Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vli
Introduction: Global Shadows: Africa and the World
Continent
25
Poverty
50
Adjustment
69
89
II3
7
8
ISS
Development
176
NOTES 21I
REFERENCES 229
INDEX 249
194
Acknowledgments
The essays in this volume were written at various times over the
course of the last decade. T hey treat a range of subjects, and each
can be read on its own, as anindependent essay. But they converge
on certain broad themes and together amount to a single book-long
argument for a certain perspective on anthropology and "Africa." I
have, for the most part, left the several previously published essays
in the form in which they originally appeared, in recognition of
the way each responded to a particular set of circunlstances in the
world and reflected a certain waypoint in the development of my
own ideas. I have, however, tried to correct any errors and to up
date references, where appropriate.
Apart from the introduction and chapter I, which introduce the
volume, the chapters appear in the order they were originally writ
ten. Chapter 2, "Paradoxes of Sovereignty and Independence," was
published in Siting
ledge,
Culture,
States,
edited
1993). Chapter 4,
Anthropology (17,
no.
Acknowledgments
to. Given the current (and, it seems to me, extremely vital) state
of the field of anthropology at present, there is every reason to be
hopeful that such a provocation will be answered with new and
innovative forms of ethnographic practice at can push the sorts
of questions I have tried to raise in this book in productive and
intellectually rewarding directions.
More than anything I have written before, this book has been
shaped by the institutional and profesSional settings within which
its chapters took form. Most of the chapters began as seminar
papers, presented at conferences, workshops, and invited lectures
at dozens of different universities in the United States and else
where. It is perhaps too easy to be cynical about the "circuit" of
seminars and colloquia that are so much a part of academic life in
the United States. My own experience, at least, is of having been
enormously enriched by m1,encounters with hundreds of serious,
thoughtful faculty and student colleagues in such settings-col
leagues whose questions, insights, and suggestions played a truly
germinal part in forming my ideas, shaping the contours of my
arguments, and pushing me toward greater clarity in my writing.
I cannot thank all of these colleagues individually, but I am pro
foundly in their debt.
Much of tlle work on this book was done while I was a mem
ber of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Cali
fornia, Irvine (UCI). T he Irvine Department provided a wonder
fully stimulating and supportive environment for my intellectual
development over the years, and I am deeply grateful to my an
thropology colleagues (especially Victoria Bernal, Tom Boellstorff,
Mike Burton, Teresa Caldeira, Frank Cancian, Leo Chavez, Susan
Greenhalgh, Karen Leonard, Bill Maurer, and Mei Zhan), as well
as to the members of ucr's Critical T heory Institute, and to the
many wonderful students I worked with over the years at Irvine.
Since 2003, I have enjoyed an equally delightful academic home in
the Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology at Stanford
University, which provided an environment amazingly rich in both
intellectual excitement and warm collegiality for the final round
of work on the book. Portions of the book were also written dur
at the Center for Advanced Study
ing a fellowship year
in the Behavioral Sciences, whose support is gratefully acknowlAcknowledgments
ix
Introduction:
Global Shadows
A F R I C A A N D THE W O R L D
Acknowledgments
eties without history;' even as "Africa" itself was a central site for
i tself. And this "Africa" talk - both on the continent and off
1994).1 Yet
but always the crisis in Africa, the problems of Africa, the failure
at the level of "Africa." The odd result is that the diScipline that
has termed "the invention of Africa" has had almost nothing to say
us
full
general" (that unlikely object) but specific places and social realities
"in" Africa?
Historically, Western societies have found in "Africa" a radical
(I988)
1997b).
the West's desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of
locality.So, I don't know about 'Africa; but let me tell you about
first of all, as Mbembe says, as "an absent object;' set always in rela
tion to the full presence of the West.Today, for all that has changed,
"Africa."l
Introduction
Introduction
Out
chssatisfaction with this state
affairs, I have in recent
years tried work toward a different sort of writing. The essays in
this book are all attempts to speak, in an explicitly non- or supra
ethnographic way, about broader questions concerning the cate
gory that is "Africa" and its place in the world. I use the essay form
as a way to move across anal-ytic and scalar levels more
freely than
is usual in ethnographic accounts, and to move s\Viftly -indeed,
speculatively-from particular observations to some very general
and abstract, broad questions to which I seek to relate them. I do so
not to present a syntlletic view of an empirical object, but simply to
try out ("essay") certain ways of thinking about a continental pre
dicament, and a discursive and imaginative object, that cannot be
grasped simply as the sum of a series of localities. The essays, some
previously published, are meant to be independent of each other,
and each can be read as a single, stand-alone piece. But they con
verge around the question of "Africa" as a place-in-the-world, and
they all in one way or another seek to use a consideration of this
question as a way to think about such large-scale issues as global
ization, modernity, worldwide inequality, and social justice.
My aim in doing this is emphatically not to define a historical or
cultural region of "Africa" (or" Sub-Saharan Africa;'"black Africa;'
"tropical Africa;' or what have you), and then identify features of
that history or culture that would explain "the crisis in Africa."
There have been a number of recent attempt to do this by trac
ing causal relations between certain features of the historical ex
perience or cultural heritage of "Africa" (normally, Sub-Saharan
Africa, often excluding South Africa) and certain features of con
temporary African societies or (especially) states that confound
developmentalist expectations. Some such authors have focused
on the relatively recent historical experience of colonialism, with
its legacies of authoritarian rule ( Ake 1997), pseudo-traditional
rural despotism (Mamdani 1996), "weak states" (Clapham 1996;
Reno 1999), "artificial" boundaries (Engelbert 2002), and enclave
export production (Leonard and Straus 2003). O thers refuse to
give so much weight or power to the colonial era and consider a
longer historical horizon. Some point to long-term considerations
of geography and population density (Herbst 2000); others, to dis
tinctive enduring features of African social and political organiza4
Introduction
et al. 1999: 72) . The team discovered that "even successful [ African]
children and the youth of Africa;' and who use the word "Aftica"
1999: 55). As one foreign investor put it, "The basic rule for black
it. Who knows what's going to happen next year?" (Bhinda et al.
might put it) that is at once dubiously artificial and powerfully real.
gory of "Africa;' the "oscillation between the real and the imagi
and low investtnent" (Bhinda et al. 1999: 72) . As the authors point
nary, the inlaginary realized and the real imagined, does not take
gest that recent thinking about "the globe" and "the global" often
guide many such investment decisions (Bhinda et al. 1999: IS) , and
that "Africa" is marginal to, and ofren even completely absent from,
This brief example is perhaps enough to suggest just how real the
is the path linking the meanings and fantasies of words and images
with what likes to imagine itself as the "real" world of global invest
ment and capital flows (cf. Tsing 2001) . This- the consequential
in shorthand, a "place-in-the-world."
Introduction
the wider ordering of the "world" within which such a category has
come to acquire its distinctive contemporary meaning.4
Introduction
T H E D A RK
O F T H E GLO B E ?
Africa is understood
investtneut. In a
(using an index
of lacks, failures, problems, and crises. Its states are "weak," "poorly
ranking twenty countries were all in Africa, and of the lowest rank
ing
fifty,
vestment all have fallen sharply in the last thirty years. Giovanni
poverty, of war, and above all of AIDS -all the modern plagues that
mies," etc.) that are external to it (see later). But it would be difficult
to argue that they are, in any simple way, mistaken. On the con
A recent literature makes clear that most Mrican states today are
2002: 5). Africa's economic collapse, Arrighi observes, has had "dis
indeed "failing" to perform most of the tasks that they are, in the
astrous consequences not only for the welfare of its people but also
for their status in the world at large" (Arrighi 2002: 17). From a very
and that much of the continent suffers from levels of insecurity and
violence (if not outright civil war) that Africans and Mricanists
from the world economy" (van de Walle 2001: 5). He cites figures
showing that the average Mrican country's GNP per capita actu
ally shrank between I970 and I998, with GNP in I998 jnst 91 per
for Africa outside of its old colonial role as provider of raw materi
cent of the figure for 1970 (van de Walle 200I: 277). Africa's share
Sub-Sallaran Africa has fully two thirds of all the world's people
can share of world trade, Susan George has remarked, "One can
almost hear the sound of sub-Saharan Mrica sliding off the world
lion Africans died of the disease (some three quarters of the world
dropped to the mid 30S and even lower (UNDP 2004), even as life
after year of endemic instability and violence and, along with that
Introduction
Introduction
to "roll back the state" to make room for markets and "civil so
ciety" have led instead to "a noted increase in corruption and
11
outsHlc
donors
capital. In the poorest counrnes of the
and NGOS have increaSingly replaced goverunlents, which now pro
are both more centralized and bigger, and yet they appear to do less
development work than they did before adjustment. (van de Walle
2001: 276)
\ shoulders of African governments-and by iInplication on African voters themselves (see chapter 3). Meanwhile, substantial mat
ters involvmg the poliCies of external donors have tended to be in
Introduction
13
S H A D O W S A N D RELAT I O N S : T O W A R D A SEM B LA N T S O L I DA R I TY
As I argue in chapter
I, "Globalizing Africa such a geogra)
.
phy finds its place in a world where much is indeed "globally
connected;' but such "global" links connect in a selective, dis
continuous, and point-to-point fashion. This is true not only of
the economic connections of transnational capital, but also of the
"global" networks of NGOS that increasingly dominate the space
of politics on the continent. Such networks of political and eco
nomic connection do indeed "span the globe;' as is often claimed,
but they do not cover it. Instead, they hop over (rather than flowing
through) the territories inhabited by the vast majority of the Afri
of the "shadow state" as a way to describe the way that state offi
cials in "weak states" may gain power not through their control of
a state bur!!aucracy, but through more or less concealed alliances
with local power brokers or warlords, arms traders, and multi
national firms. Carolyn Nordstrom (2001), meanwhile, has pro
posed an "ethnography of the shadows" that would explore the
national networks (see chapter 4), and new kinds of more or less
desperate claims to membership and recognition at a supranational
can population. This leaves most Africans with only a tenuous and
indirect connection to "the global economy;' as critics have often
observed. Bur this is not simply a matter of exclusion. The same
the wider world suggests the intimate link, in this respect, between
Introduction
Introduction
15
arly
in this view,
should reject the false value placed on thins Western and value
"their own" cultures instead. But both worries ignore the fact that
a shadow is not only a dim or empty likeness. It also implies a bond
and a relationship. A shadow, afrer all, is not a copy but an attached
twin -a shadow is what sticks with you. Likeness here implies not
clarity, the "shadow" idea usually also implies also a kind of dou
bling.
relationality
such "African" doubles are "really" what they pretend to be. ( Are
African states really states at all? Are African elections real elec
ticity of the copy. The twin fears are that the copy is either too dif
ferent from the original or not different enough. The fear that the
and 5). But as the essays in the latter part of this book seek to show,
and practices are failed copies, faint copies, mere shadows of the
case" economies). The converse fear is that the copy is not dif
that modern Africa has lost its relation to itself and ceased to be
serrion of a responsibility.
16
Introduction
Introduction
17
1 was talking to an
older man whom 1 knew well (1 will call hinr Mr. Lebona) about his
way inferior,
plans to build a new house for himself and his family. He proudly
tecture. Why, when one has a valuable cultureof one's own, would
one seek a copy (a bad copy, at that) of the culture of the colo
floor and a galVanized steel roof. Such houses were newly in fash
ion at that time, and most of the newer houses in the area were of
this kind, replaCing the old-style Sesotho round houses, which were
And was it not true that, once my fieldwork was over, I would go
built with stone walls and thatched grass roofs. I was living in a
the virtues of the local architecture. The round houses were, thanks
cool in the summe r and warm in the winter. They were built en
tirely with local materials and local labor, and they nestled beauti
to move in."
fully into the hills from which their rock walls were dug. The cattle
The lesson I draw from this is not that analysts of Mrica ought
dung plaster used on the walls and floors was even said to have
their metal roofs) hot in the summe r and cold in the winter. They
when the "local;' Sesotho traditional house had all these virtues?
in the eye, he asked, "What kind of house does your father have,
there in America?"
gular. "Does it have a grass roof?" No, it did not. "Does it have
cattle dung for a floor?" No. And then: "How many rooms does
1 mumbled,
"About ten, I think." After pausing to let this sink in, he said only:
18
Introduction
Introduction
19
the information age was "the culture of the whites;' which should
therefore be simply "copied." The storm of controversy raised by
a polite name
for poverty) .
Perhaps this i s
tion seems oddly out of place in Africa. Most Africans can hardly (
feel that they are being dominated by being forced to take on the
I
\
letter written by two Guinean boys who lost their lives trying to
ization" has not brought a global consumer culture within the reach
(among other things) "help us to become like you." Again, the scan
and allows us to see how the idea of cultural difference has some
ing such goods seem more r.t;lllote than ever. Under such circum
SOciety. That such people find other ways of getting by, that they
difference
analyst than by the "locals" themselves, who may see such practices
\in much recent thinking about what is sometimes called global cul
ture. For cultural practices are not just a matter of flow and dif
tion and cultural strategies that seek Similarity rather than differ
20
Introduction
Introduction
21
then, are indeed "global" ones, but not in the way that most dis
cussions of globalization would imply. Instead, they point to the
need for a new fran1ing of discussions of the global: centered less
on ttansnational flows and images of unfettered connection than
planetary scale.
thing that we should have learned from the history of the new
nations in the post-World War II era, it is that substantive in
equality does not go away through setting up formally equal flags,
22
Introduction
Introduction
23
Globalizing Mrica?
O B S ERVAT I O N S FROM AN
I N C O N VE N IE N T C O N T I N E N T
with the
of
Interna
I M F dogma-
brated tome
The point,
is identified
of
so-
within
a
case.
about Asian tigers and Southeast Asian dragons, since they have a
hard time finding any lions among the many African nations that
recent years. But African examples are equally awkward for those
much
rest
1999: 2; empha
societies" (and it soon becomes clear that African societies are not
worldwide
ment of any kind and unable to proVide a significant market for the
convet;gence
ing that Africa today is the only world region where one will find
huge populated swaths of the earth that are under the effective au
2002)
phaSizing that these are not odd little patches but truly vast areas.
cow would lie within the eastern border; in southern Sudan, the
26
Globalizing Africa?
