Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 1526

January 31, 2005

NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIANO S. HERNANDEZ,

JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. GO, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For our resolution is the verified letter-complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Jose C. Go dated
June 23, 1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased). Both parties are from Zamboanga
City.
The allegations in the letter-complaint are:

Ads By softonicSometime in 1961, complainants husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano S.
Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her husbands numerous creditors demanded payments of his
loans. Fearful that the various mortgage contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and
aware of impending suits for sums of money against her, complainant engaged the legal services
of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent.
Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and social
humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P
at City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute
deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration. Complainant agreed on
condition that he would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors.
Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in City, which were
mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he
convinced her to execute deeds of sale involving those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent
became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to complainant.
Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon.
Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name,
depriving her of her real properties worth millions.
1a\^/phi 1.ne t

In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was required to file his comment on the
complaint.

Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint is premature since there is pending before the then Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City Civil Case No. 17812for recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of deeds of
sale filed by complainant against him involving the subject lots.
On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying respondents motion and requiring him to
submit his answer.
In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the allegations in the instant complaint.
He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainants lots to various buyers, including himself, for
valuable consideration. On several occasions, he extended financial assistance to complainant and
even invited her to live with his family. His children used to call her "Lola" due to her frequent visits to
his residence. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and 26 days that the OSG filed a motion to
refer the instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies of complainants witnesses and
the submission of its report and recommendation.
On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A. Navarro,
Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Discipline, is quoted as follows:

Ads By softonic"A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties showed
that all the properties of the complainant are presently owned by the respondent by virtue of several
deeds of sale executed by the complainant in favor of the respondent without monetary
consideration except Lot 849-D situated in Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the
complainant on September 5, 1974.
It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who notarized the documents involving
the said properties redeemed or repurchased by the complainant from her creditors which ended up
in respondents name like in the deed of sale executed by Dejerano in favor of Hernandez over
Lots 1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Masrahon on September 3,
1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of absolute sale executed by Esperat over the Curuan
properties on November 9, 1971 and the cancellation of the mortgage executed byEnriquez on
July 18, 1964 over the Claudio properties.
The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to his having discussed,
advised and gave solutions to complainants legal problems and liabilities to her creditors and even
requested her creditors for extension of time to pay complainants accounts constitute practice of law
as legal counsel for consultation aside from representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of
a lawyer-client relations between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent.
It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the complainant on how
he paid complainants creditors without selling her properties. Instead of selling to buyers at higher
price, he paid them out of his own funds; then later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of

complainants properties in utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the
respondent concerning the value of the said sale of complainants properties.
As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation and duty as
complainants legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting complainants properties in his name and
possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member be furnished a copy of the
same for implementation hereof, subject to the approval of the Members of the Board of
Governors."
On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-39 adopting and
approving the Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in the sense that the
recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to
three (3) years.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility. However, we have to modify its recommended penalty.
l^vvphi1 .net

1a\^/ phi1. net

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source of ethical rules for lawyers
in this jurisdiction, provides:
"A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession."
Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself complainants lots entrusted to
him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a
dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment.3 Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name and
honor of the legal profession. He violated this Courts mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach.4
Canon 17 of the same Code states:
"A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him."
The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and confidence in herein
respondent, that when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed
him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors.
Respondent, however, abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others
but to himself and spent his own money to pay her obligations. As correctly observed by
Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report
to the complainant on how much he sold the latters lots and the amounts paid to her creditors.
Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records show
that she did not receive any amount from respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully
and honestly in his duty as complainants counsel.

Undoubtedly, respondents conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has
definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly
immoral acts. We have been exacting in our demand for integrity and good moral character of
members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession5 and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.6Membership in the
legal profession is a privilege.7 And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also
the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.8 Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his integrity
as a member of the Bar, but also the legal profession.
Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and ability to protect the
interests of his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects
his clients cause; he also serves the ends of justice and does honor to the bar and helps maintain
the respect of the community to the legal profession.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession. 9
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. 10
In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos ,11 we ordered the disbarment of lawyer when he deceived his 85-year
old aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later refused to return the same despite demand.
In Navarro vs. Meneses III ,12 we disbarred a member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to account
for the P50,000.00 he received from a client to settle a case. In Docena vs. Limson ,13 we expelled
from the brotherhood of lawyers, an attorney who extorted money from his client through deceit and
misrepresentation. In Busios vs. Ricafort ,14 an attorney was stripped of his license to practice law
for misappropriating his clients money.
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too
light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire
the latters properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the
need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal
profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is DISBARRED
from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., on official leave.

Footnotes

Rollo, pp. 25-26.

On January 19, 1990, Civil Case No. 1781 was decided by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 15,
against the respondent. The Deeds of Sale executed in favor of respondent covering Lots 848-A-1, Lots 849-P and 849Q, Lots 2118 and 2129, Lots 1141-A and B were declared null and void for being simulated. The certificates of title issued
in the names of the respondent and his children were ordered cancelled and respondent was ordered to reconvey the
properties and all the improvements thereon to the complainant (Records, Vol. III, pp. 75-114). On appeal, docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 27310, the Appellate Court rendered its Decision affirming with modification the trial courts judgment
(Records, Vol. III, pp. 150-179).
3
Whitson vs. Atienza, A.C. No. 5535 , August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 10, 15, citing Osop vs. Fontanilla , 365 SCRA 398
(2001).
4
Gatchalian Promotions Talent Pool, Inc. vs. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017 , September 29, 1999, 315 SCRA 406, 417,
citing Resurrecion vs. Sayson , 300 SCRA 129 (1998).
5
Sipin-Nabor vs. Baterina, A.C. No. 4073 , June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 6; Eustaquio, et al. vs. Rimorin, A.C. No. 5081 ,
March 24, 2003, citing Tapucar vs. Tapucar, 355 Phil. 66, 74 (1998).
6
Manalang, et al. vs. Atty. Francisco F. Angeles, supra, citing Maligsa vs. Cabanting ,272 SCRA 408, 413 (1997).
7
Lao vs. Medel, A.C. No. 5916 , July 1, 2003, citing Dumadag vs. Lumaya , 334 SCRA 513 (2000), Arrieta vs. Llosa, 346
Phil. 932 (1997), NBI vs. Reyes , 326 SCRA 109 (2000); Eustaquio, et al. vs. Rimorin, supra.
8
Eustaquio, et al. vs. Rimorin, supra, citing In Re: Almacen, No. L-27654, 31 SCRA 562, 601-602 (1970);In
Re:Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24 (1920); In Re: Sotto, 38 Phil. 532, 549 (1918).
9
People vs. Tuned, 181 SCRA 692 (1990); Lead vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 (1992).
10
Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Occea, 433 Phil. 138, 155 (2002)
11
A.M. No. 2884, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 93.
12
CBD Adm. Case No. 313, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 586.
13
A.C. No. 2387, September 10, 1998, 295 SCRA 262.
14
A.C. No. 4349, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 407.
2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 5739

September 12, 2007

PANGASINAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE I (PANELCO I)

represented by its GM, ROLANDO O. REINOSO,Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN AYAR GARCIA, MONTEMAYOR, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I (PANELCO I)
charging Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor with negligence in handling the cases assigned to him

which caused unwarranted financial losses to the complainant, approximately in the total amount of
sixteen million pesos (PhP 16,000,000).
Records show that for several years, PANELCO I, a rural electric cooperative with principal office
address atBrgy. San Jose, Bani, Pangasinan, retained the services of Atty. Juan Ayar
Montemayor as its counsel.
In its July 22, 2002 Complaint, PANELCO I stated that while acting as counsel for the cooperative,
respondent was negligent in handling its cases, alleging the following:

Ads By softonic4. One of the cases assigned to Atty. Montemayor was Civil Case No. 17315
filed with the Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68, entitled "Rural Power Corporation
vs. PANELCO I." After the trial court rendered a Decision adverse to PANELCO I, it was
decided that the case be appealed to the Court of Appeals;
5. However, the Court of Appeals ordered the Dismissalof the appeal for the failure
of Atty. Montemayor to serve and file the required number of copies within the time
provided by the Rules of Court. (copy of the Writ of Execution in Civil Case No. 1715
attached as Annex "A");
6. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the Decision of the trial court became final and
executory, and the judgment award in the amount of Two Million One Hundred Seventy Nine
Thousand Two Hundred Nine and 18/100 Pesos (P2,179,209.18) was paid by the
complainant;
7. Another case assigned to Atty. Montemayor was the case of "Engineering
and Corporation of Asia (ECCO-ASIA) vs. PANELCO I," filed with the Court of Quezon
City, Branch 83 as Civil Case No. Q-89-4242. Again, the decision was appealed by
PANELCO I to the Court of Appeals, through Atty. Montemayor;
8. In a Resolution dated May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals considered the
appeal Abandoned due to the failure of Atty. Montemayor to serve and file the required
Appellant's Brief despite the lapse of the two extensions of time granted. A copy of the
said Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV67614 is attached as Annex "B," as well as the Notice of
Garnishment (Annex "B-1") and Writ of Execution (Annex "B-2");
9. Thus, the funds of PANELCO I deposited in banks were garnished until the judgment
award was paid to the Plaintiff ECCO-ASIA, in the amount of Thirteen Million Eight Hundred
Thirty Six Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Six and 25/100 Pesos (P13,836,676.25);
10. Sometime last year, Atty. Montemayor informed the undersigned (complainant) of the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and that he had filed his appeal;
11. Upon receipt of the Notice of Garnishments on March 11, 2002, I (complainant)
confronted Atty. Montemayor on the matter, and he uttered "napabayaan ko itong kaso...ano
ang gagawin natin";
12. As a consequence of the negligence of Atty. Montemayor, the complainant was forced to
settle with the Plaintiffs without the benefit of an approved time-table, and is presently in a

dire financial situation, which has caused difficulty in meeting its monthly power bills with the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).1
In a Resolution dated September 4, 2002, the respondent was required to file his Comment on the
administrative charges within ten (10) days from notice. He subsequently filed with this Court a
Motion for Extension of Time to File his Comment; however, despite an extension of fifteen (15) days
from the expiration of the original period given by the Court, respondent failed to file his Comment.

Ads By softonicThus, the Court, in its April 12, 2004 Resolution, declared respondent to have WAIVED
the filing of Comment on the Complaint. The Court also referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision. 2
At the mandatory conference held before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent
admitted all the allegations in the Complaint, particularly the fact that he failed to attend to the appeal
of complainant's cases.3
On November 11, 2004, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her Report and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and recommending his disbarment from law practice. The salient portion of the Report reads:
The records also show that respondent Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor did not even bother to answer
the complaint nor present his defense, we are now constrained to impose sanctions on his gross
negligence as counsel for complainant which resulted [in] the damage of PANELCO I. Considering
further that the charges remain uncontroverted, it is recommended that Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor
be DISBARRED from the practice of law for Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On March 12, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed CBD Resolution No. XVI-2005-68 adopting
with modification the aforequoted Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the abovetitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondents gross negligence, as counsel for complainant which resulted [in] the damage of
PANELCO I, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice
of law.4
The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not respondent committed gross
negligence or misconduct in mishandling complainants cases on appeal, which eventually led to
their dismissal, to the prejudice of the complainant.
After a careful consideration of the records of the instant case, the Court agrees with the IBP in its
findings and conclusion that respondent has been remiss in his responsibilities.
The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO
ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
xxxx

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxx
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF THE LAW.
Manifestly, respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member
of the Bar in relation to his client. As counsel for complainant, respondent had the duty to present
every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect his client. When he undertook his clients
cause, he made a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution until its final conclusion.
He should undertake the task with dedication and care, and if he should do no less, then he is not
true to his lawyer's oath.5
The records of this case clearly show that respondent failed to live up to his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the legal profession. The appeals of his client, the petitioner, were
dismissed due to his improper way of filing the appeal in Civil Case No. 17315 and his non-filing of
the appellants brief in Civil Case No. Q-89-4242. Respondent did not offer a plausible explanation
for not doing his level best in representing his clients cause on appeal; thus, making complainant
suffer serious losses.
There is no doubt that it was part of respondents obligation to complainant, as the latters counsel of
record in the civil cases, to prosecute with assiduousness said cases on appeal in order to
safeguard complainant's rights, but it was respondents negligence or omission which has caused
damage to such interests.
As held in Aromin v. Atty. Boncavil:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his

client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of
the community to the legal profession.6
In Redentor S. Jardin v. Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr.,7 the Court also held that:
[T]he trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard
and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every case a
lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free. Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth
his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethargy from
the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.
Thus, for inexcusable neglect of his professional obligations to the prejudice of his clients interests,
the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of respondent from the practice
of law. The IBP Board of Governors, however, recommended that Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor be
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
It is settled that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and as a member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.8
In the case of Jardin v. Villar, Jr.,9 the Court cited several cases where lawyers were suspended for a
period of six (6) months from the practice of law for their failure to file briefs or other pleadings for
their respective clients.10
The case of Atty. Montemayor is however different. He is guilty not only of his unjustified failure to
file the appellants brief of his client not only once but twice. Moreover the Court notes with dismay
the huge losses suffered by complainant PANELCO I in the total amount of sixteen million pesos
(PhP 16,000,000). Lastly, Atty. Montemayor demonstrated an utter lack of regard for the very
serious charges against him and a gross disrespect for the Court when he failed to file his comment
after being required to file his response to the said charges. Respondent could have presented
sufficient justification for his inability to file the appellants briefs but failed to do so.
1wphi 1

In view of the forgoing circumstances, we find that Atty. Montemayor does not deserve anymore to
remain as an active member of the legal profession. The breaches of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the palpable sloth and irresponsibility he has demonstrated in handling the cases
of his client undeniably reveal that he has become more of a liability than an asset to the legal
profession. He cannot be entrusted anymore with the sacred duty and responsibility to protect the
interests of any prospective client. If he is then allowed to resume his law practice after suspension,
this will surely subvert the ends of justice, dishonor the bar, and lose the respect of society for the
profession of law. The Court will not allow this affront to pass.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED from the practice of law.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 2-3.
2
Id. at 19.
3
TSN, July 22, 2004, pp. 11-12.
4
Notice of Resolution, p. 1.
5
Tahaw v. Vitan, A.C. No. 6441, October 21, 2004.
6
A.C. No. 5135, September 22, 1999.
7
A.C. No. 5474, August 28, 2003.
8
Jimenez v. Jimenez, A.C. No. 6712, February 6, 2006; Dominador Burbe v. Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002.
9
Supra.
10
Sps. Rabanal v. Rabanal, A.C. No. 1372, June 27, 2002; Aromin v. Boncavil, supra.; Sps.
Galen v. Paguinigan , A.C. No. 5558, March 7, 2002;

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

ADM. CASE No. 4809

SPOUSES WILLIAM ADECER and TERESITA P.
ADECER, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL AKUT, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for disbarment filed by William and Teresita Adecer (complainants)
against Attorney Emmanuel A. Akut (respondent).

Ads By softonicThe instant petition is an offshoot of Criminal Case No. 72790 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. William Adecer and Teresita Adecer" in which complainants were charged with
committing a crime punishable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (Other Deceits), before
the Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro, Branch No. 5 (MTCC). Respondent was their legal counsel in
the criminal case.
On 25 March 1997, respondent received a copy of the MTCCs Decision 1 dated 12 March 1997
convicting complainants of Deceits and sentencing them to the penalty of arresto mayor2and a fine
of not less than P30,000.00.3 Complainants were also ordered to pay civil liability in the form of
damages and attorneys fees totaling P66,000.00 to the private respondents in the criminal case. 4 On
26 March 1997, the Decision was promulgated in the absence of the complainants, who were
accorded due notice. Complainants received a copy of theDecision via registered mail on 4 April
1997. Respondent received an additional copy of the Decision on even date.
Respondent had fifteen (15) days from 25 March 1997, or until 9 April 1997, to file either an
appeal5 or a petition for probation6 in behalf of the complainants. However, it was only on 16 May
1997 over a month after theDecision had become final and executory that respondent filed a
Petition for Probation.
The MTCC issued a Writ of Execution On 19 May 1997. The next day, a warrant of arrest was
served on complainants7 and they were incarcerated.8
On 28 May 1997, respondent filed a Memorandum in Support of the Petition
for Probation stating, "[i]mmediately upon her receipt of a copy of the decision,
accused Adecer contacted [her] lawyer but [her] lawyer was out of town during that time and so,
while waiting for her lawyer to come home, she raised the required amount necessary to pay the civil
indemnity awarded in the decision." 9 Respondent explained that complainantAdecer raised the
money in the belief that an application for probation would not be granted unless all monetary
awards are paid in full.10 Respondent recounted that it was only on 16 May 1997, when
complainant Teresitaapproached him and handed to him the money for the settlement of the civil
liability, that he informed her that the application for probation should have been filed within the
period for appeal.
The Petition for Probation was denied through a Resolution dated 7 June 1997. The MTCC held
that the law does not permit the grant of probation after the lapse of the period for filing an
appeal.11 With regard to respondents allegation that he was out of town during the period for filing an
appeal, the MTCC examined the calendars of various courts and ascertained that respondent had
scheduled and attended hearings before several courts in Cagayan de Oro during said period.

This prompted the MTCC to comment, "[t]he court does not know if defense counsel suffered a
sudden lack of vitamins to make him forget his duties towards his clients." 12 It appears that
complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration with an Atty. Rogelio Zosa Bagabuyo as pro
bonocounsel for the complainants.13 The motion was denied through a Resolution dated 30 June
1997.

Ads By softonicThe records also reflect that complainants filed a pleading entitled Motions to Recall
Writ of Execution and for a Second Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court dated 21
June 1997.14 In answer to "insinuations" in said pleading, respondent, as former counsel of the
complainants, filed a Manifestation dated 30 June 1997. He claimed therein that the complainants
only had themselves to blame for failing to file a timely petition for probation. Allegedly, the
complainants failed to comply with an agreement with respondent that they would immediately go to
respondents office to discuss the steps to be taken should they receive an adverse decision.
Respondent claimed that during the time complainants desisted from approaching him, he could not
make a choice in behalf of the complainants between the remedy of appeal and the benefits of
probation. He recounted that complainants came to his office only on 9 May 1997, a month after the
decision had become final and executory, with money to pay for the civil liability. He asked them to
return the next day, but they returned only on 16 May 1997 after he "sent somebody to fetch them on
several occasion[s]."15
On 29 July 1997, while serving their sentence at the Lumbia Detention and Rehabilitation Center,
complainants filed the instant administrative case praying that respondent be disbarred and ordered
to reimburse complainants of expenses, with interest and damages.16
1avvphil.net

In his Comment dated 22 February 1998, respondent reiterated his account in the Memorandum in
Support of the Petition for Probation dated 28 May 1997 on why a timely petition for probation was
not filed. However, his explanation evolved somewhat since the last time. This time, he stated that
complainants deliberately failed to meet with him seasonably for the signing of the verification of the
Petition for Probation.17 On the MTCCs finding that respondent appeared before Cagayan de Oro
courts during the period to file an appeal, he retorted that he moved for the postponement of most of
these hearings and attended only the more important ones.18 He explained that he was out of his
office most of the time because starting February 1997, he and his wife were always out of town
looking for faith healers to cure the malignant brain tumor of his wife, who succumbed to the cancer
on 1 August 1997.19 Allegedly, after attending the "important" hearings, he immediately went out of
town seeking faith healers.20
The instant case was referred by this Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.21 On 29 October 2003, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E.
Reyes filed a Manifestation before this Court reporting that the records of the case were lost due to a
carnapping incident.
On 7 November 2003, the records of the case were reconstituted. Stipulations were made and the
parties agreed that the case would be deemed submitted for decision upon their filing of their
respective Supplemental Position Papers.22 Furthermore, despite complainants several allusions to
deceit on the part of respondent, the parties agreed on a single issue for resolution, i.e., whether
respondent is administratively liable for a violating the principles of legal ethics and the Code of
Professional Responsibility in filing the Petition for Probation beyond the reglementary period. 23
In his Report and Recommendation dated 15 July 2005, Commissioner Reyes found that respondent
failed to exercise the proper diligence in dealing with the case of his clients and recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month and admonished henceforth to
be more careful in the performance of his duties to his clients. The IBP Board of Governors resolved

to adopt and approve the findings of Commissioner Reyes with the modification that respondent
instead be suspended for six (6) months. The case is now on review by this Court pursuant to
Section 12 (b), Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court.24
We affirm the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and adopt the recommendation of the
Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.25 He shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.26 Nor shall he neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.27
Respondent is bound by the representations he made in his Memorandum in Support of the Petition
for Probation, i.e., that a timely petition for probation was not filed due to the fact that he was out of
town and that complainants were laboring under the misapprehension that the civil liability must be
paid in full before probation could be availed of. Either of his two "explanations" is enough ground to
render him liable for negligence under the Code of Professional Conduct. First, despite his receipt of
a copy of the Decision and the consequent running of the fifteen (15)-day period to file a petition for
probation, respondent went out of town without contacting complainants to give them proper legal
advice. Furthermore, his admission that complainants were [1] under the impression that they first
had to pay off their civil liabilities prior to filing a petition for probation and [2] unaware that they had
only fifteen (15) days from their counsels receipt of a copy of the decision to file their petition, proves
that he failed to give complainants timely legal advise.
We consider first the implications of respondents allegation that he was out of town as his
justification to the MTCC for failing to file a timely petition.
At the outset, it must be remembered that respondent was given a copy of the Decision while he was
in town. Surely, he could have addressed his clients need during that time. At the very least, he
should have made room in his schedule to confer with complainants on what course of action to take
in furtherance of their cause and to prepare the necessary legal moves toward such end.
Furthermore, respondent was not away for the entirety of the crucial period and could have attended
to his clients needs during the instances he was in Cagayan de Oro. And even if respondent had left
town during the entire fifteen (15)-day period, in this age of cellular phones, long distance telephone
accessibility, and even overnight mail delivery, it is highly unlikely that respondent would not be able
to attend to his clients needs were he so inclined. He could at least have found a way to speak to
his clients to inform them regarding the short window within which to file their petition. He could even
have prepared a petition and mailed the same to his clients in order that they could sign it and
themselves file it in court; or as intimated by the MTCC, he could have filed a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for probation.28
There are many ways to provide proper representation for his clients and many things which
respondent could have done that would give this Court the impression that he had the least bit of
concern for his clients cause. But nothing of the sort was presented by respondent. Since he is
primarily responsible for filing the vital pleading that would have made possible for his clients to avail
of probation, we find that respondents omission is a culpable act of negligence for which he must be
held liable.
Furthermore, when the MTCC decided to take judicial notice of his scheduled hearings within
Cagayan de Oro to expose his lie, respondent "explained" that he was in town to attend some of the
more "important hearings" but was out of town most of the time. Aside from the fact that respondent

