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office MARO, PARO
and Regional Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and
ImplementationRCLUPPI on September 18 2003, disclosed the following
findings:
1. The documents (HLURB and Deputized Zoning
AdministratorDZA Certifications) show that the whole 158
hectares is exempted from the coverage of RA 6657;
2. It is not irrigated;

Page 90 of 103
3. The area where subject property is located can be considered
as already urbanizing; and
4. The topography is generally flat and the property is traversed
by a concrete highway hence accessible to all means of land
transportation.
xxxx

DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 and the case of Natalia Realty vs.
Department of Agrarian Reform (12 August 1993/225 SCRA 278) opines
(sic) that with respect to the conversion of agricultural lands covered by
RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to approve such conversion maybe [sic] exercised from
the date of its effectivity on 15 June 1988. Thus, all lands that are already
classified as commercial, industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no
longer need any conversion clearance. Moreover, Republic Act No. 6657
or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), Section 3,
Paragraph (c) defines "agricultural land" as referring to "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The case before this
Office clearly reveals that the subject property is not within the
agricultural zone prior to 15 June 1988.
The subject property has been zoned as light-industrial prior to the
enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as shown by
the various certifications issued by the HLURB15 and CPDC of Calapan
City, Mindoro stating that the subject properties were reclassified to
light-industrial zone by the City of Calapan, Mindoro and approved by
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB) per
Resolution No. R-39-04 on 31 July 1980.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

In view of the foregoing, this Office finds the application to have fully
complied with all the documentary requirements for exemption set forth
under DAR A.O. 6 Series of 1994 guidelines. x x x.16

Page 91 of 103

City was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan only in 2001

through Resolution No. 218, Series of 2001.
xxxx

The application for exemption was, therefore, granted subject to the

condition, among others, that disturbance compensation shall be paid to
affected tenants, farm workers, or bona fide occupants of the land.17
Predictably, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
of exemption.

x x x. Hence, in the case at hand, subject property is still within the ambit
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program since the same were
[sic] reclassified only in 1998 through Resolution No. 151, City
Ordinance No. 6, and was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
only in 2001 through Resolution No. 218, Series of 2001 long after the
effectivity of RA 6657.18

The Ruling of the DAR

(On Respondents Motion for Reconsideration)

Thus, the Order dated 16 December 2003 issued by DAR Secretary

Pagdanganan was set aside, revoked and cancelled.19

In a Resolution dated 15 June 2004, former DAR Officer-in-Charge (OIC)Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce (Ponce) granted respondents motion for
reconsideration based on the following considerations:

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of this Resolution.

Resolution No. R-39-4 Series of 1980 of the then Municipality of Calapan

as conditionally approved by Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(now HLURB) did not categorically place the entire landholding for lightindustrial. Section 1(f), Art. III of said resolution provided that:

(On Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration)

The Ruling of the DAR

On 21 June 2006, the DAR, through then OIC Secretary Nasser C.

Pangandaman (Pangandaman), issued an Order denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration on the following grounds:

"(f) I-1 Zone Light Industrial are the following:

All lots 100 meters deep east and 200 meters deep west of Sto. NioLumangbayan-Sapul Road from the Teachers Village down to Barangay
Guinobatan."
Resolution No. 151, City Ordinance No. 6 which declared the whole area
of Barangay Guinobatan into residential, commercial and institutional
uses was approved by the Calapan City Council only on 23 June 1998.
Furthermore, the Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning for Calapan

On 13 October 2005, the CLUPPI Inspection Team, accompanied by the

Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) and other DAR Field Personnel, conducted an ocular
inspection of the subject landholding and noted the following:
The landholding is composed of four (4) parcels embraced
under TCT No. J-7205, with an area of 153.7713 hectares and
located in Brgy. Guinobatan, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro;

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

The topography varies: Lot No. 612-D is flat, while Lot Nos.
612-A, 612-B and 612-C are flat to hilly;
There were no billboards visible in the premises;
There were grasses, some fruit trees and vegetable, but
generally, planted with rice;
Tenants/farmworkers/protestants were present during the
inspection;
A spring was seen in the area, which serves as a source of water
for the riceland and irrigation canal;
The provincial highway traverses the property;
Surrounding areas are still agricultural in nature; and
A newly constructed city hall was built in the riceland area
covering a portion of five (5) hectares out of the eighty (80)hectare riceland area.
xxxx
A careful perusal of the facts and circumstances show that the
petitioners failed to offer substantial evidence that would warrant
reversal of the Order.
Resolution No. R-39-4, Series of 1980 of the then Municipality of
Calapan, conditionally approved by Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission, did not categorically place the entire landholding under
Light Industrial Zone. x x x.
xxxx

Page 92 of 103

The Certification issued on 8 October 1998 by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB)20 proved that the property is still
agricultural. The same provides that the landholding is within the Light
Industrial Zone (100 meters deep west and 200 meters deep east) of the
Provincial Road and the rest is Agricultural Zone based on the Zoning
Ordinance approved by HLURB Resolution No. R-9-34 dated 31 July
1980. It was re-classified into residential, commercial and institutional
uses pursuant to Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 151,
Ordinance No. 6 only on 23 June 1998. The 1981 Ordinance, albeit
approved by the HLURB, did not automatically reclassify the land.
Physical aspects of the landholding are actually agricultural as there are
some fruit trees and generally, planted with rice. Also, the surrounding
areas are apparently agricultural in usage.
On 11 January 2006, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
submitted a report stating that the Light Industrial Zone which covers
the fraction covering 100 meters deep west and 200 meters deep east
along the provincial road traversing the property areas which were
declared in the HLURB Certification dated 08 October 1998, were
already covered by Presidential Decree No. 27. Thus, there was already a
vested right over the property and can no longer be covered by an
Application for Exemption Clearance.21
The Order dated 15 June 2004 granting the motion for reconsideration
filed by the farmer-beneficiaries was, therefore, affirmed in toto.
Petitioners, consequently, filed an appeal before the Office of the
President.
The Ruling of the Office of the President
In its Decision dated 15 December 2006, the Office of the President
found petitioners appeal impressed with merit. It quoted with approval

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

the findings and conclusions of former DAR Secretary Pagdanganan in

his Order of 16 December 2003.22
According to the Office of the President, contrary to the findings and
conclusions of the DAR in its Resolution dated 15 June 2004, the area
where subject property is situated was really intended to be classified,
not as agricultural, as in fact it was declared as residential, commercial
and institutional in 1998.23
Moreover, supervening events have transpired such that subjecting the
property to CARP coverage would already be inappropriate under the
circumstances. The Sangguniang Panlungsod approved City Ordinance
No. 6, Resolution No. 151, declaring the whole area of Barangay
Guinobatan into a residential, commercial and industrial zone on 23 June
1998. The
Notice of Acquisition and Land Valuation covering 100.2856 hectares
out of the 158.77 hectares total land area of the property was issued by
the DAR only on 20 August 1998. On 25 September 1998, a Certification
was issued by the City Planning and Development Officer/Deputized
Zoning
Administrator, classifying subject property as within the Light Intensity
Industrial Zone based on Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 139,
Municipal Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1981, Section 3 of RA 6657, DOJ
Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 and Sangguniang Panlungsod Ordinance
No. 6, Series of 1998. The application for exemption from CARP coverage
filed by petitioners was initially granted by the DAR in 2003. The
Certificate of Zoning Classification dated 18 December 2003 issued by
the Zoning and Land Use Division of the Urban Planning and
Development Department classifies the subject property as an urban
Development Zone, based on City Resolution No. 231, Ordinance No. 4,
Series of 1999 and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 218, Series
of 2001.24

Page 93 of 103

The Office of the President further held that from the time portions of
subject property were declared to be within the Light Intensity
Industrial Zone in 2003, it was never established that it had been
devoted to agricultural purposes. Besides, the confirmation of its falling
within the residential, commercial and industrial zone was ahead of the
Notice of Acquisition. It would not be proper to subject a residential,
commercial and industrial property to CARP anymore.25
In conclusion, the Office of the President declared that the 16 December
2003 Order of the DAR is more in accord with the facts and law relevant
to the case. Hence, it set aside, revoked and cancelled the Resolution and
Order, dated 15 June 2004 and 21 June 2006, respectively, of former
DAR OIC-Secretaries Ponce and Pangandaman and reinstated the Order
dated 16 December 2003 of Secretary Pagdanganan.26
The motion for reconsideration and second motion for reconsideration
of respondents were respectively denied by the Office of the President in
a Resolution27 dated 12 June 2007 and an Order28 dated 13 September
2007.
Respondents then appealed to the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision dated 13 March 2009, the CA granted the appeal based on a
finding that the ruling of the Office of the President is not supported by
substantial evidence.29
According to the CA, it is clear from the 1981 Ordinance of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan that only those lots 100 meters deep west
and 200 meters deep east of the Sto. Nio-Lumangbayan-Sapul Road
from the Teachers Village Subdivision to Barangay Guinobatan, and not
the entire Barangay Guinobatan, was classified into light intensity
industrial zone. If the intention were to classify the entire Barangay

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Guinobatan into a light intensity industrial zone, then the 1981

Ordinance should have provided so, instead of limiting the areas so
classified based on the reference points of the lots that would be affected
thereby.30
Citing the case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian
Reform,31 wherein it was held that lands not devoted to agricultural
activity, including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses by
government agencies other than the DAR prior to the effectivity of the
CARL, are outside the coverage of the CARL, the Court of Appeals ruled
that in this case, there is no showing that subject property was in fact
included in the classification of light intensity industrial zone prior to 15
June 1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL.32
The CA further held that the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
City of Calapan later on enacted Resolution No. 151 as City Ordinance
No. 6 on 23 June 1998, declaring the whole area of Barangay Guinobatan
as residential, commercial and institutional areas and site of the new
City Government Center for the City of Calapan does not automatically
convert the property into a non-agricultural land exempt from the
coverage of the agrarian law. It bears stressing that the 1998 Ordinance
was enacted after the effectivity of the CARL and, in order to be exempt
from CARP coverage, the land must have been classified as
industrial/residential before 15 June 1988.33
The CA likewise cited with approval the findings and conclusions of then
DAR OIC-Secretaries Ponce and Pangandaman in their respective
decisions and concluded that the Office of the President gravely erred
when it ignored the findings in the 15 June 2004 Resolution and 21 June
2006 Order of the DAR. Said the CA:
x x x The Office of the President cannot simply brush aside the DARs
pronouncements regarding the status of the subject property as not
exempt from CARP coverage considering that the DAR has

Page 94 of 103

unquestionable technical expertise on these matters. Factual findings of

administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality
by this Court, if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, a
situation that obtains in this case. The factual findings of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform who, by reason of his official position, has acquired
expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect
and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or
reversed.34
Thus, the Decision dated 15 December 2006, Resolution dated 12 June
2007, and Order dated 13 September 2007 of the Office of the President
were reversed and set aside. The Resolution dated 15 June 2004 of
former DAR OIC-Secretary Ponce and the Order dated 21 June 2006 of
then DAR OIC-Secretary Pangandaman were reinstated.
Hence, this petition for review wherein petitioners seek the reversal of
the aforementioned decision on the ground, among others, that the
Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Decision
dated 15 December 2006 of the Office of the President is not supported
by substantial evidence.35
The Issue
The core issue for resolution is whether the land subject of this case had
been reclassified as non-agricultural as early as 1981, that is, prior to the
effectivity of the CARL and, therefore, exempt from its coverage.
Our Ruling
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the determination of the issue
presented in this case requires a review of the factual findings of the
DAR, of the Office of the President and of the CA.

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

It is well settled that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised.36 This Court,
in numerous instances, has had occasion to explain that it is not its
function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.37 As a rule, the
Court respects the factual findings of the CA and of quasi-judicial
agencies like the DAR, giving them a certain measure of finality.38 There
are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, one of which is when
the findings of fact are conflicting.
The records of this case show that each of the agencies which rendered a
ruling in this case from the DARAB local office to the CA arrived at
different findings and conclusions, with each body overturning the
decision of the one before it. Thus, due to the divergence of the findings
of the DARAB local office on the one hand, and the DARAB Central Office
on the other, and considering the conflicting findings of former DAR
Secretaries and the disparity between the findings of fact of the Office of
the President and of the CA, we are constrained to re-examine the facts
of this case based on the evidence presented by both parties.
After an assiduous review of the records of this case, this Court
concludes that petitioners land is outside the coverage of the agrarian
reform program.
At the core of the present controversy is Resolution No. 139, later on
enacted as Ordinance No. 21, series of 1981 by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro at its regular session on 14 April 1981 and
subsequently amended at its special session of 20 October
1981.39 Ordinance No. 21 revised the comprehensive zoning regulations
of the then Municipality of Calapan. Article III, Section 3, No. 7 of the
ordinance provides:
I-1 Zone
Light intensity industrial zone are the following:

Page 95 of 103

All lots 100 meters deep west and 200 meters deep east of Sto. NioLumangbayan-Sapul Road from the Teachers Village Subdivision to
Barangay Guinobatan.40
Petitioners maintain that their landholding falls within the area
classified as light intensity industrial zone, as specified in the aforequoted provision of the ordinance. Respondents, on the other hand,
insist otherwise. The settlement of this issue is crucial in determining
whether the subject landholding is within or outside the coverage of the
CARL.
Section 4 of RA No. 6657 states that the coverage of the CARL is as
follows:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1989 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No.
131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public
domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. x x x;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits
as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon. (Emphasis supplied)

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

"Agricultural land" is defined under Section 3(c) of the CARL as that

which is "devoted to agricultural activity x x x and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."
The meaning of "agricultural lands" covered by the CARL was explained
further by the DAR in its AO No. 1, Series of 1990, dated 22 March 1990,
entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private
Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Uses," issued pursuant to Section
4941 of the CARL.42 Thus:
Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in RA 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988
for residential, commercial or industrial use. (Emphasis supplied)43
It is clear from the last clause of the afore-quoted provision that a land is
not agricultural, and therefore, outside the ambit of the CARP if the
following conditions concur:
1. the land has been classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as
residential, commercial or industrial; and
2. the town plan and zoning ordinance embodying the land classification
has been approved by the HLURB or its predecessor agency prior to 15
June 1988.
It is undeniable that local governments have the power to reclassify
agricultural into non-agricultural lands.44Section 345 of RA No. 2264 (The
Local Autonomy Act of 1959) specifically empowers municipal and/or
city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
in consultation with the National Planning Commission.46 By virtue of a

Page 96 of 103

zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define,

and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses
based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of
needs.47 It may, therefore, be reasonably presumed that when city and
municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an
area or district in their cities or municipalities as residential,
commercial, or industrial zone pursuant to the power granted to them
under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at the
same time, reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for nonagricultural use; hence, ensuring the implementation of and compliance
with their zoning ordinances.48
The regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective
territorial jurisdiction through zoning and reclassification is an exercise
of police power.49 The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself
and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality.50 Ordinance No. 21 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan was
issued pursuant to Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 and is,
consequently, a valid exercise of police power by the local government of
Calapan.
The second requirement that a zoning ordinance, in order to validly
reclassify land, must have been approved by the HLURB prior to 15 June
1988 is the result of Letter of Instructions No. 729, dated 9 August
1978. According to this issuance, local governments are required to
submit their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement
systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements one of
the precursor agencies of the HLURB for review and ratification.51
Ordinance No. 21 was based on the Development Plan for the then
Municipality of Calapan and on the Zone District Plan prepared by its
Municipal Development Staff. The Plans were adopted by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan through a Resolution on 14 April

