JAGUALING V.

CA | EDUAVE, 194 SCRA 607

FACTS:
Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents, which later increased in size due to
erosion caused by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn and bananas
provided that they prevent squatters to come to the area.

The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio Factura
which was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable settlement of the parties. In
the amicable settlement the heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of the land with an
area of 1,289 square meters more or less to Eduave.

Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that they are the real owners of
the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or less. According to them, they
acquired the land by acquisitive prescription since they have occupied the land since 1969. They
presented tax declarations and photos of actual occupation to prove claim of prescription.

Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against
Jagualing. RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance of evidence
their claim of ownership over the land in litigation and that the land is a delta thus is part of public
domain not susceptible of appropriation.

The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and subsequent thereto the
accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true
owners of the land subject of this case and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver
possession of the land to private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?
HELD: No.
From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the finding that the property of Eduave
actually existed and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the river. The CA, therefore,

properly applied Article 463 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land
separated or isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to such separation or
isolation. The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and nonflotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its present size
due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this regard the CA also did not err
in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the
land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer
than the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion
which corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river.

It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is,
under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island
for the reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same.
In fact, no specific act of possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner fails
to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as indeed even
accretion to land titled under the torrens system must itself still be registered.
However, Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the required period and their
possession cannot be considered in good faith since by their admission they have recognized Eduaves
ownership over the land. Thus the land still belongs to Eduave.

Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin. However such accretion
may be lost to third parties thru prescription.

Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. vs Ernesto Santos &

Riverland, Inc.
G.R. No. 1530004
November 5, 2004

Facts:
Subject of the present petition for review on certiorari is the Decision, dated January 30, 2002, as well as
the April 12, 2002, Resolution of the Court of Appeals, The appellate court reversed the Decision, dated
October 4, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, and likewise denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
On October 26, 1990, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement which amicably ended all their

pending litigations. The pertinent portions of the Agreement, include the following: (1) Defendant
Foundation shall pay Plaintiff Santos P14.5 Million on (a) P1.5 Million immediately upon the execution of
this agreement and (b) The balance of P13 Million shall be paid, whether in one lump sum or in
installments, at the discretion of the Foundation, within a period of not more than two years from the
execution of this agreement; (2) Immediately upon the execution of this agreement (and [the] receipt of
the P1.5 Million), plaintiff Santos shall cause the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Cases; (3) Failure of
compliance of any of the foregoing terms and conditions by either or both parties to this agreement
shall ipso facto and ipso jure automatically entitle the aggrieved party to a writ of execution for the
enforcement of this agreement.

In compliance with the Compromise Agreement, respondent Santos moved for the dismissal of the
aforesaid civil cases. He also caused the lifting of the notices of lis pendens on the real properties
involved. For its part, petitioner SVHFI, paid P1.5 million to respondent Santos, leaving a balance of P13
million.
On October 28, 1992, respondent Santos sent another letter to petitioner inquiring when it would pay
the balance of P13 million. There was no response from petitioner. Consequently, respondent Santos
applied with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, for the issuance of a writ of execution of its
compromise judgment dated September 30, 1991. The RTC granted the writ.

Petitioner, however, filed numerous motions to block the enforcement of the said writ. The challenge of
the execution of the aforesaid compromise judgment even reached the Supreme Court. All these efforts,
however, were futile.

On November 22, 1994, petitioner's real properties located in Mabalacat, Pampanga were auctioned. In
the said auction, Riverland, Inc. was the highest bidder for P12 million and it was issued a Certificate of
Sale covering the real properties subject of the auction sale. Subsequently, another auction sale was
held on February 8, 1995, for the sale of real properties of petitioner in Bacolod City. Again, Riverland,
Inc. was the highest bidder. The Certificates of Sale issued for both properties provided for the right of
redemption within one year from the date of registration of the said properties.

On June 2, 1995, Santos and Riverland Inc. filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages alleging
that there was delay on the part of petitioner in paying the balance of P13 million.

Issues:
a)W/N the CA committed reversible error when it awarded legal interest in favor of the respondents

notwithstanding the fact that neither in the compromise agreement nor in the compromise of judgment
by the judge provides for payment of interest to the respondent?
b)W/N the CA erred in awarding legal interest to the respondents although the obligation of the
petitioner to the respondent is to pay a sum of money that had been converted into an obligation to pay
in
kind?
c)W/N respondents are barred from demanding payment of interest by reason of the waiver provision in
the compromise agreement, which became the law among the parties.

Held:
On October 4, 1996, the trial court rendered a Decision dismissing the respondents' complaint and
ordering them to pay attorney's fees and exemplary damages to petitioner. Respondents then appealed
to the Court of Appeals.

The only issue to be resolved is whether the respondents are entitled to legal interest.

The appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court: WHEREFORE, finding merit in the appeal, the
appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered ordering appellee SVHFI to pay
appellants Santos and Riverland, Inc.: (1) legal interest on the principal amount of P13 million at the rate
of 12% per annum from the date of demand on October 28, 1992 up to the date of actual payment of
the whole obligation; and (2) P20,000 as attorney's fees and costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

Delay
Delay as used in this article is synonymous to default or mora which means delay in the fulfillment of
obligations. It is the non-fulfillment of the obligation with respect to time. In the case at bar, the
obligation was already due and demandable after the lapse of the two-year period from the execution
of the contract. The two-year period ended on October 26, 1992. When the respondents gave a demand
letter on October 28, 1992, to the petitioner, the obligation was already due and demandable.
Furthermore, the obligation is liquidated because the debtor knows precisely how much he is to pay and
when
he
is
to
pay
it.
The petition lacks merit
In the case at bar, the Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties on October 26, 1990. It
was judicially approved on September 30, 1991. Applying existing jurisprudence, the compromise
agreement as a consensual contract became binding between the parties upon its execution and not
upon its court approval. From the time a compromise is validly entered into, it becomes the source of

the rights and obligations of the parties thereto. The purpose of the compromise is precisely to replace
and terminate controverted claims.

