CASE DIGESTDioquino v.

Laureano
G.R. No. L-25906
Facts:
Attorney Pedro Dioquino, a practicing lawyer of Masbate, is the owner of a car. On
March 31, 1964, hewent to the office of the MVO, Masbate, to register the same.
Attorney Dioquino requested the defendant Federico Laureano to introduce him to
one of the clerks in the MVO Office, who could facilitate the registrationof his car and
the request was graciously attended to. Defendant Laureano rode on the car of Atty.
Dioquino onhis way to the P.C. Barracks at Masbate. While about to reach their
destination, the car driven by plaintiff'sdriver and with defendant Federico Laureano
as the sole passenger was stoned by some 'mischievous boys,'and its windshield was
broken.The defendant Federico Laureano refused to file any charges against the boy
and his parents because hethought that the stone-throwing was merely accidental
and that it was due to
force majeure
. Laureano refusedto pay for the damaged done to the windshield and challenged the
case for judicial adjudication. There is noquestion that the plaintiff tried to convince
the defendant Federico Laureano just to pay the value of thewindshield and he even
came to the extent of asking the wife to convince her husband to settle the
matteramicably but the defendant Federico Laureano refused to make any
settlement, clinging [to] the belief that hecould not be held liable because a minor
child threw a stone accidentally on the windshield and therefore, thesame was due to
force majeur.
Including in the action filed the wife, Aida de Laureano, and the father, Juanito
Laureano.
Issue:
(1)Wheter or not there was fortuitous event and Federico Laureano is liable to pay
for damages.
(2) Whether or not the plaintiff is liable for damages for
including Federico
wife and father.
Held:
(1)

The express language of Art. 1174 of the present Civil Code states that "Except in cases
expresslyspecified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when
the nature of theobligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events whichcould not be, foreseen, or which, though foreseen
were inevitable." Authorities of repute are inagreement, more specifically concerning
an obligation arising from contract "that someextraordinary circumstance
independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is anessential element of a
caso fortuito." 5 If it could be shown that such indeed was the case, liability isruled out.
There is no requirement of "diligence beyond what human care and foresight
canprovide." 6 The throwing of the stone by the child was clearly unforeseen or if
foreseen, wasinevitable. Hence, the law being what it is, such a belief on the part of
defendant Laureano wasjustified and he shall not be held liable for the damages
caused to the car.
(2)
No moral damages should be awarded against the parties. Mistaken as plaintiff
apparently was, it cannot be concluded that he was prompted solely by the desire to
inflict needless and unjustifiedvexation on them. Considering the equities of the
situation, plaintiff having suffered a pecuniary losswhich while resulting from a
fortuitous event, perhaps would not have occurred at all had not defendant Federico
Laureano borrowed his car, we, feel that he is not to be penalized further by
hismistaken view of the law in including them in his complaint. Well-worth
paraphrasing is thethought expressed in a United States Supreme Court decision as
to the existence of an abiding andfundamental principle that the expenses and
annoyance of litigation form part of the social burdenof living in asociety which seeks
to attain social control through law.

La Mallorca vs. CA
17SCRA739
Facts:

Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their three minor children, namely,
Milagros(13), Raquel(4)andFe(2) boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352 bearing
plate TPU No. 757 owned and operated by LaMallorca at San Fernando, Pampanga,
bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying withthem four
pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging. The conductor(half-brother
of Beltran) of the bus issued three tickets(Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the
plaintiff and their eldest child,Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since
both were below the height at which fare is charged inaccordance with the appellant's
Mariano Beltran went back to the bus to get thebaggage he had left under one of the
seats near the door while the rest was waiting on a shaded area, he did not notice that
Raquel was following him. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of
the bus waitingfor the conductor to hand him his
bayong
, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenlystarted moving
forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has
not giventhe driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still
attending to the baggage left behind byMariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus
was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about tenmeters from the point
where the plaintiffs had gotten off.Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano
Beltran immediately jumped from the running boardwithout getting his
bayong
from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the
shadedplace where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people
beginning to gather around thebody of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull
crushed, and without life. The child was none other thanhis daughter Raquel, who
was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.
Issue: Whether or not La Mallorca is liable for the negligence
family alreadyalighted from the bus, the fact that Beltran went back to the
bus to retrieve his bayong, the relation of carrier-passenger relation between
La Mallorca and Beltran still subsist. It has been recognized as a rule that therelation
of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carrier's vehicleat a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but

continues until the passenger has had areasonable time or a reasonable opportunity
to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or areasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.In the circumstances, it
cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of
a"very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a
common carrier in thedischarge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In
the first place, the driver, although stopping thebus, nevertheless did not put off the
engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductorgave him
the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the
passengersMariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus
was not unreasonable and they are,therefore, to be considered still as passengers of
the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated,
herein petitioner can
be held lia
ble for the negligence of its driver, as ruled
by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.Paragraph 7 of the
breach of contract, the death of Raquel
Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused
b y the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person on the part of the defendantsand their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs
and their daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the
operation of their vehicle.The driver did not exercise utmost diligence required of
him; hence, petitioner must
be adjudged peculiarly liable for the death of the child Raquel
Beltran.

Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs. Court of

Appeals
No.L-46448July31,1981106SCRA391
Facts:
Plaintiff Jesus Samson averred that on January
8, 1951, he flew as co-pilot on a regular flight
withCaptain Delfin Bustamente as commanding
C-47 plane belonging to PAL, now herein the
petitioner; that onattempting to land the plane at
Daet airport, Capt. Bustamante due to his slow
reaction and poor judgment overshot the airfield
and as result, notwithstanding the diligent efforts
of the plaintiff co-pilot to avert anaccident, the
airplane crashed-landed beyond the runway. The
jolt caused Samson to suffer from
brainconcussion, wounds, abrasions of the
forehead with intense pain and suffering.Samson
requested for expert and proper medical
assistance however was only submitted for
check-up to acompany physician who is a general
med-practitioner. Several days after, he was

called by PAL to report forduty inspite of his

previous request for expert medical assistance as
he was already experiencing generaldebility,
dizziness and nervousness.Samson, then, was
discharged from duty on the grounds of physical
disability causing him to lose his job andbecome
physically unfit to continue as aviator due to
medicalattention.
Issue:
WON PAL did not exercise utmost diligence
required of them as a common carriage.
Held:
There was gross negligence by PAL for allowing
Capt. Bustamante to fly on the that fateful day of
theaccident, even if he was sick, having tumor on
his nose. The duty of a common carrier, like PAL,
to exercise thehighest degree of diligence extends
to passengers and crew members.The dizziness,
headaches and general debility of private
respondent were after-effects of the crash-

landing. Andtherefore there is causal connection

between the accident and said after-effects. The
negligence of PAL isclearly a quasi-delict and
therefore Art. 2219
(
2) is applicable, justifying the recovery of moral
damages. Evenfrom the standpoint of the
petitioner that there is an employee-employer
relationship between it and privaterespondent
arising from the contract of employment, private
respondent is still entitled to moral damages
inview of the finding of bad faith or malice,
applying the provisions of Article 2220 which
provides that willfulinjury to property may be a
legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under thecircumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith