John Scott McKay Fraud on the Court McKay & Leong Walnut Creek Attorney J. Scott McKay Collusion-Conspiracy with Court Appointed Receiver Kevin Singer Alleged in Federal Class Action Lawsuit Charging Unauthorized Practice of Law Accessory-Aiding & Abetting by Lawyer Scott McKay - State Bar of California Jayne Kim

Case 2:14-cv-09104-GW-JC Document 1 Filed 11/25/14 Page 1 of 52 Page ID #:1
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Patricia Barry, Esq. (SBN 59116)

634 S. Spring St., Suite 823
Los Angeles, CA 90014
(213) 995-0734
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Arch Cunningham (SBN 210625)

1489 McAllister St.
San Francisco, CA 94115
archcunnghm@yahoo.com
(415) 563-1828
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

JOHN DOE, et al.
On behalf of themselves and other similarly situated.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION
)
ARCHIBALD CUNNINGHAM,
)
HUMBERTO RUIZ, both individually and on )
behalf of a class of others similarly situated. ) Case No. 2:14-cv-09104-GW-JC
)
) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR
Plaintiffs,
) DECLARATORY RELIEF UNDER 42
v.
) U.S.C. 1983; ATTORNEY FEES UNDER
) 42 U.S.C. 1988
KEVIN SINGER, Court-appointed receiver, )
sued individually and official capacity;
)
RECEIVERSHIP SPECIALISTS, a California )
licensed business, JOHN RACHLIN,
)
principal, sued in his individual capacity;
) (1) Violations of Civil Rights
RICK MARQUIS, principal, sued in his
)
(42 U.S. C 1983);
individual capacity; KAMALA D. HARRIS, ) (2) Monell-Related Claims;
Attorney General of California, sued
) (3) Declaratory and Prospective Injunctive
individually and in her official capaciy; CITY )
Relief.
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; San )
Francisco County Sheriff ROSS MIRKARIMI,) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
sued individually and in his official capacity; )
San Francisco District Attorney, GEORGE
) .
GASCON, sued individually and in his official )
capacity; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELGES, a
municipality: District Attorney JACKIE
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LACEY, sued individually and in her official )
capacity; COUNTY OF KERN, District
)
Attorney LISA GREEN, sued individually and )
in her official capacity; COUNTY OF
)
MARIN, District Attorney EDWARD S.
)
BERBERIAN, sued individually and in his
official capacity; COUNTY OF
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Complaint for Damages and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
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SACRAMENTO, District Attorney JAN

SCULLY, sued individually and in her official
capacity; COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, District
Attorney NANCY OMALLEY, sued
individually and in her official capacity;
COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, District
Attorney SCOTT PETERSON, sued
individually and in his official capacity;
JUDGE BARBARA A. MEIERS, Los Angeles
Superior Court Judge, sued individually and in
her official capacity;
JUDGE ROBERT H. OBRIEN, Los Angeles
his official capacity; JUDGE THOMAS L.
BROWN, Sacramento Superior Court Judge,
sued individually and in his official capacity;
JUDGE LAWRENCE J. APPEL, Alameda
his official capacity: JUDGE LAUREL S.
BRADY, Contra Costa Superior Court Judge,
sued individually and in her official capacity;
JUDGE RANDOLPH HEUBACH, Marin
his official capacity; JUDGE MARLA
MILLER, San Francisco Court Judge, sued
JUDGE JAMES STOELKER, Santa Clara
Court Judge, sued individually and in his
official capacity; JUDGE LORNA H.
BRUMFIELD,, Kern Court Judge, sued
JUDGE DELBERT C. GEE, Alameda
his official capacity; JUDGE DAVID B.
FINN, Contra Costa Superior Court Judge,
JUDGE LYNN OMALLEY TAYLOR, San
Francisco Court Judge, sued individually and
in her official capacity; JUDGE LYNN
JUDITH CRADDICK, Contra Costa Court
Judge, sued individually and in her official
capacity; JUDGE DONALD EVANS
QUIDACHAY, San Francisco Superior Court
Judge, sued individually and in his official
capacity; JUDGE A. JAMES ROBERTSON
II., San Francisco Superior Court, sued
,JUDGE LILLIAN SING, San Francisco
her official capacity; PRESIDING JUDGE
CYNTHIA MING-mei LEE, Presiding Judge
of the San Francisco Superior Court, sued
CHIEF JUSTICE TANI G. CANTILSAKAUYE, Chief Justice of State Supreme
Court, Chair of California Judicial Council,
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PRESIDING JUSTICE ANTHONY KLINE,
California Court of Appeals, First Appellate
Division, sued individually and in his official
capacity; JUDGE JAMES RICHMOND,
Justice of California Court of Appeals, First
Appellate District, sued individually and in her
official capacity; JOHN SCOTT McKAY, an
officer of the court and attorney in the
underlying case, sued in his individual
capacity; MICHAEL COOMBS, propertyowner and partner in condominium
association, sued in individual capacity,
TAMARA WOODS, property-owner and
partner in condominium association, sued in
individual capacity.
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Defendants, and DOES 1 through
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION. 1
II. JURISDICTION.. 4
III. VENUE 4
IV. INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT . 4
V. CLASS ALLEGATIONS. 4
VI. PARTIES. 7
VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 19
A. Statutory Framework for Unauthorized Practice of Law.. 19
B. Statutory and Regulatory Framework Related to

Appointment of Receivers .. 21
C. The Various Appointments of Mr. Singer In This Class

Action .. 23
D. The Unauthorized Practice of Law Conspiracy In the Context of
Receiverships .. 26
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION
OF CIVIL RIGHTS (42 U.S.C. Section 1983)
By Plaintiffs/Class Against All Defendants
(Violation of Class Members Civil Rights Under Color of
State Law by Engaging in Conspiracy) 32
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION

.
(Bus. & Prof. Code 6125 As Applied Violates
Class Members Procedural Due Process Rights) 34
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION

By Plaintiffs/Class Against Singer, All Judicial and
Non-judicial Defendants)
Table of Contents, i
(Violation of Separation of Powers Clause) .. 36

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION
.
(Constitutional Challenge to Code of Civil Procedure 564 et. al.,
On its Face and As Applied Violated Class Members
Substantive and Procedural Due Process Rights) 38
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION

By Plaintiff Against City and County of
San Francisco (Sheriffs Department),
All District Attorneys, AG Kamala Harris
Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law
Municipal and Individual Liability for Unconstitutional
Policies and Practices . 42
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY

AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF .. 45
Table of Contents, ii
INTRODUCTION
1. This case involves the criminal matter of one court-appointed receiver, Mr. Kevin
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Singer, who has been engaging in a criminal and fraudulent scheme throughout the state that
involves his unauthorized practice of law (UPL). Under the State Bar Act, no one can practice
law in California unless they are an active member of the bar. (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 61256126). While the judicial defendants, Attorney General Kamala Harris, and State Bar President
Craig Holden are certainly aware of the problems of the unauthorized practice of law in the
context of immigration law as spelled out by Assembly Bill 1159, 1 they seem impervious to the
same criminal conduct in the context of court-appointed receiverships. But even when members
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of the State Bar are aware of the problem of the unauthorized practice of law in the context of
immigration, it seems they lack the resources or the resolve to uphold the laws prohibiting the
unlawful practice of law. 2
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2. In the context of receiverships, not only is there no attempt by the judicial defendants,
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the Attorney General Kamala Harris, or State Bar President Holden to prosecute the unlawful
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practice of law, there seems to be a deliberate obliviousness to the fact that at least one receiver,
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Mr. Singer, is given carte blanche to practice law and file any type of pleading or case. For
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instance, in the Superior Court of Alameda County, Mr. Singer filed a motion for a Contempt of
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Court Hearing Against John Tyler and Gregory J. Tyler; If Found Guilty, Fine $1,000 and Hold
Under Arrest for Five Days or Until They Turn Over $3,245 of Receivership Rents and
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Books/Records. (RJN, Exhibit B, RG 10-499443). Mr. Singer, a non-lawyer, is filing contempt
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motions and threatening to have parties thrown in jail for not cooperating with what amounts to
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his criminal scheme to practice law without a license. He routinely prepares legal documents
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such as releases and stipulations for parties even though this is considered the practice of law. He
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not only prepares stipulations, 3 but submits them to various courts such as the Superior Court of
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http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB1159
AB 1159, signed by Governor Brown on October 5, 2014 expanded the State Bar Act related to
the unauthorized practice of law to apply to anyone who is not an attorney from advertising as
a notario, not just notaries public. The ban is intended to prevent confusion that has often times
been capitalized upon by non-attorneys hoping to present themselves as attorneys, as a notario
in many Latin American nations is a type of lawyer.
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Mark J. Geragos just filed a lawsuit against the State Bar Association and its President, Craig
Holden, for failure to enforce AB1159 and the unauthorized practice in the area of immigration
law. (RJN, Exhibit A).
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In In re Garcia (9th Cir. BAP 2005) 335 B.R. 717, 728, the court found that the preparation of
a stipulation and release between a debtor and trustee was the practice of law: It is well settled
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Complaint for Damages and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief PAGE 1
Marin and the Superior Court of San Francisco. (RJN, Exhibit I, Exhibit H).
3. In another case in San Francisco Superior Court, Mr. Singer was allowed by judicial
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defendants to practice law and evict the owner of real property. (RJN, Exhibit C, CGC-10510760). When it became apparent to Mr. Singer that his Judicial Council approved EJ-130 writ
of possession form was defective and that he was about to evict not just the targeted owner
but all of the owners tenants, he was allowed by the court to recall his writ and submit a new
one. 4 When counsel for the tenant asked judicial defendant Lynn OMalley Taylor at the
hearing on the tenants claim of right to possession if she was allowing Mr. Singer to practice
law without a license, she abruptly terminated the hearing. She became indignant that counsel
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would even ask if a court-appointed non-lawyer receiver was engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law. She shut out any discussion of whether she was aiding and abetting the unlawful
practice of law even though the California Commission on Judicial Performance has found that a
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judicial officer unlawfully aided and abetted the unlawful practice of law. (RJN, Exhibit D).
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4. In an odd twist in the Superior Court of Contra Costa, Mr. Singer had a disagreement
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with opposing counsel over the interpretation of a court order and then filed a Motion for Order
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Authorizing Receiver to Retain Legal Counsel; Memorandum of Points and Authorities and
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Declaration of Kevin Singer in Support Thereof. (RJN, Exhibit E, C12-00284). While Mr.
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Singer thought he had the right to evict the owner of real estate or bring a contempt action
against a property owner even though he is not a licensed attorney, he sought to retain counsel in
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this case, stating in his declaration, (RJN, Exhibit E, pg. 3, 5):
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Although the Receiver has the ability to write basic pleadings and file papers with the
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in California that "practicing law" means more than just appearing in court. Estate of Condon,
65 Cal.App.4th 1138, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 922 (1998). Under California law, the practice of law
includes the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured,
whether the matter is pending in court or not. Frankfort Digital Services. Ltd. v. Neary (In re
Reynoso), 315 B.R. 544, 552 (9th Cir.BAP2004).
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http://webaccess.sftc.org/Scripts/Magic94/mgrqispi94.dll?APPNAME=WEB&PRGNAME=Vali
dateCaseNumber&ARGUMENTS=-ACPF10510760
SEP-30-2014
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UNLAWFUL DETAINER MOTION 501, DEFENDANT HUMBERTO RUIZ, JR.S

HEARING ON CLAIM OF RIGHT TO POSSESSION IS DENIED. WRIT, ON WHICH
THIS MOTION IS BASED, HAS BEEN RECALLED AND A NEW WRIT HAS BEEN
ISSUED. CLAIMANT'S ALLEGED TENANCY IS NOT AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
ORDER OF AUGUST 20, 2014 SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDES ANY CURRENT
TENANT WHO IS RESIDING ON THE PROPERTY. ANY ISSUES RELATING TO
CLAIMANT'S TENANCY ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS ACTION.
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Court, he is not an attorney. The Receiver is also not an expert in legal environmental
disclosures that will need to be provided to tenants. The Receiver also seeks help from
time to time in interpreting the Courts Order and working with the Parties legal
counsels.
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Mr. Singer then goes on to quote Cal. Rule of Court 3.1180 and acknowledges that a receiver
must not employ an attorney without the approval of the court. Ironically, hes engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law by filing a memorandum of points and authorities and appearing in
court on his motion to retain counsel. No Judicial Council forms have been promulgated for
him to come into court to request an attorney and avoid the actual or appearance of practicing
law without a license. Making matters worse, the existing forms contradict CRC 3.1180 by
suggesting that the need for an attorney is permissive. (*See, RC-310, 18; The receiver may
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employ unlawful detainer attorneys and eviction services without a court order.).
5. Not only are the judicial officers complicit in denying the fact of the receivers
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unauthorized practice of law, but they seem confused about the nature and scope of the receivers
authority. While the case law states that the appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy that
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should only be applied only in exceptional circumstances, 5 the judicial defendants here have
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rubber-stamped every request for an appointment. They simply ignore any opposition to the
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appointment. (RJN, Exhibit F, Exhibit G). They then grant the receiver the right to possession
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and control of the disputed property and the authority to manage, sell, or control it as he sees fit.
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The receiver is given almost unfettered authority without any actual oversight or accountability.
6. Given the almost unfettered rights of the receiver once appointed under Code of Civil
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Procedure 564 coupled with his unauthorized practice of law, Mr. Singer has engaged in nothing
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short of a reign of terror throughout the state. He evicts owners from their property, threatens to
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throw those he considers uncooperative in jail, and rings up unconscionable fees while practicing
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law without a license. One hapless owner of a car wash Mr. Singer was appointed to sell would
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complain that Mr. Singer accomplished nothing while churning up $247,771.94 in fees. (RJN,
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Exhibit G, pg. 2/28, pg. 3/18-19).

7. Mr. Singers unauthorized practice of law dovetails with the financial incentives banks,
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lenders, and other petitioning parties. By appointing a receiver, the party petitioning for an
appointment regains control over a distressed business or real property and avoids incurring the
costs associated with a protracted judicial foreclosure. On the other hand, the property or
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City and County of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App. 4th 734, 744.
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business owner loses possession of his property, any rental income, and is smothered in fees the
receiver churns up to extract a stipulated agreement to sell. This unholy alliance involving Mr.
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Singers (and perhaps many other receivers) UPL and the financial incentive of lenders/banks
must be held accountable.
II. JURISDICTION
8. This action for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages arises under the 5th
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. section 1983; and the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
9. The court has jurisdiction over the claims alleged in this complaint pursuant to 28
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U.S.C section 1331 and 1343 for a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs claim for injunctive
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and declaratory relief are authorized under 28 U.S.C. 2202. Defendants were acting under color
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of state law in all matters and rulings related to this case.
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10. Supplemental Jurisdiction over the pendant state law claims is proper pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1367.
III. VENUE
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11. Venue is proper in the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)
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because Defendant Singer performs his administrative and official duties there and thus resides
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there for purposes of venue. While Mr. Singer has engaged in his unlawful practice of law (UPL)
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throughout the state, many of the events or actions giving rise to these claims were directed from
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Mr. Singers principal place of business which is located in Los Angeles.

