Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 2361 February 9, 1989

LEONILA J. LICUANAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Ads By softonicAn affidavit-complaint, dated November 11, 1981, was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with
the Office of the Court Administrator on 5 February 1982 against respondent, Atty. Manuel L.
Melo, for breach of professional ethics, alleging that respondent, who was her counsel in an
ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to remit to her the rentals collected by respondent on
different dates over a twelve-month period, much less did he report to her the receipt of said
amounts. It was only after approximately a year from actual receipt that respondent turned over his
collections to complainant after the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the
payment and had demanded the same.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals
from complainant's tenant,Pineda, as alleged in the complaint, but explained that he kept this
matter from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the
rentals.
We forwarded the case to the Office of the Solicitor General, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were conducted and the parties presented their respective evidence.
After investigation, the General submitted the following Findings and Recommendation:
Findings:
The issue to be resolved is whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the
respondent in accounting for the funds collected by him for his former client, the
complainant herein, for which unprofessional conduct respondent should be
disciplined.
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice
and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. Under paragraph
11 of the Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated to report promptly the money of

client that has come to his possession and should not commingle it with his private
property or use it for his personal purpose without his client's consent viz:
Money of the client or other trust property coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported promptly, and except with the
client's know and consent should not be commingled with his private
or be used by him.
And paragraph 32 of the Canons of Legal Ethics further requires a lawyer to
maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust:
... But above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved
reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest
man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.
In the instant case, respondent failed to observe his oath of office. It is undisputed
that the relation of attorney and client existed between Licuanan and Melo at the
time the incident in question took place. The records disclose that on August 8, 1979,
respondent, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor
against Aida Pineda whereby the latter was directed by the Court of Manila to
pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October, 1978 and succeeding months
thereafter.

Ads By softonicWhen several months had elapsed without them hearing a word
from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter on February 4, 1980,
demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be
constrained to take the necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of
his client (Exhibit "A", p. 8, record). On February 11, 1980, Pineda yielded to the
demand of Melo. She went to respondent's office and paid him P3,060.00 for which
respondent gave her a receipt for the said amount representing her rental payments
for October, 1978 to February, 1980 at the rate of P180.00 per month (Exh. "B", p. 9,
Ibid.) At the end of March 31,1980, Pineda again went back to respondent and paid
the rentals of her apartment for the months of March and April, 1980 in the sum of
P360.00 (Exh. "C" p. 10, Ibid.). Not only that, respondent again received
from Pinedaon June 30, 1980 rental payments covering the months of May, June
and July, 1980 in the total sum of P540.00 (Exh. "D" p. 11, Ibid.). And, on September
29, 1980, he received and issued Pineda a receipt for P540.00 covering rental
payments for the months of August, September and October, 1980. (Exh. "E", Ibid.).
After four months had elapsed, or on January 23, 1981, he collected again
from Pineda the total sum of P720.00 covering the months of October, November,
December, 1980 and January 1981 (Exh. "F", p. 12, Ibid.).
During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the said
rental payments of Pineda, he did not bother to inform or report to complainant
about the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained the money. He allowed
the money to accumulate for a year and kept complainant in the dark as to the
progress of the case. He did not even attempt to tell her about the money that had
come into his possession notwithstanding the fact that complainant used to call him
and inquire regarding the case (pp. 14-15, tsn., Sept. 10, 1985).

It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by
complainant, wrote respondent a letter on May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the
money to complainant that he accounted for it (Exh. "H", p. 15, Ibid.). But this was
rather late because as early as April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that
respondent had been receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted an
administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief of the Philippine
Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged failure
to pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case
No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to pay her just obligation
(Exh. "G", p. 14, Ibid.).
This led therefore Pineda to bring an action against her (Licuanan) for damages
before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation arising from
the unfounded administrative case Licuanan filed against her (Aida Pineda), since as
borne out by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer
of Licuanan, herein respondent (pp. 48-52, record). Clearly, this unfortunate incident
would not have happened had respondent been only true to his oath as a lawyer, i.e.,
to be honest and candid towards his client.
Thus, we find it hard to believe respondent's defense that he kept the money of
complainant for a year merely because he wanted to surprise her with his success in
collecting the rental payments from Pineda. On the contrary, it is very much
discernible that he did not surrender immediately the money to complainant because
he was using it for his own benefit. Common sense dictates that by unnecessarily
withholding the money of complainant for such length of time, respondent deprived
her of the use of the same. It is therefore too credulous to believe his explanation,
which is flimsy and incredible Respondent's actuation casts doubt on his honesty and
integrity. He must know that the "highly fiduciary" and "confidential relation" of
attorney and client requires that the attorney should promptly account for all funds
and property received or held by him for the client's benefit, and failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct, as succinctly held by the Honorable Supreme
Court in the case of Fermina Legaspi Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves
Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 304, to wit:
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for
money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity
to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his
clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it
with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without
his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and
fidelity to private trust (Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of
his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to
them (Aya vs. Bigonia, 57 Phil. 8, 11).
xxx xxx xxx
A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
his office as attorney or for any violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).

The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential in character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith (7 Am. Jur.
2d 105). In view of that special relationship, 'lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or
property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients
does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the funds received. (Emphasis
supplied).
In fine, we are convinced that respondent is guilty of breach of trust reposed in him
by his client. Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has
besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25;
In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29,
1965, 15 SCRA 131). By his deceitful conduct, he placed his client in jeopardy by
becoming a defendant in a damage suit; thus, instead of being a help to his client, he
became the cause of her misery. He, therefore, deserves a severe punishment for it.
(Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11; In re Bamberger, April 17, 1924, 49 Phil. 962;
Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, supra.)
Clearly, respondent is guilty of professional misconduct in the discharge of his duty
as a lawyer.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, we respectfully recommend that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of not less than one (1) year, and that he be strongly
admonished to strictly and faithfully observe his duties to his clients. (pp. 78-85,
Rollo)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6051

April 2, 2007

CELIA ARROYO-POSIDIO,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Ads By softonicIn a verified complaint1 dated June 14, 2002, complainant Celia Arroyo-Posidio prayed for
the disbarment of respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan on account of deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
commission of acts in violation of the lawyers oath.

Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of respondent in Special Proceeding No. C-525,
entitled "Testate Estate of deceased Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo," filed before the Court of
Caloocan City. Complainant paid respondent legal fees in the amount of P20,000.00. However, on
June 6, 1990, respondent withdrew his appearance as counsel in the said case, thus complainant
engaged the services of another lawyer.
Sometime in August 1996, respondent contacted complainant and showed her documents
consisting of tax declarations of properties purportedly forming part of the estate of Nicolasa S. de
Guzman-Arroyo, but were not included in the Inventory of Properties for distribution in Special
Proceeding No. C-525. He convinced complainant to file another case to recover her share in the
alleged undeclared properties and demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees therefor. After several
months, however, respondent failed to institute any action. Complainant decided to forego the filing
of the case and asked for the return of the P100,000.00, but respondent refused despite repeated
demands.
Consequently, complainant filed an action for sum of money and damages against respondent
before Branch 81, Metropolitan Trial Court, Valenzuela City which was docketed as Civil Case No.
7130. On March 31, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREEFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering the latter to:
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
September 7, 1996 until the same is fully paid and/or satisfied;
2. To pay plaintiff the amount of P8,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
3. To pay the cost of suit.2
Respondent appealed to the Court which affirmed3 the Court decision in toto. Thus, complainant
filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution which was granted on March 19, 2001.4
To satisfy the judgment against him, respondent issued Bank check number 03387425 dated May
31, 2001 in the amount of P120,000.00 in favor of complainant. However, upon presentment for
payment, the check was dishonored for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. Despite a written notice of
dishonor and demand6 dated September 3, 2001, respondent refused to honor his obligation. Hence,
this administrative complaint charging respondent with deceit, fraud, dishonesty and commission of
acts in violation of the lawyers oath.

Ads By softonicRespondent denied complainants allegations. He admitted having received the amount
of P100,000.00 but claimed that the same was partial payment for his services in Special
Proceeding Case No. C-525. Further, he alleged that he had already paid complainant the amount
of P150,000.00 as evidenced by a Receipt & Quitclaim 7 dated August 10, 2000.
On March 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. On January 15, 2006, the Commissioner submitted his Report8finding
respondent guilty of violating the lawyers oath and theCode of Professional Responsibility in
defrauding his client and issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same. Thus
4.3 x x x

Noteworthy is the factual finding of the court that Complainanthad already paid respondent the
amount of P20,000.00 for services he had rendered in Proceeding case No. C-525. Thus,
Respondents claim that the P100,000.00 given to him by Complainant allegedly for payment of
his legal services in the Proceeding is not correct. The MTC decision likewise found
that Respondent requested payment of the P100,000.00 in consideration for his
representing Complainant in the additional claims to be filed against the estate of Nicolasa S.
de Arroyo. Respondent, however, failed to file the claims. Hence, complainant demanded the
return of the P100,000.00. The MTC decision has already become final and executory as evidenced
by a copy of the Order of Writ of Execution issued by the Court.
4.4 x x x
4.5 As already pointed out, the RTC had rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the
MTC that theP100,000.00 given by Complainant to Respondent is not for the payment of his
previous services rendered in the Special Proceeding case No. C-525 but rather as payment for
filing of an additional claim from the estate of the late Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. It is clear that
there is identity of parties in the civil case for recovery of sum of money and damages and in the
administrative case for disbarment filed by herein Complainant. Thus, while the causes of action are
different in the two cases, there is conclusiveness on the factual circumstances surrounding
Complainants delivery of the P100,000.00 to Respondent. Respondent[s] bare assertion that his
receipt of theP100,000.00 was for payment of legal services previously rendered in the Special
Proceeding case No. C-525 does not hold water and cannot overturn the factual conclusions
reached by the MTC in its decision.
4.6 A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for deceit or misrepresentation to the prejudice of or as
a means to defraud his client. In the case of Munar v. Flores, the Supreme Court suspended an
attorney who deceitfully defrauded a client of a sum of money allegedly representing cost of
fees and other miscellaneous expenses for a suit to be filed but which promised suit he never
filed nor did he return the amount despite demands. Failure on the part of the lawyer, upon
demand, to return to his client the funds or property held by him on the latters behalf gives rise to
the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
It is clear in this case that Complainant made demands for the return of the P100,000.00, but the
same remained unanswered by Respondent. This prompted Complainant to file a civil case for
collection of sum of money and damages. Worse, after the decision was rendered in favor of
Complainant, and a writ of execution issued, Respondent issued a check purportedly to settle the
case only to have the check bounce for insufficiency of funds. The conversion of the clients property
is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics, and deserves severe
punishment. This conversion of clients property is a ground for disciplinary action and presupposes
fraudulent intent on the part of the lawyer. In the case of Manalato v. Reyes, the Supreme Court
emphasized that fraudulent intent may be inferred from the lawyers refusal to make restitution after
demand. Such circumstance is present in this case.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, this Commissioner respectfully recommends that a penalty ranging from
suspension for a period of six (6) months to one (1) year at the discretion of the Board be imposed
with warning that repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty.9