As to the remaining P13 million, the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are clear and
unambiguous. It provides that the balance of P13 Million shall be paid, whether in one lump sum or in
installments, at the discretion of the Foundation, within a period of not more than two (2) years from
the execution of this agreement.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 30, 2002 of the Court
of Appeals and its April 12, 2002 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 55122 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED

Rodzssen Supply Co. Inc. vs. Far East Bank & Trust Co. (357 SCRA 618)
14JAN
FACTS:
Petitioner opened with respondent a domestic letter of credit (LOC) in favor of Ekman and Company,
Inc. (Ekman) for the purchase of five hydraulic loaders. The first three hydraulic loaders were received
by the petitioner before the expiry of LOC and respondent paid Ekman. The remaining two hydraulic
loaders were received by the petitioner after the expiry of LOC/contract but respondent still paid
Ekman. Petitioner refused to pay respondent. Respondent filed a case. Petitioner answered by way of
affirmative defense that respondent had no cause of action being allegedly in bad faith and breach of
contract. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondent to recover from the cost of
two hydraulic loaders.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled of reimbursement from petitioner for its payment out of
mutual negligence.

RULING:
YES. Petitioner should pay respondent bank the amount the latter expended for the equipment
belatedly delivered by Ekman and voluntarily received and kept by petitioner. Respondent banks right
to seek recovery from petitioner is anchored, not upon the inefficacious Letter of Credit, but on Article
2142 of the Civil Code which reads: Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical

relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense
of another. When both parties to a transaction are mutually negligent in the performance of their
obligations, the fault of one cancels the negligence of the other and, as in this case, their rights and
obligations may be determined equitably under the law proscribing unjust enrichment.

Rafael Reyes vs. People, 329 SCRA 600

Facts:
In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound
to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer Grande bottles. Seated at the
front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper. At around 4:00 oclock that same
morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran,
Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the trucks
right lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road uneven
because the potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is
smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the
Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road
by taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run
over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved
to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Duncas vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan
dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally
stopped. The Nissan was severely damaged and its two passengers, namely, Feliciano Balcita and
Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Durian filed with the RTC an
amended information charging Dunca with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and
damage to property. On November 29, 1989, the offended parties filed with the RTC a complaint against
petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Dunca, based on quasi delict.
Respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto
they filed against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, respondents withdrew the reservation to file a
separate civil action against the accused and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex
delicto in the criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi
delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused driver. The
RTC held that the driver was guilty. Respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the
joint decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the private
respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused, which the lower court granted.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident may be held subsidiarily
liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver
despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer of the truck
driver; and

(2) Whether or not the Court may award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite
the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver.
Held:
(1) No. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil
liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured
party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the
same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.In other words,
the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil
liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto either of which may be enforced against the culprit,
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover
damages under both types of liability. In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate
civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Petitioner, as employer of the accused who has been
adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because
of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file,
and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with
the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
(2) No. The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against
the employer. The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused
Dunca is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for
recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against
the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. The policy against double recovery requires that
only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the
employee or against his employer. The injured party must choose which of the available causes of action
for damages he will bring.

Tamargo vs CA
G.R. No. 85044 June 3 1992

[Parental Authority]

FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's
natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in
November 1982.

Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to
the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was
decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural
parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial
court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.
RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still
lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that the natural
parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to
the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time
when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be
essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

Rescissible Contracts: Oria vs McMicking G.R. No. L-7003

Facts: Gutierrez Hermanos filed an action for recovery of a sum of money against Oria Hermanos & Co.
and herein plaintiff filed an action for recovery also for the same defendant. Before the institution of the
suits, members of the Company dissolved their relations and entered into a liquidation. Tomas Oria y
Balbas acting in behalf of his co-owners entered into a contract with the herein plaintiff for the purpose
of transferring and selling all the property which the Oria Hermanos & Co. owned and among the goods
stated on that instrument was the steamship Serpantes and which the subject of this litigation. When
the Trail Court resolved the action for recovery filed by Gutierrez Hermanos and jugdment was in his
favor, The sheriff demanded to Tomas Oria y Balbas to make payment but the latter said there were no
funds to pay the same. The sheriff then levied on the steamer, took possession of the same and
announced it for public auction. Herein plaintiff claimed that he is the owner of the steamer by virtue of
the selling of all the properties of the said Company.

Issue(s): 1. Whether or not there was a valid sale between Oria Hermanos & Co. to Manuel Oria y
Gonzales as against the creditors of the company.
2. Whether or not the sale was fraudulent.

Held: At the time of said sale the value of the assets of Oria Hermanos & Co., as stated by the partners
themselves, was P274,000. The vendee of said sale was a son of Tomas Oria y Balbas and a nephew of
the other two persons heretofore mentioned which said three brothers together constituted all of the
members of said company.The plaintiff is a young man of 25 years old and has no property before the
said selling. The court had laid down the rules in determining whether a there has been fraud
prejudicing creditors: 1) consideration of conveyance is fictitious; 2) transfer was made while the suit
against him (Tomas Oria y Balbas) was pending; 3) sale by insolvent debtor; 4) evidence of insolvency; 5)
transfer of all properties; 6) the sale was made between father and son; 7) and the failure of the vendee
to take exclusive possession of the property. The case at bar shows every one of the badges of fraud.