Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636 Filed 11/13/14 Page 1 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________
)
MARK I. SOKOLOW, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
Civil Action No. 04cv397 (GBD) (RLE)
)
THE PALESTINE LIBERATION )
ORGANIZATION, et al.,
)
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO PRESS APPLICANTS MOTION
TO INTERVENE AND UNSEAL JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Press Applicants, self-styled world-class, world-renowned investigative journalists
Sharyl Attkisson, Edwin Black and Steven Emerson move to intervene in this lawsuit for the
purpose of unsealing all sealed documents filed on the docket as well as substantive
correspondence or other unfiled submission by the parties. DE 628, Mem. at 1-2, 11.
Defendants the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
hereby oppose the motion because the law of this jurisdiction precludes the putative intervenors
from obtaining the relief they seek.
THE PUTATIVE INTERVENORS
The Press Applicants purport to advance the First Amendment and common law rights of
press and public to have access to judicial documents. As an initial matter, it bears noting that
none of the Press Applicants is in fact employed by any press organization. Although her
professional biography suggests she is currently employed by CBS News, DE 623-1 at 1, 3,
Attkisson resigned earlier this year and is busy promoting her new book Stonewalled: My Fight
for Truth Against the Forces of Obstruction, Intimidation, and Harassment in Obamas

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Washington.1 Emerson has changed status from journalist to terrorologist. Emerson is the
Executive Director of the Investigative Project on Terrorism, which he describes as one of the
worlds largest storehouses of archival data and intelligence on Islamic and Middle Eastern
terrorist groups. Id. at 9. According to his website, Emerson is one of the first terrorism
experts to have testified and warned about the threat of Islamic militant networks operating in the
United States. Id. The most recent publication identified in his biography (Jihad
Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the U.S.) dates back to 2006. Id. Edwin Black also
is not employed by a media organization. See id. at 6-8.
The Press Applicants purport to have particular expertise and interest in the global,
political and moral issues being litigated in this Court. DE 628, Mem. at 2. This assertion is
troubling on two fronts. First, this is a civil lawsuit in which the jury is to decide tort liability
based on evidence, not based on global, political and moral issues. Given the potential for
extreme prejudice to Defendants, the Court should be watchful of attempts by Plaintiffs and
those allied with them to use the lawsuit as a vehicle to advance their global, political and
moral agenda of demonizing and delegitimizing the Palestinian government. Second, there is
no evidence the Press Applicants in fact have any journalism expertise relevant to this lawsuit.
Attkisson claims to have published news articles on payments received by Palestinian martyrs,
id. at 5, but provides no citation to these articles and Defendants have not been able to locate
any.2 Emerson has made a career out of fanning the flames of Islamophobia in the United States,

http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2014/03/sharyl-attkisson-to-leave-cbs-news-184836.html

Defendants did locate Attkissons 2013 interview with the Sokolow plaintiffs on CBS This Morning
about their lawsuit against the Arab Bank for their alleged role in so-called martyr payments.
https://archive.org/details/KPIX_20130421_130000_CBS_News_Sunday_Morning#start/2700/end/2760

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with such works as American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us. DE 623-1 at 9.3 It is
not apparent he has any experience covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a journalist. The
Palestinian Authority is not a jihadist organization, nor is it an Islamist state.
The only specific example the Media Applicants offer of prior coverage of the
Defendants is Mr. Blacks 2013 book, Financing the Flames: How Tax-Exempt and Public
Money Fuel a Culture of Confrontation and Terrorism in Israel, DE 628, Mem. at 6, in which
he inaccurately characterizes the Palestinian Authority as providing payment for terrorist acts
that follows a schedule of compensation pegged directly to the number of victims murdered and
the amount of carnage inflicted. Id. Plaintiffs counsel previously used this same book excerpt
to argue for the unsealing of documents covered by the Protective Order. In Mr. Yalowitzs
March 27, 2014 letter to the Court, he stated:
The fact that defendants pay generous salaries to convicted terrorists is not
confidential. . . . This policy is also discussed in a recent book by historian
Edwin Black, entitled Financing the Flames. As Mr. Blacks website
states, the book describes funding mechanisms by which the PA pays the
salaries of specific terrorists sitting in Israeli prisons, salaries that are
among the best paid jobs in the Palestinian Authority, and are calculated to
increase with the level of mass murder and destruction.
Letter at 5-6.
There can be little doubt that the Press Applicants have been recruited to further
Plaintiffs agenda. In their overwrought submission, the Press Applicants claim there has been a
cloak of secrecy over the contents of public filings in this litigation and that the information
3

Emerson also was quick to pronounce that the Oklahoma City bombing had a Middle Eastern trait and
that the Boston Marathon bombing was perpetrated by a Saudi national. See Alex Seitz Wald, Why is
Steve Emerson Still a Terrorism Expert, Salon.com (Apr. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.salon.com/2013/04/16/the_perils_of_steve_emersons_expertise/; see also John F. Sugg,
Steven Emersons Crusade: Why Is a Journalist Pushing Questionable Stories from Behind the Scenes,
FAIR: Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (Jan. 1, 1999), available at http://fair.org/extra-onlinearticles/steven-emersons-crusade/

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thus freed from improper occlusion would reveal an unlawful, pernicious and murderous system
established and organized by the defendant, which they irresponsibly and wrongly characterize
as a suicide-murder for hire system. DE 628, Mem. at 1-2. So much for impartial journalism.
The Press Applicants claims that the martyr and prisoner payment practices of the Defendants
are cloaked in secrecy by virtue of the Protective Order also is squarely at odds with their
claims to special expertise on these practices. Indeed, as just noted, Mr. Yalowitz previously has
argued citing Blacks book that they are a matter of public knowledge.
The Press Applicants also irresponsibly engage in fear-mongering by implying
Palestinian Authority policies put the American public at risk. See id. at 2 (mischaracterizing the
martyr payment system and stating it presents [a]n ongoing danger to the public, regardless of
nationality and location); see also id. at 3 (characterizing the litigation over events in 2001-2004
as bear[ing] on issues of grave, immediate and ongoing concern). This fear-mongering is
reminiscent of Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants motion for summary judgment which began
by wrongly implying that President Obama viewed the Defendants as posing a current terrorism
threat to Americans at home. DE 545, Mem. at 1. There is a substantial risk that if the Press
Applicants obtain confidential discovery material before trial they will taint the jury pool with
inflammatory articles mischaracterizing the documents and making outlandish claims of
suicide-murder for hire programs that pose a grave threat to Americans at home. Plaintiffs
may well then cite these articles as reasons why the jury will be fearful for its safety,
necessitating an anonymous jury, which would further prejudice the Defendants. See DE 557
(Plaintiffs Motion for an Anonymous Jury in which they argue that trial publicity and the jurors
concern for their personal safety provide justification for an anonymous jury).

