ARGALLON VS JOCOSON AND TUISING VS CA 594 SCRA 343

FACTS:
Jocson filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages against Marcelo Steel
Corporation and Maria Crisitna Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC). The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff. Marcelo Steel and MCFC appealed to the Ca
but the latter court affirmed the RTCs ruling. A writ of execution was issued to the
Sheriff commanding the latter to levy the properties for the full satisfaction of the
claim and an execution sale was then scheduled. Midas Corp filed a third party claim
alleging that some of the levied properties were previously mortgaged to Midas
Corp. The execution sale pushed through and Tuising was declared to be the highest
bidder.
Jocso filed a very urgent ex parte motion for issuance of a break open order and
petition for contempt of court. Marcelo Steel, on the other hand, filed an Extremely
Urgent Omnibus Motion for the annulment of execution sale and for the issuance of
an order directing the Sheriffs not to deliver the properties sold to Tuising. The Trial
court issued an order declaring the execution sale null and void and the Certificate of
Sale was set aside and cancelled.
Jocson moved for MR. Tuising filed a motion for intervention with leave of court
with MR and entry of appearance. ---all granted by lower court.
Joscon filed with the RTC a motion for issuance of alias writ of execution to
implement the decision as against MCFC.

pleading. Although nagfile naman si Jocson ng SPA, late na to eh, 4 months na

lumipas. Sa lack of certification against forum shopping, generally no curable by its
subsequent submission or correction unless may good ground to relax the rules.
In Athena Computers vs Reyes, the complaint was dismissed by the court when it
found out na the verification and certification against forum shopping were only
signed by one of the plaintiffs.
In Docena vs Lapesura, the certificate of non forum shopping should be signed by all
petitioners and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation on
non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same
and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of
the filing or non filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as
similar to the current petition.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS ABALLA 461 SCRA 392
FACTS:
SMC entererd into a one year Contract of Services with Sunflower Cooperative.
Under their contract, the cooperative shall employ the necessary personnel and
provide adequate equipment, materials, tools and apparatus to fully accomplish the
work and services undertaken by the cooperative. The contract pushed through and it
was deemed renewed by the parties every month after expiration.

CA: affirmed RTCs ruling

Private respondents filed a complaint before NLRC praying that they be declared as
regular employees of SMC with claim of all benefits and privileges enjoyed by SMC
rank and file employees. They also filed an amended complaint including illegal
dismissal. SMC filed a motion for leave to file attached Third Party Complaint to
implead Sunflower as third party defendant.

ISSUE:

LA- dismissed private respondents claim for lack of merit.

WON the mandatory ba ang pagsign ng both parties sa pleading Verification and
Non forum shopping.

NLRC dismissed pa din.

RTC: ang liability nila Marcelo Steel is joint. Sa oblicon, if di nastate na ang
obligation is solidary of joint, presumption is joint.

RULING:
Yes. Sa case na to, the court noted that the petition supposedly signed by petitioners
Jocson and Tuising was not signed by Jocsons counsel. It was Tusiings counsel
who signed in behalf of Jocsons counsel. Tuisings counsel had no authority to sign
the petition in behalf of Jocson. The records are bereft of any showing that Jocson
authorized Tuisings counsel to be her counsel or to act in her behalf. Under section
3, Rule 7 of Civil Procedure, every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him, otherwise the pleading produces no effect.
Further, only Tuising signed the Verification and Certification for non forum
shopping. Jocson did not sign the verification and certification. A pleading required
to be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned

CA reversed.
Contention ni SMC: bakit dinismiss ni CA yung petition for certiorari naming eh
only 3 out of 97 named petitioners signed the verification and certification against
forum- shopping.
ISSUE:
Mandatory ba na lahat ng petitioner pumirma sa verification and certification against
non forum shopping?
RULING:

No. While the general rule is that the certificate of non forum shopping must be
signed by all the parties or petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them
is insufficient. The court has stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were
designed to promte and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certificate
of non forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded. It does not, however, thereby interdict substantial compliance with its
provisions under justifiable circumstances.

Yes. The relation of common carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the
passenger alights from the carriers vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the
point of destination but continues until the passenger had a reasonable time or
reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated,
herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the
complaint, which reads

Thus in HLC Construction and Development Corp vs Emily Homes Subdivision

Homeowners Association, pag the plaintiffs share common interest, the collective
nature of the case, there was no doubt that Mr Buat could validly sign the certificate
of non forum shopping in behalf of all its co- plaintiffssubstantial compliance na
to.

That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel
Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of
exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the
defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their
daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the
operation of their vehicle.