had attempted to deceive the court by initially stating without qualification that he was out of town, he
later on uttered words which reveal his notion that some of his cases were more important, and
therefore, given more immediate attention than others. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, skill and competence, regardless of his impression that one case or hearing is more
important than the other.29
Respondent has attached a death certificate showing that his wife died from cardiac arrest close to
the period in question. We commiserate with respondent for the loss of his wife, and appreciate fully
that during the period of a mans existence when the sense of mortality and loss is most closely felt
more then ever, it would appear that no responsibility is more important than tending to loved ones.
However, such is the lawyers charge that no personal consideration should stand in the way of
performing a legal duty.30 In these situations, it is only fair that a lawyer should lighten his case load
lest he prejudice his clients cases.
We have held that the failure of an attorney to file a timely motion for reconsideration or an appeal
renders him liable for negligence under the Code of Professional Responsibility.31 In the instant case,
the negligence exhibited by the respondent is made more grievous by the fact that the Decision to
be acted upon is one that subjects his clients to incarceration. The liberty of ones clients is not to be
taken lightly, whether the sentence is for destierroor reclusion perpetua. Litigants entrust their
properties, liberties, and even lives, in the hands of their lawyers, who must protect these values with
utmost zeal and vigilance.
What compounds respondents negligence is his indifference to complainants plight. He abruptly
dismissed his failure to communicate with complainants by stating that, "even if [complainants]
house is near respondents office, yet respondent does not know [where] their house [is] as he ha[s]
never gone to said house. It has never been the practice of respondent to visit his clients in their
home. It must be the client who must go to him."32
Respondents choice to be oblivious to his clients place of residence is his prerogative. This,
however, neither excuses nor explains why he was unable to contact his clients by telephone or
cellular phone to properly advise them of their legal options. Furthermore, in adopting this style of
dealing with clients, respondent takes the obvious risk of being incapable of contacting his clients
during crucial periods. He should, thus, be prepared to be held in the event that his manner of
dealing with clients results in the latters being deprived of remedies to which they would otherwise
be entitled, for it is the duty of an attorney to advise his client promptly whenever he has any
information which is important that the client receive.33
To cover his own inattention, respondent even blamed his clients for their ignorance by stating that
they were under the wrong impression that the civil liability should be paid in full before they could
ask for probation. The laymens lack of knowledge of substantive and procedural law is the exact
reason why they hire the services of counsel. It was counsels responsibility to look after the welfare
of his clients by communicating with them to determine whether they would take the avenue of an
appeal or a petition for probation and to thereafter prepare and file the relevant pleading.
We note the IBP Investigating Commissioners observation that complainants themselves did not
show much interest in their own case. Indeed, complainants did not attend hearings of their case;
the decision was promulgated in their absence; during trial, complainants were thrice ordered
arrested for their failure to attend hearings; thrice, too, respondent had to file a motion for
reconsideration of the orders of arrest. It is true that the client must, with regard to his case, exercise
that standard of case which an ordinary prudent man bestows upon his important
business.34 However, complainants lackadaisical attitude is relevant only with regard to the binding
effect upon them of the lapse of the fifteen (15)-day period and their loss of the fight to file the

petition for probation. The instant administrative proceeding concerns respondents omission, not
those of his clients.
The lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner and he should
provide a quality of services at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a
competent lawyer in the like situation.35 By agreeing to be his clients counsel, he represents that he
will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the
character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests and take all steps or
do all acts necessary therefor, and his client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations
diligently.36 Respondent has failed to measure up to his oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Emmanuel A. Akut is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months and ADMONISHED henceforth to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties to his clients, with the caveat that commission of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Asscociate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

Penned by Judge Ernesto Gabor Malferrari of the Cagayan de Oro MTCC, Branch 5.
Four months and one day to six months.
3
Complainants were sentenced to the penalty of Arresto Mayor (Four Months and One Day to Six Months) and a fine not
less than P30,000.00. Rollo, p. 46.
4
On the civil aspect of the case, complainants were ordered to pay the private complainant P30,000.00 by way of moral
damages, P10,000.00 in exemplary damages, P20,000.00 for attorneys fees, and P6,000.00 by way of litigation
expenses, all of which are to earn 6% per annum from date of judgment. Id. at 46.
5
Rule 40, Section 2.
6
Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the
trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal place the defendant on probation.
7
Rollo, Folder I, p. 4.
8
See Id. at 169.
9
Id. at 15.
10
Id. at 15.
11
Citing Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384, (1996).
12
Rollo, Folder I, p. 9.
13
See Id. at 2.
14
Id. at 19.
15
Rollo, Folder I, p. 20.
2

16

Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
18
Id. at 38.
19
Id. at 60. Notably, however, the cause of death indicated in the Certificate of Death is cardiac arrest; id. at p. 72.
20
Id. at 38.
21
Through a Resolution dated 15 November 1999; id. at 80.
22
Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes, p. 12.
23
Id.
24
Section 12 x x x
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the record of the case, shall forthwith be terminated to the Supreme
Court for final action.
25
Canon 18, Code of Professional Responsibility.
26
Rule 18.02, Code of Professional Responsibility.
27
Rule 18.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.
28
Rollo, Folder I, pp. 11 and 12.
29
Regardless, too, of whether he accepts it for free or for a fee. See, Santiago et al, v. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103, 7 September
1995, 248 SCRA 68, 75-76.
30
See Alvero v. De la Rosa, 76 Phil, 428, 435 (1946).
31
Adaza v. Barinaga, A.C. No. 1604, 29 May 1981, 104 SCRA 684; Guiang v. Antonio, A.C. No. 2473, 3 February 1993,
218 SCRA 381.
32
Rollo, Folder I p. 37; See also Rollo, Folder II, p. 31.
33
Ruben E. Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct, c. 2001, p.
206, citing Baker v. Humphrey, 101 US 494, 25 L ed 1065 (1979).
34
Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, G.R. No. L-15877, 28 April 1961, 1 SCRA 1138, 1144.
35
ABA, Code of Professional Conduct, p. 8, as cited in Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, c. 1995, p. 200.
36
Ruben E. Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct, c. 2001, p.
192.
17

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 7815

July 23, 2009

DOLORES C. BELLEZA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C. Belleza against
respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical conduct in connection with the
handling of a criminal case involving complainants son.

Ads By softonicOn November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual
friend, Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in connection with the
case of her son, Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Cityearlier that day for alleged
violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165.1Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.

The following day, complainant made a partial payment ofP15,000 to respondent thru their mutual
friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000
balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three
occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a
bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again, respondent did not issue any
receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did not
remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but
respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants son and
complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint 2 for disbarment against respondent in
the Occidental chapter of the Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Attached to the verified complaint was
the affidavit3 of Chua which read:
I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy. Bata, Bacolod City, after
having been sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza [to] Atty. Alan Macasa
when she looked for a lawyer to help her son in the case that the latter is facing
sometime [i]n [the] first week of November 2004;
2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am the one who
facilitated the payment of Mrs. DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan Macasa;
3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from Mrs. Dolores Belleza
as payment for Atty. Alan Macasa:
Date

Amount

November 11, 2004 P15,000.00

A week after
November 18, 2004

10,000.00
5,000.00

4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as Attorneys Fees were

immediately forwarded by me to Atty. [Macasa];
5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth of all the foregoing
statements.
xxx

xxx

x x x4

In a letter dated May 23, 2005,5 the IBP Negros Occidental chapter transmitted the complaint to the
IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).6

In an order dated July 13, 2005,7 the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within 15 days
from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer dated
August 10, 2005,8 simply brushed aside the complaint for being "baseless, groundless and
malicious" without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until
September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.
Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions9 for second and third extensions of time praying to be
given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.
When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006, they were ordered to
submit their respective position papers.10
In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007,11 the CBD ruled that respondent failed to
rebut the charges against him. He never answered the complaint despite several chances to do so.
The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those
others kept by him.
The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was unfit and unworthy of
the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of the bar. The CBD recommended a
suspension of six months with a stern warning that repetition of similar acts would merit a more
severe sanction. It also recommended that respondent be ordered to return to complainant
the P18,000 intended for the provisional liberty of the complainants son and the P30,000 attorneys
fees.
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
CBD with the modification that respondent be ordered to return to complainant only the amount
of P30,000 which he received as attorneys fees.12
We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but we modify the
IBPs recommendation as to the liability of respondent.
Respondent Disrespected
Legal Processes

Ads By softonicRespondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges against him.
Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to answer and refute the accusations of
professional misconduct against him. In doing so, he failed to observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.
Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position paper. His propensity to flout
the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern and disrespect for the proceedings of the CBD.
He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession "to obey the laws
and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities." He displayed insolence not only to the
CBD but also to this Court which is the source of the CBDs authority.
Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not only irresponsible but
also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. 13 His conduct was
unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to
stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court. 14 Respondent should
have known that the orders of the CBD (as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases
against lawyers) were not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with
promptly and completely.15
1avvph !1

Respondent Grossly Neglected

The Cause of His Client
Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. Such undertaking
imposed upon him the following duties:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxx

xxx

xxx

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time,
knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the
interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion
of his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law legally applied.16
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his client with
competence and diligence.17 He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such
relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following
representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers
similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the

litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill
and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary
to adequately safeguard his clients interest.18
1 avvphi 1

A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel and
client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant,
particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers
lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical. 19
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his client by promptly
filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is
specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. 20 However, this right can only
be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer:
... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a
part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is
amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of
the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence.21

[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without counsel, the
right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused
secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of
counsel.22
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn
duty of fidelity to his client.23 Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.24
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his attorneys
fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For
all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of
respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public
Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was
reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional
right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to
secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional right
to bail.
Respondent Failed to Return
His Clients Money

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client. 25
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing
fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client
how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client.26His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if
the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.27
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand.28 His failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by the client.29 It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. 30 Indeed, it may border on the
criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.
Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond to
secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money for its intended purpose yet also
never returned it to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to complainant
despite the latters repeated demands.
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to the P30,000 attorneys
fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for his services is subject to two
requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of
services to the client.31 Thus, a lawyer who does not render legal services is not entitled to attorneys
fees. Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly enriched at the expense of the client, he would also
be rewarded for his negligence and irresponsibility.
Respondent Failed to Uphold the Integrity and Dignity of the Legal Profession
For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed
to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
(emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands for. In so doing, he disregards
the ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. 32 Thus, every lawyer should act and
comport himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.33
Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the money for the bond of
the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his
dealings with his client.34 He failed to live up to his fiduciary duties. By keeping the money for himself
despite his undertaking that he would facilitate the release of complainants son, respondent showed

lack of moral principles. His transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a
shame to the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not only of dishonesty but
also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John Bellezas right to counsel and to bail
under Sections 13 and 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, and for violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and
19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01, 16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza the amounts
of P30,000 andP18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this
decision until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of
payment of the amount within ten days from payment. Failure to do so will subject him to criminal
prosecution.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of the Court Administrator to be furnished
to the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Footnotes
*

On official leave.
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Rollo, pp. 2-5.
3
Annex "A" of the Complaint. Id., p. 6.
4
Id.
5
Id., p. 1.
6
The CBD docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 05-1524.
1
2

Id., p. 8.
Id., pp. 9-10.
9
Dated September 2, 2005 and October 4, 2005, respectively. Id., pp. 16-17 and 21-22, respectively.
10
Order dated April 19, 2006. Id., p. 27.
Despite receipt by the parties of the order, no position paper was filed. Hence, the investigating commissioner
resolved the case based on the pleadings and papers available to him.
11
Prepared and signed by CBD Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag. Id., pp. 32-36.
12
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-182 dated October 12, 2007.
13
Sibulo v. Ilagan, A.C. No. 4711, 25 November 2004, 486 Phil. 197 (2004).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, 3 February 2005, 450 SCRA 406.
17
See Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
18
Islas v. Platon, 47 Phil. 162 (1924).
19
See Villaflores v. Limos, A.C. No. 7504, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 140.
20
See Section 14(2), Article III, Constitution.
21
People v. Molina, 423 Phil. 637 (2001).
22
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 US 365 (1986) cited in People v. Liwanag, 415 Phil. 271 (2001).
23
Callangan v. People, G.R. No. 153414, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 269 citing People v. Ferrer, 454 Phil. 431 (2003).
24
Id.
25
See Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
26
In re Nueno, 48 Phil. 178 (1948).
27
See Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, 349 Phil. 520 (1998).
28
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall
have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
29
Pentecostes v. Ibaez, 363 Phil. 624 (1999).
30
Id.
31
Arce v. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 570 (1935).
32
Ducat v. Villalon, 392 Phil. 394 (2000).
33
Id.
34
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
8

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7902

March 31, 2009

TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Ads By softonicAt bar is a Motion for Reconsideration,1 dated, October 21, 2008 filed by respondent
Godwin R. Valdez (Valdez), praying that the September 30, 2008 decision of this Court disbarring
him from the practice of law be reconsidered by remanding the records of the case to the Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Commission onDiscipline. He further prays that the IBP Commission
onDiscipline be directed to receive his Answer, evidence and Position Paper and thereafter, that
he be absolved of the charges against him and that his name be reinstated in the Rollof Attorneys.2