Globalizing Africa?
27
area that was until recently out of the reach of even major relief
central state in countries like the Congo and Angola goes back for
many decades, while much of southern Sudan has been out of the
( 1997) would
shows. Meanwhile, the property laws that are sometimes taken for
not a
true not only of countries wracked by war but also of mans that
arship on Africa can help to reveal the quite specific ways in which
have seen nothing but peace. In Zambia, for instance- the country
Africa
looked and forces us to think harder about issues that might other
50 in 1980 to
fully) allow. But the reeent history of Africa does pose a profound
how
and
about
DoliticaJ economy.
'-H'lJl"1ilLU1
Africa?
Globalizing Africa?
between
was necessary to rethink our
the
ing US. culture as the English language, pop music, blue jeans,
and McDonald's seemed to be expanding across the globe? Was
tire planet? And if so, what was the fate of the diScipline of anthro
( 1987, 1992,
people in Calcutta to
Globalizing Africa?
many
as
Peter Geschiere
an
diflerent problem wiili ilie idea, which derives from ilie way that
31
lack
to historicize cultural
that there is
UHJUdlULlllf', Africa ?
np" rl"1P
32
an
of EUTocelltric
or to call into
the as
<'?P" C
lln.aDonciate:d
UlI\JlJclliLH1\C
Africa?
C A P I TA L F LO W S
of what generally have been very hard times on most of the con
tinent, mining and oil extraction have boomed in several coun
tries. Again, this is a matter that is discussed at some length later in
this volume (see chapter 8). What needs to be highlighted for the
for capital, and that investment in those countries would yield such
high rates of economic growth that they would soon converge eco
the wider society. The clearest case (and no doubt the most attrac
as in Angola, where neither the oil nor most of the money it brings
today attract very little private capital of any kind. According to the
34
Globalizing Africa?
Globalizing Africa?
35
cludes that "the local economy . . . does not appear to have bene
and improved public services;' and that "local people feel no per
"thick:' But nowadays, mining (and even more so, oil production)
thin; it has become much more capital intensive and re
is socially
(World Bank 2003: 21). Unemployed ysmth, the report notes, had
recently attacked local chiefs and destroyed their palaces out of frus
tration over "lack of jobs and insufficient access to land for c-wtiva
sharply walled off from their own national societies (often literally
ciety through enclave methods. But that does not stop a variety of
both private security firms and what are termed DRC "police offi
'
cers" (who nonetheless report to MIBA'S head of security, not to
Gold has now replaced cocoa as Ghana's main export. Yet a recent
World Bank report voices doubt about what the "true net bene
Ghana after accounting for all its outflows" (World Bank 2003: 23).
Tax revenues are also slight, due to the "various fiscal incentives"
and their legal basis are often highly unclear (see AIlUlesty Interna
tional 2002; see also Global Witness 2004, which provides a useful
"field
Bank staff
I errmtlas:LZc
two
such -,>,
"'-LULtH;'
36
Globalizing Africa?
for arable
37
often
staff and
enclaves. Again, the "movement of capital" here does not cover the
i globe; it connects discrete points on it. Capital isglobe-hoppiYff, not
G OVER N ANCE
as Joseph Hanlon has pointed out, since the higher salaries and
better terms of employment offered by N G OS qUickly "decapaci
tated" governments by luring all the best civil servants out of the
government nlirustries (Hanlon 2000). Those who remained were
38
Globalizing Mrica?
39
rule of law obtain have had very mixed records of draWing capital
investtnent in recent years. (Zambia is unfortunately a prime ex
ample. ) But countries with the " weakest" and most corrupt states,
and even raging civil wars, have often attracted very Significant
less spaces? On the contrary: The four soaked up over half of pri
vate capital inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa)
"star" of the 1990S, in spite of its horrific civil war and oppressive
governnlent.6
IMF
noted. But the situation that comes into view from recent scholar
ship is not exactly the featureless void that Castells ( 2000) evokes
in his characterization of Africa as a "black hole" of the informa
tion society. On the contrary, specific forms of "global" integra
tion on the continent coexist with specific - and equally "global" forms of exclusion, marginalization, and disconnection. Indeed, it .
40
bl.)b;;Uizin2 Africa?
a theOJ:etilcaJU1
AN
not only illuminate the situation on the continent but also help us
to think more critically about the meaning of the global. I will now
illustrate this with a brief example from the domain of environmen
tal politics.
Discussions of the environment often rely on a language of the
"global." Global warming, the ozone layer, acid rain, ocean eco
systems, Chernobyl, desertificatio n- all seem to show with over, whelming clarity that today's key environmental issues are global
ones that demand to be addressed at what we call the "global level,"
not merely the national or the regional level. Such common-sense
turns of phrase invoke the "global" as an encompassing, overarch
ing spatial level, a notion that has come to be widespread both in
popular and journalistic understandings and in the scholarly litera
ture on "globalization."
The implication usually drawn from such invocations of the en
evicted to make way for the game park. (see Adams and McShane
I996; Duffy 2000; Neunlann 200Ia).
More recent efforts in environmental protection and wildlife
conservation in Africa have responded to the failures of the tradi
tional "fortress conservation" approach by promoting a new ap
proach based on "community participation." The idea is to involve
members of "local communities" in the management of wildlife
"resources," in the hope that they will be able to control poach
ing while also benefiting in some way from the existence of pre
served wildlife (Hulme and Murphree 2001) . Yet Roderick Neu
mann (200Ib) has convincingly argued that the new model depends
just as much as the old one on the coercive partitioning of space and
the desire to "secure" selected rural areas as "resources" for inter- .
nationally valued eco-tourism. In his case study of the Selous Con
servation Progranmle in Tarrzania, he shows that the creation of
"buffer zones" for the use of villagers was designed to recruit vil
lagers into a kind of anti-poaching self-surveillance. "Community
state violence and the threat of it, Neumann argues, were essen
lined up, and shot to death some fifty famine-stricken villagers who
Globalizing Africa?
had entered the park armed with bows and arrows in search of small
game (Neumarm 200Ib : 305).
Such spatial enclaving in the service of "nature" is not only the
Globalizing Africa?
43
it;' said Richard Carroll of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). "Can
you imagine tlle headlines? ',\\IWF supporting South African mer
the
'_WJUO'UL.JU1>',
AJrican
Africa?
conservation
conservation
force. "We wouldn't do
funds to create
44
field
Deborah
L""'-LLC"UCH6
account
process
and the International Rhino Fund
,-WJUdlHLC'HF;
Africa?
45
to hire mercenaries
is
say
transnational N G OS
to
cause (as Avant rightly observes) they derive much of their power
Network, Randy Hayes, was present on the ARRC 'S Chinko River
very efficiently, the fighting stops- and that's when babies get fed"
that the organizations with the panda-bear logos don't want to deal
(as quoted in Reno 2001a: 212). Saving rhinos, like feeding babies,
with. It's dirry, filthy work. And if you want to succeed, you don't
such calW>es are pursued would seem to have much to tell us about
projects.
globalization
necting the territory that lies between the two points. But as the
network while excluding (with equal efficiency) the spaces that lie
securiry.
46
GlobaliZing Africa?
Globalizing Africa?
47
is a global where capital flows and markets are at once lightning fast
gional nor the planetary scale is easily addressed via today's "globe
of globalization - as
that Simply "covers it all;' that all views (even the most apparently
where"
CONCLUSION
new piee to an otherwise intact picture (as in the old cliche about
the five blind men and the elephant) - as if we could simply "add
society may in fact reveal key features of how the "global" works
ings that attend more adequately not only to exciting new inter
do we see about the "global" today from the vantage point of these
recent studies ?
nication. Rather, the " global" we see in recent studies of Africa has
sharp, jagged edges; rich and dangerous traffic amid zones of gen
eralized abjection; razor-wired enclaves next to abandoned hinter-
,-,,,jlNUlLH'!,:
Africa?
bl.C)D'll1zmg Africa?
Paradoxes of Sovereignty
bar and finds himself getting the cold shoulder from the locals who
The Mexican refuses, saying : "Look, you gringos came here in 1840
and stole half our country. Now you sit up there with your cars
as an assemblage of "national
and your swinuning pools and your skyscrapers, while we sit here
in our poverty. Why should I have a drink with you? " The gringo
responds : "You mean, ISO years later, you still can't forgive us for
ciety, and "the field" tend to localize and depoliticize our under
taking half of your country? " "No," the Mexican replies. "I can for
give that. It is not easy, but I can forgive that you took half of our
country. But there is one thing that I can't forgive." "What is that ? "
the
necessary to assure
United States that
Paradoxes
much discussion
ethnic "Bantustans" as
he
the
Paradoxes of Sovereignty
Paradoxes of Sovereignty
53
Kimberly ., '
Graff-Reinet
Oudtshoorn
o
50
100
200
L--L_'--_---'I
Independent Homeland
kilometers
Non-!ndependent Homeland
Bophuthatswana
Transkei
Kangwane
KwaZu!u
Ciskel
Venda
QwaQwa
Gazankulu
____
;;;e;
E KwaNdebele
Black Town
White town
International
Homeland
Provincial
Boundary
Boundary
Boundary
T RA N S K E i : C H R O N i C L E O F A P S E U D O - N AT i O N - S TATE
1 985: 7-8.
Paradoxes of
the South
the
1950S and 19605, it becan1e dear that its central strategy \vas
a
as early as
Commonwealth. Planners also harbored hopes (from
,
1954) that the former High Commission territories of Lesotho
system, tW:1C!:io]nirUI
of
master
the
t into
S\vaziland, and Botswana might also eventually be brough
macy both inside and outside South Africa, the planners of apart
heid aimed to redefine black South Africans as ethnic citizens of
"their own" (as they said) "national states" or "homelands" to be
constructed and consolidated mainly out of the pieces of the old
Native Reserves. As these new " Bantu states;' or Bantustans, at
tained "independence," their "African" citizens would indeed en
joy the political rights and voting privileges that the world was de
manding - but only
be free
(as it was usually put) to "develop freely along their own lines."
But within the
1968: 74).
was being
As all this was happening, an extraordinary effort
states
made to establish the legitimacy of the supposed national
ents were
both within South Africa and beyond . National governm
dors,
ambassa
established with all the trappings, complete with
s were self- \
embassies, and limousines. Moreover, national symbol
)
crests,
flags,
s,
Anthem
states.
new
consciously fashioned for the
in the early
mottos - all were being churned out at a record clip
not only
velopment. The new "Republic of Transkei" was given
style
uous
incongr
a national flag, but also a national crest (in the
head (said to
of medieval European heraldry ) displaying a bull's
but also the
svmbolize "not only the vital role of animal husbandry
" ) along
i nport,mce of bulls in the ritual life of the Xhosa people
h" (Malan
with the unintentionally ironic motto, " Unity Is Strengt
and Hattingh
56
Paradoxes of Sovereignty
list symbol
accompanied by a tremendous flurry of such nationa
dence cere
waving, including an elaborate and expensive indepen
book celebrat
mony and me publication of a glossy coffee-table
. Never
heritage
cultural
its
and
i"
ing the new "Republic of Transke
phrase "the in
was Hobsbawm's and Ranger's somewhat cynical
literally
vention of tradition" ( Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) more
appropriate.5
legitimacy
In the end, of course, these various attempts to secure
In spite
for the Bantustans were a more or less complete failure.
Africa ever ex
of vigorous lobbying, no nation outside of South
edly indepen
suppos
tended formal diplomatic recognition to the
of carrots
dent states. And in spite of a dizzying combination
and
Paradoxes of Sovereignty
57
which stripped away the coating o f flags and anthems and nation
1982: 5-6).
cealed. A few quotations will give a bit of the flavor of the ami
independence campaigns.
The Black People's Convention, in
1975, declared:
ation f the people of the Transkei from the rest of Azania, which is
their motherland, so as to give the denial of their rights in Azania a
legal and constitutional backing.
For Steve Biko, the Bantustans were "the greatest Single fraud
ever invented by white politicians" (Biko
press for black liberation - "quick;' as Biko said, "to see a loophole
he claimed, "The simple fact is that Transkei will not be any worse
want to fight your enemy you do not accept from him the wlloaded
( B C P 1976 : 16-17).
National Geographic's
world maps as
Paradoxes of
of his
twO guns and then challenge him to a duel" (Biko 1978: 85)
These tribal cocoons called "homelands" are nothing else but sophiS
ticated concentration camps where black people are allowed to "suf
fer peacefully:' . . . [ W ] c black people should all the time keep in
mind that South Africa is our country and that all of it
Paradoxes
lamented.
up and implemented; their failures were analyzed and
"develop
of
web
the
Transkei was thus very much caught up in
P O l i T I C S A N D P O V E RTY: TWO D I S C U R S I V E LA N D S C A P E S
national econom'\!.
as
"Lesotbo>S poverty"
1994).
distinctive
ment" discourse. Like Lesotho, it was the object of a
within the
mode of knowledge that sought to identify "problems"
ns to them. In
national economy and to prescribe technical solutio
internationally
at least some respects, then, the "illegitimate" and
"legitimate,"
despised "development" activities in Transkci and the
so
Lesotho
in
es
initiativ
internationally beloved "development"
different in the view from afar looked a good deal alike
when seen .
closer up.
ception
strikingly dif
inside and outside of the territories in questio n, was
opment"
"Devel
o.