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ARGUMENT
I.

The Motion to Intervene Must Be Denied Because There Is No First Amendment or

Common Law Right of Public Access to the Record in this Action.
A.

The Presumptive Right to Public Access Applies Only to Judicial Documents.

The Press Applicants claim the public and press have an affirmative presumptive right to
inspect all motion papers and the record in this action. DE 628, Mem. at 7. They seek an
order unsealing all motion papers and all other sealed documents filed on the docket and also
all substantive correspondence or other unfiled submissions by the parties. Id. at 11. The
Press Applicants offer no support for their position that there is a right of public access to
correspondence and other unfiled, under-seal submissions to the Court. The Press Applicants
cite Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006), as their principal legal authority.
That case, however, makes abundantly clear that the First Amendment and federal common law
right of public access applies only to judicial documents. Id.4 A judicial document is an item
filed on the docket that is relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the
judicial process. Id. Thus unfiled submissions are not judicial documents, and there is no
presumptive right of public access to them.
Nor does the presumption of public access apply to all sealed documents filed on the
docket. The mere filing of a paper or document with the court is insufficient to render that
paper a judicial document subject to the right of public access. United States v. Amodeo, 44
F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (Amodeo I). Only a small fraction of documents filed on the
docket may be treated as judicial documents, for an abundance of statements and documents
generated in federal litigation actually have little or no bearing on the exercise of Article III
4

Federal courts employ two related but distinct presumptions in favor of public access to court
proceedings and records: a strong form rooted in the First Amendment and a slightly weaker form based
in federal common law. Newsday LLC v. Cty. of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 2013).

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judicial power. United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) (Amodeo II).
Summary judgment motions and the documents relied upon in adjudicating them are
considered judicial documents. Newsday LLC v. Cty. of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.
2013). Documents filed with discovery motions are generally not considered judicial
documents and are not subject to the public right of access. Chicago Tribune Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. GMT, LLC, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96585, at *7-8 (D. Neb. July 11, 2012). And, the mere fact that a dispute
exists about whether a document should be sealed or disclosed . . . cannot ipso facto create a
presumption of access, because such a rule would bootstrap materials that are not closely
related to judicial proceedings into judicial documents. Newsday, 730 F.3d at 167. Thus,
although the Press Applicants complain that much of the correspondence with the Court on the
scope and application of the Protective Order is not available to the public, DE 628, Mem. at 4,
they have no right to access these documents.
As the Second Circuit observed in Newsday, [p]arties are entitled to litigate issues that
divide them, if they can fairly do so, without thereby exposing to public view confidential
materials. 730 F.3d at 167 n.15. Further, when a party chooses not to rely on documents or
other confidential information in court, the fact that the information is sufficiently relevant to the
proceeding that it could have been introduced into evidence does not entitle the press or public to
demand access to it or to put courts to the burden of evaluating whether the strict standards for
rebutting the presumption of public access have been met. Id. Accordingly, here, the parties
are entitled to litigate the confidentiality, relevance, admissibility, and discoverability of the
under-seal documents without subjecting the documents to public scrutiny.

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B.

The Motion Must Be Denied Because the Press Applicants Failed to Identify the
Judicial Documents They Wish to Unseal.

Given the Press Applicants position that they are entitled to a blanket unsealing of all
documents in the record currently under seal, their motion fails to specifically analyze whether
particular documents in fact constitute judicial documents. As set forth in Part I.A. above, the
Press Applicants blanket approach to unsealing is not sanctioned by the law of this Circuit.
With the exception of the summary judgment papers, as discussed in I.C. below, the Press
Applicants failed to articulate a fall-back position, and they did so at their peril.
There are over 600 entries on the docket, many of which include numerous exhibits. The
burden of particularizing the Press Applicants request and analyzing which ones were filed
under seal or in redacted form and arguably constitute judicial documents should not fall to the
Defendants or the Court. See Federal Housing Finance Agency v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No.
11-cv-6188, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50788, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2014) (under similar
circumstances, denying non-partys motion for an itemization of records under seal because, in
part, he offered no authority to support burdening the parties or the Court with such a task).
Accordingly, the Press Applicants motion must be denied.
C.

The Summary Judgment Papers Have Been Mischaracterized.

The Press Applicants correctly note that summary judgment motion papers are generally
treated as judicial documents entitled to a presumption of public access. DE 628, Mem. at 8.
The Press Applicants, however, fail to analyze the summary judgment papers to assess the extent
to which judicial documents have in fact been filed under seal.
Each party filed a summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
is fully briefed on the record. None of the briefing was redacted and none of the exhibits was
filed under seal. See DE 492, 523, 552. Defendants opening summary judgment brief was filed

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in unredacted form. DE 497. Only three exhibits were filed under seal, only one of which was
produced by Defendants. DE 497-63. Defendants reply brief was filed with minimal
redactions, and no exhibits were filed under seal. DE 554. Plaintiffs opposition brief was filed
with minimal redactions. DE 545. Rather than providing a set of exhibits to their opposition
brief, Plaintiffs counsel instead submitted as Exhibit A a CD with 18,400 pages of their
Selected Trial Exhibits, which included just about every document Defendants produced in
discovery. See DE 521 (Declaration of Kent A. Yalowitz) at 1. The index of the Selected Trial
Exhibits itself is 31 pages. See DE 521-1. Thus, Plaintiffs chose not to submit exhibits tailored
to their summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs, in conjunction with Press Applicants, may not
transform discovery materials as to which there is no presumptive right of public access, into
judicial documents merely by submitting with their summary judgment motion a data dump of
all discovery material submitted in the case. Those documents remain the raw fruits of
discovery, to which the public is not entitled access. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11,
2001, 454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ([N]o public right of access exists with respect
to materials produced during the initial stages of discovery).
Moreover, the publics right to access is less pressing where there has been a public
hearing on the summary judgment motion. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124 ([a]ccess to written
documents filed in connection with pretrial motions is particularly important in the situation . . .
where no hearing is held and the court's ruling is based solely on the motion papers) (quoting
Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984)). Here, the Court
conducted an extensive public hearing on the Defendants motion for summary judgment on July
22, 2014, the transcript of which is publicly available.

