Philosophy and Feminism: final exam

Prepared for Professor Marvin Glass' course 32.236.

Written by: critical (on Scribd.com).

#1a)

A fetus which forms within a woman's womb is not necessarily something

which we should consider a human being merely because it is alive and it emanates

from a human woman. We would not want to consider a severely deformed and

mentally retarded fetus to be a human being merely because it has the two above

qualities. Something which is a human being requires something much more, than

merely the combination of two related qualities like living and comes from a human

woman. One cannot merely add the two highlighted vectors, as if they were

vectors of force in physics, and come up with the result -- human being. The

human fetus in the woman's womb is a human fetus and it is alive this method

attempts to play a game of terminology which is philosophically bankrupt. The

human fetus is merely a living human fetus not a human being. That which is a

human being requires many more distinct criteria to achieve certainty that it is

indeed a human being, such as a capacity to reason.

#1b)

If this argument defines rape or an abnormal child as its criteria as

"something equally serious" to the threat of the mother's life then it has some
major philosophical drawbacks. It does not seem likely that the argument could be

referring to anything else other than rape or abnormality of the child so I will take

this as given. The important question to ask at this point is exactly why rape and

abnormality are as important as the life of the mother. The fact of conception

through rape has no moral impact on the child, true it would cause a great deal of

discomfort to the mother but nothing as morally justifiable as death in childbirth.

Abnormality of the child seems even less morally justifiable to abort a fetus as

rape. This leaves us with the question of implication that this argument will have

on our lives. This argument taken to its reasonable conclusions could result in

justifying race purification. The conclusion is not one we find morally acceptable

and therefore this argument must be seen as morally unjustifiable.

Why is it justifiable for the woman's right to life to supersede the fetus's

right to life? If we must accept that the fetus may be human the method of

adjudicating a situation where the mother's risk of death morally outweighs the

fetus's right to life is not justified. It would seem just as reasonable to accept

that the woman should forfeit her life because the fetus's right to life outweighs

the woman's right to life. The argument says nothing as to why it favours the

woman's right to life in this situation and without justification we cannot merely

automatically agree with the argument. The argument is of little use in the
abortion debate as it provides no method of adjudicating between the right to life

of the woman and that of the fetus.

Some women (or men) might want to deny the argument that we cannot be

certain that the fetus is not human, as this is a premise that requires more

justification than given by the argument.

#1c)

I favour the position of a limited decriminalization of prostitution. Limited

decriminalization would be an elimination of laws that prohibit prostitutes from

soliciting, while instituting laws that penalize the pimps who live of the avails of

prostitutes. Anti-solicitation laws are counter-productive as a means of controlling

prostitution since a prostitute who is fined for soliciting will without a doubt have

to 'turn a trick' just to pay the fine and then she will need to 'turn a trick' again

to feed herself. In this way laws that prohibit soliciting by means of a fine merely

encourage soliciting once the prostitute is released. Solicitation laws also have the

effect of forcing prostitutes to work in 'underground' leaving them more

vulnerable to pimps and abusive 'johns'.

Fining or incarcerating the 'johns' or customers of prostitutes would merely

place an initial hardship on prostitutes while encouraging pimps to become the

middle-men between johns and prostitutes -- it would not eliminate prostitution

itself. Fining or incarcerating the pimps would hopefully have the effect of

lessening the abusive situations women as prostitutes must undergo. Unfortunately

this position of making pimping or 'living of the avails' illegal appears an unpopular

one among prostitutes as it makes finding a husband or partner difficult or it

causes unnecessary hardship to the loved ones of prostitutes. However, it does

not seem possible to protect prostitutes from pimps in any other way.

The purveyor of a position against decriminalizing prostitution would have to

deal with many unjustifiably hazards it places prostitutes in and an equally

unjustifiably difficult lifestyle for prostitutes. To be against decriminalization is

to say that punishing women and women alone in the market place of prostitution is

justifiable. To penalize the 'johns' alone would as mentioned above have the

effect of worsening an already hazardous situation for prostitutes by forcing them

to become more dependent on pimps. Anti-decriminalization tells prostitutes as

women that they cannot expect society to protect them as human beings.

Keeping prostitution in its current status as illegal serves no purpose, not

even the long fabled purpose of prevention. The conditions of our society allow for

the existence of prostitution because of the ghettoization of women. In a society

where there is 100 percent employment and equal opportunity for both men and
women prostitution might become extinct, women would no longer have the need to

enter this profession as a means for sustenance. Without the conditions of

Utopian society described above some women will always find the need to become

prostitutes just to survive.