We have previously decided in Torben B. Overgaard v. Atty. Godwin R. Valdez, 3 that

respondent Valdez committed malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney and is
thus unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the bar.
The complainant, Torben Overgaard (Overgaard) engaged the services of respondent Valdez as
his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed against him. Despite the receipt of the
full amount of legal fees of P900,000.00 as stipulated in a Retainer Agreement, the respondent
refused to perform any of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the
complainants request for a report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected the
complainants demands for the return of the money paid to him.
Complainant Overgaard filed a complaint for disbarment against Valdez before the IBP. During the
investigation, respondent Valdez did not participate despite due notice. He was declared in default
for failure to submit an answer and attend the mandatory conference. He did not submit a position
paper or attend the hearing.
On September 30, 2008, this Court held that respondent Valdez committed multiple violations of
the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of this Decision
states:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED to immediately return to Torben
B. Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its equivalent in Currency at the time of actual
payment, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of
extra-judicial demand. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu of six percent (6%), shall
be imposed on such amount from the date of promulgation of this decision until the payment thereof.
He is further ORDERED to immediately return all papers and documents received from the
complainant.4
xxxx
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration filed on October 21, 2008, by respondent Valdez, based
on the following grounds:
I. RESPONDENT HAD ABSOLUTELY NO KNOWLEDGE THAT COMPLAINANT HAD FILED
CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND THAT THERE WERE DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AND AN
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
II. HAD HE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, HE WOULD HAVE PRESENTED
STRONG, VALID AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSES TO THE CHARGES LEVELLED AGAINST HIM
WHICH DEFENSES, CORRECTLY APPRECIATED, WOULD HAVE TOTALLY EXONERATED
HIM. 5
We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ads By softonicOn the first issue, the respondent argues that the IBP has no jurisdiction over him since
proof of service of the initiatory pleading to the defendant is a jurisidictional requirement.6 He states
in his Motion for Reconsideration that "he had no inkling whatsoever of the existence of the
disbarment case filed by the complainant." 7 He asserts that, in September 2006, he "abruptly

abandoned his office at Suite 402 Pacific Irvine Bldg., 2746 Zenaida St., at City following persistent
and serious threats to his physical safety and security x x x." 8 On the advice of his close friends and
clients to "lie low" and "make himself scarce," 9he stayed for a few days in his residence at Imus,
Cavite then relocated to Malaybalay City, Bukidnon.10 He has been holding office and residing
in Bukidnon since then, and he only found out about the decision from a colleague
in Bukidnon who read the decision from the Courts website.
He claims that because he "abruptly abandoned" 11 his Makati office on September 2006, he was not
able to receive the demand letter12 sent by the complainant.13 He was also not able to receive any of
the notices, orders and other papers pertaining to the disbarment proceedings because at the time
these were sent to his Makati office address, he was already holding office in Bukidnon.
Complainant Overgaard filed an "Opposition/Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration" 14 on
December 9, 2008. He counters that respondent Valdez was duly notified of the charge against him
and of all the proceedings at the IBP,15 since all notices were sent to "Suite 402 Pacific Irvine Bldg.,
No. 2746 Zenaida St., Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines," 16 which is the respondents office
address indicated in his letterhead and made known to the complainant and to the public. He sent
the respondent a letter dated November 27, 2006, demanding that the latter return the documents
and the P900,000.00 paid to him in relation to the case. The demand letter was sent to the same
address and was received by one whose signature was "RRJ," as noted in the Registry Return
Receipt.17
Complainant Overgaard argues that respondent cannot claim ignorance of the disbarment case
against him, since this is a natural offshoot of a wrongful act. 18 Complainant Overgaard points out
that when respondent Valdez left for Bukidnon, he already knew that the complainant was looking for
him and demanding the return of the money and documents he received from the complainant. 19 The
November 27, 2006 demand letter further contained a warning that "[i]f [the respondent] will not
return the documents and the money within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, [the complainant] will
bring the matter to the proper authorities/forum for the redress of [his] grievances."20 The
complainant denies that he or his business partners know of respondents whereabouts, and he
argues that it is the respondents duty as his counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a system that
efficiently takes into account all notices sent to him.21
1avvphi1

We hold that respondent was given reasonable notice of the complaint for disbarment against him.
A copy of the Complaint as well as the Order 22 to answer the Complaint was sent by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline to the respondents Makati office address, and it was duly received by
the respondent. The Registry Return Receipt23 shows that it was also received by one "RRJ," whose
signature appears on the space for the signature of the addressees agent. The respondent cannot
claim lack of knowledge of the complaint for disbarment against him when the Complaint and the
Order for him to submit an Answer were duly received by his agent at his Makati law office.
Succeeding notices in connection with the disbarment proceedings were also sent to the
respondents Makati law office. He cannot escape liability for his misdeeds by feigning ignorance of
the disbarment case, since the notices in connection with the proceedings were sent to his office
address made known to the public and properly received by his agent.
Respondent Valdez was given full opportunity, upon reasonable notice, to answer the charges
against him and to present evidence on his behalf. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was
correct in proceeding with the investigation ex parte, because it was due to the respondents own
fault and negligence that he was not able to submit an answer to the Complaint and participate in the
investigation. Rule 138, Section 30 provides that an attorney should be heard before he is removed

or suspended; but if, upon reasonable notice, an attorney fails to appear and answer the accusations
against him, the matter may be dealt with ex parte. Rule 138, Section 30 states:
SECTION 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed
or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard
by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation,
the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents feeble excuse that he was no longer holding office at his Makati office address at
the time the Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was sent to him is unacceptable.
Ordinary prudence would have guarded against his alleged failure to receive the notices. All notices
to the respondent were sent to his Makati office address, which was the address made known to the
public and to the complainant. This is even the address printed on the letterhead of the Retainer
Agreement between the complainant and the respondent. And although the respondent claims that
he had to "make himself scarce"24 due to threats to his life and safety, this does not mean that he
avoids the responsibility of taking account of his mail. The respondent owes it to himself and to his
clients to adopt a system whereby he would be able to receive mail sent to his law office during his
absence. Assuming that circumstances would justify the respondents abrupt abandonment 25 of his
Makati office, it absolutely does not give him the license to abandon his clients as well.
This brings us to the second issue: whether or not respondent committed multiple violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and thus his disbarment should be sustained.
The respondent argues that he did not abandon his client. He denies that he refused to perform any
of his obligations under the contract for legal services between himself and the complainant. He
claims that he gave the complainant legal advice, and that he searched for and interviewed
witnesses in relation to the cases he was handling for the complainant.26 He also denies that he
ignored the complainants requests for a report of the cases entrusted to his care. He claims that he
gave periodic status reports on the result of his work, that he returned the documents in connection
with the case, and that he rendered an accounting of the money that he actually received.
We find that respondents disbarment should be upheld. From the facts of the case, and based on
his own admissions, it is evident that he has committed multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In abruptly abandoning his law office without advising his client and without making sure that the
cases he was handling for his client were properly attended to during his absence, and without
making arrangements whereby he would receive important mail, the respondent is clearly guilty of
gross negligence. A lawyer cannot simply disappear and abandon his clients and then rely on the
convenient excuse that there were threats to his safety. Even assuming that there were serious
threats to his person, this did not give him the permission to desert his client and leave the cases
entrusted to his care hanging. He should have at least exercised reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence by taking steps to ensure that the cases he was handling were attended to and that his
clients interest was safeguarded. If it was not possible for him to handle the cases entrusted to his
care, he should have informed the complainant of his predicament and asked that he be allowed to
withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the services of another counsel who could
properly represent him.27 Deplorably, the respondent just disappeared, deserted his client and forgot
about the cases entrusted to his care, to the complainants damage and prejudice.
The respondent denies that he did not do anything in connection with the cases included in the
Retainer Agreement. He asserts that he reviewed the documents in relation to the case and gave

the complainant important advice. He claims that he travelled to Bato, Camarines Norte to negotiate
for an amicable settlement with the members of the family of the adverse party in one of the cases
filed against the complainant.28 He also went to San Carlos City (Negros Oriental), Antipolo City, and
other parts of Metro Manila to interview and search for witnesses for the cases that he was handling
for the complainant.29
The respondents disbarment is not anchored on his failure to do anything in relation the cases
entrusted to his care, but on his abandonment of his client. He will not be absolved from liability on
the basis alone of these inconsequential acts which he claims to have accomplished because the
glaring fact remains that he has failed to perform his essential obligations to his client, to the courts
and to society. As the complainants lawyer, the respondent is expected to serve his client with
competence and diligence.30 This includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care and
giving the complainant sound legal advice, but also properly representing his client in court,
attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the cases
entrusted to his care with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for his
client or the court to prod him to do so. He should not idly sit by and leave the rights of his client in a
state of uncertainty.
The respondents acts and omissions were not just a case of inaction, but they amount to deceitful
conduct and are contrary to good morals. After assuring the complainant that he would protect the
latters interest and attend to the cases included in the Retainer Agreement, he abandoned his client.
It was only after the complainants own inquiry that he discovered that the respondent never
appeared in court to represent the complainant in the cases filed against him, so much so that he
had no knowledge that warrants of arrest were already issued against him. The respondent also
failed to enter his appearance in the civil case for Mandamus, Injunction and Damages that the
complainant filed. After receiving the complete amount of legal fees, giving the complainant initial
legal advice, and interviewing some witnesses, the respondent just disappeared and the
complainant never heard from him despite his continued efforts to contact the respondent.
1avv phi1

The complainant put his trust in the respondent with full faith that the latter would exert his best effort
and ability in the prosecution and defense of his clients cause. But instead of devotion to his clients
cause, the respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client. After all the representations he
made to the complainant and after receipt of the full amount of the legal fees, he absconded from his
responsibilities and betrayed his clients trust. There is no excuse for this, and his gross negligence
and appalling indifference is unforgiveable.
On the Courts finding that the respondent refused to return the money he received from the
complainant despite written and verbal demands and was not able to give a single report regarding
the status of the cases, the respondent claims that he returned the documents to the complainants
representative in the middle of July 2006,31 and that he also gave an accounting of the money he
received sometime immediately after it was demanded from him on July 25 or 26, 2006. The
respondent counters that although he initially received the amount of P900,000.00, he
gave P300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives for locating witnesses in favor of the complainant in
Antipolo City and other parts of Metro Manila.32 He claims that only P600,000.00 was actually
received by him, and from this amount he drew all expenses in connection with the complainants
cases. The respondent further avers that he made an accounting of the P600,000.00 received by
him and offered to returnP250,000.00, but it was the complainants business partner who refused to
accept the P250,000.00 and insisted on the payment of the whole amount. 33
The complainant declared that he did not receive the documents being demanded from the
respondent, nor did he receive an accounting of the money he paid to the respondent. He stated in
his "Opposition/Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration" that the respondents empty claims --

that he already returned the documents sometime in the middle of July 2006 and that he rendered
an accounting of the money paid to him immediately after July 25 or 26, 2006 -- are refuted by the
demand letter sent by the complainant on November 27, 2006, four months after the alleged time of
return.
We agree with the complainant.
If the respondent had indeed returned the documents sometime in the middle of July 2006, he would
have presented a receipt to prove such turnover of documents. And if the respondent had indeed
rendered an accounting of the money that was paid to him, he would have attached a received copy
of the accounting to his Motion for Reconsideration. But he failed to do both. There was no proof
presented. We cannot rely on his bare allegation, especially when the complainant demanded the
return of the documents months after they were allegedly returned.
Neither are we persuaded by the respondents explanation as to how and where the P900,000.00
was spent. He claims that out of the P900,000.00, he only received P600,000.00 because he
paid P300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives. In paying the intelligence operatives, he stated in
his Motion for Reconsideration that he deposited P100,000.00 to the Land Bank account of one
Investigator Operative Collado (Collado) sometime in the second week of January 2006, and that the
rest of the P200,000.00 was personally handed by him to Collado in the last week of January 2006
at McDonalds restaurant at the corner of Pasong Tamo and J.P. Rizal Streets at Makati City. 34
Such an account offered by the respondent is insufficient to free him from liability. If the respondent
indeed paidP300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives with the knowledge of the complainant, he
would have presented a receipt issued by Collado, and he would have also presented a validated
deposit slip or certification as proof that he deposited the amount he claims to have deposited to
Collados account. His failure to attach proof of payment of the P300,000.00 to the intelligence
operatives does not only make his defense flawed, it also highlights his incompetence in handling
the money he received from the client.
It is a lawyers duty to properly account for the money he received from the client.35 If indeed the
respondent told the client that he would pay P300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives, as he claims
in his Motion for Reconsideration, he should have held this money in trust, and he was under an
obligation to make an accounting. It was his duty to secure a receipt for the payment of this amount
on behalf of his client. But he failed to present any receipt or certification from Collado that the
payment was received. Since the respondent was not able either to present an accounting of
the P900,000.00 paid to him upon the complainants demand, or to provide a sufficient and plausible
explanation for where such amount was spent, he must immediately return the same.
For these reasons, and those previously stated in the September 30, 2008 Decision of this Court, we
find that respondent Valdez has committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He has failed to observe the fundamental duties of honesty and good
faith and, thus, we sustain his disbarment.
We must emphasize that the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the
nature of a privilege or franchise,36 and it may be extended or withheld by this Court in the exercise
of its sound discretion. As guardian of the legal profession, this Court has ultimate disciplinary power
over members of the Bar in order to ensure that the highest standards of competence and of
honesty and fair dealing are maintained. We find that the respondent has fallen below such exacting
standard and is unworthy of the privilege to practice law.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. This Courts en banc decision in
Administrative Case No. 7902 dated September 30, 2008, entitled Torben B. Overgaard v. Atty.
Godwin R. Valdez, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Footnotes

Rollo, pp. 104-127.