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified
the penalty from suspension to reprimand10 with stern warning that a similar misconduct will warrant
a more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings of the IBP. However, we find that the penalty of reprimand is not
commensurate to the gravity of wrong committed by respondent.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin every lawyer to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.11 Lawyers are prohibited from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct 12 and are mandated to serve their
clients with competence and diligence.13 To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the
legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the profession.14
Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires the lawyer to account for
all money or property collected or received for or from his client. Where a client gives money to his
lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to file an action, appeal an adverse judgment, consummate a
settlement, or pay the purchase price of a parcel of land, the lawyer should, upon failure to take such
step and spend the money for it, immediately return the money to his client. 15
In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P100,000.00 as legal fees for filing additional
claims against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. However, he failed to institute an action,
thus it was imperative that he immediately return the amount to complainant upon demand therefor.
Having received payment for services which were not rendered, respondent was unjustified in
keeping complainants money. His obligation was to immediately return the said amount. His refusal
to do so despite complainants repeated demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he
pledges not to delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his
clients.
A lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. 16 A lawyer should be scrupulously careful
in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity
and good faith on his part is exacted.17 In Barnachea v. Quiocho,18 the Court suspended a lawyer
from the practice of law for one year for his failure to return clients funds which were given to him for
the expenses for the transfer of title over real property and in payment for his legal services. The
Court held:
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession.
He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose
such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the
transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned
immediately to his client upon demand therefor. The lawyers failure to return the money of his
client upon demand gave rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money in
violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer [of] funds entrusted to him
by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in
the legal profession.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent must likewise be reminded that a lawyer should, at all times, comply with what the court
lawfully requires.20 It bears stressing that the judgment against him in Civil Case No. 7130 has long
become final and executory. However, up to this date, he has failed to comply with the order to pay

complainant the amount ofP100,000.00 as well as interest and attorneys fees. His refusal to comply
with the said order constitutes a willful disobedience to the courts lawful orders.
Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand
foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court. 21 And while
respondent issued a check in the amount of P120,000.00 in favor of complainant, purportedly to
satisfy the judgment against him, the check was later dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account. Respondent never denied the issuance of the check or refuted complainants
allegations regarding the same. Neither did he question the veracity of complainants evidence which
consisted of the check itself.
Needless to say, the act of issuing a bouncing check further compounded respondents infractions.
Time and again, we have held that the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to
cover the same constitutes willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in law and lawyers.22Such conduct indicates the respondents unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.23
It is clear from the foregoing that respondent fell short of the exacting moral and ethical standards
imposed on members of the legal profession. Respondents refusal to return complainants money
upon demand, his failure to comply with the lawful orders of the trial court, as well as the issuance of
a bouncing check, reveal his failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It cannot be overemphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. Whenever it is
made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege. 24
The Court believes that a penalty of suspension is called for under the circumstances. In Espiritu v.
Cabredo IV,25a lawyer was suspended for one year for failure to account for and return the amount
of P51,161.00 to his client. In Reyes v. Maglaya,26 a lawyer was suspended for one year for failure to
return to his client the amount ofP1,500.00 despite numerous demands. Likewise, in Castillo v.
Taguines,27 a lawyer was suspended for one year for failure to return to his client the amount
of P500.00 and for issuing a bouncing check.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of the respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as on the Court Administrator
who shall circulate it to all the courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Footnotes

Rollo, pp. 1-4.

Id. at 5.
Id.
4
Id. at 9.
5
Id. at 8.
6
Id. at 10-11.
7
Id. at 33.
8
Id. at 70-82. Penned by Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
9
Id. at 76-81.
10
Id. at 69.
11
Ong v. Unto, 426 Phil. 531, 540 (2002).
12
Rule 1.01, Canon I, Code of Professional Responsibility.
13
Canon 18, Code of Professional Responsibility.
14
Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon Jr., 392 Phil. 394, 402 (2000).
15
Schulz v. Flores, 462 Phil. 601, 612 (2003).
16
Villanueva v. Ishiwata, A.C. No. 5041, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 401, 405.
17
Navarro v. Meneses III, 349 Phil. 520, 527 (1998).
18
447 Phil. 67 (2003).
19
Id. at 75.
20
Frias v. Lozada, A.C. No. 6656, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 393, 402.
21
Sibulo v. Ilagan, A.C. No. 4711, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 1, 7.
22
Barrios v. Martinez, A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 324, 335.
23
Cuizon v. Macalino, Adm. Case No. 4334, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 479, 484.
24
Malhabour v. Atty. Sarmiento, A.C. No. 5417, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 1, 9.
25
443 Phil. 24 (2003).
26
313 Phil. 1 (1995).
27
325 Phil. 1 (1996).
2
3

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5829

October 28, 2003

DANIEL LEMOINE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Ads By softonicOn December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a verified
complaint1 against respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for estafa and misconduct before
the Barof the Philippines. The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-679, was referred by
the Commission on Bar Discipline to anInvestigator for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance Company
(Metropolitan Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered
problems in pursuing his claim which was initially rejected, 2 his friend, a certain Jesus "Jess" Garcia
(Garcia), arranged for the engagement of respondents services.
By letter3 of October 21, 1998 addressed to Elde Management, Inc., "ATTN: Mr. Daniel Lemoine,"
under whose care complainant could be reached, respondent advised complainant, whom he had
not before met, that for his legal services he was charging "25% of the actual amount being
recovered. . . payable upon successful recovery;" an advance payment of P50,000.00 "to be
charged [to complainant] to be deducted from whatever amount [would] be successfully collected;"
P1,000.00 "as appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearings, conferences
outside our law office and meetings before the Office of the Insurance Commission which will be
also charged to our 25% recovery fee;" and legal expenses "such as but not limited to filing fee,
messengerial and postage expenses . . . and other miscellaneous but related expenses," to be
charged to complainants account which would be reimbursed upon presentation of statement of
account.
The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorneys fees does not bear complainants conformity,
he not having agreed therewith.
It appears that Insurance finally offered to settle complainants claim, for by letter 4 of December
9, 1998addressed to it, respondent confirmed his acceptance of its offer to settle the claim of
complainant "in an ex-gratiabasis of 75% of his policy coverage which is therefore FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P525,000.00) PESOS."
A day or a few days before December 23, 1998 when complainant left for France,5 he, on the advice
of respondent, signed an already prepared undated Power of Attorney6 authorizing respondent
and/or Garcia to bring any action against Insurance for the satisfaction of complainants claim as
well as to "negotiate, sign, compromise[,] encash and receive payment" from it. The Special Power
of Attorney was later dated December 23, 1998 on which same date Insurance issued a
Chinabank Check No. 841172 payable to complainant in the amount of P525,000.00 as full
settlement of the claim.7 The check was received by respondent.
In the meantime, complainant returned to the Philippines in early January 1999 but left again on
the 24th of the same month.8 On inquiry about the status of his claim, Garcia echoed to
complainant what respondent had written him (Garcia) in respondents letter 9 of March 26, 1999 that
the claim was still pending with Insurance and that it was still subject of negotiations in
which Insurance offered to settle it for P350,000.00 representing fifty percent thereof. In the same
letter to Garcia, respondent suggested the acceptance of the offer of settlement to avoid a protracted
litigation.

Ads By softonicOn December 6, 1999, on complainants personal visit to the office of Insurance, he was
informed that his claim had long been settled via a December 23, 1998 check given to respondent
the year before.10 Complainant lost no time in going to the law office of respondent who was not
around, however, but whom he was able to talk by telephone during which he demanded that he turn
over the proceeds of his claim.11
Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a December 7, 1999 letter12 wherein he acknowledged
having in his possession the proceeds of the encashed check which he retained, however, as
attorneys lien pending complainants payment of his attorneys fee, equivalent to fifty percent
(50%) of entire amount collected. In the same letter, respondent protested what he branded as the
"uncivilized and unprofessional behavior" complainant "reportedly demonstrated" at respondents
office. Respondent winded up his letter as follows, quoted verbatim:
We would like to make it clear that we cannot give you the aforesaid amount until and unless our
attorneys fees will be forthwith agreed and settled. In the same manner, should you be barbaric and
uncivilized with your approached, we will not hesitate to make a proper representation with the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for the authenticity of your visa, Department of Labor and
Employment for your working status, Bureau of Internal Revenue for your taxation compliance and
the National Bureau of Investigation [with] which we have a good network...
While it [is your] prerogative to file a legal action against us, it is also our prerogative to file a case
against you. We will rather suggest if you could request your lawyer to just confer with us for the
peaceful settlement of this matter. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
As despite written demands,13 respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the insurance claim
and to acknowledge the unreasonableness of the attorneys fees he was demanding, complainant
instituted the administrative action at bar on December 17, 1999.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that "[i]t appears that there was irregularity with the
check," it having been issued payable to him, but "and/or AMADEO BALON" was therein
intercalated after his (complainants) name.14
1awphi1.n t

Maintaining that respondent was entitled to only P50,000.00 in attorneys fees, 15 complainant decried
respondents continued possession of the proceeds of his claim 16and his misrepresentations that the
recovery thereof was fraught with difficulties.17
In his Counter-Affidavit18 of February 18, 2000, respondent asserted that his continued retention of
the proceeds of complainants claim is in lawful exercise of his lien for unpaid attorneys fees. He
expressed readiness, however, to account for and turn them over once he got paid fifty percent
(50%) thereof, he citing the so called contingent fee billing method of "no cure, no pay" adopted by
practicing lawyers in the insurance industry as the basis of the amount of his attorneys fees, 19 which
to him was justified in the absence of an attorney-client contract between him and complainant, the
latter having rejected respondents letter-proposal of October 21, 1998.20
Respondent also highlighted the value of the time and efforts he extended in pursuing complainants
claim and the expenses he incurred in connection therewith. He went on to assert that his inability to
contact complainant whose whereabouts he did not know prompted him to encash the check and
keep the proceeds thereof in conformity with the Power of Attorney executed in his favor.21
During the hearings conducted by the IBP Investigator, complainant echoed his allegations in his
Complaint-Affidavit and stressed that he turned down as unreasonable respondents proposal in his