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In sum, any characterization of the judicial documents in this case being cloaked in
secrecy, see DE 628, Mem. at 1, is plainly wrong.
II.

Even as to the Relatively Few Documents That Arguably Be Characterized as

Judicial Documents, There Is No Right to Unfettered Public Access.
While there is a legal presumption favoring access to judicial records, the fact that a

document is a judicial record does not mean that access to it cannot be restricted. Amodeo I, 44
F.3d at 146. According to the Supreme Court, it is uncontestedthat the right to inspect and
copy judicial records is not absolute. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
598 (1978). Indeed, a district court has the authority to redact a document to the point of
rendering it meaningless, or not to release it at all. In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d
74, 80 (2d Cir. 1990).
Once a court has determined that the documents are judicial documents, it must
determine the weight of that presumption. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119. As the Second Circuit
explained in Lugosch, the weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed by
the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value
of such information to those monitoring the federal courts. Id. Then, after determining the
weight of the presumption of access, the court must balance competing considerations against
it. Id. at 120 (quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050). Such countervailing factors include but
are not limited to the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency and the
privacy interests of those resisting disclosure. Id. (quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050); see
also United States v. Longueuil, 567 Fed. Appx. 13, 16 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing law
enforcement techniques and procedures and privacy interests of third parties as strong
countervailing interests).

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The parties cited less than two dozen under-seal exhibits in their summary judgment
briefs. Those documents fell into three categories: (1) personnel files (PTE 88); (2) General
Intelligence Service (GIS) files (PTE 129, 131, 143, 163, 164, 233, 1038, 1060); and (3) the
so-called martyr files (PTE 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 36A, 60).5 Given the general transparency
of the summary judgment briefing and hearing and the limited nature of the under-seal exhibits,
the law enforcement and privacy interests associated with the under-seal documents override any
public right to access.
In particular, potential damage to law enforcement is a legitimate basis for sealing
documents and restricting public access to them. See Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 147 (We have
recognized the law enforcement privilege as an interest worthy of protection.). The law
enforcement privilege is designed
to prevent disclosure of law enforcement techniques and
procedures, to preserve the confidentiality of sources, to protect
witness and law enforcement personnel, to safeguard the privacy of
individuals involved in an investigation, and otherwise to prevent
interference with an investigation.
Id. Indeed, protect[ing] witnesses and law enforcement personnel is just one purpose of the
law enforcement privilege. Dinler v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 934-935 (2d Cir. 2010);
see also In re United States Dept of Homeland Sec., 459 F.3d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 2006) (Our
case law has acknowledged the existence of a law enforcement privilege beyond that allowed for
identities of confidential informants.).

Press Applicants will no doubt argue that all of Defendants discovery materials are judicial
documents because they provided them to the Court on a CD marked as Exhibit A to their opposition to
Defendants motion for summary judgment. The Court should not sanction such a cynical attempt to
bootstrap plainly confidential material into judicial documents. In addition, the admissibility of these
documents is contested by the parties, and the Court has yet to rule which, if any, of the under seal
documents would be relevant to a summary judgment ruling.

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The Court should not unseal any of the GIS documents or require the Defendants to
reveal redacted material relating to such documents. Throughout this litigation, Defendants have
argued that the GIS documents are privileged, and Defendants only produced the GIS documents
to Plaintiffs pursuant to court order and subject to Defendants objections. The PA clearly has a
compelling interest in preventing disclosure of its intelligence materials. See Declaration of
Majed Faraj 12-14, 17 (attached as Exhibit A) (declaring that disclosure of GIS investigative
methods would, inter alia, increase security threats and impair GISs ability to conduct future
investigations); see also In re United States Dept of Homeland Sec., 459 F.3d at 569 ([I]n
todays times the compelled production of government documents could impact highly sensitive
matters relating to national security.); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Auth.,
No. 01-853, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38037, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2014) (noting the courts
previous finding that Defendants had made numerous persuasive arguments for concluding that
disclosure of the requested [GIS] files would undermine important interests of the PA.).
Moreover, GIS documents are protected from public disclosure by the PAs Intelligence
Law, which prohibits public revelation of [i]nformation regarding the regulation of [GIS] and
its activities, functions, documents, headquarters, and properties, and provides that GIS
investigations and information may only be viewed by special permission of the President.
See Ex. A 12, 18; see also GIS Law at 253, 259 (attached as Exhibit B). Violation of this law
is a criminal offense. Ex. A 18; Ex. B at 259. Courts have considered the following factors in
determining whether to order disclosure of documents in contravention of foreign law: (1) the
importance of the documents to the litigation; (2) the specificity of the request; (3) whether the
information originated in the United States; (4) alternate means to secure the information; (5)
the extent that disclosure or non-disclosure would undermine interests of the United States or the

