ART 252

G.R. Nos. 158930-31 March 3, 2008 UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND
ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS - KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU), petitioner, vs.
NESTL PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, respondent.
G.R. Nos. 158944-45 March 3, 2008 NESTL PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs.
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU), respondent. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts: UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees
of Nestl belonging to the latters Alabang and Cabuyao plants. On 4 April 2001, as the existing
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU was to end on 5 June
2001, the Presidents of the Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions of UFE-DFA-KMU informed Nestl of
their intent to "open [our] new Collective Bargaining Negotiation for the year 2001-2004 x x x as
early as June 2001." In response thereto, Nestl informed them that it was also preparing its own
counter-proposal and proposed ground rules to govern the impending conduct of the CBA
negotiations. On 29 May 2001, in another letter to the UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division only),
Nestl reiterated its stance that "unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated
policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental
Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA
negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom." Dialogue between the company and the
union thereafter ensued. On 14 August 2001, however, Nestl requested the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional Office No. IV, Imus, Cavite, to conduct
preventive mediation proceedings between it and UFE-DFA-KMU owing to an alleged impasse in
said dialogue; i.e., that despite fifteen (15) meetings between them, the parties failed to reach any
agreement on the proposed CBA.
Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective, though, and the UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of
Strike1 on 31 October 2001 with the NCMB, complaining, in essence, of a bargaining deadlock
pertaining to economic issues, i.e., "retirement (plan), panel composition, costs and attendance,
and CBA". On 07 November 2001, anotherNotice of Strike was filed by the union, this time
predicated on Nestls alleged unfair labor practices, that is, bargaining in bad faith by setting
pre-conditions in the ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the Retirement Plan in
the CBA negotiations. The result of a strike vote conducted by the members of UFE-DFA-KMU
yielded an overwhelming approval of the decision to hold a strike.
Issue: Whether or not Nestle is guilty of Unfair Labor Practice.
Held: No. UFE-DFA-KMU argues therein that Nestls "refusal to bargain on a very important CBA
economic provision constitutes unfair labor practice." It explains that Nestl set as a
precondition for the holding of collective bargaining negotiations the non-inclusion of the issue
of Retirement Plan. In its words, "respondent Nestl Phils., Inc. insisted that the Union should
first agree that the retirement plan is not a bargaining issue before respondent Nestl would

agree to discuss other issues in the CBA." It then concluded that "the Court of Appeals committed
a legal error in not ruling that respondent company is guilty of unfair labor practice. Obviously,
the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract
binding on the parties; but the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have continued
for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and
contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain
does not include the obligation to reach an agreement. The crucial question, therefore, of
whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the
facts of the individual case. As we have said, there is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.
Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. To some degree, the question
of good faith may be a question of credibility. The effect of an employers or a unions individual
actions is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions,
considered as a whole, and the inferences fairly drawn therefrom collectively may offer a basis
for the finding of the NLRC.
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that Nestl was motivated by ill
will, "bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave
anxiety resulted x x x" in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective
bargaining negotiations. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the
employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the
commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is
that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort
to reach a common ground of agreement. In the case at bar, Nestle never refused to bargain
collectively with UFE-DFA-KMU. The corporation simply wanted to exclude the Retirement Plan
from the issues to be taken up during CBA negotiations, on the postulation that such was in the
nature of a unilaterally granted benefit. An employers steadfast insistence to exclude a
particular substantive provision is no different from a bargaining representatives perseverance
to include one that they deem of absolute necessity. Indeed, an adamant insistence on a
bargaining position to the point where the negotiations reach an impasse does not establish bad
faith. It is but natural that at negotiations, management and labor adopt positions or make
demands and offer proposals and counter-proposals. On account of the importance of the
economic issue proposed by UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestle could have refused to bargain with the
former but it did not. And the managements firm stand against the issue of the Retirement Plan
did not mean that it was bargaining in bad faith. It had a right to insist on its position to the point
of stalemate. There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an
inference to be drawn from the facts. Herein, no proof was presented to exemplify bad faith on
the part of Nestl apart from mere allegation. Construing arguendo that the content of the
aforequoted letter of 29 May 2001 laid down a pre-condition to its agreement to bargain with
UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestls inclusion in its Position Paper of its proposals affecting other matters
covered by the CBA negates the claim of refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad faith.
Accordingly, since UFE-DFA-KMU failed to proffer substantial evidence that would overcome the
legal presumption of good faith on the part of Nestl, the award of moral and exemplary damages
is unavailing.

The Arbitration Branch of the NLRC : The complaint was dismissed on the ground that USTFU
failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that indeed UST was guilty of ULP.
UST FACULTY UNION vs. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, REV. FR. ROLANDO DE LA ROSA,
REV. FR. RODELIO ALIGAN, DOMINGO LEGASPI, and MERCEDES HINAYON G.R. No. 180892
April 7, 2009 VELASCO, JR., J.:
** The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it with
substantial evidence. While there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of ULP, the
alleging party has the burden of proving such ULP. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion..**
FACTS: On September 21, 1996, the University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) wrote a
letter to all its members informing them of a General Assembly (GA) to be held on October 5,
1996. The agenda for the GA included an election of officers (the then incumbent president of the
USTFU was Atty. Eduardo J. Mario, Jr). On October 2, 1996, Fr. Rodel Aligan, O.P.,the Secretary
General, issued a Memorandum allowing the request of the Faculty Clubs of the university to
hold a convocation on October 4, 1996.
DURING THE CONVOCATION: Members of the faculties of the university attended the
convocation, including members of the USTFU, without the participation of the members of the
UST administration. During the convocation, an election for the officers of the USTFU was
conducted by a group called the Reformist Alliance. Upon learning that the convocation was
intended to be an election, members of the USTFU walked out. Meanwhile, an election was
conducted among those present, and Gil Gamilla and other faculty members (Gamilla Group)
were elected as the president and officers, respectively, of the union.. Thus, there were two (2)
groups claiming to be the USTFU: the Gamilla Group and the group led by Atty. Mario, Jr.
(Mario Group). Mario: Mario Group filed a complaint for ULP against the UST with the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. It also filed on October 11, 1996 a complaint with the Office of
the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE, praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group as
officers of the USTFU. The acts of UST which USTFU complained of as ULP were the following: (1)
allegedly calling for a convocation of faculty members which turned out to be an election of
officers for the faculty union and that the legal counsel of UST Atty. Legaspi rendered derogatory
remarks; (2) subsequently dealing with the Gamilla Group in establishing a new CBA because
respondents transacted business with the Gamilla Group such as the processing of educational
and hospital benefits, deducting USTFU dues from the faculty members without turning over the
dues to the Mario Group, and entering into ; and (3) the assistance to the Gamilla Group in
padlocking the USTFU office.
MED ARBITER: The med-arbiter declared the election of the Gamilla group as null and void and
ordering that this group cease and desist from performing the duties and responsibilities of
USTFU officers. This Resolution was appealed to the Director of the (BLR), the director affirmed
the Resolution of the med-arbiter. His Resolution was then appealed to this Court which upheld
the ruling of the BLR.