October 21, 1998 letter that he be paid 25% of the actual amount collected for his legal
services.22 And he presented documentary evidence, including the March 26, 1999 letter of
respondent informing his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia of the supposedly still unrecovered claim and
suggesting acceptance of the purported offer of Insurance to settle complainants claim at
P350,000.00.
Explaining how his above-mentioned March 26, 1999 letter to Garcia came about, respondent
declared that it was made upon Garcias request, intended for a certain Joel Ramiscal (Ramiscal)
who was said to be Garcias business partner.23
Respondent later submitted a June 13, 2001 Supplement24 to his Counter-Affidavit reiterating his
explanation that it was on Garcias express request that he wrote the March 26, 1999 letter, which
was directed to the fax number of Ramiscal.
1vvphi1.n t

Additionally, respondent declared that in the first week of May 1999, on the representation of Garcia
that he had talked to complainant about respondents retention of fifty percent (50%) of the
insurance proceeds for professional fees less expenses,25 he gave Garcia, on a staggered basis, the
total amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent averred, is the amount of insurance claim
complainant is entitled to receive less attorneys fees and expenses. 26 Thus, respondent claimed that
he gave Garcia the amount of P30,000.00 on May 31, 1999 at Dulcinea Restaurant in Greenbelt,
Makati; the amounts of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 on different occasions at his
(respondents) former address through his executive secretary Sally I. Leonardo; the amount of
P20,000.00 at the office of his (respondents) former employer Commonwealth Insurance Company
through his subordinate Glen V. Roxas; and several other payments at Dulcinea, and at Manila
Intercontinental Hotels coffee shop sometime in October 1999.27 Respondent submitted the
separate sworn statements of Leonardo and Roxas.28
Explaining why no written memorandum of the turn over of various payments to Garcia was made,
respondent alleged that there was no need therefor since he very well knew Garcia who is a coRotarian and co-attorney-in-fact and whom he really dealt with regarding complainants claim.29
Respondent furthermore declared that he rejected complainants offer to pay him P50,000.00 for his
services, insisting that since there had been no clear-cut agreement on his professional fees and it
was through him that Metropolitan Insurance favorably reconsidered its initial rejection of
complainants claim, he is entitled to a contingent fee of 50% of the net proceeds thereof. 30
Finally, respondent declared that he, in connection with his follow-up of the insurance claim, incurred
representation expenses of P35,000.00, entertainment and other representation expenses on
various occasions of P10,000.00, and transportation and gasoline expenses and parking fees of
P5,000.00;31 and that his retention of complainants money was justified in light of his apprehension
that complainant, being an alien without a valid working permit in the Philippines, might leave the
country anytime without settling his professional fees.32
The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and Recommendation33 of October 26, 2001, found
respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended that he be disbarred and directed to immediately
turn over to complainant the sum of P475,000.00 representing the amount of the P525,000.00
insurance claim less respondents professional fees of P50,000.00, as proposed by complainant.
The Board of Govenors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, acting on the Investigators Report,
issued Resolution No. XV-2002-40134 on August 3,2002, reading:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering
respondents dishonesty which amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which
caused dishonor, not merely to respondent but the noble profession to which he belongs,
Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) monthswith the directive to
turn over the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Five Thousand (P525,000.00) Pesos to the
complainant without prejudice to respondents right to claim attorneys fees which he may collect in
the proper forum. (Underscoring supplied)
The records of the case are before this Court for final action.
Respondent, by a Motion for Reconsideration35 filed with this Court, assails the Investigating
Commissioners Report and Recommendation as not supported by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof. He prays for the reopening of the case and its remand to the Investigator so that Garcia can
personally appear for his (respondents) confrontation.
There is no need for a reopening of the case. The facts material to its resolution are either admitted
or documented.
This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP Investigator that respondent violated the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients.
RULE 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal
or legislative body.
xxx
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession.
RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
RULE 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary
to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.

xxx
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence in him.
xxx
RULE 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
xxx
RULE 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his advantage or that of a third person, unless
the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Filipino lawyers principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears on the
principal complaint of complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that he may come to possess. This commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a
lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all money or property received for or from the client 36 as
well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon demand. 37 Respondent
breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainants insurance claim, he did
not report it to complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia
who was his contact with respect to complainant.
In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by his
letter of March 26, 1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to state that the claim was still pending and
recommend "acceptance of the 50% offer . . . which is P350,000.00 pesos." His explanation that he
prepared and sent this letter on Garcias express request is nauseating. A lawyer, like respondent,
would not and should not commit prevarication, documented at that, on the mere request of a friend.
By respondents failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit of his
client, he committed professional misconduct.38 Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater
degree, for it was obviously done on purpose through the employment of deceit to the prejudice of
complainant who was kept in the dark about the release of the check, until he himself discovered the
same, and has to date been deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of
fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair
name of an honorable profession.39
That respondent had a lien on complainants funds for his attorneys fees did not relieve him of his
duty to account for it.40 The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the
client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to be charged. In case of disagreement or when the
client contests that amount for being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply
the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees.41 He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the
necessary action or proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount of such fees. 42
In respondents case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of his compensation for
judicial determination so that his and complainants sharp disagreement thereon could have been

put to an end. Instead, respondent stubbornly and in bad faith held on to complainants funds with
the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to the amount of attorneys fees sought. This is an
appalling abuse by respondent of the exercise of an attorneys retaining lien which by no means is
an absolute right and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to
his client when due or upon demand.
Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorneys fees. After he received the
check and after complainant had discovered its release to him, he was already asking for 50%,
objection to which complainant communicated to him. Why respondent had to doubly increase his
fees after the lapse of about one year when all the while he has been in custody of the proceeds of
the check defies comprehension. At any rate, it smacks of opportunism, to say the least.
As for respondents claim in his June 2001 Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he had on
several occasions from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total of P233,000.00 out of
the insurance proceeds to Garcia in trust for complainant, this does not persuade, for it is bereft of
any written memorandum thereof. It is difficult to believe that a lawyer like respondent could have
entrusted such total amount of money to Garcia without documenting it, especially at a time when,
as respondent alleged, he and Garcia were not in good terms. 43 Not only that. As stated earlier,
respondents Counter-Affidavit of February 18, 2000 and his December 7, 1999 letter to complainant
unequivocally contained his express admission that the total amount of P525,000.00 was in his
custody. Such illogical, futile attempt to exculpate himself only aggravates his misconduct.
Respondents claim discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas who, acting allegedly for him,
purportedly gave Garcia some amounts forming part of the P233,000.00 are thus highly suspect and
merit no consideration.
The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional
misconduct.
The intercalation of respondents name to the Chinabank check that was issued payable
solely in favor ofcomplainant as twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance44 is clearly a brazen act of
falsification of a commercial document which respondent resorted to in order to encash the check.
Respondents threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible sanctions
from certain government agencies with which he bragged to have a "good network" reflects lack of
character, self-respect, and justness.
It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of complainants
funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal,
until its discovery by complainant after about a year, his receipt of the funds and his tenacious
custody thereof in a grossly oppressive manner point to his lack of good moral character. Worse, by
respondents turnaround in his Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to
complainants friend Garcia the amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent claims, is all that
complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared that he has nothing more to turn over to
complainant. Such incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to remit complainants funds, and
gives rise to the conclusion that he has misappropriated them.45
In fine, by respondents questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit to remain a member of
the noble profession that is the law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and
gross misconduct in the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED. The

Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform
all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of this Decision.
Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount of P525,000.00
within thirty (30) days from notice, without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to
recover his attorneys fees and purported expenses incurred in securing the release thereof from
Metropolitan Insurance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

Footnotes

Rollo at 1-4.
Rollo at 46.
Id. at 49-50.
4
Id. at 19.
5
TSN, May 9, 2000, pp. 4-6.
6
Rollo at 7-8.
7
Id. at 10.
8
TSN, May 9, 2000, p. 7.
9
Rollo at 67-68.
10
Rollo at 1.
11
Rollo at 1 and 3.
12
Id. at 11-13.
13
Id. at 20, 21, and 23.
14
Rollo at 3.
15
Id. at 2.
16
Id .at 2-3.
17
Id .at 1 and 3.
18
Id .at 41-45.
19
Id. at 41 and 43.
20
Id. at 43.
21
Rollo at 43.
22
TSN, May 9, 2000, pp. 12-13.
23
TSN, May 25, 2001, pp. 6-7.
24
Rollo at 88-92.
25
Rollo at 89-90.
26
Id. at 88 and 90.
27
Id. at 90.
28
Id. at 95-96.
29
Id. at 88 and 90.
30
Rollo at 90-91.
31
Id. at 91.
32
Id. at 90.
33
Rollo at 111-135.
34
Id. at 109-110.
35
Rollo at 137-159.
36
Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 16.01.
37
Id. at Rule 16.03.
38
Daroy v. Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304, 312 [1975].
39
Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct, p. 410 [2001].
40
Tanhueco v. De Dumo, 172 SCRA 760 [1989].
41
J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera, 317 SCRA 339 [1999].
42
Ibid.
43
Rollo at 43.
44
Rollo at 18 and 102.
45
Castillo v. Taguines, 254 SCRA 554 [1996].
2
3

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 793

July 30, 2004

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE

TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Ads By softonicMay a member of the Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as
a member of the Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a Rule
of Court provision covering this case's central issue. Up to this juncture, its reach and breadth
have not undergone the test of an unsettled case.
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,1 the Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension
of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant
to the Decision rendered by the Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings Case No.
SP0075-94,2 a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maquera's suspension in Guam to the Confidant for comment in
its Resolution dated November 19, 1996.3 Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been
admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the
foreign court's action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended that
the Court obtain copies of the record of Maquera's case since the documents transmitted by
the Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maquera's suspension and are thus
insufficient to enable her to determine whether Maquera's acts or omissions which resulted in his
suspension in Guam are likewise violative of his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. 4

