CrmPRO

PART I
A. VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES IS JURISDICTIONAL
1. ISIP v PEOPLE
FACTS
Petitioner Manuel Isip (and his wife Marietta) were convicted of
Estafa before the RTC of Cavite City. Marites, however, died during
the pendency of the appeal before the CA. The spouses were
engaged in the buying and selling of pledged and unredeemed
jewelry pawned by gambling habitus. However, in their dealings
with Complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose, they failed to account for the
jewelries given to them to be sold on commission. Also, certain
checks theyve issued in favor of Jose bounced. Procedurally,
petitioner contends that the RTC of Cavite has no jurisdiction over
the case since the elements of the crime did not occur there.
Instead, he argues that the case should have been filed in Manila
where their supposed transactions took place.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC of Cavite has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: YES. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases,
unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.
The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However,
if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.
Complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by
the case took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was
on approved leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs. Since it
has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner's
task to prove otherwise, since he claims that the transaction was
entered into in Manila. He who alleges must prove his allegations
applies.
Here, petitioner failed to prove that the transaction happened in
Manila. He argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in
Manila, convenience suggests that the transaction was entered
there. The Court wasnt persuaded. The fact that Cavite is a bit far
from Manila doesnt necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or
did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any person from
going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell
so that he can earn a living. It is not improbable or impossible them
to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite if that is the
number of times they received pieces of jewelry from complainant.
Also, the fact that the checks issued were drawn against accounts
with banks in Manila or Makati doesnt mean that the transactions
were not entered into in Cavite City.
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves
great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with

arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight

and influence.
2. LANDBANK of the PHILIPPINES v BELISATA
FACTS
Belista is the owner of 8 parcels of land placed by the Dept. of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (PD No. 27 & EO No. 228). He and DAR/LBP disagreed on
the amount of just compensation he deserved, which caused him to
file a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation
before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V). The
RARAD-V decided in his favor. Aggrieved, LBP filed an original
Petition for Determination of Just Compensation at the same sala of
the RTC sitting as SAC. It was dismissed on the ground of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE
Whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation
under RA No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be
appealed to the DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.

RULING
Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and
exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the
RTC sitting as a SAC. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases
for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.
Here, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycocos
complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be
stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was
held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate
of initially determining the value of Wycoco's land pursuant to
Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary
manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the
agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to
challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation
cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function.

CrmPRO
B. JURISDICTION TO ISSUE HOLD DEPARTURE ORDERS
1. MONDEJAR v BUBAN
FACTS:
Mondejar seeks to hold Judge Buban of the Tacloban City MTCC
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, partiality,
serious irregularity and grave misconduct, in relation to a BP 22 case
against Mondejar. Judge Buban allegedly issued a hold departure
order against her, in violation of SC Circular No. 39-97, which says
that hold departure orders may only be issued in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. She also claims that said
order was issued without giving her an opportunity to be heard.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The

offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
elements took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information.
The rules on venue for written defamation are as follows:
1. When offended party is a public official or a private person
= filed in RTC of province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published
2. When offended party is a private individual = filed in RTC
of province where he actually resided at the time of
commission of offense
3. When offended party is a public officer whose office is in
Manila = filed in RTC of Manila
4. When offended party is a public officer holding office
outside Manila = filed in RTC of province or city where he
held office at the time of commission of the offense

The judge responded, stating that he was only made aware of said
order when he instructed his staff to secure a copy from the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Tacloban. After which, he immediately
issued an order setting aside and lifting the hold departure order.
As regards the supposed due process, he sent a notice of hearing to
her and her counsel, but neither appeared.

Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the

libelous article, the venue may be the RTC of the province/city
where the libelous article was printed and first published OR where
he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
The Information *relevant to REM+ states only that x x x both the
accused as columnists and editor-publisher, respectively of Panay
News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City
of Iloilo and throughout the region x x x. such did not establish that
the said publication was printed and published in Iloilo City. As cited
in 2 other cases, the SC held that if it would be held that the
information sufficiently vests jurisdiction on the allegation that the
publication was in general circulation in [place where case is filed],
there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in
other location where the publication is in general circulation. Such
was not the intent of RA 4363.
On residence the information failed to allege the residence of Dr.
Portigo. While the information alleges that Dr. Portigo is a physician
and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, it did not clearly and
positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the
time of the commission of the offense. It was possible that he was
actually residing in another place.
Residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or
his actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time is
required. Residence must be more than temporary.

Court Administrator recommended a severe reprimand with a stern

warning that should it happen again, he would be dealt with more
severely.
ISSUE:
W/N the judge is administratively liable?
HELD:
YES. The judge is administratively liable.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders
to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts.
Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that holddeparture orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Clearly then,
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do
not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the
part of respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.
C. JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT
1. FOZ v PEOPLE
Facts:
Vicente Foz (columnist) and Danny Fajardo (editor-publisher) of
Panay News were charged with libel for writing and publishing an
1
article against Dr. Edgar Portigo . The RTC found them guilty as
charged which was affirmed by the CA hence this petition for
review. Foz and Fajardo raised for the first time that the information
charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
Issue: W/N the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction over the offense
Held: NO
1

That a certain Lita Payunan consulted with Dr. Portigo\ that she had rectum myoma
and had to undergo an operation. Even after surgery she still experienced difficulty in
urinating and defecating. On her 2nd operation, she woke to find that her anus and
vagina were closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side.\ she found out
she had cancer.\ they spent P150,000 for wrong diagnosis\

CrmPRO
D. JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive

original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and
felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to
their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is
contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in
this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21,
2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern.
This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged
to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions,
there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the
accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid
office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense
committed in relation" to his office.
Note also that:
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions thus enumerated by R.A. No. 3019. Particularly and
exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city
department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial
prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law
provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office
also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

1. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On
January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the
amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to
defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19,
1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash
advance, no liquidation was made. Commission on Audit sent a
report to Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, which then issued a
resolution recommending the filing of an Information for violating
the Auditing Code of the Philippines against respondent Amante.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMBVisayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum
finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.
The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing
Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 alleging that
with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances
of P71,095.00. The OSP filed an Information with the
Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of
P.D. No. 1445,
Amante countered by saying amongst others that Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent
Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of
salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249
provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only
in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16,
1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the
Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of
the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to
try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution
of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The
exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it
expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the
offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a)
of the said two provisions states:

CrmPRO
2. SERRANA v SANDIGANBAYAN

she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise

bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.