NLRC: NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter. MR denied CA: Affirmed NLRC . MR
denied
ISSUE: w/n UST is guilty of Unfair Labor Practice?
HELD: NO.The petition must be denied.UST Is Not Guilty of ULP.
The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it. While
there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of ULP, the alleging party has the burden of
proving such ULP. The onus probandi falls on the shoulders of petitioner to establish or
substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum of evidence. In labor cases as in other
administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. In the petition at bar, petitioner
miserably failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.
It bears stressing that at the time of these events, the legitimacy of the Gamilla Group as the valid
officers and directors of the USTFU was already submitted to the med-arbiter and no decision
had yet been reached on the matter. Having been shown evidence to support the legitimacy of
the Gamilla Group with no counter-evidence from the Mario Group, UST had to recognize the
Gamilla Group and negotiate with it. Thus, the acts of UST in support of the USTFU as the
legitimate representative of the bargaining unit, albeit through the Gamilla Group, cannot be
considered as ULP.
The concept of ULP is contained in Article 247 of the Labor Code which states: Article 247.
Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof.Unfair labor practices
violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the
legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively
and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt
industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.
Notably, petitioner claims that respondents violated paragraphs (a) and (d) of Art. 248 of the
Code which provide: Article 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.It shall be unlawful for an
employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices: (a) To interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; (d) To initiate, dominate,
assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization,
including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters. *** ON
THREE ISSUES of ULP submitted by the petitioner
FIRST: With regard to the alleged derogatory remarks of Atty. Legaspi, the alleged evidence to
support petitioners claim was the Affidavit of Yu, is unacceptable. What may be derogatory to Yu
may not be punishable under the law. As to the convocation,the Memorandum dated October 2,

1996 does not support a claim that UST organized the convocation in connivance with the
Gamilla Group.
SECOND: Anent USTs dealing with the Gamilla Group, including the processing of faculty
members educational and hospitalization benefits, the labor arbiter ruled that: Neither are We
persuaded by complainants stand that respondents acquiescence to bargain with USTFU,
through Gamillas group, constitutes unfair labor practice. Such conduct alone, uncorroborated
by other overt acts leading to the commission of ULP, does not conclusively show and establish
the commission of such unlawful acts. There was no reason not to recognize the Gamilla Group as
the new officers and directors of USTFU. In view of the provisions of the Labor Code re CBA, the
UST was obligated to deal with the USTFU, as the recognized representative of the bargaining
unit, through the Gamilla Group. USTs failure to negotiate with the USTFU would have
constituted ULP. It is not the duty or obligation of respondents to inquire into the validity of the
election of the Gamilla Group. Such issue is properly an intra-union controversy subject to the
jurisdiction of the med-arbiter of the DOLE. Respondents could not have been expected to stop
dealing with the Gamilla Group on the mere accusation of the Mario Group that the former was
not validly elected into office.
THIRD: As to the padlocking of the USTFU office, it must be emphasized that based on the
Certification of Sibug, Cardenas was merely present, with Brgy. Captain Aseron of Brgy. 470,
Zone 46, at the padlocking of the USTFU office. The Certification also stated that Sibug himself
also padlocked the USTFU office and that he was neither harassed nor coerced by the padlocking
group. Clearly, Cardenas mere presence cannot be equated to a positive act of "aiding" the
Gamilla Group in securing the USTFU office.

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING

CORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), and RITO MANGUBAT G.R. No.
146728 February 11, 2004
Facts: In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling
Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all members of private respondent
General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity), a duly certified
bargaining agent.
On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which
included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The CBA was effective for
three years retroactive to December 1, 1988. Hence, it would expire on November 30, 1991.
On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed
CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. As early as
October 1991, however, GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who
stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation
and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA,

GMC did not send any counter-proposal.

On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the union's officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor
Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no
longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on
matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on how the company may improve its
operations.
In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive
disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its members,
stating that they had not withdrawn from the union.
On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed Marcia Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of
incompetence. The union protested and requested GMC to submit the matter to the grievance
procedure provided in the CBA. GMC, however, advised the union to "refer to our letter dated
December 16, 1991."
Thus, the union filed, on July 2, 1992, a complaint against GMC with the NLRC, Arbitration
Division, Cebu City. The complaint alleged unfair labor practice on the part of GMC for: (1)
refusal to bargain collectively; (2) interference with the right to self-organization; and (3)
discrimination. The labor arbiter dismissed the case with the recommendation that a petition for
certification election be held to determine if the union still enjoyed the support of the workers.
The union appealed to the NLRC. On January 30, 1998, the NLRC set aside the labor arbiter's
decision. Citing Article 253-A of the Labor Code, the NLRC ordered GMC to abide by the CBA draft
that the union proposed for a period of two (2) years beginning December 1, 1991, the date
when the original CBA ended, to November 30, 1993.
In its decision, the NLRC pointed out that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715, the duration
of a CBA, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, is five (5) years which, in the case of
GMC-Independent Labor Union was from December 1, 1988 to November 30, 1993. All other
provisions of the CBA are to be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution.
Thus, the NLRC held that respondent union remained as the exclusive bargaining agent with the
right to renegotiate the economic provisions of the CBA. Consequently, it was unfair labor
practice for GMC not to enter into negotiation with the union. CA affirmed NLRC.
Issues: whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in (1) finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for violating the duty to
bargain collectively and/or interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization, and
(2) imposing upon GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years to begin from the
expiration of the original CBA.
Held: No, On the first issue, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715,
states:

ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement
that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a
term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining
agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of
Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of
such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution....
The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years. The
relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth
year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic
terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of
the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of
effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The union's proposal was also submitted within the
prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of
said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with
the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the
economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of
the Labor Code, which provides
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit
any of the following unfair labor practice:
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the meaning of the phrase "duty to bargain collectively,"
thus: ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain collectively means
the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good
faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement....
We have held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to
bargain in good faith typically turn on the facts of the individual case. There is no per se test of
good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. The
effect of an employer's or a union's actions individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining,
but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole.
Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to
GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty
under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the
union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation.