IV. INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT
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12. Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-2(c), this action should be assigned to Los Angeles because
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all the events, rulings, hearings, orders giving rise to this complaint have been directed from Mr.
Singers office in Los Angeles. The counsel for the class members also has her office in Los
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Angeles. The judicial defendants rendering the various rulings and orders perform their judicial
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functions throughout the state. Los Angeles is as more convenient forum than Bakersfield or
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other possible locations.
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V. CLASS ALLEGATIONS
13. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 23(a)(1-4) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals who have
suffered financial and emotional harm as a direct result of Mr. Singers UPL scheme.
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14. The class, to be represented by Archibald Cunningham and Humberto Ruiz, is

defined as follows:
All owners of real estate or businesses, tenants, and other parties who have been the
subject of orders, stipulations, or other motions and actions in state superior courts that
were brought against them by non-lawyer and court-appointed receiver Mr. Kevin Singer
while Mr. Singer was practicing law without a license.
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15. This action has been brought and may properly be maintainted as a class action under
Federal law and satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy rquirements for
maintaining a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
16. The member of the class are so numerous as to render joinder impracticable. There
are hundreds of cases Mr. Singer has been appointed to spread throughout the state where he has
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been engaged in the UPL. In any given superior court, its possible that some judicial officers
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have followed the rules of court and Mr. Singer has appeared in those particular cases only while
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represented or under the supervision of one of the law firms. However, in the same court, another
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judicial officer will have allowed Mr. Singer to practice law without a license. Upon information
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and belief, the size of the proposed class is approximately 200. Further, Mr. Singer is only one of
many receivers practicing throughout the state and its not unreasonable to assume that other
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receivers are also being allowed, deliberately or inadvertently, to practice law without a license.
In which case, it may be that many other prospective class members will emerge.
17. Upon information and belief, joinder of all of these individuals is impracticable
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because of the large number of class members and the fact that the class members are dispersed
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over the entire state of California, with most scattered in different judicial districts. Furthermore,
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upon information and belief, many of the class members are distressed business and real property
owners, who are in court in their own case in propria persona because they cannot afford to
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hire an attorney who might point out Mr. Singers UPL. In that regard, these class members have
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been financially compromised by the appointment of a receiver and would have great difficulty
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in pursuing their rights individually. Moreover, those class members who are represented and
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who have been contact by counsel, have expressed an unwillingness to join the class because
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they are concerned above the professional repercussion of suing judges, however justified the
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basis for the lawsuit might be. Finally, its likely that many of the attorneys for prospective class
members are afraid of their own roles and potential liability in Mr. Singers UPL. For example,
Mr. Singer routinely prepares a stipulation where all parties, attorneys, and judges sign off. In
one case in the Superior Court of Alameda, Mr. Singer prepared a stipulations where the attorney
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for plaintiff, Alan Scott Koenig, and the attorney for defendant, Stephen M. Flynn, both have
signed off on Mr. Singers document. (RJN, Exhibit SS). In signing off on Mr. Singers legal
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document, they are arguable aiding and abettting in the UPL. Naturally, counsel for the class
members are encountering resistance from the attorneys for prospective class member who may
have unwittingly and with no bad intentions implicated themselves in the UPL.
18. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, in that they
have had their civil rights violated by Mr. Singers UPL. All of the class members have been
dragged into court by the non-lawyer Mr. Singer while he was acting in propria persona. They
have all had their civil rights violated by the judicial defendants and non-judicial defendants who
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have allowed Mr. Singers UPL. They have all been billed receiver fees that are actually legal
fees incurred by a non-lawyer who was practicing law without a license. The order or judgments
obtained by a non-lawyer engaged in the UPL of law are a nullity and the billed fees are not
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recoverable because they are unathorized legal services as explained in the holding of the
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Supreme Court in Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Ca.
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4th 119, 135.6

19. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs and
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all class members sustained damages arising out of Defendant Siingers course of conduct
related to his UPL scheme. The harms suffered by Plaintiffs are typical of the harms suffered by
the class members.
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20. The representative Plaintiffs have the requisite personal interest in the outcome of this
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action and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have no interests
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that are adverse to the interests of the members of the Class.
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21. Plaintiffs counsel have the knowledge and experience to successfully prosecute this
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action against the Defendants. While counsel for the Plaintiffs is aware of no conflict of interest
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between counsel and members of the class, Plaintiff has noted that there is concern among the
counsel for class members (in their own ongoing cases) involving their possible implication in
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the UPL.
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22. Common question of law and fact related to the UPL exist as to all members of the
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Class and predominate over questions and law related to the receivership issues that affect the
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individual members of the Class. Theses common questions of law and fact include, without
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Birbrower, supra, 135: We agree with the Court of Appeal to the extent it barred Birbrower
from recovering fees generated under the fee agreement for the unauthorized legal services it
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limitation or exception, the impact of Mr. Singers UPL on the various receivership estates. A
favorable ruling on the issue of the UPL will render any orders or judgment or rulings related to
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the underlying receiver issues moot.

23. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy because there are inherent obstacles and biases that judges have
in judging other judges or themselves. In this action, judicial defendant Quidachay gave short
shrift to Plaintiffs assertion on May 6, 2014 that Mr. Singer was engaged in the UPL. He simply
dismissed the UPL issue as untimely. Also, on October 20, 2014, when counsel for Plaintiff
Ruiz asked judicial defendant Lynn OMalley Taylor if she was allowing Mr. Singer to practice
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law without a license, the judicial defendant promptly and abruptly terminated the hearing. The
judicial defendants dont want this issue raised because it implicates them in the unlawful
conduct of UPL. The Commission on Judicial Performance has found judges guilty of aiding
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and abetting in the misdemeanor of UPL. For instance, on February 28, 1995, Victoria B.
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Henley found that Judge Thomas M. Kelly of the Alpine Judicial District of California, aided
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and abetted in the misdemeanor of the unauthorized practice of law, (RJN, Exhibit D):
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The trial court determined that Judge Kelly, by agreeing that the Nevada attorney would
handle the management of the lawsuits in the absence of a court order permitting the
Nevada attorney to appear as counsel, after signing the complaints prepared by the
attorney, unlawfully aided and abetted the unauthorized practice of law. (emphasis
added).
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A class action is needed here because, as experienced by Plaintiff, the judicial officers find one
pretext or another to dispatch the issue and allow the receiver to continue his UPL. By suing the
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judicial officers en masse, counsel can avoid some summary dismissals on the pretext that their
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cases are de facto appeals under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine rather than general
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constitutional challenges. Further, the cost and expense of each individual member of the class
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litigating would be enormous and deter them from litigating even if they were afraid or rightly
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apprehensive of suing judges.

VI. PARTIES
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Plaintiffs
24. Archibald Cunningham (hereinafter Cunningham) is the owner of the condominium
located at 1489 McAllister St., San Francisco, which is the subject of this lawsuit and was the
subject of Mr. Coombs suit of September 29, 2010 to compel arbitration under the 2007 TIC
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performed in California.
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Agreement. (CPF-10-510760). Mr. Cunningham sued Mr. Coombs, Ms. Woods, and their
attorney, for fraud for suing on the defunct 2007 TICA rather than the governing document,
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which was, under the California Subdivision Map Act, the 2009 CC&Rs and Bylaws. (CGC-11511994). After his civil complaint in state court was dismissed when he failed to post $50,000 in
security under the state Vexatious Litigant Statute (VLS), Cunningham filed a federal civil rights
suit, arguing that the VLS was never intended to be applied against represented litigants.
25. Humberto Ruiz is a tenant of Mr. Cunningham and was subject to eviction by Mr.
Singers first and second writ of possession. He avoid being evicted by filing a Claim of Right to
Possession under Code of Civil Procedure 1174.3, which halts an eviction. Although Mr. Singer
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would recall his second writ of possession on Judicial Council form EJ-130 and check the box
that he had not served all the tenants with a Pre-judgment Clam of Possession, Mr. Ruiz was
still subject to eviction under the procedures promulgated under statutes and the judicial council
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forms.
Defendants
26. Kevin Singer7. Mr. Singer is employed as a court-appointed receiver. Hes also the
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President of a firm doing business in California as Receiver Specialist. Mr. Singer has been
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employed in almost 200 cases in numerous counties throughout California. Alhough California
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Rule of Court 3.1179(a)(1-2) provides that he should remain neutral and act for the benefit
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of all who have an interest in the receivership property, he normally does the bidding of the party
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seeking his appointment because he only gets paid and recovers his fees and expense once the
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receivership estate is sold or liquidated. In all the cases cited in the Request for Judicial Notice,
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Mr. Singer has practice law without a license. Hes also acted in excess of his statutory authority
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as receiver and tried to initiate contempt actions against recalcitrant parties who do not follow
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his biddings. In some of his pleadings, hes asked to be allowed to use the Sheriff as his private
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security company. (*See, RJN, Exhibit RHO). In another case, he slipped in a general release
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Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assoc. (2001) 531 U.S. 288,
298. We have treated a nominally private entity as a state actor when it is controlled by an
agency of the State, when it has been delegated a public function by the State, when it is
entwined with government policies, or when government is entwined in its management or
control.: Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 997 (1982)(holding that the issue of whether a private
party is an actor functioning under color of law or as a state actor is a question of law for the
court
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
form exonerating him from any liability. (*See, RJN, Exhibit FF). Besides improperly
expanding his statutory rights, he has engaged in a scheme to practice law without a license. In
the guise of being in-house counsel, his partner John Rachlin provides him legal services.
Likewise, the parties who have sought his appointment often have their attorney provide him
legal services or appear in court to provide him support during oral argument. For instance,
attorney John Scott McKay has written numerous pleadings on Mr. Singers behalf and acted as
his attorney at court. The fact that Cal. Rule of Court 3.1179 prohibits the party who sought
appointment from entering into any agreements, contracts, or understanding with the receiver,
both Mr. Singer and those very parties collude to bring about the sale of the receivership estate
10
so that they may collect their various fees.
11
27. John Rachlin. John Rachlin is an attorney licensed to practice law in California and
12
is also a principal in Receivershp Specialists. His duties with Receivership Specialists is
13
described as in-house counsel. He is sued in his individual capacity for aiding and abetting Mr.
14
Singers UPL. Hes provide his legal services to Mr. Singer and provided him various
15
declarations for the cases in which Mr. Singer has been appointed a receiver. (RJN, Exhibit
16
JR, Exhibit JR-1, Exhibit JR-2). Their firm Receivership Specialists is simply a mechanism
17
where Mr. Rachlin aids and abets Mr. Singers UPL in violation of CRPC 1-300(A) [A]
18
member shall not aid any person or entity in the unauthorized practice of law. Upon
19
information and belief, it may be shown that they are illegally fee-splitting in violation of the
20
CRPC.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
28. RECEIVERSHIP SPECIALISTS. (John Rachlin, Rick Marguis). Receiver

Specialists is a licensed business doing business in California. Mr. Singer is the principal and
founder of the company. The company is sued for damages for the criminal activity of its
principal. Rick Marquis is the firms licensed real estate broker who Mr. Singer uses for the
sales of real property and then apparently splits or shares the commissions. Most recently, Mr.
Marquis aided and abetted Mr. Singers UPL by participating in the wrongful eviction of an
owner from his house.
29. Attorney General Kamala Harris. She is the chief law enforcement officer of the
state of California and is charged with seeing that the laws of the State are uniformly and
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
adequately enforced. (Cal. Const. Art. V, sec. 13). She has direct and complete supervisory
control over every district attorney and sheriff and such other law enforcement officers as
3
4
directed by law. In that regard, a district attorneys enforcement action for violation against the
UPL provides a basis for relief to the offended party. (Bus. & Prof. Code 61255). Further, the
state constitution provides (Cal. Art. V, sec 13);
5
Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being
adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to
prosecute any violations of law of which the superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in
such cases the Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney. When
required by the public interest or directed by the Governor, the Attorney General shall
assist any district attorney in the discharge of the duties of that office.
6
7
8
9
10
Here, at least one class member has filed a complaint with the San Francisco District Attorneys
11
Office as well as with the San Francisco Sheriffs Department and Sheriff Ross Mikarimi.
12
Neither the district attorney, the Sheriff, nor the AG, however, has taken any steps to enforce
13
the prohibition against the UPL. Ironically, the San Francisco Sheriffs Department at the behest
14
of Sheriff Mirkarimi and with the legal support of Mark Nicco has enforced a facially void
writ of possession on Judicial Council form EJ-130 filed by non-lawyer receiver Kevin Singer.
15
30. Craig Holden, President of California State Bar. Craig Holden was elected
16
President of the California State Bar in September, 2014 and was promptly sued by the former
17
president (Joseph Dunn) who alleged that he was fired for Whistle-Blowing activities that
18
related, among other things, to the failure of the State Bar to uphold its duty to enforce the
19
prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law. This story was recently covered in the Los
20
Angeles Times. 8 Mr. Holden as President of the State Bar is charged with performing a variety
of functions, most notably here, the prevention of the unlawful practice of law. (Keller v. State
21
Bar of California, (1999) 496 U.S. 1, 5; Keller v. State Bar (1989) 47 Cal. 3d. 1152, 1160, In
22
addition to those duties, the State Bar enforces the law relating to the unlawful practice of law
23
and illegal solicitation upholding (Citations omitted)). Bus. & Prof. Code section 6001.1
24
provides that protection of the public shall be the highest priority for the State Bar of California
25
and the board of trustees in exercising their licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions.
31. City and County of San Francisco. (San Francisco Sheriffs Department, Ross
26
27
28
Mirkarimi). The City is subject to for municipal liability for maintaining the policy of allowing
8
http://www.latimes.com/la-me-ln-cal-bar-20141113-story.html?track=rss;
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
court-appointed receivers to practice law without a license and by enforcing the receivers
facially void orders though the San Francisco Sheriffs Office. For purposes of Monell liability,
3
4
5
its the policy and practice of the City, through the San Francisco Sheriffs Department and Ross
Mirkarimi, to enforce facially void writs of possession, which are not filed and signed by
licensed California attorneys authorized to practice law and are not obtained after judgments
under the Unlawful Detainer Act (as mandated by CCP 715.050), but by non-lawyer receivers
who are not members of the State Bar. This violates Bus. & Prof. Code 6125 as well California
Rule of Court 3.1180 which required the received to obtain court approval to hire an
attorney to file such a writ. On September 17, 2014, the San Francisco Sheriffs Department
served a Notice to Vacate on Plaintiff and evicted him on November 6, 2014.

32. City and County of San Francisco. (George Gascon, San Francisco Sheriffs
10
Department.) Its also the policy and practice of the San Francisco District Attorneys Office
11
not to enforce the prohibition against the UPL. While Steve Cooley and the DAs Office in Los
12
Angeles has bent over backwards to deal with the issue of the UPL in the context of immigration
13
law, the DAs office in San Francisco has neglected to implement any policy to curb or prevent
14
the UPL by court-appointed receivers. The DAs office has failed to provide any training or
15
supervision regarding methods and procedures for assuring that the UPL is not taking place in
16
the county by court-appointed receivers. 9 Specifically, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Mr.
Singer back in June, 2014 with Maffei of the Consumer Fraud Department of theDAs office.
17
The DAs office has failed to investigate his charges or respond to Mr. Singers UPL.
18
33. County of Los Angeles. (District Attorney Jackie Lacey). The City is sued for
19
municipal liability for maintaining the policy or practice of allowing court-appointed receivers
20
to practice law without a license. Former District Attorney Steve Cooley and the DAs Office in
21
Los Angeles proactively dealt with the issue of the UPL, but there is no indication that District
22
Attorney Lacey has acknowledged or taken any steps to prevent the by court-appointed receivers.
The Los Angeles DAs office, under the direction of District Attorney Lacey, has failed to
23
24
provide any training or supervision regarding methods and procedures for assuring that the UPL
is not taking place in the countys courts by court-appointed receivers. The failure to provide
25
26
27
28
The Ninth Circuit has found that four conditions for municipal liability must be satisfied in
order establish municipal liaibilty for failing to take appropriate actions to preserve constitutional
rights: "(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that
the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy `amounts to deliberate indifference' to the
plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the `moving force behind the
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
training or enforce the prohibition against the UPL in the context of court-appointed receivers is
a practice that has directly caused the constitutional violations of the members of the Class.
3
4
5
6
34. County of Kern (Kern County District Attorney Lisa Green). The County is sued
for municipal liability under the holding of Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of N.Y.
(1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694-695 on the grounds that it has failed to correct the policy or practice of
allowing court-appointed receivers to practice law without a license.
35. County of Marin. (Marin County District Attorney Edward S. Berberian). The
County is sued for municipal liability under the holding of Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of
City of N.Y. (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694-695 on the grounds that it has failed to correct the policy
9
10
or practice of allowing court-appointed receivers to practice law without a license.

36. City and County of Sacramento. (District Attorney Jan Scully). The County is sued
for municipal liability under the holding of Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of N.Y.
11
12
13
(1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694-695 on the grounds that it has failed to correct the policy or practice of
allowing court-appointed receivers to practice law without a license.
37. City and County of Alameda. (District Attorney Nancy OMalley). The County is
14
sued for municipal liability under the holding of Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of
15
N.Y. (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694-695 on the grounds that it has failed to correct the policy or
16
practice of allowing court-appointed receivers to practice law without a license.

