Reviews

437

hensive tbinker," wbile for Buchler he was a piecemeal, experimental

investigator. In reference to Peirce, Buchler suggests, "To strain principally
for the conservation of his picturesque architectonic will scarcely be to
provide the corrective which he lacked wbile alive. It would be better to
honor hirn in the act ... ," to learn from his sharply focused inquiries into
specific topics, than to strlve for "the esthetic contemplation of their dubious
unity."
Kelly Parker stands squarely in a tradition of interpreters, going back at
least as far as Morris Cohen and Paul Weiss. He is perhaps not as mindful
of how far back this tradition stretches or how useful its adherents might yet.
be; nor is he sufficiently attentive to the value of taking more seriously the
counter-tradition ofBuchler and arguably Thomas Goudge. But the immense
value of bis own systematic study of Peirce' s systematic tendencies cannot
be gainsaid. This "in-depth introduction" offers a vivid portrait of Peirce
from a distinctive angle, one Peirce bimselfemphasized. Murray Murphey' s
The Development 0/Peirce 's Philosophy (1961) and Christopher Hookway' s
Peirce (1985) remain the best general introductions to Charles Peirce. Kelly
Parker' s The Continuity 0/ Peirce's Thought, however, is also an excellent
introduction and provocative interpretation of a multifaceted genius.

Vincent Colapietro, Pennsylvania State University

A General Introduction to the Semeiotic

Sanders Peirce, by James Jak6b Liszka

0/ Charles

Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. $49.95 (cloth). 162 pp.

The goal of the author is to see Charles Sanders Peirce's semeiotic as
Peirce hirnself did (x). James Jak6b Liszka presents the general theory of
signs articulated in a staggering wealth of manuscripts, composed over a
lifetime, "as a discipline and to give, as far as possible, a coherent presentation" of this theory. In other terms, the goal is to present Peirce' s theory of
signs "sympathetically and in the best possible light" (x). In doing so, Liszka
hopes "to create the feeling as if Peirce is present and involved in the
conversation of the interpretation of his own material" (x). This compact
study goes a significant distance toward fulfilling this admirable hope of
giving Peirce an audible voice in the interpretation of his own texts. A
General Introduction to the Semeiotic 0/ Charles Sanders Peirce is a

438

Reviews

valuable study of an incredibly intricate theory of signs. Liszka displays a

wide and deep familiarity with Peirce' s unpublished as weIl as published
writings; moreover, he exhibits a firm grasp of Peirce's architectonic
conception ofscientific inquiry (Peirce' s system ofsciences) and the specific
place of sign theory within this heuristic scheme. Finally, his style of
presentation is consistently clear and his organization of the material is
textually grounded, philosophically warranted, and pedagogically sensitive.
The first chapter gives an overview of "The Discipline of Semeiotic"
that the author opens by defining Peirce's semeiotic as afonnal science and
concludes by arguing, all too briefly, for the superiority ofPeirce' s semeiotic
over Ferdinand de Saussure's semiologie. In addition, he specifies the place
and role of Peirce's semeiotic in the classification of the sciences, the
distinctive character of this philosophical disciple, and (of utmost importance) Peirce' s threefold division of semeiotic. The first branch of semeiotic
is speculative or fonnal grammar, "the study of the basic components of
signs, their types, aspects, and classification." The second is critic or general
logic, "the attempt to decipher the means by which we may avoid error,
eliminate illusion and distortion, and positively ascertain truth." And the
third is speculative orfonnal rhetoric, also called methodeutic, "the study of
the formal conditions under which signs can be communicated, developed,
understood, and accepted" (10-11).
Liszka eoncludes this introductory chapter with a far-too-compressed yet
surprisingly helpful section (15-17) contrasting Peirce's semeiotic and
Saussure's semiologie. He stresses that "for Peirce the relation between
linguistics and semeiotic is one of discipline to methodology, or empirical
science to formal science, whereas for Saussure the relation is one of general
to particular discipline" (linguistics being part of the possible science of
semiology and, in turn, semiology being included in the more general
science of social psyehology) (16). In Semiology (1975), Pierre Guiraud
asserts that: "Saussure emphasized the social function of the sign, Peirce its
logical function. But to the two aspects are closely correlated" (16), closely
enough to assume that semiotic and semiology are but different names for the
same discipline-thus, Peirce and Saussure are, at bottom, engaged in
similar endeavors. In explicit opposition to Guiraud, Liszka contends, "The
only way in which the logical or formal view of semeiotic and the empirical
one would be compatible is if the empirical and the formal were treated as
the same thing" (16). But this would allegedly lead to psychologism, the
reduction of necessary logical laws and principles to purely eontingent
psychologieal facts. Peirce' s anti-psychologism is unquestionable. Yet does
this stance require the kind of formalism Liszka attributes to Peirce? In