Facts:
Serana was a senior student and a government scholar of UP-Cebu.
She was appointed by then President Estrada as a student regent of
UP, to serve a one-year term. She discussed with President Estrada
the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.
With her siblings and relatives, Serana registered with the SEC the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the
projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.
President Estrada gave P15M to the OSRFI as financial assistance for
the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information,
was
the
Office
of
the
President.

While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of
law.

However, the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.

Hence, the succeeding student regent, filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman. And the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found
probable cause to indict Serana and her brother for estafa.

As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions

similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an
essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to
the
public
office.

Serana moved to quash the information. She claimed that the

Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

4. The offense charged was committed in relation to public office,

according to the Information.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in
the information. In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no
uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P.,
"while in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position,
with intent to gain

Issue:
Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try a government scholar
and a student regent, along with her brother (a private individual),
of swindling government funds? YES
Ratio:
1. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

3. ESQUIVEL v SANDIGANBAYAN(borrowed from C)

FACTS:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive

original
jurisdiction
in
all
cases
involving:
A.
xxx
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxx
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions
or
foundations.

PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan are assigned to the

Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division of San Fernando
Pampanga. They filed their complaint-affidavits with the CIDG
against petitioners Antonio Esquivel (the municipal mayor Jaen,
Nueva Ecija) and his brother Eboy Esquivel. They crimes complained
of were illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted
murder and grave threats. Several other police officers were accused
with the Esquivels.
The initial investigation showed that on March 1998,
Eduardo was in his parents house, about to eat lunch when Equivels
arrived with other police officers. They disarmed Eduardo and forced
him to board their vehicle and brought him to the municipal hall. On
the way, Mayor Esquivel mauled him and threatened to kill him
while pointing a gun at Eduardo.
Upon arrival at the town hall, Mayor Esquivel ordered a
certain SPO1 Espiritu to kill Eduardo but SPO1 Catacutan arrived to
verify what happened to Eduardo. The mayor threatened him as
well. The mayor continued to harass, threaten and inflict physical
injuries upon Eduardo until he lost consciousness. When he woke
up, he was released but no before he signed a statement in a police
blotter that he was in good physical condition. The alleged motive
for this was because the mayor believed Eduardo and Catacutan
were among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den connected
to the mayor.
After investigation, the CIDG forwarded the findings to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, which conducted a preliminary
investigation and required the submission of counter-affidavits. In

2. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.

Section
4(B)
of
P.D.
No.
1606
reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a)
the offense is committed by public officials and employees and that
(b) the offense is committed in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa
is
one
of
those
other
felonies.
3.

Petitioner

UP

student

regent

is

public

officer.

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27;

CrmPRO
their counter-affidavits, the Esquivels allege that Eduardo was
actually a fugitive with a warrant of arrest for malversation and they
just confiscated his gun for illegal possession.
In June 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman issued a resolution
recommending that both Esquivels be indicted for less serious
physical injuries and grave threats. As to the charges against other
petitioners, they were dismissed. Then Ombudsman Desierto
approved this. So, the separate informations were filed against the
Esquivels in the Sandiganbayan.
Accused filed an MR but this was denied. Esquivels were
arraigned, pleaded not guilty. With the denial of their MR, they
elevate the matter to the SC alleging GADLEJ in the issuance of the
resolution of the deputy ombudsman.
Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in
Republic Act No. 7975. As the positions of municipal mayors
and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim they
are not covered by said law under the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases
against both Mayor Esquivel and Eboy Esquivel.
HELD/RATIO: Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Esquivels are
wrong!
Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, Binay
vs.
Sandiganbayan, and Layus
vs.
Sandiganbayan, we already held that municipal mayors fall under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor
can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is
not a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides that it
is only in cases where "none of the accused (underscoring supplied)
are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or
higher" that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended." Note that under the 1991 Local Government
Code,
Mayor
Esquivel
has
a
salary
grade
of
27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary
grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as
over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the
writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners favor.

submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges

against them be dismissed.
Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses
executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts
and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit
before the Ombudsman. NBI Director Wycoco, in a letter dated May
4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez,
recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP
officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes:
kidnapping for ransom and murder of several individuals. On May 7,
2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to
Lacson, et al named in the witnesses sworn statements directing
them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence
at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by
the NBI. However, Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter dated
May 18, 2001 that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the
complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints
pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts
against the same respondents, and claimed that the Ombudsman
has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases involving public
officials, including police and military officials such as private
respondent. DOJ, which construed the letter as a motion to dismiss,
denied the motion.
Lacson, et al. filed before the RTC a petition for prohibition, which
the RTC granted, saying that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
the case, and directing the DOJ to desist from conducting
preliminary investigation. Thus, the DOJ filed a Petition for certiorari
and prohibition in the SC.
ISSUE/RULING: W/N the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a
preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the
Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and
circumstances NO
RATIO:
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken
over the investigation of the case or cases in question to the
exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. Since
the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, respondents
cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the same
matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In
the final analysis, the resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is
final. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman
itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no
power and right to add an input into the Ombudsmans
investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative
agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make
preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the
investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman.
The public respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the
law that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage, from any
investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials such
as the petitioners. That situation presupposes the conduct by other
Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public
officials in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the
Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken
hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage
of the proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another

E. JURISDICTION OF OMBUDSMAN
1. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE v LIWAG
FACTS:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaintaffidavit on before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M.
Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking
officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaintaffidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses
imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found
the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance
and thus required the respondents therein to file their counteraffidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents

CrmPRO
agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and
becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the
respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled
by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they
are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that
is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates
absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and
authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means
equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the settled
rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an
unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or
be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first
complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the
Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence,
it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to
the exclusion of the DOJ.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the
conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the
respondents would not promote an orderly administration of
justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a
casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to be filed
successively before two or more investigative bodies would
promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue
difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and
defend his position before every agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as
to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. There is yet
another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility
that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would
come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the
respondents.