38. City and County of Contra Costa. (District Attorney Mark Peterson). The County
17
is sued for municipal liability under the holding of Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of
18
N.Y. (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694-695 on the grounds that it has failed to correct the policy or
19
practice of allowing court-appointed receivers to practice law without a license.
20
39. Judge Barbara A. Meiers. Judge Barbara A. Meiers is a judge at the Superior Court
21
of California in Los Angeles County. She is sued in her individual and official capacity for
22
aiding and abetting Mr. Singers UPL by signing off on his stipulation on September 18, 2014
23
and allowing him to set hearings and practice law in her courtroom even though he is unlicensed
24
and engaged in the UPL. (RJN, Exhibit BM).
25
40. Judge Robert H. OBrien. Judge OBrien is a judge at the Superior Court of
26
California in Los Angeles County. He is sued in his individual and official capacity for aiding
27
and abetting Mr. Singers UPL. He has allowed Mr. Singer to file pleadings, notice of hearings
28
constitutional violation.'" Oviatt v. Perace, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992).
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
and even a request for a contempt on December 24, 2013. (RJN, Exhibit RHO). While Judge
OBrien curbed Mr. Singers overreach of his power as a receiver by inking out the hearing for a
contempt action, he did open his court as a forum for Mr. Singers UPL. Judge OBrien also
rightly, unlike the vast majority of the other judicial defendants here, affirmatively curbed the
law firms request that Mr. Singer be given the right to engage the Sheriff as a private security
force to to take and safely keep possession and control of the Properties. (RJN, Exhibit RHO-
1, pg. 10, 18).
41. Judge David L. Brown. Judge Brown is a judge at the Superior Court of California
in Sacramento County. He is sued in his individual and official capacity for aiding and abetting
10
Mr. Singers UPL by allowing him to file pleadings, make court appearance, and represent
11
clients. (RJN, Exhibit DLB).
12
42. Judge Lawence John Appel. Judge Appel is a judge at the Superior Court of
13
California in Alameda County. He is sued in his individual and official capacity for aiding and
14
abetting Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit SS).
15
43. Judge Laurel S. Brady. Judge Brady is a judge at the Superior Court of California in
16
Contra Costa County. She is sued in her individual and official capacity for aiding and abetting
17
Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit EE, Exhibit G).
18
44. Judge Randolph Heubach. Judge Heubach is a judge at the Superior Court of
19
California in Marin County. He is sued in his individual and official capacity for aiding and
20
abetting Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit I).
21
45. Judge Marla Miller. Judge Miller is a judge at the Superior Court of California in
22
San Francisco County. She is sued in her individual and official capacity for aiding and abetting
23
Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit H).
24
46. Judge James Stoelker . Judge Stoelker is a judge at the Superior Court of California
25
in Santa Clara County. He is sued in his individual and official capacity for aiding and abetting
26
Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit Y).
27
47. Judge Lorna H. Brumfield. Judge Brumfield is a judge at the Superior Court of
28
California in Kern County. She is sued in her individual and official capacity for aiding and
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
abetting Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit V).
48. Judge Delbert C. Gee. Judge Gee is a judge at the Superior Court of California in
Alameda County. He is sued in his individual and official capacity for aiding and abetting Mr.
Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit M).
49. Judge Harold Kahn. Judge Kahn is a judge at the Superior Court of California in
San Francisco County. He is sued in his individual and official capacity for aiding and abetting
Mr. Singers UPL, including his signing off on Mr. Singers stipulations. (RJN, Exhibit HK).
8
9
50. Judge David B. Flinn. Judge Flinn is a judge at the Superior Court of California in
Contra Costa County. He is sued in his individual and official capacity for aiding and abetting
10
Mr. Singers UPL, including his signing off on Mr. Singers orders. (RJN, Exhibit DBF).
11
51. Judge Lynn OMalley Taylor. Judge Lynn OMalley Taylor is a judge at the
12
Superior Court of California in San Francisco County. She is sued in her individual and official
13
capacity for aiding and abetting Mr. Singers UPL in several cases. (CGC-10-510760; CGC 14-
14
542184 10). At an October 20, 2014 hearing, she terminated a hearing on a tenants Claim of
15
Right to Possession when the tenants counsel asked if she was allowing Mr. Singer to practice
16
law without a license. Mr. Singer had filed for a writ of possession without having obtained a
17
judgment under the Unlawful Detainer Act as mandated by CCP 715.050. (RJN, Exhibit LOT).
18
52. Judge Judith Craddick. Judge Craddick is a judge at the Superior Court of
19
California in Contra Costa County. She is sued in her individual and official capacity for aiding
20
and abetting Mr. Singers UPL filing of pleadings and other legal documents.. (RJN, Exhibit
21
JC).
53. Judge A. James Robertson II. Judge Robertson is a judge in the Superior Court of
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
10
http://webaccess.sftc.org/Scripts/Magic94/mgrqispi94.dll?APPNAME=WEB&PRGNAME=case
infoscreens&ARGUMENTS=-ACGC14542184,-AT,-AGenerated\%3A%20Nov-192014%2012\%3A25%20pm,-A00315649,-AD,-AOCT-14-2014,-ANOV-05-2014,ASort%20by%20Party%20Name,-ASort%20by%20Name,-AS,-AS,-AD,-AA,-A,-A,-A
SINGER, KEVIN
11150 WEST OLYMPIC
BLVD.
LOS ANGELES, CA 90064
OTHER
Pro Per
OCT-23-2014 BOND
OCT-23-2014 GENERIC CIVIL FILING (NO
FEE) NOV-05-2014 EX PARTE APPLICATION
FOR ORDER $60.00 PAYMENT
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
San Francisco. He aided and abetted Mr. Singers UPL by allowing him to appear in court and
present oral argument, to file pleadings, and represent clients. On July 31, 2014, 11 Judge
3
4
5
6
Robertson allowed Mr. Singer to practice law in his courtroom and even issued him an order
allocating him fees to defend himself in a federal civil rights lawsuit against Mr. Singer based on
his UPL. He is sued in his individual capacity and his official and administrative capacity. Judge
Robertson also aided and abetted Mr. Singers UPL in another case in which an appeal was
taken. (CGC-09-492710; RJN, Exhibit JR, Exhibit JR-1).
7
8
9
10
54. Judge Donald Evans Quidachay. Judge Quidachay is a judge in the Evictions
Division of the San Francisco Superior Court, Department 501. On May 6, 2014, he was
presented with pleadings that asserted that the court-appointed receiver, Mr. Singer, was
engaging in the UPL by filing pleadings, including a request for a writ of possession. Judge
Quidachay stated that the objection to Mr. Singers alleged misdemeanor under Bus. & Prof.
11
Code 6126(a) was untimely. He has aided and abetted Mr. Singer by allowing him to come into
12
in his court room and commit the misdemeanor of UPL. He has willfully colluded with Mr.
13
Singers conspiracy to practice law without a license. He signed Mr. Singers drafted writ of
14
possession on August 20, 2014 knowing very well that such a writ can issue only pursuant to a
15
judgment for possession in an unlawful detainer action. (CCP 715.050). He is sued in his
16
individual capacity and his official and administrative capacity.

55. Judge Lillian Sing. Judge Lillian Sing is a judicial officer at the San Francisco
17
Superior Court. She has aided and abetted Mr. Singers UPL. For instance, on April 18, 2014,
18
she allowed Mr. Singer and Mr. McKay to come into her court-room and set times for Mr.
19
Singers request for a writ of possession. In assigning Mr. Singer court dates and allowing him to
20
request hearing dates, she participated in his crime of practicing law without a license and
21
colluded in his UPL conspiracy. She is sued in her individual and official capacity.
56. Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye. Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye is the
22
23
24
25
26
27
Director of the Judicial Council, the state agency responsible for assuring that the law,
statutes, and court rules and procedures are consistent with constitutional guarantees.
11
JUL-30-2014
ORDER ON EX PARTE APPLICATION (AUTHORIZING RECEIVER)
28
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Defendant Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye is a public agency director responsible for a
public entity, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 121319(1)(A)&(B). She denied a class members
Petition for Review (S218853 12, file July 9, 2014) in which he sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against Mr. Singers unlawful practice of the law in the San Francisco
Superior Court. By failing to grant the petition, she has tacitly sanctioned Mr. Singers
6
7
8
criminal conduct and acted in the complete absence of all her jurisdiction. Defendant
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye is sued in her official, individual, and administrative
capacity.
57. Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye is also authorized under Gov. Code 68501 to
9
10
11
appoint communities to study the means for improving the administration of justice.
She is also charged with the duty of preparing Judicial Council forms (Gov. Code
68511) to help implement court rules and enactments. She has failed to appoint any
12
committee to study the UPL in the context of receiverships. She also has failed to
13
produce any forms that allow a receiver to appear in court to seek approval to hire an
14
attorney under CRC 3.1180 without inadvertently engaging in the UPP. She has failed to
15
produce any form that would provide notice to an opposing party as well as the court that
16
a receiver is acting as an agent of the court (CRC 3.1179) as opposed in exercising
17
some right to self-representation on matters of his own interests. In failing to fabricate
18
such forms, she has enabled Mr. Singers UPL conspiracy and to perpetuate and deceive
19
the court that he is entitled to practice law solely based on his appointment as receiver.
58. Judge Anthony Kline. Judge Kline is the Presiding Judge of Division Two of
20
21
22
23
24
the Court of Appeals for California, First District. He summarily denied Plaintiffs writ of
mandate (A141788) seeking to enjoin Mr. Singers unlawful practice of law. On July 31,
2014, he summarily dismissed an appeal (A142115) related to Mr. Singers unlawful
practice of law,13 essentially denying the class member any recourse to address the issue
25
12
26
27
28
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=2078061&doc_n
o=S218853
13
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=1&doc_id=2079756&doc_n
o=A142115
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
of Mr. Singers unlawful practice of law. In refusing to uphold the law and enjoin Mr.
Singers violation of 6126(a), judicial defendant Kline has tacitly or effectively
approved and sanctioned and aided Mr. Singer in the commission of the crime and UPL
conspiracy. He is sued in his individual and official capacity.
59. Judge James Richmond. Judge Richmond is an appellate judge in Division
Two of the Court of Appeals for California, First District. He summarily denied a
Plaintiff writ of mandate (A141788) seeking to enjoin Mr. Singers unlawful practice of
law. In refusing to uphold the law as mandated by Judicial Canon 3B(2) and refusing to
enjoin Mr. Singers violation of Bus. & Gov. Code 6126(a), judicial defendant Richmond
10
has tacitly approved and sanctioned and aided Mr. Singer in the commission of the crime.
11
Judge Richmond has an unflattering reputation in the legal community for turning a blind
12
eye on judicial misconduct or implicating lawyers rather than judges. 14 He is sued in
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
07/31/2014 Dismissal order

filed.
Respondent's unopposed motion to dismiss is granted

and the above-entitled appeal is hereby dismissed.
14
In In re Henry James Koehler (A125012), Judge Richmond summarily denied two habeas
corpus petitions before he got it right and granted the third petition. But by that time the mid70ish year old Princeton alumni, University of Michigan Law School educated lawyer, James
Henry Koehler, had spent 10 days in jail (two five day stints), was disbarred, was financially and
professionally ruined, and had moved backed to Ohio where the attorney who represented him
speculated that it was likely that he was dead. Now some would argue that his death (negligent
homicide by judicial fiat?) could not or should not be imputed to trial judge Susan I. Etezadi who
issued the orders of contempt because his death was too attenuated from her orders or the delay
of Judge Richmond in, not exactly upholding the law, but putting a long delayed end to the petty
ego-damaged abuse in her position as a judicial officer. While Judge Richmond would scold the
trial judge for not crossing her ts and totting her i in using the ultimate weapon of
contempt, he uttered nary a word about the ultra vires acts of the Judge Susan I. Etezadi. (Is
contempt or incarceration a matter for facile penmanship metaphors?) However, he did take it
upon himself to speculate whether Henry James Koehler was being contumacious and thereby
somehow incited and provoked his incarceration on an ad infinitum basis. Of course, Henry
James submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction and went along with being thrown in jail for not
complying with a facially void sanction order, but that did not deter Judge Richmond from
impugning Henrys motives and deflecting attention from the trial judges outrageous conduct.
Its difficult to say whether the greater outrage lies with the sadistic trial judge who blatantly,
recklessly, and arrogantly abuses her power or the appellate judge who fabricates excuses for her
and enables the insanity, that is, the trial judges belief that she has the right to throw an attorney
in jail ad infinitum and on the basis of sanctions under Family Code 271 that did not even
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
his individual and official capacity.

60. Judge Cynthia Ming-mei Lee. Judge Lee at all times applicable herein was the
2
3
4
5
Presiding Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court with authority to administer, implement,
and enforce the states statute related to the unauthorized practice of law. She had authority to
promulgate policies and procedures for doing so. She is sued in her official capacity as an
officer, agent, and employee of the City and County of San Francisco for damages and
prospective injunctive relief. 15 She is sued in her individual and in her administrative capacity
for damages for acts taken as an administrator and for failing to correct of the practice of
allowing court-appointed receivers to file pleadings and practice and schedule hearings on their
pro se motions. She was notified repeated by letter that Mr. Singer was engaged in the UPL.
61. Scott McKay16. Scott McKay is the lawyer for Mr. Coombs and Ms. Woods and is a
10
11
named Defendant and is sued in his individual capacity for aiding and abetting Mr. Singers
UPL. He has provided Mr. Singer legal support in the state law arbitration case of In Re Coombs
12
(CPF 10-510760) in the San Francisco Court. In the arbitration proceeding, he drafted the order
13
seeking the appointment of Mr. Singer to enforce the forced sale in accordance with the 2007
14
TICA. Although Mr. McKay, as the party seeking the appointment of the receiver, was not to
15
come to any understanding or agreement with the receiver (CRC 3.1180(b)), Mr. McKay has
16
encouraged and conspired with Mr. Singer to commit the crime of practicing law without a
17
license. In fact, Mr. Singers billing statement showed that he and Mr. McKay coordinated the
timing of Mr. Singers motion and that he and McKay had numerous correspondences regarding
18
his ex parte hearing. At the May 6, 2014 hearing before Judge Quidachay, Mr. McKay conceded
19
that Mr. Singer was not an attorney and he effectively conceded that he was committing a crime
20
but he nevertheless argued and tried to persuade Judge Quidachay, on Mr. Singers behalf, that
21
Mr. Singer was authorized to evict Plaintiff without first obtaining a judgment under the
22
Unlawful Detainer Act. Mr. McKay, as an officer of the court, knows that California Rules of
23
Professional Conduct 1-300(A) provides that [A] member shall not aid any person or entity in
the unauthorized practice of law. Yet, he deliberately violated this rule and colluded with Mr.
24
Singer in the conspiracy to evict Plaintiff, which occurred on November 6, 2014. He is sued in
25
26
27
28
apply to this attorney who was representing his client.

15
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 77 (1989).

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980) (holding that private parties who corruptly conspired
with a state judge acted under color of law).
16
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
5
his individual capacity.

62. Michael Coombs. Mr. Coombs has aided and abetted Mr. Singer in the UPL by
providing declarations in his action in the San Francisco Superior Court. (CGC 10-510760). He
has colluded in Mr. Singers conspiracy to practice law without a license by loaning him money
to defend against charges that he is in fact practicing law without a license. (District Court, ND
of Cal. cv-14-3250 WHA). He is sued in his individual capacity.
63. Tamara Woods. Ms. Woods has aided and abetted Mr. Singer in the UPL by
providing declarations in his action in the San Francisco Superior Court. (CGC 10-510760). She
has colluded in Mr. Singers conspiracy to practice law without a license by loaning him money
9
10
to defend against charges that he is in fact practicing law without a license. (District Court, ND
of Cal. cv-14-3250 WHA). She is sued in her individual capacity.
VII. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
11
12
A. Statutory Framework for Unauthorized Practice of Law

64. Judicial officers have no authority to determine who practices law. The State Bar Act
13
(Bus. & Prof. Code, 6000 et seq.) provides the comprehensive legislative scheme for regulating
14
the practice of law. It prohibits the practice of law by anyone who is not an active member of the
15
State Bar. (J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 958, 965). Since the passage of the
16
State Bar Act in 1927, the general rule has been that "[w]hile any person may represent himself,
and his own interests, at law and in legal proceedings," no person shall practice law for another
17
unless he or she is an active member of the State Bar. (Abar v. Rogers (1981) 124 Cal.App. 3d
18
862, 864; J.W. v. Sup. Ct., supra at 965). The prohibition against unauthorized law practice is
19
within the state's police power and is designed to ensure that those performing legal services do
20
so competently. (Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Ca. 4th
21
119, 127). Section 6125 articulates a strong public policy favoring the practice of law in
22
23
24
California by licensed State Bar members. (Birbrower, supra, 134).

1. Section 6125
65. Bus. & Prof. Code section 6125 thus states: "No person shall practice law in
California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar." A person who engages in the
25
unauthorized practice of law may be guilty of a misdemeanor or felony (6126), and subject to
26
civil penalties (6126.5), and contempt (6127). A single incident of practicing law without a
27
license constitutes a statutory violation. (People v. Ring (1937) 26 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 768, 773;
28
disapproved on other grounds in Birbrower, supra, 17 Cal. 4th, at 129).

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2. Exceptions to Section 6125
66. Exceptions to 6125 are narrowly drawn, strictly interpreted and are generally limited
2
3
4
5
to allowing out-of-state attorneys to make brief appearances before a state court. Title Nine
Rules, 9.40-9.48, provide exceptions to 6125 for out-of-state attorney or certified law
students (CRC 9.42) but there are no exceptions for non-attorneys. The Legislature has made
two exceptions to section 6125, one for international disputes resolved in California under the
states rules for arbitration and conciliation of international commercial disputes. (CCP 1297.11
et seq). 17 The other for labor negotiations and arbitrations arising under collective bargaining
agreement in industries subject to federal law. (Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co. (1962). 369
U.S. 95, 103).

3. No Judicial Exceptions to Section 6125
10
67. In Birbrower, the state Supreme Court declined to fashion an arbitration

11
exception to section 6125s prohibition of the unlicensed practice of law, reasoning that an
12
exception for arbitration is best left to the Legislature. (Birbrower, supra, 133-134). In
13
rejecting the plea of an exception, the Supreme Court concluded, supra, at 131-133:
This contention is without merit because it contravenes the plain language of the statute.
Section 6125 clearly states that no person shall practice law in California unless that
person is a member of the State Bar. The statute does not differentiate between attorneys
or nonattorneys, nor does it excuse a person who is a member of another state bar. (6) It
is well-settled that, in determining the meaning of a statute, we look to its words and give
them their usual and ordinary meaning. (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593,
601 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 238, 828 P.2d 140]; Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 208209 [271 Cal. Rptr. 191, 793 P.2d 524].) "[I]f statutory language is `clear and
unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.'
[Citation.]" (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d
211, 218 [188 Cal. Rptr. 115, 655 P.2d 317].) (5b) The plain meaning controls our
interpretation of the statute here because Birbrower has not shown "that the natural and
customary import of the statute's language is either `repugnant to the general purview of
the act' or for some other compelling reason, should be disregarded...." (Id. at pp. 218219.)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
4. The Right to Self-Representation Does Not Apply to Individuals

Acting in a Representative Capacity.
24
25
68. California appellate courts have uniformly refused to fashion exceptions to 6125 for
26
17
27
28
This exception provides that in a commercial conciliation in California involving international

commercial disputes, The parties may appear in person or be represented or assisted by any
person of their choice. A person assisting in representing a party need not be a member of the
legal profession or licensed to practice law in California. (CCP 1297.351).
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
non-attorneys acting in representative capacities. 18 These courts have categorically rejected
the legal argument that individuals acting in a representative capacity are acting in pro per.
3
4
5
For instance, in City of Downey v. Johnson (1968) 263 Cal. App. 2d, 775, the Court of Appeals
ruled that a non-lawyer representing his mother's estate as conservator and as executor after her
death was held incapable of appearing in propria persona on behalf of her estate. The court
expressly rejected the theory that "`an administrator, executor or guardian'" could "`practice law
in matters relating to his trusteeship on the theory that he is practicing for himself.'" (Id. at p.
779).
5. Judgments and Orders Obtained by Non-lawyer Receiver Are a Nullity.
69. Orders or judgments obtained by the non-lawyer receiver are a nullity.
9
10
((The general American rule is that an unlicensed person cannot appear in court for another
person, and that the resulting judgment is a nullity. Russell v. Dopp (1995) 36 Cal. App. 765,
11
775; "A judgment obtained against a party represented by an unlicensed person is invalid." 1
12
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985; Attorneys, 294, p. 330; A nonattorney trustee who
13
represents the trust in court is representing and affecting the interests of the beneficiary and is
14
thus engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Ziegler v. Nickel (1998) 64 Cal. App. 545,
15
549; Thus, one holding a special power of attorney cannot act as an attorney for another by
16
virtue of the power of attorney. People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Malone (1965) 232 Cal.
App. 2d 531, 537).
17
18
B. Statutory and Regulatory Framework Related to

Appointment of Receivers.
19
20
70. The California Supreme Court has stated that [T]he appointment of a receiver is a
21
drastic remedy, may involve unnecessary expense and hardship and courts carefully weigh the
22
propriety of such appointment in exercising their discretion to appoint a receiver particularly if
23
24
25
26
27
28
18
*See, Torres v. Friedman (1985) 169 Cal. App. 3d 880, 888, A purported substitution of
attorney form was ineffective because it purported to substitute a non-attorney guardian ad litem
as the attorney of record; City of Downey v. Johnson (1968) 263 Cal. App. 2d 275, 279, a
nonlawyer representing his mothers estate as conservator and as executor after her death was
incapable of appearing in court on behalf of estate; Abar v. Rogers (1981) 124 Ca. App. 3d 862,
865, a husband, not licensed to practice law, may not represent his wife as a plaintiff in civil suit;
In re Gordon J (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 907, 914, juvenile not entitled to have father assist him
in his defense or represent him since father was not member of the bar; Campell v. Jewish Com.
For P. Services (1954) 125 Cal. App. 2d 771, non-lawyer brother could not appear as attorney
for his sibling in a libel suit).
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
there is an alternative remedy." (Hoover v. Galbraith (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 519, 528)..)

71. In California, a receiver may only be appointed in the class of cases expressly set
2
3
4
5
forth in statute. (Marsch v. Williams (1994) 23 Cal. App. 4th 238, 246; 6 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure, (3 ed. 1985) Provisional Remedies, supra, 340, pg. 288; Miller v. Oliver (1917) 174
Ca. 407, 410. The Marsch court explained that great care must be taken in narrowly defining
the circumstances because the appointment of a receiver is tantamount to the statutory
authorization for the taking of the property of another and transferring it to the agent of a court.
(supra, 247). 19 This implicates the 14th and 5th Amendments concern for the taking of property
without due process of law. It also raises procedural due process issues regarding the standards
9
10
and procedures for the exercise of the statutory right to appoint a receiver and the due process
safeguards to prevent improper takings.
72. Code of Civil Procedure section 564 provides:
11
"A receiver may be appointed, in the manner provided in this chapter, by the court
in which an action or proceeding is pending in any case in which such court is
empowered by law to appoint a receiver.
"In superior courts a receiver may be appointed by the court in which an action or
proceeding is pending, or by a judge thereof, in the following cases: ...
12
13
14
"2. In an action by a mortgagee for the foreclosure of his mortgage and sale of the
mortgaged property, where it appears that the mortgaged property is in danger of being
lost, removed, or materially injured, or that the condition of the mortgage has not been
performed, and that the property is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt;
...
15
16
17
18
"7. In all other cases where receivers have heretofore been appointed by the usages of
courts of equity."
19
20
21
73. In some mortgages and deeds of trust, there are provisions stipulating that a receiver
may be appointed in the event of a default. One California appellate court has viewed such a
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
19
Monarsch, supra, at 247-248: When exercised, it means the taking of property by the court
from one who may turn out to be the rightful owner thereof, and transferring it, pro re nata, to
an agent of the court vested with power to handle and dispose of it according as the court may
direct for the purposes of the action in which such agent or receiver is appointed. There is no
power vested in the courts more jealously guarded or safeguarded than this very power to
appoint a receiver to take, for the court, the possession and control of the property of others, and
this is because, as above suggested, the exercise of the power may mean the divesting the owner
of his lawful right to remain in possession of his property. It is, therefore, obvious that, while the
power to appoint a receiver is provisional and an ancillary remedy, its scope may go beyond that
of a mere remedy and strike at the very substance of a person's property rights."
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
stipulation in a mortgage as an agreement in equity that should not be ignored, and
presumably given effect or at least some evidentiary weight. (Barclays Bank of California v.
Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal. App. 3d 593, 601-602). In Barclays, the court took note of the
New York rule that does not consider it inequitable to take the property out of an owners
hands pending an action to foreclose the mortgage if the parties have agreed, that, in case of a
default, a receiver shall be appointed. (Barclays, supra, at 601-602, quoting C.B. Keogh
Manufg Co. v. Whiston, 14 N.Y.S. 344).
8
9
74. As a result of these stipulations coupled with the broad reading of statutory language
related tousages of equities, financial institutions routinely include such stipulations in their
10
legal instruments and argue that they are entitled to the appointment of receivers in accordance
11
with the stipulations in either the deed of trust or mortgage without making any showing that the
12
real property security (rents, etc.) is inadequate to service the debt. (Barclays, supra, at 597;
13
Mines v. Superior Court (1932) 216 Cal. 776; Lovett v. Point Loma Development Corp. (1968)
14
266 Cal. App. 2d 70. 20 In short, an owners property is handed over to the receiver on the bare
15
allegations of a plaintiff and without the need for an evidentiary hearing on the factual and legal
16
issues of default. If a trust deed further provides that there is no need for an undertaking or a
17
bond, the trial court will even waive those court rules. (*See, RJN, Exhibit E, pg. 2/14-17). Mr.
18
Singer just files his pleadings in pro per (UPL), provides points and authorities for the sale,
19
and the trial court rubber stamps the sale for the best interest of the parties. (RJN, Exhibit
20
LHB, pg. 5/4-23).
21
C. The Various Appointments of Mr. Singer In This Class Action.

75. In the 200 cases or so in which Mr. Singer has been appointed as a receiver 21,
22
23
the courts have rubber-stamped every request for appointment without ever considering if
24
20
25
26
Lovett v. Point Loma, supra, 73-75: Where the lienholder seeks enforcement of a provision in
the lien agreement conferring the right to collect rents and apply such upon the secured
indebtedness, the authority to appoint a receiver is conferred by Code of Civil Procedure,
section 564, subdivision 7.
27
28
21
*See Mr. Singers reference to his Case List at his web page.
http://www.receivershipspecialists.com/case-list/
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there is an alternative 22 to the drastic remedy that is the appointment of a receiver. In
fact, judicial defendant Wynne Carvil of the Superior Court of Alameda granted Budget
Finance Companys unopposed motion for the appointment of a receiver in a tentative
ruling in a law and motion proceeding. Gregory Taylors property was simply handed
over to Mr. Singer without any type of evidentiary hearing and in apparent contravention
6
7
of fundamental notions of due process. (RJN, Exhibit L, Motion to Confirm

Appointment of Receiver, RG 10499443).
76. Even when a defendant such as Benyam Mulugeta hires an attorney who
provides a memorandum of points and authorities opposing the drastic remedy of the
9
10
11
appointment of a receiver on equitable grounds, the trial judges routinely rubber stamp
the requests for appointment which are normally brought by banks or other financial
institutions that are represented by high-profile law firms. (RJN, Exhibit M, Lone Oak
12
Fund, LLC v. Mulugeta, RG 12634973). Four days after Mr. Mulugetas counsel files
13
his opposition, the judicial defendant Delbert C. Gee granted the motion to appoint the
14
receiver in a half-paragraph order. (RJN, Exhibit N). Not only were there no clear,
15
written, or published statutory standards or criteria that defendant had to satisfy in order
16
to defeat the appointment, the judicial defendant provided no written explanations or
17
reasons for granting the motion. In that regard, there is only a scant record on appeal and
18
no transcript of the law and motion hearing on which the defendant could fashion some
19
response to the courts ruling.

77. The scope of a trial courts appointment often exceeds the statutory limits or is
20
21
22
amended thereafter without regard to those limits. For instance, in Lone Oak Fund v.
Mulugeta, no sooner had Mr. Singer been appointed then he filed pleadings, appeared in
court without an attorney (UPL), and asked for an ex parte hearing to expand his rights
23
24
and to allow him to issue certificates of indebtedness to support the receivership estate
and his fees and expenses for managing the property. (RJN, Exhibit O). Despite Mr.
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22
"[T]he availability of other remedies does not, in and of itself, preclude the use of a
receivership. (Sibert v. Shaver [(1952)] 113 Cal.App.2d [19,] 21 [247 P.2d 609].) Rather, a trial
court must consider the availability and efficacy of other remedies in determining whether to
employ the extraordinary remedy of a receivership. (Alhambra-etc. Mines v. Alhambra G. Mine
(1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 869, 873 [254 P.2d 599].)" (City and County of San Francisco v. Daley,
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Mulugetas objection that this would undermine the fair market value of the property
(RJN, Exhibit P), judicial defendant Gee allowed Mr. Singers unlawful practice of law,
his ex parte hearing, and granted him new powers. The judicial defendant then signs off
on Mr. Singers proposed order without changing a word. (RJN, Exhibit Q).
5
6
7
8
78. In a case in the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, judicial defendant
Judith A. Sanders appointed Mr. Singer receiver based on the stipulations in the deed of
trust (which stated in the event of a default under the Borrowing Agreement) and the
Plaintiffs allegations in the complaint of the existence of a default. (RJN, Exhibit R, pg.
1/25-2). At an ex parte hearing on the proposed order to stipulate to a receiver, judicial
9
10
11
defendant Judith Sanders signed off on the order prepared by the law firm even though
the order purported to allow Mr. Singer to evict tenants. (RJN, Exhibit R, pg. 6/16).
While CCP 564(b)(7) provides that a receiver may be appointed in an action for
12
unlawful detainer, there was no pending action, no proof the tenants were in breach, and
13
a question of whether Mr. Singer has standing to bring such an action because he is not
14
the landlord, owner, or a new purchaser. 23 In Los Angeles county, Mr. Singer sought an
15
order allowing him to rely on the Sheriff to ensure an owner left his property. (*See,
16
RJN, Exhibit RHO-1, pg. 10/13-16).
17
79. In another case, Mr. Singer seems to have colluded in a deliberate fraud on the
18
court and an owner as to his powers as a receiver. 24 He was appointed pursuant to CCP
19
564(b)(3) to enforce an arbitration award requiring the owners cooperation in the
20
forced sale of the owners property under a Tenants-in-Common Agreement. (RJN,
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 745, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 256.)

23
Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 354, 358; The procedure in unlawful
detainer "is covered in [Code of Civil Procedure section] 1161 et seq. The remedy, as broadened
by statutory changes, is available in three situations: [] (a) Landlord against tenant for
unlawfully holding over or for breach of the lease (the traditional and most important
proceeding). ([Code Civ. Proc., http://www.receivershipspecialists.com/case-list/] 1161;...) []
(b) Owner against servant, employee, agent, or licensee, whose relationship has terminated.
([Code Civ. Proc., ] 1161(1);...) [] (c) Purchaser at sale under execution, foreclosure, or power
of sale in mortgage or deed of trust, against former owner and possessor. ([Code Civ. Proc., ]
1161a;...)" (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, 599, p. 69.)
24
Turner v. Superior Court, (1977) 72 Cal. App. 3d 804. The requirements of Code of Civil
Procedure section 564 are jurisdictional, and without a showing bringing the receiver within one
of the subdivisions of that section the court's order appointing a receiver is void. (Rondos v.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Exhibit S). The owner informed Mr. Singer that the TIC Agreement provided for the
forced sale of the defaulting Cotenants cotenancy share in the TIC property, and
that his interest was not a tenancy-in-common but a separately owned condominium
that had been converted to a condo a year Mr. McKay even filed his petition to compel
arbitration. Instead of returning to the court and asking for clarification of the arbitration
6
7
8
award or the appointment or for permission to file an unlawful detainer under CCP
564(b)(3), he simply asked in propria persona for judicial defendant to issue a writ of
possession. Although writs of possession are only issued pursuant to a judgment for
possession in an unlawful detainer action (CCP 715.050), Mr. Singer convinced
9
10
11
judicial defendant to sign off, not on the approved Judicial Council form EJ-130, but his
own drafted pleading. (RJN, Exhibit T). Mr. Singer was practicing law without a license
while participating in a fraud.
12
D. The Unauthorized Practice of Law Conspiracy In the Context of Receiverships.
13
1. Incentives to Hire Non-Lawyer Receivers.

80. On his web site, 25 Mr. Singer identifies himself as the President of his firm
14
15
16
Receiver Specialist. His in-house counsel is John Rachlin, a member of the California State
Bar (SBN 166214). 26 Mr. Singers unauthorized practice of law dovetails with the incentives
lenders and other petitioning parties have for the appointment of a receiver. It is axiomatic that
17
lenders have an incentive to appoint a receiver in order to avoid the delay and expense of hiring
18
attorneys for a judicial foreclosure or some other legal proceeding such as an unlawful detainer
19
action. If a deed of trust or mortgage contains a stipulation for a receiver in the event of a default,
20
lenders can request a receiver and effectively regain control of the real property. The petitioning
21
party at once regains controls over rental incomes or other income-producing activities and can
22
call the shots through the receiver. On the other hand, the owner is deprived of his property, any
income from rents, and is saddled with the new expenses of a receiver while trying to remain
23
24
solvent. This 14th Amendment rights to notice and hearing are essentially ignored. As noted
above, upon appointment, the owners property is taken from him/her by operation of a statute
25
and apparently without an evidentiary hearing or the need for a lender to prove or show a
26
default.
27
28
Superior Court (1957) 151 Cal. App. 2d 193, 195, [311 P.2d 113]).
http://www.receivershipspecialists.com/
25
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81. By hiring Mr. Singer as a receiver, lenders and petitioning parties are essentially
1
2
3
4
5
hiring his firm, Receiver Specialists, with an in-house counsel at Mr. Singers beck and call
and a licensed broker, Mr. Marquis, who is available to sell any real property once Mr. Singer
forces the parties to agree to sell. In one case, Satwant Singh complained that Mr. Singer had
churned up $155,726.30 in fees and another $92,045.62 in consultant fees, presumably to his
confederates at Receiver Specialists. This occurred in the 15 month period between October 15,
2012 and February 13, 2014. (RJN, Exhibit U).
2. Coercion to Stipulate to Sale.