Pursuant to this Court's directive in its Resolution dated March 18, 1997,5 the Confidant sent a
letter dated November 13, 1997 to the Court of Guam requesting for certified copies of the record
of the disciplinary case against Maquera and of the rules violated by him.6
The Court received certified copies of the record of Maquera's case from the District Court of Guam
on December 8, 1997.7
Thereafter, Maquera's case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from the IBP's receipt of the case
records.8
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBP's Commission on
Bar Discipline on July 28, 1998.9 However, the notice was returned unserved because Maquera had
already moved from his last known address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding
address.10
On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and Recommendation and
its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice of law within the
Philippines until and unless he updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full. 11

Ads By softonicThe IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On
October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was
suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as
payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee
for handling his client's case.12
In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the
creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as
Castro's counsel in said case. Castro's property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold
at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right
of redemption over the property for one year. The right of redemption could be exercised by paying
the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid period. 13
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castro's property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars
(US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him. 14
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maquera's legal services in the civil case
involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of
redemption in favor of the latter.15
On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's right of redemption by paying Benavente
US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property
transferred in his name.16
On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three
Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00). 17
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted hearings regarding
Maquera's alleged misconduct.18

Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that Maquera be
sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.519 and 1.8(a)20 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an
unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself
admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer
shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest
adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyer's acquisition of such
interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and understood by the client
and reduced in writing.21
The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the practice of law in Guam for
a period of two 2 years, however, with all but thirty (30) days of the period of suspension deferred; (2)
ordered to return to Castro the difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs and
the amount due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3) required to pay the costs of the
disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It also recommended that other jurisdictions
be informed that Maquera has been subject to disciplinary action by the Superior Court of Guam.22
Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property in his favor as
compensation for past legal services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself, was oral
and was not made pursuant to a prior written agreement. However, he contended that the
transaction was made three days following the alleged termination of the attorney-client relationship
between them, and that the property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his legal services to
Castro.23
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered its Decision24 suspending Maquera from the
practice of law in Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-State
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that the
attorney-client relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet completely terminated when
they entered into the oral agreement to transfer Castro's right of redemption to Maquera on
December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera profited too much from the eventual transfer of
Castro's property to him since he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more than
US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for services rendered to Castro amounted only to
US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to take the MPRE upon his admission during the
hearings of his case that he was aware of the requirements of the Model Rules regarding business
transactions between an attorney and his client "in a very general sort of way." 25
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the
said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that [Maquera]
committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines." 26 However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him
indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is,
in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under
Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.27
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme
Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing

as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of
such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied).
The Court must therefore determine whether Maquera's acts, namely: acquiring by
assignment Castro's right of redemption over the property subject of the civil case where
Maquera appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right of redemption; and, subsequently
selling the property for a huge profit, violate Philippine law or the standards of ethical
behavior for members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension or
disbarment in this jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his client's property by exercising the right
of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services. Such
transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 149128 prohibits the lawyer's acquisition by assignment of
the client's property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article
1492,29 the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public policy
because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance
of his client30 and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.
The case of In re: Ruste31 illustrates the significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In that case,
the attorney acquired his clients' property subject of a case where he was acting as counsel
pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made
at the instance of his clients because they had no money to pay him for his services. The Court ruled
that the lawyer's acquisition of the property of his clients under the circumstances obtaining therein
rendered him liable for malpractice. The Court held:
Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven
by financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latter's behest, as
contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case an attorney occupies a
vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the "rule
so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between
attorney and client, and of the rights of both".32
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maquera's acquisition of Castro's right of redemption,
his subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed property for huge profits
were tainted with deceit and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant
fee for his legal services. The court held that since the assignment of the right of redemption to
Maquera was in payment for his legal services, and since the property redeemed by him had a
market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of redemption
was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his legal services way
beyond his actual fees which amounted only to US$45,000.00.

Maquera's acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law in
that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines.
Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a]
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed
in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good's
standing in the legal profession.33
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering Maquera's suspension from the
practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines. Under Section 27,34Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his
suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only
if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in
this jurisdiction.35 Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima
facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a lawyer.36 More fundamentally, due process demands
that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary
evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of
the charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent
lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex
parte.37
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the
charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive
the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need
to ascertain Maquera's current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice, this time
specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why he should not
be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through thisResolution), may be sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of
law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present.38 Under Section 10,
Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be
ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 39
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of thisResolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise
to the disciplinary proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent
suspension in said jurisdiction.
The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty. Maquera in Guam
and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution.
In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR or until
he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maquera's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

Footnotes

Rollo, p. 1.
Guam Bar Ethics Committee, petitioner, v. Leon G. Maquera, respondent.
3
Rollo, p. 11.
4
Id. at 14-15.
5
In said Resolution, Court directed the Bar Confidant to obtain copies of the entire record of Maquera's case from the
appropriate authorities in Guam.
6
Rollo, p. 16.
7
Report of the Bar Confidant dated January 21, 1998, Id. at 39. In compliance with the requirements for the admissibility
of public documents issued by a foreign jurisdiction under Sections 24 and 25 in relation to Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the Deputy Clerk of Court of the District Court of Guam certified that the documents comprising
the record of Maquera's case transmitted to this Court are true copies of the original on file with the District Court of Guam
(See Id. at 20 and 33).
8
En Banc Resolution dated February 10, 1998, Id. at 40.
9
Notice of Hearing dated June 24, 1998, Id. at 65.
10
IBP Report and Recommendation, Id. at 72.
11
Id.
12
Id., at 69-70.
13
Decision of the Superior Court of Guam dated May 7, 1996, Id. at 50.
14
Ibid.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id
19
The record of the case does not contain a copy of the text of Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct but
the Decision of the Guam Superior Court states that Rule 1.5 prohibits a lawyer from obtaining an unreasonably high fee
for his services (Rollo, p. 52).
20
Rule 1.8 (a). A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership,
possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
1. the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and
are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can reasonably be understood by
the client;
2. the client is given a reasonable opportunity too seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction;
and
3. the client consents in writing thereto. (Ibid)
21
Decision of the Superior Court of Guam dated May 7, 1996, Id. at 52-53.
22
Id. at 53.
23
Id. at 54.
24
Id. at 49-50.
25
Id. at 49-60.
26
IBP Report and Recommendation, Id. at 72.
27
Id. at 73.
28
Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code provides:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or
through the mediation of another:

(5) Judges, justices, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession. (Emphasis supplied)
29
Art. 1492. The prohibitions in the two preceding articles are applicable to sales in legal redemption, compromises and
renunciations (Civil Code; emphasis supplied).
30
Cruz v. Jacinto, Adm. Case No. 5235, March 22, 2000, 328 SCRA 636; Nakpil v. Valdes, Adm. Case No. 2040, March
4, 1998, 286 SCRA 758; Sotto v. Samson, G.R. No. L-16917, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 733.
31
70 Phil. 243 (1940).
32
Id. at 247, citing Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil 775 (1920).
2

33

Villanueva v. Sta. Ana, CBD Case No. 251, July 11, 1995, 245 SCRA 707; Cordova v. Cordova, Adm. Case No. 3249,
November 29, 1989, 179 SCRA 680.
34
Supra, p. 10.
35
Ibid.
36
The characterization of the judgment of a foreign court or disciplinary agency suspending or disbarring of a member of
the Philippine Bar for acts committed in that foreign jurisdiction as prima facie evidence of the ground for suspension or
disbarment is consistent with Section 48, Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the judgment of a
foreign court cannot be enforced by execution in the Philippines, but only creates a right of action. Section 48 further
states that a foreign judgment against a person is only presumptive evidence of a right against that person. Hence, the
same may be repelled by evidence of clear mistake of law (see Nagarmull v. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Inc., 144 Phil
72 [1970]).
37
Section 8, Rule 139-B provides:
Investigation. Upon joinder issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with
deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and
administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his
behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to
appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte .
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its commencement,
unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
Willful failure to refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt
with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP
Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice.
The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure
set forth in this Rule for hearing before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated
within fifteen (15) days form its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like
period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.
See also Baldomar v. Paras, Adm. Case No. 4980, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 212; Cottam v. Laysa, Adm.
Case No. 4834, February 29, 2000, 326 SCRA 614.
38
IBP Report and Recommendation dated October 12, 2000, Rollo, pp. 72-73.
39
See also Santos v. Soliman, Adm. Case No. 4749, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 529; In the Matter of the IBP
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. M.A. Edillon, Adm. Case No. 1928, December 19, 1980, 101 SCRA 617.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 7027

January 30, 2009

TANU REDDI, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO C. SEBRIO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Tanu Reddi (complainant), an American citizen of Indian descent and a practicing endodontist
in York, seeks the disbarment of Atty. Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. (respondent) for allegedly
deceiving her into giving him a total of US$ 3,000,000 for the purpose of, among other things,
purchasing several real estate properties for resale.
From the records of the case, the following facts are gathered:

Taking after her parents who had been involved in various charitable activities in India,
complainant nurtured philanthropic desires of her own consisting primarily in opening a hospital with
modern facilities in an underdeveloped part of Asia.1