Making the activity of prostitution illegal will not remedy the situation, as we

have seen within our own society it merely pushes the prostitute and her business

underground. On the other hand, fully decriminalizing prostitution would be

societies tacit approval that women should prostitute themselves while making the

state her pimp (assuming taxation and licensing as part of full decriminalization).

The position that I have proposed (limited decriminalization) looks upon

prostitution as a necessary evil that we cannot eliminate through legislation, nor

should we condone it as practice that women should want to participate in or that

the state should profit from. Women in an ideal society might even want to

become prostitutes but given the societal inequalities of our current society we

cannot say that a woman truly freely chooses to become a prostitute. Given the

fact that women are ghettoized into low income low satisfaction jobs there will

always be a certain percentage who choose prostitution as a means that is

preferable to filling matchboxes.

Certain radical feminist approaches that were discussed in class like

eliminating the demand for prostitutes by penalizing the john and the pimp alone

are I believe impractical. The result of such a radical approach would be to merely

either send prostitution underground or completely eliminate the business of the

prostitute. In a way the latter possibility appears very beneficial but the results

would merely force prostitutes to either find employment that they may find just

as degrading or cause them to seek out a man to marry -- possibly just prostituting

herself for life to her husband. The former result, that of sending prostitution

underground, is committing the prostitute to a hazardous lifestyle not liberating

her from her conditions. If on the other hand the radical approach took place in a

society were women are equals to men then the results would not be especially

damaging to women.

#1d)

Although professors at universities should have freedom to speak their

minds women should also have the freedom to the absence of sexual harassment.

The University of New Brunswich does not appear to have a tension between these

two freedoms in this case since Martin Yaqzan is a mathematics professor.

Professor Yaqzan should have the academic freedom to say what he believes with

regards to mathematics but since his specialty is not in an Arts faculty he should

not be given free rein in matters of social interaction. The Vice-President of

U.N.B should have no qualms about giving the professor a warning and then if his

sexual harassment persists he should be suspended or fired.

#2)

The Burstyn anthology on censorship describes a position against censorship

that is hard to refute. Feminists of the past who have allied themselves with

conservative groups to improve the conditions of women and society are bound to

lose ultimate control of the reform that actually occurs. Examples of exactly how

reforms can go contrary to feminist ideals is described by Burstyn in her

introductory essay (pg 15). Burstyn makes a convincing analogy between the

modern issue of censorship and the historical

issue of the repeal of Contagious Diseases Acts, the latter issue went very wrong

for women because they lost control of its ultimate societal implementation and so

also will the former issue -- the issue of censorship of pornography. The state and

its institutions are not empty vessels that feminists or any other group may fill

with their "content and meaning" (pg 15). The state is a structure based on

patriarchy which we can not merely reform from within, through the use of the

state apparatus of legal proceedings for example, it is an organism that exists in

and perpetrates the status quo. We cannot eliminate the beast of patriarchy,

which we personify in pornography, through the institutions of a patriarchal system

without losing fundamental control of the process and perhaps causing ourselves

more harm than good.

Censorship of pornography could very well cause more harm than good to

women and feminism through a myriad of ways. An implementation of censorship of

pornography would confer upon the state the power to dictate a single sexual norm

upon our society as a whole. This sexual norm dictated by the state through

censorship of pornography may not necessarily be a violently pornographic norm but

it would undoubtedly be a violently patriarchal norm. In the apparatus of

censorship the cure, the enforcement of patriarchal sexual norms, would

undoubtedly be worse than the disease, the patriarchal pornography which offends

our sensibilities.

The enforcement of a single patriarchal norm of sexuality that would be the

end result of a successful campaign to censor pornography would do more harm

than good to the women of our society. Undoubtedly the sexual norm referred to

above that would arise would be that of a male-centred, heterosexually.

Undoubtedly the sexuality of the homosexual (lesbians and gays) would bear the

brunt of this new sexual norm -- thus placing gays and lesbians in an even worse

more persecutive environment than before mass censorship. Censorship, leading to

an enforced sexual norm, could also drastically hamper the ability of women to seek
out their own perhaps distinct forms of sexual expression as a means of liberating

themselves from present male-centred sexuality. To seek out state enforced

censorship of pornography would be to open Pandora's Box;

Let's not create new constraining ideas of what women's behaviour

should be, ideas that would rob us of our right to explore our desires
on our own terms. We need to examine our feelings of lust, our desire
for power, our objectification of others, how anger can be expressed
within and through sexuality, our attraction to particular aspects of
others' identities and images, and more, and not demand that our or
others' fantasies conform to an abstract idea of politically correct
sex (pg 54-50).
We do not know what direction women's sexuality would take in a society in which

she is equal to men, censorship of pornography could very well inhibit the growth of

this sexuality rather than provide a safe area for it to grow uninhibited.