82. Under the weight of Mr. Singers receivership, property and business owners feel
8
9
10
compelled to sell if they are to salvage any equity in their property or businesses. This is evinced
in Mr. Singers pro per pleading for an order of sale of real proper that he filed in the Superior
Court of Kern County on June 25, 2013. (RJN, Exhibit V). Likewise, Mr. Singer managed to get
11
an order for the sale of real property in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County, including a
12
real estate commission of $76,716 which Mr. Singers colleague and real estate broker, Mr.
13
Marquis, pocketed. (RJN, Exhibit W). Mr. Singer supports and justifies the need for a sale by
14
his bare allegations in his own pro per documents. (RJN, Exhibit X). In the Stipulated
15
Distribution of Funds from the Sale prepared by Mr. Singer in propria persona and filed by
16
him in court (RJN, Exhibit Y), he names his own price and walks away with fees of $31,258.23.
3. State Bars Responses to UPL.
17
83. Assembly Bill 1159 was passed to enhance the State Bars Office of the Chief Trial
18
Counsels (OCTC) enforcement powers to prosecute both lawyer and notarios fraud, a from of
19
unauthorized practice of law that preys on Californias large immigrant community. 27 Likewise,
20
the State Bar Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct issued an Ethics Alert (Feb.
21
2, 2000) to remind California attorneys that they may not, among other things, aid foreclosure
22
consultants (or other nonlawyers) in the unauthorized practice of law. (e.g., lawyers may not
form partnerships or joint ventures with foreclosure consultants or other nonlawyers if any of the
23
business activities involve providing legal services). In other words, lawyers may not, under the
24
25
26
http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/166214
AB 1159, signed by Governor Brown on October 5, 2014, expanded the State Bar Act related
to the unauthorized practice of law so that it would apply to anyone who is not an attorney and
is advertising as a notario as opposed to a notary public. The ban related to notarios is
intended to prevent confusion about this label which has been exploited by non-attorneys hoping
to present themselves as attorneys. Notario, in many Latin American nations, is a type of
lawyer.
27
26
27
28
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guise of serving as in-house counsel for foreclosure consulting businesses, perform legal
services for clients.
3
4
5
4. Mr. Singers Scheme to Practice Law Without a License.

84. Mr. Singers UPL is not like those of the notarios who want to deceive the innocent
and unsuspecting into believing they are attorneys. Mr. Singers motive is just the opposite. He
wants lenders and other parties petitioning for a receiver to hire him as a non-lawyer receiver
so that the lender can gain immediate control over a property or business and avoid the costs of
hiring lawyers to undergo a foreclosure. As a non-lawyer receiver, unlike an attorney in a
foreclosure action, he gains immediate possession and control without the delay or expense of a
9
10
judicial foreclosure. But, at the same time, Mr. Singer markets his firm as a one-stop shop of
in-house counsel, accountants, and licensed brokers who can dispatch a property. In one odd
twist, a party sought to recover fees from a court-appointed receiver who was playing by the
11
books and hiring attorneys as required by CRC 3.1180. The partys attorney presumed that the
12
prior receiver would conduct her own legal work, as has the current referee, Kevin Singer.
13
(RJN, Exhibit ZZ).
14
85. In this regard, Mr. Singers UPL follows the example of foreclosure consultants.
15
Mr. Singers associate, Mr. Rachlin, under the guise of serving as in-house counsel for their
16
firm (Receivership Specialists is tantamount of a business/real estate foreclosure firm), is

performing legal services for lenders and petitioning parties Mr. Singer is working with. For
17
instance, in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County, Mr. Rachlin, while Mr. Singer practiced
18
law and filed the pleadings (UPL), provided his declaration for an ex parte hearing on the sale of
19
real property. He discussed with opposing counsel any objections they might have to Mr.
20
Singers ex parte order for sale of the property. (RJN, Exhibit JR, CIVMSC 11-00890). In Santa
21
Clara Superior Court, Mr. Singer, acting in propria persona, had Mr. Rachlin file a similar
22
pleading. (RJN, Exhibit JR-2). In short, Mr. Rachlin, behind the veneer of being in-house
counsel, is providing legal support to Mr. Singer and legal services to the parties.
23
24
86. Besides using his in-house counsel at Receivership Specialist to perform legal
services related to his receivership duties, Mr. Singer is even more brazen and cavalier about his
25
UPL. At a hearing on May 6, 2014, a class member filed pleadings and raised the issue of his
26
UPL. (RJN, Exhibit AA). Mr. Singer did not deny that he was appearing in court, filing legal
27
pleadings, and seeking court orders, and practicing law. Rather, he suggested or implied that his
28
in-house counsel could delegate to him authority to practice law. (The right to practice law
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not only presupposes in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the
exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust. It is
3
4
5
6
manifest that the powers and privileges derived from it may not with propriety be delegated to or
exercised by a nonlicensed person. McGregor v. State Bar (1944) 24 Cal.2d 283, 288). Judicial
defendant Quidachay, who was presiding over the case, simply ignored the issue of Mr. Singers
UPL and dismissed the matter of a misdemeanor as untimely.
87. Mr. Singer also insists that his duties as a receiver are his own interests or affairs
and he has the right to self-representation regarding these matters. As noted above, Mr. Singer
has the right to self-representation. However, when hes acting as a receiver hes an agent of the
9
10
court and acting in a representative capacity, not for his own interest. At October 20, 2014
hearing for one of the class members, Mr. Ruiz attorney raised the issue of Mr. Singers UPL.
Mr. Singer insisted he had the right to act in pro per and judicial defendant Lynn OMalley
11
12
13
14
15
16
Tyler terminated the hearing when counsel asked if she was allowing Mr. Singer to practice law
without a license.
5. Aiding and Abetting Mr. Singers UPL
Attorneys
88. State Bar members are subject to discipline for aiding any person or entity in the
unauthorized practice of law. [CRPC-1-300(A); see Geibel v. State Bar 91938) 11 C2d 412,
419-423, 79 P2d 1073, 1078-1079lawyers allowed their names to be used on pleadings
17
prepared by unlicensed persons without attorneys review of supervision; Matter of Valinoti
18
(Rev. Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 498, 502;attorney deliberately aided and abetted
19
unauthorized practice of law by relying on and permitting nonlawyers to prepare and file
20
immigration applications, pleadings, and other documents.) As noted above, Mr. Rachlin has
21
filed pleadings for Mr. Singer while he practiced law without a license. Hes also colluded with
22
or clandestinely authored all of the pleadings Mr. Singer has filed on behalf of clients of
Receivership Specialists. Likewise, defendant McKay has appeared in court and presented oral
23
24
argument on Mr. Singers behalf. He has also aided and abetted Mr. Singers misdemeanor by
providing him points and authorities in opposition to a motion that Plaintiff had filed to vacate
25
Mr. Singers August 20, 2014 writ of possession. Mr. Singer had drafted the writ himself and
26
judicial defendant attached his signature along with an impromptu stay-away order. (RJN,
27
Exhibit BB). He also aided and abetted Mr. Singers UPL by filing pleadings related to Mr.
28
Singers second and third writs of possession that affected Mr. Ruiz right to possession. (RJN,
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Exhibit CC). Furthermore, there is the issue of whether various attorneys, such as Brenda Cruz-
Keith and Drexel A. Bradshaw deliberately aided and abetted Mr. Singer when they signed the
3
4
5
6
stipulation prepared by the unlicensed receiver. (*See, RJN, Exhibit H, San Francisco Superior
Court, CGC-10-504897). In the Superior Court of Marin, attorney Roger L. Meredith also signed
off on a stipulation prepared by the unlicensed receiver. (*See, RJN, Exhibit I, pg. 4). In this
class action, there are dozens of attorneys who have signed off on Mr. Singers myriad pro per
legal pleadings.
Non-lawyers/Lay Persons
89. According to former District Attorney Steve Cooleys Manual on the Unauthorized
8
9
10
Practice of Law, the various offices of the District Attorney are to investigate a non-lawyers
UPL or the aiding and abetting of such UPL. In his press release, 28 Mr. Cooley stated:
"Unqualified and unlicensed con artists are preying on a growing number of unsuspecting
victims, especially new immigrants, Cooley said. "Theyre not only taking their money
but also violating their legal rights. As District Attorney, I am committed to combating
this serious form of fraud.".
11
12
13
"This office has initiated numerous investigations and prosecutions against these
unscrupulous operators. We also have led statewide efforts to strengthen Californias
laws and the penalties for the unauthorized practice of law," Cooley said. "Working
closely with the State Bar of California and community bar associations, I have launched
a broad-scale effort to identify and prosecute these crimes."
14
15
16
17
18
In this class action, Mr. Singers real estate broker has aided and abetted his UPL by providing
him declarations supporting Mr. Singers motion for a writ of possession. 29 Mr. Marquis also
was present and choreographed with the San Francisco Sheriffs Department the wrongful
19
20
eviction of Plaintiff on November 6, 2014. Further, defendants Coombs and Woods have
provided Mr. Singer with their declarations in support of his various unlawful motions. As
21
22
28
23
29
24
25
26
27
http://da.lacounty.gov/mr/archive/2004/021904b.htm
MAY-06-2014
UNLAWFUL DETAINER MOTION, 501, NTC OF MTN AND MTN FOR ORDER: 1)
ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION TO REMOVE ARCHIBALD CUNNINGHAM
FROM THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT 1489 MCALLISTER ST, SF, CA 2)
RESPONDENT IS ORDER TO STAY AWAY FROM 1489 MCALLISTER ST, SF, CA /
DEC OF RICK MARQUIS; DEC OF J. SCOTT MCKAY; DEC OF KEVIN SINGER,
SUBMITTED ON MAY-06-2014 BY RONALD E. QUIDACHAY.
28
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
noted above, Plaintiff filed a complaint regarding Mr. Singers UPL with the San Francisco
District Attorneys Consumer Fraud Unit back in July, 2014.

State Bar Association/Craig Holden
3
4
5
90. The United States Supreme Court pointed out in Keller v. State Bar of California 496
U.S. 1 that the broad statutory mission of the State Bar is to promote the improvement of the
administration of justice. It also noted that one of its functions was to prevent the unlawful
practice of law. (Keller, supra, at 5). However, as noted by Mark Geragos in his recently filed
lawsuit, the State Bar and President Craig Holden have failed to enforce the UPL as mandated by
AB 1159. In this class action, the class members complaint to the State Bar regarding defendant
9
10
McKays aiding and abetting Mr. Singers UPL was denied but the State Bar investigator invited
him to resubmit it to the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel. Although Plaintiff has resubmitted his
complaint, the State Bar has failed to enforce the prohibition against the ULP or investigate Mr.
11
McKays aiding and abetting of Mr. Singers UPL.
12
Attorney General Kamala Harris/District Attorney
13
91. On July 8, 2014, Plaintiff sent Attorney General Harris a letter complaining about Mr.
14
Singers UPL. The AGs willful failure to enforce the prohibition against the UPL in the context
15
of non-lawyer receivers is equaled only by its unwillingness to admit or acknowledge the fact
16
that Mr. Singer and his firm are engaged in the UPL.
VII. Judicial Immunity As Applied to the Misdemeanor of Unauthorized Practice of Law.
17
92. In Mireless v. Waco (1991) 502 U.S. 9, the Supreme Court noted that judges have
18
absolute immunity for judicial acts committed with malice, for erroneous decision, and even
19
for acts committed in the excess of jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court, in Mirelss v.
20
Waco, also noted limits to immunity, recognizing that a judges criminal acts are not subject to
21
absolute immunity, citing 30 at fn 1 Ex Parte Virginia 100 U.S. 339, 348-349 (1880). In his
22
23
dissenting opinion in Mireless, Justice Stevens pointed out that a judge acts in a judicial
capacity 31 when he has bailiffs drag a public defender back into court but not when he orders
bailiffs to commit a battery on him. (Id., at 14; He ordered them to bring respondent into his
24
25
30
26
27
28
Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, fn 1 (1991): The Court, however, has recognized that a judge is
not absolutely immune from criminal liability,Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 348-349 (1880),
or from a suit for prospective injunctive relief, Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522, 536-543 (1984),
or from a suit for attorney's fees authorized by statute, id., at 543-544.
31
Stumps v. Sparkman (1978) 435 U.S. 349 for the four-part test for determining when a judge
acts in his official judicial capacity
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
courtroom, and he ordered them to commit a battery. The first order was an action taken in a
judicial capacity; the second clearly was not. Ordering a battery has no relation to a function
3
4
5
normally performed by a judge.)

93. In the instant case, the judicial defendants have allowed Mr. Singer, a non-lawyer, to
come into their courtrooms and practice law without a license. While the judicial defendants
have each opened their courtroom as a forum for Mr. Singer to commit his misdemeanor, that
doesnt make Mr. Singers act any less criminal, it makes it more insidious. The judicial
defendants decided, deliberately or inadvertently, to cloak his criminality in the guise of a
judicial act, but the fact is that the judges were simply aided and abetting the unauthorized
9
10
practice of law. The law against the unauthorized practice of law has never been upheld by the
judicial defendants or enforced by the Attorney General or Craig Holden. (Rooker-Feldman
does not apply to void judgments)
11
94. Plaintiff is unable to identify any state or federal decision finding that a judge is
12
immune from liability for aiding and abetting the authorized practice of law, a criminal as
13
opposed to judicial act. The state Commission on Judicial Performance, however, has
14
censored a trial judge for aiding and abetting the unauthorized practice of law. On February
15
28, 1995, Victoria B. Henley found that Judge Thomas M. Kelly of the Alpine Judicial District
16
of California, aided and abetted in the misdemeanor of the unauthorized practice of law, (RJN,
Exhibit D):
17
18
19
20
21
22
The trial court determined that Judge Kelly, by agreeing that the Nevada attorney would
handle the management of the lawsuits in the absence of a court order permitting the
Nevada attorney to appear as counsel, after signing the complaints prepared by the
attorney, unlawfully aided and abetted the unauthorized practice of law. (emphasis
added).
In this class action, the judicial defendants have signed off on myriad legal pleadings and
orders prepared by Mr. Singer and allowed him into their court rooms to present oral argument
on these pleadings and commit the misdemeanor of practicing law without a license.
23
24
25
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION

26
27
28
(Violation of Class Members Civil Rights Under Color of

State Law by Engaging in Conspiracy)
95. The Class Members reallege and incorporates herein by reference each and every
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
allegation and paragraph previously set forth.
96. California Penal Code 182 provides that two or more persons engage in a conspiracy
when they collude and conspire to commit any crime, when they falsely maintain any suit, action
or proceeding, or when they try to cheat or defraud any person of property by means by
themselves are criminal. (Penal Code 182(a)(1-3)). Section 182(a)(5) also provides that there
can be a conspiracy to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the law.
97. California Business & Professional Code 6125 provides that [N]o person shall
practice law in California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar. Bus. & Prof.
code 6126(a) provides that any person who holds themselves out as entitled to practice
10
law but who is not a member of the State Bar or otherwise authorized to practice law by
11
court rule or statute is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable to up to one year in jail. Under
12
Bus. & Prof. Code 16240,32 a person satisfies the elements of the misdemeanor of practicing
13
law without a license when the person practiced, or offered to practice law but failed to have
14
the requisite license required by the State Bar.
15
98. As detailed above, the judicial defendants as well as the non-judicial defendants have
16
conspired with the court-appointed receiver Mr. Singer in the unauthorized practice of law and
17
did so with the objective of depriving the class members of their real and personal property
18
without due process of law. All of the judicial defendants are obliged under the Judicial Canon
19
3B to uphold the law and were on notice that the UPL is a misdemeanor. Nevertheless, they
20
conspired with Mr. Singer and aided and abetted him in prosecuting his various actions and
21
motions. By allowing Mr. Singer to come into their courtrooms in propria persona and under
22
the guise that he was entitled to self-representation as a receiver, they also have conspired to
23
violate Cal. Rules of Court 3.1180. This violation of the rules of court amounted to improper
24
government activity under the Whistle Blower Act, that is, Gov. Code 8547.2(c).
25
26
99. All of the defendants have conspired with each other to violate the civil rights of the
class members by participating in Mr. Singers UPL conducted under the guise of his business,
27
28
32
*See, Bus. & Prof. Code 16240.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Receiver Specialists. All of the judicial and non-judicial defendants have either affirmatively
participated in, or, at a minimum, promoted the conspiracy, by filing Mr. Singers pleadings, by
providing him hearing dates, by providing sworn affidavits in support of his UPL scheme, by
providing oral argument in support his scheme, and by opening the court room as a forum for the
unlawful practice of law.
100. All the judicial and non-judicial defendants knew or should have known that Mr.
Singers UPL by and through and with his Receivership Specialists firm was a misdemeanor
under Bus. & Prof. Code 6126(a), an improper government activity under the Whistle Blower
Act, and any resultant orders or judgments are to be considered a nullity.
10
11
12
13
101 The actions of the judicial and non-judicial defendants were taken in bad faith, and
with malice toward the class members.
102. The conduct of the judicial and non-judicial defendants represents a violation of 42
U.S.C. 1983 given that their actions were undertaken under color of state law.
14
103. Class members are informed and believe that Defendants Singer and his employees
15
at Receiver Specialists acted knowingly and willfully, with malice and oppression, and with the
16
intent to harm the class members. Therefore, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code 3294, the class
17
members are entitled to an award of punitive damages for the purpose of punishing said
18
defendants and to deter them and other from such conduct in the future.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
104. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, the
class members have been irreparably injured.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION
.
(Bus. & Prof. Code 6125 As Applied Violates
Class Members Procedural Due Process Rights)
105. The class members reallege and incorporate herein by reference each and every
106. The class members are constitutionally guaranteed procedural due process under the
28
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
5th and 14th Amendments, which requires both notice and an opportunity to be heard. 33 Before
the class members could be deprived of their personal and real property or business, they had the
right to be heard under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no
State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 34
107. The class members had the constitutional right to adequate notice and a meaningful
opportunity 35 to be heard on the issue of whether Mr. Singers was engaging in the UPL and
whether the state trial courts were opening their courtrooms as a forum for him to commit his
misdemeanor and thereby unlawfully aiding and abetting his misdemeanor. (The "right to be
heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve
10
the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Joint
11
Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (Frankfurter, J. concurring). The
12
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
13
in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S 545, 522 (1965).