Reviews

439

envlsloning semelotlc as a formal and normative discipline, is Peirce

defining it in such thoroughgoing opposition to empirical and observational
disciplines? Liszka appears to suppose that Peirce was doing so. But, in
rightly stressing the anti-psychologistic orientation of Peircean semeiotic,
Liszka dubiously argues that the formal and the empirical cannot be made
compatible without lapsing into psychologism (16). But is there not a clear
sense in which Peirce' s semeiotic is both formal and empirical without being
psychologistic?
The section contrasting Peirce and Saussure unintentionally reminds the
reader of how much Liszka not only takes Peirce on his own terms but also
treats hirn in relative isolation from riyal theorists. This has the advantage
of allowing the author to offer a streamlined, focused exposition, but the
disadvantage of not exploiting opportunities to exhibit the scope, power, or
fecundity of Peirce's reflections on signs. For the reach, force, and
fruitfulness of Peirce's semeiotic only comes into sharp focus when his
theory is compared to other approaches.
The remaining chapters simply follow Peirce' s threefold division ofsign
theory, chapter 2 being devoted to "Semeiotic Grammar," chapter 3 to
"Critical Logic," and chapter 4 to "Universal Rhetoric." Each of these
chapters is finely conceived and carefully wrought; and each contains
valuable information and not infrequently felicitous formulations ofdifficult
ideas.
Hence, quite diverse audiences, ranging from those unfamiliar with
Peirce' s semeiotic to scholars who have devoted their lives to studying him,
are likely to find this book illuminating and insightful. For the serious
student of Peirce, Jak6b Liszka' s A General Introduction to the Semeiotic 0/
Charles Sanders Peirce deserves a place on one' s shelf, along side the works
of David Savan, Joseph Ransdell, T. L. Short, Michael Shapiro, Thomas
Olshewsky, John Deely, and only a handful of others. Moreover, for the
person trying for the first time to enter into the labyrinth of Peirce's
semeiotic, Liszka' s study is a valuable map. The invaluable writings of
Savan, Short, and Shapiro on Peircean semeiotic remain the best introductions, even given Liszka's meritorious addition to this secondary literature.
The principal virtue of this study is also, however, its main deficiency.
In chapter 1 ("The Discipline of Semeiotic"), the author in effect disciplines
bis subject, both in the sense of the subject matter and in that of the subject
or person with whom he is concerned. This becomes apparent in the very
first sentence of the opening chapter: "In one of the more straightforward
definitions of semeiotic, Charles Sanders Peirce describes it simply as the
formal doctrine of signs" (2). Liszka turns immediately to Peirce's abstract

440

Reviews

definition of a formal discipline: "Aformal discipline is," in his paraphrase

of Peirce, "one that aims at discerning the necessary conditions for the
subject it studies" (1). These two definitions provide the controlling
assumptions of this interpretive study.
But Peirce offered countless definitions of this deliminable area of
disciplined inquiry, not all of which pull so decisively in a formalist
direction. In addition, he began pragmatically and phenomenologically, not
abstractly and definitionally. So the place to begin a presentation of Peirce' s
semeiotic would seem to be not with any one ofhis formal definitions ofthis
discipline, nor even his more abstract characterizations of semiosis (or signactivity), but with his phenomenological deiimitation of the field of inquiry
(the survey ofthe field which prompted Peirce to characterize hirnself as "a
backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up" this field, one he
found "too vast ... for a first-corner"). This delimitation would itself begin
with the range of phenomena we ordinarily subsurne under the rubric of sign
or sign activity. Of even greater significance, the direction in which such an
exposition should drive, if the exposition is to envision semeiotic as Peirce
hirnself envisioned it, is explicitly pragmatic definitions, classifications, or
typologies ofthe varieties of sign functions. Liszka certainly does not ignore
the pragmatic character ofPeirce's general theory of sign functions; he not
only acknowledges its importance but also elucidates just why and where
this dimension of Peirce' s semeiotic merits emphasis.
Unfortunately, Liszka' s controlling assumptions go a great distance
toward insuring that the formalist tendencies in Peirce eclipse his pragmatic
orientation. Peirce's early indebtedness to Kant is, accordingly, allowed to
eclipse his eventual resemblance to Hege!. This interpretive strategy can
however work against a developmental understanding of an author' s
complete oeuvre, by freezing Peirce in time such that no other development
or manifestation of philosophic principles can emerge. I would add that
speculative grammar as a formal discipline (the first branch of semeiotic)
tends to eclipse speculative rhetoric as a heuristic study (the third branch),
even though the author of this study is a careful, informed student of the
history of rhetoric and Peirce's place within that history. Following in a
fashion the traditional trivium of the medieval university (9), Peirce divides
semeiotic into grammar, logic, and rhetoric. But the principal preoccupation
of the third branch of Peircean semeiotic is the generation of interpretants,
especially in the context of objective inquiry where the defining aim is the
attainment of truth (see, for example, 79). Thus it is, not surprising that
Peirce supposed that this branch of semeiotic is "the highest and most living
branch of logic," when logic is conceived as equivalent to semeiotic (78).

