'Exists' as a Predicate: A Reconsideration

Author(s): James Child and Fred I. Goldberg

Source: Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Dec., 1970), pp. 53-57
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee
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'EXISTS'AS A PREDICATE:A RECONSIDERATION

By JAMESCHILD and FREDI. GOLDBERG

SINCEthe criticismsof the ontological argumentby Hume andis Kant,a

it has been an almost unchallengedassumptionthat 'exists' not

predicate. A number of years ago, however, Professors Nakhnikian
and Salmon1attempted to show that one important argument against
treating 'exists' as a predicateis not well-founded. The purpose of this
paper is twofold. First, to consider and refute two other important,
perhaps more widely held, arguments against treating 'exists' as a
predicateand, second, to show a way in which such a predicatemight
be used to shed some philosophic light.
Nakhnikian and Salmon were most concerned to show that an
argumentgiven in slightly differentforms by Broad, Ayer, and Wisdom
is not sound. They claimed that when 'exists' is treatedas a predicate,
all affirmative existential propositions become tautologies and all
negativeexistentialpropositionsbecomeself-contradictions.Nakhnikian
and Salmon were able to show that the argument depends upon a
mistranslationof the affirmativeexistentialproposition and a misinterpretationof the negative existentialproposition and that both existential
propositions are in fact synthetic.
Nakhnikian and Salmon realize they must avoid the drastic consequences of importing non-existing entities into the universe of
discourse. For this reason the existence predicate must be treated as
universal, non-descriptive and redundant, i.e., '(arx)Hx'implies '(gax)
(Hx . Ex)' and is implied by it. Since 'E' is universal,
(1) (x)ax
is true. The authors suggest that (1) be taken as a meaning postulate
for 'E'. This extensionallydefines the predicateand is all that need be
said about its meaning within a specified language. It simply says that
there are no non-existententities.
I

The arguments of Nakhnikian and Salmon were constructed with

reference to a logic without individual constants. Nonetheless, their
claim that 'exists' can be treated as a predicateshould hold in a logic
with individual constants, since the latter can always be constructed
from the former. However, such an alteration creates problems not
foreseen by Nakhnikian and Salmon, for it appearsto be inconsistent
with Russell's theory of names and descriptions. Russell believed that
I George Nakhnikianand WesleySalmon,' "Exists"as a Predicate',Philosophical
Review
Vol. LXVI, No. 4, October,1957.

53

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54

ANALYSIS

it was impossible to predicate meaningfully non-existence of a named

entity. As he argued,
It is only of descriptions-definite or indefinite-that existence can be
significantlyasserted; for, if 'a' is a name, it mustname something; what
does not name anything is not a name and, therefore, if intended to be a
name is a symbol devoid of meaning . .1.
Thus, if '-Ea' is meaningless, 'E' violates the rule of significant denial
and is not an acceptable predicate.
This argument may be interpreted in two ways. Upon first examination it appears to turn on a simple confusion. The claim that '-Ea' is
not well-formed is based on the argument that '-Ea' says that a does
not exist, and hence 'a' is not a legitimate individual constant. But if
'-Ea' is not well-formed, it says nothing. It cannot be the case both
that '-Ea' is not well-formed and that it makes an existence assertion.
It is not surprising that the argument understood this way is not
sound for, if it were, the logically true formula '(rjx) (x = a)' would as
well be meaningless. This is so since its negation asserts that there is
no entity which is identical with a, from which it follows that 'a' fails
to denote. In fact, '(ax) (x - a)' and 'Ea' say exactly the same thing,
viz., that a exists. For this reason both are logically true, and their
negations are self-contradictory. The peculiarity of the predicate 'E'
lies in the fact that, in a specified universe of discourse, it applies to
everything.
The problem is that as an individual constant or proper name 'a'
must refer to an extra-linguistic entity. When we remember that the
extension of 'E' contains all entities over which the system is interpreted,
'-Ea' says that the individual denoted by 'a' is not a member of the
class of everything there is. Since 'a' must always denote something,
'-Ea' is never true.
The source of difficulty appears to be a blurring of the distinction
between truth and meaning. The state of affairs in which the individual
denoted by 'a' is not included among the things there are follows not
from the meaning of '-Ea', but from its truth.
This suggests what is perhaps a fairer interpretation of Russell's
argument. He might not at all have confused meaning and truth as
suggested above, but rather assumed the meaningfulness of 'Ea' to
arrive by reductioat the incoherence of '-Ea'. If some negative existential
propositions are true and 'Ea' is a legitimate expression, then '-Ea' is
true for some as. But certainly '-Ea' cannot be true, and thus if some
negative existential propositions are true, 'Ea' is not legitimate.
1
Bertrand Russell, Introductionto MathematicalPhilosophy, (London, 1919), p. 179. A
slightly different form of the argument appears in Russell's 'The Philosophy of Logical
Atomism', Logic and Knowledge(London, 1956), p. 242-243. For an example of how this
argument has been used in the discussion of existence, see William Kneale, 'Is Existence a
Predicate ?' Readingsin PhilosophicalAnalysis, edited by H. Feigl and W. Sellars (New York,
1949), pp. 36-37.