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state where the information is; (6) hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom
discovery is sought; and (7) the good faith of the party resisting discovery. Gucci Am., Inc. v.
Weixing Li, No. 10-cv-4974, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011).
These factors weigh against any type of disclosure of GIS materials. Because the GIS is
a law enforcement body, its records are protected. See United States v. Basciano, No. 97-1264,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3085, at *6 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1998). Access to GIS records would cause
irreparable harm to the PAs compelling interest in keeping its intelligence materials
confidential. In re United States Dept of Homeland Sec., 459 F.3d at 569; Gilmore, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38037, at *6. And no other alternative restriction would adequately protect the
PAs interests in avoiding an increase in security threats and in avoiding any impairment in the
GISs ability to conduct future investigations. See Ex. A 12-14, 17.
The remaining under-seal exhibits referenced in the parties summary judgment briefing
are a personnel file and the so-called martyr files, which at the very least could be produced only
in redacted form. These documents contain personal identifying information, including birth
years and government-issued identification numbers, and many also include bank account
numbers. See, e.g., PTE 21, 22, and 36A. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, public
filings must redact the last four digits of the individuals identification number, the year of the
individuals birth, and the last four digits of the financial account number. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a).
Before the Court could publicly disclose any under-seal exhibits ultimately found to be
judicial documents, the Court also would have to weigh the publics presumptive right to access
against privacy and safety interests of individuals referenced in the files. Some exhibits include
information about individuals mental health or identify intelligence sources. The Second
Circuit has held that privacy is a proper concern[] for a trial court in performing the balancing

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test required to determine whether access should be allowed or denied. Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at
147; see also Newsday LLC, 730 F.3d at 165 (holding that the common law right should be
balanced against countervailing interests favoring secrecy). Private information should
therefore be protected:
We have previously held that the privacy interests of innocent third
parties should weigh heavily in a courts balancing equation. Such
interests, while not always fitting comfortably under the rubric
privacy, are a venerable common law exception to the
presumption of access. Courts have long declined to allow public
access simply to cater to a morbid craving for that which is
sensational and impure.
Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050-51 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The job of
protecting such interests rests heavily with the trial judge, since all the parties who may be
harmed by disclosure are typically not before the court. In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895
F.2d at 80.
Moreover, the individuals whose private information is at risk of being made public also
have a strong interest in preventing its disclosure. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001,
454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (entering protective order based on privacy and
prejudice concerns, where most of the individual defendants were accused of committing
terrorist acts and where they would be asked to turn over a vast array of private and confidential
information during discovery, much of which will have little or no bearing on the resolution of
these actions but will be subject to widespread public scrutiny with prejudicial effects in the
absence of a protective order). If the Court were to disclose all of the materials accompanying
the parties summary judgment papers, this would include, inter alia, bank account numbers,
government-issued identity numbers, and potentially embarrassing mental health information.
As the Plaintiffs have previously conceded, see DE 455 at 8, all such information should be

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redacted. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050-51; In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d at 80; see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a).
CONCLUSION
The Press Applicants motion to intervene should be denied. They have not
demonstrated that the public has a presumptive right of access to all material that has been filed
under seal. Because they failed to limit their requested relief to judicial documents, the Press
Applicants are not entitled to intervene. In any event as to the relatively few arguable judicial
documents filed under seal, countervailing law enforcement and privacy interests outweigh the
public interest in access, especially in light of the general openness in which the motions for
summary judgment have been litigated and the fact that the Court has yet to determine which
exhibits will be relevant to any judicial decisions on the merits.

November 13, 2014

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Laura G. Ferguson
Mark J. Rochon
Laura G. Ferguson
Brian A. Hill
Dawn E. Murphy-Johnson
Michael J. Satin
MILLER & CHEVALIER CHARTERED
655 15th Street, NW, Suite 900
Washington D.C. 20005-6701
(202) 626-5800 [tel]
(202) 626-5801 [fax]
lferguson@milchev.com [email]
Counsel for Defendants the Palestinian Authority and the
Palestine Liberation Organization

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EXHIBIT A

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MARK I. SOKOLOW, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v.
PALESTINIAN LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION, et al.,

)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 04-397 (GBD) (RLE)

)
)

Defendants. )
)
DECLARATION OF MAJED FARAJ
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, I, Majed Faraj, declare under penalty of perjury under the
laws of the United States of America, as follows:
1. I currently reside in the city of Ramallah, in the State of Palestine.
2. I am over eighteen years old, and I am competent to make this declaration. Unless
otherwise stated herein, the facts set forth below are based on my personal knowledge.
3. I am currently the Head of Intelligence for the General Intelligence Service ("GIS") of
the State of Palestine, formerly the Occupied Palestinian Territory, or Palestinian
Authority ("PA").
4. I understand that Plaintiffs in the above captioned action have requested all files in
possession of the PA (now, the State of Palestine) relating to the following individuals:
Nasser Shawish

Mohammad Hashaika

Abdel Karim Aweiss

Sana' Shehadeh

Kahira Saadi
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Marwan Barghouti

Ahmad Taleb Mustapha Barghouti

Abdullah Barghouti

Ibrahim Hamed

Mohammad Hassan Ahmad Arman

Wael Mahmoud Mohammad Ali Qasam

Walid Abdel Aziz Abdel Hadi Anjas

Mohammad Aschak Odeh

Wisam Said Abbasi

Ali Munir Ja'ara

Abdel Rahman (Zaher) Yousuf Abdel Rahman Makdad

Ahmad Salah Ahmad Salah

Halmi Abdel Karim Hamash

Ahmad Mohammad Ahmad Sa'ad

Mohammed Issa Mahmoud Ma'ali

Ali Mohammad Hamed Abu Halail

Ahmad Abu Radab

Said Ramadan

Majed-Al-Masri

Mohammad Abdel Rahman Salam Maslah

Naser Aweiss

Faras Sadak Mohammed Ghanem

Mohammad Sami Ibrahim Abdullah

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Sa'id Awada

Naef Abu Sharkh

Mazen Faritakh

Kamal Eddin Musa el Abed

5. Pursuant to Chapter II, Article 9 of the General Intelligence Law No. 17 of 2005 of the
Palestinian Authority (now, the State of Palestine) (the "General Intelligence Law") the
GIS performs numerous functions including:
a. Taking measures to "prevent acts that may endanger the security and
safety of Palestine..."; and
b. "Reveal[ing] external dangers which may jeopardize the Palestinian
national security in the fields of espionage, collusion and sabotage, and
any other acts which may threaten the unity, security, independence,
and resources of the homeland."
6. In executing these functions, the GIS maintains security files on some, but not all,
Palestinians.
7. The GIS maintains these files, among other reasons, in order to help monitor securityrelated allegations made by Israel, ensure security within the Occupied Palestinian
Territories (now, the State of Palestine), monitor militant or subversive activities within
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (now, the State of Palestine), engage in law
enforcement activities, and execute its functions under the General Intelligence Law.
8. The information in the files is collected through numerous meant-:, including through
public sources, GIS agent investigative fieldwork, interrogations, and confidential
sources and informers. With respect to persons who have been charged and/or convicted

3
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Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636-1 Filed 11/13/14 Page 5 of 14

by Israel with security-related offenses, the information in the files often includes or
consists of allegations or charges made by Israel against those persons, which the GIS has
neither confirmed nor officially adopted as true.
9. In response to Plaintiffs' request, I directed my staff to collect files relating to the
individuals listed in 114. As a result, documents were located for persons that I believe
match one or more of the names of nearly all the individuals described in paragraph 4.
In some cases, in response to our attorneys' inquiries, my staff created entries in files that
summarize the status of a particular individual or sent correspondence related to the
request.
10. I have personally reviewed these files and conclude they constitute State Secrets of the
Palestinian Authority (now, the State of Palestine), and I am invoking the State Secrets
Privilege on behalf of the State of Palestine.
11. I understand that this affidavit will be public, and I have therefore described many of the
below concerns generally, so as not to compromise the very information that ought to be
held confidential. I am willing to provide a more detailed affidavit to the Court, should
such an affidavit be kept under seal by the Court.
12. Revealing info' nation contained in the files including, but not limited to, the identity of
confidential sources, the methods of intelligence collection, and the identity of security
suspects identified by the GIS (other than those individuals listed in Plaintiffs discovery
requests), would directly threaten GIS's role in securing the homeland because it would
endanger the security and safety of Palestinian nationals and potentially subject
Palestinian nationals to external dangers, and reveal intelligence methods regarding
dangers such as espionage, collusion and sabotage, all in direct contradiction of the

4
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Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636-1 Filed 11/13/14 Page 6 of 14

General Intelligence Law. Furthermore, disclosure of this information would potentially

reveal GIS intelligence methods to foreign powers and increase the likelihood of security
threats from foreign powers.
13. The files additionally contain information relating to GIS law-enforcement investigations,
and therefore I am also invoking the Law Enforcement Privilege on behalf of the PA
(now, the State of Palestine).
14. The information contained in the files includes information relating to GIS investigatory
techniques and law enforcement investigations and should not be disclosed. The success
of GIS's investigations depends on the confidentiality of these files and the sources
located within them. Specifically, disclosure of these files would:
a. Expose GIS intelligence gathering and analysis techniques;
b. Expose the identity of GIS informants, officers, and security suspects;
c. Undermine the privacy of the subjects of the files as the files contain
personal information relating to the subject of the file, such as the
names of their family members and friends, political affiliations, and
occupations; and
d. Impair the ability of the GIS to conduct future investigations
15. Moreover, like files maintained by intelligence and security forces in other countries, the
information contained in the files is not necessarily completely reliable or accurate.
Rather, the files contain information that is often collected from sources outside of the
PA (now, the State of Palestine) that are of varying degrees of reliability. This
information may or may not be true and may or may not be based on first-hand
knowledge.

5
1334903 1

Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636-1 Filed 11/13/14 Page 7 of 14

16. The files do not contain any information which would suggest the PA (now, the State of
Palestine) or PLO had advance knowledge or information regarding any of the attacks at
issue in this matter.
17. Disclosure of this information to third parties could compromise the GIS' s intelligence
gathering and law enforcement abilities and result in the disclosure of sensitive
intelligence and law enforcement information.
18. Various provisions of the General Intelligence Law generally prohibit and criminalize
the disclosure of GIS intelligence information, including the identities of informants or
information provided by such informants. Specifically, Chapter I Article 7.2 of the
General Intelligence Law states:
The Head of Intelligence shall be accountable to the President or
the person whom he may authorize to maintain the confidentiality
of the work of the Intelligence, the information and the means of
accessing it, and its sources. Investigations or information of the
Intelligence may not be viewed except by special permission of the
President or the person whom he may authorize.
Chapter VII, Article 30, of General Intelligence Law states:
Information regarding the regulation of the Intelligence and its
activities, functions, documents, headquarters and properties and
the data of its members shall be a secret of national security, the
revealing of which is prohibited. Such shall apply to any member
of the Intelligence and those working by special contracts, even
following the expiration of their service.

and Chapter VII,Article_31 ofThe_Genezal_Intellig_ence_Law_states:

Any person who deviates from the requirements of the functional
obligation, or commits any of the prohibited acts set forth under
this law and its bylaw, or appears in manner that violates the
dignity of the function and its requirements shall be punished
pursuant to the Penal Law in force.

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19. Based on the foregoing, I request that this Court permit the PA (now, the
State of Palestine) to withhold production of these documents pursuant to
the State Secrets and Law Enforcement Privileges.
I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed on this

day of May 2013, in the State of Palestine.

Majed Faraj

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Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636-2 Filed 11/13/14 Page 1 of 10

EXHIBIT B

Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636-2 Filed 11/13/14 Page 2 of 10

"

1:4,;

'Lut,

'

..;;40.1

The '::;eCUrily Sector .egisl6t ion of the Pales finianNational Authority

General Intelligence Law No. 17 of 2005

The Chairman of the executive 'Committee of the Palestine Liberation
Organisation,
,
The President of the Palestinian National Authority,
Having reviewed the Amended Basic Law of 2003 and its Amendments,
Having reviewed the Law of Civil Service No. 4 of 2998 and its Amendments,
Having reviewed the Law of Insurance and Pension of the Paleninian Security poives
No. 16 of 2004 and its Amendments,
Having revieWed the Law of Public Retirement No: 7 of 2005,
Having::reviewed the Law of Seevice in the Palestinian Security Forces No, 8 of 2005,
Based upon approval of the Legislative Council during its sessioma 21September,
2005,
Based upon the powers bestowed upon me, and
in the name of the-Arab Palestinian People,
I hereby piomulgate the followingltal:

Chapter Y x Definitions and General Pr visions

Article I
In applying the provisions of this law, the following terms and expressions shall
have the meanings specified below, unless the context determines Otherwise:
NationakAti thority:

The Palestinian National Atithority.

President;

The President of the Palestinian National Authority.

The. Palestin:art General Intell'gence.

fead of Intelligence:
Member

The Head of the PaleStinkut General Intelligence.

Any officer, non-corn iissioned Officer, orineinbei of
p.'_,rsonnel appointed In the httelligence.'

Article 2
The Intelligence shall be a regular security' agency guborditiato to the President`
It shall perform its functions and Continence its jurisdictions pursuant to the
provisions of the law under the presidency ilta(e command of its Head, who shall
issue the decisions necessary for the management of its work and the regulati on
of all of its affairs.

252

Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636-2 Filed 11/13/14 Page 3 of 10

Authority

' of 2005
Palestine Liberation

!ndincrtts,
; Amendments,
estinian Secu rity Forces
t Forces No, 8 of 2005;
,scion Of 21 September,

Provisions
.-i arid expressions
tinkles -otherwise:

Friuhewurk of the PNA Security Foxes

Artkle 3
The Intelligence shall consist of a Head, a Deputy, and a sufficient number Of officers
and individuals expedient to carry out the work in accordance with the organisational
structure to- be issued by the President, The pmvisions of this law shall apply to all
members thereof.
Article 4
1. The Head of Intelligence shall be appointed by the. President in the rank of a
minister.
2. The duration of the appointment of the Head of Intelligence shall last fOr three
(3) years. It may be extended for one (1) year only.
Article 5
The Headof Intelligence shall be the authority competent to enforce the provisions
of this law and defining the jurisdictions of the units in the light of the bylaw, He
may delegate some of his authority to whomever he deems fit from. among the
officers.
Made '6
1. The Deputy-Head of Intelligenee,shall be appointed bythoPresident and upon
the notuirtation of the Head of intelligence.
2. The appoint ent in the functiOn of a director of a department at the intelligence
OA be made by the Head of Intelligence- and upon the nomination of. the
Con-milt:tee of Officers.
The directors of departments shall' be part of the exccutiVe , conuirtnd of
ti-te Intelligence and fully responsible for the implementation: of the duties
assigned to thern.

ity,
[9:#tiortal Authority.
4nce,

,oral Intelligence.
officer, or member of
ligence.
iinate to the tiNsident.
coons pursuant to the
of its Head, who shall
tork and the regillation

Article.?
1. The Head of Inteil igence shall assume the au thority of superVising the activities
of the Intelligence and its members. He may establish necessary committees
and issue decis.ons and orders required for the regulation of the progress of
work and the ensurement of good performance.
2. The ilead of Intelligence shall be accountable to the President or the person
whom he may authorise to maintain the confidentiality of the work of the
Intelligence, the information and the Means of acceSSing it, and its sottices.
InVestigations or information of the Intelligence may not be viewed-, except
by a special permission of the President or the person whom he ina.y
authorise.
The Head of Intelligence shall notify the. President or the person whom he
may authorise of all matters of significant or urgent nature.

25

Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636-2 Filed 11/13/14 Page 4 of 10

The Security Sector Legislation of the Palestinian National Authority

Chapter II. The Duties of the Intelligence

6.
1,
2:

Article 8
The Intelligence shall be officially assigned to exercise security activities and
duties beyond the geographical boundaries of Palestine.
The Intelligence shall exercise specific security duties within the geographical
boundaries of the State of Palestine to complete the measures and activities
commenced beyond those boundaries:

Article 9"
The Intelligence shall perfbrrn the fallowing:
1. Take the measures necessary to prevent acts that may endanger the security and
safety of Palestine and expedient Measures against their perpetrators pursuant
toile provisions of the law
2. Reveal external dangers which may jeopardise the Palestinian national
security in the fields of e.spionage, collusion and sabotage, arid any other acts
which may threaten the unity, security, independence, and- resold:co' of the
homeland.
3. Jointly Cooperate with similar agencies of friendly states to fight all acts which
may threaten the joint peace and security or any fields of external security,
upon the condition of reciprocal treatment.
Arfiele 1.0
The acts upon vviirch the provisions under the preceding Article are applicable
shall be:
1. Communleating with a foreign state in order toperform a hostile act against
Palestine:
2. Joining the service of a foreign ariny which-ig in a state of war with .Palestine.
3. Delivering Or helping to deliver a secret of the defence of Palestine in the
military, political, economic or social domain to a foreign state.
4; Any intentional aet which may result in the death, a critical physical injury, or
loss of freedom of any of the:
a) Monarchs arid Presidents of States and their spouses or their ascericiagts
or descendanta.
b) The heirs to the throne or deputies of the Presidents of States or Priffie
Ministers or niinisterS.
.
c) Persons who are> in charge of public responsibilities or those ocetiPP"&
public positions, if such acts are directed toward them in their
capacities.
d) AmbasSadors or diplomats who are accredited with the state of
Palestine.
5. The purposeful sabotage or damage of public or pri-Vate properties for public,
purposes which belongto Or are subject to the authorities of a state cbrtnectea
with Palestine by diplomatic or friendly relations.
25.4

7.

Ptti
lief?
the
Intr
LOA
to,
Fui
juri
tttrt
Th

un
Thi
lay)
Pu,
in
sea
del
sea
or '
to t

1.
2.

Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636-2 Filed 11/13/14 Page 5 of 10

(mat Authority

The Legislative. Framework of the INA SecerityBurces

telligence

The manufacturing, possession or acquisition of weapons, explosives

or any detrimental materials with the intention to perpetrate any of the
aforementioned acts in any state.
7. Any act of violence or threat, whatever its motives or purposes, which occurs
in the implementation of an individual or collective criminal plot aimed at
creating fear amo g the people or intimidating them. by harming them or
putting their life, freedoms or security in danger, or by causing damage to
the environment or to any facilities or public properties, or occupying or
seizing control of them, or forfeiting land, tv subjecting a national resource
to danger.

ise security activities and

s within the geographical
measures and activities

Artic...e 11
Pursuant to the provisions of the laW, the intelligence shall have the right to collate
inftirmation in the jurisdictions which the. law Approves And to request it from
the agencies Of the. National Authority and others without objection, The Head of
Intelligence may request from the Attorney-General pursuant to the law the right
to bring about legal decisions to prevent foreign nationals from travelling from or
to Palestine and, for reasons of national security, to prevent citizens from travelling,.
Furthermore, the Intelligence shall have, in the cause of the commencement of its
jurisdictions set forth tinder this law, the authority of oversight and investigation
through various technical and professional means pursuant to the law.

ericitinger thesecurity and

ten perpetrators pursuant.
the Paleatinian 'national.
otage, and any other acts
Ice, and resources of the
nes- tOfight all acts which
elds of external seciiiity,

Article 12The Intelligence, in the,cause of the oilnniericernent of its jurisdiction set forth
under this law, shall have the Capacity of the Judicial Police

rig Article are applicable

'arm a hostile act against

Article 13
The Intelligence must heed the Tights and. guarantees set xorth in the Palestinian
laws and, the rules otthd international law in this ciciniain,

Ile of war with Palestine.

fence of Palestine in the
vign state.
:Atka! physical injury, or
mses or their ascendants
idents of States or prime
lities or those occupy log
their
toward them
ited with the State d
public
/ate properties for
cities of a state connect'

Article 14
Pursuant to the provisions of the law, the Intelligence shalt conduct preliminary
investigations into incidents- ascribed to the detained person; exercise oversight;
search; investigate and inspecte; may requegt the attachMent of properties and the
detention of individnaig; may suntinon and interrogate individuals and hear their
statements; .and may reqnest data, Information and documents-from any person
t keep them and take such miens as it deems necessary in their regard pursuant
to the law.
Article 15
If the detained person is a foreign national, he must be assisted to contact the
2. closest representative of the state to which he is a subject.
IV Intelligence may notify any other stale of interest if it deems appropriate
for (he fact of such measure and the cfrettinstanees which required it to be
taken.
255

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The Security lector Legistatior,of the Palestiniao National Authority

Article 16
In a manner not contradicting the:ofoyisions of this law; the treaties pertaining to
the extradition of defendants in crimes subject o'extradition between the National
Allthority and any other -state musvbe abided by.

Chapter trt. The Btidget

Article 17
1. Pursuant to the Tto#15ions of the 1-aW, the Intelligence shall have its own
inderse'ilderielsucfger, Which sliai-Pbe:included.as one figure within the .Ger
Midget of tha$tate., The Intel4erfeerafatl:manage itsown budget and-ev.
(loin; if {Wet- aieluperVision
of three (3) mein
2. The Legysiativecouncil'.shair Itirain An ad hoc court
that shall assume Ifie,di'scu-gaortndaproval of the budget of the Inteir,g.2.,
a:p-t.lof lfie.approvalkof,,ihe Oeft017Budget.
3, A finartoW 'controller. Shall be afrinted in; the Intelligence by the President
andUpon the noininivtioh 0,PtIAI.letidof Int elligerice: The financial controller
fye resgonsible-4Or IewieWing the items of exp.-Iv:MI.1re, have ditect
an Lctvisiort. over Mi.E.'altell,flng--oNccolintS,, anclenStire ft " s are sound.

Z.

Artitleff$
The Head of Intcll genre shall'be responsible for preparing the Intelligence'sannual budget and submitting it to the President for approval.
The Head of Intelligence shall issue the decisions which include the bases and
procedures pertaining to the implementation of the items of the budget for the
purposes designated thereto,He shall have the power to disburse confidential
expenditures in the mannetWhich he decides without abiding by the bylaws
and decisions applicable to other governmental agencie,S. All the items and
procedures related thereto Shall be' deemed confidential.

Article 19
The Head of intelligence shall prepare a regulatiOn far;urchases which shall conform
to the nature of the function of the Intel ligenee, Which regalation is subject to approval
by the President The Head of Intelligenee sl eII &Ivo ffe full power to enforce it.

Chapter IV. The Committees

Article 20
The Head of Intelligence may establish coot iittees in accordance with ti,!
e
requirernentg of the work, The decision of establishment shall determin
1111.,.,,,d
duties, powers and restrictions of the function of a committee, provided t
nsd;r
function of a committee does trot conflict with the duties of administratio
units already in existence, Cornmiaees of investigation which are establishe
specific purposes shall be excepted therefrom.
256

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The Legislative Fiarnework of the P1\17ASequeity Forces

opal Authority

the-treaties pertaining to
:ion between the National

Article 21
Pursuant to- the previsions of the:Law of $ereice in the Palestinian Setufity Forces
and by decision of the Head of Intelligence, a subcommittee of officers shall be
established in the Intelligence.
Axtide 22
The conunittee shall exercise Its jurisdictions over all members of the.Intelligence.
It may also include in its meetings persons from whom it deems fit to seek
assistance.

;mice shall have its own

figure within the General.
i.own budget and expend
fttee, of three (3) members
budget of the Intelligence,
11.1gence by the PreSident
ii The financial controller
expenditure, have direct
re that they are sound.
eparing the Intelligence's
r approval,
rich include the bases and
tennis of the budget for the
nr to disburse confidential
iut abiding by the bylaws
orioles. All the items and

hases which shall conform

ation is subject to approval
11 power to enforce it

tees
10 accordance with the
tent
shall determine. the
Inittee, provided that the
!s adntinistrations and
which are established fol

Chapter V. The Obligations of the Members and

Prohibited Acts
Article 23
The Head Intelligence, his Deputy or any of the members may not bear witness
before the courts, even following their retirement from work, with regard to
information which came to their knowledge &frig the- performance of their
work, but which was not diSserriinated in a legal manner and which the National
Authority did not allow tO be, disseminated. The Permission of the competent
authority shalt be given to the Head of Intelligence and his Deputy Vale Presideat.
Other members shall thus be given by the Head of Intelligence.

1,

[he!
ck.
Inrpiro
vis'uno ui unis law ana its bylaw They
nustalse abide4 the,-, by.laWs-and Regulations operating insicle.and outside
4,theitifelllgOteL:
A mantraI.O. tt.e members w)ifehlegulateS.their demeanoUr and ethics is to
%)e.. issued.

