IMPLEMENTATION OF SCADA IN GAS

PIPELINE

Chapter 1
Introduction
Gas distribution and management has always been a problem or challenge for many
countries (even well developed countries). Poor infrastructure or inefficient management of
gas supply result in inconvenience and unsatisfied customers due to insufficient supply of gas to
different places across the state at right time, thus increasing cost of supply. Also the gas
plant and pumping stations distribution network are managed manually by operators in a
primitive manner. During peak consumption periods, which may last for weeks, gas is not
delivered to wide areas and resources are not distributed evenly to public. Operators try hardly to
achieve fairness by manually controlling the valves along with pumping stations. So, in order to
overcome these chalange, we need to design or introduce improvements to an existing system
architecture that operate on real time data communicated from remote places to central or
main control centre. For this purpose SCADA systems will be used; SCADA stands for
supervisory control and data acquisition system and SCADA systems are built and installed to
monitor and control processes in areas such as gas pipeline, gas distribution, water
distribution, waste water treatment, oil refineries, etc. SCADA systems are regularly
implemented in gas pipelines to improve maintenance, operation and reliable gas supply to
customers. SCADA system consists of various sub systems like human machine interface
(HMI ), remote terminal units (RTU), supervisory control system and communication
infrastructure. HMI is a user interface that presents the processed data to the operation
personnel who then analyses data and controls the process based on these values. A supervisory
control system collects the data and sends commands to the process. RTUs are connected to
sensors in the process and finally the connection between supervisory system and RTUs is made
using the communication infrastructure. SCADA security is crucial as ever today with cyberattacks and physical security. Physical security relates to access control, intrusion detection etc.
evaluation of SCADA security will allow its stakeholders to determine the safety of the system.

1.1

Importance
The SCADA System can:

To provide effective & efficient monitoring and control of entire pipeline network.

Remote control of important station equipment, process set points & block valves from
MCC.
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Emergency shutdown of entire pipeline from MCC.

Acquisition & display of pipeline parameters, alarms from attended stations, scraper
stations and block valves at MCC.

1.2

Coordinate security measures with process operation

Provides immediate knowledge of system performance.

Reduce or eliminate manned patrols; provide constant monitoring, system-wide

SCADA systems are relied upon to operate safety critical systems such as fire control

panels and nuclear reactors

Typically expand rather easily via additional I/O points, RTU devices and network links

Scope

In this research we will design a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
system for managing, monitoring and controlling the gas pipeline stations.
The SCADA Systems should be able to monitor and measure a variety of pipeline data including
flows, motor currents, temperatures, water levels, voltages, and pressures. Alarms at central or
remote sites triggered by any abnormal conditions are propagated to the HMI computer for
operator's attention. In addition to alarms, important plant information such as, levels, flows,
pressure will be logged in the HMI computer database for reports and trends.

1.3

Objective

The main objective of the thesis is for easy control and monitor of processes on how gas is safely
distributed. So, in order to overcome problems caused due to poor infrastructure of gas supply
system, we need to design or introduce improvements that operate on real time data
communicated from remote places to central or main control centre. For this purpose SCADA
systems are used.

1.4

Problem Statement

Poor control and monitoring

or inefficient management of gas supply result in inconvenience

and unsatisfied customers due to insufficient supply of gas to different places across the state at
right time, increasing cost of supply.
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1.5

Report Organization

There are six chapters in this thesis. Chapter1 provides introduction. Chapter 2 discusses the
literature review of past related work. Chapter 3 includes description of the SCADA system and
its components and architectures. Chapter 4 presents description, analysis and upgrade to gas
pipeline. Chapter 5 presents the communication system design for remote stations. Finally, in
chapter 6, conclusions and suggestions for future work are given.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
The primary sources of literature for this project were books, manuals and internet.
The help files provided with SCADA components and implementation are comprehensive
and covers all topics related to this project. Dr. M b o c h a also helped, to gain insight into
this topic.

2.1

Literature Survey

2.1.1 Lessons in industrial Instrumentation by Tony. R Kuphaldt.

This book gives a clear insight on instrumentation and control in oil and gas industries. As the
project is centred on gas pipeline, this book provides the necessary material for this thesis.

2.1.2 A Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) For Water Distribution
System Of Gaza City by Prof. Dr. Mohammed Abdelati.
This book provides comprehensive material on water distribution and monitoring. As the project is
based upon SCADA control and monitoring, this book provides the basics of SCADA control and
Monitoring.
2.1.3

Securing SCADA Systems by Ronald L.Krutz

The book defines SCADA system components and functions, and provides

illustrations of general SCADA system architectures. The book also provides information about
the security importance of SCADA systems. The book also discusses the security problems
related to SCADA and the techniques to solve these security issues.
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As security of SCADA systems is not prime focus of this project, so only brief
overview of security risks for SCADA systems is studied from the book.

2.1.4

SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition by Stuart A. Boyer

The book provides basics of SCADA and gives an overview of related topics to project.