Ads By softonicTogether with Immaculada Luistro (Immaculada), a Filipino citizen,2 who was her assistant
of over 10 years, complainant visited the Philippines for the first time in 2000. Noting the level of
poverty in the country and the lack of medical services for the poor,3 she decided to put up a
hospital.4
Immaculada suggested to complainant to consider engaging in the real estate business in
the Philippines in order to speed up the generation of funds.5 Heeding the suggestion,
complainant returned to the Philippines in 2003 to explore opportunities in the real estate
business.6
Complainant was introduced to respondent who would help her acquire real properties for
development and/or resale. Since she could not acquire ownership of lands in the Philippines,
respondent advised her to use corporate vehicles to effect the purchases. Three corporations were
thus formed Tagaytay Twins, Inc., Manila Chic Twins, Inc., and Tanu, Inc.7
By complainants account, respondent cajoled her into buying several parcels of land located at
Tagaytay City, Las Pias City, Makati City, Quezon City, and City. She related the details
surrounding the intended acquisition of property as follows:
Re the Tagaytay City Property
Respondent represented to complainant that his client Teresita Monzon (Teresita) owned an untitled
27-hectare property located at City. Through the Tagaytay Twins, Inc., complainant
and Teresita executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated March 21, 2003 (Tagaytay
MOA)8 prepared by respondent under which she agreed to finance the titling of the property in the
total amount of P20,000,000, and that once titled, the property would be offered for sale, the
proceeds of which would be divided equally between her and Teresita. Complainant thereupon
made staggered payments of US$1,000, P2,000,000, and US$36,360 to Teresita.9
Complainant was later to discover that 996 square meters of the 27-hectare property had been
purchased by Aldio Properties, Inc. in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, which
sale Teresita challenged in an action for annulment before the Court of Tagaytay City. In said
action, respondent was Teresitas counsel of record.10
Re the Las Pias City Property
Respondent offered to complainant the option to purchase a house and lot located at City, which
were encumbered by a mortgage, and which respondent represented as owned and being sold by
one Francisca Parales (Francisca)11 to finance an urgently needed heart surgery of her daughter.12
On respondents advice, complainant obtained a franchise to operate a Jollibee food outlet, with the
agreement that out of the profits that its operation would generate, she would get 50% while
respondent and Immaculadawould share the remaining 50%.13 Complainant thus sent respondent
sums of money for the acquisition of both the Pias property and a franchise to operate a Jollibee
outlet.14

Re the Makati City Property

Respondent introduced complainant to a certain Mario C. Mangco (Mangco), alleged legal officer of
the intestate estate of one Faustino Ramos (Ramos), which estate was alleged to be the owner of a
real property located at the consular area adjacent to Park in Makati City.15 Complainant having
been interested in acquiring the property, respondent prepared a Memorandum of Agreement
(Makati MOA) which she, together with Mangco, forged on March 20, 2004.16
Under the Makati MOA, complainant agreed to, as she did, release P10,000,000 representing the
cost of development and titling of the property, and payment of back taxes; and an
additional P2,000,000 for the execution of the Makati MOA.
Complainant was later to learn that the property was neither owned by the intestate estate of Ramos
nor for sale.
Re the Quezon City Property

Ads By softonicRespondent broached to complainant the idea of buying the land on which SM North Mall
in Quezon City stands, he representing that it belongs to his client, purportedly a retired US Navy
employee who resides in Mindanao.17 Complainant assented and transmitted large sums of money
to respondent for the purpose of, among other things, filing a petition for injunction against SM North
Mall, paying back taxes, and titling of the land.18
Re the Pasay City Property
Complainant sent respondent hefty amounts of money for the purchase of a vacant lot located along
Roxas Boulevard in Pasay City, alleged to belong to Florenda Estrada (Florenda) and Alma Mallari
(Alma), but which was mortgaged to one Atty. Go to secure a loan of P5,000,000.19 She also
defrayed expenses, on the strength of respondents representations, to secure title to the lot, settle
the mortgage obligation, relocate squatters on the lot, and bribe a judge to "close the transaction." 20
Complainant subsequently discovered that there was no such vacant lot along Roxas Boulevard in
Pasay City; instead, she found out that the "vacant lot" referred to was titled in the names of
Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC) and Banco De Oro Universal Bank (BDO). 21
In light of the foregoing developments, complainants counsel, by letter dated December 19,
2005,22 demanded from respondent the return of the amount of US$3,000,000, claimed to be part of
the total sum of money she had sent to him for all the transactions that did not come about. No
amount has been returned to complainant.
Hence, spawned the filing on January 27, 200623 of the present complaint for disbarment against
respondent.
By his Comment, respondent admits receiving a total of US$544,828 from complainant 24 which
amount he claims was used not only for the purchase of the Las Pias property and discharge of the
mortgage thereon, but also for the setting up of the earlier mentioned corporations, as well as for the
downpayment on the Makati property and related expenses.25
Respondent likewise admits having represented to complainant that the Las Pias City property
belonged to one Francisca,26 certificate of title to which and the corresponding deed of sale signed
by Francisca, by his claim, are in his possession; but the title has not been transferred to Tanu, Inc.,

as agreed, in view of complainants failure to provide the money needed therefor, he adding that he
is also exercising his retaining lien over the Las Pias documents. 27
Specifically with respect to the Makati property, respondent claims having paid P500,000 to Mangco
representing initial payment28 thereof.
Regarding the Tagaytay City property, respondent admits that the Tagaytay MOA exists, and avers
that it is complainant who wants to get out of a perfected sale in order to recover her partial payment
amounting to approximately P4,000,000.29
With respect to the Quezon City property, respondent states that he is willing to surrender all the
documents pertaining thereto, but would do so only if complainant is first ordered to pay him his
professional fees.30
As for the Pasay City property, respondent denies complainants claims thereon as mere
"preposterous allegations."
Following the filing by complainant of her Reply, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision by Resolution of January
22, 2007.31
At the mandatory conference scheduled by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline on September 13,
2007 before Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing (the Commissioner), 32 respondent failed to appear
despite notice. He instead sent a representative who sought a resetting as, allegedly, respondent
was in Ilocos attending to an important family matter.33 The Commissioner, finding respondents
absence inexcusable, given that he had ample time to file a motion for resetting but he did not,
considered respondent to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings. 34 Complainant
thereupon presented evidence ex-parte and submitted her position paper.35
In her Report and Recommendation36 submitted to the IBP Board of Governors on December 14,
2007, the Commissioner found respondent to have committed fraudulent acts which constitute
violations of the lawyers oath and numerous provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), viz:
1. Respondent violated CANON 1 which states: "A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and for legal processes."
Respondent committed estafa punishable under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. With
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, he misappropriated millions of pesos which was [sic] given
to him on his misrepresentation that such were needed for the acquisition of the aforementioned
properties.
Respondent also committed an unlawful act (i.e., falsification as part of his fraudulent scheme) when
he tampered with the Articles of Incorporation of Tanu, Inc.. A perusal of the Articles of Incorporation
given by respondent to complainant shows that the incorporators are Tanu Reddi, Michael Lee,
Prasuna Reddy, Ahalya Devi, and Robert Juntilla. When complainant obtained a copy of the same in
September 2005, she discovered that other names were inserted. The names of respondent, Clarito
D. Cardozo, Brian Pellazar, and Michael Angelo Lopez were intercalated. (Exhibit "W")
2. He likewise violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

He engaged in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct when he offered properties for sale to
complainant on the misrepresentation that complainant was dealing with the true owners thereof.
This is very clear from the documents he asked complainant to sign; namely, the Memorandum of
Agreement (Exhibit "D") for the Tagaytay property, Deed of Conditional Sale (Exhibit "U") for the
Pasay City property, and Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit "M") for the Makati City property. The
certificates of title, tax declaration and other documents obtained by complainant from the various
government agencies reveal that all these properties aforementioned were eitherfictitious, not
susceptible to sale, simulated, or inexistent.
3. Respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR which state:
"CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client."
He failed to account for the sums of money he received from complainant and failed to return the
same upon demand. (Copy of demand letter dated 19 December 2005, Exhibit "T")
4. Respondent violated Rule 15.06 of the CPR which provides:
"A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body."
He convinced complainant to pay bribe money to our judges since, he claims, that it is a common
practice in the Philippines.37 (Underscoring supplied)
The Commissioner thus recommended that respondent be disbarred; that his name be ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys; and that he be ordered to return the total amount of US$3,000,000
to complainant.
By Resolution of January 17, 2008,38 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Commissioner, with the modification that respondent was ordered to
return only the admitted amount he received from complainant (US$544,828), without prejudice to
complainants recovery of the other amounts claimed in the appropriate forum.
The Court sustains the IBP Board of Governors, except its findings/conclusion that respondent
committed estafa and falsification. This is not the proper forum to determine whether he committed
these offenses.
The Court finds, however, that respondents dishonest and deceitful conduct with respect to the
intended transactions, real property acquisitions which turned out to be bogus, is sufficiently
established.
It bears emphasis that respondent admits having received from complainant at least US$544,828.
He claims, however, that the amount was used for the purchase of the Las Pias property and the
discharge of the mortgage thereon, the setting up of the corporations earlier mentioned, and the
downpayment on the Makati property and related representation expenses therefor. The Court finds
that the claim does not lie.

All that respondent presented to account for the money is a handwritten acknowledgment of a
supposed partial payment of P500,000 for the Makati property, purportedly executed by one
Mangco.39 By any standard, this document is a mere piece of paper, Mangco not having been
presented, if he exists at all, to confirm that he indeed issued the receipt. Since respondent failed to
credibly account, upon demand, for the money held by him in trust an element of
misappropriation40 complainants claim that respondent employed deceit on her is established.
Respondents culpability is further highlighted by his utter lack of regard for the seriousness of the
charges against him. His defenses raised in his Comment consist mainly in bare denials. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. 41 He must show proof that he
still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. 42 This,
respondent miserably failed to do.
Respondents justification for his non-presentation of any documents to substantiate the so-called
property acquisitions that he is exercising his retaining lien over them as, allegedly, his
professional fees have not been paid is incredible.
If those documents actually exist, and considering that his license to practice law is on the line,
respondent could have readily attached even photocopies thereof to his Comment in order to lend a
semblance of credibility to his claim. His "retaining lien" claim remains just that. Worse, it only
amounts to an admission that he acted as counsel for complainant; yet, he completely failed to show
that in his dealings on her behalf, he put her interests before his.
As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, the Court finds the same to be in order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. x x x.
To reiterate, by his own admission, respondent received a total of US$544,828 from complainant,
which he could not properly account for. The orchestrated manner in which he carried out his
fraudulent scheme, in connivance with other persons, and by taking advantage of complainants
naivete in the workings of the real estate business in the Philippines, depict a man whose character
falls way, way short of the exacting standards required of him as a member of the bar and an officer
of the court. Thus, respondent is no longer fit to remain as such.
The Court is mindful that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such,
the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and only for the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.43 If the practice of law, however, is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its
tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. 44 The
requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of much greater import, as far as the general public
is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.45

The Court also sustains the order of the IBP for respondent to return only the amount of
US$544,828. While complainant submitted documents showing her bank remittances involving
different sums of money, some of these remittances were not made in the name of
respondent.46 And as complainant herself declares, the amount of US$3,000,000 is a mere estimate
of her total claim.47 Thus, only the return of the admitted amount of US$544,828 is in order. As
reflected above, complainant is not precluded from litigating her claim for any balance due her in the
proper forum.
WHEREFORE, respondent Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. is DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED TO RETURN to complainant the amount of
US$544,828. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let
notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
REYNATO S. PUNO*
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING**
Acting Chief Justice