Lesoth
in
case
ferent iN Transkei than was the
poverty,
discourse in Lesoth o largely succeeded in depoliticizing
as a lack of some
constructing it in technical (and national) terms
case of Tran
combination of skills, inputs, and resources. I n the
an acute,
tered
encoun
skei, by contrast, "development" discourse
g "Transkei"
vigorously politicizing critique. Rather than acceptin
relentlessly in
as a bounded economic unit, critics from tlle start
ment with a
sisted on comlecting the Transkei's economic predica
direct way, rural
wider economic order and on linking, in a quite
black poverty with urban white wealth .
ci's indepen
Hector Ncoka zi, who led the resistance to Transk
declared, for
dence until his detention by security forces in 1976,
instance:
Paradoxes of Sovereignty
The people of the Transkei who are so shabbily and callously ill
treated by tlle South African socio-political system are the self-same
people, who have built the Souili African economy which the gov
ernment boasts of abroad. They have suffered most as a result of
mine disasters that have riddled this country in tile past. They now
Paradoxes of Sovereignty
61
..
ilieir citizens. Neiilier are dley seriously meant to have dlls by ilieir
white creators because dle wlute man has decided that although he
certainly does not want ilie black man's vote in ilie broader metro
Another author writing a t about the Sa!11e time finds that discus
sions in the journal have come to a broad agreement on the exis
tence of "one functional integrated S outh African economy" (as
to make Ius garden and to care for his babies. Thus migratory labour
will eventually be at ilie heart of dle entire relationship between
the so-called dunmly states and ilie broader metropolitan Souili
Africa. . . . [The Bantustans1 will be used as dunlping grounds for ilie
unwanted black vote . . . [and] will serve as convenient labour reser
voirs wiiliout ilie other complicating factors ariSing out of haVing
to recogluse ilie permanence of black labour in metropolitan Souili
Africa. (Hep 1976: 42-'+3)
Paradoxes of ovel:eli:rnltv
62
ment Strategy for Lebowa;' observing that its authors had "failed
to eXa!11ine the nature and circumstances of poverty in Lebowa
for Tran-
Paradoxes of 'nUP1','lnm
sion in a very
fundamental way
dependent states. But the refusal ofcritics inside and outside South
gest the relevance of the joke with which I began, which i& in fact
very sedous. For the joke suggests that - as in the case of South
economy." By being
of "lv1cxico's problems" ? 7
thereby masking the relations that link the rich and poor regions
never existed ?
The line between "real" and "pseudo- " nation-states is more frag
ile than we have yet realized, and South Africa's experience with
64
Paradoxes of Sovereignty
. Paradoxes of Sovereignty
65
nation-states, as well.8
E P I L O G U E : A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L APARTH E I D ?
A C O N S T E L LAT I O N O F C U LT U R E S
I n this brief final section, I suggest some parallels between the way
players and all share a set of common meanings and codes. Since
ideas about "cultures," "societies," and "the field" act to do the same
global) system, so, too, there can be no local "cultures" apart trom
1993; Wright 1 985) have shown that such things as Englishness and
to and exit from "the field;' the images of "heading out to" or
Paradoxes of
De-moralizing Economies
AFRICAN SOCIAL I S M , S C IE N T I F I C
O F STR U C T U RAL A D J U ST M E N T
or what have you, and of how they got to be that way. Placing
central analytic focus on the connections and relations that consti
tute national economies as national, or local cultures as local, can
the people must have their stomachs filled. Give us rain. Give us
Paradoxes of ,>UVClCOV
based
such
gry; with free medical care abolished, many sick people could not
Mansa. I wondered how it was that this merchant had in such abun
its stated goals" (Bernstein 1990 : 3). But my concern here is with
rather, with the style in which it is legitimated. For the cold, tech-
that he was after; tllis was what gave him his special supply lines
waste .in Africa is in reality just the raw form of a literally "de
moralizing" logic of legitimation that, I will show, is pervasive in
And yet, as the story of tlle merchant with which I began hints,
lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages."
Furtllermore, he suggested, carcinogens associated with, say, pros
tate cancer ought to be of less concern in countries where people
70
De-moralizing Economies
De-moralizing Economies
71
local particularities, I will here try to dra,v out some broad themes
set of moral themes that are Widely distributed across a vast region.
hand, it can provide for the people and bring peace and prosperity;
on the other, it can destroy the land and feed off the blood of the
people. Key metaphors appear again and again : the chief as both
man and lion, rainmaker and witch, feeder of the people and eater
to two kinds ofwealth - broadly, the kind that feeds the people and
the kind tJ1at eats them. The first type is a kind of collective wealth
phors for this kind of pro-social prosperity are rain and feeding the
chiefship :
nala
as Sally Falk Moore has pointed out. Because only the rich can
cut out?
Karl Marx had Africa in mind when he made his fan10us analogy
Economics
..
('r" n'''''cn',h"
of Africa is
central
bears
and Ge-
but that
even
of human agency.
the
du ventre
Pritchard argued that it was simply termites that had caused the
mishap, the Azande agreed that the termites were involved but in
sisted that the termites were only the means - they were
how the
question, however, was why it
fell. Why did it fall at that moment rather than another? Why did
that man happen to be under it at just that second? Surely termites
were present, but the real question was: \,Vho sent the termites ?
1993) .8
Hut my point here is rather different. For what is crucial to our pur
poses is neither the rationality nor the mysticism of the Azande line
ample, socialism was first of all an attitude of mind. The key oppo
: j eers, the Azande were busy hWl1anizing the natural. And \vhat is
human
Not only .unong the Azande, but throughout the region, dispari
ties of power and wealth, like fluke accidents, never "just happen";
contrast, was defined as "tlle man who uses wealth for the purpose
cial and moral (i.e., human) terms are not only found in popu
tion to exploit one's fellow man. As the Arusha D eclaration put it,
1 990) reveals that key discursive themes concerning the healing and
not live off the sweat of another man, nor conunit any feudalistic or
( 1 985) showed
74
De-moralizing Economies
De-moralizing Economies
75
case, however, the policies of the socialist state were largely justi
On the day of reverting to the old price of mealie meal all milling
companies were nationalized under those two books he [Kaunda 1
has written under the heading Humanism parts I & I I ; but for god's
sake this was not the root cause and all these books have not brought
anything [for) a Zambian to enjoy. So personally, how dare we toil
over a book which has brought hunger on my body - imagine I got
two boys, not knowing what was to come. I an1 unable to meet their
1985-86, for
1995). \\Then
S C I E N T I F I C C A P I TA L I S M
mental shift in the way these states have sought to legitimate their
poliCies. Leaving behind the moral language of legitimation that
was shared by African socialism and its critics alike, Atrican poli
ticians and bureaucrats now seek to explain and justify their new
poliCies (for audiences both foreign and domestic) in the econo-
the focus on
lli<JI <lllLJt1l1!
Economies
Jt:-llltJ[<lIlLtHI!
Economies
economies to concentrate
,-L'JH\JllJ,i\'
correctness"
more
1t is
guide to the bank's actual economic policies (it is not ) , but because
it arguably has been the single most central text in a coordinated
strategy of ideological legitimation (Bernstein
1990: r6).
198r:
6+, 43 -+4 )
The effectiveness of the whole package o f prescribed policy
changes is definitively demonstrated through a "simulation"
projecting, with the Bank's usual fraudulent pseudo-precision
("Source: World Bank projections" ), the exact percentage increases
that the speCified reforms will bring in
G D P, agriculture, exports,
and imports (World Bank I981 : 1 22). What is there to argue about,
after all ? It's right there in the nunlbers.
It is true that in recent years there has been some dissatisfaction
even within the bank with purely economistic approaches. I ndeed,
the fashionable view now among enlightened insiders is that just
ful analysts in and out of Africa are concerned about a loss of food
ing in its own right (as discussed later), it is clear that it does not
vation of export crops. Yet the Berg Report flatly declares, with all
For it is all too obvious that in the quest to "get the p olitics right,"
are
R E M O RA L I Z I N G E C O N O M I C D I S C O U RS E
to seek to escape the niche the world market has provided for
78
De-moralizing Economies
best produce
as
79
done just that, and with great success. But in contemporary jus
ing city on the hill. It speaks instead in the gray language of eco
Reagan once did, of the glory of individual freedom and the shin
vVhoever is there to represent, is there to tow their system's poli
cies, bur the masses know the purposeful of this system -secure
moral terms and that they arc received and sometimes resisted ac-
1987
lic policy. Yet a whole set of moral premises are implicit in these
bia." For many Zambians, what was truly illegitimate was not the
theft by the looters, but the rise in ptices itself. Similar events have
occurred all over the continent, where 1M F-sponsored policies have
for past irresponsibility: haVing lived high on the hog for so long,
say the stern bankers and economists (safely ensconced in their five
star hotels and Six-figure incomes), it is time for Africans to pay for
their sins.
But the larger point is that these moral premises on which the
always remain
or I M F do not" ( Bernstein
hold them.
of
-w'n aH,'m.!'.
and popn-
Economics
}
/'
De-moralizing Economies
I have thus far argued that the rhetoric of scientific capitalism does
not provide effective legitimation for the impOSition of structural
adjustment in Africa and that the attempt to reduce questions of
public policy to questions of economistic technique runs afoul of a
well-developed African talent for wlderstanding questions of pov
erty and wealth in a social and moral frame that foregrounds ques
tions of human agency and responSibility. In tllis final section, I
will attempt to sketch some of the implications of this analysis for
thinking about practical political alternatives and effective strate
gies of resistance to IMF-World Bank rule.
First, it should be clear that such alternatives should not be ex
pected to come from within the I M F-World Bank apparatus itself.
Extraordinary amounts of ink have been spilled in recent years in
advertiSing the emergence from within this apparatus of a "new
paradigm" that focuses not only on economic growth and expan
sion of markets but also on such things as "governance," "partici
pation:' and "sustainability."9 This is supposed to be the "liberal"
("with a hunlan face") version of stmctural adjustment- the vel
vet glove, as it were, over the iron fist of 198os-style market disci
pline. Yet it is not clear that there is really much that is new in this
'new" paradigm. It is easily enough demonstrated that the ideo
logical program of "governance" (at least in its dominant versions)
is little concerned with substantive democracy and still less with the
"empowerment" of the poor ( Schmitz 1995). But this can hardly
be surprising, since what the new paradigm seems to be principally
about is getting African governments to accept, implement, and
legitimate policies made in Europe and North America largely in
the interests of Western banks.
De-moralizing Economies
83
nondenwcratic
it will have to come to terms with dle 1 M I', and the voice of the
Zanlbian electorate will have precious little say over those terms.
aimed at cleansing the world of its only too evident corruption and
Economies
1 9 99 ) ;
earlier must be
ence
have
would best serve the public "good." It will not be sufficient to com
of whether the very aims and purposes of state rule are not cor
velopment agencies
even though they dearly play a very central role in the de facto
the vise grip of international finance. But it would at least allow the
who will eat and who will go hW1gry; whose sickness will be treated
international debt itself. ( Indeed, in the years since this essay was
come a key rallying point for progressive forces in and out of Africa,
ment must make its way from tl1e moral dilenll1as facing African
debt-cancellation campaign.)
Africa raises for "tl1e \Vest" itself. It is not only Africans who have
ing, and renewal. As David Cohen has pointed out, the West has its
form, "Well, then, what should Zan1bia do?" 10 For the cast of rele
well be dusted off and put to work as we survey the landscape of the
vant political actors extends far beyond the roster of national gov
suggests that the historical mol11ent calls instead for a sober assess
ment of responsibility:
86
De-moralizing Economies
De-moralizing Economies
87
IN THE S T U D Y O F AFRICAN P O L I TI C S
Economies
it
will be
state.
The term "civil society" still had a rather ,mtique cast to it when I
first encountered it in graduate seminars on social theory. But since
then it has gotten a new lease on life, chiefly thanks to the dranlatic
recent political history of Eastern Europe (Arato and Cohen 1994;
90
91
1992). The
But I also have a second, and less reactive, aim in exploring the
raphy, may appear as the middle latitude, the zone of contact be- I
tween the "up there" state and the "on the ground" people, snug in:
the family low (on the ground) , and a range of other institutions in
between. In what sense is the state "above" society and the fan1ily
crucial part of the way that nation-states have sought (often very
of the term. But it also, and at the sanle time, entails redlinking re
show that both the "top" and the "bottom" of the vertical picture
a single figure, the "up dlere" state that encompasses the local and
text that makes the constructed and fictive nature of the vertical
split and the idea (of which Jiirgen Habermas makes much) of a
ties for both research and political practice. First, however, I wish
" public sphere" that mediates between state and citizen. Imagining
tion of the
Power
of "state-civil
relations"
of
T H E V E RTICAL T O P O G R A P H Y iN T H E STUDY O F
inevitable pro-
can mean
as
1994).
Nation-building
and a necessary and histOlic movement from one to the other. The
first such level, logically and historically prior, is the local or sub
building approach 3 - regards the state and its projects with new
identities may fairly be described as out of date, they are very far
it were, for the first time onto the stage of world history. With
the chief obstacle to it. What are called "governance" reforms are
needed to reduce the role of the state and bring it into "balance"
94
95
with civil society (see, e.g., Carter Center 1990; Hyden and Bratton
their own needs and may even press their interests against the state.