The tool that some feminists propose will make our society a more

comfortable place for women is the tool of censorship of pornography. The

Burstyn anthology rightly condemns this approach as an attack on the symptoms of

inequality rather than a wholehearted attempt to eliminate the source of societal

inequalities -- the entire patriarchal system itself. The fact that women are still

second-class citizens in our society is not the result of pornography it is the result

of a male-centred society. The fact that women are forced to work as prostitutes

or pornographic models is not the result of pornography as a force in our society, it

is the result of a male-centred society that does not allow for the equality of
treatment of women. Pay equity and universal daycare these are the things that

have the power to provide equality for women, the power to eliminate violence

against women, censorship of pornography will do none of these things. What

censorship of pornography will do is give us a false sense of security that

something is being done, it will divert important financial resources from solutions

that can rectify the inequality of women in our society (ie. pay equity, universal

daycare, etc.).

In summary there are two primary reasons that censorship of pornography is

a bad idea: Censorship will confer on the state a control of our sexuality that

places a single norm of sexuality as the only permissible form of sexuality.

Censorship is a solution that attempts to fix relatively minor symptoms of our

society without accessing the root causes of the inequality of women, in the

process it diverts important societal resources toward a goal which is very unlikely

to succeed in promoting feminist values.

Susan Cole's book on pornography takes a decidedly more favourable position

on censorship than the Burstyn anthology. Cole attempts to demonstrate that

pornography does very real harm to women, in and of itself, by citing statistics

that link pornographic consumption with rape in the United States. According to

her data the states with the highest rate of rape are also apparently the states
with the highest rate of pornographic material consumption (pg 46). To

substantiate the link of causality claimed above Cole attempts to describe the

message of pornography and how men internalize it. Pornography tells men that

women are objects to be desired and used. Pornography tells men that women are

"naturally lubricious and enjoy rape, he may not believe it. But if he is told again

and again -- especially if the information comes from more than one source -- the

chances of him believing it will be greatly increased" (pg 49).

Cole continues her line of argument by debunking the libertarian view that

freedom of speech should always overcome the powers of censorship that even

"obnoxious" speech should be tolerated in a free and democratic society (pg 59).

Women do not have an equal opportunity to free speech as men and the prevalence

of pornography is cited as a proof of this condition of our society. Women have

less access to money, training and resources than men and this is evidence that

women are not equal to men in our society -- thus rendering our society

undemocratic and un-free therefore the above freedom of speech argument does

not apply.

In a society where women have less freedom of speech than men, basically dictated

by women's lesser material conditions, women should be protected from the

unequal situation by state censorship of male-centred forms of expression like

pornography.

The obvious result of Cole's line of argument is a program of state control

over pornography in the form of laws and legislation that enable women to seek

compensation from the pornographer that they can demonstrate took part in

rendering them harm.

I prefer the argument laid out in the Burstyn anthology against censorship

of pornography. The Burstyn anthology argument has a weakness in not seeing or

expressing the importance of the direct harm that pornography can cause to

women. However, the anthology is correct in assessing censorship as more harmful

than good to women's condition in our society. To give the state the ability to

enforce a social norm of sexuality is truly an opening of Pandora's Box, the results

of which would be cursed by feminists and lesbians for many generations to come.

The anthology rightfully places the burden of women's condition in our society on

the same root causes of society that also generate pornography -- this is the

primary strength of its argument. To attack pornography itself without a clear

understanding of the possible negative outcomes of censorship on women as

described by the anthology is something Cole should have been at pains to express.

In Cole's book little if any possibility of a miscarriage of feminist values are

considered possible when using the state apparatus for control of pornography.
Cole describes a whole series of women-specific values that our legal system could

embrace to deal well with the process of censorship of pornography, but she seems

to have little idea of how thoroughly this process could be overcome by either

conservative lobbies or the male-centred apparatus of the state itself -- ideas

which are well described within the Burstyn anthology. To Cole it would seem the

state legal system is an empty vessel to be filled with the ideologies and values of a

specific interest group, namely feminism, but this is precisely what the Burstyn

anthology says the state is not.

