G.R. No.

163193, June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., et.al, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
(Digest by Ali Caronongan Sourced from class digest)
FACTS :
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436
authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system
(AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated
counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and
materials and adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation
during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections, particularly in
counting the votes collected from the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the machines to
correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its
implementation.
Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172
on January 24, 2003, allocating the sum of P2,500,000,000 to
exclusively fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004 elections. On
February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing
the release of a further supplemental P500 million budget for the AES
project of the COMELEC.
The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and
manual voting and counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections
after contract negations with companies Mega Pacific Consortium
(the supplier of the computerized voting/counting machines) were
discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC nevertheless
continued the electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results

of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions,

also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of Jurisdiction in the
issuance of Resolution No. 6712. Respondent COMELEC contends
that its advancement in tabulation procedures is allowed within the
statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the Omnibus Election Code
that:
Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest technological and
electronic devices, taking into account the situation prevailing in the
area and the funds available for the purpose. Provided, That the
Commission shall notify the authorized representatives of accredited
political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or
adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty
days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the
COMELEC in authorizing the use of election funds in consolidating
the election results for the May 10, 2004 elections should be declared
VOID, as it is unconstitutional.
HELD:
YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712
preempts the sole authority of the Congress to canvass the votes of
the election returns for the President and the Vice-President.
REASONS:
Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive
authority vested in the Congress to canvass the votes for the election
of President and Vice-President. It is a grave error on the part of the
respondent to have ignored the misapprehensions addressed by

Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin

Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of
the Constitution (section 4 of Article VII):
"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said
positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the
President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive
of the authority of Congress, but would also be lacking of any
constitutional authority."
The existence of an accredited Citizens arm: Under Section 27 of
Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and
reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizens
arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy
of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of
the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other
entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use
a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an
"unofficial" count.
In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while
required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the said laws, are
not intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The said copies
are archived and unsealed only when needed by to verify election
results in connection with resolving election disputes that may be
established.
Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code: The
Court contends that Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code,
which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed
resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and
election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the
COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of
accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by
the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less
than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices,
after failing to submit any document proving that it had notified all
political parties of the intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712.

Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]

16 Aug
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18
June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).

On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued

transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of
Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An
Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The
Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain
And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain
Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by
then President Marcos. The decree, entitled Revoking All
Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant
Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By
The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota,
And Other Forms Of Gambling, in Section 3 thereof, expressly
revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local
governments.

In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to

operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and
Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No.
771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to
operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local
governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.

ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and
non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to
show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or
amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the
executive still exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued
existence of ADCs franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of
PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the
Courts First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot
have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only
the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of
the Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADCs possession of a valid franchise,
the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by
the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
Board of Optometry v. Colet
a. Facts: 1995 Congress enacted R.A. No. 8050 Revised
Optometry Law.Private respondents prayed before RTC Manila
a petition for declaratoryrelief and for prohibition and
injunction of R.A. No. 8050. They claimed thatR.A. 8050 was
unconstitutional on the grounds of derogation in thelegislative
process and vitiation of legislative consent; undue delegation
of legislative power and vitiation in the legislative process of the
said act. RTCManila granted the writ of preliminary injunction. In

their efforts to seekannulment of the said order, petitioners

Board of Optometry et al alleged thatthe respondents did not
have any legal existence or capacity to sue exceptfor
Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.b.
b. Issue: WON private respondents have locus standi to question
theconstitutionality of R.A. 8050.c.
c. Ruling: No. Private respondents have no legal standing to
question theconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8050. SC cited Art. 44 of
the Civil Code that anassociation is considered a juridical
person if the law grants it a personalityseparate and distinct
from its members. Otherwise, it cannot be a real partyin interest
in any civil action. When the private respondents failed to
provethe juridical personality of their associations and chose to
keep mum on thatissue, they have grossly disregarded Sec. 4
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.Thus, without juridical entity demerits
the private respondents to becomereal parties in interest.
Petitioners prayer for the writ of preliminary injunctionto be
annulled and set aside was granted
Fernandez v. Torres ||
J. Feliciano GR No. 102940 November 6, 1992
Doctrine:
Mere speculation/apprehension does not constitute a justiciable
controversy. Courts do not sitto adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest.
Facts:
There was a public agitation for a total ban on deployment of Filipino
entertainers abroad due tothe growing number of complaints from
entertainers and relatives about the exploitative workingconditions,
harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape and even death
suffered by female performing artists and entertainers abroad. The First
National Tripartite Conference for the Protection ofOverseas
Entertainers, attended by representatives from the government and the
labor sectors, was heldon November 18, 1991. The outcome of such
was the DOLE Circular No. 01-91 (dated November 20,1991) entitled

Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the

Deployment ofPerforming Artists
. Petitioners Fernandez, et.al. wish to prohibit and restrain the DOLE and POEA
fromenforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of the aforementioned circular,
citing it to be arbitrary, oppressiveand discriminatory against performing
artists ages 18-22, who would otherwise be qualified for
overseasemployment, hence it violates the equal protection clause and
due process clause of the Constitution.
*For reference, Item No. 1 of the aforementioned circular states: "
1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployedoutside the Philippines
except for legitimate performing artists consisting of musicians,
singers and members ofdance troupes. In all cases, the performing
artists must have a track record of legitimate and reputable
performancein the Philippines for at least one year. In no case shall
the performing artist be below 23 years old. The Secretaryof Labor
and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing
artists from coverage hereof .
Issue:
Whether or not the petition at bar presents a justiciable controversy
Ruling:
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the petition does not present
a justiciablecontroversy. Petitioners have failed to show the first requisite of
judicial inquiry (i.e. the existence ofactual case or controversy) hence
the Court is resolved to DISMISS the petition.
Ratio:
Requisites for judicial review/judicial inquiry:
In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmlysettled rule is that a
constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless
thefollowing requirements of judicial inquiry are met:[1]
the existence of an actual case or controversy;[2]
the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial
interest in theresolution thereof;[3]

the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and[4]

that the resolution of the constitutional issue must, be indispensable for the
finaldetermination of the controversy
the DOLE circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive
prohibition of the deploymentabroad of entertainers below 23 years of age.
Item No.1 provides that the Sec. of Labor &employment may exempt
someone from the coverage of this law for justifiable reasons. Grounds
forsuch exemption are provided for in a set of Administrative Guidelines
Implementing Dept. Circular No. 01-91
The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent
would deny any and allapplications for exemption for coverage of DOLE
circular No. 01-91. It is presumed thatadministrative orders and
regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality and,
that official duty has been or will be regularly performed.
"Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law
withdraw the permit of oneof petitioners does not constitute a
justiciable controversy.
(Phil. Association of Colleges and
Universities v. Secretary of Education)
Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is
especially true where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for then
there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of
constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.' (Rice vs. Sioux City)

La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest

G.R. No 127882
Facts :
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations
or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with
the foreign proponent.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No.
7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and
processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes
of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure
for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal,
and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical
assistance agreements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995
in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation,
R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No.
7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an
FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued
DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known
as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was
later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on

December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR
Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A.
No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from
receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or
act on petitioners' letter.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any
application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No.
7942 as unconstitutional and null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 9640 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional
and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal
and null and void.
Issue :
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.
Ruling :
The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be
violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and hereby
declares unconstitutional and void:

(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to

wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall
be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an
exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or
mineral processing permit.
(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an
exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or
technical assistance agreement,
(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a
financial or technical assistance agreement;
(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every
financial or technical assistance agreement;
(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and
technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral
production-sharing agreement;
(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing
permit to a contractor in a financial and technical assistance
agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are
dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their
own:
(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it
applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement.
Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a

financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical
assistance agreements;
Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation
of financial or technical assistance agreement proposals;
Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance
agreements;
Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or
technical assistance agreements;
Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;
The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for
the Government's share in a financial and technical assistance
agreement; and
Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs
insofar as it applies to said contractors;
When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and
connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be
carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected,
must fall with them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI,
respondents.
FACTS: A petition for prohibition and declaratory relief against R.A.
No. 7854, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati," was filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,
Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto
Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The
others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854.
ISSUES: Whether sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 are
unconstitutional.
RULING: The court finds no merit in the petition. Section 2 of R.A. No.
7854 clearly stated that the city's land area "shall comprise the
present territory of the municipality." Section 2 did not add, subtract,
divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. Hence, the
territorial bounds need not be made in metes and bounds with
technical description and does not violate sections 7 and 450 of the
Local Government Code. Also, at the time of the consideration of
R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of
Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out
of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the
courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by
making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. The
contention on the constitutionality of section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 was
not entertained by the court since it did not comply the
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of
a law which are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)

the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;

(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must
be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events which this
Court has no jurisdiction and nor are they proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. On the constitutionality of section 51 of R.A. 7854,
which declares the addition of another legislative district in Makati,
the court refers to the case of Tobias vs. Abalos. In said case, the
court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed
by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase
in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment
can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a
review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation
where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood
at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still
be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement
of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). There is also no merit in the
contention of the title of the bill that it should expressly state the
addition of a legislative district. The Constitution does not command
that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue all its details so as not to impede legislation. Hence, the
court ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to
such general subject." WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