I M F : stern, real
economic correctness.
ress; the problem now is how to induce the state to get out of
and not enough state, the second sees it as too much state and not
enough society.
myth than of politiCS, we are left with two paradigms that are simul
(see figure
I).
building" one, altering only the valuation of their roles. The "na
tional" level is now called "the state"; the "local" level, "civil so
Ciety." But where the older view had a new, dynamic, progres
sive national level energizing and overcoming an old, stagnant,
reactionary local level, the new view reverses these values. Now the
national level (the state) is corrupt, patrimonial, stagnant, out of
date, and holding back needed change; while the local level (civil
society) is understood as neither ethnic nor archaic, but as a dy
nanlic, emerging, bustling assemblage
The
Transnational
too,
opogr;u)hies of Power
T H E T O P O G R A P H Y O F "STATE A N D C I V I L S O C I E T Y"
porary
It is obvious that a range of phenomena exist in contem
optic that
Africa that are not captured in the old nation-building
primordial
saw politics as a battle between a modernizing state and
to ensociety
civil
of
ethnic groups - hence, the recourse to the idea
but
Transnational
of Power
LEVELS
NATIONAL
LO C A L
development:
development:
progress:
progress:
civil sOciety
modernity:
modernity:
democracy:
democracy:
development:
development:
progress:
progress:
this is literally the case, such as when N G Os are actually run out o f
government offices as a sort of moonlighting venture. ("An N G O ? "
a Zambian informant o f mine once remarked. "That's just a bu
reaucrat with his own letterhead.") Perhaps more profoundly, as
Timothy Mitchell has argued, the very conception of "state" as a set
of reified and disembodied structures is an effect of state practices
Key:
themselves (Mitchell
(e.g., Gupta
I inhibits democracy
progress
'The Top
tion is
It as neoliberal theories of state and society suggest, domina
namstate
the
of
power
rooted in state power, then rolling back the
Transnational Topographies of Power
99
colonized (just a little over a hundred years ago) not by any gov
was this private corporation that conquered and "pacified" the ter
ritory and set up the system of private ownership and race privilege
that becanle the colonial system.
Today, Zambia (like most other African nations) continues to be
ruled in signifiGill t part by transnational organizations that are not
"The Bottom
and World Bank, together with allied banks and First World gov-
nores, as Jane Guyer has put it, is "the obvious: that civil society
IMF
1994:
The name for this process in recent years has been "structural ad
justment," and it has been made possible by both the general fis
cal weakness of African states and the more specific squeeze cre
I M F has been
S aul
banks and international agenciei> have involved not only such broad
macroeconomic interventions as setting currency-exchange rates,
bankrolled by
(Bornstein
countries, are being directly formulated in places like New York and
the most basic functions and powers of the state - as they very
Washington, D. C .
1991 )
"
"
i t becomes only too clear that " N G OS" are not as N eT as they
Transnational
Transnational
refers to
as
CARE,
What of "U,lU.,,,,-
or Doctors without
across
runs around
soring their own programs or interventions via N G OS in a wide
ments sheds a good deal of light on the cmrent disdain for the state
and celebration of civil society that one finds in both the theoretical
In all of these cases, we are dealing with political entities that may
up that have not been well described or analyzed. These are usually
lays it tlnd coexists with it. In this optic, it might make sense to
festations of a newly resurgent civil society that has been long sup
or even "sub-national"?
Guerrilla insmrections, for instance, which are not famous for
sites, but in every case operating on the same level and in the same
global space.
their "Civility," are often not strictly "local" or " sub-national," either
" G R A S S R O OTS" P O L I T I C S W I T H O U T V E RT I C A L I T Y ?
1 02
1 03
educated cadres, and made many townships no-go areas for the
the civics were not just protest groups, but something approach
protesting others.
recognized .
(AN C) government to
outside the state may have had its utility in the struggle against
has come to recognize that the policies of the new South African
When faced with the threat of a capital boycott, there may be limits
orization of "civil society" for its own sake contains the risk of "fol
ministries, namely, to shrink the size and scope of third world gov
12).
dur-
lowed to preserve its autonomy from the state. Mayekiso cites two
base
Transnational
of Power
Transnational
Power
successful social movements have done just that (as the example of
namic: light, photogenic . . . ideal for the soldier who goes from
106
1 07
war to war and who doesn't have time to change." Benetton even
tistas' actual raids as from the effect that thefear of such raids has on
(as they say) of the international bondholders who have the Mexi
his mask) , "we <have decided that it is not suitable to wear sweaters
in the jWlgle."
be so out of place after all. Indeed, it may well be the most tactically
effective sort of warfare that the terrain will support.
have forms of reSistance- along lines not only of race and class,
our maps from tinle to time. The image of civil society as a zone
served the left well enough at one moment in history, just as tlle
ns not a pure and centered subject of resistance but, like the sub
voked not only in such terms as "the state" and "civil society" but
image of destabilization
T O W A R D AN E T H N O G RA P H Y O F E N C O M PA S S M E N T
Transnational
H"fJ";"'Ldl lJijcl'-
burst
of Power
Transnational
of Power
Gupta
far as state legitmation goes smoothly) the "up there" state gets to
interest that was self-eVidently higher thaIl (aIld superior to) the
customs duties are the most obvious examples. But while this is a
tialization of states takes place. The larger issue has to do with the
widely shared among citizens and scholars. The policing of the bor
der is intimately tied to the policing of Main Street in that they are
render the claims of a merely national interest aIld scope narrow and
nation by the state. These acts represent the repressive power of the
state as both extensive with the boundaries of the nation and inten
But today these claims are increasingly being challenged and under
and the global in ways that make a hash of the vertical topography
depended.
111
'
Chrysalis
THE L I FE A N D DEATH O F
I N A ZAM B I A N I N TE R NET
vertical height.
Such a view might open up a much richer set of questions about
MAGAZ I N E
The African Renaissance did not last long. Its dates can b e roughly
its title would imply, it was all the same a key moment in the pro
cess through which Africa has come to find its place in a "new
weak (or strong) as to reconfigure the way that states are able to
temporary world.
at
Transnational
of
the same
wave" would finally bring the peace and prosperity that had eluded
was finally ready to turn the corner and enter a new era of peace
"Afro-optimism."
UNCTAD
H IV/AIDS
and prosperity.
In March 1998, the "Renaissance" went global. President Clinton
I M F de
been that many of the new African elites who originally promul
it. In this essay, I seek to shed light on how and why that may
ingly hopeful cover stories on a "new Africa" that had left behind
Africa finally ready to move ahead with democracy and free enter
prise. Academics joined in the fray, dusting off their old paradigms
just seven issues in the space of about a year before publication was
and its ultimate abandonment are very much to the point. For what
democratization years.
Chrysalis
Ch,:vsalis
115
T H E A F R I C A N R E N A I SS A N C E A N D "TH E V O I C E O F
new rhetoric was something much more specific and, indeed, con
A N E W G E N E R AT I O N O F ZAM B I AN S"
brought with it the hope that a "new South Africa" might help to
complices, the givers of the bribes and the recipients, are as African
as you and I. vVe are the corrupter and the harlot who act together
I997-98, he
rell 2000).
litical and moral reform with one for neoliberal economic restruc
we may say about these matters [is] that we have to attract into the
. to whose
Yet
left no doubt that new economic
''''H'-H_J
attractive
ing in the
racy (MMD), led by the trade unionist Frederick Chiluba. The MMD
advocated not only " democracy" and new leadership, but also the
full priva
public" in 1 9 9 1 .
bia in the 1990S. Zambia had been led to its 1964 independence
M M D slogan'S
"The Hour Has Come ! " appeared to promise more than a simple
racy might itself put Zambia back on track toward its rightftll
ous nation.
on the continent.
of the mining sector), the dismantling of the color bar, and the
listic ones (see Hansen 2000: 92-96). In place ofthe safari suits and
African prints that linked many of the Kaunda old guard to the "old
1 18
Chll'salis
Ch1ysaiis
1 19
something new.
It was in this context- and just as the global hoopla about the
a good deal more like their predecessors than they were supposed
to be. And their economic program, it is fair to say, has had little
success in reversing the downward spiral of deindustrialization and
sult of the recent reforms, the economic decline has been halted
and growth is expected to resume" (World Bank 1994: i). With the
privatization of the mines scheduled to be completed by 1997, at
the latest, the new Zambian economy was supposed to be pOised
for a successful "transition."
By 1997, not only were the mines beginning to be privatized, but
The
was
and
erudite, with
Aleksandr
how
jJuuU'_aL"U
of the
readers
2:mstt)oolc But
Part of the playful pleasure of the publication, too, came from shat
text.
good deal of the magazine's humor came from the explosive joy of
Zambians, mostly young and male, and mostly living abroad. The
concealed or ignored.
(though many of them, too, had recently been abroad for wliver
its heart, a very serious project. The am.bition of the editors and
journalists who made up ChrysaliS was nothing less than to remake
United States : 76
Canada: 7
Britain and Ireland: 51
Other Western Europe: 1 3
Eastern Europe: 4
Oceania: 5
Zambia: 46
Republic of South Africa: 6
Botswana: 4
Other Africa:
cal group tell us very little about how Zambians in general have
thought about the recent crisis. But they may tell us a great deal
1 22
Chrvsalis
Chrysalis
1 23
and blaming, and start acting, setting in motion a whole new way
of thinking about Zan1bia and its problems. The
CG
THE
CHRYSALIS P R O J E C T: A N E W C U LT U R E F O R A N E W Z AM B I A
full ac
full activity in development, full ac
mink. The
create its own wealm, fund its own independence and carve out its
own niche in tlle global village of tomorrow.
Chisala ended his inspirational message with the exclamation: "The
creatur(4is about to start flying! "
A similarly optimistic generational tone was struck b y the other
featured article in the first issue, Nick Tembo's "The Verge of a
Metamorphosis;' Tembo, identified as a "post-information tech
nology age operator . . . gainfully employed in one of Zambia's
mining compatties:' described having grown up believing that the
economic problems of Third World nations like Zambia were the
result of explOitation by the West:
Growing up in a business nlinded family (my grandfather owned
a small grocery store and my father used to deal in safety dom
ing), I vigorously endorsed iliis point of view and readily accepted
Kaunda's one size fits all excuse for our problems : external factors.
Besides, if mat wasn't enough, two years of civics in junior second
ary school provided the last nail in me proverbial coffin - the "west"
was definitely me enemy.
to
face
UJUUlU"W
has become
,,,,,,,,"""0:
be
world economic success." 26 years and the Choma Dec
laration later, look what we've done.
The task of the new generation was to make a break with the old
style attributions of external blame and to take charge of Zambia's
future. "We need to pay a little more honest attention to 'history' to
help us prosper in the third republic;' Tembo wrote. "The Kaunda
era is over, eat your heart out Franz Kafka, the 'Z' has got a meta
morphosis of its own going on."
called the "old African Chief cultnre mentality;' blan1ing it for the
126
Chrysalis
ChrysaliS
1 27
"surviving" ( "what
acter and culture. Again, Chisala led the way. Debt relief, he sug
as
tity. Chisala asked, "What does Zambia stand for? What is the
for here lay their true national distinctiveness. And this was not a
laughing matter:
, possible.
Several articles pointed to language - and especially to certain
distinctively Zambian forms of English - as a key attribute of a dis
tinctively "Zan1bian" national culture. IS A regular feature of the
magazine (and apparently the most popular, to judge by the guest
book cOl1U11entary) was Mjumo Mzyece's colurrm, "Chrysalis Dic
tionary of Zanglish." 16 The "dictionary" explained, often with wry
humor, the meanings of Zambian neologisms, or of standard En
glish words whose common Zambian use gave them a distinctive
meaning. Thus, Mzyece described for his readers what it means for
He
a
the very
" vVhen was the last
asked his
you
his elite
,,,,"'U\.Dlll
characteristic boldness
if at
ing the Ngoni people's personal and first hand accounts of the
solar eclipse that occurred on the day they entered this region
called Zambia. Wouldn't it be thrilling to share Chuma's and Susi's
thoughts and emotions as they carried David Livingstone's body
:
to the coast. But alas, it is all lost to us, they never wrote a word.' )
tively update them to suit and match the 2ISt century, but do we
need to? . . . I feel there is very little profit in that. . . . For me the
Z's written history started in I964 [ Zambia's independence]
find no shame in that." He continued:
but
d I
reasons too extended to enter into now, this collection of people has
developed into a nation of "peaceful" citizens. This had led some
are
people into making the erroneous assunlption that Zambians
is
This
.
.
.
.
nt
indiffere
are
united. I think not, I say that Zambians
is
tlus
why our doctors continue to trek to Canada and Australia,
s
why our teachers are flocking to Botswana, dus is why the student
!
are
ns
politicia
some
why
is
we send abroad aspire to stay there, this
on
s
willing to ask the international community to impose sanction
Zanlbia at the expense of the people for the sake of their own inter
ests. We need something apart from money to entice the doctors and
teachers to stay, we need something aside from threats of legal action
to draw our students back home, we need some force other than the
armed forces to make politicians consider first the colmtry and then
themselves.
it. We should write songs, movies, and books; telling our stories in
The patriotism for Zambia that was needed, Tembo insisted, would
sorry -fate has dealt us a hand and we must play it as best we can.
this beautiful language. In five hundred years the five year aIds in
this country won't know the difference and they won't care. I think
it is our duty to give them art and works that make them proud to
be Zanlbian so that they do not suffer problems of self-doubt. We
should make English such a part of their lives, like nshima made from
maize meal is fix most Zanlbians today, and yet it was introduced
not simply come about with the passage of time. "Time, my dear
friends, is neutral . . . . A car driven in the direction of Livingstone
will not magically arrive in Mbala." Since it is people who make
things happen, not time, Zambian patriotism would have to be ac
tively made, not simply awaited. But "since the 'Z' l Zambia J is
to you? 20
Chrysalis
131
like " Oh, yes, I have heard of Zambia, that'$ the country where they
d be given
.
tor an invented national culture were offered with wry self
consciousness and rich postmodern irony, but they were no less
serious for all that. "A ridiculously funny idea," as he wrote of "na
tional fish day," and yet "many a serious thing can be achieved in
jest." At issue was nothing less than a viable national identity for
the new Zambia, an identity that might serve as a source of pride
and patriotism for Zambians while also giving the "z" a recognized
place among other nations in the wider world:
T H E HAM E F F ECT
1998 issue
whether Africans were suffering under the biblical curse that Noah
placed on his son, Ham, a curse that supposedly fated Hanl's de
scendants to be enslaved. 24 His vigorous conclusion was that the
situation of Africans had nothing to do with a biblical curse, that
'
slavery had been "made possible by circumstances," and that to
dwell on such aspects of history was to risk "unWittingly instilling
an inferiority complex in our children - nothing is more effective in
killing anlbition and drive than self-doubt." Instead, Tembo argued
(in keeping with the Chrysalis program) that African problems
were the result of "the continued influence of the pre-information
age financial and political operators" and of an "old African Chief
culture mentality" that fostered corruption. These old mentalities
were being thrown off, he suggested, by a new, information-age
generation for whom "the interests of the chief before the people
is not a part of their culture."