issued a resolution recommending the filing against petitioners of 14

counts each of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019. This resolution was approved by Ombudsman
Desierto. Hence, 28 informations were filed against petitioners in
the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners Lazatin et al. filed their respective Motions for
reconsideration/reinvestigation which were granted. The Office of
Special Prosecutors (OSP) recommended the dismissal of the cases
for lack or insufficiency of evidence. However, Desierto ordered the
Office of the Legal Affiars (OLP) to review the OSP resolution. In a
memorandum, the OLA recommended that the OSP resolution be
disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial.
Desierto adopted the OLA memorandum. The cases were then
returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
proceedings.
Hence, petitioners Lazatin et al. filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. They contend that the Ombudsman had no
authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution because, under Section
13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed
only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing
of proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the
power to prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the
power to prosecute belongs to the OSP, which was intended by the
framers to be a separate and distinct entity from the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the
Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the
Ombudsman should have no power and authority over the
OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic
component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck down
for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether Ombudsman Desierto acted with GADLEJ NO.
HELD: Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No.
6770 is stale. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No.
6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers
and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional
infirmity.
The Court cited the case of Acop v. Office of the
Ombudsman. In that case, the Court held that giving prosecutorial
powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman
shall exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by
law. The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which
subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was
likewise upheld by the Court in Acop.
More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, the
Court declared that the OSP is merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and
control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman and ruled that
under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged
only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court's

2. LAZATIN v DESIERTO(borrowed from C)

FACTS:
The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-affidavit, charging petitioners
Lazatin et al. with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and
penalized under Article 220 of the RPC and violation of Section 3 (a)
and (e) of RA 3019. The complaint alleged that there were
irregularities in the use of Congressman Lazatin of his Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) for 1996 (he was both proponent and
implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed
vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as
Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18)
checks amounting to P4,868,277.08). Thus, Lazatin, with the help of
Morales, Pelayo, David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into
cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) thereafter

CrmPRO
ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute
based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also
made the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,
where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the
power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not
been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under
the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the
grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP
under the Office of the Ombudsman.

prescribed under the provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019. As to

the two 1982 transactions of Golden River, the Ombudsman found
that, contrary to the claims of the Commission, the loan accounts
obtained by the said corporation have sufficient collaterals. The
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman was empowered to dismiss the
complaint motu propio, without requiring the respondents to file
their counter-affidavit or conducting preliminary investigation?
(REM
TOPIC)

3. PRESIDENTIAL AD-HOC FACT FINDING COMMITTEE v

DESIERTO
Facts:
President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating
the Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans.
Orlando S. Salvador, in his capacity as PCGG consultant, executed
three separate Sworn Statements stating that among the loan
accounts referred by the Assets Privatization Trust to the Committee
for investigation, report and recommendation are those of the
following corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and
Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation
(Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation
(Filcarbon).
On different occasions, these three companies obtained loans from
the Development Bank of the Philippines (PRGS and Golden River),
and the National Investment Development Corporation (Filcarbon),
amounting to tens of millions of pesos for various purposes in a
period spanning from 1967 to 1982. Filcarbons loan in particular
was favorably recommended by the President of the Philippine
National Bank. Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence
submitted to the Committee, these three corporations did not have
sufficient collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with respect
to the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977. Salvador
also alleged that the above-mentioned corporations did not have
adequate capital to ensure not only the viability of their operations
but also their ability to repay all their loans. Accordingly, the
Committee found the loan accounts of the above-mentioned three
corporations as behest loans. The Committee submitted its report to
President Ramos who instructed then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo, sitting as the Committee's ex-officio Chairman, to file
the necessary charges against the DBP Chairman and members of
the Board of Directors, the former PNB President and former NIDC
General Manager, together with the respective stockholders/officers
of the three corporations. Salvadors Sworn Statements were used
by the Committee as its bases in filing separate complaints with the
Office of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents for
alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Complaints were filed against the aforementioned parties in the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon the recommendation of the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, complaints against
the respondents were dismissed. The Ombudsman ruled that,
except with respect to the two loan transactions entered into by
Golden River in 1982, all the offenses alleged by the Committee as
having been committed by herein respondents had already

Ruling:
Yes. The Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has
discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may
dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in
form and substance or, should he find it otherwise, to continue with
the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view,
the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. Quite
relevant is the Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman
and reiterated in the case of The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto, to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by
public officers is vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from
outside pressure and improper influence, the
Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it
with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers virtually free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention.
This court consistently refrains from interfering
with the exercise of its powers, and respects the
initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as
the champion of the people and the preserver
of the integrity of the public service.
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsmans
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in
the Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to indicate
otherwise. The basis for this rule was provided in the case of
Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman where the Court held as follows:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they would be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion

CrmPRO
on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.
It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint
outright for want of palpable merit. At that point, the Ombudsman
does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of
a complaint. Should the investigating officer find the complaint
devoid of merit, then he may recommend its outright dismissal. The
Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a preliminary
investigation is proper. It is only when the Ombudsman opts not to
dismiss the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the
Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their
counter-affidavit and petitioner, its reply.

constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the

accused to due process.
RULING: YES to BOTH.
In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, similar grounds
were raised and the SC held that the Ombudsman has powers to
prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It
held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The
law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official"
is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer
or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be
construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should
not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor
under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only
act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine
the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to
these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on
all complaints against officers and employees of the government
and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in
every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the
law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate
any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to
act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation
and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to
assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise
allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases
outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section
11(4c) of RA 6770.
In the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, court held that
the March 20, 2001 Resolution, that the Ombudsman has
prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even
to criminal information filed or pending at the time when its August
9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.