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO*
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA*
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Footnotes
*

On Official Leave.
Acting Chief Justice.
1
Rollo, p. 1.
2
Id. at 1-2.
**

Ibid.
Ibid.
5
Id. at 708-709.
6
Id. at 709.
7
Id. at 14-43.
8
Id. at 44-46.
9
Id. at 47-49.
10
Id. at 51-58.
11
Id. at 5, 112.
12
Ibid.
13
Id. at 112, 2, 126.
14
Id. at 5, 112.
15
Id. at 7, 67.
16
Id. at 67-69.
17
Id. at 6.
18
Ibid.
19
Id. at 5.
20
Id. at 5-6.
21
Id. at 6.
22
Id. at 171-172.
23
Id. at 1.
24
Id. at 112.
25
Ibid.
26
Id. at 111-112.
27
Ibid.
28
Id. at 113, 116.
29
Id. at 110-111.
30
Id. at 112-113.
31
Id. at 188.
32
Id. at 193.
33
Id. at 205-206.
34
Id. at 206-207.
35
Id. at 222.
36
Id. at 708-714.
37
Id. at 712-713.
38
Id. at 706-707.
39
Id. at 116 .
40
Vide Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 171121, 26 August 2008; Lee v. People, G.R. No. 157781, April 11, 2005, 455 SCRA
256.
41
Yu v. Palaa, A.C. No. 7747, July 14, 2008.
42
Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaa, A.C. No. 7434, August 23, 2007, 530 SCRA 771, 772.
43
Soriano v. Reyes, A.C. No. 4676, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 328, 330; Barrios v. Martinez, A.C. No. 4585, November 12,
2004, 442 SCRA 324, 325.
44
Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 582.
45
Ibid.
46
Rollo, pp. 71-96.
47
Id. at 7.
4

SECOND DIVISION
NELIA PASUMBAL DE CHAVEZBLANCO, REPRESENTED BY HER
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTY.
EUGENIA J. MUOZ,
Complainant,

ADM. CASE NO. No. 5195

Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

- versus -

ATTY. JAIME B. LUMASAG, JR.,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
April 16, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Nelia P. de Chavez-Blanco

against respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.

In a Report and Recommendation dated 11 December 2001,[1] the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commissioner Milagros San Juan found respondent guilty of the charges and recommended the penalty of
disbarment. Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors reduced the penalty to a five (5)-year suspension in its
Resolution XV-2002-229 dated 29 June 2001. In a Resolution dated 9 December 2002, the Court, however,
remanded the case to the IBP in view of its findings that no formal hearing/investigation was conducted.

Upon remand to the IBP, the case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa and hearings were
accordingly held thereafter.
Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J. Muoz, complainant alleged in her Complaint [2] that she was a
resident of the United States of America together with her husband, Mario Blanco. She also stated that she owned
two (2) adjacent parcels of land in Quezon City, each with an area of 400 square meters, covered by Transfer

Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 22162 and 22163 registered in her name. In a document dated 20 November 1989,
she authorized respondent, who were her husbands first cousin, to sell said lots. [3]

In a letter dated 20 March 1990, respondent reported that he had sold only one lot for the price of P320,000.00
and therefrom he deducted P38,130.00 for taxes and commissions. And, allegedly, per complainants instructions,
he remitted the remaining balance of P281,900.00 to a certain Belen Johnnes.[4]

In 1995, complainant was informed by respondent that the other lot remained unsold due to the presence of
squatters on the property.

In December 1998, Mario Blanco discovered that in truth, the two (2) lots had been sold on 11 March 1990 to
the spouses Celso and Consolacion Martinez for the price of P1,120,000.00, and that new titles had been issued to
the transferees. Mario Blanco confronted respondent with these facts in a letter, but the latter disregarded the same.
Thus, in May 1999, complainant, through Atty. Muoz sent a demand letter to respondent directing him to remit and
turn over to her the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties.

Soon thereafter, respondent admitted the sale of the properties and his receipt of its proceeds, but he never
tendered or offered to tender the same to complainant. Despite repeated and continued demands, respondent has
since not remitted the amount equivalent to P838,100.00 (P278,000.00 for the first parcel of land and P560,000.00
for the second).[5]

Complainant also averred that the Special Power of Attorney dated 16 January 1989, which respondent had
used to sell the lots is a forgery and a falsified document, as the signature therein were not the real signatures of
complainant and her spouse. In addition, they could not have acknowledged the document before a notary, as they
were not in the Philippines at the time.[6]
For his part, respondent vehemently denied all the accusations of deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct. [7]

Respondent countered that Mario Blanco was the true owner of the properties, which had to be titled in
complainants name, as Mario Blanco was a U.S.citizen. Mario Blanco had requested him to look for a buyer of the
properties and, in the course of selling them, respondent claimed that he had only transacted with the former and
never with complainant. Respondent averred that he had been authorized in November 1989 to sell the property,
through a Special Power of Attorney, for a price of not less than P250,000.00 net for the owner.[8]

Respondent also alleged that the deed of absolute sale if the two (2) lots had been executed on 19 March
1990 but, only one lot was initially paid in the amount of P281,980.00, which he immediately remitted to Mario
Blanco. The payment for the other lot was withheld, pending the relocation of the squatters who had been occupying

the premises. And when respondent had finally collected the proceeds of the second lot more than three (3) years
after, he asked Mario Blanco if the former could use the amount for a real estate venture whose profit, if successful,
he would share with the latter. Mario Blanco allegedly did not think twice and consented to the proposal. The
venture, however, did not push through.[9]
Respondent strongly maintained that the two (2) lots had been sold for only P563,960.00.[10]

Finally, respondent denied the charge of falsification. He claimed that complainant and her spouse, Mario
Blanco, had in fact signed the Special Power of Attorney, but it was only notarized later. [11]

In his Report and Recommendation dated 4 December 2006, Atty. Dennis A.B. Funa arrived at the
following findings:

It appears from the records that the two lots were sold by Respondent for P560,000.00,
not P1,120,000.00 as alleged by Complainant. The basis is the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March
11, 1990 which shows that the two lots composing 800 sq. meters being sold for P560,000.00.
There appears to be no documentary basis for the claimed amount of P1,120,000.00 of
Complainant. However, Respondent in his Comment stated that the two lots were sold by him
for P563,960.00. In any case, we shall uphold and apply the amount stated in the Deed of
Absolute Sale.

In Respondents letter dated March 20, 1990, he acknowledged that he already

received P320,000.00 as the total value of one lot. Moreover, the computation shows that
the P320,000.00 was only for 400 sq.m. as the computation stated: 400 sq.m.
x 800p/sqm=P320,000.00. Therefore, if the first lot was sold for P320,000.00, then the second
lot must have been sold for P240,000 x x x
x x x there was clear deception on the part of Respondent when he wrote the letter
dated March 20, 1990 informing the Blanco spouses that he had sold only one of the two
parcels of land for P320,000.00. This is belied by the fact that on March 11, 1990, or 9 days
before he wrote the letter, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by him selling the two lots
for P560,000.00. This Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized on March 19, 1990. During the
hearing, Respondent admitted that the Deed of Sale covered two lots. Clearly, Respondent was
not forthcoming towards the Blanco spouses.
xxx
x x x Instead of representing that two lots had been sold for P560,000.00. Respondent
only represented that he sold only one lot for P320,000.00 and pocketing the balance
of P240,000.00.
xxx

During the course of hearing, Respondent claims that the Deed of Sale referred to above
is a fake, and that there is a Deed of Sale showing a selling price of P320,000.00 which is the real
Deed of Sale. However, no such Deed of Sale has been presented by Respondent and no such
Deed of Sale appears in the records. Later in the hearing, Respondent retracted his statement
claiming he was merely confused.
As for the alleged falsification of a Special Power of Attorney dated January 16, 1989,
wherein the signatures of the Blanco spouses appear in the SPA when they were not in the
Philippines on January 16, 1989 but were allegedly in the United States, their absence in the
country has not been satisfactorily established since mere xerox copies of their passports, although
noted by a notary public, cannot duly establish their absence in the country on that date. Other
acceptable documents such as a certification from the Bureau of Immigration would have been
appropriate but which, however, had not been presented. In any case, Respondent denies the
charge of falsification.[12] (Citations omitted) [Emphasis supplied]

Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended that, in view of the fact that respondent was already 72
years old, he be meted out the penalty of suspension of one (1)-year suspension, not disbarment as had been prayed
for and not 5 year-suspension as had been earlier resolved by the IBP Board of Governors. Moreover, the IBP
Commissioner recommended that respondent be ordered to deliver to Complainant the amount of P240,000.00 plus
the legal interest rate of 6% per annum computed from March 1990.

On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-222 adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner. [13]

The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but a reduction of the recommended penalty
is called for, following the dictum that the appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[14]

A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit
to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers
to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides:
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent committed
dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the complainant and her spouse.

Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of 11
March 1990. Respondent, however, taking advantage of the absence of complainant and her spouse from the

Philippines and their complete trust in him, deceitfully informed them in a letter dated 20 March 1990 that he had
sold only one. It can be reasonably deduced from the exchanges between the parties that the proceeds of the first lot
had been transmitted to complainant and her spouse. Respondents contention, though, that he had been authorized to
retain the proceeds of the second is specious, as complainant and her spouse could not have given the same, having
been left in the dark as regards its sale. And despite repeated demands, to date, there is no showing that the
outstanding amount has been paid. Thus, respondents deceitful conduct warrants disciplinary sanction and a
directive for the remittance of the remaining proceeds is in order.

As to the charge of falsification, the Court agrees with the IBP that the same appears to be unsubstantiated.
Settled is the rule that, in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause
of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense. [15] Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. [16]
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct
for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to so do.

Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. The Court finds, however, that suspension from the practice
of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the
bar. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where
the evidence calls for it, the Court will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end. In this case, the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension of two (2) years for respondent to
be too severe, considering his advanced age. The Court believes that a suspension of six (6) months is sufficient.
Suspension, by the way, is not primarily intended as punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal
profession.[17]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Further, respondent is ordered to deliver to complainant the
amount of P240,000.00 plus legal interest rate of 6% per annum computed from March 1990.

Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice
thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesand on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE
TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

O.

[1]

Rollo, pp. 740-750.