It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is
mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace.
GMC's failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its
utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer
represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless.
We hold that GMC's refusal to make a counter-proposal to the union's proposal for CBA
negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an
answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain
collectively.
Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union's proposals, GMC
violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice. Perforce, the
Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the circumstances, guilty of unfair labor practice.

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN,-versus-ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF

LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS G.R. No. 141471 September 18, 2000 KAPUNAN, J.:
ART. 232
Facts: On December 1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of respondent union, Association of
Employees and Faculty of Letran, initiated the renegotiation of its Collective Bargaining
Agreement with petitioner for the last two (2) years of the CBAs five (5) year lifetime from
1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a new set of officers wherein private respondent
Eleanor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President.
Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao,
claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted the
disputed CBA to a referendum by the union members, who eventually rejected the said CBA.
Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC.
LA:Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiters
decision was reversed on appeal before the NLRC.
The union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to
strike on the grounds (sic) of petitioners: non-compliance with the NLRC (1) order to delete the
name of Atty. Federico Leynes as the unions legal counsel; and (2) refusal to bargain.
The parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on a new five-year
CBA starting 1994-1999. On February 7, 1996, the union submitted its proposals to petitioner,
which notified the union six days later or on February 13, 1996 that the same had been

submitted to its Board of Trustees.

In the meantime, Ambas was informed through a letter dated February 15, 1996 from her superior
that her work schedule was being changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambas
protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old
CBA (Ibid, p. 2-3). Due to petitioners inaction, the union filed a notice of strike on March 13,
1996. The parties met on March 27, 1996 before the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for the
negotiation. On March 29, 1996, the union received petitioners letter dismissing Ambas for
alleged insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice of strike to include Ambas
dismissal.
Petitioner stopped the negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new group of
employees had filed a petition for certification election.
On June 18, 1996, the union finally struck. The Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed
jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees including the union president to return to work
and for petitioner to accept them back under the same terms and conditions before the actual
strike. Petitioner readmitted the striking members except Ambas.
DOLE: On December 2, 1996, public respondent issued an order declaring petitioner guilty of
unfair labor practice on two counts and directing the reinstatement of private respondent Ambas
with backwages.
CA: Having been denied its motion for reconsideration, petitioner sought a review of the order of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Petitioner ascribes the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
ISSUES: (1) Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the
union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) upon mere information that a petition for certification has been filed by
another legitimate labor organization?
(2) Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees
right to self-organization?
RULING: The petition is without merit.
As regards the first issue, Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase duty
to bargain collectively,
Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on both parties of the performance of the
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose

of negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, respondent Association of Employees and Faculty of

Letran (AEFL) (hereinafter, union) lived up to this requisite when it presented its proposals for
the CBA to petitioner on February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways and
means in order to prevent the negotiation.
Petitioners utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure to make a
timely reply to the proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals
were submitted by the union, petitioner still had not made any counterproposals. This inaction
on the part of petitioner prompted the union to file its second notice of strike. Petitioner could
only offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had not yet convened to discuss the
matter as its excuse for failing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of Article 250 of the Labor
Code governing the procedure in collective bargaining, to wit:
Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in
collective bargaining: (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written
notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply
thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.
xxxxxxxxx
As we have held in the case of Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,[5] the companys refusal to make
counter-proposal to the unions proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith.
In the case at bar, petitioners actuation show a lack of sincere desire to negotiate rendering it
guilty of unfair labor practice.
Moreover, the series of events that transpired after the filing of the first notice of strike in
January 1996 show petitioners resort to delaying tactics to ensure that negotiation would not
push through. Thus, on February 15, 1996, or barely a few days after the union proposals for the
new CBA were submitted, the union president was informed by her superior that her work
schedule was being changed from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. A request from
the union president that the issue be submitted to a grievance machinery was subsequently
denied. Thereafter, the petitioner and the union met on March 27, 1996 to discuss the ground
rules for negotiation. However, just two days later, or on March 29, 1996, petitioner dismissed
the union president for alleged insubordination. In its final attempt to thwart the bargaining
process, petitioner suspended the negotiation on the ground that it allegedly received
information that a new group of employees called the Association of Concerned Employees of
Colegio (ACEC) had filed a petition for certification election. Clearly, petitioner tried to evade its
duty to bargain collectively.
PETiTIONERS CONTENTION: Petitioner, however, argues that since it has already submitted the
unions proposals to the Board of Trustees and that a series of conferences had already been
undertaken to discuss the ground rules for negotiation such should already be considered as acts
indicative of its intention to bargain.

Petitioner, likewise, claims that the suspension of negotiation was proper since by the filing of
the petition for certification election the issue on majority representation of the employees has
arose. According to petitioner, the authority of the union to negotiate on behalf of the employees
was challenged when a rival union filed a petition for certification election.
We disagree.
In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there must be a
valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence,
the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the
suspension of negotiation by the employer.

FACTS:
On Oct 3, 1978 the Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa a LLO won in the certification election and
subsequently certified in a resolution by the BLR as the sole bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant. The companys MR was denied.
On Dec 7, 1978 the union furnished the company of its proposal for the CBA and requested for a
counterproposal to no avail. Two subsequent requests were made but itbwere ignored and
remained unacted byt the company. The union then filed a notice of strike with the BLR based on
the ground of unresolved economic issues in the CBA.

The Contract Bar Rule under Section 3, Rule XI, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, provides that: If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for
intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such
agreement.

Conciliation proceedings were made but the amicable settlements failed. Compulsory arbitration
was resorted however the parties failed to submit position papers then there were subsequent
postponements and resets of the hearing. Upon the submission of the union of its position paper,
itbwas again reset to another date, the company filed its position paper on May 28, 1979.
There were postponements again.

The rule is based on Article 232, in relation to Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code. No
petition for certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse
of the sixty-day freedom period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed. The
petition for certification election by ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) only on May 26, 1996.

The labor arbiter submitted a report to NLRC and declared that the company is guilty of
unjustified refusal to bargain. The draft agreement submitted was found to be reasonable under
the premises.

Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing
thereof was barred by the existence of a valid and existing collective bargaining
agreement. Consequently, there is no legitimate representation issue and, as such, the filing of
the petition for certification election did not constitute a bar to the ongoing negotiation.
In view of the above, there is no doubt that petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by its stern
refusal to bargain in good faith with respondent union. Concerning the issue on the validity of the
termination of the union president, we hold that the dismissal was effected in violation of the
employees right to self-organization.
Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for
insubordination. But when the exercise of such management right tends to interfere with
the employees right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a
prohibited act.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
KIOK
GR
J. CUEVAS

LOY

NO

VS

NLRC
L-54334

ISSUE:
Whether or not the company violated its duty to bargain.
HELD:
The SC found that there was a valid cause to complain against the company.
Collective bargaining is the negotiations towards a collective agreement, democratic frameworks
designed to stabilize the relations between the labor and management and to create a climate of
sound
and
stable
industrial
peace.
It is a mutual responsibility of both parties, however, the employer is not under the obligation of
initiating contract negotiation.
Jurisdictional preconditions:
1) status of majority representation of the employees
2) proof of majority
3) demand to bargain

The
three
JP
enumerated
above
were
proved
by
the
union.
A companys refusal to make counter proposal may indicate bad faith and especially true when
left unanswered. The undue delay during the compulsory arbritration leads to no other
conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement.

On 22 April 1988, prior to the payment of the 13th month pay (mid-year bonus), PAL released a
guideline implementing the aforequoted provision, to wit:
1) Eligibility
a) Ground employees in the general payroll who are regular as of April 30, 1988;

G.R. No. 142399

March 12, 2008

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION (PALEA), Respondent.
Facts:
On 6 February 1987, PAL and PALEA entered into a CBA covering the period of 1986-1989, to be
applied, thus:
Section 3 Application
On the other hand, all such benefits and/or privileges as are not expressly provided for in this
Agreement but which are now being accorded in accordance with the PAL Personnel Policies and
Procedures Manual, shall be deemed also part and parcel of the terms and conditions of
employment, or of this Agreement.
Part of said agreement required PAL to pay its rank and file employees the following bonuses:
Section 4 13th Month Pay (Mid-year Bonus)
A 13th month pay, equivalent to one months current basic pay, consistent with the existing
practice shall be paid in advance in May.
Section 5 Christmas Bonus
The equivalent of one months current basic pay as of November 30, shall be paid in December as
a Christmas bonus. Payment may be staggered in two (2) stages. It is distinctly understood that
nothing herein contained shall be construed to mean that the Company may not at its sole
discretion give an additional amount or increase the Christmas bonus.

b) Other ground employees in the general payroll, not falling within category a)
above shall receive their 13th Month Pay on or before December 24, 1988;
PALEA assailed the implementation of the foregoing guideline on the ground that all employees
of PAL, regular or non-regular, must be paid their 13th month pay. In fact, in a letter,
PALEA informed PAL that the following regular employees failed to receive their 13th Month Pay
as of the date of the correspondence.
In response thereto, PAL informed PALEA that rank and file employees who were regularized
after 30 April 1988 were not entitled to the 13th month pay as they were already given their
Christmas bonuses on 9 December 1988 per the Implementing Rules of PD 851.
Disagreeing with PAL, PALEA filed a labor complaint for ULP against PAL before the NLRC. The
complaint interposed that "the cut-off period for regularization should not be used as the
parameter for granting [the] 13th month pay considering that the law does not distinguish the
status of employment but the law covers all employees."
PAL countered that those rank and file employees who were not regularized by 30 April of a
particular year are, in principle, not denied their 13th month pay considering they receive said
mandatory bonus in the form of the Christmas Bonus; that the Christmas Bonus given to all its
employees is deemed a compliance with PD 851; and that the foregoing has been the practice
formally adopted in previous CBAs as early as 1970.
Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the PALEAs complaint for lack of merit. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that PAL was not guilty of ULP in withholding the grant of the 13th Month Pay or
Mid Year Bonus to the concerned employees. The giving of the particular bonus was said to be
merely an additional practice made in the past, "such being the case, it violated no agreement or
existing practice or committed unfair labor practice, as charged."
NLRC reversed LA. The NLRC held that the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus is distinct from
the Christmas Bonus, and although PAL already paid its employees the latter, it must likewise
pay them the former. CA affirmed NLRC.

Issues:
1.
2.

W/N employees regularized after April 30, 1988 are also entitled to the mid-year
bonus. YES
If YES, W/N the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus can be equated to the Christmas
bonus. NO

Ratio:
1. In a Resolution dated 19 June 2007, SC resolved to suspend the proceedings of the case at bar
in view of the on-going rehabilitation of PAL. On 28 September 2007, however, the SEC issued an
Order granting PALs request to exit from rehabilitation after successfully stabilizing its financial
operations. Hence, the suspension earlier issued by this Court is hereby lifted, making the
present Petition ripe for resolution.
In refusing payment of the mid-year bonus, PAL argues that 1) the CBA does not apply to nonregular employees such that any benefits arising from said agreement cannot be made to apply
to them, including the mid-year bonus; and 2) it has always been the company practice not to
extend the mid-year bonus to those employees who have not attained regular status prior to the
month of May, when payment of the particular bonus accrues.
PAL maintains that in extending the grant of the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus to
employees who are not covered by the CBA, the CA, in effect, "modified or altered the terms of
said agreement and expanded its coverage to non-regular employees who are not covered by the
bargaining unit." The issue on modification or alteration of the CBA, however, was raised by PAL
rather belatedly and invoked for the first time on appeal. This being the case, SC is barred from
taking cognizance of and resolving the issue for it would be violative of the proscription against
the presentation of new issues on appeal.
Be that as it may, a cursory reading of the 1986-1989 CBA of the parties will instantly reveal that
Art. I, Sec. 3 of said agreement made its provision applicable to all employees in the bargaining
unit. The particular section specifically defined the scope of application of the CBA without
distinguishing between regular and non-regular employees.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA extend to the laborers and employees in the
collective bargaining unit, including those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor
organization. Otherwise, it would be a clear case of discrimination.
Hence, to be entitled to the benefits under the CBA, the employees must be members of the
bargaining unit, but not necessarily of the labor organization designated as the bargaining