4. CASTRO v DELORIA(Borrowed from C)

FACTS:
Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with
Malversation of public funds. The information alleged that Castro
was a revenue officer of the BIR who misappropriated 556K+ of
collections. Castro pleaded NOT GUILTY on arraignment. On Aug 31,
2001, Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary investigation and file the Information since it failed t to
allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner
further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade
27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be
investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not
by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases
cognizable by theSandiganbayan.
The RTC denied & held that the (1) jurisdiction of the RTC over the
case did not depend on the salary grade, but on the penalty
imposable upon the latter for the offense charged. It also (2)
sustained the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman since in the
cited case the court later overturned their decision in a clarificatory
resolution. Finally, it said that the (3) Motion to Quash was contrary
to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after Castro pleaded not guilty
under the Information.
Castro contends that the prevailing jurisprudence from Aug 9, 1999
til May 20, 2001 was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial
powers over cases cognizable by the RT and since the investigation
and prosecution against Castro was conducted by the Ombudsman
beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was
applicable, notwithstanding that the decision was set aside in the
March 20, 2001 Resolution. So, the Information that was filed
against petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no
investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.
Castro filed an MR which was denied so filed a petition for certiorari
w/ CA also dismissed. Filed 65 with SC.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file the information in
light of the ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which
declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited
to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
2. W/N the clarificatory Resolution in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case
can be made applicable to the Castro, without violating the

CrmPRO
F. REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN

reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the motion for

reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.

1. ANTONINO v DESIERTO
FACTS

2. (relevant topic)
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and
pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. Well-settled is the rule that this Court will
not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons that indicate otherwise. A contrary rule would
encourage innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, which would
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in
much the same way that courts would be swamped by a deluge of
cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.

Petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman

against the respondents for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j),
Section 3 of RA No. 3019 and for malversation of public funds or
property through falsification of public documents. This concerns
the alleged conspiracy involving respondents to cheat and defraud
the city government of General Santos through the illegal disposition
of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park in violation of law and its charter.
The Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the charges against
the respondents. Petitioner filed MR which was denied by the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman held that since the criminal
Informations were already filed and the cases were already pending
before the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of General Santos
City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.
Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party

may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This Court laid
down the following exceptions to the rule:

ISSUE: w/n the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion,

amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in the exercise of his
prosecutor functions, by dismissing the charges against the
respondents.
HELD: NO
1.

1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the

constitutional rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance
or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance;
10.
When there is clearly no prima facie case against
the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied.

Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)

provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.
(1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any
order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days
after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
(1)
New evidence has been
discovered which materially affects the order,
directive or decision;
(2)
Errors of law or irregularities
have been committed prejudicial to the interest
of the movant. The motion for reconsideration
shall be resolved within three (3) days from
filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.

Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is

exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to
amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. The alleged grave
abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in
this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the
general rule.

Petitioner failed to establish that her MR was indeed filed

on time, and thus, failed to refute the assertion of the respondents
based on the aforementioned Certification that petitioner was
personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution. There are a
number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the
interest of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer
any explanation at all for the late filing of the MR. We find no
justification why the Ombudsman entertained the motion for

3.
Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction
of an accused under Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:
(1)
The accused is a public officer or a private
person charged in conspiracy with the former;

CrmPRO
(2)
The said public officer commits the prohibited
acts during the performance of his or her official duties, or
in relation to his or her public functions;
(3)
That he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party;
(4)
Such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and
(5)
That the public officer has acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect.

3.
4.

Did Respondent err in issuing her Order dismissing the

complaint for violation of R.A. 10?
Did Respondent err in transmitting the records of the
case to the PPO instead of the Office of the Ombudsman?

HELD:

1. No. A preliminary investigation is required before the filing

of a complaint or information for an offense where the
penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. Thus, a
preliminary investigation is not required nor was one
conducted for the charge of violation of Art. 177 of the
Revised Penal Code which is punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or from
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months.
2. No. There is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for the
non-appearance of the accused during the trial. Hence, its
issuance rests on the sound discretion of the presiding
judge. More so in this case, the private prosecutor did not
move for the issuance of such warrant.
3. No. Respondent concedes that due to oversight, she failed
to rule on the charge of violation of R.A. 10 in her initial
Resolution. Nonetheless, she asserts in her Comment With
Motion To Dismiss Administrative Complaint that she
conducted a preliminary investigation for the charge of
violation of R.A. 10 and dismissed the charge after taking
into consideration the affidavits and evidence presented.
Complainant does not dispute the fact that indeed a
preliminary investigation was conducted for this
charge. Thus, when respondent judge dismissed the
complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she merely did so to
correct an oversight. It was the dismissal of the charge for
violation of R.A. 10 that was elevated to the PPO for
review. It was imprudent, however, for respondent judge
to transmit the entire records of the case to the PPO
knowing that the charge for Usurpation of Authority was
included in the records of the case. Respondent judge
should have ensured that at least one complete set of the
records remained in her sala so that the prosecution for
Usurpation of Authority would not be held up. Injudicious
though her actuation was, Respondent judge was not
motivated by an evil intent to delay the case.
4. No. This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 8
entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of
Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides "that all
prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors."
Moreover, "[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases against
public officers and employees prepared by a deputized
assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or
City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the
same to the Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his
recommendation for the approval or disapproval thereof.

As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records,

there is no showing of evident bad faith and/or gross negligence in
the respective acts of the respondents. Finally, petitioner speaks of
conspiracy among the respondents and those indicted. However, as
found by the Ombudsman, such conspiracy alleged in the complaint
was not supported by ample evidence. Conspiracy must be proved
by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused,
before, during and after the commission of the crime charged
indicative of a common design. This, the petitioner sadly failed to
establish.
G. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE OMBUDSMAN
1. SESBRENO v AGLUGUB
FACTS:
This case involves a complaint filed by Sesbreo (Complainant)
against MTC Judge Aglugub (Respondent) for Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service relative to a criminal case (entitled People v. Enrique
Marcelino, et al.). In the said criminal case, Complainant filed three
(3) separate complaints against Marcelino, Nuez, Tabazon, and
Carunungan who are all from the Traffic Management Unit of San
Pedro, Laguna. The criminal complaint was for Falsification, Grave
Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three (3) cases were
assigned to respondent judges branch and subsequently
consolidated for disposition. In a Consolidated Resolution, only the
charge of Usurpation was set for arraignment, the rest of the
charges having been dismissed. Thereafter, Complainant made a
manifestation that the complaint also charged the defendants with
violation of RA No. 10 accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of
warrants of arrests against the defendants. Respondent judge found
no probable cause and dismissed the charge for violation of R.A. 10.
She also denied complainants prayer for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against the accused and ordered the records forwarded to the
Provincial Prosecutors Office (PPO) for review. The PPO affirmed
respondents order and remanded the case to the court for further
proceedings on the sole charge of Usurpation of Authority. During
the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan
and Nuez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreo, however, did not move
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Neither did he
object to the cancellation of the scheduled hearing.
ISSUES:
1. Did Respondent err in not conducting a preliminary
investigation for the charge of Usurpation of Authority?
2. Did Respondent err in not issuing warrants of arrest for
failure of the accused to appear during trial?