Here, the complaint shows that 97 complainants were being represented by their
counsel of their choice. Thus the first sentence of their complaint alleges xxx
complainants by counsel and unto this honorable office respectfully state xxx and
the complaint was signed by Atty. Ortiz as counsel for the complainants. Thus, in
compliance with ROC, atty. Ortiz is presumed to be properly authorized by private
respondents in filing their complaint.

is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasidelict, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is
permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a
plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each
other or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be resolved and
determined.

LA MALLORCA VS COURT OF APPEALS 17 SCRA 729

The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was
predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran,
plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent."
This allegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that the
driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there
were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the
vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the
presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this
presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome.
Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the
child Raquel Beltran.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs, husband and wife together with their children, boarded a bus owned and
operated by the defendant at San Fernando, Pampanga. At that time, they were
carrying 4 baggages. The conductor who happened to be a half brother of plaintiff
issued tickets for them.
When the plaintiffs alighted from the bus, their father went back to it to get their
baggage. (medyo may motion tong si BUS_ Unknown to him, her daughter Raquel
followed her. Ayun, na run over si Raquel skull crushed, deads na siya.
The plaintiffs filed with the trial court an action seeking to recover an aggregate
amount of 16000 for actual and moral damages. The RTC ruled in favor of them and
found La Mallorca liable for breach of contract of carriage. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:

JOSELANO GUEVARRA VS ATTY JOSE EMMANUEL EALA AC. NO.

7136

Ang main issue ditto is kung passengers pa ba sila nung common carrier.

FACTS:

RULING:

Complainant filed a disbarment case against Eala before the IBP for grossly immoral
conduct and violation of the lawyers oath.

He alleges that he and her fiance Irene introduced respondent to him as her friend
who aws married to Marianne with whom he had 3 children.
After his marriage with Irene, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls as well as messages of
which read I love you, I miss you or meet you at Megamall He also noticed that
Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following
day and sometimes did not go home from work. He also alleged that she saw Irene
with respondent together on two occasions. Later on, he found a letter addressed to
Irene from respondent.

In his reply, respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous

relationship with Irene as alleged in par 14 of the complaint, the truth of the matter
being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate
members of their respective families, and that respondent, as far as the general public
was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.
ISSUE:
What is a negative pregnant?
RULING:

My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I
will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness
but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again?
Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything
humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my
own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on
you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But
more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are
together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to
last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my
soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND
YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M
LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!" 2
Eternallyyours,
NOLI
(Nilagay ko lang para di boring)

Yes meron. It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent
specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that]their
relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts
of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship
with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is
indeed a "special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene,
[which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje sufficiently prove that there was indeed an
illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
"Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the
father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make
any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje.
Respondents denial is a negative pregnant. A denial pregnant with the admission of
the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It
was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It
is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of

Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said
certificate, Irene named respondent a "lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father.
And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in
the certificate with her signature on the Marriage Certificate shows that they were
affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence
adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other which is the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
GOJO VS GOYALA 35 SCRA 557
FACTS:
Goyala sold to Gojo by a Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale a certain parcel of land.
About 10 years from the execution of the said document, the vendee filed with the
CFI a petition for consolidation of ownership over the said land. Goyalas filed an
opposition and denied the allegation in the petition regarding pacto de retro sale.
According to Goyala, what really transpired was an equitable mortagage. Later on,
Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that despite the lapse
of 43 days after Gojos receipt of a copy of the order of the trial court, gojo failed
and neglected to subit an amended complaint. The lower court declared the deed to
be an equitable mortgage. Upon appeal sa CA, sabi ng CA since the matter involve
only pure questions of law, cinertify na nila sa SC.

order of consolidation; on the other hand, appellant's counterclaim was for

reformation of the deed claiming that it was only a mortgage. Thus the counterclaim
was clearly inconsistent with and directly controverted; the whole theory and basic
allegations of the complaint. In consequence, appellant's complaint stood as the
answer to appellee's counterclaim; hence, the incorrectness of the trial court's order
declaring the appellant in default in regard to said counterclaim is evident.

GAJUDO VS TRADERS ROYAL BANK 485 SCRA 108

FACTS:
Petitioner obtained a loan from Respondent Bank and this was secured by a real
estate mortgage over a parcel of land. When the loan was not paid, the Bank
commenced an extra judicial foreclosure proceedings. Eventually the land was sold
to Respondent Bank highest bidder. Petitioner alleges that the auction sale was
tainted with irregularity as the bid price was shockingly low, but they wanted to buy
back the said land from respondents. At first, the Bank agreed to sell the said land
based from the price it paid in the auction sale. But later on, it changed its mind
saying that the price should be based on the lands current market value. The Bank
filed an answer alleging na the auction sale was done in accordance with law.

ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff in default with respect to
defendants counterclaim.

Eh during pre trial, nagkaroon ng conflagration so nasunog pati yung records ng case
na to. After nareconstitute ang records, naibenta na pala ni Bank kay Ceroferr Realty
yung land. So nagfile ng amended complaintdinamay na nila si Ceroferr. Nagserve
ng summons sa Bank. Di naman sumagot si latter. File naman ng Motion to declare
the Bank in default. Eh si Trial Court nagissue ng partial decision of default. Sabi ng
Bank, wait. Appeal kami. Yung partial decision nay an eh nanovate via compromise
agreement, whose effect of resjudicate had rendered that decision functus officio.

RULING:

CA ruled in favor of the BANK, hence this case.

Yes. It is already settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a
compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default, principally because the
issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations
of the complaint. Here, there can be no doubt that appellants counterclaim was a
compulsory one in as much as it arises out of or is necessary connected with
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the complaint. In the instant
case, there can be no doubt that appellant's counterclaim was a compulsory one in as
much as it arises out of or is necessarily connected with transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the complaint; the complaint alleged that the right of
appellee to repurchase the property in question had already expired and asked for an

ISSUE:
Does declaring a party in default automatically result in the grant of the prayers of
the plaintiff?
RULING:
No. The court held in Pascua v. Florendo that complainants are not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants are declared in default.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is

warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party.
In Pascua, this Court ruled that "x x x it would be meaningless to require
presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a
decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and
exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the Rules
nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause."
The said provisions are not to be understood as meaning that default or the failure
of the defendant to answer should be interpreted as an admission by the said
defendant that the plaintiffs cause of action find support in the law or that plaintiff is
entitled to the relief prayed for. Further, "Being declared in default does not
constitute a waiver of rights except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in
the trial court.
"In other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a
sense it may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court,
the rules see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with law. The
evidence to support the plaintiffs cause is, of course, presented in his absence, but
the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. Although the
defendant would not be in a position to object, elementary justice requires that only
legal evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence presented should
not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be
dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in
amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint."
In sum, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Section 3
of Rule 9, they were not excused from establishing their claims for damages by the
required quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133. Stated differently, any
advantage they may have gained from the ex parte presentation of evidence does not
lower the degree of proof required. Clearly then, there is no incompatibility between
the two rules.

On May 19, 1982, petitioner filed his opposition to the aforesaid motion inviting
attention to the fact that he had filed a motion for extension of time to file responsive
pleading within the reglementary period.
On May 26, 1982, respondent judge issued an order declaring defendant (herein
petitioner) in default and allowing plaintiff (herein private respondent) to adduce its
evidence ex parte.
On May 27, 1982, defendant (petitioner) filed his answer to the complaint.
On July 28, 1982, respondent court rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff (herein
private respondent).
On August 11, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to set aside decision dated July 28,
1982.
On August 25, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying petitioner's motion to
set aside decision.
On October 6, 1982, petitioner filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari/prohibition. But the CA affirmed the order of the trial court. The court
reasoned out that the granting of the motion to declare the defendant in default
means that the motion for extension filed by defendant was already denied.
ISSUE:
WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in issuing the order of default.

Tama ba na certiorari ang tamang case to file?

RULING:

LINA VS COURT OF APPEALS 35 SCRA 637

FACTS:
On March 31, 1982, private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) a case for sum of money.
On April 22, 1982, petitioner Alex Lina was served with summons together with a
copy of the complaint.
On May 8, 1982, when no answer or motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner,
private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed a motion to declare him in default.
The motion was set for hearing on May 21, 1982.

No.The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint

is a matter largely addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. "While
trial courts are persuaded, as a matter of policy, to adopt a basically flexible
attitude in favor of the defendant in this area of our adjective law, the defense
should never be lulled into the belief that whenever trial courts refuse a second
request for extension to file an answer, the appellate courts will grant relief.
In the case at bar, it was on May 5, 1982 or two (2) days before the expiration of
the fifteen-day reglementary period given to defendant to file his responsive
pleading when petitioner moved for an extension of twenty (20) days from May
7 within which to file his answer. Upon motion of private respondent and over

the objection of petitioner, respondent judge issued an order declaring petitioner

in default.
Under the Rules of Court, the remedies available to a defendant in the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) are:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery
thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside
the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he
has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant
discovered the default, but before the same has become final and
executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of
Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has
become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under
Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set
aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule
41)
(Yan dapat yung finile niya)