My position is decidedly on the side of the anthology though I wish it were

possible to find some common ground between this position and the pro-censorship

position. I am convinced that the Burstyn's 'all-or-nothing' position is the most

responsible one to take in this situation but I do sense a need to deal with the

harms which derive directly from pornography itself -- perhaps this could be

accomplished by tough restrictions on violent pornography with the fundamental

hope that this will open up a decidedly smaller and less damaging Pandora's Box.

For although pornography is a symptom of more root societal causes, it too is

harming women in definite ways. The above not quite 'all-or-nothing' approach

might help deal with existing pornography-rooted problems while we await the

solution promised by the anthology's 'broader social change' for elimination of the
root causes of gender inequality.

#3)

The reason affirmative action is required in the present is because hiring is

not based on ability. It would be impossible to merely go from our gender

inequalities of the past to a present that is bereft of gender discrimination.

According to figures that have been much heard in the media and within our class

women currently make approximately 69 cents to every dollar men make. Further

it is estimated that it will take 400 years before women and men are making the

same amount. This statistic alone should be evidence that gender-neutral hiring

practices are not currently in place. Statistics of a varied nature indicate that

women are far behind men in placement within well-paid professions. Statistics are

also available that indicate that the people who are involved in hiring new

candidates are primarily men and that they favour either male qualities or just

blatantly favour male candidates when hiring to fill positions.

Affirmative action does not discriminate against men in the same way that

women have been discriminated against in the past. The most stringent system of

affirmative action that has been implemented so far within our society is merely

the practice of choosing the woman for a job in a situation where a male candidate
and a female candidate have equal qualifications. The conditions of past

discrimination that women have been complaining about for 'centuries' have been

for employers to not consider female applicants no matter their qualifications --

merely by virtue of their gender.

The act of not implementing affirmative action in the present would be to

victimize the next four centuries of women.

#4)

Perhaps I would agree that picking our friends based on looks could be

considered morally wrong. If I find someone not beautiful and therefore decide

that I will not form a friendship with them I am unjustifiably discriminating

against them, but perhaps they would be better served not to be my friend if I

would judge them on such a shallow basis.

The situation of choosing a lover does however appear different than that

of choosing friends. In choosing a lover I want a person I can trust, a person

who's company I enjoy and someone that I find physically attractive. If I ignore

the final criterion of my list then I am doing a disservice to both myself and my

potential lover. Why is it a disservice to both of us? My sexual performance with

a lover who I find unattractive is bound to be inadequate and this would make the

relationship short-lived and perhaps hurt the feelings of my lover.

 If the question were to be; is it a moral fault to not choose as a lover

someone you do not find fits your ideal aesthetics? My answer would be different

in reply to the above rephrased question. I have noticed that many people will say

about potential lovers that they are to fat or their legs or bottoms are to heavy.

This I believe to be a definite moral fault unless it should negatively effect the

sexual appeal to a drastic degree. I personally have found peoples minds a much

more important feature for choosing them as a potential lover than their physical

appearance. Those who do not share this feeling about peoples minds are short-

changing themselves.

If I do not choose a lover of a different race because I do not find them

attractive and if that lack of attraction is based on racism then I am exhibiting a

'moral fault'. If I do not find a member of a different 'race' sexually attractive I

do not think it is a racist practice as I am not racist in any other element of my

lifestyle. If I do not choose a lover on the basis that they are unattractive to me

then I must say that it is either morally irrelevant or morally neutral. My criteria

of choosing a lover are not wholly rational things they are indeed based on almost

pure emotion a person is either physically or mentally attractive and that is final.

Morality should have no place in the choosing of my mate because this form of

morality is based on a rational idea of right and wrong. My emotional choice to

choose someone as a lover is based on personal emotional preferences. This

markedly differs from my choice of employees as in our society our aesthetic value

should not dictate how much we can make -- this would interfere with democratic

ideals of equality of opportunity.

On the personal level it would seem that the only person who actually has

trouble finding friends or lovers is a person who is to shy or to abusive for

adequate social interaction. It is not morally wrong to choose a lover or even

perhaps a friend on an aesthetic level because it seems that nobody has trouble

finding a lover or a friend despite their aesthetic value to me. The situation is not

in need of changing or of moral adjudication because as far as I can tell nobody is

unfairly deprived of lovers. The reason the situation of choice of lovers by

aesthetics is not a problem is probably due to the transitive nature of aesthetic

beauty -- beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Consider that someone who I do

not find attractive enough to be my mate could be the most beautiful person in the

world to you -- or at least to someone or some group in our society.