Id. at p. 124.
3
A.C. 7902, September 30, 2008.
4
Id. at p. 11; rollo, p. 99.
5
Rollo, pp.104-105.
6
Id. at p. 108.
7
Id. at p. 105.
8
Id. at p. 106.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at p. 106.
12
Id. at p. 40.
13
Id.
14
Id. at pp. 162-176.
15
Id. at p. 162.
16
Id. at p. 163.
17
Id. at p. 164.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at p. 166.
21
Id. at p. 167.
22
Id. at p. 13.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at p. 106
26
Id. at pp. 116-188.
27
Ventura v. Santos, 59 Phil. 123, 128 (1933).
28
Rollo, pp. 114-115.
29
Id. at pp. 117-118.
30
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 21.
31
Rollo, p. 121.
32
Id.
2

33

Id. at p. 122.
Id.
35
CODE OF PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY, Canon 16, Rule 16.01.
36
In Re: SyCip, G.R. No. X92-1, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 1, 10, citing, 7 C.J.S. 708.
34

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7181

February 6, 2009

MARIA ANGALAN, NENA ANGALAN, DIONICIO ANGALAN, MAGDALENA ANGALAN,

FRANCISCA ANGALAN, INIS ANGALAN, ROSALINO ANGALAN, AND JOSEFINA ANGALAN,
ALL OF WHOM ARE HEIRS OF ANGALAN SAMAL married to SANAAN SAMAL, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. LEONIDO C. DELANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Maria, Nena, Dionicio, Magdalena, Francisca, Inis, Rosalino, and
Josefina Angalan (complainants) against Atty. Leonido C. Delante (respondent) for gross violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainants are the heirs of Angalan Samal (Angalan) and Sanaan Samal (Sanaan).
Complainants allege that they are illiterate and belong to the Samal Tribe. Angalan, Sanaan, and
complainants owned a 9.102-hectare parcel of land in Barrio San Jose, Kaputian, Island Garden City
of Samal, Davao del Norte. The property was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P11499.1
On 15 April 1971, Angalan and complainants borrowed P15,000 from Navarro R. Eustaquio and
Arabella P. Eustaquio (Spouses Eustaquio). To secure the loan, Angalan and complainants
mortgaged 8.102 hectares of the 9.102-hectare property and surrendered OCT No. P-11499 to the
Spouses Eustaquio. The Spouses Eustaquio prepared a document 2 and asked Angalan and
complainants to sign it. Angalan and complainants affixed their thumb marks on the document.
When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover OCT No. P-11499 from the Spouses
Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquio refused. Complainants learned that the document which the
Spouses Eustaquio prepared, and which complainants signed, was a deed of absolute sale and not
a real estate mortgage. They also learned that Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the
title over the 8.102-property to his name OCT No. P-11499 was canceled and Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-99263 in the name of Navarro was issued.
1 avvphi 1.zw+

Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property. In a
receipt4dated 18 November 1970, respondent acknowledged receipt of P1,200 from Francisca
Angalan and her husband, Macario Capul (Capul), representing the full payment of his professional
fees: "Received from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional

services in regard to recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan
(Samal)."
Respondent filed a complaint5 dated 13 April 1976 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region XVI, Tagum, Davao stating that:
2. x x x Angalan Samal and his children x x x are the original patentees of a certain parcel of land,
situated in Ombay, Samal, Davao, covered under Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499, of the
Registry of Deeds of Davao, having acquired the same under HP-No. 65310, pursuant to the
provisions of the Homestead Laws of the Public Land Law (C.A. 141);
3. x x x [O]n April 15, 1971, the herein original patentees x x x sold and conveyed said parcel of land
covered by the aforesaid title to the herein defendants for the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00) x x x;
4. x x x [U]nder the provisions of the Public Land Law, particularly Section 119 thereof and even on
the face of the title of said property now under the name of the defendants x x x the herein plaintiffs
have the right to repurchase said property within a period of five (5) years from the date of the
conveyance;
xxxx
7. [A]s a matter of right under the law, the herein plaintiffs are entitled to the produce of the property
at least beginning April 8, 1976;
xxxx
9. [B]y reason of unwarranted refusal on the part of the defendants to reconvey the property to
plaintiffs, the latter have been constrained to engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of
counsel x x x6
Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement. In the amicable
settlement7 dated 3 September 1977, the parties stated that:
1. x x x [T]he plaintiffs have offered to the defendant[s] the sum of P30,000.00 as repurchase
price which the defendant[s accept];
2. x x x [U]pon the signing hereof, the plaintiffs shall pay the defendant[s] the sum
of P15,000.00 and for this purpose hereby authorize the defendants to collect the same from
the Clerk of Court which amount had been deposited with this Honorable Court; Likewise,
upon signing hereof the Deed of Reconveyance shall be immediately executed and delivered
by the defendants to plaintiff[s];
3. x x x [W]hile the balance of P15,000.00 has not been paid, the defendant[s] shall continue
to possess, and if necessary to gather the produce of the property, however, upon receipt of
the defendant[s] of the balance of P15,000.00, said defendants together with [their] agent
and/or worker, Alfredo Rabadon shall clear the area and turnover the same within fifteen (15)
days from receipt [of] said balance.8
In a Decision9 dated 30 September 1977, the CFI approved the amicable settlement.

Complainants did not have the P30,000 repurchase price for the property. Respondent advanced
the P30,000 and, in return, complainants allowed respondent to possess the property and gather its
produce until he is paid. In a letter 10 dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of
Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, respondent stated that:
This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through
me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my capacity as counsel of the Heirs of
Angalan Samal and owner of the money in redeeming the property, I have authorized Mr. Macario
Capol to take over the possession of the property together with the harvesting of the matured
coconuts.
1avvp hi1

When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchase price and recover the property from
respondent, respondent refused. Complainants learned that respondent transferred the title of the
property to his name TCT No. T-9926 was canceled and TCT No. T-5793211 in the name of
respondent was issued.
Complainants filed a complaint12 dated 30 April 2004 with the RTC, Judicial Region XI, Branch 34,
Davao City praying that (1) the deed of absolute sale prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and
signed by the complainants be declared void, (2) TCT No. T-57932 be declared void, and (3)
respondent be made to pay damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 57-2004. In his
answer13 dated 29 December 2004, respondent stated that:
[In] 1971, ANGALAN (SAMAL) [now deceased) [sic] together with his son-in-law, MACARIO CAPUL,
the latter being the town mate of herein defendant Delante in Danao, Cebu and who is married to the
daughter of the late ANGALAN (SAMAL), came to herein defendants office and sought for an advice
to borrow money;
x x x [T]he late ANGALAN (SAMAL) together with his children in company with MACARIO CAPUL,
were directed by herein defendant to inform him why it was necessary for them to borrow money and
for whatever [sic] purpose; after their story, herein defendant disagreed as to their justification in
borrowing money which was for no other purpose except to have money on their own;
xxxx
It is preposterous for plaintiff[s] to claim that they had [sic] engaged the professional services of
herein defendant to file an annulment case since plaintiffs never came back apparently ashamed
when they were driven out, but worse they had [sic] never paid the herein defendant a single
centavo for purposes of filing an annulment case against co-defendant NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO;
x x x [T]he transfer of said property consisting of 8.102 hectares under the name of herein
defendants was not tainted with any deceit but effected legally by virtue of a valid deed of
sale executed by defendants [sic] spouses EUSTAQUIO in favor of herein defendants.
xxxx
[T]he absolute deed of sale, [sic] dated 15 April 1971, executed by herein plaintiffs in favor of
defendants EUSTAQUIO, speaks for itself. It is a sale of real property and NOT a mortgage.
xxxx

Contrary to the malicious and untruthful claim of the plaintiffs, the legal services of defendant Atty.
LEONIDO DELANTE was never solicited by them. Plaintiffs only asked defendant from where they
could borrow money, and after knowing that they just simply would [sic] like to borrow money without
any concrete investments in mind to repay [sic] back [sic] any loan, defendant Atty. LEONIDO
DELANTE drove them out of his office and told them to look for another person to help them;
Defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE later learned from MACARIO CAPUL, who is a friend and
a town mate, and who is the husband of FRANCISCA ANGALAN CAPUL, that the plaintiffs had
negotiated a sale with a certain NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO x x x;
In September 1977, a former Filipino client of herein defendant DELANTE, who, and his family [sic]
are now permanent residents of New York, was looking for a real property to build his retirement
home, [sic] and he approached herein defendant, in which he was referred to defendant
EUSTAQUIO [sic]; Upon visiting the property of defendant EUSTAQUIO, he was so impressed of
the location of the property and decided to buy the same, hence left the money to herein defendant
DELANTE and to buy [sic] said property under defendants name, with the understanding to turn
over said property to him, as soon as he and his family shall have returned to the country;
x x x [S]ince herein defendant is not interested over the said property as his own, he waited for his
client from New York to come home and to get his property but after 11 years, his client decided not
to come back anymore to the Philippines, and directed herein defendant to register the Deed of
Sale over the property to [sic] his name and directed herein defendant to refund his client. 14
Complainants filed a complaint15 dated 28 December 2005 with the Court charging respondent with
gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a Resolution 16 dated 3 July 2006, the
Court required respondent to comment on the complaint and, in a Resolution17 dated 4 December
2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In a Notice dated 14 March 2007, Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag)
directed complainants and respondent to appear before the IBP for a mandatory conference. The
parties failed to appear at the mandatory conference. In an Order dated 16 May 2007,
Commissioner Hababag directed the parties to submit their position papers.
In a motion dated 4 April 2007 and filed with the RTC, respondent and complainants prayed that
Civil Case No. 57-2004 be dismissed. Complainants filed with the Court a motion to withdraw the
complaint for disbarment dated 4 April 2007 and an affidavit of desistance dated April 2007.
In his position paper dated 2 July 2007, respondent stated that (1) Angalan and Capul went to his
office in 1971 to seek advice about borrowing money; (2) his client from New York bought the
property from the Spouses Eustaquio; and (3) complainants executed a motion to withdraw the
complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance.
In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner Hababag found that respondent violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
The issue to resolve is whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code of
Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their knowledge,
consent and against their will?
Weighing evidence presented by both parties, respondent should be punished for his
unprofessional and distasteful acts.

xxxx
His vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts was too flimsy to gain belief and acceptance. It
is unbelievable that a buyer would entrust his money intended for payment of a property but
allowed that said property be registered under the name of another, specifically his lawyer,
simply runs counter to ordinary human nature. (Emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Hababag recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
six months.
In a Resolution dated 22 November 2007, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted and
approved the Report with modification. The Board increased respondents suspension from six
months to one year.
Pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,18 the Board forwarded the case to the
Court for final action.
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP.
Complainants and respondent presented two different sets of facts. According to complainants, they
engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property from the Spouses
Eustaquio. In violation of the trust and confidence they reposed in him, respondent transferred the
title over the property to his name. According to respondent, complainants did not engage his
services. His client from New York was the one who bought the property from the Spouses
Eustaquio.
After a careful review of the records, the Court gives credence to complainants version of the facts.
Respondents credibility is highly questionable. In his answer dated 29 December 2004 and filed with
the CFI and in his position paper dated 2 July 2007 and filed with the IBP, respondent alleged that
Angalan and Capul went to his office in 1971 to seek advice about borrowing money. According to
respondent, complainants did not engage his services. In his answer, respondent stated that:
It is preposterous for [complainants] to claim that they had [sic] engaged the professional
services of herein defendant to file an annulment case since [complainants] never came back
apparently ashamed when they were driven out x x x;
xxxx
Contrary to the malicious and untruthful claim of [complainants], the legal services of
defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE was never solicited by them. Plaintiffs only asked
defendant from where they could borrow money, and after knowing that they just simply would
like to borrow money without any concrete investments in mind to repay back [sic] any loan,
defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE drove them out of his office and told them to look for another
person to help them;
Defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE later learned from MACARIO CAPUL x x x that the
plaintiffs had negotiated a sale with a certain NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO.19 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court is not impressed. Angalan and complainants went to respondents office not to seek
advice about borrowing money but to engage his services for the purpose of recovering their

property. This is obvious. First, after Angalan and complainants went to respondents office,
respondent filed a complaint with the CFI praying that the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey the property
to Angalan and complainants. Second, in the complaint, respondent stated that, "by reason of
unwarranted refusal on the part of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the latter
have been constrained to engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel." Third,
respondent issued a receipt to complainants stating that he "RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO
CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to the
recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal)." Fourth, in
respondents letter dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of Umbay, Samal,
Davao del Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer of complainants:
This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through
me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my capacity as counsel of the Heirs of
Angalan Samal and owner of the money in redeeming the property, I have authorized Mr. Macario
Capol to take over the possession of the property together with the harvesting of the matured
coconuts.20
These clearly show that complainants engaged the services of respondent.
In his answer, respondent alleged that complainants did not pay him his professional fees (which,
according to him, they did not engage). He stated that, "[complainants] had never paid the herein
defendant a single centavo for purposes of filing an annulment case against x x x NAVARRO
EUSTAQUIO."
The Court is not impressed. Complainants fully paid respondent his professional fees. This is
obvious. In a receipt dated 18 November 1970, respondent stated that he "RECEIVED from Mr.
MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to
the recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal)." This
clearly shows that complainants paid respondent his professional fees.
In his answer and position paper, respondent alleged that his client from New York bought the
property from the Spouses Eustaquio:
[I]n September 1977, a former Filipino client of herein respondent, who, and his family [sic] are now
permanent residents of New York, was looking for a real property to build his retirement home, and
he approached herein respondent, in which [sic] he was referred to Navarro Eustaquio; and upon
visiting the property of Navarro Eustaquio, he was impressed of [sic] the location of the property and
decided to buy the same, hence left the money to herein respondent and to buy [sic] said property
under respondents name, with the understanding to turn over said property to him, as soon as he
and his family shall have returned to the country;
x x x [S]ince herein respondent was not interested over the said property as his own, he waited for
his client from New York to come home and to get his property but after 11 years, his client decided
not to come back anymore to the Philippines, and directed herein respondent to register the Deed of
Sale over the property under his name and directed herein respondent to refund his client. 21
The Court is not impressed. Complainants repurchased the property from the Spouses Eustaquio.
This is obvious. First, complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement
stating that complainants would repurchase the property from the Spouses Eustaquio:

1. x x x [T]he plaintiffs have offered to the defendant[s] the sum of P30,000.00 as

repurchase price which the defendant[s accept];
2. x x x [U]pon the signing hereof, the plaintiffs shall pay the defendant[s] the sum
of P15,000.00 and for this purpose hereby authorize the defendants to collect the same from
the Clerk of Court which amount had been deposited with this Honorable Court; Likewise,
upon signing hereof the Deed of Reconveyance shall be immediately executed and delivered
by the defendants to plaintiff[s];
3. x x x [W]hile the balance of P15,000.00 has not been paid, the defendant[s] shall continue
to possess, and if necessary to gather the produce of the property, however, upon receipt of
the defendant[s] of the balance of P15,000.00, said defendants together with [their] agent
and/or worker, Alfredo Rabadon shall clear the area and turnover the same within fifteen (15)
days from receipt [of] said balance.22 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, in his letter to the barrio captain, respondent stated that complainants repurchased the
property from the Spouses Eustaquio:
This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property
through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my capacity as counsel of the
Heirs of Angalan Samal and owner of the money in redeeming the property, I have authorized Mr.
Macario Capol to take over the possession of the property together with the harvesting of the
matured coconuts.23 (Emphasis supplied)
These clearly show that complainants repurchased the property from the Spouses Eustaquio.
Respondents story about the client from New York is unbelievable. Respondent did not give any
detail or proof to substantiate his story the name of the alleged client, an affidavit of the alleged
client, the old passport of the alleged client showing immigration stamps, or any form of
correspondence between him and the alleged client. The Court agrees with the observation of
Commissioner Hababag that respondents "vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts [is] too flimsy
to gain belief and acceptance."
In his position paper, respondent alleged that complainants executed a motion to withdraw the
complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance. This is immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court states that, "No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of
the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same."
Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 16 states
that lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of their clients that may come into their
possession. Respondent should have held in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property to
complainants upon demand.24 Instead of holding in trust the property of complainants, respondent
(1) transferred the title of the property to his name, (2) refused to return the property to
complainants, and (3) referred to complainants charges as malicious and untruthful.
Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him.
Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their
property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of
complainants and transferred the title of the property to his name.

Considering the depravity of respondents offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty too
light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. 25 Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Court for gross misconduct. In Hernandez v. Go,26 the Court disbarred a lawyer for
transferring the titles over the properties of his client to his name without the knowledge of his client.
In Hernandez, the Court held that:
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too
light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire
the latters properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the
need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal
profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.27
A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling
the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of
law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the
personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Footnotes

Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 11-12.

Id. at 13-16.
3
Id. at 17.
4
Id. at 18.
5
Id. (Vol. II) at 57-60.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 69-70.
8
Id. at 69.
9
Id. at 71-73.
10
Id. (Vol. I) at 19.
11
Id. (Vol. II) at 74.
12
Id. at 76-83.
13
Id. at 84-95.
14
Id. at 85-89.
15
Id. (Vol. I) at 1-10.
16
Id. at 22.
17
Id. at 89.
18
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
If the Board, by the vote of the majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.
19
Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 86, 88.
20
See note 10.
21
Rollo (Vol. II), p. 89.
22
Id. at 69.
23
See note 10.
24
Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that, "A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand."
25
Hernandez v. Go, A.C. No. 1526, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 1.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 10-11.
2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

ADM. CASE. No. 6383

March 31, 2009

IRENE SANTOS-TAN, Represented by her Attorney-in-fact

MIRIAM S. ELGINCOLIN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROMEO R. ROBISO, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Ads By softonicThis is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Irene Santos-Tan against

respondent Atty. Romeo Robiso.1Complainant charged respondent with malpractice for grossly
neglecting his duties and responsibilities as counsel for complainant and for issuing a bouncing

check. Complainant seeks that respondent be disbarred and ordered to return the sum
of P85,000.00, plus interest.
Complainant asserts the following: Sometime in December 2000, complainant engaged the
professional services of respondent as her counsel to represent her in Special Proceeding No. 01101339, entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Eusebio G. Tan, a.k.a. Tan Chin Bio
G., pending before the Court of Manila, Branch 45. She paid respondent P100,000.00 as
acceptance fee. Subsequently, respondent entered his appearance as new counsel on 12
December 2002.
After several months had passed, complainant asked respondent about the status of her case. She
found out that her case had not progressed and that the only pleading that respondent had filed was
his notice of appearance.2 Not satisfied with the way respondent was handling her case, complainant
and her sister, Miriam Elgincolin (Miriam), went to his office on 3 November 2003. She demanded
that he return the professional fees earlier paid as there was allegedly no professional service
rendered by him. And for the purpose of returning a portion of the professional fee, respondent
issued to complainant Asia United Bank Check No. 0048229 dated 29 November 2003 in the
amount of P85,000.00.3
However, respondents check was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds.4 Despite several demands, respondent failed to make good or replace the check. In reply to
complainants final demand, made through her counsel, respondent wrote a letter dated 25 January
2004 asserting that the check was without consideration and it was issued to stop complainants
"acerbic verbal abuse."5
In compliance with the Courts 21 June 2004 Resolution, 6 respondent filed his Comment dated 16
August 20047and a Supplement Comment dated 17 September 2004.8 Below are his allegations:
Before respondent entered his appearance as counsel, a motion for reconsideration of the order
appointing Tanas administrator of complainants husband and a motion for early resolution of said
motion for reconsideration had already been filed by complainants former counsel. Still, respondent
"went back and forth to the court to personally follow-up the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration."9 However, the branch clerk of court would only advise him to wait "for the
replacement of the presiding judge who retired." 10 Further still, he would, once or twice a month, still
drop by the office of the branch clerk of court to inquire about the status of the case. But without fail,
the answer he would get was "no new judge yet." 11 It was only later that he learned that the regular
judge did not actually retire but was suspended by the Court. Respondent recorded the dates of
his court visits in his notes and these were part of the case file which was turned over to complainant
when she terminated his services. Whatever delay in the resolution of the motions before the RTC
was due to the suspension of the regular presiding judge of the court and the reluctance of the
acting judge to resolve said motions during such period. In effect, he even contacted the opposing
counsel to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. Thus, he was never remiss in his duties
as counsel for complainant.12

Ads By softonicComplainant was proud and nasty. His secretary would receive her calls berating him on
the slow progress of the case. Complainant also badmouthed her former lawyers while expressing
her disappointment over their failure to have the RTC appoint her as an administrator of her
husbands estate.
As to the acceptance fee, it was understood to be non-refundable. But on 3 November 2003, so
respondent asserts, complainant "bullied respondent with harsh words right inside his

office."13 Complainant shouted invectives at him. So, to make her leave his office, he wrote
the P85,000.00 check and gave it to her.14
In her Reply to respondents Comment and Comment dated 6 October 2004,15 complainant
avers: if respondent had really made numerous follow-ups regarding her case, he would have known
that the regular presiding judge did not retire but was merely suspended.16 Respondent learned of
such fact only when he reviewed the case record. Instead of apologizing to her for issuing the rubber
check, respondent concocted an incredible tale to make it appear that she was the one bullying him
inside his office and forcing him to issue her a check. It is unthinkable for an ordinary person like
herself to raise her voice against a lawyer especially inside the latters office. It is unbelievable for
any person to issue a check for P85,000.00 just to appease another person. Respondent could have
called security to stop her if indeed she was bullying him in his office. Moreover, respondent himself
deducted P15,000.00 from the acceptance fee as payment for the alleged professional service he
had rendered.17
Attached to complainants reply is the affidavit18 of her sister Miriam who was with her when she
went to respondents office and witnessed everything that had transpired therein. According
to Miriam, respondent explained to complainant that he had been following-up the case and that
he could not return the full amount of the acceptance fee. Complainant was told by respondent that
he had no money so instead he wrote her a check before her departure to the U.S. They then left the
office of respondent. Miriam stated that she saw the case folder was given by respondent and there
were no notes which would allegedly indicate the dates when he made follow-ups in the intestate
case.19
In a Resolution dated 26 January 2005,20 the Court referred the case to the Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The issues are: (1) whether respondent was negligent in handling complainants case; and (2)
whether respondent should be disciplined for issuing a bouncing check. To thresh out the issues, the
IBP conducted the mandatory conference/hearing and thereafter required both parties to submit their
respective verified position papers.
Both parties submitted their respective verified position papers both substantially reiterating their
arguments in previous submission.
Complainant notes that respondent had admitted in effect his negligent handling of her case when
he returnedP85,000.00 of the acceptance fee she paid him. The commission of a criminal act, such
as the issuance of a bouncing check, a violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) 22, clearly constitute
gross misconduct. Respondents claim that there was no consideration for the check is not true since
it was issued to return the complainantsP100,000.00 attorneys fees for services that were not
rendered. There was in effect a rescission and cancellation of the retainer agreement. 21
For respondents part, he alleges that his secretary, Malana, saw the notes in which he recorded
the dates when he went to court to follow up the status of complainants case. Respondents
secretary also witnessed how he was berated in his office on November 2003. Since he was also in
a hurry to catch up with his law class, he quickly issued the check to complainant.22 As for
complainants case, neglect should not be attributed to him then since the motions filed by her
previous lawyer were already submitted for resolution and there was nothing further he could do.
That at the beginning of his engagement as lawyer, he made it clear to complainant that
theP100,000.00 was an acceptance fee and was non-refundable.
1avvphi1