Thus, Respondent did not err and was, in fact, merely

acting in accordance with law when she forwarded the
case for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the
PPO remanded the case to the court for further
proceedings instead of forwarding the same to the Deputy
Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is
quite another matter. In any event, respondent judge

10

CrmPRO
should have taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse
in order to preclude delay in the disposition of the case.
Complaint dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent was
nonetheless admonished to be more circumspect in the
performance of her duties in the future.

show that the alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor,

discredit or contempt upon him. He also found that the statements
were uttered by Rosalinda in a state of distress and were not
actionable. The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall
and 14 others was also dismissed because complainant Dela Peas
claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense of
Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by
Rainier against the latter.
Dela Pea and Cagara separately appealed to the DOJ. On
March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a
Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the
Assistant City Prosecutor.
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan,
together with their co-respondents, filed separate MR. On June 6,
2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000
Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations
against the movants, Punzalan et al. (Reason: Oral Defamation case
should be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements
were uttered without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of
shock and anger. Anent the Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela
Pea against Rainier, the Secretary held that the allegations in
support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the
Attempted Homicide case filed by Rainier against Michael Plata. He
added that Dela Pea failed to prove that Rainier, Randall and his
companions intended to kill him.)
Respondents MR was denied. Hence, they filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA, which reversed June 6, 2000 Resolution
where Secretary of Justice directed the withdrawal of informations
for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted
homicide against the respondents.
Petitioners MR was denied. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice YES
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse
of discretion to justify interference by the Courts.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
at law.
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion in his Resolutions dated June 6,
2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the Revised Administrative Code,
the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors.
Supervision and control includes the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to approve,
revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.

H. POWER OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE OVER PROSECUTORS

1.PUNZALAN v DELA PENA(Borrowed from C)
FACTS:
Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors. On Aug.
13, 1997, Dela Pea, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a
store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall
Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex Toto Ofrin, and
others arrived. Eugenio shouted at Dela Pea, Hoy, kalbo, saan mo
binili ang sumbrero mo? Dela Pea replied, Kalbo nga ako, ay
pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako. Irked by the response, Gregorio
slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The
group then ganged up on him. Somebody shouted, Yariin na yan!
Thereafter, Ofrin kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab him with
a balisong but missed.
While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the
Platas family driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun
and pointed it to the group chasing him to scare them. Michael
Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away
from Dela Pea. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier
Punzalan on the thigh. The group ran after them and when they got
to the Platas house, shouted, Lumabas kayo dyan, putang ina
ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!
Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael
Plata for Attempted Homicide and against Robert Cagara for Illegal
Possession of Firearm.
In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Pea filed several countercharges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious
mischief and slight physical injuries against the Punzalans, including
one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Pea against Rainier and
Randall Punzalan and fourteen others and one for Grave Threats
filed by Dela Pea against Ofrin.
In their counter-affidavit, the Punzalans argued that the
charges against them were fabricated in order to dissuade them
from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of
Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara,
respectively.
Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation
against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on
October 16, 1997 at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City, Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing distance of
other people, told him, Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga
Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng
trabaho. In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the
alleged defamatory statements.
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral
Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, holding that Cagara failed to

11

CrmPRO
In the case of People v. Peralta, we reiterated the rule that
the right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors.
In the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, we declared
that: A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal
justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor
prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner.
We need only to stress that the determination of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is
recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor.
An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal
action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of
evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers
have equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or
reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the
determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with
the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the discharge of this
function.
Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a
complaint is within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor
and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.
The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City
Prosecutor to withdraw the informations for slight oral defamation
against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide against the
other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative
of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.
First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records
show that the defamatory remarks were uttered within the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The CA in its Decision
stated the settled rule that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its opportunity to
observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the stand.
The City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the occurrence
of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and
conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine probable
cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within
the hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor
found that no sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in
his Resolution affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor.
As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein
petitioners other than Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice
resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a
countercharge. The DOJ in a Resolution had already directed that
Dela Pea be likewise investigated for the charge of attempted
homicide in connection with the shooting incident that occurred on
August 13, 1997 making him a party to the case filed by Rainier
Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
that the complaint of Dela Pea should be threshed out in the

proceedings relevant to the shooting incident that resulted in the

serious injury of Rainier Punzalan.
In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not
commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the
CA. It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et al. v.
Guingona that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of
information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not
subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave
abuse.
I. ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IN CRIMINAL
CASES
1. PEOPLE v DUCA
FACTS
It was in 1999 that Pedro Calanayan filed an action for ejectment
and damages against Cecilia F. Duca and several of her relatives.
The case was decided in favor of Calanayan. Decision became final
and executory.
Ultimately properties belonging to Cecilia hit the auction block to
satisfy judgment and a certificate of sale was issued in favor of
Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder in the auction sale.
Cecilia Duca went on fighting. She filed an action for the Declaration
of Nullity of Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of
Injunction and Temporary Restraining order.
When the said
case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the house
erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her
son Aldrin Duca. This is the core of the controversy: Cecilia
(Mother) and Arturo (Son) Duca feloniously prepared a Declaration
of Real Property over a bungalow type residential house by making it
appear that the signature appearing on the sworn statement of
owner is that of her other son Aldrin F. Duca. This was false of
course, as the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the
Philippines only long after the dastardly deed.
Accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature thereon and
by doing so caused damage to private complainant Pedro Calanayan.
Because of the isrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able to
mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against
Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them to stop from
evicting the plaintiffs from the property in question.
Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca.
Cecilia testified that she had no participation in the execution as she
was in Manila at that time. Arturo insisted there was no falsification.
The MTC found him guilty. RTC affirmed. Duca filed petition for
review at the CA.
The CA ruled that Arturo was empowered by Aldrin to issue that tax
declaration, hence no crime had been committed. Aggrieved, the
SolGen declared that the CA should have given the Republic a
chance to be heard before ruling such.