Article 25
In addition to prohibitions set forth under the Law of Service in the Palestinian
Security F!ottes; the members shall be prohibited from the following.
1. Combiningwork at the Intelligence with any other work, unless the interest of
the work so requires and by decision of the Head of Intelligence.
2, Negligence or failure due to will& a right of the State may be lost.
3. Revealing any data pertaining to the matters of work to the media, whether
during
thereor the service or thereafter, except through a person authorised
4.
5, Performing any political or media activity.
Affiliating with associations, institutions or dubs, unless the interest of the
work thus requires and by decision of the Head. Of Intelligence,
6. txpioiung the function in order to achieve personal goals.
7. keepin g k
fo: themselves any official downieri- ts, even if they pertained to
which they were assigned.

Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636-2 Filed 11/13/14 Page 8 of 10

The Security Sectoe Legiilation Of the Palest[(dart NatiCntal Authority

8. Contravening the security measures of which a decision is issued by the

Competent authority.
9. Concealing errors and contraventions by their colleagues at work.
10. Communicating or establishing special relationships with foreign nationals or
members of embassies and missions accredited at the State, unless the'interest
of the work so requires and by decision of the Head of Intelligence.

Chapter VI. Appointments

Article 26
The following shall be required from>a person to be appointed in the intelligence:
1. Be of Palestinian nationality and Palestinian parents.
2. Not be previously convicted of a crime or rnisderneanour violating honour or,
trust.
3, Be physically fit for service.
4. Not be married to a nen-Arab,
5. Be between eighteen (18) and thirty (30) years of age.
6. Not have been dismissed from fanner service by a disciplinary decision.
7. Be of good conduct.and repute,
8. liold the academic qualifications required for the function.
9. Pass the examinations necessary to occupy the function.
1.

Article 27
Any person who is appointed; as an officer in the Intelligence shall'swear the.
Oath of Allegiance in accordance with the following;formula:
swear"by. the Almighty Codlo be sincere to the homeland and the people, to defend
there and sacrifice my soul in their cause, to preserve ray weapon and military honour,
to respect the laws and regulations and enforce them, to safeguard the secrets of
my career, and to perform all of my functional and national obligations in honour,
trus tworthiness and sincerity, God shall hereby be witness upon what I say,'

Chapter
Every member ofthe
and ineaSures issued
Information tegardir
documents, headqw
secret of national se(
to any member of tt
following the expiral
Arty person who dE
or commits any of tl
appears in a manner
Shall be punished pu
hi. cases other than
a member or interr
Intelligence.

Char
The Legislative Cotu
hold the Head of Into
1..

3.

The swearing of the oath by the Head of intelligence and hisneputy shall be
before the President.
Intelligence or the person
The swearingof the oath shall be before the Hea
wham he delegates therefor. The officer shaft sign the form ofthe 'Swearing
of the Oath' which shall be kept in the service file.

Artiele 28
Assistance may be sought from experienced retirees who were previously members
of the Intelligence for the performance of particular functions by spec work
contracts for a period of one (1) year that stuill-be renewable for three (3) year's in
return for a fixed remuneration,

258

Pursuant to the p
to .prepare, train
2, The Heact,of Trite
courses and shat
interest and achit

111 a

manner not contr

of Service in the Palest
aPPOintment, senforit
bsdlolarships, salaries,
a cigea, arid medals, t
"I' other matter of zv

Case 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE Document 636-2 Filed 11/13/14 Page 9 of 10

ThelegislativeFramework of the Pt4A Security Forces

aittiartty
on is issued by the

Chapter VII. Confidentiality and Discipline

at work.
t foreign nationals or
:e, unless the interest
.telligence.

Article 29
gverymernber of the Intelligence shall be subject to the security directives, restrictions,
and measu*sisbued by the Head of Intelligertce.

in the Intelligence'.
'violating honour or

liriary decision.
al;

Article 30
Information regarding the regulation of the Intelligence and its activities, functions,
documents, headquarters and properties and the data of its members shall be a
secret of national security, the revealing of Which is prohibited. Such shall apply
to any member of the Intelligence and those working by special contracts, even
following the expiration of their service.
tide 31
Any person who deviates from the -requirementS of the functional obligation,
or commits any of t114-prohibited::att6.-set forth under this law and its bylaw, or
appears in. a mariner that violates the dignity of the function and its requirements
shall be purls ct pats-uant to the Peal taw iit fOrce.
Article 32
In cases other than flagrante clench!), the competent authorities may not detain
a member or interrogate him except following notification of the Head of
Intelligence.

;erice shall swear the

Chapter VIII. Concluding Provisions

ilat

td the people. to defend,

tt anti mititary honouri
ifeguarci the secrets of
obligations in honour,
on what I say.'

Article 33
The Legiglative Council, through its ad hoc-committees, shall have the right to
hold the Head. of Intelligence accountable.

his Deputy shall be

2..

ligence or the Person

man of the 'Swearing

previously members
orts by special work
for three (3) years in

Article 34
Purtuant to the provisions of this law, a security academy shall be established
to prepare, train and qualify the members of the Intelligence.
The Head of it utellIgence Shall aSSurrte the supervision over the curricula and
courses and shall appoint trainers and instructors in accordance With the
interest and'achievettient of the goals.

Article 35
In a inanner not contradicting the prrivisions of this law, the provisions of the Law
of Service in the Palestinian Security Forces Shall apply to the members regarding
appointment, seniority, promotion, delegation, assignment, transfer, secondment,
scholarships, salaries; leaves, obligations, prohibited acts, penalties, decorations,
badges, and medals, transfer to provisional retirement, expiration of service, and
any other matter of which a relevant provision is.not' mentioned in this law.
259

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The Security Sector Legislation of the Palestinian National Authority

Article 36
The Head of ffitelligence- shall draft the bylaw of this law and the regulations
necessary for the function of the Intelligence, which shall he issued by decision of
the.president.
Article 37
All competent 'authorities, each one within its sphere of jurisdiction, shall
intplement the provisions of this law, which shall enter into force as of the date of
its publicatioit in the Official Gazelte.
Issued in the city of Ramallah on 26 October, 2005 AD, corresponding to 23
Ramadan 1426 AXL
Mahrnoud Abbas'
Chairman of ,the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation
President the Palesiinian National Authority

Ds

in
Ai
lie
Ba
In
II
In
ha

i.