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

1980.52 The same were granted approval by the HLURB through

Resolution No. R-39-4, series of 1980, dated 31 July 1980.53
Based on the foregoing, there is no doubt that Ordinance No. 21 validly
reclassified the area identified therein as "100 meters deep west and
200 meters deep east of Sto. Nio-Lumangbayan-Sapul Road from the
Teachers Village Subdivision to Barangay Guinobatan" into a light
intensity industrial zone, making the same exempt from CARL coverage.
The next and more crucial question to be settled now is whether or
not petitioners landholding falls within the reclassified zone, thereby
taking it out of the coverage of the CARL.
In resolving the issue in the affirmative, former DAR Secretary
Pagdanganan relied primarily on the respective Certifications issued by
the Office of the Deputized Zoning Administrator, Urban Planning and
Development Department of Calapan City54 and by the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC),55 and considered
subject property as having "been zoned as light-industrial prior to the
enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program." Secretary
Pagdanganan consequently granted petitioners application for
exemption pursuant to DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994.56 This issuance was
released by the DAR following DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of
1990,57 wherein the Secretary of the DOJ opined that "with respect to
conversions of agricultural lands covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural
uses, the authority of the DAR to approve such conversions may be
exercised from the date of the laws effectivity on June 15, 1998." Thus,
AO No. 6 states that "all lands that were already classified as commercial,
industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any
conversion clearance." Designed "to streamline the issuance of
exemption clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44," the AO laid down
the procedure and guidelines for the issuance of exemption
clearances58 for landowners whose lands are covered by DOJ Opinion
No. 44, Series of 1990 and desire to obtain an exemption clearance from

Page 97 of 103

the DAR. Such exemption clearance does not mean that the DAR
Secretary is exempting the land from CARL coverage, with the
implication that the land was previously covered; it simply means that
the CARL itself has, from the start, excluded the land from CARL
coverage, and the DAR Secretary is only affirming such fact.
The exemption order of Secretary Pagdanganan found petitioners
application to have fully complied with the documentary requirements
for exemption set forth under AO No. 6, the more important of which are
the Certifications from the Deputized Zoning Administrator and the
HUDCC stating that petitioners property falls within the Light Intensity
Industrial Zone of Calapan City.
Incidentally, what AO No. 6 requires is a certification from the HLURB.
Although what petitioners submitted was a certification from the
HUDCC, Secretary Pagdanganan apparently considered the same as
sufficient compliance with the requirements of AO No. 6 and in fact
never referred to the certification as coming from the HUDCC but was
consistently identified as "certification from the HLURB" throughout his
order. We see nothing irregular in this considering that the HLURB is an
agency under the HUDCC59 and especially since the Certification of the
HUDCC is itself "based on the Zoning Ordinance approval by HLURB
Resolution No. R-39-4 dated 31 July 1980."
In contrast to the exemption order issued by Secretary Pagdanganan, the
resolution and order, respectively, of OIC Secretaries Ponce and
Pangandaman which the CA cited with approval relied mainly on
certifications declaring that the property is irrigated or has a slope of
below 18% and on an ocular inspection report stating that the property
is generally covered with rice and that the surrounding areas are still
agricultural, as bases for their conclusion that subject land is agricultural
and, therefore, covered by the CARL. These matters, however, no longer
bear any significance in the light of the certifications of the Deputized