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A RECONSIDERATION
AS A PREDICATE:
'IEXISTS)

55

This argument,though strongerthan the firstversion, is not without

flaw. It does not follow from the fact that some negative existential
propositions are true that some propositions of the form '-Ea' must
be true. When one wants to assert non-existence of an object without

contradiction,he must not name it, but describe it. This is, to say the
least, consistentwith Russell'sown views about namesand descriptions.
'The present king of France exists' is false and, since 'the present king
of France' cannot be a name, it can only be formulated as a definite
description.
The above analysis,it should be pointed out, is perfectly in accord
with Russell's general attitude about existence.'
II
The most pervasiveargumentagainstthe use of 'exists'as a predicate
is also perhapsthe most superficial.Both Ayer and Kneale claim that if
one asserts that 'exists' is a predicate, one is committed to a reality
beyond that of existence.
The fundamental
thesisof those who believeexistenceto be a predicate
is thatthereis a senseof beinglogicallypriorto existence.. .2
The argumentis roughly as follows: if existence is a property(and thus
'exists' a predicate) of an existent thing, then non-existence and other
similar properties like fictitiousness must be properties of something
as well. There must be something which does not exist in order for it
to have the property of non-existence. So if existence is a predicate,it
follows that non-existentbeings '. .. have a mode of real being which is
differentfrom the mode of being of existent things'.3
Another way of formulating this objection is simply to assert that
an existence predicate cannot be adopted in an ordinary extensional
logic where the domain of discourse is limited to existing (actual)
entities. The very possibility of the consistent use of the predicateas
demonstratedabove seems to vitiate this argument.4
However, the answer to the problem as posed by Ayer and Kneale
is equally straightforward. When we take (1) to be a logical truth, it
follows that there is only one kind of "being", and that any entity we
can properly name has that "being", i.e., simple extensional existence.
We can, quite consistently, give definite descriptions of non-existent
1 In 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' Russell would have rejected 'E' because it can
produce logical truths or contradictions in atomic statements. But this rejection is for
ontological and even epistemological reasons and not for logical ones. 'E' is perfectly
consistent with Russell's views in 'On Denoting' and PrindcpiaMathematica.
2 W. C.
Kneale, op. cit., p. 40.
8Alfred J. Ayer, Language,TruthandLogic (New York, 1946), p. 143.
4 Though this argument suggests that 'exists' can only be a predicate in a modal logic,
where possible but unactualized entities can be values of variables, the facts are rather
different. Such a predicate is inconsistent with certain important modal logics, see Nicholas
Rescher, 'On the Logic of Existence and Denotation', PhilosophicalReview(April, 1959).

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56

ANALYSIS

entities and even asserttheir existence. In doing so thereis no difference

between an extensional language with the existence predicateand one
without it. It is the meaningpostulateand the consequentcontradictory
characterof '-Ea' that prevents the illicit question of the being of a
non-existententity from arising.
III