108. In California, the prohibition against unauthorized law practice is within the state's
14
15
police power and is designed to ensure that those performing legal services do so competently.
16
(Bribrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C., et al. v. Superior Court, (1998) 17 Cal. 4th
17
119, 127). The Attorney General and President of the State Bar know or should have known that
18
they have been delegated the responsibility by the Legislature and state constitution to uphold
19
and enforce the State Bar Act, particularly the prohibition against the UPL described in Bus. &
20
Prof. Code 6125-6128. They know or should know that the class members have no authority
21
to enforce the prohibition against the UPL. The Attorney General, by failing to enforce the
22
prohibition against the UPL, both at the state level and through each countys district attorneys
23
office, has violated the class members due process rights.
24
109. The President of the State Bar knows or should know that the class members do not
25
have either the right or the authority to enforce the State Bar Act. By failing to adopt policies,
26
27
28
33
See 7 Witkin, Summary of Calif. Law (9th ed.) Constitutional Law, 502.
34
Also Calif. Const. Art. 1, 7.
35
Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371:
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
procedures, or issue an ethics advisory on the UPL in the context of receivership law, Mr.
Holden and the State Bar have also violated the class members due process rights under the 5th
and 14th Amendments.
110. The judicial defendants are obliged under the Judicial Canon to uphold the law and
are presumed to act in the lawful exercise of their jurisdiction. (Canon 3B(2); A judge shall
be faithful to the law regardless of partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism, and
shall maintain professional competence in the law.; Evid. Code 666). By failing to uphold the
prohibition against the unlawful practice of law, the judicial defendants acted in excess of all of
their jurisdiction in unlawfully aiding and abetting the misdemeanor, violated Canon 3B(2), and
10
deprived the class members of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
11
111. The actions of the judicial and non-judicial defendants were taken in bad faith, and
12
with malice toward the class members. This was evinced by judicial defendant Quidachays
13
dismissal of the challenge to Mr. Singers UPL at the May 6, 2014 hearing as untimely.
14
Similarly, judicial defendants Lynn OMalley Taylors termination of an October 20, 2014
15
hearing when counsel for a class member asked her if she was allowing Mr. Singer to practice
16
law without a license evinced malice. Finally, judicial defendant James Robertsons outrageous
17
order to grant Mr. Singers request for an attorney, to be paid at the class members expense, to
18
represent him in a civil rights suit in the federal court alleging Mr. Singers UPL not only was in
19
excess of all his jurisdiction but evinced malice. (Northern District of California, cv-14-3250.).
20
21
22
23
24
25
class members has been irreparably injured.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION
By Plaintiffs Against Singer, All Judicial and
Non-judicial Defendants)
26
27
28
(Violation of Separation of Powers Clause)

114. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
and paragraph previously set forth.
115. The Separation of Powers Clause precludes judicial officers from acting in
legislative capacities. (Calif. Const. Art 3, 3; The powers of state government are legislative,
executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either
of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.). While the California Supreme Court
recognizes that courts have fundamental inherent authority equity, supervisory, and
administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation before them,36 there are
constitutional limits on judicial authority. (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th
66, 71; aside from constitutional policy, the Legislature, and not the courts, is vested with the
10
responsibility to declare the public policy of the state.).
11
116. The judicial Defendants knew or should have known that the Legislature enacted the
12
State Bar Act, which granted the State Bar the authority to determine who is eligible or qualified
13
to practice law in California. 37 The judicial Defendants knew or should have known that their
14
inherent authority under the state constitution did not allow them to ignore Legislative intent,
15
policy, or the statutory scheme related to the unauthorized practice of law. (Bus. & Prof. Code
16
6125-6127). The judicial Defendants knew or should have known that the Legislature has not
17
delegated the authority to determine eligibility to practice law to individuals or the judiciary.
18
(The right to practice law not only presupposes in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
19
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the
20
nature of a public trust. It is manifest that the powers and privileges derived from it may not with
21
propriety be delegated to or exercised by a nonlicensed person. McGregor v. State Bar (1944)
22
24 Cal.2d 283, 288).
23
24
117. In allowing Mr. Singer to practice law in various courtrooms throughout the state,
the named judicial defendants knew or should have known that they had no authority to override
25
36
26
27
28
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal. App. 953, 967

J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 958, 965). Since the passage of the State Bar
Act, originally enacted in 1927, the general rule has been that "[w]hile any person may represent
himself, and his own interests, at law and in legal proceedings," no person shall practice law for
another unless he or she is an active member of the State Bar. (Abar v. Rogers (1981) 124
Cal.App. 3d 862, 864; J.W. v. Sup. Ct., supra at 965).
37
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
the Bus. & Prof. Code 6125-6127 and allow Mr. Singer to commit a misdemeanor in their
courtroom. They knew or should have known that under the Separate of Powers Clause they had
no authority to judicially legislate and allow Mr. Singer to practice law without a license. They
knew or should have known that neither they nor anyone else had the authority to delegate to Mr.
Singer the right to practice law.
118. In allowing Mr. Singer to commit a misdemeanor in their courtrooms, judicial
defendants acted in the complete absence of their jurisdiction, thereby forfeiting the right to
judicial immunity from suits for damages.
119. The effect of their violations of the Separation of Powers Clause was to deny the
10
class members their fundamental procedural due process rights. The class members had no notice
11
or reason to believe that judicial defendants would ignore the fact that Mr. Singer was engaging
12
in the unauthorized practice of law or that they would refuse to enforce the law regarding the
13
UPL and refuse to enjoin Mr. Singers illegal action. They had no reason to believe that Mr.
14
Singer, a non-lawyer without the skills, training, and legal education, and apparently lacking the
15
requisite moral turpitude, would be allowed to practice law, present pleadings chock-full of
16
memorandum of points and authorities, and presume to know what the law is.
17
18
19
20
21
22
120. The actions of the Defendants were taken in bad faith, and with malice toward the
Plaintiff.
121. The conduct of the Defendants represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 given that
their actions were undertaken under color of state law.
122. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above,
Plaintiff has been irreparably injured.
23
24
25
26
27
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION

.
(Constitutional Challenge to Code of Civil Procedure 564 et. al.,
On its Face and As Applied Violated Class Members
Substantive and Procedural Due Process Rights)
28
123. The class members reallege and incorporate herein by reference each and every
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
124. The class members are constitutionally guaranteed procedural due process under the
5th and 14th Amendments, which requires both notice and an opportunity to be heard. 38 Before
the class members could be deprived of their personal and real property or business, they had the
right to be heard under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no
State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 39
125. The class members have the constitutional right to adequate notice and a
7
8
9
10
11
meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether the trial court should appoint a
receiver under Code of Civil Procedure 564 and hand over the owners property to the receiver.
The Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 422 U.S. 319, 333 has stated that [T]his
Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally
deprived of a property interest. (citations omitted.). In Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S.
12
371, the Supreme Court explained that the meaningful opportunity to be heard must be at a
13
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. (Id, 378). The Cal. Rules of Court 3.1177 refers
14
to a hearing but provides no details as to the type of hearing and essentially begs the question
15
16
by stating that the parties may suggest a receiver. Worse yet, CRC 3.1176, by its language
whenever a receiver is appointed without noticesuggests that the appointment is automatic
and presumed justified unless the matter is made returnable upon an order to show cause.
17
126. In this class action, the class members have been afforded law and motion
18
hearings with tentative rulings, summary procedures and with no statutory right to call witnesses,
19
to cross-examination, to present all relevant evidence (Evid. Code. 362). For instance, and as
20
noted above, Wynne Carvil of the Superior Court of Alameda granted Budget Finance
21
Companys unopposed motion for the appointment of a receiver in a tentative ruling in a law
22
and motion proceeding. Gregory Taylors property was simply handed over to Mr. Singer
without any type of evidentiary hearing and based solely on the self-serving pleadings of the
23
lender without any pretense of affording due process protections. (RJN, Exhibit L, Motion to
24
Confirm Appointment of Receiver, RG 10499443). ("The fundamental requisite of due process
25
of law is the opportunity to be heard." Grannis v. Ordean 234 U.S. 385, 394; But when notice
26
is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. Mullane v. Central
27
28
38
See 7 Witkin, Summary of Calif. Law (9th ed.) Constitutional Law, 502.
39
Also Calif. Const. Art. 1, 7.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).

127. In the deed of trust and mortgage cases cited here, lenders have relied on the
2
3
4
5
stipulation to appoint a receiver in those documents to summarily grant the appointment

without requiring the lenders to even show default. (Barclays Bank of California v. Superior
Court (1977) 69 Cal. App. 3d 593, 601-602). In that respect, the judicial defendant routinely
rubber stamped the appointment based on the stipulation without affording the party a
meaningful hearing on the issue of default and the related underlying issue of whether the
lenders were engaging in predatory lending practices by demanding these receivership
provisions in their contracts as a mandatory condition for granting a loan. (RJN, Exhibit R,
pg. 6/16).
128. Not only are the hearings provided in the trust deed and mortgage cases of
10
11
12
13
this class action constitutionally flawed, but the hearings in the appointment cases related
to the enforcement of judgments under CCP 564(b)(3) are also flawed. As noted
above, several of the judicial defendants have granted Mr. Singer the right to evict
tenants and apparently foregone the due process protections that inhere under the
14
15
16
Unlawful Detainer Act. In one case involving a class member, judicial defendant
Quidachay ignored the need to grant Mr. Singer the right to bring an unlawful detainer
action under CCP 564(b)(7), but instead just liberally construed CCP 564 and
17
concluded that the mere fact of appointment (given statutory language of a receivers
18
right to possession) was itself sufficient to evict a landlord without a judgment under
19
the Unlawful Detainer Act. (Oddly, the receivers right to possession was only construed
20
as applying to the owner of the real property, not his tenants/roommates; RJN, Exhibit
21
S).
22
129. The procedures, standards, and criteria for granting the appointment of a
23
receiver are also constitutionally inadequate, vague, or overbroad. As noted above, the
24
case law provides that the appointments are drastic remedies 40 that should only be
25
26
27
28
applied if there are no other alternatives, but the consistent and routine practice of trial
courts is to rubber stamp the appointments. The orders granting the appointments are
prepared by the attorney of the petitioning party and neglect to provide any legal basis or
40
City and County of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal. App. 4th 734, 745.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
explanation for the ruling. This precludes or undermines any possible appeal.
130. In the same way, there are no set standards, procedures, or written and
2
3
published criteria that a party or a trial judge can rely on or consider in determining
whether to deny or grant a partys opposition to an appointment. The oppositions to
an appointment are also routinely denied without written explanations or legal reasons.
6
7
8
(RJN, Exhibit DD, Superior Court Ct. of Marin Court, CIV-025229). On the other hand,
Kevin Singer is allowed by the court to file his opposition to a partys motion to amend
the appointment even though he is unlicensed (UPL) and is required to be acting as a
neutral party under Cal. Rules of Court 3.1179(a). (RJN, Exhibit EE). Mr. Singer is
9
10
11
also allowed to draft and submit his own proposed orders regarding the trial courts
Retaining Jurisdiction Regarding this Receivership where he tries to slip in a provision
excusing him from any potential liability. (RJN, Exhibit FF, pg. 2, Finding that all of
12
the Receivers actions were right and proper and in the best interest of the Receivership
13
Estate.). To his credit, judicial defendant John Appel inked out Mr. Singers impromptu
14
self-serving release (though he did not cite him for his UPL).
15
131. The state statute here is constitutionally infirm in that it leaves public policy
16
considerations related to the procedures, criteria, and standards for granting or denying an
17
appointment to the discretion of judges and, often times, the receiver himself. (Note Mr.
18
Singers attempt to limit his liability). Both trial judges and litigants must guess at what
19
standards they need to meet in order to defeat or prevail in a motion to appoint a receiver.
20
21
(If arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
22
23
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Grayned v. City of Rockford,

408 US 104, 108-109 (1972)).
24
132. The judicial and non-judicial defendants know or should know that an individual has
25
a fundamental right to contract and be secure in ones home. (Myers v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390,
26
399; U.S. Const. Art. I, sec 10; Cal. Const. Art. I, sec 9). 41 While the state may have a rational
27
28
41
Myers, supra, 399: While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
reason or purpose for depriving a party of it real property without a meaningful hearing or
quickly expediting property disputes, there is no compelling reason to deprive an individual of
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
his real property or physical possession of his home (impromptu evictions) without a compelling
reason. (Strict scrutiny is the proper test of a legislative classification only when the
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. Brandwein v. California Bd. of Osteopathic Ex'rs,
708 F. 2d 1466, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983)
133. The actions of the judicial and non-judicial defendants were taken in bad faith, and
with malice toward the class members.
class members has been irreparably injured.
13
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION

By Plaintiff Against City and County of
San Francisco (Sheriffs Department),
All District Attorneys, AG Kamala Harris
14
15
16
(Violation of Civil Rights under Color of Law

Municipal and Individual Liability for Unconstitutional
Policies and Practices)
17
18
19
20
21
22
136. The actions of the Defendants were taken in bad faith, and with malice toward the
Plaintiff.
137. The Defendants know or should know that a municipality will be considered a
person subject to liability within the meaning of section 1983 when the municipality itself
causes the constitutional violations at issue. (Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of N.Y.
23
(1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694-695). The Defendants know or should know that the Supreme Court
24
explained that a policy, custom, or practice for purposes of imposing municipal liability under
25
section 1983 "generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various
26
27
28
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
alternatives. (Oklahoma City v. Tuttle (1985) 471 U.S. 808, 823-824).

138. The Defendants know or should know that San Francisco Sheriff Ross Mirkarimi
2
3
4
5
had final authority to enforce or not enforce facially void writs of possession. In the same
way, the District Attorney of each of the named municipalities had the final authority to
establish policies and practices for enforcing the statutory prohibition against the UPL.
(Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati (1986) 475 U.S. 469, 482-483; The official must also be
responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the
municipality can be held liable.).