The book focuses on technologies that make SCADA easily understandable. The also identifies
basic differences between SCADA Systems of different industries. But again, according to the
project requirement only basics of SCADA is studied from the book.

2.1.5

Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial

Control Systems Security by Keith Stouffer, Joe Falco, Karen Kent
The book provides basic difference between SCADA, DCS and ICS. But basically the

book is referred to study SCADA systems and the difference between SCADA and DCS and
SCADA system implementation and applications. In the book basic to deep concept of SCADA
is given but only relevant information about SCADA is taken from the book.

2.1.6 Research Paper on SCADA by A. Daneels & W.Salter

The research paper describes SCADA Systems in terms of their architecture, their
interface to the process hardware, functionality, scalability, performance and openness. Some
consideration is also given to the industrial standards of SCADA Systems.

2.1.7 Intrusion Detection and Cyber Security Monitoring of SCADA by Dale Peterson
The research paper describes how to protect SCADA from attacks of hackers, cyber
terrorists, and others who want to disrupt the critical infrastructure of SCADA System. The
paper also provides means for early detection of attacks from the most common threat agents.
The deficiencies and future specific solutions of SCADA system are also discussed. Only
brief overview of the paper is taken.

2.2

Background of SCADA

Supervisory control first evolved in electric utility systems when a need to operate remote
substation equipment without sending in personnel or line crew at the remote site was felt. In
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1940s, a pair of wire for every unique equipment that was used between sites. The potential of
multiplexing on one pair of lines was soon put to use taking ideas from the Magnetic Stepping
Switch developed by telephone companies in the 30s. Security being an issue, a select-checkoperate procedure was adopted where the operator waited for acknowledgement from device
before finally operating it. Taking further cues from the telephone relay systems and its coding
schemes, Westinghouse and North Electric Company developed the Visicode supervisory control.
General Electric and Control Corporation too developed their own independent supervisory
control programs. These were used in pipelines, gas companies and even airports for runway
landing lights. These systems became popular during 1950 and 1965. By that time, i.e. in 1960s
Telemetry was developed for monitoring purposes. Before 1970s equipment was generally hard
wired as solid state devices were in birth and infancy stages. But with the advent of low cost
computer technology, software and computers enabled the performing of the functions previously
done by technicians and operators sitting beside panel instruments and tone telemetry.

The first push was given by the 8 and 16 bit computers called minicomputers. The second was the
microprocessors, several years later. Computers offered flexibility in programming and
communicating with field data acquisition units that were previously being done by hard wired
equipments. This was the dawn of SCADA. Many organizations have been involved with the
standardization of SCADA systems since then, including the IEEE, American National Standards
Institute, Electric Power Research Institute, International Electro-technical Commission, DNP3
Users group etc.

2.2.1

SCADA implementation by sensor to panel system

The following figure shows a sensor to panel system

Figure 2.1 Sensors to panel using 420 mA or

voltage
The sensor to panel type of SCADA system has the following advantages:
It is simple, no CPUs, RAM, ROM or software programming needed
The sensors are connected directly to the meters, switches and lights on the
panel
It could be (in most circumstances) easy and cheap to add a simple
device like a switch or indicator
The disadvantages of a direct panel to sensor system are:
The amount of wire becomes unmanageable after the installation of
hundreds of sensors
The quantity and type of data are minimal and rudimentary
Installation of additional sensors becomes progressively harder as the
system grows
Re-configuration of the system becomes extremely difficult
Simulation using real data is not possible
Storage of data is minimal and difficult to manage
No off site monitoring of data or alarms
Someone has to watch the dials and meters 24 hours a day

2.2.2

Architecture for Secure SCADA and Distributed Control System Networks

To address the security needs of control networks, it is essential to begin with a

layered defence-in-depth approach that enables administrators to monitor the network at

every level. Primary concerns for a control system network manager include:
Assuring the integrity of the data
Securing remote access
Validating and authenticating every device and user on the control system
network
A systematic approach to security begins with reducing the vulnerable surface of the
industrial control system network. The first step is the creation of control system-specific
policies that detail; which devices, what protocols and which applications may run on the
network, who has access to these devices 7and from where, and what are the types of

operations a user (or a role) is allowed to perform. The next step is to identify the appropriate
locations to implement the policy. This could be through the appropriate configuration of
controls on devices already present on the network, and by adding various network elements.
Such network elements are required to create a security perimeter, provide additional
enforcement points and segment the network for fault containment. The third step is to
monitor the implementation of the policy to ensure these controls are effective, locate any
violations and then feedback into the policy any corrections based on observed network
behaviour. Security is a continuous process and requires diligent monitoring, reviewing and
adjusting to be effective. Figure below shows one of the existing technologies that can be
used for securing typical control networks.

Figure 2.2 Typical electric SCADA network diagram

2.3

Remote Access of SCADA

Remote access is enabled for several reasons: a plant operator/engineer may remotely monitor
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equipment status, an ISO may need to collect current production data, or a vendor may have to
diagnose and fix operational problems. In order to minimize the probability of unintentional
misuse or tampering, users should be limited only to functions for which they are
authorized. For example, a vendor logging in to update a patch must not be able to run any
control system commands. If a contractors laptop contains spyware, or his antivirus is not
up to date, that contractor should not be allowed access to the control system network.