agent. At this point, the allegation of PAL that the non-regular employees do not belong to the
collective bargaining unit and are thus not covered by the CBA is unjustified and
unsubstantiated. It is apparent to us that PAL excludes certain employees from the benefits of the
CBA only because they have not yet achieved regular status by the cut-off date, 30 April 1988.
There is no showing that the non-regular status of the concerned employees by said cut-off date
sufficiently distinguishes their interests from those of the regular employees so as to exclude
them from the collective bargaining unit and the benefits of the CBA.
2.PAL insists that "[u]nder the 13th Month Pay Law (P.D. 851), the 13th Month Pay is due on or
before December 24th of the year. Therefore, non-regular employees are entitled to their 13th
Month Pay, not in the month of May, but in the month of December when the Christmas Bonus
becomes due. The Christmas bonus becomes their 13th Month Pay." Simply put, as far as nonregular employees are concerned, PAL alleges that their 13th month pay shall be the same as
their Christmas bonus and will be paid according to the terms governing the latter.
We do not agree. From the facts of the present Petition, it is crystal clear that PAL is claiming an
exemption from payment of the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus provided in the CBA under
the guise of paying the Christmas bonus which it claims to be the equivalent of the 13th month
pay.
PD 851 mandates that all employers must pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not
more than P1,000 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, a 13th month pay not
later than 24 December of every year. Memorandum Order No. 28, dated 13 August 1986,
removed the salary ceiling, generally making all employees entitled to the 13th month pay
regardless of the amount of their basic salary, designation or employment status, and
irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid, provided that they have worked for at
least 1 month during a calendar year. PD 851, as amended, does admit of certain exceptions or
exclusions from its coverage, among which is:
Sec. 3(c). Employers already paying their employees 13-month pay or more in a calendar year or
its equivalent at the time of this issuance.
While employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or more in a calendar year or
its equivalent are already exempted from the mandatory coverage of said law, PAL cannot escape
liability in this case by virtue thereof.
It must be stressed that in the 1986-1989 CBA, PAL agreed to pay its employees 1) the 13th
month pay or the mid-year bonus, and 2) the Christmas bonus. The 13th month pay, guaranteed
by PD 851, is explicitly covered or provided for as the mid-year bonus in the CBA, while the
Christmas bonus is evidently and distinctly a separate benefit. PAL may not be allowed to brush

off said distinction, and unilaterally and arbitrarily declare that for non-regular employees, their
Christmas bonus is the same as or equivalent to the 13th month pay.
PD 851 mandates the payment of the 13th month pay to uniformly provide the low-paid
employees with additional income. It but sets a minimum requirement that employers must
comply with. It does not intend, however, to preclude the employers from voluntarily granting
additional bonuses that will benefit their employees. A bonus is an amount granted and paid to
an employee for his industry and loyalty which contributed to the success of the employer's
business and made possible the realization of profits. It is an act of generosity of the employer for
which the employee ought to be thankful and grateful. We deem that the Christmas bonus in this
case is of this nature, although, by virtue of its incorporation into the CBA, it has become more
than just an act of generosity on the part of PAL, but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.

FVC LABOR UNION-PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION

(FVCLU-PTGWO) vs. SAMA-SAMANG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA SA FVCSOLIDARITY OF INDEPENDENT AND GENERAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (SANAMA-FVCSIGLO)
G.R. No. 176249 November 27, 2009
KEYWORD/S: CBA; five-year term; exclusive collective bargaining status; amended/extended
term of CBA.
PONENTE: BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original five-year term together with all other
CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a
change in the unions exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision of Article 253A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a
legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement
for a CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an original provision or by amendment, the
bargaining unions exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be
challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBAs first five years.
FACTS:

On December 22, 1997, the petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO the recognized bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of the FVC Philippines, Incorporated (company) signed a five-year
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the company. The five-year CBA period was from
February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003. At the end of the 3rd year of the five-year term and
pursuant to the CBA, FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation of the CBA
and modified, among other provisions, the CBAs duration. Article XXV, Section 2 of the
renegotiated CBA provides that this re-negotiation agreement shall take effect beginning
February 1, 2001 and until May 31, 2003 thus extending the original five-year period of the CBA
by four (4) months.
On January 21, 2003, nine (9) days before the January 30, 2003 expiration of the originallyagreed five-year CBA term (and four [4] months and nine [9] days away from the expiration of the
amended CBA period), the respondent Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVCSolidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-SIGLO) filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election for the same
rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO CBA. FVCLU-PTGWO moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the certification election petition was filed outside the freedom
period or outside of the sixty (60) days before the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2003.
On June 17, 2003, Med-Arbiter Arturo V. Cosuco dismissed the petition on the ground that it was
filed outside the 60-day period counted from the May 31, 2003 expiry date of the amended CBA.
SANAMA-SIGLO appealed the Med-Arbiters Order to the DOLE Secretary, contending that the
filing of the petition on January 21, 2003 was within 60-days from the January 30, 2003
expiration of the original CBA term.
DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas set aside the decision of the Med-Arbiter. She ordered the
conduct of a certification election in the company. FVCLU-PTGWO moved for the reconsideration
of the Secretarys decision, which DOLE Acting Secretary Manuel G. Imson granted on November
6, 2003. The Acting Secretary held that the amended CBA (which extended the representation
aspect of the original CBA by four [4] months) had been ratified by members of the bargaining
unit some of whom later organized themselves as SANAMA-SIGLO, the certification election
applicant. Since these SANAMA-SIGLO members fully accepted and in fact received the benefits
arising from the amendments, the Acting Secretary rationalized that they also accepted the
extended term of the CBA and cannot now file a petition for certification election based on the
original CBA expiration date.
SANAMA-SIGLO sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court based on the grave abuse of discretion the Labor Secretary committed when she
reversed her earlier decision calling for a certification election.
The CA ruled in favor of SANAMA-SIGLO and set aside the challenged DOLE Secretary decisions
and reinstated her earlier ruling calling for a certification election.
Hence this petition.
Required to comment by the Court and to show cause for its failure to comply, SANAMA-SIGLO
manifested on October 10, 2007 that: since the promulgation of the CA decision on July 25, 2006
or three years after the petition for certification election was filed, the local leaders of SANAMASIGLO had stopped reporting to the federation office or attending meetings of the council of local
leaders; the SANAMA-SIGLO counsel, who is also the SIGLO national president, is no longer in the
position to pursue the present case because the local union and its leadership, who are principals