12

CrmPRO
ISSUE: w/n the CA gravely abused its discretion and acted without
discretion by resolving the appeal without giving the SOLGEN a
chance to be heard.
HELD: CA abused its discretion.
Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when
the CA resolved the respondents appeal without notifying the
People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the
pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to
file his comment.
Petitioner also asserts that once the case is elevated to the CA or
this Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring
or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it acted on respondents appeal without
affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard.
Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should
be considered void for being violative of due process.

and the payment of the full amount of the

docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to extend
fifteen (15) days.
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with
requirements. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of
service of the petition, and the contents of and
the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. (emphasis supplied)

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases

before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.:

Respondent Duca appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC

via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse
party, in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG.

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The

Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It
shall have the following specific powers and
functions:
(1)
Represent the Government in
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
all
criminal
proceedings;
represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts
or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any
officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(emphasis supplied)

Respondent Duca failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG

and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Dagupan City. The service of a copy of the petition on the People of
the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for
the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of
the People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the
Supreme Court.
Certiorari was thereby granted and the SC remanded the case to
the CA

The CA also failed to follow Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997

Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.
A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
paying at the same time to the clerk of said court
the corresponding docket and other lawful fees,
depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs,
and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the
adverse party with a copy of the petition. The
petition shall be filed and served within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision sought to
be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in
due time after judgment. Upon proper motion

13

CrmPRO
PART II
A. COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT or INFORMATION
1. PEOPLE v DIMAANO
FACTS:
Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano, with 2
counts of rape and 1 count of attempted rape in the complaints
which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of
Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned Maricar Maricar Dimaano y
Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 10 years of age,
against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 96-150
th
That on or about the 29 day of December 1995, in the
Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned Maricar Maricar
Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12
years of age, against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO
LAW.
Criminal Case No. 96-151
st
That on or about the 1 day of January 1996, in the
Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar
Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of
the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless
did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other
than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely
arrival of the complainants mother. CONTRARY TO LAW.
The trial court found Edgardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of rape (2 counts) and the crime of attempted rape. The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court with modifications as to the
award of damages. In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the
Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), the case was CERTIFIED to
the Supreme Court for review.
ISSUE:
W/N the complaint for attempted rape was sufficient?
RULING: NO.
RATIO:
We affirm the trial court's conviction for the crimes of rape.
However, we acquit Edgardo for the crime of attempted rape for
failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of
attempted rape.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint,
nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law

made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged

and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment.
No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately
and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of
the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The above-cited complaint upon which Edgardo was arraigned does
not allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the
crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of
elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The
allegation therein that the Edgardo 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to
rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a
complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the
one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents
this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction; otherwise we
would be violating the right of Edgardo to be informed of the nature
of the accusation against him.

2. SASOT v PEOPLE
Facts:
NBA Propeties Inc. is a foreign corporation which owns trademarks
and names of certain basketball teams registered with the Bureau of
Trademarks and Patents and Technology Transfer. On the basis of its
complaint filed, the NBI conducted an investigation on possible
unfair competition under RPC Art 189 against petitioner for the
unauthorized use of the trademarks and names owned by NBA
Props. Inc.
In its report, the NBI discovered that petitioner is engaged in the
manufacture , printing, sale and distribution of counterfeit NBA
garment products and recommended prosecution of petitioner for
unfair competition.
In the meantime, a Special Power of Attorney(SPA) was drawn by
Welts, President of NBA Prop. Inc. which authorized the Ortega law
firm to file cases in their behalf in the Phils. Accompanying it is the
complaint-affidavit made by Welts. The SPA and complaint-affidavit
were notarized abroad which were authenticated by the Philippine
Consul.
On the basis of the complaint filed by Welts and the report of the
NBI, an Information was filed against the accused with the following
accusatory portion:
That on or about May 9, 1997 and on
dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above named accused ALLANDALE
SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of Allandale
Sportslines, Inc., did then and there willfully,

14

CrmPRO
unlawfully and feloniously manufacture and sell
various garment products bearing the appearance of
"NBA" names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the
public to believe that the goods offered by them are
those of "NBA" to the damage and prejudice of the
NBA Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the
"NBA".
Petitioner now filed a motion to Quash Information on the basis that
the facts charged does not constitute an offense and that the court
has no jurisdiction of the offense charged and the person of the
accused. This was denied by RTC and now under a petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint is sufficient and the denial of the
motion to quash information should be sustained.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner harps on the insufficiency of the charge based
on the following circumstances: formal defects such that
complainant has not personally sworn before the investigating
prosecutor; complainants lack capacity to sue such that there was
no board resolution authorizing Welts(president) to institute the
action; and other exculpatory defenses against the crime.
However, under Rule 112 Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it
states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by
complainants affidavit and his witnesses and supporting
documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath,
or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must
certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed
before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be
noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not
necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form,
which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on
the merits.
In this case, the basis of the information is Welts complaint affidavit
which though subscribed abroad before a foreign notary public, it
bears the authentication of the Phil. Consul. Although what was
initially presented was just presented was a photocopy, there was
an offer to produce the original which was in the hands of another
prosecutor. Moreover, there are other basis such as the report of
the NBI and the Ortega law firms letter asking NBIs assistance and
the affidavit of a consulting service commissioned by the
prosecution to conduct investigation.
(Only if sir asks)
With regard to other defects, Section 3, Rule 117 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the
time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the
grounds for quashing an information, to wit:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged or the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so;