Figure 2.3 Adding remote accesses to SCADA

2.4

Implementation of SCADA in Water Distribution

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) solutions for water systems

combined with, leak detection and use of Pressure Regulating Valve (PRV) stations may
significantly improve the situation. These measures have to be complemented with adapted
water conservation programs aimed at minimizing excessive water usage. These initiatives
shall combine to form a "water strategy" for conserving this valuable resource and making it
available at an affordable price.
Water companies are able to provide estimates of their production, imports, exports
and consumption, but are less able to point on reasons for unaccounted-for water. Water
losses can be determined by conducting periodic water balance in defined sections of a water
network. This calculation is based on the measurement of water flow, produced and imported
quantities compared to exported and consumed quantities. This can be done automatically by
the SCADA system and with RTUs, and the outcome provides a guide to how much water is
lost as a result of leakage from the network and how much of the water loss can be attributed
to other undetectable reasons.

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Figure 2.4 SCADA systems for water distribution

Water utilities are now seeking new ways to introduce improvements in their
maintenance processes, which may also reduce operating and maintenance costs. Introduction
of electronic microprocessor based pump efficiency monitoring, combined with water
SCADA systems will result in faster return on the investment in a SCADA system.
Implementation of this process involves:

2.6

Calculating the volume of pumped water as measured and logged by the RTU

Monitoring of the "peak power" drawn by the pump during its activation.

Monitoring the average energy supplied to that pump during the same period

Application of the SCADA System in Waste water Treatment Plants

The implementation of the SCADA system has a positive impact on the operations,
maintenance, process improvement and savings for city Wastewater Operations. The
application discusses the system's evolvement, the external/internal architecture, and the
human-machine-interface graphical design. The system also successes in monitoring the
city sewage and sludge collection/distribution systems, wet-weather facilities and
wastewater treatment plants, complying with the 11
USEPA requirements on the discharge,

and effectively reducing the operations and maintenance costs.

2.7

Application of SCADA in Hydro Power Plant

Hydro automation improves efficiency and reduces operating expense. A number of

hydro plants are operated by remote control utilizing standard SCADA concepts. The rest of
the plants are manually controlled locally at the plant site. Intelligent control systems placed
at most of protecting and loading the generating units. The corporate WAN is used to transmit
schedules to the plants from the Hydro Dispatch Control Cell (HDCC) located in the Power
Business Centre. If the WAN is unavailable for some reason, the local control system simply
continues to operate the plant according to the last schedule it received. SCADA
communication channels allow for manual control of the plants if the WAN is unavailable.
The basic control components and design concept for the HDCC are shown in Figure below.

Figure 2.6 Hydro dispatch control cell

Inter-plant communications between the various components of the automation system are
accomplished through one of three LANs. Communications between the local operating workstation and the automation hardware is over an Ethernet
fiber optic LAN configured. All the
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Ethernet addresses on this LAN and the machine condition monitoring (MCM) LAN are
configured such that access to and from internet is not possible. The MCM LAN, which also
utilizes Ethernet connections, is used to allow the transfer of data between third party machine
condition monitoring systems and the automation system. The third LAN in the automation
system is the Profibus LAN that allows communication between the various PLCs and
their remote I/O. This LAN is entirely internal to the plant.

Figure 2.7 Automation philosophy of hydro-plant

2.8

SCADA for Offshore Wind Farms

The SCADA system for wind farm monitoring and control will require a

communications network between the wind turbines in the wind farm, and back to the shore.
Candidate media for this are:

Copper twisted pair (RS485)

Fiber Optic - multi mode

Fiber Optic - single mode

Radio telemetry
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The SCADA system is conceptually separate to the machines and their controllers.
Unless there is a regulatory requirement that requires the machines to stop if there was a
loss of communications, the machines should be allowed to run independently of the
SCADA system status. Although the SCADA system needs to be reliable, there is no
obvious benefit in making it any more reliable than the power distribution network, if it
utilizes communications cables within the power cables.

2.9 Present Project

The objective of the project is the Implementation of SCADA in Gas pipeline. In
the project, study and observation is carried out on how data is collected from gas pipeline,
which technology is used to collect data, which mode of communication is used to
transfer data from plant to RTU, which sensors are used, which protocols are used, whether
the technology implemented is based on relay logic, PLC or IED. Also mode of
communication between different gas pipeline and Nigeria Gas Company (NGC) is taken
under consideration.
The project is the general implementation of SCADA in Gas pipeline or
substations. This generalized concept can be applied to any gas pipeline, gas treatment
plant or substation. ABB technology is used in the implementation in the project. If in any
other gas pipeline or substation, SCADA is implemented other than ABB, there can be a
slight difference in technology, protocols, name of components etc but the main method
and scheme will remain same. So, the study can be applied to any gas pipeline or
substation with SCADA with a slight difference.

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