Reviews

441

Peirce's semeiotic is first and foremost an integrated set of heuristic clues,

designed to facilitate most directly the investigation of "the essential nature
and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis," but also crafted to assist the
investigation of any subject whatsoever (see, for example, 7-9). It is a
discipline framed by and for an inquirer. Its main value is not to solidify or
consolidate the results of previous investigations as to open and expand
fields of potentially fmitful inquiry. On this reading, the historieal,
pragmatic, phenomenological, and heuristic dimensions of Peirce's
semeiotic stand out in bold relief, while the formal, abstract, disciplinary,
and scientistic are downplayed. Even for such a reading, Liszka's book is
useful, despite the fact that it pulls so strongly in the opposite direction of
this more pragmatic, rhetorical (less formalist, "grammatical") interpretation.
A more pragmatic, rhetorical approach to Peirce tends to highlight the
contextual, historical features of semiosis. In The Sense ofChange, Michael
Shapiro quotes Manuscript 290 (1905): a symbol "may have a mdimentary
life, so that it can have a history, and gradually undergo a great change of
meaning, while preserving acertain self-identity." It is often permissible and
even perhaps obligatory to abstract from the life and history constitutive of
symbols and arguable other kinds of signs and, then, to frame abstract
definitions upon the basis of these deliberate abstractions. Mathematics,
logic, and large tracts of phenomenological investigation depend upon such
definitions and thus such abstractions. But these definitions are crafted and
these abstractions are made for a purpose, one definitive of a context of
engagement (including the engagements definitive of inquirers). Thus,
pragmatism does not reject but encompasses formalism; however, it insists
upon interpreting the forms of thought (and indeed all else) contextually,
hence historically and culturally.
In a memoir of his mentor, Norman Malcolm recollects Ludwig
Wittgenstein saying in conversation that an expression only has meaning in
the stream of life. Peirce would have insisted that this must always be
conceived as an ongoing stream in which established and consolidated
usages are 'modifiable in light of the emergent exigencies of our historical
involvements. The goal ofPeirce's semeiotic is to see human semiosis as an
inseparable part of an ongoing stream of human engagement and, indeed, to
see this stream itself as a part of nature. Semiosis in its most mdimentary
forms is a natural process and, in its most sophisticated embodiments, a
historical practice in which autonomous agents exercise appropriate levels
of control over what they think, do, and even to some extent over what they
fee!.

442

Reviews

James Liszka in effect assumes that in order to get beyond Peirce it is

necessary to catch up to this complex and often elusive genius. He has taken
great pains to help us catch up to Peirce. One frequently senses that Peirce
is indeed living in this tex~, "involved in the interpretation of his own
material." If those of us who are also familiar with Peirce' s writings suppose
that the tensions, ambivalences, divided purposes, divergent tendencies and
perhaps even the contradictions in Peirce's investigation of signs should be
given a more central place in our interpretive efforts, this points to the need
of making the rhetorical dimension of philosopbical hermeneutics, along
with the speculative rhetoric of Peircean semeiotic, a more central concern.
Pragmatic questions regarding our interpretive aims demand deliberate
consideration. In particular, the controlling purpose of the pragmatic
interpreter should not be to discipline its subject, but rather to join the author
being explicated. Peirce' s thought is indeed far more coherent than the state
of his writings readily allows us to glimpse. Herein lies the great value of A
General Introduction to the Semeiotic 0/ Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce is,
however, more exciting and useful, because more unfettered and even wild,
than informed, sympathetic, but formalist interpreters help us to appreciate.
Herein lies the main weakness of this book.

Vincent Colapietro, Pennsylvania State University

On the Emotions, by Richard Wollheim

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. $25.95 (cloth). 282 pp.
At the outset of On the Emotions, Richard Wollheim asks the question,
"How do emotions fit into the general scheme of mental phenomena?"
Before proposing an answer to tbis question, he sketches a very. general
account of mental phenomena as divisible into two broad categories, mental
states and mental dispositions. In connection with the latter category, he
advocates what he describes as the "repsychologization of mental dispositions." In other words, he affmns the reality ofmental dispositions as entities
in their own right wholly apart from the associated mental states. He
underscores the point that this repsychologization is in marked contrast to
views endorsed by such figures as Gilbert Ryle, who maintain that so-called
mental dispositions are wholly explainable in terms of mental states, that