The hearing officer, Dulay, in his Report and Recommendation dated 20 November
2007,23 recommended that respondent be suspended for one month with strong warning that a
commission of a similar offense would be dealt with more severity in the future. He also
recommended that respondent be ordered to reimburse complainant the amount
of P70,000.00, P30,000.00 of which corresponds to the services rendered by him on aquantum
meruit. He did not find respondent to be grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as there
was nothing more respondent could do in accelerating the resolution of the motions which were
already submitted for resolution. The filing of additional pleadings or papers with the court would not
be necessary. During the time the motion for reconsideration was pending the regular presiding
judge of the court was under suspension and the acting presiding judge who issued the resolution
considering the motion as submitted for resolution was not disposed to act on said motion but
instead opted to wait for the regular presiding judge to act on it.
However, the hearing officer recommended that respondent be made liable for issuing the bouncing
check. Whatever was respondents reason for issuing the check, the fact remains that the same was
dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. If respondents purpose
was just to appease complainant to make her leave his office and he firmly believed that he had no
obligation to return the P100,000.00, then he could have issued a stop-payment order to the bank
before the encashment of the check, the hearing officer added.
The Board of Governors of the IBP, in a Resolution on 14 December 2007, adopted and approved
the Reportand Recommendation with modification that the recommended penalty of suspension
from the practice of law be increased to one year.24
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the administrative case is now before the Court for
resolution.
The Court affirms the findings of the IBP.
On the issue of negligence on the part of respondent in handling complainants case,
the Court agrees that based on the facts presented there was nothing that he could have done to
expedite the resolution of the motion for reconsideration then pending before the RTC. The RTC had
already ordered that the motion for reconsideration be submitted for resolution. Respondent could
not be faulted if the acting presiding judge did not want to act on the motion until the regular
presiding judge return.
Regarding the other issues, as a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially Blg. 22
(B.P. Blg. 22). By issuing a check in violation of the provisions of this law, respondent is guilty of
serious misconduct.
In People v. Tuanda,25 we explained the nature of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as follows:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment x x x. The thrust of the law is
to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.
xxxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief
it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest.26
In issuing a worthless check, respondent showed that he was unmindful of the deleterious effects of
his act to the public interest and public order. Respondent violated the Attorneys Oath that he will,
among others, obey the laws. The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession. [emphasis supplied]
The issuance of bouncing check cannot be countenanced nor condoned under any circumstances.
The act of a lawyer in issuing a check which is drawn against insufficient funds constitutes deceitful
conduct or conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. The Court has held that the issuance of
checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him. It shows a lack of personal honesty
and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. 27
As such, we have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law.28 The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year. However, the Court notes that, in practice, acceptance fees of
lawyers are generally non-refundable and the fact that, in the present case, respondent is willing to
make good the amount of the bouncing check. Thus, we deem that one month suspension from the
practice of law and the restitution of P85,000.00 to complainant would be sufficient in this case.
The Court reiterates that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.29 As servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover
make himself an exemplar for others to emulate. The responsibilities of a lawyer are greater than
those of a private citizen. He is looked up to in the community.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Romeo R. Robiso is ORDERED SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of ONE (1) month effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is
further ORDERED to pay complainant the full amount of P85,000.00, as reflected in the check. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a commission of a similar offense will be acted upon with more severity.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to be entered into the personal record of Atty. Robiso. The Court Administrator is
directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice

Footnotes
*

Additional member as replacement of Justice Arturo D. Brion who is on official leave per Special Order No. 587.
Rollo, pp. 1-6.
2
Id. at 10.
3
Id. at 12.
4
Id. at 13.
5
Id. at 14.
6
Id. at 16.
7
Id. at 21-23.
8
Id. at 30-33.
9
Id. at 21.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 22.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 47-52.
16
Id. at 47.
17
Id. at 48-49.
18
Id. at 53-57.
19
Id. at 54-55.
20
Id. at 62-63.
21
IBP record, pp. 9-19.
22
Id. at 27-35.
23
Id. at 67-74.
24
Id. at 65-66.
25
Adm.Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692.
26
Id. at 696, citing Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986).
27
Cuizon v. Macalino, Adm Case No. 4334, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 479, 486.
28
Lao v. Atty. Medel, 453 Phil. 115, 124 (2003).
29
Lao v. Atty. Medel, 453 Phil. 115, 123 (2003).
1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7024

January 30, 2009

OFELIA R. SOMOSOT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. GERARDO F. LARA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:

Ads By softonicOnce again, we are faced in this complaint for disbarment with the problem of a clientlawyer relationship developing into a legal action between the lawyer and the client. 1 The
complaining client is Ofelia R. Somosot (complainant), a defendant in a collection case before the
trial court; her defense was handled by Atty. Gerardo F. Lara (respondent).2
The Factual Background
In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant alleged that she retained the services of
the respondent as her counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544, entitled "Golden Collection Marketing
Corporation v. Ofelia Somosot, et al.," filed against her and her co-defendants for the collection of a
sum of money amounting to P1.3 Million. Her defense was that it was the plaintiff who actually owed
her P800,000.00. She claimed that she had the evidence to prove this defense at the trial. The
respondent agreed to handle the case and duly entered his appearance as counsel after securing
his acceptance fee.
The complainant expected the respondent to perform his duty as counsel and to defend her interests
to the utmost. She alleged, however, that after filing the Answer to the Complaint, the respondent
failed to fully inform her of further developments in the case. She only heard about the case when
there was already a decision against her and her co-defendants. She even belatedly learned that the
respondent had sought his discharge as counsel without her knowledge and consent. Contrary to
the respondent's claim that he could no longer locate her, she claimed that the respondent knew all
along where she lived and could have easily contacted her had he been in good faith.
After the court denied the respondent's motion to withdraw from the case, the complainant claimed
that the respondent represented her interests in a half-hearted manner, resulting in the grant of the
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Allegedly, the respondent failed to properly oppose
the motion and she was thereafter deprived of the chance to present her evidence. Execution of the
court's decision followed, resulting in the sale of her house and lot at public auction despite her
efforts to reverse the judgment with the help of another lawyer. Thereafter, a third party to whom her
property had been mortgaged sued her.
The complainant bewailed the respondent's evasive attitude when she confronted him about her
problem with his representation. She found the respondent's excuse - that he could not contact her
because she had changed her office address - to be unsatisfactory. She accused the respondent of
miserably failing to comply with his oath as a lawyer and to discharge his duty of ably representing
her.

In his comment,3 the respondent denied that he failed to exercise the diligence required of him as
counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544. He argued that pursuant to his oath as counsel, he pursued
the complainant's case "according to his own ability and knowledge." He alleged that: 4
1. He filed the complainant's Answer with Counterclaim on July 16, 2001. He presented all
the complainant's defenses and claims, but the plaintiff, Golden Collection Marketing
Corporation, filed for "interrogatories and request for admission." He filed an objection to the
plaintiff's motion on the ground that the interrogatories and request for admission are, by law,
properly addressed to the complainant herself and not to him as counsel.
2. He filed a reply to the plaintiff's comment (on his objection) and the case proceeded
despite the complainant's failure to pay his billing from May 3, 2001 to August 2, 2001
amounting to P27,000.00

Ads By softonic3. On November 1, 2001, he joined the government service as consultant in

the Board of Investments and full-time counsel to BOI Gov. J. Antonio Leviste. He tried to
inform the complainant of his appointment and to collect his billings at her office
in Greenhills, but the office was locked. A security guard told him that the complainant had
moved without leaving any forwarding address. He even tried to contact complainant and her
husband's cellular phones, to no avail.
4. Desperate, he filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance with the explanation that the
conformity of the complainant could not be obtained since the complainant's corporation had
moved its office without informing him of its new location, and the complainant had not been
communicating with him.5 He later learned that the complainant had moved to Pasig City.
5. In late December 2001, he was able to talk with the complainant by phone and he
informed her that he could no longer handle cases for the complainant's company, thereby
terminating his relationship with complainant. He advised the complainant to look for another
lawyer; the complainant replied that she already had another lawyer.
6. Despite his situation and aware that the court had denied his motion to withdraw from the
case, the respondent continued rendering legal services as the complainant's counsel. He
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision dated June 3, 2002. He likewise
filed an urgent opposition to the winning party's motion for execution.
7. On September 2, 2005, he received a letter from the complainant giving him "one final
opportunity to convince me, why she should not pursue disbarment proceedings." He
promptly prepared a reply which, upon her suggestion, he delivered at the complainant's
residence.
8. He thought that he had given the complainant a satisfactory explanation only to learn later
that she filed a complaint for disbarment against him.
9. The respondent expressed his regret for what happened to the case, but stressed that he
did not abandon the complainant and the cases he had been handling for her company. He
did not likewise neglect to perform his duties as counsel. On the insinuation that he may
have been "bought," he emphasized he that cannot and will never abandon a client as a
Christian lawyer and a family man.

In a Resolution dated July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) "for investigation, report and recommendation." The complainant filed a Position Paper (dated
January 12, 2007) before the IBP Commission on Discipline through her counsel Honorato V.
Reyes, Jr.6 She reiterated in this position paper the allegations in her complaint. She could not
understand how a simple collection case against her where she felt she had a good defense and
which she expected to go through a full-blown litigation could be lost virtually through a mere
technicality, i.e., through a judgment on the pleadings for her failure to answer the plaintiff's
interrogatories and request for admission. She insisted she had not been informed by the
respondent of the plaintiff's motion for written interrogatories and request for admission. Had he
informed her, she could have responded.
The complainant was even more surprised to learn that the respondent tried to withdraw from the
case because she (the complainant) could not be contacted. She maintained that she had never
transferred her residence where she could be reached had the respondent exerted a meaningful
effort to contact her. She claimed that the respondent was able to do so later when he was collecting
the balance of his legal fees. She denied that she had not paid respondent his retainer fees.
The complainant stressed that the respondent violated his oath as a lawyer by mishandling her case,
resulting in the loss of her house and lot and other damages.
The respondent's Position Paper (dated January 3, 2007) essentially reflected the arguments
presented in hisComment before this Court.7 He clarified that the complainant did not incur extra
expenses in defending herself in the collection case since its handling was part of the services
covered by his retainer. He insisted that he vigorously pursued the case and defended the
complainant to the utmost despite the complainant's unpaid billings of P27,000.00.
The respondent contended that he had good reasons not to continue as the complainant's counsel.
He reasoned out that under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may withdraw from a
case upon a good cause such as when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the lawyer's
services, or fails to comply with the terms of the retainer agreement, or when the lawyer is elected or
appointed to public office.8 Two of these possible causes applied to his situation; he was appointed
legal consultant at the BOI requiring full-time work and the complainant had failed to pay his legal
fees to him amounting to P27,000.00. He filed the formal notice of withdrawal without the conformity
of the complainant because he could not locate her.
The respondent insinuated that that the complainant's real intent was merely to harass him and his
family as indicated by her non-appearance, despite due notice, at the preliminary conference before
the IBP. He argued that he could not be disbarred considering that it was the complainant who was
negligent in informing him of her whereabouts. While he expressed regret for what happened in the
case, he insisted that he exerted every effort to locate her, filed the necessary pleadings, protected
her and her company's interest as best as he could.
The IBP Recommendation
In a letter to the Justice dated January 28, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors, through the IBP
Commission onDiscipline, transmitted to the Court a Notice of Resolution9 and the records of the
case. The resolution was for the adoption and approval of the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco who had investigated the case. 10
Commissioner Limpingco recommended that respondent be reprimanded for lack of reasonable
diligence in representing the complainant.