of SIGLO, had given up and abandoned their desire to contest the representative status of FVCLUPTGWO; and a new CBA had already been signed by FVCLU-PTGWO and the company. Under
these circumstances, SANAMA-SIGLO contends that pursuing the case has become futile, and
accordingly simply adopted the CA decision of July 25, 2006 as its position.
ISSUE:
Whether the amended or extended term of the CBA affects the exclusive representation status of
the collective bargaining agent and the right of another union to ask for certification as exclusive
bargaining agent.
RULING:
While SANAMA-SIGLO has manifested its abandonment of its challenge to the exclusive
bargaining representation status of FVCLU-PTGWO, the Court deems it necessary in the exercise
of its discretion to resolve the question of law raised since this exclusive representation status
issue will inevitably recur in the future as workplace parties avail of opportunities to prolong
workplace harmony by extending the term of CBAs already in place.
The root of the controversy can be traced to a misunderstanding of the interaction between a
unions exclusive bargaining representation status in a CBA and the term or effective period of
the CBA.
FVCLU-PTGWO has taken the view that its exclusive representation status should fully be in step
with the term of the CBA and that this status can be challenged only within 60 days before the
expiration of this term. Thus, when the term of the CBA was extended, its exclusive bargaining
status was similarly extended so that the freedom period for the filing of a petition for
certification election should be counted back from the expiration of the amended CBA term.
The Court held the FVCLU-PTGWO position to be correct, but only with respect to the original
five-year term of the CBA which, by law, is also the effective period of the unions exclusive
bargaining representation status. While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original fiveyear term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five
years will not carry with it a change in the unions exclusive collective bargaining status. By
express provision of Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years
and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In
other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an
original provision or by amendment, the bargaining unions exclusive bargaining status is
effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration
of the CBAs first five years.
#ANCIADO

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO vs HON. MA. NIEVES D. CONFESOR

DOCTRINE:
The employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have
substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the
type of work they performed.
FACTS:

On June 28, 1990, petitioner-union San Miguel Corporation Employees Union PTGWO entered
into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with private respondent San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) to take effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA which shall become effective and
shall remain in force and effect until June 30, 1992.
SMC management informed its employees in a letter dated August 13, 1991 2 that the company
which was composed of four operating divisions namely: (1) Beer, (2) Packaging, (3) Feeds and
Livestocks, (4) Magnolia and Agri-business would undergo a restructuring.
Magnolia and Feeds and Livestock Division were spun-off and became two separate and distinct
corporations: Magnolia Corporation (Magnolia) and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI).
Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA remained in force and effect
After June 30, 1992, the CBA was renegotiated in accordance with the terms of the CBA and
Article 253-A of the Labor Code.
During the negotiations, the petitioner-union insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC should still
include the employees of the spun-off corporations: Magnolia and SMFI; and that the
renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective only for the remaining period of two years or
until June 30, 1994
SMC, on the other hand, contended that the members/employees who had moved to Magnolia
and SMFI, automatically ceased to be part of the bargaining unit at the SMC. Furthermore, the
CBA should be effective for three years in accordance with Art. 253-A of the Labor Code
Unable to agree on these issues with respect to the bargaining unit and duration of the CBA,
petitioner-union declared a deadlock
The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Several conciliation meetings
were held but still no agreement/settlement was arrived at by both parties.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the Secretary of Labor issued an
Order directing, among others, that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective for the
period of three (3) years from June 30, 1992; and that such CBA shall cover only the employees
of SMC and not of Magnolia and SMFI.
Dissatisfied, petitioner-union now comes to this Court questioning this Order of the Secretary of
Labor
ISSUE:
1.
2.

WON the CBA must shall cover employees of SMC, Magnolia and SMFI.
WON the CBA must effective only for two years.

Petitioners Contention:
Petitioner-union contends that the duration for the non-representation provisions of the CBA
should be coterminous with the term of the bargaining agency which in effect shall be for the
remaining two years of the current CBA
SOLE: She ruled that the renegotiated terms of the CBA at SMC should run for a period of three
(3) years and would cover SMC employees only.
RULING:

1.

No. Magnolia and SMFI were spun-off to operate as distinct companies. Management
saw the need for these transformations in keeping with its vision and long term
strategy. Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate juridical
personalities. Thus, they can not belong to a single bargaining unit. Moreover, in
determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the test of grouping is mutuality or
commonality of interests. The employees sought to be represented by the collective
bargaining agent must have substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and
working conditions as evinced by the type of work they performed. Considering the
spin-offs, the companies would consequently have their respective and distinctive
concerns in terms of the nature of work, wages, hours of work and other conditions of
employment. Interests of employees in the different companies perforce differ.
2. No. The CBA is a contract between the parties and the parties must respect the terms
and conditions of the agreement. In the instant case, it is not difficult to determine the
period of effectivity for the non-representation provisions of the CBA. Taking it from
the history of their CBAs, SMC intended to have the terms of the CBA effective for
three (3) years reckoned from the expiration of the old or previous CBA . As a matter
of policy the parties are encourages to enter into a renegotiated CBA with a term
which would coincide with the aforesaid five (5) year term of the bargaining
representative.
In the event however, that the parties, by mutual agreement, enter into a renegotiated contract
with a term of three (3) years or one which does not coincide with the said 5-year term, and said
agreement is ratified by majority of the members in the bargaining unit, the subject contract is
valid and legal and therefore, binds the contracting parties. The same will however not adversely
affect the right of another union to challenge the majority status of the incumbent bargaining
agent within sixty (60) days before the lapse of the original five (5) year term of the CBA.