Summary of City of Los Angeles v Lyons

S. Ct. 1983
Facts: Adolph Lyons was stopped by LA police for a traffic violation,
and without any resistance, he was subdued by a choke hold. The
application caused damage to Mr. Lyons larynx. He subsequently
filed an action. Count V requested injunctive relief against the City
barring use of the control holds.
Issue: Whether Lyons satisfied the prerequisites for seeking injunctive
relief in the Federal Court?
Holding: No
Procedure: District Court granted judgment for City. Ct of App
reversed. Reversed by S. Ct.
Rule: Ripeness arises when an actual case has ripened or matured
into a controversy worthy of adjudication.
Ct. Rationale: Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show
a present case or controversy. Lyons request depended upon
whether he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of
chokeholds by LA police officers for traffic stops. Lyons would have
to assert either the all police perform this way or that the City orders
them to perform.
Lyons case is not ripe because of the speculative nature of his
claim. Predictions of future behavior are beyond the courts
functions.
DISSENT: Whether Lyons can show that the Citys chokehold policy is
unconstitutional?
Lyons claim for damages gives him standing to sue, success therein
depends on his proving whether the conduct was
unconstitutional. Standing under Article III is established by an
allegation of threatened or actual injury. Lyons suffered an actual
past injury, as the findings of the District Ct show.
Pl A: Lyons should argue the actual injury and damages sufficient to
determine Case and Controversy.
Def A: The City should argue the policy is not aimed at all traffic
stops, only those where the officers safety is in question.

Professor Randolf S. David., et. Al vs Macapagal-Arroyo., et., al

G.R. No. 171396
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

03 May 2006

Ponente:

OVERVIEW:
This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and
prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse
of discretion.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a
State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the
1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP
and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress
and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of
the same. She did so citing the following bases:

The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPPNPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to
bring down the President;
Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely
affecting the economy thus representing clear and present
danger to the safety and integrity of the State

A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be

noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of
events ensued:

February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled

Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more
particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming
in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist
safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that
Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the
20th Anniversary of Edsa I.

February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information

that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect. Also, it
was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin
were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a
movement against the Arroyo administration. The two were
later taken into custody by Gen. Senga. However, statements
were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the
increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and
military.
The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan.

The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:

Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of

programs and activities for the 20thcelebration of Edsa I as well
as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of
the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf
David and Ronald Llamas.
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and
confiscation of news stories and various documents
Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the
police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and
attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.

The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987
Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.
ISSUES:
1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot
and academic;
2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on
the petitioners contention that the said proclamation has none
of it;
3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their
insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless

arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and

to peaceably assemble.
HELD:
1. The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did
not render the present petitions moot and academic. During
the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers
committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question
that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving
as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression,
of assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still
be decided provided that the party raising it continues to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its
issuance (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable
in the present case.
2. Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into
the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven that the
President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft
of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This,
however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove.
3. Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President
Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to
determine
what
acts
constitute
terrorism,
without
restrictions. Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by
such violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus,
the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is
unconstitutional. The plain import of the language of the
Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are
normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of
arrest. A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is
committed in ones presence or it has just been committed
based on personal knowledge both of which are not present
in Davids warrantless arrest. This being done during the
dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also
violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble. The

wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant

disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to
be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent. Revocation of such permits may only be
done after due notice and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case,
the search and seizure of materials for publication, the
stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune
offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to
media are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak
only if allowed to do so, and no more. When in implementing
its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police
committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the
Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts
unconstitutional and illegal.
LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR
Dec. 1, 2004
Facts: On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its
Decision granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality
of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire
FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the
finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987
Constitution.
The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service
contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution,
were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle
of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the
prejudice of the Filipino nation.
Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils

limited to technical or financial assistance only?

Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements
may be entered into, and only for large-scale activities. Full control is
not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor,
provided that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy;
and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the
contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised
by the board of directors of a private corporation: the performance
of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions
may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual
entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business.

Facts. Marco DeFunis, Jr. sued the University of Washington Law

School, a state operated university. DeFunis argued that the
Universitys admissions policies and criteria were racially
discriminatory. However, DeFunis was allowed to attend the law
school during the case and was in his third year when the case was
heard by the Court. Further, the University has agreed to let him
graduate upon completion of his last year.
Issue. Does an actual controversy exist between the parties,
capable of redress by the United States Supreme Court (Supreme
Court)?
Held. The Court ordered the parties to address the issue of mootness
before they proceeded to any other claims in the petition. The Court
reasoned that federal courts are without power to decide questions
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the cases before them.
This requirement stems from Article III of the Constitution, under which
the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case
or controversy. No amount of public interest would be sufficient to
create an actual case or controversy, and the case was rendered
moot because DeFunis was going to graduate from the law school
regardless of the Courts ruling. Thus, the case was rendered moot.

[T]he controversy between the parties has thus clearly ceased to be

definite and concrete.
Dissent. There were numerous potential litigants who would be
affected by a decision on the legal issues presented. Further, 26
amici curiae briefs were filed by parties in this case. The public
interest would be best served by reviewing these issues now, as they
would inevitably find their way back into the federal court system.
There was a stronger interest in litigating these issues immediately to
avoid repetitious litigation that would inevitably occur due to the
high public interest in this issue.
Discussion. A case is considered moot if a justiciable controversy
existed when a case was filed, but circumstances after filing indicate
the litigant no longer has a stake in the controversy. In such a
situation, the Supreme Courts jurisdiction is not invoked, and the
Court will no

t even hear the other issues presented.