But Tembo's artkle was followed by an outrageous reply by
an in
the biblical curse of Ham on its head and made the explosively
vented idea which worked. Every year there would be some camera
simple argument that blacks were indeed biblically cursed and that
pagcb
white inside while staying black outside (coconut}." If the readers
and writers of
Chrysalis
white - inside . . . . You are sitting there reading this article on the
Ferguson
your formative years. They are the ones who built the white con
science into you." 'Vhat is more, Phiri claimed, the sanle was true of
those other blacks outside Zanlbia who were most often admired
ority clearly insulted and injured the pride of many readers. Some
audiences ; Cuba Gooding Jr. and Quincy Jones had white wives;
this way was not something to be ashamed of. It was the only "vay
feeding the white people with the stuff they want to hear from
forward :
ror some reason, I think we have tllis curse on us which has affected
us in a very negative way and made us fail to invent, innovate, or
ganise, or clean up our world. God seems to have given the white
people these gifts and he has opened the way for us by shOWing us
how to become coconuts. Yeah, all of us need to make the English
language our very own and teach it to our kids [as argued by Tembo l .
And more than that, we have to read white books, see white movies,
listen to white music, and so on ul1til we embrace the whiteness and
be relieved of our natural curse .
Chrysalis discussion
included not only the predictable angry denials, but also moments
proper ("white") form of English than other Africans -" Have you
Chrysalis
Clnysalis
135
seldom met a normal person who stunk as much as some of tl1e white
2. Convent Schools
5. UNZA
and not race (or else, "Why is Finland cleaner than England [when]
black Zambians who try to "act white"] .27 Some seem to have vio
both countries are full o f white s ? ").3o Nor was an "instantistic" ori
lently reacted against their "Africanness" (the little they had left),
others seem to have also reacted to the other extreme. The rest, well
like me they love to carry on the argument. One chap even laughs
at his own language - Zanglish. (I understand Mjumo your mum
taught me English for three years about 1 7 years ago. She hated
Zanglish! She probably gives him hell over that imaginative and
thought-provoking piece of work). The whole works brings back
memories. Trust school, Mpelembe and UN ZA. I suppose we accord
ing to one author are the quintessential "coconuts." 28
Another article, strongly critical of Phiri, still acknowledged a cer
tain unpleasant truth in his "coconut" charge :
But I 'll tell you what else white is. White is killing 6 million Jews in
a holocaust just because you hate them . . . . White is telling a nation
that you want to help them to prosper but refuse to cancel the huge
But the replies to Phiri also marshaled strong and angry counter
debt they owe you even when you know it's the thing that's kill
I spent tl1e better part of five years in England studying at the Uni
versity of Manchester from
writing a book against your religiOUS leader. Does that sound like
civilisation? . . . White is two kids killing fOlIrteen people in Colo
rado hefore killing themselves, for no apparent reason; white is a
religious leader taking thousands of followers to a retreat
to
make
intelli-
genet'
eOI11 -
137
sible
vou
become
can't
billionaire?
be a
No, you mean "white thinking," right? White ideas are obviously
always better than black ideas. Here's a small list of white ideas:
Fascism, Nazism, Anti-Semitism, ethnic cleansing, Apartheid, and
of course, Structural Adjustment Program. No, you mean white
behaviour, of course; not white ideas, necessarily. Let's see. \Vhite
behaviour? The Devil's l Hell'sJ Angels, the Mafia, English soccer
hooligans.33
Indeed, Jonathan Sikombe suggested that Phiri was able to ideal
as
as
say
Bemba! I
other white
You need
Yes ? Did
You're
promise you.
hW'r.U"'r.' '
VU,'''AL'''''- ,
ize whites only because he had not had enough contact with them.
Until people like Phiri "face an outright racist, they do not real
ize that actually whites can be obtuse, dull and backward. Every
tain unto the standard of their white counterparts." This was not
gence as anyone else but insisted that, even if the historical notables
Ciety." Knowledge was indeed the key, but whose knowledge? "Not
pages of Chrysalis.
Chrysalis
Chrysalis
1 39
OF C O C O N U T S A N D C H RY SA L I S E S : C O P Y I N G AS A T H R EAT T O
gued, but there "everybody has a risk of getting cancer (it's in the
R E P R O D U C T I O N A N D N AT I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T
Phiri had urged the " coconut" strategy and been rebuked for it. But
instance, ope of the chief critics of the "Han1 Defect" thesis, insisted
that it was necessary for Zan1bia not only to develop its culture,
rebuttal:
If the U N and the international conmmnity could turn a blind eye i<)r
about
cam armed with machine glillS and rifles and they took us easily. . . .
Maybe we should study history and copy what the Europeans and
Americans did to make their regions strong.43
needed to emulate rich Western nations like the United States, a key
sex and morals that the dangers of "copying" appeared most evi
dent. As Chishala put it, there might be much to learn from "white
ones ? And if the future lay in copying, what remained that was dis
society:' but one could not ignore "the obvious fact that whites are
also very sexually tolerant and gays, lesbians and the like are fre e
agree, was not desirable. Zambia had become " a cOlilltry of the
have abandoned God in their lives and are heading for a disaster"
(Cf. Simpson
became a
flash
of the >;U""LUV'V.
to a
Danlien Habantu started the discussion off
nn"tl'Vt'
column
141
some \vomen
siderable number
Zambia,'1 men ,
\,-" v,-,.HU' l
tolerance
nr."" "n
for nom()SeXI
Zambia and
cannot
right now, maybe in 155 years or so. Or just say as soon as All Afri
cans stop living in round grass and mud houses and every one has
access to electricity . . . then John can marry Peter and also Susan can
go and stay with Mary. And the good thing is that by then Susan
will be able to have her womb and ovaries transplanted into Peter's
ass . . . you know just so we do not die out as black people in Africa.53
have to be sensible when you talk about what things Africa has to
United States have their good economy to be proud but for us all
tator. "We have way too many problems to resolve than to let this
to copy all the stupid things that happen in the Western World."
the months that followed. Yet the lingering issue of the attractions
and dangers of "copying" continued to hover over the magazine'S
in the magaZine proper and (even more so) in the guestbook com
it, was about "whether Zambia joins the fanlily of civilized nations
( 1 am not gay,
Africa behind tlle rest of the world" 51 ) and for embarraSSing Zam
of the
142
Chrysalis
Chrysalis
Chrysalis
143
E X P LA I N I N G C O N T I N U I N G E C O N O M I C FA I L U R E
Zambia.
high purpose that many had shared at the time of the change of
in the economy that many had expected, the final years of the 1990S
lis
pages of
Chrysalis
that "we do not die out as black people in Africa." How are we to
the period, the mining industry was in free fall as the stalled seH
and its link to concerns over copying, on the one hand, and the re
the other?
(IMF
sat on the auction block, their value dropped with each passing
year. What is more, one large mining division that had been priva
Chrysalis archive.
2000
in Africa"
and
For
"
imports when the economy was opened up in the mid 19905, ac
'-VlUill!':
from
the
; '-',"-AHU",'
lVlark Genera-
in 1991 to
declined
not
and
pects for a "big break" mat might come out of the "right thinking"
insisting that Zambia was just "one good idea away" from having
next two years showed very low figures of just 3 15,000 and 182,000
tons
of Globenet, which earned its founders more than $75 million each
the Chiluba government's poliCies and cast doubt on the idea that
aire or do a hit song in America, and other people will slowly begin
seemed to be, as one guestbook writer put it, "in a state . . . of per
to believ that they can also do it."61 Like the lmemployed mine
are hungry . . . [there are] farmers who are now competing with
I56), me
Chrysalis
general societal progression with hopes for a big break that might
People are dying every day from starvation and curable diseases,
shortage of drugs in hospitals, corruption, unemployment, slave
wages, children are denied dIe right to education, etc. Let's face it,
Zambia is a very poor country and we have to accept it. Chiluba has
failed, wlder his rule Zambia will never develop. 58
In seeking to explain Zambia's economic woes,
Chrysalis's
au
acter and national culture and to the need for "the right attitude."
146
Chrysalis
Chrysalis
147
V E R G E O F A M ETAM O R P H O S I S ,
P A R T V: T H E D R EA M B E C O M E S N I G H T M A R E
Zanlbians too would walk many miles in the rain and they could
praise us for how hard working we arc . . . . Don't kid yourself,
brother, sure there is a serious need for upright stand up men in our
governments, but one would be a liar if one refuses to admit that
we need some serious, no-nonsense cash to enable us to enter and
B y the time ChrysaliS produced its final issues, its tone and purpose
had changed dranlatically. Instead of a forum for planning a new
Zambian future, it had become a venue for reflecting on what was
understood as a continuing national failure. The dream, as 1embo
put it, had become a nightmare . "What happened to the ' L I G HT AT
that the light has been turned off. I t is terrible to be without the
At the same time, an ironic dark humor was gradually taking the
place of the earnest idealism of the early issues, as the hopeful pro
posals for putting the nation on a new footing gave way to increas
ingly cynical and self-deprecating jokes about a nation of " TO mil
lion layabouts who owe the world 700 dollars per head, i.e. 7 billion
dollars."63 The final entry from the magazine'S chief editor, Tonto
Nkanya, complained about the way that rich nations, with their
own problems of discrimination and corruption, feel free to lecture
Zambia on such things as "good governance and gender equality."
The solution?
Because we are poor, we don't get the chance to point out that these
particular emperors are butt naked . What we need to do is get either
economic might or military might. Look at how China gets away .
with human rights abuses because of its economic muscle. Look at
Russia getting admitted to the Gs group of nations because of its
nuclear arsenal. As I see it, we have two options : either get rich quick
or build a nuclear bomb.
J. Robert Oppenheimer proved tllat a "nuclear device" can be built
by a relatively small group of brilliant men (and women, of course)
round
HdIUU.Udl econonw
peal, so unlike his initial clarion call for "metanlOrphosis," was for
charity :
Peopk, wherever you are, forget all the silly posters telling you not
to give money to beggars and all of that. Most of these people have
very little legal alternatives. Please give as much as you can. Set up
many foundations and give. Open soup houses like Al Capone and
feed your friends. Remember, by a chance of birth it could have been
you. Like Bill Cosby says, "If you can't send you, send money!" If
you don't know where to send it, ask us at Chrysalis, we will tell you.
swept away by the rough tough miners boys who really run
the
country. They won in tl1e end. We ended up on the Internet.
( The
Kantanshi and Chamboli [mine townships 1 boys can use the
Inter
am
Chrysalis
4 Minimizing
att<mpts to
looking arguments for political and economic reforms that marked
ship), I think it's best we vote with our feet or plane tickets or what
ever. After all we are the Zambians, if we go away they would not
have anyone to misgovern, starve, rob, cheat and lie to. I an1 really
ashamed of being Zambian at this point in our largely forgettable ,
nay, best forgotten, history.
one's forefathers had not run away from the slave traders and you
had been born American, Surinames, Jamaican, Arab (check out the
nunlber of very dark negroid types calling themselves Arab) any
thing but Zambian. We deserve the apology of government we have
endured since independence. Our capital city looks like a trash heap.
One begins to think we are cursed. The only thing I am proud of in
this country is Mosi [the national beer] . But then again going by the
evidence it seems we are not capable of organising a booze-up in
ChrysaliS
151
P. S. Will
ness and gUilt over this fact. But as a number of writers observed,
it was not surprising, given the deteriorating conditions of life in
Zambia, to see "the cream of our country;' as one put it, "leave for
green pastures to feed on." 71
Under the circunlstances, it is perhaps not surprising that after
the August 1999 issue, Chrysalis stopped being updated, and came
to an effective end - one more in a long list of abandoned proj
lend
<
<
153
could
world
In August
boys were Guineans and that their names were Yaguine Koita and
C01U1kry, 29/7/98
Your Excellencies) members and officials of Europe, 2
It is a distinctive h(}lWr and privilege to write this letter to talk to you
ab(}Ut the aim of our trip and our suffering - we the children and thc
youth ofAfrica. We put our trust in you.
First ofall) we bringyou ourgreetings -the sweetest, the most ador
able and respectfulgreetings of life. To this end, please be our support
and help, we the people of Africa. Otherwise whom shall we tum to
f(}Y help?
We beseechyou, come to our rescue. Think ofyour lovefm'your beau
tiful Wltinent, your people) yourfamily, above all the love ofyour chil
dren that you love so dearly like life. M(}Yeover, think of the love and
kindness of the creat(}Y "God) The Almight.'Y who hasgiven you the
good experiences, wealth and power to build and m;ganize y(}Ur conti
nent so well that it has become the nwst beautiful and admirable of
them all [?j.3
Members and officials ofEurope) we are appealing toyourgracious-
154
Chrvsalis
ness
soiidi;wil[1! to COI"/'U:
the cultural
schools can omget good education and good teaching, but it requires
quite a lot of money and our parents are poor) they must feed us [?}.
Therefore, we do not hape sportsfacilities such as soccer) basketball) ten
nis [?j, etc.
Therfore, we Africans, especially we the African children and
youth) are askingyou to set up agreat, ejfectipe o1'lJanizationfor Africa
so that it might make prflffress.
And if.youfind that we hape sacrificed our lives, it is because we suf
fer too much in Africa. We need your help to struggle againstpoverty
and to put an end to war in Africa. Ourgreatest wish, though, is to
study, and we ask thatyou help us to study to becmne likeyou in Africa.
Finaly, we beseech you tof01'lJipe usfor daring to write such a letter
toyou, importantpeople whom we truly respect. Do notf01'lJet that it is
to eYOU that we must plead [?j the 'weakness of our strength in Africa.