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Zoning Administrator and the HUDCC testifying to the non-agricultural

nature of the landholding in question.
The CARL, as amended, is unequivocal that only lands devoted to
agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land are within its scope. Thus, the slope of the
land or the fact of its being irrigated or non-irrigated becomes material
only if the land is agricultural, for purposes of exempting the same from
the coverage of the agrarian law. However, if the land is non-agricultural
as is the case of the property here under consideration the character
and topography of the land lose significance.
It must likewise be emphasized that, since zoning ordinances are based
not only on the present, but also on the future projection of needs of a
local government unit, when a zoning ordinance is passed, the local
legislative council obviously takes into consideration the prevailing
conditions in the area where the land subject of reclassification is
situated. Accordingly, when the then Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan
enacted Ordinance No. 21, there is reasonable ground to believe that the
district subject of the reclassification, including its environs, was already
developing. Thus, as found by the Office of the President: "we find that
the area where subject property is situated was really intended to be
classified not as agricultural, as in fact it was declared as a residential,
commercial and institutional in 1998."60
The CA, agreeing with the finding of OIC Secretary Pangandaman, and
quoting from the OIC Secretarys order, held that the Certification of the
HUDCC "proved that the property is still agricultural."
A careful scrutiny of the aforementioned certification reveals, however,
that contrary to the findings of OIC Secretary Pangandaman and the CA,
the certification, in fact, proves that petitioners land falls within the area
classified as light intensity industrial zone. Quoted hereunder are the
pertinent portions of the certification:

Page 98 of 103

This is to certify that a parcel of land with a total area of 1,587,713

square meters and situated at Brgy. Guinobatan, Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro, a portion of which is approximately 1,537,713 square meters is
applied for Zoning Certification as shown in the vicinity map submitted
by the applicant appears to be within the LIGHT INDUSTRIAL ZONE (100
meters deep west and 200 meters deep east) of the Provincial Road and
the rest is AGRICULTURAL ZONE based on the Zoning Ordinance
approval by HLURB Resolution No. R-39-4 dated 31 July 1980.
(Emphasis supplied)
Submitted Transfer Certificate of Title described as:
TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA (sq.m.) REGISTERED OWNER
J-7205

612

1,531,713

(sic) Luis A. Luna, et al.

x x x x61
Based on the foregoing, 1,537,713 square meters (sq. ms.) out of the
1,587,713 sq. ms. total area of petitioners property have been zoned as
light industrial and only 50,000 sq. ms. apparently remain agricultural.
Considering, however, the certification of the Deputized Zoning
Administrator of the Urban Planning and Development Department of
Calapan City, this Court finds and so holds that the entire landholding
has been classified as light intensity industrial zone pursuant to
Ordinance No. 21.
The court is inclined to give more evidentiary weight to the certification
of the zoning administrator being the officer having jurisdiction over the
area where the land in question is situated and is, therefore, more
familiar with the property in issue. Besides, this certification carried the
presumption of regularity in its issuance62 and respondents have the

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

burden of overcoming this presumption. Respondents, however, failed to

present any evidence to rebut that presumption.
Accordingly, since specialized agencies, such as the HUDCC and the
Office of the Deputized Zoning Administrator tasked to determine the
classification of parcels of land have already certified that the subject
land is industrial, the Court must accord such pronouncements great
respect, if not finality, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.63
Respondents insist that petitioners landholding is not included in the
light intensity industrial zone under Ordinance No. 21, yet, they never
submitted any evidence to support their contention. No maps, such as a
zoning map or a land use map, clearly showing that petitioners property
lies outside the reclassified area were presented by respondents.
Instead, what they presented were: (1) a certification from the
Provincial Irrigation Manager stating that several of the respondents
were listed as beneficiaries of the Calapan Dam Irrigators Association;
(2) a certification from the Municipal Agriculturist of Calapan declaring
that the property is irrigated; (3) photographs of the irrigation system
covering the subject landholding; (4) a letter from the Chief of the Land
Management Service of the DENR Region IV stating that the entire
158.77 hectares of the land in question falls under 18% slope;64 (5)
photographs showing that the property is generally planted with
rice;65 and other documents which, however, do not prove nor support
their claim that the property has not been reclassified into nonagricultural use.
Respondents, however, did submit in the proceedings before then DAR
OIC Secretary Ponce an "approved survey plan" commissioned by the
DAR allegedly "showing that only about 20 hectares or so would be
covered by" Ordinance No. 21. A copy of this plan was nevertheless not
attached to the records of this case thereby making it impossible for this
Court to examine the same and draw its own conclusions therefrom.

Page 99 of 103

At any rate, as already adverted to above, the certification of the

deputized zoning administrator carries more weight by reason of his
special knowledge and expertise and the matter under consideration
being under his jurisdiction and competence. He is, therefore, in a better
position to attest to the classification of the property in question.
The best evidence respondents could have presented was a map
showing the metes and bounds and definite delineations of the subject
land. Since respondents failed to do so, this Court is bound to rely on the
certifications of the appropriate government agencies with recognized
expertise on the matter of land classification. Thus, through the
certifications issued by the deputized zoning administrator of Calapan
City and by the HUDCC, petitioners were able to positively establish that
their property is no longer agricultural at the time the CARL took effect
and, therefore, cannot be subjected to agrarian reform.
A final note: In his Order dated 21 June 2006, then OIC Secretary
Pangandaman made mention of a "report" issued by the MARO of
Calapan City claiming that the area covering 100 meters deep west and
200 meters deep east along the provincial road traversing the property
which was declared in the HUDCC certification dated 8 October 1998 as
light industrial has already been covered by Presidential Decree No.
27.66 Thus, Secretary Pangandaman concluded, there were already
vested rights over the property and can no longer be covered by an
application for exemption.
The records of this case, however, do not contain a copy of the
aforementioned report.1wphi1 Thus, the Court is unable to scrutinize
the same and make a definite ruling thereon.
In any case, an examination of the records of this case show that the
earliest document evidencing coverage under the CARP of the land
subject of this dispute is the published Notice of Land Valuation and
Acquisition dated 20 August 1998. Prior thereto, all documents in

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 100 of 103

connection with the compulsory acquisition of land for agrarian reform

pertain to land covered by TCT No. T-18192 with an area of 161
hectares, purportedly in the name of Mariquita A. Luna.67 Clearly, this
land is different from the land subject of this case which is covered by
TCT No. J-7205 (T-54199). It may, therefore, be reasonably presumed
that the report adverted to refers to the land covered by TCT No. T18192 and not to the property under consideration herein.
The Office of the President was, consequently, correct when it revoked
the resolution and order, respectively, of former OIC Secretaries Ponce
and Pangandaman and declared that the Order of then Secretary
Pagdanganan was more in accord with the facts and the law applicable
to the case at bar. Thus, the CA clearly erred when it held that the
findings and conclusion of the Office of the President are not supported
by substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the Decision dated 13 March 2009 and the Resolution dated 10
June 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 101114. The
Decision of the Office of the President dated 15 December 2006 is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

Footnotes
*

Heirs of Dr. Jose De!este v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G. R.

No. 169913, 8 June 2011, 651 SCRA 352, 376. citing Pasong
1

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Per Special Order No. 1408 dated 15 January 2013.

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 142359 and

142980, 25 May 2004, 429 SCRA 109, 134-135.

Page 101 of 103

14

DAR Records, Folder No. 6, p. 69.

Should be HUDCC (Housing and Urban Development

Coordinating Council). See Rollo, p. 218, No. 6 of Order of Sec.
Pagdanganan and p. 468, Folder No. 2, DAR Records.
15

Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with

Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez and Sesinando E. Villon
concurring. Rollo, pp. 64-92.
2

16

Rollo, pp. 218-220.

17

Id. at 220.

18

Id. at 227-228.

19

Id. at 229.

Id. at 94-98.

Id. at 65-66 and 177-178. CA Decision and DARAB Joint

Decision, respectively.
4

Id. at 178. DARAB Joint Decision; DAR Records, Folder No. 6, p.

79, DARAB Decision dated 9 October 2003.
5

Should be Housing and Urban Development Coordinating

Council. See page 468, Folder No. 2, DAR Records.
20

DAR Records, Folder No. 6, p. 79. DARAB Decision dated 9

October 2003.
6

21

Rollo, pp. 243-245.

22

Id. at 250-251.

23

Id. at 251.

24

Id. at 252.

Rollo, p. 66, CA Decision.

DAR Records, Folder No. 3, pp. 566-567. DARAB Calapan

Decision dated 26 August 1999.
8

Id. at 564-565.

10

Id. at 564.

25

Id.

11

Id., Folder No. 6, p. 71. DARAB Central Office Decision.

26

Id. at 253.

12

Id. at 70-71.

27

Id. at 263-267.

28

Id. at 269-270.

29

Id. at 81.

The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing

that the case was referred to the DAR Region IV in compliance
with the directive of the DARAB Central Office.
13

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25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 102 of 103

30

Id. at 84.

43

31

Citations omitted.

44

32

Rollo, pp. 84-85.

Id. at 163.

Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, supra

note 1 at 375.
Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, Municipal
Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in
municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations for their respective cities
and municipalities subject to the approval of the City Mayor or
Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities
may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on
matters pertaining to planning and zoning.
45

33

Id. at 85.

34

Id. at 86.

35

Id. at 24.

Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

473 Phil. 64, 90 (2004) citing Calvo v. Vergara, 372 SCRA 650
(2001).
36

Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

supra note 36 at 94.
46

37

Solmayor v. Arroyo, 520 Phil. 854, 871 (2006).

Id. citing Orcino v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92869, 18

October 1990, 190 SCRA 815, 819.
38

39

Rollo, p. 151.

40

Id. at 112.

Sec. 49. Rules and regulations - The PARC and the DAR shall
have the power to issue rules and regulations, whether
substantive or procedural, to carry out the objects and purposes
of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (10) days after
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.

Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M.

Ramos and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 131481, 16 March 2011, 645 SCRA
401, 432.
47

48

Id. at 433.

49

Id. at 434.

41

Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052,

Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, 13 February 2008
545 SCRA 92, 140 citing Tan Chat v. Municipality of Iloilo, 60
Phil. 465, 473 (1934).
50

Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, supra

note 1.
51

42

Junio v. Secretary Garilao, 503 Phil. 154, 162.

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Prof. Avena

25. PRESUMPTIONS

Page 103 of 103

52

Rollo, p. 103.

64

Rollo, pp. 225-226.

53

DAR Records, Folder No. 3, pp. 495 and 499.

65

CA rollo, pp. 506-517.

66

The Tenants Emancipation Decree, dated 21 October 1972.

67

See DAR Records, Folder No. 2, pp. 304 and 394.

Dated 25 September 1998; Annex "H," Petition for Cancellation

of Certificates of Land Ownership Award, Revocation of Notice of
Valuation and Acquisition and Upholding and Affirming the
Classification of Subject Property and Declaring the same Outside
the Purview of R.A. 6657 With Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. Id., Folder No.
1, p. 293.
54

55

Dated 31 July 1980. Id. Folder No. 3, p. 495.

56

Dated 27 May 1994.

57

Dated 16 March 1990.

58

Junio v. Secretary Garilao, supra note 42.

Executive Order No. 90 (1986) renamed the Human

Settlements Regulatory Commission as the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and was designated as the
regulatory body for housing and land development under the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC).
http://hlurb.gov.ph/about-us/ (6 December 2012).
59

60

Rollo, p. 251.

61

DAR Records, Folder No. 2, p. 468.

62

Junio v. Secretary Garilao, supra note 42 at 167-168.

63

Solmayor v. Arroyo, supra note 37 at 875.