Let me not presume to speak for the Catholic church :) but ... one wonders if they draw a distinction between imagining THAT a divine logic may be at work, which is partly intelligible, as one can imagine possible analogical situations demonstrating efficacies for SOME suffering, GENERALLY, versus pretending that this logic is wholly comprehensible, such that anyone could ever possibly imagine WHAT that divine logic means for any given suffering, PARTICULARLY, or HOW that logic might be efficacious for ALL sufferings, many which suggest NO morally intelligible efficacies from a human vantage. One then only imagines - not that God's goodness and power arenecessarily incompatible, qualifying his omnipotence as somehow morally whimsical (God would've been there but decided to clear up a quantum traffic jam elsewhere, instead.) - but, instead imagining that God's interactivity has been logically constrained by what would amount to inconsistencies in an inscrutable divine logic (God couldn't make a rock so big he couldn't pick it up). In other words, divine interventions or not proceed from a logic we can apprehend, in part, not comprehend, as a whole. While we swim in this ocean of mystery, which is intelligible, it doesn't mean we could possibly swallow it. The common lament is that this view of God —- whether the logical problem of evil is solved by St Augustine's privation account or by Plantinga's free will account or by Process thought's predications ofomnipotence — no longer matches that of popular piety or is worthy of that God as has been classically conceived. Let me introduce another distinction, that between normative consistency and evaluative dispositions, which correspond to your characterizations, contradictory and unsatisfactory. The strict formulations, some of them employing modal logic, have been deductively clarified as logically consistent, hence are not contradictory. That the accounts of these God-concepts might be unsatisfactory, a God not worthy of worship, to anyone reflects - not a normative proposition, but — an evaluative disposition. The masses of believers from all the great traditions just do not happen to share your disposition, even as they've grappled with the problem of evil, logically, evidentially and existentially for millennia. It doesn'tmean that either they or you are necessarily being unreasonable, When confronted with reality's complexities and ambiguities, reasonable people can disagree. One's evaluation of reality, one's affective disposition, is very personal and deserving of empathy and compassion. The OT Psalms are roughly divided 50:50:50 between glad, sad and mad psalms, two-thirds of them expressing existential disappointments. The NT gospel mysteries are divided 5:5:5:5 between joyous, luminous, sorrowful and glorious, the ratio improving upon the reception of Good News. Most believers who subscribe to same are responding to personal invitations that are robustly relational, not philosophical demonstrations that are metaphysically decisive. Should they investigate their faith philosophically, it's presuppositions are not contradictory, just not universally compelling (almost though).problem of evil, theodicy, Plantinga free will, omnipotence vs omnibenevolence, logical problem of evil, evidential problem of evil, existential problem of evil,