[2]

Dated 20 December 1999; id. at 1-7.

[3]

Id. at 1.

[4]

Id. at 1-2.

[5]

Id. at 2-3.

[6]

Id. at 5-7.

[7]

In his Comment with Motion to Dismiss dated 19 April 2000; id. at 41-46.

[8]

Id. at 42.

[9]

Id. at 43-44.

[10]

Id. at 45.

[11]

Id.

[12]

Report and Recommendation; id. at 745-749.

[13]

Id. at 739.

[14]
Endaya v. OCA, 457 Phil. 314 (2003); see also Uytengsu III v. Baduel, A.C. No. 5134, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 621, 630,
citing Marcelo v. Javier, A.C. No. 3248, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1, 14-15.
[15]

Tam v. Judge Regencia, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1604, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 26, 37-38.

[16]

Nedia. v. Lavia, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1957, 26 September 2005, 471 SCRA 10, 20.

[17]

Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, 443 Phil. 478, 489 (2003).

THIRD DIVISION

WILSON CHAM,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 7494

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA,

Respondent.

June 27, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainant Wilson Cham against respondent
Atty. Eva Paita-Moya, who he alleged committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit and,
thereafter, vacating the same without paying the rentals due.
According to the Complaint, on 1 October 1998, respondent entered into a Contract of
[2]

Lease with Greenville Realty and Development Corp. (GRDC), represented by complainant as its
President and General Manager, involving a residential apartment unit owned by GRDC located at No.
61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, for a consideration of P8,000.00 per month for a term of one year.
Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent informed the complainant that she would
no longer renew the same but requested an extension of her stay at the apartment unit until 30 June
2000 with a commitment that she would be paying the monthly rental during the extension
period. Complainant approved such request but increased the rental rate to P8,650.00 per month for the
period beginning 1 October 1999 until 30 June 2000.

Respondent stayed at the leased premises up to October 2000 without paying her rentals from
July to October 2000. She also failed to settle her electric bills for the months of September and October
2000. The Statement of Account as of 15 October 2004[3] shows that respondents total accountability
is P71,007.88.
Sometime in October 2000, a report reached complainants office that respondent had secretly
vacated the apartment unit, bringing along with her the door keys. Also, respondent did not heed
complainants repeated written demands for payment of her obligations despite due receipt of the same,
compelling complainant to file the present Complaint.
In her Answer,[4] respondent alleged that she had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had not
vacated the apartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that she transferred to another place because
she was given notice by the complainant to vacate the premises to give way for the repair and renovation
of the same, but which never happened until presently. Respondent actually wanted to ask that
complainant to account for her deposit for the apartment unit, but she could not do so since she did not
know complainants address or contact number. For the same reason, she could not turn over to the
complainant the door keys to the vacated apartment unit.
After the mandatory preliminary conference conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, the parties
were given time to submit their respective Position Papers per Order [5] dated 17 February 2006. On 29
March 2006, complainant filed his Position Paper. [6] Respondent, despite the extension given, did not file
hers. Hence, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 8 September 2006, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his Report and
Recommendation,[7] recommending the imposition of the penalty of three-month suspension on
respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that herein respondent be held
guilty of having violated the aforequoted provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and imposed upon her the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the
practice of law.

The IBP Board of Governors, however, passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-585[8] dated 15
December 2006, amending the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
approving the dismissal of the Complaint, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit.

We do not agree with the foregoing Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. The Complaint
should not be dismissed and respondent must face the consequences of her actions.
It is undisputed that by virtue of a lease contract she executed with GRDC, respondent was able
to occupy the apartment unit for a period of one year, from 1 October 1998 to 30 September 1999, paying
a monthly rental of P8,000.00. Upon the expiration of the lease contract[9] on 30 September 1999, the
same was renewed, but on a month-to-month basis at an increased rental rate of P8,650.00. Under such
an arrangement, respondent was able to stay at the leased premises until October 2000, undoubtedly
incurring electric bills during the said period.
A review of the records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay
just debt. Complainant is able to fully substantiate that respondent has existing obligations that she failed
to settle.
Annex D[10] of the Complaint is a letter dated 11 September 2000 signed by complainant and
addressed to respondent demanding that she settle her unpaid rentals for the period of three months,
particularly, from 1 July to 30 September 2000. The letter appears to have been received by one
Purificacion D. Flores. Annex H of the same Complaint is another letter dated 30 August 2004 by
complainant reiterating his earlier demand for respondent to settle her unpaid rentals, as well as her
unpaid Meralco bills. This second letter of demand was sent through registered mail and received by one
Nonie Catindig. Respondent did not expressly deny receipt of both letters of demand in her Answer to
the Complaint. Having failed to rebut the foregoing allegations, she must be deemed to have admitted
them. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material
averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damage,
shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.

Moreover, a settled rule of evidence is that the one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. Even where it is the plaintiff (complainant herein) who alleges non-payment, the general rule
is that the burden rests on the defendant (respondent herein) to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff

to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has
been discharged by payment.[11]
Apropos is another well-settled rule in our jurisprudence that a receipt of payment is the best
evidence of the fact of payment. [12] In Monfort v. Aguinaldo,[13]the receipts of payment, although not
exclusive, were deemed to be the best evidence.

A receipt is a written and signed acknowledgment that

money or goods have been delivered. In the instant case, the respondent failed to discharge the burden of
proving payment, for she was unable to produce receipts or any other proof of payment of the rentals due
for the period of 1 July to 20 September 2000.
It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed to pay her just debts. Her unpaid
rentals and electric bills constitute just debts, which could be any of the following: (1) claims
adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the
debtor.[14]
Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle them
when they became due. Respondent should have complied with just contractual obligations, and acted
fairly and adhered to high ethical standards to preserve the courts integrity, since she is an employee
thereof. Indeed, when respondent backtracked on her duty to pay her debts, such act already constituted
a ground for administrative sanction.
Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her unpaid obligations, and without the
complainants knowledge and consent. Respondents abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her
obligations for the rent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which explicitly state:
CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

Respondents defense that she does not know where to find the complainant or his office is
specious and does not inspire belief considering that she had been occupying the apartment unit and
paying the rents due (except for the period complained of) for almost two years. How she could have
dealt with complainant and GRDC for two years without at all knowing their office address and contact

numbers totally escapes this Court. This is only a desperate attempt to justify what is clearly an
unjustifiable act.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they
are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing. [15] In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial and legal system is
ensured.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their
conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any
professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.[16]
The Court stresses that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. [17] It demands a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.[18] In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards
expected of her as a guardian of law and justice. [19]
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her professional or private capacity is a ground for the
imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification
for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege. [20] The Court has held
that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct,[21] for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice of
law,[22] or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. [23]
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross misconduct. The case at
bar merely involves the respondents deliberate failure to pay her just debts, without her issuing a
worthless check, which would have been a more serious offense. The Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months, a penalty which this
Court finds sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED for one month from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this
Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as
well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO

NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

EDUARDO

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]

[12]

[13]
[14]
[15]

Rollo, pp. 2-5.

Id. at 6-11.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 57
Id. at 62-67.
Id. at 72-74.
Id. at 71.
Annex D, id. at 14.
Id.
Alonzo v. San Juan, G.R. No. 137549, 11 February 2005, 451 SCRA 45, 55-56; Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Querimit, 424
Phil. 721, 730-731 (2002).
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 326, 335-336 (1996), cited in Towne and City Devt. Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 135043, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 356, 361-363.
91 Phil. 913 (1952).
Orasa v. Seva, 472 Phil. 75, 83 (2005).
Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting, 338 Phil. 912, 916-917 (1997).

B.

[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]

[21]
[22]
[23]

Co v. Bernardino, A.C. No. 3919, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 102, 106; Nakpil v. Valdes, 350 Phil. 412, 430 (1998).
Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, 390 Phil. 1, 10 (2000); National Bureau of Investigation v. Judge Reyes, 382 Phil. 872, 886 (2000).
Id.
Barrios v. Martinez, A.C. No. 4585, 12 November 2004, 442 SCRA 324, 338.
Whitson v. Atienza, A.C. No. 5535, 28 August 2003, 410 SCRA 10, 15, citing Jesena v. Oasa, 211 Phil. 543, 546 (1983); Lao v.
Medel, A.C. No. 5916, 1 July 2003, 405 SCRA 227, 234; Dumadag v. Lumaya, supra note 17 at 10; Arrieta v. Llosa, 346 Phil. 932,
939 (1997); National Bureau of Investigation v. Judge Reyes, supra note 17 at 886.
Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, A.C. No. 6408, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 209, 216.
Lao v. Atty. Medel, 453 Phil. 115, 121 (2003).
Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, supra note 21 at 220.

EN BANC

JERRY T. WONG,

A.C. No. 6972

Complainant,
Present:

- versus -

ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II,

Respondent.

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:

October 17, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a complaint[1] dated December 1, 2003 for the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Salvador N. Moya II filed by complainant Jerry T. Wong with the Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesCommission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1172 for violation of Batas
Pambansa 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt.

Complainant avers that he is the owner of J & L Agro-vets, a company engaged in the business of
selling agricultural and veterinary products and medicine. Sometime in 1997, he retained the services of

respondent for the purpose of collecting due and demandable debts in favor of the company. Respondent
also handled personal cases of complainant and his wife.

As their relationship prospered, respondent asked financial help from complainant for the
construction of his house and purchase of a car. Complainant willingly helped him. Pursuant to their
arrangement, complainant purchased a car on installment basis from Transfarm for respondent. He
issued postdated checks to cover its payment to Transfarm. The respondent in turn issued checks in
favor of the complainant to reimburse the latter.

The checks issued by complainant in favor of Transfarm were duly encashed upon
presentment. However, the checks issued by respondent to reimburse complainant were dishonored for
the reason Account Closed. Respondent refused to comply with the repeated demands of the
complainant to replace the dishonored checks.

Furthermore, complainant introduced respondent to Quirino Tomlin and to the owner of Unisia
Merchandising Corporation, from whom respondent obtained construction materials for the construction
of his house on credit in the amount of P164,000.00. Respondent also failed to pay this indebtedness,
which remained unsettled and thus caused embarrassment to complainant.

Respondent as well handled another case of complainant against Berting Diwa, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1482 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. It was decided
on September 21, 2000. After the decision became final and executory, complainant and his wife sought
the execution of the judgment through respondent.

