PIMENTEL vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the Supreme Court to require the Executive
Department to transmit the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court for the Senates
concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a
function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome
Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners
submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary
international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless
they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.[5] The Office of the Solicitor General,
commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of the petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended
that the petition at bar violates the rule on hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by petitioners,
respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for
concurrence.
Issue:
Whether or not the executive department has a ministerial duty to transmit the Rome Statute (or any treaty) to the
Senate for concurrence.
Ruling:
The petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court ruled that the the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the
sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence,
the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm
of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a
limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of
ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step
is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized
representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the
other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of
the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The

negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even collapse in case the parties
are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is
primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the
parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is
required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is
allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty
more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It
is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government
other than that which negotiated them.
The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies
the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed
with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be
underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making
process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a
symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic
mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a
treaty concluded by its representative.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a
treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has
no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in
Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02-1. They are a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States in 1951. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed
forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the Balikatan is the largest such training exercise directly
supporting the MDTs objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks
to reaffirm.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition,
attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.

Issue:
Whether Balikatan 02-1 activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement?
Ruling:
To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an
impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its
definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with
the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of
international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the
text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids
to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken
into account alongside the aforesaid context.
It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .activities arose from accident. It was
deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may
sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on
new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nations marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to
assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical
and humanitarian missions, and the like.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that
.Balikatan 02-1, a mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise, falls under the umbrella of
sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.
Posted by josephcanete28at 6:50 AMNo comments:
ABAYA vs. EBDANE
Facts:
The Government of Japan and the Government of the Philippines, through their respective representatives, namely, Mr.
Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Republic of the Philippines, and then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be
extended to the Philippines. These loans were aimed at promoting our countrys economic stabilization and
development efforts.
The assailed resolution recommended the award to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract
for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation
of the San Andres (Codon)-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the length of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of
Catanduanes.The DPWH caused the publication of the Invitation to Prequalify and to Bid for the implementation of
the CP I project, in two leading national newspapers, namely, the Manila Times and Manila Standard on November 22
and 29, and December 5, 2002.
A total of twenty-three (23) foreign and local contractors responded to the invitation by submitting their accomplished
prequalification documents on January 23, 2003. In accordance with the established prequalification criteria, eight

contractors were evaluated or considered eligible to bid as concurred by the JBIC. Prior to the opening of the respective
bid proposals, it was announced that the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) was in the amount of
P738,710,563.67.
The bid goes to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation was corrected from the original P993,183,904.98
(with variance of 34.45% from the ABC) to P952,564,821.71 (with variance of 28.95% from the ABC) based on their letter
clarification dated April 21, 2004.
The petitioners anchor the instant petition on the contention that the award of the contract to private respondent China
Road & Bridge Corporation violates RA 9184, particularly Section 31 thereof which reads:
SEC. 31. Ceiling for Bid Prices. The ABC shall be the upper limit or ceiling for the Bid prices. Bid prices that exceed this
ceiling shall be disqualified outright from further participating in the bidding. There shall be no lower limit to the amount
of the award.
The petitioners insist that Loan Agreement is neither an international nor an executive agreement that would bar the
application of RA 9184. They point out that to be considered a treaty, an international or an executive agreement, the
parties must be two sovereigns or States whereas in the case of Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, the parties are the
Philippine Government and the JBIC, a banking agency of Japan, which has a separate juridical personality from the
Japanese Government.
The respondents however contend that foreign loan agreements, including Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, as executive
agreements and, as such, should be observed pursuant to the fundamental principle in international law of pacta sunt
servanda. The Constitution, the public respondents emphasize, recognizes the enforceability of executive agreements in
the same way that it recognizes generally accepted principles of international law as forming part of the law of the
land.34This recognition allegedly buttresses the binding effect of executive agreements to which the Philippine
Government is a signatory. It is pointed out by the public respondents that executive agreements are essentially
contracts governing the rights and obligations of the parties. A contract, being the law between the parties, must be
faithfully adhered to by them. Guided by the fundamental rule of pacta sunt servanda, the Philippine Government
bound itself to perform in good faith its duties and obligations under Loan Agreement.

Issue :
Whether or not the the loan agreement violates RA 9184.
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the respondents.
Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes binding through
executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress. executive agreements, They sometimes take the
form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or
protocols.
The fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, which is, in fact, embodied in Section 4 of RA
9184 as it provides that [a]ny treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to
which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed, the DPWH, as the executing agency of the projects

financed by Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of civil works for the
CP I project to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation.
Posted by josephcanete28at 6:48 AMNo comments:
BAYAN vs. ZAMORA
Facts:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, To further strengthen
their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on
their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and
13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and
United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On
October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to
the Senate of the Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and
taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in
ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the
Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by
the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by
congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to
be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
Ruling:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should
apply in the instant case.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or
international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides :

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the Senate by the other contracting state.
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with a wide variety of
subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter,
coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military bases, troops and
facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground. The fact that the President
referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same
provision is immaterial.
Posted by josephcanete28at 6:46 AMNo comments:
AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO
Facts:
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto.The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by
the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics
which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment,
intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy,
mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final
provisions.
Issues:
a. Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.
b. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages of the negotiation process.
c. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege.
d. Whether the Respondents failed to claim executive privilege on time.
Decision:
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:
1.
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a
matter of public concern.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of

subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a
case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not
dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus
constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific
showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public
concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is
indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably
participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.
2.
Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should
not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order.
3.
The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need
determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is
asserted the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of the competing interests," taking into account factors such
as "the relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other evidence," "the seriousness of the litigation," "the role of
the government," and the "possibility of future timidity by government employees.
In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong and sufficient showing of need. The arguments they
proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this standard stated in the decided cases.
There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The Court has earlier
concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown by petitioners, but from the
very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement.
Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this Court that they will not be
able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making unless the initial offers are also published.
4.
When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not
mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited.
Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a
waiver thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received from the House Committee and petitionerCongressman Aguja were mere requests for information. The House Committee refrained from pursuing its earlier

resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecias alleged request to Committee
Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.
While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials out of
respect for their office until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory
process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege.
SATURDAY, JULY 11, 2009
Public International Law (Case Digest)
Kuroda
Facts:

vs.

Jalandoni

Petitioner, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial
Forces, was charged before a military commission set by Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines. Said
executive order also established a National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules and regulations governing the trial of
accused war criminals. Petitioner contended that E.O. No. 68 was illegal and unconstitutional because he cannot be tried
fro violation of international conventions, like the Geneva and Hague Conventions. Furthermore, he alleged that the
participation of two American lawyers in the prosecution was violative of our national sovereignty.

Issue:
Whether the Philippine Government has the jurisdiction to try and convict Kuroda for violating prohibited acts of the
war.

Ruling:
Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional because Article II, Section 3 of the 1935 Constitution explicitly provides
that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of nation.
In promulgation and enforcement of E.O. No. 68, the President of the Philippine exercised his power as commander-inchief of all armed forces. Moreover, it was in adherence with the generally accepted principles and policies of
international law which form part of our Constitution.
With regards to the contention about the participation of two American lawyers, the Philippines was under the
sovereignty of the United States and thus, we were equally bound together with the US and Japan, to the rights and
obligations contained in the treaties. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty.

Secretary of Justice vs Judge Lantion GR 139465 Jan 18 2000

Facts:
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United
States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the
related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons
Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country and the established Extradition Treaty Between the Government of
the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, the department proceeded with the designation
of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and
the treaty.

The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted
therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is
premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore,
the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.

Issue:
1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official extradition request and
documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto

2.Whether or not private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this
case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of
the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to a prospective
extraditees liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.
On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the
parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law
and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of
incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United States and
the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions.
At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither the
Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite.

Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said
agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost
and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as
reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic
sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives
foreign trading intervention.

Issue :
Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Ruling:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation
of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict
its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of
authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership
should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty.
WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be
allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 90 PHIL 70

September 26, 1951

Facts:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a decision of this Court of July
30, 1949.

"The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret
operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a
Japanese
spy,
by
U.
S.
Army
Counter
Intelligence
Corps.
Thereafter the People's Court ordered his release. But the Deportation Board taking his case up, found that having no
travel documents Mejoff was illegally in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration
authorities.

After the corresponding investigation, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration on April 5, 1948, declared that Mejoff
had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a
designation port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia.

The

petitioner

was

then

under

custody,

he

having

been

arrested

on

March

18,

1948.

In October 1948 after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at
Muntinglupa where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration
believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements for his departure are
being made."
Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not found ways and
means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although, it should be said in justice to the
deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.

RULING:
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the
laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of
nationality.

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights" and approved by
the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December
10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed.

It was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2);
that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9 ); etc.

Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these
terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form
and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready
to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court
or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse.

No costs will be charged.

Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195

Facts :
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a
distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the
Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administratie Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and
unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police
power.

Issue:
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not unconstitutional.
These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare and public
safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis,
the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the
United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or
parked vehicles on the streets and highways.

G.R.

No.

88211

September

15,

1989

Marcos

v.

Manglapus

FACTS:
It is a case of a dictator President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines forced out of office and into exile after causing
twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks
to
return
to
the
Philippines
to
die.
But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has
stood
firmly
on
the
decision
to
bar
the
return
of
Mr.
Marcos
and
his
family.

Issue: 1 .Whether or not the ban of Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines has international
precedents?
2. Whether or not the President acted in grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the Marcoses?

HELD:

NO, The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats
only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)]
separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).]
On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence"
[Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own."
[Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order,
public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).]
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
2.NO.The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the
duty of the President, as steward of the people.
Petition is Dismissed