His recommendation was based on the following evaluation:

It appears that the respondent was to some degree, remiss in fulfilling his duties to
complainant Somosot. While it may be true that he had filed an answer in Civil Case No. Q0143544, objected to the plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for admission, asked for
reconsideration of the decision rendered by the court and opposed the adverse party's efforts to
have the same executed, it can nevertheless be seen that the remedial measures taken by the
respondent were inadequate, especially in view of the direction which the proceedings were taking.
The respondent is not incorrect in saying that a lawyer may be relieved of his duties even without the
conformity of his client when he lost all contact with the latter, and the complainant's failure to settle
his unpaid fees is not received without sympathy. The fact remains,however, that the respondent's
efforts to be discharged as counsel were disallowed by the court, under the circumstances, he was
bound by his oath to represent complainantSomosot and to advocate her cause to the best of his
ability.
The respondent claims that in late December 2001, he was finally able to talk to
complainant Somosot and was told that she already had another lawyer by the name of Atty.
Tomas Dulay. Considering his stated desire to withdraw from the case and his own declaration that
he had again come into the means of contacting the complainant, it is thus entirely puzzling why he
did not at this point, revive his efforts to be relieved of his responsibilities in Civil Case No. Q0243544 given complainant Somosot's alleged engagement of Atty. Tomas Dulay and her
presumed willingness to give her consent to such discharge. As it is, respondent Atty. Lara
remained as counsel of record and for some undisclosed reason did not appeal the decision against
his client.
This is not to say that the client is entirely without fault. While complainant Ofelia Somosot's narrative
is in many respects at odds with that of the respondent, it is nevertheless clear from her submissions
that she never made any effort to contact the respondent to follow up the status of the case, but
instead expected the latter to take complete initiative in this regard.
It has been held that it is the duty of a party-litigant to remain in contact with his lawyer in order to be
informed of the progress of his case. "True enough, the party-litigant should not rely totally on his
counsel to litigate his case even if the latter expressly assures that the former's presence in court will
no longer be needed. No prudent party will leave the fate of his case entirely to his lawyer. Absence
in one or two hearings may be negligible but want of inquiry or update on the status of his case for
several months (four, in this case) is inexcusable. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with
his counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case." Thus the
complainant did not do, and such circumstance can only mitigate in respondent's favor.
The Court's Ruling
As the IBP did, we find that the respondent deserves to be sanctioned for having fallen short of the
standards required of him as defense counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544. He violated the basic
rule, expressed under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,11 that "a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence." 12
While it may be said that the respondent did not completely abandon the case, his handing of the
complainant's defense left much to be desired.

The records show that the plaintiff in the collection case filed interrogatories and a request for
admission. The respondent duly filed his objection to the plaintiff's move, but the court apparently
allowed the interrogatories and request for admission and directed the complainant (as the
defendant in the civil case) to respond. The complainant was never informed of this development
and the omission eventually led to the grant of the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
which in turn led to the decision against the defendants.13
In his submissions before this Court and before the IBP, the respondent alleged that he objected to
the interrogatories and request for admission and did all he could, even filing a reply to the
defendant's comment to his objection. He likewise alleged that from May 3, 2001 to August 2, 2001,
the complainant had not paid the billings sent to her; that the complainant could not be contacted
because she had closed her office without any forwarding address; 14 that as of November 1, 2001,
he had been appointed as a consultant in the office of BOI Governor J. Antonio Leviste; and that he
continued to represent the complainant even after the trial court's decision by filing a motion for
reconsideration and opposing the plaintiff's motion for execution. 15
After examining the whole record of the case, we find the respondent's positions to be very revealing
with respect to what they say and do not say.
First, the respondent failed to precisely allege in his submissions how he tried to contact the
defendant on or about the time the interrogatories and request for admission were pending. It
appears that he really had not; by his own admission, his attempt to contact the complainant came in
December 2001 and only to inform her of his government appointment and to collect his billings. It
was only after the discovery of the closure of the defendant's office did the respondent try to contact
the complainant and her husband by cellular phone, but they could not be reached.
Second. The interrogatories/admission issue happened in August 2001, which tells us that the
respondent at about that time was already very sensitive about his billing issue against his client as
he had not been paid from May to August 2001. Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure
should not be a reason not to inform the client of an important development, or worse, to withhold
vital information from her. As the court held in Luisito Balatbat v. Atty. Edgardo Arias,16 a client must
never be left in the dark for to do so would destroy the trust, faith and confidence reposed in the
retained lawyer in particular and the legal profession in general.
Third. The respondent failed to provide details on the developments that led to the adverse rulings
on the interrogatories/admissions and the judgment on the pleadings. We gather under Annex "G" of
the respondent's Comment filed with this Court that the trial court ruled in open court on March 8,
2002 that a judgment on the pleadings was appropriate. This was confirmed by an Order of the
same date (attached as Annex "B" to the complainant's Position Paper before the IBP) which partly
states;
The Court NOTES the manifestation of Atty. Honorato M. Guttierez, counsel for the plaintiff that the
defendants have not been appearing in the case for one (1) year as per December 14, 2001 Order
of this Court. The Court even denied the Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance of Atty. Lara, counsel
for the defendants, with the end purpose of obviating the further delays of the proceedings of this
case. Moreover, in the said Order, this Court ruled that the Rule on judgment on the pleading under
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court will now obtain.
The respondent never bothered to explain this court order whose highlighted portions give hints on
the reasons for the adverse developments for the defendants. While the records do not explicitly
state what remedies the respondent took to react to the Order and to the trial court ruling on the
interrogatories/admission issue, we feel it safe to assume that the respondent did not move at all to

question the trial court's rulings; nowhere in the records, both from the complainant's and the
respondent's end, is there any allegation that the respondent sought to review the trial court's
rulings. What intrigues us is that the respondent could have reacted to the trial court's ruling on the
interrogatories/request for admission; he was aware of the recourses open to him under the ruling in
Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 101682, December 4, 1992, that he cited in his objection to the
interrogatories and request for admission.
Fourth, on the matter of the respondent's withdrawal from the case, the respondent might have had
valid reasons to withdraw and terminate his relationship with his client. As the respondent now
states, he could withdraw under paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Code of Professional Responsibility 17 i.e., deliberate failure of the client to pay the fees for the services, or failure to comply with the
retainer agreement, or appointment or election to public office. However, he does not appear to have
cited these reasons before the trial court. Instead, he merely filed a Notice of Withdrawal of
Appearance, citing his client's unknown location and failure to communicate as reasons for his
client's lack of express consent to his withdrawal.18 It is undisputed that the trial court denied the
respondent's notice of withdrawal; thus, he remained as counsel of record burdened with all the
responsibilities that his representation carried.
By his own admission, the respondent succeeded in contacting the complainant in late December,
2001, i.e., soon after he filed his notice of withdrawal with the trial court. As Commissioner
Limpingco observed, it was quite puzzling that he did not then revive his efforts to be relieved of his
responsibilities in the case, given the complainant's reported engagement of a new counsel. He
could have then secured his client's consent to his withdrawal but did not.
Fifth. As Commissioner Limpingco did, we wonder why the respondent did not appeal the decision
against his client. It even appears from one of the annexes (Annex "I" of the respondent's comment)
that he did not immediately inform the complainant of the decision against her. To quote the
complainant's letter (Annex "I"):
"However, for reasons you have not fully explained, you virtually
abandoned the case and interest therein after having initially filed an answer in my behalf.
You never informed me of any further developments in the case. As a result, I lost the said case by
reason of default and technicality.
You never informed me of this loss, thus denying me the opportunity to appeal the adverse decision.
.."
The respondent never bothered to refuse this very damaging allegation; neither in his Position Paper
before the IBP nor in the Comment filed with us did he offer an explanation. Thus, it appears that the
respondent could not have really taken any instructions from his client on how to handle the trial
court's adverse decision. He simply took it upon himself to decide not to appeal the trial court's
decision and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
While the respondent expressed regret for the reverses the complainant suffered, regret is a belated
response that will not bring back the complainant's lost case. It cannot erase the fact that he
mishandled the complainant's defense. By the exacting standards of the legal profession, he has
been weighed and found wanting.
What lightens the impact of the respondent's mishandling of the case is the complainant's own
failings as a client. The non-payment of fees is a factor that we cannot simply disregard. As a rule,

law practice is not a pro bono proposition and a lawyer's sensitivity and concern for unpaid fees are
understandable; lawyers incur expenses in running their practice and generally depend, too, on their
law practice income for their living expenses. Likewise, the respondent's appointment as a
consultant should be considered although it is a matter that none of the parties have fully examined.
Both the non-payment of fees and the appoint to a public office, however, were not reasons properly
presented before the trial court through a motion that informed the court of all the surrounding
circumstances of the desired withdrawal. Instead, another reason was given by way of a mere notice
lacking the client's express consent. Thus, the court's denial of the desired withdrawal was not totally
unexpected.
More than these reasons and as Commissioner Limpingco correctly noted, the complainant never
made any effort to contact the respondent to follow up the status of her case, expecting instead the
respondent to take full and complete initiative in this regard. While the respondent, as counsel, has
the obligation to inform his client of the material developments in the case, particularly of the aspects
of the case that would require the client's instructions or participation, this obligation is balanced by a
complementary duty on the part of a party-litigant to remain in contact with his lawyer in order to be
informed of the progress of the case.
The complainant's failing in this regard is her failure to inform her counsel of her change of business
address, a serious lapse but one that a resourceful counsel could have easily handled. In a
balancing, the greater fault still lies with the respondent as he did not appear, based on the records
of the case, to be a lawyer whose practice routine included regular reporting to clients on matters
other than billings. We note that he did not bother to report (or even allege that he bothered to
report) on the interrogatories and request for admission - incidents that can make or break a case as
it did break the defendant's case before the trial court. Despite knowledge of his client's location
gained in late December 2001, he did not likewise bother to inform the complainant of the adverse
decision against her in June 2002, taking it upon himself to simply file a motion for reconsideration
and to accept the court's ruling when his motion was denied. In our view, these are law
practice mortal sins that we cannot allow to simply be glossed over or be penalized by a simple
reprimand.
However, we cannot also disbar the respondent as the complainant demands in light of the
complainant's own contributory faults. Disbarment is an ultimate remedy in the professional world, no
less serious and weighty as the power to impose reclusion perpetua in criminal cases; in both,
recovery from the penalty - although not totally impossible - is extremely difficult to attain. Thus, we
must at all times act with caution and due consideration, taking into account not only the interests of
the immediate parties, but the interest of the public, the bar and the administration of justice as well.
The general public must know that the legal profession is a closely regulated profession where
transgressions merit swift but commensurate penalties; it is a profession that they can trust because
we guard our ranks and our standards well. The Bar must sit up and take notice of what happened in
this case to be able to guard against any repetition of the respondent's transgressions, particularly
his failure to report the developments of an ongoing case to his clients. Unless the Bar takes a proactive stance, we cannot really blame members of the public who are not very well disposed
towards, and who may even distrust, the legal profession after hearing experiences similar to what
the complainant suffered. The administration of justice is served well when we demonstrate that
effective remedies exist to address the injustice and inequities that may result from transgressions
by those acting in the dispensation of justice process.
In these lights, we hold that while the respondent is liable for a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects his standing and character as an officer of the Court and as a member of the Bar,
this liability ought to be tempered by the mitigating circumstances we pointed out above. We

therefore cannot impose disbarment as penalty. Given the mitigating circumstances and the extent
of their effects on the respondent's culpability, we hold that a three-month suspension from the
practice of law is the penalty that is more in keeping with the damage the complainant suffered and
the interests that the public, the bar and the administration of justice have to protect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent ATTY. GERARDO F. LARA is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, effective upon receipt
of a copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice<brChairperson</br
RENATO C. CORONA*
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

Footnotes
*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 558 dated January 15, 2009.
1
Filed on January 19, 2006.
2
Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 1-5.
3
Id., pp. 9-15.
4
Id.
5
Annex "F," respondent's position paper.
6
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 20-24.
7
Id., pp. 4-15.
8
Canon 22.01(e) & (f).
9
Resolution No. XIII-2007-90, adopted on September 19, 2007 by the IBP Boardof
Governors.
10
Id., Annex "A."
11
Promulgated by the Court on June 21, 1988.
12
Canon 18.01 further provides - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he
is not qualified to render xxx
Rule 18.02. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04. - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
13
Complainant's Position Paper; Rollo Vol. II, pp. 21-22.
14
Respondent's Position Paper, id., p. 6.
15
Id.

16

A.C. No. 1666, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 1.

Supra note 8, p. 6.
18
Supra note 3, p. 3.
17