On August 15, 2001, Diwa paid the amount of P15,680.50 for the satisfaction of the
judgment. As complainants counsel, respondent received the payment but he did not inform complainant
about it. Complainant had knowledge of it only when he got hold of a copy of the Manifestation with
Prayer to Terminate Proceedingsfiled by respondent before the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

On December 1, 2003, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to file his answer to the complaint for
disbarment within 15 days from receipt of thereof. He filed three motions for extension of time to file his
responsive pleading/answer. The first motion dated January 5, 2004 asked for a 15-day extension

from January 5, 2004or until January 20, 2004 within which to file his responsive pleading. He filed
on January 20, 2004 his second motion for extension of time for another 15-day or until February 4,
2004.[2] On February 4, 2004, he filed a Manifestation/Explanation for Extension of Time to File
Responsive Pleading/Answer/Motion to Dismiss, citing that as early as October 1, 2003, complainants
third cause of action pertaining to a debt with Unisia Merchandising was already filed in court.
Subsequently, he filed his Motion to Dismiss [3] dated February 27, 2004 on the following
grounds:

That complainant is not the proper party in interest and has no cause of action.
That complainant has prematurely prejudged respondent relative to the latters
intention of not paying his debt as the former impresses the honorable body that
respondent would not pay at all.
That complainants action in the Berting Diwa case should be addressed to the
Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and not to the IBP.

In the aforesaid motion, respondent never denied and even acknowledged what he described as
honest debts to Unisia Merchandising and Mr. Tomlin, [4] which he admitted he was unable to pay on time
due to financial constraints. He added that the IBP, being not a collection agency, was not the proper
forum to lodge the complaint against him that merely concerned the collection of his monetary
obligations which were then subject of pending court suits. Similarly, respondent argued that the
complaint against case should be addressed to the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

On April 28, 2004, the IBP-CBD issued an Order [5] denying respondents motion to dismiss as it
is prohibited pleading under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. Respondent
was given a new period of fifteen (15) days within which to file his verified answer.

On May 28, 2004, respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration[6] which was denied in an
Order dated June 16, 2004.[7]

On June 28, 2004, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Give Respondent Extension of
Time to File His Answer/or Responsive Pleadings,[8]requesting for a fresh period of fifteen (15) days or

until July 13, 2004 to file his answer. In the Order dated June 30, 2004, respondents motion was granted
with warning that no further request for extension shall be entertained. [9]

On July 13, 2004, respondent filed another Very Urgent Motion for Extension to File
Answer,

[10]

seeking another period of ten (10) days within which to file his answer or responsive

pleading. On July 21, 2004, the IBP-CBD issued an Order finding the ground for extension not
justifiable. Respondent was also declared in default and complainant was directed to file his verified
position paper within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order, after which, the case shall be considered
submitted for report and recommendation, with or without the position paper.

On July 23, 2004, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Terminate Proceedings on the
Ground of Prescription, considering that six (6) months had already passed from the date of discovery of
the offense.[11]

On August 10, 2004, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Recall Order Dated July 21,
2004[12] in the interest of higher justice and fair play.

On January 3, 2005, the IBP-CBD issued an Order giving both parties a period of ten (10) days to
file their respective verified position paper, as follows:

Respondent should be informed that a complaint for disbarment, suspension or

discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional
misconduct. (Section 1, Rule VIII, Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline). And records show that the acts complained of took place in 2002.
In the interest of justice, both parties are given ten (10) days from receipt of this
Order to file their respective verified position papers. After the expiration of the said
period, with or without the position paper, the case shall be considered submitted for
report and recommendation.

Respondent did not file any responsive pleading at all.

Thus, on April 27, 2005, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
submitted her Report and Recommendation.[13] She recommended that respondent be suspended from the

practice of law for one (1) year. The pertinent portions of the said Report and Recommendation read as
follows:

After a careful study and consideration of the facts and evidence presented, we
find merit to warrant disciplinary action against respondent. His failure to answer the
complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several occasions and to appear on the
scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary
sanction. (Ngayan v. Tugade, 193 SCRA 779).
Respondents contention that there were cases already filed in court against him
is of no moment. The pendency of a criminal action against a respondent from the facts
of which the disciplinary proceedings is predicated, does not pose a prejudicial question
to the resolution of the issues in the disbarment case (In re Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1; Calo
v. Degamo, 20 SCRA 447).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is hereby recommended that respondent ATTY.
SALVADOR N. MOYA II be SUSPENDED for a period of ONE YEAR from receipt
hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[14]

On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Maala in its Resolution No. XVII-2005-113.[15] Respondent
was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years with a notification that this suspension of two
(2) years must be served in succession to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of Suspension of two
(2) years in CBD Case No. 03-1171, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of B.P. 22 and for failure
and refusal to comply with his obligations, Atty. Salvador N. Moya is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a notification that this suspension of two years
must be served in succession to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of Suspension
of two years in CBD Case No. 03-1171.[16]

On January 12, 2006, respondent through counsel filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a notice informing it that respondent is filing an Appeal Memorandum. On the same date,
respondent filed his Appeal Memorandum with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS SUSPENSION
FORM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2) YEARS FOR HAVING
ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO FILE HIS ANSWER ON THE COMPLAINT FOR
DISBARMENT DESPITE DUE NOTICE.
II
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS SUSPENSION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2) YEARS FOR HAVING
ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE BOUNCING CHECKS LAW.
III
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS SUSPENSION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2) YEARS FOR HAVING
ALLEGEDLY REFUSED TO SETTLE HIS OBLIGATIONS.

On January 31, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution noting the aforesaid Notice of Resolution No.
XVII-2005-113 dated October 22, 2005 of the IBP.[17]

On various dates,[18] the Court issued Resolutions noting the following pleadings filed by the
respondent:

1. Appeal Memorandum filed on January 12, 2006;

2. Manifestation/Supplement[19] to the Appeal Memorandum With Motion to Give Due

Course To said Pleading More So That The IBP Had Gone Beyond the Period Provided
For By Law To Conduct Investigation As In The Case of Malonzo v. Principe, 447 SCRA
1.

3. Urgent Manifestation with Motion to Remand the Case to the IBP-CBD and Treat the
Appeal Memorandum as Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution of the IBP-CBD
filed on November 3, 2006.

At the outset, respondents Urgent Manifestation with Motion to Remand the Case to the IBPCBD and Treat the Appeal Memorandum as Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution of the IBPCBD, is denied. It is not necessary to remand this case to the IBP because the latter no longer have
jurisdiction over the case which had already been endorsed to this Court for final action. Rule 139-B,
12(b) of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

Xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines
that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.

Regarding the merits of the case, we sustain the findings and conclusions of Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala, as approved, adopted and modified by the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks as
payment for his loan from complainant and the latters friends which were incurred at the time when he
was engaged as complainants counsel. He did not deny the aforesaid allegations but he contended that
he committed neither a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility nor any dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct because he never denied his debts and he was only unable to pay them on time due to
financial constraints.

Respondents contention is untenable.

Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross

misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. [20]

In Lao v. Medel,[21] we ruled as follows:

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the

Bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code
specifically provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. In Co v. Bernardino, [ A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA
102] the Court considered the issuance of worthless checks as violation of this Rule and
an act constituting gross misconduct.

Moreover, in Cuizon v. Macalino,[22] we also ruled that the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. Similarly, Sanchez
v. Somoso[23] held that the persistent refusal to settle due obligations despite demand manifests a lawyers
low regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem. This conduct deserves
nothing less than a severe disciplinary action.

Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in
the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless checks by his dire financial
condition. Respondent should not have contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity to
pay. If he suffered a reversal of fortune, he should have explained with particularity the circumstances
which caused his failure to meet his obligations. His generalized and unsubstantiated allegations as to
why he reneged in the payment of his debts promptly despite repeated demands and sufficient time
afforded him cannot withstand scrutiny.

The Court finds unmeritorious the justification of the respondent as to his failure to immediately
deliver to the complainant the payment made by Diwa for the satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case
No. 1482 of the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Respondent is accused of delay in the delivery of the sum

of money due to his client. His failure to explain such delay cannot be excused by his bare allegation that
the same had already been transmitted to the complainant.

His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter of serious
concern. He submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several extensions of time to file his
answer.

His failure to attend the hearings and belated plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to the

contrary, show a callous disregard of the lawful orders of the duly constituted authority, which caused
undue delay in the IBP proceeding. This conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional
Responsibility[24] and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to
delay no man for money or malice. Respondent has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with

conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the Rules of the Legal Profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This
authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as well. [25] Sadly, herein
respondents conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the legal
profession. Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross misconduct.

We come now to the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v. Bernardino[26] and Lao v.
Medel[27] we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the
practice of law.

However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBPCBD, i.e., respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, because aside
from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, respondent also had seriously breached his
clients trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBPs
Orders in the course of its proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVII-2005-113 dated October 22, 2005 of the IBP which found
that respondent Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of

Professional Responsibility is AFFIRMED in toto. He is hereby SUSPENDED for two years from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all
courts for their information and guidance as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to
append a copy to respondents personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the
Integrated Bar of thePhilippines.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 1-9.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP, rollo at 145; Respondents Appeal Memorandum, rollo at 116-117.
Rollo, p. 28.
[4]
Id., pp. 37-49.
[5]
Annex I Appeal Memorandum.
[6]
Annex J Appeal Memorandum.
[7]
Annex K Id.
[8]
Annex L Id.
[9]
Annex O Id.
[10]
Annex M Id.
[11]
Annex N Appeal Memorandum.
[12]
Annex P Appeal memorandum.
[13]
Annex B.
[14]
Annex B.
[15]
Annex 1.
[16]
Annex 1.
[17]
Rollo at 110.
[2]
[3]

(1) June 20, 2006; noting the Manifestation/Supplement to the Appeal Memorandum; (2) July 11, 2006, noting respondents Appeal
Memorandum; and (3) December 5, 2006, noting the Urgent Manifestation with Motion to remand the case to the IBP.
[19]
Filed on March 14, 2006.
[20]
Michael P. Barrios v. Atty. Francisco P. Martinez, A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 332.
[18]

[21]
[22]
[23]

A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 232-233, citing the case of Co v. Bernardino, A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 102.
A.C. No. 4334, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 484.
Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 569, 572.

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
xxx
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
xxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
[25]
Dumadag v. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 513, 521.
[26]
A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 102.
[27]
A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 232-233.
[24]