Labor Arbiters Ruling:Labor Arbiter Phibun D. Pura (Labor Arbiter) promulgated a decision,
ruling in respondents favor. PACSI and petitioner were directed to pay a total of P422,702.28,
representing respondents separation pay and the award of attorneys fees. Petitioner and PACSI
appealed to the NLRC.
NLRC Ruling: In a decision dated October 20, 2004, the NLRC ruled that petitioner failed to
perfect his appeal because he did not pay the supersedeas bond. It also affirmed the Labor
Arbiters decision with modification of the award for separation pay to four other employees
who were similarly situated. Upon finality of the decision, respondents moved for its execution.
To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff Romeo Pasustento issued a Notice of
Sale on Execution of Personal Property over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-140167 in the name of "Paquito V. Ando x xx married to Erlinda S. Ando." This
prompted petitioner to file an action for prohibition and damages with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
CA:The CA affirmed the RTC Order in so far as it dismissed the complaint on the ground that it
had no jurisdiction over the case, and nullified all other pronouncements in the same Order.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Petitioner claimed that the property belonged to him and his
wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the
corporation that was the judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latters properties.
RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Order. Petitioner argued that the writ of execution was
issued improvidently or without authority since the property to be levied belonged to him in
his personal capacity and his wife.

ARTICLE 254
1.
CASE TITLE
KEYWORD/S
PONENTE
DOCTRINE

dismissal and some money claims with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City.

:ANDO V. CAMPO, ET., AL.

: NO INJUNCTION POLICY
:NACHURA, J.:
: Regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide
questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement
of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by
appropriate officers and tribunals of the DOLE. It is
the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment that governs any
question on the execution of a judgment of that body.

FACTS:Petitioner was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an
independent labor contractor. Respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers tasked to
manually carry bags of sugar from the warehouse of Victorias Milling Company and load them on
trucks. n June 1998, respondents were dismissed from employment. They filed a case for illegal

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
(2) Whether the execution of judgment against Andos property is
proper.
RULING:
1. NO. Regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise from and are
incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by
appropriate officers and tribunals of the DOLE. It is the NLRC Manual on the Execution of
Judgment that governs any question on the execution of a judgment of that body. It defines a
third-party claim as one where a person, not a party to the case, asserts title to or right to the

possession of the property levied upon. It also sets out the procedure for the filing of a thirdparty claim.

1. International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing

Facts:

Petitioner may indeed be considered a third party in relation to the property subject of the
execution vis--vis the Labor Arbiters decision. There is no question that the property belongs to
petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs to the
conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party, i.e., the
conjugal partnership.
The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National Labor Relations Commission
by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpreted as vesting in them
jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the
controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
There is no denying that the present controversy arose from the complaint for illegal dismissal.
The subject matter of petitioners complaint is the execution of the NLRC decision. Execution is
an essential part of the proceedings before the NLRC. Jurisdiction, once acquired, continues
until the case is finally terminated, and there can be no end to the controversy without the full
and proper implementation of the commissions directives.
Further underscoring the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over petitioners complaint is Article 254 of
the Labor Code, to wit:

Petitioners are employees (teachers) of respondent's school who are receiving less than their
counterparts hired abroad and now cry discrimination. The school contends that a foreign-hire
would necessarily uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take
the risk of devaiting from a promising career path - all for the purpose of pursuing his profession
as an educator, but this time in a foreign land and such person does not enjoy security of tenure
as well so the compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain
competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent pruofessionals in the field
of international education. The school's classification between foreign-hires and local-hires was
in the point-of-hire so foreigners hired locally are being classified as local-hires. Petitioner claims
that such classification is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to
foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. On the other hand, the Acting Secretary of Labor
upheld the point-of hire classification for the distinction in salary rates. He also stated that The
Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an
established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A
classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of
the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the
former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and
have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching
faculty of the School.

ART. 254. INJUNCTION PROHIBITED. No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining

order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other
entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.
2.
NO. The power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. A sheriff, therefore, has no
authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor. Likewise,
there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation.
In sum, while petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy to vindicate his rights, nonetheless,
justice demands that this Court look beyond his procedural missteps and grant the petition.
Execution of Personal Property is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

ARTICLE 255

Hence the present petition.

Issue:
WON the Acting secretary erred in upholding the reasonableness of the classification made by
respondent-school.
Held:
Yes. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution 8 in the Article on
Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,

economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every
person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for
all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,"
25 "to afford labor full protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital.27 These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary
to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There
is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

2. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (NAFTU), Petitioner, vs. MAINIT

LUMBER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY WORKERS UNION-UNITED LUMBER AND GENERAL
WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES. (MALDECOWU-ULGWP), Respondents.
G.R. No. 79526; December 21, 1990
Case Doctrine: While the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with
in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other
factors must be considered. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interests. This is
so because "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights."

Keyword:

Sawmill

Division

and

Logging

Division

Ponente: PARAS, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union-United
Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines, MALDECOWU-ULGWP (ULGWP), a legitimate
labor organization, filed a petition for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining representative among the rank and file workers/employees of Mainit
Lumber Development Company Inc. (MALDECO), a duly organized, registered and existing
corporation engaged in the business of logging and saw-mill operations.
The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election.
Petitioner National Association of Free Trade Unions (NAFTU) appealed the decision of the MedArbiter. Petitioner NAFTU alleges that the employer MALDECO was composed of two bargaining
units, the Sawmill Division and the Logging Division and in fact, had then two separate CBA's, one
for the Sawmill Division and another for the Logging Division, but both the petition and decision
referred only to one bargaining unit; that from 1979 to 1985, the Ministry of Labor and
Employment recognized the existence of two (2) separate bargaining units at MALDECO, one for
its Logging Division and another for its Sawmill Division.
The Bureau of Labor Relations affirmed the decision.
Thus, a certification election was held on separate dates at the employer's sawmill division and
logging area respectively. In said election MALDECOWU-ULGWP garnered a total vote of 146
while NAFTU garnered a total of 2 votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was right for the Med-Arbiter to change the employer from two
separate bargaining units to only one.
RULING: Yes. While the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in
determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors
must be considered. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interests. This is so
because "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights."
In the case at bar, out of two hundred and one (201) employees of MALDECO, one hundred
seventy five (175) consented and supported the petition for certification election, thereby
confirming their desire for one bargaining representative.
Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the Sawmill Division and the
Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same
way that the company needs them both. There may be difference as to the nature of their
individual assignments but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a
separate bargaining unit.