COUNT ONE -San Francisco Sheriffs Department.
139. Here, Plaintiff has spoken with and emailed Ross Mirkarimi and Rick Nicco, the
9
10
staff attorney for the Sheriffs Department, and pointed out that Mr. Singers writ of
possession was facially defective for not being filed by an attorney. Plaintiff informed both men
11
that Mr. Singer was engaged in the UPL. He informed them that a valid writ was a
12
precondition to their issuing a Notice to Vacate.42 Plaintiffs attorney also emailed Mr. Nicco
13
and informed him that the writ was facially void in view of the UPL and the failure to comply
14
with statutory procedures. Both Mr. Nicco and the Sheriff were provided them copies of
15
Plaintiffs pleadings and proof that the writ of possession was not issued pursuant to a
16
judgment for possession under the Unlawful Detainer Act as mandated by CCP section
715.050 but by a petition to comply arbitration. Nevertheless, the Sheriff and Mr. Nicco
17
18
scheduled three separate evictions, before finally forcibly and wrongfully evicting Plaintiff on
November 6, 2014.
19
140. The San Francisco Sheriffs Departments policy or practice of presuming that a
20
writ of possession issued by a court or a clerk of the court is presumptively valid or by
21
definition is not facially ambiguous or void is not supported by case law. The Sheriffs
22
Department should know that their improper policies and practices have been rejected by
appellate courts. Bedi v. McMullen (1984) 160 Cal. App. 272, 275:
23
The trial court took the view an eviction by the marshal under color of judicial process is
not forcible, by definition. (3) It is certainly true a landlord is not liable for forcible entry
and detainer if he evicts a tenant under a valid writ of execution issued under an
enforceable judgment. (Hamilton v. Waters (1949) 93 Cal. App.2d 866, 867 [210 P.2d
24
25
26
42
27
28
Bedi, supra, at 275: A valid writ of execution is the ultimate indispensable element of the legal
process by which a party entitled to possession of the property acquires possession. Allowing the
landlord to forcibly evict a tenant on the strength of a judgment alone would remove the key
conditions on the use of force: necessity and judicial authorization.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
67].) (2b) But, the case at bench presents just the opposite set of facts. It is alleged the
eviction was carried out under an invalid writ of execution issued under an unenforceable
judgment.
Clearly, an eviction is no less forcible because it is carried out by the marshal instead of
by the landlord personally. (See Tri-State Refreshments, Inc. v. Nitke (1964) 41 Misc.2d
386 [246 N.Y.S.2d 79, 83-84].)
5
6
Here, the Sheriffs Department policy and practice of enforcing facially void writs of possession
based not on judgments for possession obtained under the Unlawful Detainer Act but on
petitions to compel arbitration should subject the City to Monell liability.

COUNT TWO-District Attorneys Non-Enforcement Practice/Policy
141. The municipal Defendants know of should know that their policy or practice of
10
failing to enforce the prohibition against the UPL in the context of receivership cases was the
11
proximate cause of the class members constitutional violations. The Defendants know or should
12
know that the enforcement of the prohibition against the UPL is a matter within the police
13
powers and that the class members lacked any authority to enforce the statute. Without the
14
DAs oversight and supervision, the members of the class were easy targets and prey for Mr.
Singers unlawful scheme to practice law without a license, to game judicial inadvertence or
15
16
ineptitude, and to deprive the members of the class of their property, possession of their homes,
and their peace of mind without due process of law.
17
142. Here, Plaintiff has informed the Consumer Fraud Division of the San Francisco
18
District Attorneys Office of Mr. Singers UPL. He has also sent a complaint to AG Kamala
19
Harris and the U.S. Attorney General apprising them of Mr. Singers UPL. At a hearing on
20
21
22
23
August 5, 2014, Mr. Singer acknowledged Plaintiffs complaints and interpreted the failure of
the district attorneys office to enforce his UPL as a vindication of his UPL. He then mocked and
ridiculed Plaintiffs allegations that he was engaged in the UPL, stating that he had the right to
act in pro per.
143. The Defendants know or should know that each District Attorney in each of the
24
named municipalities is responsible for establishing official policy regarding the UPL as evinced
25
by the Prosecutors Manual for the Unlawful Practice of Law issued by former LA District
26
Attorney Steve Cooley. While it is laudable that District Attorney Cooley had implemented a
27
policy and manual for preventing the UPL, its shameful and a constitutional tort to have a policy
for the remaining District Attorneys, as well as the current LA district attorney, not to enforce the
28
ban against the UPL. As noted above, AG Harris may be responsible for implementing a state_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
wide policy, but the District Attorneys for each county are the final authority for implementing
a policy and assuring that it is enforced. 43 The District Attorneys have woefully failed to enforce
the prohibition against the UPL, causing the class members irreparable harm.
144. This conduct on the part of the above-named Defendants, the San Francisco Sheriff,
4
5
6
and the various District Attorneys also represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, given that their
actions were undertaken under color of state law.
145. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional actions described above,
7
8
Plaintiff has been irreparably injured.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
9
10
146. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation
11
12
and paragraph previously set forth.

147. As stated herein, the members of the class, as citizens and individuals, are protected
13
14
15
by the laws of the State of California, as well as those of the United States Constitution,
including the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments thereto.
148. As stated herein, the judicial defendants and non-judicial defendants have
16
17
18
19
20
wrongfully, unlawfully, and with deliberate indifference to the rights of the members of the
class, acted, practiced an/or adopted policies, practices, procedures an/or customs which are in
violation of the rights of the Class, including subjecting the members to actions, motions, and
suits by individuals not authorized to practice law in the state of California.
149. The Defendants, particularly the judicial defendants, have failed to acknowledge
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
their improper, unlawful and unconstitutional actions, conduct and policies at the time of the
incidents at issue in the present action, and Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis
alleges, that they have not changed or modified the procedures or policies that allow for the
unauthorized practice of law and the enforcement of invalid of writs of possession (which is the
basis for an eviction by the Sheriffs Department)..
43
Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that [t]he decision not to take
any action to alleviate the problem of detecting missed arraignments constitutes a policy for
purposes of 1983 municipal liability).
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
150. The Defendants wrongful and unlawful conduct, actions and/or policies, unless and
until enjoined and restrained by order of this court, will cause, and continue to cause, great an
irreparable injury to the Plaintiffs, and other similarly situated members of the class, in that the
Defendants will continue to act in accordance with said unlawful polices, and with deliberate
indifference to their duties and obligations under state and federal law, including those under the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments as alleged herein above.
151. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to prevent or prohibit Defendants from
continuing, and/or repeating, their unlawful and unconstitutional conduct and policies related to
the UPL other than through declaratory relief, and therefore Plaintiff on behalf of the Class seek
10
an order enjoining and prohibiting Defendants, particularly judicial defendants, from, but not
11
limited to, conducting and/or allowing court-appointed receivers such as Kevin Singer or any
12
other non-lawyer to practice law and file lawsuits against Plaintiff.
13
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
14
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court order the following relief and remedies:
15
1). Issue a judicial declaration that Defendant Singers unauthorized practice of law is a
16
violation of the Class Members due process rights under the 14th Amendment, and 42 U.S.C.
17
1983;
18
19
2). Issue a judicial declaration that a court receivers powers under the statute (CCP 568,
CCP 708.610) do not entail the right to practice law without a license;
20
3). Issue a judicial declaration that a court-appointed receiver for the right to possession
21
22
under CCP 568 does not deprive the other party of his due process protections including the
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment and California Const. Art. I, sec. 16.
23
4). Issue a judicial declaration that a judicial officer acts in the complete absence of all
24
25
his jurisdiction in allowing his courtroom to be used as a forum for the commission of the
misdemeanor of practicing law without a license;
26
5). Issue a judicial declaration that Mr. Rachlin, Mr. McKay and the other defendants
27
28
colluded and conspired with Mr. Singer to commit the crime of practicing law without a license
and for the purpose of furthering their eviction scheme;
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
6). Issue a judicial declaration that all proposed orders, stipulations, or writs of possession
submitted by Mr. Singer and signed by the judicial defendants while Mr. Singer was practicing
law without a license are a nullity and invalid.
7). Issue a preliminary injunction enjoining Mr. Singer from practicing law while acting
in his representative capacity as a court-appointed receiver.
8). Award the Class punitive damages for the conspiracy, costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988;
9). Award such further and additional relief as is just and proper.
9
10
11
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

In accordance with Fed. R. Div. P. 38(b), and Central District Local Rule 38-1. Plaintiff
hereby demand a jury trial on all issues triable by a jury.
12
13
Respectfully submitted,
14
/s/ Patricia Barry
15
16
________________________
Patricia Barry, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
17
18
/s/ Archibald Cunningham
19
________________________
Arch Cunningham, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Patricia Barry, Esq. (SBN 59116)

634 S. Spring St., Suite 823
Los Angeles, CA 90014
(213) 995-0734
Arch Cunningham (SBN 210625)
1489 McAllister St.
San Francisco, CA 94115
archcunnghm@yahoo.com
(415) 563-1828
JOHN DOE, et al.
On behalf of themselves and other similarly situated.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION
)
ARCHIBALD CUNNINGHAM,
)
HUMBERTO RUIZ, both individually and on )
behalf of a class of others similarly situated. ) Case No. 2:14-CV-9104
)
)
Plaintiffs,
) REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
v.
)
)
KEVIN SINGER, Court-appointed receiver, )
sued individually and official capacity;
)
RECEIVERSHIP SPECIALISTS, a California )
licensed business, JOHN RACHLIN,
)
principal, sued in his individual capacity;
)
RICK MARQUIS, principal, sued in his
)
individual capacity; KAMALA D. HARRIS, )
Attorney General of California, sued
)
individually and in her official capacity; CITY )
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; San )
Francisco County Sheriff ROSS MIRKARIMI,)
sued individually and in his official capacity; )
San Francisco District Attorney, GEORGE
)
GASCON, sued individually and in his official )
capacity; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELGES, a
municipality: District Attorney JACKIE
)
LACEY, sued individually and in her official )
capacity; COUNTY OF KERN, District
)
Attorney LISA GREEN, sued individually and )
in her official capacity; COUNTY OF
)
MARIN, District Attorney EDWARD S.
)
BERBERIAN, sued individually and in his
official capacity; COUNTY OF
SACRAMENT, District Attorney DON

SCULLY, sued individually and in his official
capacity; COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, District
Attorney NANCY OMALLEY, sued
COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, District
Attorney SCOTT PETERSON, sued
JUDGE BARBARA A. MEIERS, Los Angeles
her official capacity;
JUDGE ROBERT H. OBRIEN, Los Angeles
his official capacity; JUDGE THOMAS L.
BROWN, Sacramento Superior Court Judge,
JUDGE LAWRENCE J. APPEL, Alameda
his official capacity: JUDGE LAUREL S.
BRADY, Contra Costa Superior Court Judge,
JUDGE RANDOLPH HEUBACH, Marin
his official capacity; JUDGE MARLA
MILLER, San Francisco Court Judge, sued
JUDGE JAMES STOELKER, Santa Clara
Court Judge, sued individually and in his
official capacity; JUDGE LORNA H.
BRUMFIELD,, Kern Court Judge, sued
JUDGE DELBERT C. GEE, Alameda
his official capacity; JUDGE DAVID B.
FINN, Contra Costa Superior Court Judge,
JUDGE LYNN OMALLEY TAYLOR, San
Francisco Court Judge, sued individually and
in her official capacity; JUDGE LYNN
JUDITH CRADDICK, Contra Costa Court
Judge, sued individually and in her official
capacity; JUDGE DONALD EVANS
QUIDACHAY, San Francisco Superior Court
Judge, sued individually and in his official
capacity; JUDGE A. JAMES ROBERTSON
II., San Francisco Superior Court, sued
,JUDGE LILLIAN SING, San Francisco
her official capacity; PRESIDING JUDGE
MING-LEE, Presiding Judge of the San
Francisco Superior Court, sued individually
and in her official capacity; CHIEF JUSTICE
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, Chief Justice of State
Supreme Court, Chair of California Judicial
Council, sued individually and in her official
capacity; PRESIDING JUSTICE ANTHONY

KLINE, California Court of Appeals, First
Appellate Division, sued individually and in
his official capacity; JUDGE JAMES
RICHMOND, Justice of California Court of
Appeals, First Appellate District, sued
individually and in her official capacity; JOHN
SCOTT McKAY, an officer of the court and
attorney in the underlying case, sued in his
individual capacity; MICHAEL COOMBS,
property-owner and partner in condominium
association, sued in individual capacity,
TAMARA WOODS, property-owner and
partner in condominium association, sued in
individual capacity.
Defendants, and DOES 1 through
10.
Plaintiffs and members of the Class respectfully request pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201
that the District Court take judicial notice of official records, transcripts, judicial council forms,
pleadings, and correspondences from various superiors courts of the state of California as well as
pleadings from California Commission on Judicial Performance.
Fed. R. Evid. 201 (b) states that [a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be determined. It is appropriate for a court to take judicial notice of
court filings and other matters of public interest such as the pleadings in related litigation. *See,
Reyna v. Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc. 442 F. 3d 741, 746, n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006); Schweitzer
v. Scott, 469 F. Supp. 1017, 1020 (C.C. Cal. 1979). Sufficient notice of matters subject to
judicial notice is provided by lodging a copy of the relevant documents and records with the
Court. Fed. R. Evid. 201(d).
DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL

I, Patricia Barry, declare as follows:
1. I am the counsel for Plaintiffs and the members of the class and an active member of
the California State Bar.
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this declaration and could
competently testify if called as a witness, except for matters stated upon information and belief,
and as to those matters I believe them to be true.
3. A true and correct copy of the following court records are attached to this declaration as
Exhibits A-EE. The records, pleadings, transcripts are from proceedings in superior courts of the
state of California and the California Commission on Judicial Performance.
Exhibit
Title
Date
Pages
___________________________________________________________________________
Exhibit A
Mark J. Geragos Complaint

Against State Bar President
Craig Holden
11/17/14
9-23
Exhibit B
Contempt of Court Hearing Against John

Tyler and Gregory J. Tyler; If Found Guilty,
Fine $1,000 and Hold Under Arrest for Five
Days or Until They Turn Over $3,245 of
Receivership Rents and Books/Records.
7/30/10
24-33
Exhibit C
Memo of Points and Authorities In Support

Of Humberto Ruiz Claim of Right to Possession
9/26/14
34-50
Exhibit D
Commission on Judicial Performance

Censure of Judge Thomas Kelly
2/28/95
51-53
Exhibit E
Motion for Order for Receiver to Obtain

Legal Counsel, Memo of Points & Authorities
9/11/12
54-73
Exhibit F
Declaration of Satwant Singh In Opposition

9/20/12
To Plaintiffs Motion for Appointment of
Receiver (CIVMSC-12-01134, Santa Clara Sup. Ct.)
74-81
Exhibit G
Receivers Declaration and Response to Amend

Order Confirming Appointment
(CIVMSC-12-01134, Santa Clara Sup. Ct.)
5/23/14
82-91
Exhibit H
Kevin Singers Stipulation Amongst the Parties

To Buyout Interest in Property and Application
For Orders (CGC-504807; SF Sup. Ct).
1/18/13
92-106
Exhibit I
Kevin Singers Stipulation and Order

Correcting the Address and Name of the Real
Property to Be Secured By a Bank Loan
(FL 060341; Marin Sup. Ct)
5/31/11
107-114
Exhibit J
Judge Carvills Order Granting Motion to

Confirm Appointment Of Receiver
7/16/10
115-116
Exhibit K
Defendants Memo of Points and Authorities

In Opposition to Order to Show Cause Re
Appointment of Receiver
(Alameda Sup. Ct. No. RG 12-634973)
7/6/12
117-126
Exhibit L
Judge Delbert Dees Order Granting Receiver

7/10/12
127-128
Exhibit M
Kevin Singers Ex Parte Application for Order

Authorizing Receiver to Borrow Money and
Execute Receiver Certificates
9/10/12
129-142
Exhibit N
Judge Delbert Dees Order Granting Ex

Parte Application of Mr. Singer
9/12/12
143-148
Exhibit O
Order Appointing Receiver

(Contra Costa County Sup. Court No.
CIV C12-00284)
7/12/12
149-162
Exhibit P
Order Appointing Receiver

(SF Sup. Co. No. CGC 10-510760)
8/1/11
163-170
Exhibit Q
Judge Quidachay Signing Off on Kevin

Singers Writ of Possession
(SF Sup. Ct.No. CGC-10-510760)
8/20/14
171-182
Exhibit R
Declaration of Satwant Singh In Support of

4/1/14
Motion to Amend Order Confirming Appointment
Of Kevin Singer as Receiver (C-12-01134)
183-186
Exhibit S
Kevin Singers Notice of Order

Judge Blumfields Order
Granting Singers Ex Parte Application
(Kern County Sup. Ct. S-1500-CV-277435)
7/23/14
6/25/13
187-194
Exhibit T
Judge Solker Signing Off on Kevin Singers

Proposed Order for Sale of Bellville Way
Sunnyvale, CA (Santa Clara Sup. Co. No
112-CV-222194)
1/17/13
195-207
Exhibit U
Declaration of Mr. Singer in Support of

Motion for Interlocutory Judgment for
Partition of Real Property
6/14/13
208-240
(Santa Clara County Court; 112-cv-237304)

Exhibit V
Kevin Singers Stipulation RE: Distribution

Of Funds from Sale of Property
(Santa Clara County Sup. Ct. 112-cv-222194)
3/20/13
241-249
Exhibit W

(LA Sup. Ct., No. BC465205)
12/30/13
250-257
Exhibit X
Judge OBriens Order Granting