Nakhnikian and Salmon felt that the universal and redundant

characterof the existence predicatemade it ratheruninteresting. We
feel that, while essentially dispensable,the existence predicate can be
used to make some interestingpoints.
Severalof the most intractablephilosophic problems have revolved
around the existence of certain types of entities: universals, numbers,
classes, theoreticalentities of science, etc. Often these discussions take
the form of suggested criteriaof existence, that is, a specificationof the
necessaryand sufficientconditions for a thing's existence. This issue is
perhapsmost prominentin contemporaryphilosophy in the discussion
of the existence of theoretical entities. The question often turns on
an examination of differentcriteria for physical existence. R. Harrd'
and Gustav Bergmann2formulatethe problem in these terms, and Max
Born3has attemptedto specify a set of criterianot for the existence of
all physical entities, but for the entities of microphysics. Probably the
most widely discussed version of this approach is Ernest Nagel's.4
In all of these cases the authors involved are suggesting one or more
propertiesof things which would make them physicallyreal, i.e., define
physical or microphysicalexistence. But this seems to make existence
a property. Indeed, this objection has been made. In discussing the
suggestions made by Nagel and Bergmann,Professor Maxwell says,
One wouldhopethat... over ninehundredyearsof debateandanalysis
have made it clear that existenceis not a property. Now surelythe
characteristics
of beingmentionedin well-confirmed
laws,beingpublicly
perceptible,etc.,are propertiesof sorts; and if these comprisedpart of
of the meaningof 'exist' then 'existence'would be a predicate(and
existencea property).5
Maxwell considers this difficulty sufficientreason for abandoning the
attempt to define existence in terms of other properties. But if 'exists'
can correctlybe treatedas a predicate,it follows that the consideration
of criteriaof physical existence or criteriaof microphysicalexistence is
quite legitimate.
1R. Harr', TheoriesandThings(London,

1961).

of Science,28:1-4(1961).
*Gustav Bergmann,'Physicsand Ontology',Philosophy
a MaxBorn,'PhysicalReality',Physicsin My Generation
(London,1956).

4 Ernest Nagel, The Structureof Science(New York, 1961).

Studiesin
s GroverMaxwell,'The OntologicalStatusof TheoreticalEntities',Mintnsota
thePhilosophy
editors,H. Feigl and G. Maxwell(Minneapolis,1962),Vol. III.
of Science,

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'EXISTS1 AS A PREDICATE: A RECONSIDERATION

57

Given a formallanguageand a domainof discourseover whichto

withinthatlanguage.
interpretit, theexistencepredicateis not descriptive
But the predicatecanhave a metalinguistic
whichmight
interpretation
to
be of interest. Suchan interpretation
the
meaning
symbolby
gives
whichthemselvesmayor may
relatingit to wordsin the metalanguage,
not appearin the objectlanguage.For example,Nagel suggestsas a
possiblecriterionof physicalexistencethat an entitybe publiclyperceivable.' Recastwith the explicituse of the existencepredicate,this
criterionwould take the form of the followinginterpretation
in the
semanticmetalanguage.
(2) 'E' appliesto all andonly publiclyperceivableevents.
Since'E' appliesto all of the entitieswithinthe domainof discourseof
the objectlanguage,suchan interpretation
of the termwould give the
and
sufficient
conditions
the
existence
of an entitywithin
for
necessary
that particulardomainof discourseand for that language. In other
words,withina particular
languagethe predicateis quiteuninteresting,
but when comparingvariouslanguagesand domainsof discourse,the
notionof an existencepredicatetakeson somecontent.
It may be arguedthat in (2) the existencepredicateis redundant
since one could simplymakethe predicate'perceivable'applydirectly
to all entitiesin the domainof discourse. But the adoptionof the
existence predicate does make explicit the point that to exist in this
particular universe of discourse an entity must be perceivable. In
addition, there are possible cases where the existence predicatewould
economize existence claims by conjoining or disjoining properties to
make necessaryand sufficientconditions for existence.
Needless to say, the existence predicate is not irreducible, and
everything requiredcan be said without its use and handledin the more
traditionalmanner,assertingexistenceonly with the existentialquantifier.
The important point is, however, that 'exists' can also be treated as a
predicate; and for this reason one can talk in a standardextensional
logic of criteriaand conditions for and even definitions of 'existence',
as Nagel et al. do, with a clear logical conscience.

1
Nagel does not actuallyargue for the adoption of one or anotherof the alternative
criteriahe suggests. Ratherhe wantsto show thatsincethereareseveralpossiblecriteria,any
solutionto the controversyis essentiallyarbitrary.

of California,SantaCruZ
University
SanJoseStateCollege

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