,-,
peans to come to their aid and who bluntly ask for help in order
colonial master.
fronted (as they often are) with informants who oppose the anthro
157
his or her own "authenticity"? What does one do with the cultural
gists - was not that they blurred or destabilized colonial race cate
gories, but that they threatened, by their very conduct, to confirm
the claims of the racist colonizer: that "African" ways were inferior
T H E A N T H R O P O L O G Y OF I M I TA T I O N
be
been
of certain urban cultural prac158
Of
and
Of
and
rices
Friedman reports
an account that
that young men in
said a bout
and
tain skin-lightening creams. But, Friedman tells us, these men were
in
urban
ing, by their conduct, claims to the political and social rights of full
terials here were really drawn from the West - the cultural project
clothes and other goods was the only domain available in colonial
man
I990, I992, 1994, I995; cf. Ferguson 1999: 280, 290).5 Again,
lized men." They wanted, that is, to be full and equal citizens of
1 941 : 19-
ways and in many settings) but, rather, the place Africans were to
ing of the deadly gulf dividing the West and Africa - to puncture
occupy in
man's. And whatever they may have meant when they appealed
This was also the case, I would suggest, with a great deal of
colonial-era mimicry, most of which does not fit the paradigm
of Les
1 60
maz'tres fous
161
There is no doubt that such a complex and vivid film as Les tnaitres
Indeed,
I950S for mimicking that mimicking" (Taussig 1993: 243).
ning
Taussig claims, this subversive representation was so threate
govBritish
the
by
banned
was
to colonial authority that the film
ernment.
illu
Taussig's reflections on the uses of mimesis are undoubtedly
de
film
's
Rouch
of
on
recepti
the
of
minating. But his account
follows
Taussig
s.
parts in telling ways from other published source
that
Rouch in claiming that the film was considered so dangerous
l au
it had to be banned because of the threat it posed to colonia
ty"
authori
her
and
thority - specifically, " the insult to the Queen
ts
accoun
ed
is identified as the cause of the baru1ing.7 Other publish
t
of the banning tell a rather different story. Fritz Kramer's accoun
African
d
shocke
.
.
.
film
"The
s:
(Kramer 199 3 : 137) reads as follow
re
students and such anthropologists as Marcel Griaule at its premie
and
in the Musee de l'Homme; they condemned the film as 'racist'
,
coloBritish
the
in
banned
was
demanded it be destroyed. The film
was
m
l
fi
the
nies." According to the film critic Mick Eaton, when
ts
shown in Paris in 1954, it was widely criticized. " Black studen
v
sa
'
of
ypes
stereot
Cing
reinfor
of
in the audience accused Rouch
colo
agery and the film was banned throughout Britain's African
Stoller
nies because of its 'inflammatory' content" ( Eaton I979 : 6).
contro
the
of
t
accoun
frank
his
but
is a great admirer of the film,
praised
ly
strong
was
it
versy (Stoller 1 99 3 : 151-53 ) makes clear that
ed
from the start by white critics but widely condemned and deplor
that the
by African scholars, students, and directors, who argued
153).
:
3
99
1
r
film perpetuated "a racist exoticism" (Stolle
t con
\Vhat all of these accounts show is what Taussig's accoun
e it was
spicuously sideste ps: that the film was banned not becaus
ed
regard
was
it
e
becaus
but
bravely subversive ofthe colonial order,
racist?
m
l
fi
by Africans as racist. Why did African students find the
is today
And what are we to make of the fact that the film that
of
anding
underst
l
ologica
anthrop
the paradigmatic exemplar for
deeply
so
as
s
mimicry was in its time regarded by educated African
offensive that it should be destroyed?
banned
Of
and
lVH:II""r:!
Of
and 1',1emb,crshl
of
modern but in fact
in
as mere savage
the service
deeper level of "nvin,i t-i,up
The
with
1 65
important, but they are only part of the story. For what is most
striking in the recent history of much of Africa is not the break
down of boundaries, but a process in which economic decline and
political violence have produced new political and economic exclu
sions that distance Africa from the rest of the world and destrov the
sense of connection with, and membership in, an imagined \\:orld
conunwlity rIlat so many Africans experienced during the early
years of independence. The combination of an acute awareness of
a privileged "first class" world, together with an increaSing social
and economic discOlmection from it, is a contemporary African
predicament that I have elsewhere described as "abjection" (Fergu
son 1999).
To speak of the political and economic borders of a postcolonial
world often characterized
its cultural free flows
Of
The color bar made the racialized exclusions of rile modern social
l in
order expliCit and obviously political. But in an era of politica
and
ate
illegitim
are
ies
dependence, where explicit racial hierarch
an
ed,
inequality is naturalized by being culturalized and spatializ
de in
anthropological insistence on interpreting gestures of similitu
continu
the
ng
obscuri
of
effect
terms of parody and magic has the
a
in
rights
ing claims of Africans and others to full membership
world society.
n of mo
A. similar danger is introduced by treating the questio
ng
includi
easily
toO
dernity in exclusively cultural terms and thus
ly
within an analytical "modernity" people who are quite distinct
from he political ,md economic conditions of life that
excluded
tand
are normally characterized as "modern." One can well unders
in
the urge to de-provincialize the notions of modernity at work
that
the variously Eurocentric versions of modernization theory
cen
th
twentie
late
the
of
dominated social theory through most
contem
tury. And there is certainly a good deal to be gained by
nt
plaing the "alternative modernities" that may contest domina
but
n,
traditio
of
not
name,
Eurocentric cultural practices in the
Han
of different configurations of the modern (Appadurai 1996;
an ideal
nerz 1996). But what is lost in the overly easy extension of
li
inequa
real
too
all
the
are
plural
equality to "modernities" in the
the
from
d
abjecte
ties that leave most Africans today excluded and
regard
economic and institutional conditions that they themselves
as modern.
by inWhen Charles Piot concludes his insightful recent book
of
"part
sisting that the marginalized people of Kabre, Togo, are
s are "a
the modern world;' for instance, and that their rnral village
(Piot
other"
any
as
ged
site . . . of the modern, one that is as privile
nod
fully
1999 : 1 78), we contemporary anthropologists may respect
mode
our heads. \Vho are we to say that they - in their distinctive
.
we>.
an
th
"
ern
d
mo
"
ess
1
any
of engagmg the modern worId - are
are
that
es
Surely Piot is right to historicize local cultural practic
tion to
too often understood as timeless and to show their connec
m t -:t l l rn and state for.
Of
"traditional"
but
running
7).
are seeking but help in a "struggle against poverty and war" and,
thereby, an institutional and economic convergence with a "well
constructed and organized" First V\'orld. l ! "We want to study,"
they say. We want health care. We want well-nourished children.
"
It is in these - quite specific - respects that they seek to become
like you." By phrasing their demand for new political and economic
conditions as a wish "to become like you;' they simultaneously ap
peal for what they call "solidarity" and attempt to invoke a prin
Ciple of responsibility via moral and political connection.12 Their
which I began. Let me be clear from the start that I take this letter
than as ethnographic
evidence
this evoke parental responsibility (and with it all tl1e well-worn cli
on their subjects and to speak not for this or that local person in this
"children" and " the youth of the world" (Malkki 1994, forthcom
the letter's writers say. "We, the African children and youth." Let
some cost) whose finders might learn from it something not about
the authors, but about the needs of "Africa" and its youth and the
wider world.13
as
169
Dear America,
1 know you've heard it many times by now: yourpolicy in dealing with
Bttt iet me
Of
and Membership
Of
and
,Vl':lIlm::rs
172
be connected,
knowledgement of a debt. It is a right to
to autonomy or inde
right
and attended to that is claimed, not a
in the strongest terms
pendence. And while the letter denounces
solution is not to re
the burden imposed on Africa by debt, its
n. It is to recognize
pudiate the debt or to appeal for its cancellatio
No !" To cancel the
its true nature. "Should they cancel our debt?
d and walk away, but
debt would be to declare the accounts settle
us big time."
accounts are not settled so easily. "They owe
the first letter also
In this connection, it is worth noting that
but for the creation of
appeals not for the cancellation of debt,
e who discussed the
a new level of engagement with Africa. Thos
discovery tended to as
letter in Europe in the days following its
d, the letter was cited
similate it to the issue of debt relief; indee
the radical Jubilee 2000
in this connection by actors as diverse as
n and I M F President
campaign for Third World debt cancellatio
read the letter aloud
Michael Canldessus himself (who reportedly
occasion of announc
to the I M F and World Bank Assembly on the
debt to the poorest
of
tion
ing the Cologne Initiative for the reduc
letter makes no mention
countries) P But Koita's and TOlUlkara's
ad, it calls for the cre
of debt and does not ask for forgiveness. Inste
t allow Africa to
migh
that
ation of a "great effective organization"
status as the "members
"progress" toward the sanle condition and
er to America" (which,
of Europe." In this it is much like the "Lett
not ventured to read
to my knowledge, I M F officials so far have
aloud at any meetings) .
ip, then, the two letWith respect t o the question o f membersh
cit claims to the rights
ters are not so different. Both make impli
ty (a society in which
of a common membership in a global socie
less than Bosnia or Ko
Zambia and Rwanda should enjoy rights no
Africa with its own se pa
sovo). Both refuse the idea of a separate
make the same paired
rate problems. In their different ways, both
Of Mimicry and Membership
173
Of
and Mc:mtlenih
Of
DeCOlnposing Modernity
H I STORY A N D H I E RARCHY AFTER
DEVE L O P M E N T
T H E T I M E OF M O D E R N I Z AT I O N
Let us begin by going back to the days when people thought they
knew what they meant by modernity: the years following World
War II the days of decolonization and "emerging nations;' mod
ernization theory and "nation-building." At the end of empire, a
story about the emergence of "new nations" via processes of "mod
ernization" or "development" provided a new grid for interpreting
and explaining the world's inequalitieS. As the "backward nations"
advanced, in tIlls optic, a "modern" form of life encompassing a
whole package of elements -induding such things as industrial
economy, scientific technology, liberal democratic politiCS, nuclear
fanillies, and secular world views - would become wliversalized. In
the process, poor countries would overcome their poverty, share
in the prosperity of the "developed" world, and take their place as
equals in a worldwide family of nations.
This vision, so cmdely sketched here, amounted to a powerful
political and economic charter. With the world understood as a col
lection of national societies, global inequalities could be read as the
TIME
cess of development.
versal telos, even for the most "traditional" of societies. The extent
The idea that the various creatures of the world formed a great
them) were not simply at the bottom, they were at the beginning.
nial nations were condemned to live in the "not yet" shadow land
was clearly "higher" in this sense than the "lesser" creatures. But
the level of the rich ones. For those at the bottom of the global
hierarchy, the message was clear: vVait, have patience; your turn
will come.
turn was higher than a frog or a worm, and so on. And, of course,
1 78
DecompOSing Modernity
Decomposing Modernity
179
F I G U R E 3 , T H E G R EAT C H A I N O F B E I N G
God
ism held that the different "races" were created separately by God
Angels
and that they held, by nature and divine plan, different rartks in the
Man
Animals
lical story of Noah's curse on his dark son, Ham. In this alternative
dog
rat
frog
worm
Mosse
1996;
1978).
3 and see in it
1936: 242).
the
to a
evo-
Decomposing Modernity
was
Donhan1 1999; Hansen 2000; Meyer and Geschiere 1999; Piot 1999 ;
Werbner and Ranger 1996).
But the developmental narrative is increasingly visible as a fail
ure not only in the domain of academic theory but also in practical
economic terms. The basic premise of postwar developmentalism,
of course, was socioeconomic convergence. But no one talks about
183
useful for Peter Geschiere ( I997), for example, to insist on the "mo
dernity of witchcraft;' much as it was helpful for Paul Gilroy ( 1993)
to identify slavery and its aftermath as unfolding within, rather
ilian outside of, the modern.
Yet I want to argue that the alternative-modernity formulation
misses what may be most important about the current mutation
in the meaning of " modernity" for Africans. To understand why
tl1is might be, it will be helpful to return to the old modernization
narrative and ask what it is at stake in the current collapse of that
narrative.
M O D E R N ITY F RO M
TEL OS TO STAT U S
The modernization narrative was a story not just about cultural dif
ference, but also about global hierarchy and historical time, and it
combined iliese three elements in a wlique and powerful (if ulti
mately mistaken) way.
Figure 2 shows the timeline of development and its two dimen
sions. As time moves forward, status in a global system rises. His
tory and hierarchy arc indissolubly bound to each other, and a
movement forward in time is also- necessarily, so long as the de
velopmental timeline holds - a movement "upward" on ilie scales
of development and modernity. This story about history and hier
archy encoded a set of facmal claims (about ilie relation between
social, cultural, and economic change) iliat turn out to be mostly
wrong. But it also encoded a set of political promises (in ilie con
text of decolonization and national independence) that remains
quite important.
Anthropologists today are eager to say how modern Africa is.
Many ordinary Africans might scratch ilieir heads at such a claim.
As iliey examine the decaying infrastructure, non-functioning in
stitutions, and horrific poverty that sWTow1d them, they may be
more likely to find their situation deplorably non-modern, and to
Zambian
used
Africa
is modern, not
,,","'U"H"' "
But
who
as a broken
and
from
been bricked up.
de-
The
promise: "If you are dissatisfied with your conditions, just wait;
your society is moving forward and moving upward." Today, they
are more often evaded - by culturally minded anthropology and
neoliberal economics alike.
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that some contem
porary Africans seem to feel a sort of nostalgia for the modern. In
my own research in Z.unbia, for instance, mineworkers did not sav,
"We are modern, but in our own, alternative, way ! " or even, "VVe
have never been modern" (as B runo Latour [ 19931 would have it).
They said, in effect, "We used to be modern-or, at least, well on
our wav - but now we've been denied that opportwlity." .Moder
nity, for them, was not an anticipated future but a dream to be re
membered from the past. The real future was almost wliversally
.
understood as bleak, even apocalyptic ( Ferguson I997, I 999).
Once modernity ceases to be understood as a telos, the question of
rank is de-developmentalized, and the stark status differentiations
of the global social system sit raw and naked, no longer softened
that history would, by its nature, transform status and that Third
World people needed only to wait and to have patience and their
class." Some peopk and places have it; others don't. The key issues
rifle in the face of a driver who had been stopped. The young man
are the anthropologists so out of step with the locals on the mean
with the rifle wore a T-shirt, on the back of which were written the
following English words: "Patience my ass ! "
Decomposing Modernity
How does one term yield two such different discussions? And why
ing of modernity?
To answer this question, it may be useful to think a bit more
about what sorts of thinking are possible and necessary in the after
math of the modernization story.
Decomposing Moderniry
187
D EC O M P O S I N G M O D E R N I TY
seriously the idea that this picture is in some sense falling apart.
What does it fall apart into ? If it falls apart, what are the parts?
We might think of this as analogous to the chemical process of de
questions here are not about development and sequence, but about
modernities." They are not wrong. vVe are right to see cultural dif
take the two axes of the diagram and peel them apart, cracking the
timeline for so long fused into a single figure. vVhen such a "decom
a great deal of exciting and valuable work has recently been done.
But wh.at about the second axis? Here, our decomposition yields
The
188
themes here are " " "' ", ' ' ''V tragnlerltaitlOn, Jl.10 COjt1tlng,en<:y
2003).
What is new here is not the existence of negative and even stereo
typical images of Africa, for those go back a very long way, but the
land by nature given to poverty, turmoil, and low global status, the
eral years ago in Goma, in the Congo. Having lived though geno
camp, the man betrayed little fear in the face of the terrifying vol
cano. After all, he reasoned, "we have read about these things in
the Bible. The Lord will be coming for us soon." One should be
the one hand, and the rise of new spirimalities and their associated
temporalities, on the other. 5
Such new understandings of the temporal dynanlics of social
and economic well-being (of the relation, that is, between history
and hierarchy) may bring with them new strategies through which
people seek to secure their own futures. One thing that seems to
come up all over the continent in recent years is a shift from a focus
status of being "a poor African" ? Not through "patience" and the
elsewhere, even in the face of terrible danger (cf. chapter 6). Today,
can you do for us ? " (that time-honored question), but, "How can
1 90
Decomposing Modernity
Decomposing Modernity
191
I get out of this place?" Not progress, then, but egress. If escape,
too, is blocked, other avenues may involve violently crashing the
and plenty. As Achille Mbembe ( 2002a: 271 ) has observed, the con
gates of the "first class," smashing the bricked-up walIs and break
192
A N D D I S ORDER I N N E O L I BERAL
Governing Extraction
Extraction
property
U1C'''"f'U1L\.-U
and so
And do not
either peace
low
World Bank doctrine wonld suggest) where what they call "gover
nance" is good and the rule of law is strong. Rather, the conntries
to Angola. The reason, it seemed, was simple : Angola had oil. But
gola had oil, Zambia had copper. Why should oil be so different? I
racy, and some measure of "mIe of la-w" obtain have had very mixed
of
with the most violent and "corrupt" states, even those with active
eign investment in the period I994-96 in Africa fell into the study's
r:les of
"most risky" category; the list was headed by such nnlikely para
rial Guinea. Indeed, countries with raging civil wars and spectacu
rates of
"thick."
rate for the 1990S put it comfortably at the top of the continental
bia was a force that conld not be ignored. Urban wages rose sharply,
196
Governing Extraction
Governing Extraction
1 97
with the nation ( Bates 197I, 1 976; Daniel I 979). When the industry
land mines from the war. They come and go from the airport to
went into decline, starting in the mid-1970s, all the forms of social
most corrupt in the world (third worst out of 102 in the annual
and Karl 2003 : 32). Government revenues (which accrue from t<LX
payments, shares of "profit oil" paid to the state oil company, sig
cially very thill.3 The country is one of the world's leading oil ex
within the next few years to 2 million barrels per day- substan
(see Global Witness 1999, 2002; Hodges 200 1, 2003 for detailed de
tially more, that is, than the current production of Kuwait). The
scriptions ).
$8 billion of oil revenue each year. Yet nearly all of the production
payment that nearly all conventional credit lines have been severed
and very little of the oil wealth even enters the wider society. In
golans today are an10ng the most desperately poor people on the
planet, and the country ranks near the very bottom of the usual
indices of "human development" ( 161 out of 173 according to the
age points above Libor rates) . This has enabled not just the loot
of future revenues for years into the future. Indeed, oil produc
has had very little net revenue. It can pay for its current opera
tions only by taking on new loans (which continue to be offered
als, even down to the food and water it serves to staff ( Blakely
tors' risk.5
(Le Billon
1 98
Extraction
arrangements.
"The
ineffici enci es
tion was reportedly funded with state monies that had originally
come from a Canadian mining company nan1ed Ranger; in turn,
oil backing means that "the barrks' appetites for these oil-backed
cuss in a moment, both the use of private military forces and their
While the socially "thick" Zambian model failed in the 19S0S (for
"thin" Angolan model not only has been sustained but has seen re
I I : ) . In tllls and other respects, Angola has been both a pioneer and
an influential model.
Outside observers from the IMF and elsewhere always lan1ent the
new oil fields in West Africa, most of tl1em offshore; and second,
whom is the system I have sketched here inefficient? The oil com
panies, for their part, seem to be quite satisfied with the existing
200
Governing Extraction
Governing Extraction
201
A F R I C A N O I L STATES A N D T H E A N G OL A N M O D E L
instance). Yet earnings fall mainly to the president and his r elatives,
and the World Bank reports that "there has been no impact in the
cowltry's dismal social indicators" (as cited in Gary and Karl 2003 :
200 3 : 27).
tinctly Angolan.
I will not attempt to detail here the complex local and national
political struggles that Watts's analysis describes. Instead, I only
the national
nn'rn mo
Extraction
HLUUUl'. FntFrnn
as
has suggested
Tulipe
Cll ssed briefly in chapter I). In either case, the industry no longer
"rent." But for all the hope (and hype) that has surrounded the new
work forces.
litical entanglements has also been facilitated (as has been observed
There are continuing unresolved tensions over all this, and the
Indeed, Sudan may yet see a more benign form of oil development
An
But the dominant model that is emerging across the new Afri
can oil states does appear to have distinctly Angolan features: not
while the elite cliques who are nominal holders of sovereignry cer
T H E O I L- L I K E F E AT U R E S OF N E W M I N I N G V E N T U R E S
eral Fields
recent years become more "oil-like" for several reasons. For one
204
Governing Extraction
Governing Extraction
205
miners nor their host govenm1enrs . need to bear the social costs
of fostering, regulating, and protecting local markets to generate
CONCLUSION
cal extreme. The results for the great majority of Congolese citi
zens have been appalling. But the mining firms flexible enough to
operate in such an environment are apparently doing very well,
nor even civil war threaten such sovereignty (as long as the gov
less automatic reward for holding the capital City). Nor need they
than a hindrance. You set up your own network and make your own
rity measures, and thus increase expenses. But they may also have
both
and
and
observers
Extraction
Aid
2003 :
deed, the Angola watcher will have noted that among the "private
times and places, domestic peace, the rule of law, and strong central
both capital investment and economic growth. But the cases I have
names like Blackwater, Erinys, and Global Risk Strategies not only
ing willi Iraqi insurgents, using heavy weapons and even (in at least
one case) private military helicopters (New York Times 2004). There
features
put it, "Why pay for a British platoon to guard a base when you
gest that it does. I certainly do not mean to say that extreme cases
like Angola can provide any sort of model for the contemporary
Such forces are free from the constraints of usual military disci
am
thinking of places
might well become (as they already have in many African nations)
Allawi, given the embarrassment that has been caused by his cur-
208
Governing Extraction
Governing Extraction
209
Notes
I NTRODUCTION
Political Systems, Seven Tribes of British Central Africa, Schism and Con
tinuity in an African Society. Today, anthropology titles typically use
national and regional deSCriptors while political scientists and journal
ists speak of "Africa."
2
Political scientists have not been so shy. Recent years have seen a
For a recent account of some of the (very d ifferent) ways that the
category "Asia" is put to use, see Ching 200 I . For a discussion of the
history of continental categOrization, see Lewis and Wigen 1997.
5
Extraction
while at the
end
ludo 1<)<)9; van de Walle 2001; \Vhite 1996. The main strategy of the
ture. In fact, four different books have (so far) been p lblished under
World Bank and others who would defend structural adjusU11ent has
this title. (The other two are Burbach et al. 1996 and McBride and
Wiseman 2000.)
2
and to claim that these rates are the consequence of their willingness
which the cited statistics have been drawn), see Garbus 200 3 . See also
these two 'success stories' do not appear that different from the Afri
can median" ; that G N P per capita in Ghana in 1998 was still 16 per
cent lower than in 1970; and that both countries clearly exhibit_.the
regional trends toward increased "rent-seeking and corruption." It is
also worth noting hm.v often the World Bank's "success stories" have
whole).
much such activity to a halt (e.g., Uganda and Mozambique), and how
port notes, however, that tl1e "developmental" benefits of this are lim
11
212
Notes to Introduction
2004).
8 As quoted in John Mbaria and Paul Redfern, "Kenyan in Row
over Congo Elephants," Horizon (Nairobi) , 30 May 2002; avail
213
PAR A D O X E S O F S O VE R E I G N TY
am grateful
to
D E -MORALIZI N G E C O N O M I E S
use the phrase " the Transkei" to refer to the pre-1976 territory
in its days as a "Native Reserve." I use "Transkei" when the reference
1985: 217.
studies.
4 See Ferguson 1994: 105-107 and the references cited there.
sharp rise in food prices, and the removal of most price controls) were
See, for example, Clark and Allison 1989 for the Zambian casco
wick 1982; Middleton and Winter 1963; Turner 1957; van Binsbergen
1981.
S
Malkki 1994.
9 Jean and John Comaroff have written about the closely related
1988; Lan 1985; Marwick 1965; Packard 1981; Richards 1960; van Bins
8 Cf. also Bayart 1986; Feierman 1990; Fisiy and Geschiere 1991;
Geschiere 1982, 1988, 1989; Lan 1985; van Binsbergen 1981.
10
9 For example, World Barrk 1989, 1992. Also d. Carter Center 1991;
10
T RA N S N AT I O N A L T O P O G RA P H I E S OF P O W E R
Notes
Notes
to
term
CHRYSA L I S
1
comnl011.
is available at http://www.in1f.org/external/np/speeches/1998/06Il98
am
The speech may be found on the ANC 'S Web site, at http://www
.anc.org.za/andocs/history/mbeki/1998/tm0813 .htm (accessed 20 De
3
cember 2004).
4
Chl:vsalis
lis,
216
November-December 1998.
Notes to Chapter 5
217
Chrysalis,
12
1999
13 Chanda Chisala, "Reinventing Zambia: Crafting the Real New
Culture (Part I);' Chrysalis, August 1999.
14 Ibid.
15 On the significance of language for Zanlbian national identity,
see Spitulnik 19<.14.
16 Mjumo Mzyece's column appeared in each issue of Chrysalis,
with the exception of the first issue (September 1998 ) and the last issue
(August 1999).
17 Mjumo Mzyece, "ChrysaliS Dictionary of Zanglish," Chrysalis,
November-December 1998.
18 Ib).d ., January-March 1999.
19 This assertion drew strong criticism from one guestbook com
mentator, who replied in Bemba and contradicted Tembo point for
point. But other authors and commentators seemed generally to ac
cept Tembo's claim that a Zanlbianized English, not the "local lan
guages;' would be central to the new national culture they sought to
form. The Bemba reply to Tembo (where Bemba was clearly used for
effect) was the only non-English entry in the entire guestbook (though
several English entries threw in the odd local word or phrase, as is com
mon in "Zanlbian English").
20 Nick Tembo, "The Verge of a Metamorphosis, Part III: What
about This Coconut Thing?" Chrysalis, November-December 1998.
21 Idem, "The Verge of a Metanlorphosis, Part IV: How about Kith
and Kin?" Chrysalis, January-March, 1999.
22 Ibid.
23 Chisala, "Reinventing Zambia," 141.
2 4 Tembo, "The Verge of a Metamorphsis, Part II."
25 Chileshe Phiri, "The Ham Defect," ChrysaliS, January-March
1 999
26 Chrysalis guestbook entry dated 13 June 1999.
27 Mzyece explained the term in "Dictionary of Zanglish:' June-
Americans, and British English better than the British (those seem to be
the two paragons). And they have the clothes and mannerisms to boot.
The operative word is "tries" . A chong is someone who tries to be what
they are not. A little elocution never hurt anybody, but chongs mix up
that word and concept with evolution. The word has an interesting his
tory. It is derived from a television and radio programme from the 70S
and 80S called the Chongololo Club. This was a children's wildlife con
servation club. Chongololo means "caterpillar". The Chongololo Club
had an interesting theme song that was sung in an interesting accent.
Well, not so much interesting as posh. You know, plum-in-the-mouth,
Received PronunCiation, Queen's English posh. And hence the word
Chongololo.
28 Letter to the editor, Chrysalis, April-May 1999.
29 Jonathan Sikombe, "Byte Back;' Chrysalis, June-July 1999.
30 Michael Chishala, "The Shame Effect;' Chrysalis, April-May
1999. A letter from a reader (Richard Mutemwa, "ByteBack," Chrysalis,
January-March 1999 ) argued along similar lines, citing The Canterbury
Tales in support of the observation, "Whites have never been clean all
the time, and neither are they necessarily cleaner than us today."
31 Chishala, "The Shanle Effect."
32 The reference is to the revelations, then current, concerning
PreSident Bill Clinton's sex acts in the Oval Office with the White
House intern Monica Lewinski.
33 Chanda Chisala, "The Ham Defeat;' Chrysalis, June-July 1999.
34 Jonathan Sikombe, "ByteBack;' Chrysalis, June-July 1 999.
35 Phiri, "The Ham Defence."
36 Ibid.
37 Chishala, "The Shame Effect."
38 Michael Chishala, "Thoughts on Black Development: The
Shame Effect, Part II;' Chrysalis, June-July 1999.