ARTICLE 256
1. PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED (PRI), v. ANACLETO L. TAECA, G.R. No. 160828,
August 9, 2010
CASE DOCTRINE:
The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. This, however, is not without
limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his
employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process
must be observed in dismissing an employee, because it affects not only his position but also his
means of livelihood. Employers should, therefore, respect and protect the rights of their
employees, which include the right to labor.
FACTS:
A COMPLAINT for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal with money claims, damages and
attorneys fees was filed by respondents against petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PRI). PRI
invoked the defense that respondents were terminated from employment based on acts of
disloyalty they committed when they signed an authorization for the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), a rival union, to file a petition for certification election among all rank-and-file employees
of PRI. It contends that the acts of respondents are a violation of the union security clause, as
provided in their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Issue:
1. WON the act of signing an authorization for certification election before the freedom period is
sufficient ground to terminate the employment
Ruling:
The Supreme Court is in consonance with the Court of Appeals when it held that the mere signing
of the authorization in support of the Petition for Certification Election of FFW on March 19, 20
and 21, or before the freedom period, is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of
respondents, because the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom period. Nothing in
the records would show that respondents failed to maintain their membership in good standing
in the Union.
Respondents did not resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong.
Respondents continued to pay their union dues and never joined the FFW.
Significantly, petitioners act of dismissing respondents stemmed from the latters act of signing
an authorization letter to file a petition for certification election as they signed it outside the
freedom period. However, we are constrained to believe that an authorization letter to file a
petition for certification election is different from an actual Petition for Certification Election.
Likewise, as per records, it was clear that the actual Petition for Certification Election of FFW was
filed only on May 18, 2000. Thus, it was within the ambit of the freedom period which
commenced from March 21, 2000 until May 21, 2000. Strictly speaking, what is prohibited is the
filing of a petition for certification election outside the 60-day freedom period. This is not the
situation in this case. If at all, the signing of the authorization to file a certification election was
merely preparatory to the filing of the petition for certification election, or an exercise of
respondents right to self-organization.

2.. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIESMANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HOLIDAY INN MANILA z PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION
AND
ACESITE
PHILIPPINES
HOTEL
CORPORATION
G.R.
No.
181531.
July
31,
2009.
CARPIO MORALES, J.
DOCTRINE: Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes
cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1.
FACTS:
A certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file employees of respondent Holiday
Inn
Manila
Pavilion
Hotel
(the
Hotel)
with
the
following
results:
EMPLOYEES
TOTAL
NUWHRAIN-MPHC
HIMPHLU
NO
SPOILED
SEGREGATED

IN
VOTES
UNION

VOTERS

LIST
CAST
=
=
=

=
=

353
346
151
169
1
3
22

In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, petitioner,

NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union
(HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter Ma. SimonetteCalabocal to decide which
among
those
votes
would
be
opened
and
tallied.
Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, specifically
those cast by the 11 dismissed employees and those cast by the 6 supposedly [supervisory
employees] of the Hotel. The votes of the probationary employees were not ordered included in
the number of valid votes cast on the premise that the said employees are precluded from voting
in
the
certifocation
election
under
the
CBA.
Petitioner NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE),
arguing that respondent HIMPHLU, should not be immediately certified as the bargaining agent,
as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338
(151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of
the
majority
which
would
then
become
170
(338/2
+
1)
The Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) then issued a resolution affirming bthe Med-

Arbiters Order. It held that, even if the 17 votes of the dismissed and supervisory employees
were to be counted and presumed to be in favor of petitioner, still, the same would not suffice to
overturn
the
169
votes
garnered
by
HIMPHLU.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the SOLE, it appealed to the Court
of
Appeals.
The
appellate
court
affirmed
the
ruling
of
the
SOLE.
The appellate court brushed aside petitioners contention that the opening of the 17 segregated
votes would materially affect the results of the election as there would be the likelihood of a runoff election in the event none of the contending unions receive a majority of the valid votes cast.
It held that the majority contemplated in deciding which of the unions in a certification election
is the winner refers to the majority of valid votes cast (one who obtained the highest number of
votes from all the votes cast), not the simple majority (50% +1) of the valid votes cast, hence, the
SOLE was correct in ruling that even if the 17 votes were in favor of petitioner, it would still be
insufficient
to
overturn
the
results
of
the
certification
election.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, the present recourse was
filed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the
exclusive
bargaining
agent.
RULING:
NO. It is well-settled that under the so-called double majority rule, for there to be a valid
certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union
must
have
garnered
majority
of
the
valid
votes
cast.
Notably, the Supreme Court ruled that all the probationary employees votes should be deemed
valid votes while that of the supervisory employees should be excluded, it follows that the
number
of
valid
votes
cast
would
increase

from
321
to
337.
Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the
eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in
the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at
least
170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to
obtain a majority vote. The position of both the SOLE and the appellate court that the opening of
the 17 segregated ballots will not materially affect the outcome of the certification election as for,
so they contend, even if such member were all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win, is
thus
untenable.
It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for

it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union
won the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To be
sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate
bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining representative, if
the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of
who between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will
of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which
union
they
want
to
represent
them.
Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required
majority, it follows that a [run-off election] must be held to determine which between HIMPHLU
and
petitioner
should
represent
the
rank-and-file
employees.
A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest
number of votes in a certification or consent election with three (3) or more choices, where such
a certified or consent election results in none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the
majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total number of votes for all contending unions
is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast. With 346 votes cast, 337 of which are
now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only garnered 169 and petitioner having obtained 151
and the choice NO UNION receiving 1 vote, then the holding of a run-off election between
HIMPHLU
and
petitioner
is
in
order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Resolutions of the Secretary of Labor are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.