d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed

form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment
for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense
charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of
the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the
complainants capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.
3. LASOY v ZENAROSA
FACTS: In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn
Dimaculangan-Querijero ,accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa
were charged of selling prohibited drugs (42.410 GRAMS of dried
marijuana fruiting tops). The case was presided by Judge Jaime
Salazar. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were
sentenced on July 16, 1996 to suffer a jail term of 6 months and 1
day. Both accused applied for probation.
On August 28 1996, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora EscasaRamos filed two separate motions, first, to admit amended
Information and second, to set aside the arraignment of the
accused, as well as the decision of the trial court. The prosecutor
alleges that the accused should rather be charged for transportation
and delivery, with intent to sell, 45 pieces of dried marijuana fruiting
tops (42.410 KILOS) and that it is imperative to file an amended
information in order to make it conformable to the evidence on
hand.
The trial court denied the first motion. However, it granted the
second motion for rearraignment it appearing from the published
resolution in Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen Bobares vs. Hon.
Francisco Escano, Jr. it is said that the jurisdiction over drug of small
quantity as in the case at bar should be tried by the Metropolitan
Trial Court, although under the statute of R.A. 7659, the penalty for
possession or use of prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision
[correccional] to reclusion temporal which indeterminate penalty
and under the rule on jurisdiction the court which has jurisdiction
over a criminal case is dependent on the maximum penalty attached
by the statute to the crime. This second information was assigned to
Judge Monina Zenarosa.
Both accused filed a Motion to Quash before the trial court which
was denied and subsequently, a petition for certiorari before the CA
which was also denied. Hence this Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for injunction and TRO.
ISSUES brought before the Supreme Court:
(1) W/N there was valid information filed and therefore double
jeopardy sets in? YES
(2) W/N the original court already obtained jurisdiction over the
case? YES
ISSUE further addressed by the ponente:
(3) W/N after conviction and application for probation, information
may still be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the
ground that the information was allegedly altered/tampered with?
NO.
RATIO:
(1) To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2)

15

CrmPRO
the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded
to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof. If the offense is stated in such a way that a person of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the
court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable
conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to
follow the language of the statute in the information. The
information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.
The first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the
manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of
the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge
against them, is reasonably complied with. Applying Rule 110Section
6, shows on its face that it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed.
Further, we cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned,
entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first information.
Granting that alleged alteration/tampering of information took place
and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the setting
aside of the early decision. The alleged tampering/alteration
allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the subject of
another inquiry.
(2) On the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and Bobares v.
Escano, Jr., upon which both trial courts justified their claim of
jurisdiction was already superseded by a later resolution where the
RTC is exclusively designated try and decide cases of Kidnapping For
Ransom, Robbery In Band, Robbery Committed Against A Banking Or
Financial Institution, Violation Of The Dangerous Drugs Act, and
Violation Of The Anti-Carnapping Act, and other heinous crimes
penalized under Rep. Act No. 7659 committed within their
respective territorial jurisdictions. This issue is further settled
inPeople v. Velasco where it is stated that *A+ll drug-related cases,
regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty imposable
pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, still fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No.
6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
(3) The belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the
information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having
attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact
that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage. Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to
all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11,
provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.

Even appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will

not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a
sham.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accused Marcelo
Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith ordered released from
detention.
SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
1. SALUDAGA v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses, MAYOR
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at
the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being
then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and committing the
crime herein charged while in the discharge of his official
administrative function, conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2
FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with
the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give
unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a nonlicense contractor and non-accredited NGO, through evident bad
faith and manifest partiality by then and there entering into a
Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay
Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta,
Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of
NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency,
without the benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice
of the Government and public interest.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation dated June 4,
2008 which was strongly opposed by the prosecution in its
Opposition dated June 18, 2008.
Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a
new preliminary investigation before the filing of the second
Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter
charged a different offensethat is, violation of Section 3(e) by
giving unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a
substitution of the first Information. They argue that assuming that
no substitution took place, at the very least, there was a substantial
amendment in the new information and that its submission should
have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. Further,
they claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination
of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.
The graft court found that there is no substituted information or
substantial amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new
preliminary investigation. It gave the following ratiocination:
The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense
charged, but merely modified the mode by which accused
committed the offense. The substance of such modification is not
such as to necessitate the conduct of another preliminary
investigation.

16

CrmPRO
Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal
liability of the accused upgraded in the re-filed information. Thus,
new preliminary investigation is not in order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused
to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, when the
second Information in the instant case constituted substituted
Information whose submission required the conduct of preliminary
investigation. - NO
RULING:
There is no substitution of information there being no change in the
nature of the offense charged.
While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and
substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, the denial of
petitioners claim for a new investigation, however, did not deprive
them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of
the case discloses that there was a full-blown preliminary
investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated.
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as
alleged in the first Information, and conferring unwarranted
benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct
violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue injury
to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very least, a
substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is
founded on the same transaction as the first Information, that of
entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay
day care centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares,
Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements for the
prosecution and defense remain the same.
A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the
original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal
complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if
under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been
upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability
of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a
principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit
counter-affidavits and evidence.
No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no
modification
in
the
nature
of
the
charged
offense.1avvphi1 Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is
unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners.
AMENDED INFORMATION
1. BONIFACIO v RTC
FACTS:

and were alleged to contain libellous statements against the

Yuchengcos.

Gimenez, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family and of the Malayan

Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), a criminal complaint before the
Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts
of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) against petitioners.
The Makati City Prosecutors Office, found probable cause and
caused the issuance of the information which was eventually
reversed on appeal by the Secretary of Justice. The Justice Secretary
opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence,
the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the
RPC.
Hence, Petitioners, filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts
complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since
internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the
Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense
charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense of libel. Motion granted.
Motion for reconsideration granted and accordingly ordered the
public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of
want of venue. The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the
Amended Information dated March 20, 2007, the accusatory portion
of which reads:
th

That on or about the 25 day of August

2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the
trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition
and as such trustees they hold the legal title to
the websitewww.pepcoalition.com which is of
general circulation, and publication to the public
conspiring, confederating together with John
Does, whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and all of
them mutually helping and aiding one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and publicly and maliciously with
intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor
and integrity, character and reputation of
complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc.,
Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further
purpose exposing the complainant to public
hatred and contempt published an article
imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and
caused to be composed, posted and published in
the
said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a
website accessible in Makati City, an injurious
and defamatory article, which was first
published
and accessed by
the
private
complainant in Makati City, as follows:

Planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of

Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the
Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously
purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable
to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due
to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer
for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC, formed PEPCI.
PEPCI manages and controls the following websites that
served as a forum to seek redress for their pecuniary loss under
their
policies; www.pepcoalition.com,
www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e[7]
group at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are
easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet

17

CrmPRO
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring
in the original; italics supplied)

discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see

the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites author
or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be
sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private
complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
FILING OF INFORMATION IF THERE IS PENDING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
1. RAMISCAL v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, retired Brigadier General of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), was President of the AFP-Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) for almost 4 years.
During his term as president, AFP-RSBS board of trustees approved
the acquisition of a parcel of land in General Santos City for
development as housing projects.
Thus, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, executed bilateral deeds
of sale over the subject property (at the agreed price of P10,500.00
per square meter) with Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, representing the 12
individual sellers.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed unilateral deeds of sale over the
same property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase
price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual
purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter. These deeds of sale
were presented for registration and later on became the basis for
the TCTs issued by the Register of Deeds.
Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first
district of South Cotabato, filed in the Ombudsman a complaintt
affidavi against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1)
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds
or property through falsification of public documents.
In a Resolution, the Ombudsman found petitioner probable guilty of
the 2 offenses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of RA 3019 and 12
informations for falsification of public documents against Petitioner
Ramiscal and the other respondents.
Petitioner Ramiscal then filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the prosecution to evaluate its evidence and
report its recommendations on the MR filed. Initially, the
prosecution recommended the dropping of petitioner in the cases
filed. However, the prosecutions final recommendation was that
the MR filed by Petitioner should be denied. Upon receipt of this
finding/recommendation, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the
arraignment of Petitioner.
nd
Afterwards, Petitioner filed his 2 MR of the Ombudsmans finding
of probable cause against him.
Petitioners arraignment nevertheless followed. He filed a motion to
nd
set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his 2 MR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to set aside arraignment should
be granted due to the pending MR?
RULING: No. The motion should not be granted even though the
resolution of the MR was still pending.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
,
amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001 sanction
the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a
finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended,
provides:
Section
7. Motion
for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE: whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public

respondents admission of the Amended Information.
RULING: YES
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where
the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
[33]
action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This
principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that
Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible
venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such
cases.
Venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is
limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the
complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and
2
first published. The Amended Information in the present case
opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that
the offending article was first published and accessed by the
private complainant in Makati City. In other words, it considered
the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing
and first publication.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first
published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in
the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the
defamatory
article
was
printed
and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the
address of their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition
becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains
to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as
there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and
first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his
firstaccess to the defamatory article on petitioners website
in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very
ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to
2

Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal
action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of
where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618).
Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured
party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the
offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by
laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant
place.
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was
enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the
criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written
defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means
of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote
municipal courts

18

CrmPRO
a)
Only
one
motion
for
reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be
allowed, the same to be filed within five (5)
days from notice thereof with the Office of
the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy
Ombudsman as the case may be, with
corresponding leave of court in cases where
the information has already been filed in
court;
b) The filing of a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation shall
not
bar
the filing of the corresponding
information in Court on the basis of the
finding of probable cause in the resolution
subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)

documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly

the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy
of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had
claimed
to
be
Cawili's
business
associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro
V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the
charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the
Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was
filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July
1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the
bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in
the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson
and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation
(NBI).

If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution

finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding
information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the
accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically
follows the filing of the information.
Moreover, any of grounds for suspension of arraignment as
provided for under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court is not
present in this case (i.e. accused of unsound mind, prejudicial
question, etc.)
nd
Lastly, the Court also said that Petitioner cannot anymore file a 2
MR
questioning
again
the
same
finding
of
the
Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.
PRESCRIPTION
1. PANAGUITON v DOJ(lifted from net)
Facts:

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his

motion
was
denied
for
lack
of
merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga
(ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without
referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which
provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after
four
(4)
years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through
Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating
that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.

Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili
borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from
petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate,
Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3)
checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks
bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment
for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either
for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili
on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.

On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the
offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with
the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period
citing
Ingco
v.
Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably
acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that
the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the
withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22"
against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ
explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that
do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326
applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which
governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and

Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before
the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary
investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.
However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as
party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to
Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was
not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several
criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson
denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that
his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of

Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several

19

CrmPRO
petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of
non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that
the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his
petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it
was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial
to
require
consideration.

of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the

information
against
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9
August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of
Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
No costs.
CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
1. PINOTE v AYCO
FACTS:
State Prosecutor Pinote filed an administrative case against RTC
Judge Ayco for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority,
and grave misconduct. In a criminal case being handled by Pinote,
Judge Ayco allowed the testimony of 2 witnesses in court, despite
the absence of Pinote. Pinote, at that time, was undergoing medical
treatment in the Philippine Heart Center.

The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err
in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of
Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running
of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that
under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own
prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in
accordance
with
Act
No.
3326.
Issue: Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg.
22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of
judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?

In the following hearings, despite orders of Ayco, Pinote refused to

cross examine the witnesses due to his being absent during their
direct examinations, contending that the proceedings were void.
Pinote filed a Manifestation stating such, but Judge Ayco ruled that
the prosecution was waiving its right to cross-examine the 2
witnesses instead.

Held: It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on
4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was
conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law,
"institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

The Court Administrator found in favor of Pinote, stating that Ayco

violated Rule 110, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE:
W/N Ayco should be held administratively liable?

Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the

prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August
1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an
aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay
was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated
the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only
to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and
its
misapplication
of
Act
No.
3326.

HELD:
YES. Ayco should be held administratively liable.
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
control and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however,
or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may
be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the
Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to
the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the
termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,
unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights

and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency
of
the
investigating
agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed.
Petitioners filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of
the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they
had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a
definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim

Aycos act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in

the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private
prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression
of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the
prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.

20

CrmPRO

21