39 Chisala, "Reinventing Zambia." Compare Sin1pson's thoughtful
discussion of the issue of emulating " Europeans" among the students
of an elite Zanlbian secondary school (Simpson 2003).
40 Guestbook entry dated 22 February 1999.
41 Ibid., 27 January 1999.
42 Ibid., 10 April 1999.
43 Nick Tembo, "The Verge of a Metamorphosis, Part V;' Chrysalis,
I999
1999,
Notes
to
Notes to
Chishala
November_",_,uuu,a,
1 February
1 999, 27 November 1998, 12 December 1998, II December 1998.
47 See, for example, guestbook entries dated 27 November 1998,
gust 2000.
72
73
49
50
51
52
53
II
OF M I M I C RY A N D M E M B E R S H I P
Belche,
;'hich
54
55
56
57
58
59
December 1995.
I.
61
1999, 22.
62
63
64
"
"membre" has a meaning very close to the English word "member" and
gust 1999.
65
66
67
Ibid.
" L etters
68
220
Notes to Chapter 5
ond half of this sentence as ". . . the good experiences, riches, and
Notes to Chapter 6
221
power to build and organize our continent so that it may become the
tion that Africa is "as modern as any other" place. In both cases, what
most beautiful and admirable friend of all." This differs from most
such happily balanced assertions tend to leave to one side are the un
other published versions I have seen. Compare the Radio BeIche tran
sCription: "toutes les bomlfs experiences, richesse and pouFOin de bien cOrt
gth in chapter 7.
long feature article written about the two boys in Paris Match (August
1999). There we learn a good deal about the boys' lives and circum
stances, including that they came from the poor slum neighborhood
Ciety. But the move to link the young men's desire for stylish French
ribly inadequate schools; and that Yaguine Koita's mother had already
emigrated to France (where the boys hoped to surprise her), while
innovation.
5
Koita also had an uncle in Germany and another in the United States.
The case of Koita and Tounkara is also discussed, and related to the
1 993) that mimesis constitutes not only resistance but also an "electro
(Lambert 1999).
like Taussig, Stollercombines this formula with the key theme of local
peace, and prosperity that the letter's authors seem to associate with
ist cultural resistance, since such magical acts "tap into" white power
only "so that it might be recirculated for local uses" (Stoller 1995: 195-
would s ggest. The Europe that actually exists is no doubt less well
96).
u'
African immigrants there often find very difficult conditions of life, not
shall and John W. Adan1s ( Rouch 1978: 1009). But in the san1e inter
the paradise that some of them may have expected (see Lambert I999).
view, Rouch also noted that African students who saw the film "said
But the contrast that the young men draw is not an entirely fanciful
one, either. One need only compare a few crude indicators to see that
Taussig's discussion.
rector Blaise Senghor described coming out of a Paris theater where the
in reality. (In Guinea, for instance, G D P per capita is some $530, while
film was being shown, only to find the spectators staring at him, say
life expectancy is only 46.5 years [UNCTAD 20011.) The letter does not
ing to each other, "Here's another one who is going to eat a dog." (The
place where one might escape poverty and hunger, avoid the ravages of
cal "privilege" and does much to analyze its roots and implications.
If the Kabre site is "as
modernities" discussion.
for Piot it
t.l}eoretical
of the word
Notes to
Notes to
223
1996; Hodgson 2001; Larkin 1997; Paolini I997; Piot 1999; Pred and
writer."
15
Watts T992.
with the differences between the two letters, by tracing the links be
tween their different modes of appeal and the different social contexts
and conditions from which they emerged -for example, English ver
will show, I also seek to make connections with what the nineteenth
authors within a local social and culmral context. But as I noted earlier,
16
That the first letter addresses "Europe" and the second, "Amer
addressed to all the citizens of the so-called First World, and not only
and Ter Haan 1998; Englund 2000; Meyer 1999; Meyer and Geshiere
("they," "the GSA and the other super-rich nations of the world") that
G O V E R N I N G E X T R AC T I O N
224
Notes
to
Chapter 6
Especially valuable have been Tony Hodges arld the Global Wit
ness organization on Angola; William Reno on West Africa and the
Congo; and Peter Singer on pnvate military companies. All are ciled
1
for Nigeria). The highly Simplified sketch I present here has its uses (1
hope), but it carmot stand in for the detailed ethnographic accounts
Notes to Chapter 7
225
that, one hopes, will soon help to give us a more fleshed-out picture
of the social and political life of African mineral-extraction enclaves.
ber 2002).
10
dress the pOSSibility that the peace agreement of 2002 may allow for
have been able to learn, it seems possible ( but very far from cettain)
(2001 : 186) has noted, the idea that " capitalism" today is characterized
proper to the frontier nlineral boom, a space that, "far from miniature
to
sion of social services. This remains to be seen. For the present, I claim
system, sec Gary and Karl 2003; Hodges 2001, 2003; Human Rights
Watch 200 1 ; and especially Global Witness 1999, 2002.
6
Notes to
Notes
to
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247
Index
Acquired Immunodeficient
Syndrome
192; governance in, 38-42, 83-84, 85, 87, 9S-96, 97, 102-3, I07,
196; health in, 9, 79, I02, 169;
129
Africa: anthropology and, 3, I03,
in,
in, 9 1 - 99,
I04-5, 2 1 6 nn.4, 6;
Zambia
African National Congress
(AN c),
IOS, I l 6
African Renaissance, IO-II, I I 319, 147, 153-S4, 217 n.2
African Renaissance Conference,
II7
CARE, 103
Avant, Deborah, 45
Carroll, Richard, 45
Azande, 7+, 82
Bantu, 60
Bantustans, 17, 51-66, 68; usage
of name "Transkei;' 21+ n.2;
economy, 61
Barrell, Howard, I ! 6
Amnesty International, I I I
Anglo-Ametican Corporation, 98
Angola, 28, +1, 194, 210, 226 n.3;
civil war in, 102, 199-200; econ
omy in, 35, 36, 198-202; as
exemplar, 196, 204, 207, 208.
See
See
Non
governmental organizations
( N GOS)
Anticolonialism. See Postcolonial
ism
Ballinan, Zygmunt, 2 9
Bayan, ]earl-Fran<;ois, 5 , 1 0 , 3 9 , 75
Bemba, 138, 154, 218 n.I9
Berg Report.
Compassionate conservatism.
See Economy
Conswnerism, 20, 21
Cosby, Bill, ISO
Chad, 203-4
Cote d'Ivoire, 39
Creolization. See Culture
See also
Children.
Cuba, 199-200
Culture, 19, 20, 30, 5 1 , 89; Ameri
Power
See Africa
governmental orgarlizations
(NGOS)
Chrysalis,
M odernity
D'Amico-Samuels, Deborah, 6 7
Democratic Republic of Congo
Citizenship, 1 6 1
Civil SOCiety, 13, 2 2 , 8 9 , 90-91,
102, 108; liberal politics and, 93;
Marxism and, 93.
Deloz, Jean-Pascal, 5
19, 1 12-54
State
Clapham, Christopher, 39
Clinton, Bill, II 4
Cohen, D avid, 87-88
Colonialism, 4-5, 8, 22, 27, 100,
I I4, I I 6, 158, 159, 167, 1 97 ;
British, 1 3 1 , 163; French, 39,
159, 1 62 ; mental, 157; symbolic
resistance to, 162-65.
See Africa
Conservation International, 46
Chabal, Patrick, 5
CanleroOI1, 3 1 , 75
Capital flows. See Economy
102
Congo.
of Congo ( D RC)
Anti-Semitism, 1 38, 1 70
Appadurai, Arjun, 3 1
See also
Diouf, Mamadou, 32
Doctors \Vithout Borders, 103
Duffield, Mark, IS
East Asia.
See Asia
Easterly, William, 34
Eaton, Mick, !()3
Index
See
Bush, George W.
Causality, 74
Assimilation, 2 1 , 160
Index
See also
Fer'gwiol1. Adam, 90
Feudalism, 75
Fieldwork.
See Anthropology
( F D I ),
36
Gandoulou, J. n , 2 2 2 n.4
Morality
Geertz, Clifford, 30
George, Susan, 9
Germany: culture of, 1 3 8 ; the
Elections, 1 2 , I I 7, 1 1 9
Holocaust and, 88
Ellis, Stephen, 1 0 , 39
English language.
See Zambia
See Africa;
Environmentalism.
Globalization
Ethiopia, 2 1 7 n.2
Ethnicity.
See Afriea
Ethnic separatism, 85
Sec
also Anthropology
222 nn.4-S
Hannerz, Ulf, 3 0
Hardt, Michael, 2 6
Hanka, 159, 162, 163, 164
Hayes, Randy, 46
Hayse, Bruce, 44-45
Hegel, Georg, 92, 98
Hibou, Beatrice, IO, I I , 39
History: concepts of, 188, 190, 191;
post-World War II, 22, 1 7 7
Lemarchand, Rene, 85
Hoogyelt, Ankie, 1 2
Hunger, 77
Hnnting, 43
Hutcheson, Francis, 90
Hutu, 76
173-75
Gooding, Cuba, 1 34
Intcrdisciplinarity, 29
Evans-Pritchard, E. E . , 74
Gould, Jeremy, 1 3
rity
(mAS), 206
(1 M F),
Index
Kuwait, 198
252
I09
216 n.2
Knights, Peter, 45
Hoiland, 5 9 , 1 0 6 , 206
Lan, D avid, 74
225 n. 1 .
Lebowa, 6 1 , 6 3
126, 1 9 7
Kinship: as basis for politics, 85;
Hobsbawm, Eric, 1 3 1
Hitler, Adolf, 1 7 0
See also
Hanlon, Joseph, 38
Fugelstad, Finn, 1 6 2
Japan, 1 29
France, Anatole, 2 3
Garang, John, 98
Guinea-Bissau, 217 n. 2
omy
Guinea, 155, 223 n.IO
253
M alaysia, 3 1
M amdani, M ahmood, 9 2
lv!.<mdela, Nelson, 1 20
O\1<muel, Trevor, I ! 8
Moshoeshoe I , 5 2
Nongovernmental organizations
racy
(MMD), 1 1 9, 1 45
o\lazoka, Anderson, 1 26
M azmi, Ali, 15
Mnlenga, Brian, 1 5 1
46; government-organized
(GONGO), 1 0 1 ; international,
1 26, 147
212 n.7
Media: ideology of the African
Renaissance ,md, I I 4 ; political
struggle and, ro8
Mexicans: in the United States, 56
o\1exico, 25; economy of, ]08-9;
United States and, 64, ro8
Middle East, 1, 25
M igrant labor, 55-56; in Germany,
5 6 ; in South Africa, 62-63; in
the United States, 56
M ilosevic, Slobodan, 1 7 0
M imicry: cnltural, 143-44, 155-75,
2 1 2 n. l l
M ineworkers Union of Zambia,
1 97
National Christian/Citizen's
Council, 1 26
Natwnal Geqgraphic:
and Bantu
stans, 58
II8,
See Socialism
National parks, 42-45. See also
Africa; Globalization
Nation-state, 5 1 , 53, 56, 58, 62, 63,
64-66 , 87, 92, 93, 95, 102-3, ro7,
208.
Nazism, 1 3 8
Sec also
102-3
Nordstrom, Carolyn, 15
Nyerere, Julius, 75-76
Ncokazi, Hector, 6 1
Negri, Antonio, 26
Nelson, Diane, 1 0 8
Neoliberalism, I I , 1 + , 1'7, 1 9 , 26,
39, 99, 1 I 3, IlS, 1 20, 154, 184,
[87; extractive, 210
Neumann, Roderick, 43
Newton, Isaac,
1 22
Observer, 45, 46
Obstfeld, Maurice, 34
Relief agencies, 28
Ojanen, Jnlia, 1 3
object of anthro
Namibia, 1
NATO,
Index
Musce de l'HoI1U11e, 1 6 3
Native Reserves.
O\lissions, 87, 9 8
telos,
and, 1 01-2;
Nationalization.
M illenarian cults, 85
as
1 92-93; as a
194-210
(OUA), I I +
Ouattara, Alassane D . , 2 1 7 n . I
Oxfam, 103
Panhandle Producers and Royalty
Owners Association, 208
Pareto, Vilfredo, 1 22
Phiri, Chileshe, 1 33- 38, 1 + 3
Piaget, Jean, 1 22
Piot, Charles, 167
Poaching, 4 3 ; ami-poaching policies and, 44-45
Poland, 1 84
Pollution, 70-71
Index
Shadow!>, 1 5 - 1 7
Structural
See Witchcraft
Sec Asia
Civil Society;
Nation-state; Nongovernmen
tal Organizations (NGOS);
Transnationalism
Stiglitz, Joseph, 25
256
Index
See Ecan-
ain
215
Smith, Neil, 29
Sorcery.
222
PauL r62-63,
Stone, Oliver,
Shaka,
Sec History
Tourism, 43
Tradition: the invention of, 57,
1 31-32.
Party
(UNIP), n8-19
See Anthropology
Vorster, John, 59
Walle, Nicholas van de, 9, I I ,
2I2 n . 9
War: civil, 8, I S , 3 9 , 41, 4 5 , II 6,
18, 196, 204, 217 n.2, 226 n.6;
chronic, 1 3 ; guerilla, 107-9
Warlord p3litics, 10
Watts, Michael, 202, 203
Wealth: kinds of, 72-73; political
power and, 74-75; as a social
relation, 82
Westernization, 30-32.
III
World Wildlife Fund, 45, 46
Urban studies.
See also
Globalization
WildAid, 45
Wilson, Godfrey, 164, 166, 174
Winfrey, Oprah, 1 3 4
'
Witchcraft, 3 1 , 3 2 , 73, 75, 85, 1 85
Sec Africa
Trobriand Cricket, 162
257