Appointment of Receiver
12/2/13
258-272
Exhibit Y
Kevin Singers Stipulation RE:

Approving Sales Package to Be Used
In the Sale of 12 Condominiums Units
(Sup. Ct. of Alameda, No. RG 10508193
7/15/10
273-281
Exhibit Z
Kevin Singers Order for Retaining

Jurisdiction Regarding Receivership
(Sup. Ct. of Alameda, No. RG9440563)
8/14/09
282-288
Exhbit AA
Kevin Singers Pleading, Ex Parte

Declaration of John Rachlin
12/24/13
289-291
Exhbit BB

(Santa Clara Sup. Ct. No. 112-CV-222194)
1/2/13
292-294
Exhibit CC

(Contra Costa Sup. Ct. No. CIVMSC 11-00890
11/26/13
295-297
Exhibit DD
Kevin Singers Ex Parte Application to

Sell Property, Points and Authorities
(Sacrament County Sup. Ct. No.
34-2012-00124519)
9/24/13
298-309
Exhibit EE
Kevin Singers Ex Parte Application

Confirming Stipulation to Conduct Sale
(SF Up. Ct. No. CGC-09-493126)
4/16/12
310-333
Exhibit FF
12/9/13
334-337
Exhibit GG
Judge David B. Finn Signing Off

On Kevin Singers Proposed Order
12/12/13
338-340
Exhibit HH
Judge Lynn OMalley Taylors Denial

Of Claim of Right to Possession
10/29/14
341-345
Exhibit II
Singers Ex Parte to Sell Property

1785 Rockwood Place, Concord
(Contra Costa County Sup. Ct.
No. CIVMSC 11-00890)
11/26/13
346-355
Exihibit JJ
Judge James. A. Robertson Signing Off

On Kevin Singers Order Instructing
Receiver as to The Distribution of Proceeds
From Sale of Liquor License
(SF Sup. Ct. No. CGC-09-492710)
1/31/1
356-365
Exhibit KK
Judge Robertson Signing Off on Kevin

Singers Order Approving and Ratifying
All of Receivers Acts and Transactions
(CGC- 13-533770)
3/7/14
366-375
Exhibit LL
Objections to Approval of Sale

(SF Sup. Ct. No. CGC 09-493126)
6/27/12
376-380
Exhibit MM
Opposition to Motion to Vacate Mr. Singers

Writ of Execution (SF Sup. Co. No. CGC 10510760)
9/29/14
381-387
Exhibit NN
Judge Quidachays Order Denying Claim of

Right of Possession by Humberto Ruiz, Jr.
(SF Sup. Co. No. CGC 10-510760)
10/8/14
388-392
Exhibit OO
Opposition to Motion for Appointment

Of a Receiver. (Marin County Sup. Ct. No
(CIV 025229)
9/26/11
393-402
Exhibit PP
Declaration of William Cheek in

Opposition to Motion for Appointment
Of a Receiver. (Marin County Sup. Ct. No
(CIV 025229)
9/26/11
403-407
Exhibit QQ
Receivers Declaration and Response

To Defendants Motion to Amend Order
Confirming Appointment of Kevin Singer
5/23/14
408-417
As Receiver (Sup. Ct. Contra Costa, No.

CIVMSC 12-01134)
Exhibit RR
Exhibit SS
Revised Notice of Continuance of

Hearing (LA Sup. Ct. BC447913)
10/3/14
Stipulation Between Kevin Singer

City National Bank, Kogan Law Firm
9/18/14
Kevin Singers Ex Parte Order to

Sell 228-318 White Lane In Bakersfield
(Kern County Sup. Ct. No. S-1500-CV-277435)
6/24/13
418-428
429-441
/s/ Patricia Barr
________________________
Patricia Barry, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Class
Dated: 11/22/14
EXHIBIT A
1
2
3
4
5
6
GERAGOS & GERAGOS

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
LAWYERS
HISTORIC ENGINE Co. No. 28
644 SOUTH FIGUEROA STREET
Los ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-3411
TELEPHONE (213) 625-3900
FACSIMILE (213) 625-1600
GERAGOS@GERAGOS.COM
MARK J. GERAGOS
SBN 108325
BEN J. MEISELAS
SBN 277412
SENATOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.)
7
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
9
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Case No.
SENATOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.),

Executive Director of the State Bar of
California; and WHISTLEBLOWER DOES
1-7,
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

1.WHISTLEBLOWER LIABILITY
AND RETALIATION CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE
SECTION 1102.5
2.BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Plaintiff,
vs.
15
16
17
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;

CRAIG HOLDEN, an individual; and ROES
1 through 50, inclusive,
TRIAL
Defendants.
18
19
20
DEMAND FOR
INTRODUCTION
1.
Senator Joseph Dunn (Ret.), the Executive Director of the State Bar of
21
California, and Whistleblower DOES 1-7 bring this whistleblower action and demand for
22
injunctive relief against the State Bar of California (the "State Bar") based on the State Bar's
23
unilateral termination of Senator Dunn's employment on November 7, 2014, immediately
24
after Senator Dunn, and other whistleblowers, through counsel, lodged two whistleblower
25
notices with the State Bar's Board of Trustees ("BOT") on November 3, 2014 and November
26
5, 2014.
27
28
1
COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
10
2.
1
2
prosecutorial lapses, and fiscal improprieties by State Bar President Craig Holden, certain
BOT members, and Chief Trial Counsel and head of the State Bar's Office of the Chief Trial
Counsel ("OCTC") Jayne Kim, which were being concealed from the public.
..,.
<Zl NWO
Senator Dunn's whistleblower notices identified senous ethical breaches,
3.
The conduct Senator Dunn complained about included (1) the unlawful
intentional manipulation and false reporting of backlog cases, (2) the intentional lack of
prosecutorial efforts to proactively investigate and prosecute "notario" and lawyer fraud as
envisioned by the Legislature in passing Assembly Bill 1159, and (3) the conflicted retention
of a private firm with close ties to a BOT member in violation of State Bar protocol to
10
evaluate a complaint against undisclosed targets and, upon information and belief, against
11
Senator Dunn.
12
outside of established protocol, leading to a bill that is likely in excess of $300,000.00, even
13
though a retired California Supreme Court Justice had agreed to provide the same services
14
pro bono as a way to give back to the State Bar. Even with this unnecessary and exorbitant
15
cost to members of the State Bar, the BOT only decided to terminate Senator Dunn without
16
cause.
Holden, and a small group of BOT members, hired the conflicted firm
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4.
Since becoming the Chief Executive of the State Bar in 2010, Senator Dunn
18
received consistent high praise and positive performance reviews in his formal performance
19
evaluations from 2011-2013. In fact, Senator Dunn's performance was determined to be so
20
excellent by the State Bar that he received bonuses substantially above his yearly salary
21
during the years 2011-2013.
22
5.
In September 2014, attorney Craig Holden was installed as the new President
23
of the State Bar. In May 2014, Holden was the only announced candidate, so it was clear he
24
would be elected State Bar President.
25
determined "to do something about Dunn," with the clear implication that he was determined
26
to have him fired. The events described below gave Holden the pretext to begin a process
27
28
Starting in May, Holden told several people he was
-2COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
11
leading to Senator Dunn's termination. Finally, after Senator Dunn sent his whistleblower
notice, Holden guided the BOT to terminate Senator Dunn, but even then only "without
cause."
6.
Defendant Craig Holden was installed as President of the State Bar in

Defendant Craig Holden, now a partner at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
September 2014.
Smith LLP, is an attorney that has had difficulties in previous law firms and who submitted
irregular expense reports to the State Bar.
7.
Defendant Craig Holden's conduct is part of an effort to usurp executive
authority in the State Bar and has cleared the way for Defendant Holden to assume control
10
over the State Bar's executive functions. Employees of the State Bar have been infomLed
11
that Defendant Holden and Deputy Executive Director Robert Hawley will oversee and
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manage the State Bar in the "interim" period.
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formation of a process to hire a new Executive Director. No previous State Bar President in
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history has assumed executive management authority over the State Bar, as Defendant
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Holden has now done. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Holden has engaged in this conduct
16
to ultimately become the State Bar Executive Director.
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8.
There has been no announcement for the
In addition to the termination of Senator Dunn, the State Bar has recently
18
targeted some of the Whistleblower DOES 1-7 with various degrees of discipline and
19
retaliation because they corroborated and identified the same conduct Senator Dunn
20
complained of and joined in the whistleblower notices to the State Bar. Under the leadership
21
of Holden, the BOT has engaged in an effort to purge the ranks of whistleblowers at the State
22
Bar who were aware of and complained about the conduct of the BOT, President Holden,
23
and other ROE defendants. That purge of State Bar employees, consolidating power in the
24
hands of Holden, is unprecedented in the history of the State Bar.
25
26
27
28
9.
On Friday, November 7, 2014, at approximately 5:00 p.m., while giving a
speech for the State Bar in San Francisco, Plaintiff Senator Dunn received a termination
-3COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
12
letter from Defendant President Holden. The termination letter demanded that Senator Dunn
not speak with the press or public if he desired to negotiate a "mutually acceptable
[severance] agreement."
10.
Senator Dunn brings this whistleblower action to protect the public integrity of
the Defendant State Bar, to overturn the illegally motivated decision to terminate his
employment, and to vindicate his rights as a whistleblower.

PARTIES
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Senator Joseph Dunn (Ret.) is a former California State Senator who
represented California's 34th Senate District in Orange County, California. Senator Dunn
10
was appointed as Executive Director of the State Bar of California on November 22, 2010.
11
Senator Dunn served in this capacity as the State Bar's chief executive officer from
12
November 22, 2010 through his termination on November 8, 2014.
13
resident of Orange County, California.
Senator Dunn is a
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"The State Bar of California is a public corporation. Every person admitted and
15
licensed to practice law in this State is and shall be a member of the State Bar except while
16
holding office as a judge of a court of record." (Cal. Const., art VI, 9.) Under pain of
17
criminal punishment, no person may practice law in California unless he is an active member
18
of the State Bar. (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6125-6126.) The Board of Trustees of the State
19
Bar, upon authorization from the Legislature, fixes and imposes an annual membership fee
20
upon members of the State Bar. (Id. 6140.) The fees are paid into the treasury of the State
21
Bar, and become part of its funds. (Id. 6144.)
22
Trustees of the State Bar of California. The Board of Trustees makes rules of procedure,
23
regulates and operates the State Bar. The State Bar office is located at 845 South Figueroa
24
Street, Los Angeles, California 90017.
25
26
27
28
13.
The State Bar acts through the Board of
Defendant Craig Holden was installed as President of the State Bar in
September 2014 and is also a current partner at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.
-4COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
13
Defendant Holden resides in Los Angeles County, California. Craig Holden is sued herein in
his individual capacity.
14.
ROES 1-50 include trustees and employees of the State Bar who acted in
concert with Defendant Holden as well as certain government employees not employed by
the State Bar.
6
7
8
9
AND VENUE
15.
The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because they are
residents of and/or are doing business in the State of California.

16.
Venue is proper in this county in accordance with Section 395(a) of the
10
California Code of Civil Procedure because the Defendants, or some of them, reside in this
11
county and the injuries alleged herein occurred in this county.
,)
12
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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Senator Dunn's Appointment as Executive Director
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In 2009, the California Bureau of State Audits conducted a complete audit of
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the State Bar's disciplinary system. The Bureau highlighted the backlog reporting process
16
and shined light on the failure of the State Bar to include all backlog cases in the annual
17
discipline report. The report called for more transparency in the reporting of backlog cases
18
to give stakeholders a clear picture of the State Bar's effectiveness.
19
criticized: "By not reporting consistently and including all pertinent information, the State
20
Bar is limiting its stakeholders' and the Legislatures ability to measure the effectiveness of
21
the discipline system."
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The Audit Report
Senator Dunn was appointed as Executive Director in 2010, in the wake of this
23
highly critical audit, with the directive to reform the State Bar by bringing fiscal
24
responsibility and transparency to the State Bar's reporting obligations.
25
Director functions as the chief executive officer for the State Bar and oversees all employees.
26
The Executive Director is the only employee directly hired by the BOT and the Executive
27
28
The Executive
-5COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
14
Director reports directly to the BOT. All other State Bar employees report directly to the
Executive Director, with the exception of the head of the OCTC
prosecuting grievances in the State Bar Court
based on the unique appointment process which requires direct BOT approval and Senate
confirmation. The head of the OCTC is Jayne Kim.
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responsible for
who exercises a quasi independent function
Senator Dunn succeeded in bringing important reforms to the State Bar. For
example, Senator Dunn brought the investigative backlog on open complaints with the State
Bar to near zero in 2011 after years of criticism from the legislature on the size of the
backlog. Senator Dunn oversaw the purchase, remodel, and move in to the State Bar's new
10
home at 845 South Figueroa Street. Working with the Chief Financial Officer, Senator Dunn
11
stabilized the State Bar's budget with no new increase in mandatory dues under his
12
leadership.
13
public protection mission of the State Bar. This includes outreach to other State regulatory
14
bodies, law enforcement, the consulate community, religious communities, labor unions, and
15
others. Senator Dunn is also credited with substantially improving relations between the
16
Legislature and the State Bar including launching joint town halls with other regulatory
17
partners through the district offices of legislators.
18
working group that met regularly to develop proposals to increase funding for legal services
19
in California.
20
20.
Senator Dunn created an external relations team to proactively advance the
Senator Dunn also created a small
In all his years as Executive Director of the State Bar, Senator Dunn received
21
glowing performance reviews. All of Senator Dunn's formal performance reviews from
22
2011-2013 were positive leading the State Bar to award him substantial yearly bonuses in
23
addition to his salary.
24
25
2 1.
Senator Dunn's written employment agreement, initially set for a three year
term, was renewed in 2013 for a subsequent three-year term through 2016.
However,
26
27
28
-6COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
15
Senator Dunn was given notice of termination on November 7, 2014, just one year into his
new term as Executive Director. The termination was "without cause."
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As discussed below, Senator Dunn had learned of egregious improprieties
being committed by BOT members, by Chief Trial Counsel Jayne Kim, and by Holden.
When Senator Dunn raised these concerns with other whistleblowers, which called to task
the State Bar's core functions and competencies, Senator Dunn was targeted by Holden who
has attempted to cover up for the malfeasance that was reported.
"evaluation" of certain executive employees at the State Bar including Senator Dunn and
tasked a private firm, outside of protocol, to investigate Senator Dunn and those executive
10
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22.
employees.
Ethical Breaches - Unlawful Removal of Backlog
11
12
Holden initiated an
23.
Senator Dunn was one of the whistleblowers within the State Bar who reported
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that Chief Trial Counsel Jayne Kim unlawfully removed backlog cases from the official
14
reports released to the BOT and the public. This was done to benefit Ms. Kim in her
15
upcoming evaluation and to fraudulently inflate the productivity of her office.
16
24.
It was uncovered that at Ms. Kim's direction, internal reports were altered to
17
unlawfully remove cases from the statutory backlog. Ms. Kim then issued false reports to
18
the Regulation Admissions & Discipline ("RAD") Committee of the State Bar, the
19
membership of the State Bar, the Legislature and the Governor, and the general public.
20
25.
Ms. Kim's conduct did not involve a few isolated incidents but was shockingly
21
rampant. In her reports to the RAD Committee on September 30, 2013, Ms. Kim unlawfully
22
removed 269 cases from the internal reports. She then used the altered internal reports to
23
prepare her official quarterly report to the RAD Committee and posted this information on
24
the State Bar website for public consumption. The information in the public reports was
25
false and misleading due to Ms. Kim's unlawful removal of cases from the backlog reports.
26
27
28
-7COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
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The State Bar server that houses the backlog and case reports left a digital
footprint detailing the changes to the reports made at Ms. Kim's direction. The first run of
the backlog reports shows the accurate number of backlogged files. However, the backlog
report run two hours later removed a certain group of cases to artificially lower the number
of backlog cases. The metadata on the State Bar server exposes the changes and Ms. Kim's
misconduct. The reduction in the State Bar's backlog inventory was not due to increased
productivity but rather due to Ms. Kim's removal of cases from the official backlog reports.
26.
27.
The California Bureau of State Audits is set to conduct its biannual audit of the
State Bar in 2015. Rather than hold Ms. Kim and the OCTC accountable for its actions as
10
Senator Dunn encouraged, the State Bar has terminated Senator Dunn and taken adverse
11
actions against other whistleblowers for bringing this issue to their attention.
12
28.
Upon hearing concerns from Senator Dunn about her performance, Ms. Kim
13
attempted to preserve her position by filing a complaint against Senator Dunn. As detailed
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below, an evaluation of Senator Dunn was conducted at an exorbitant expense to the
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membership of the State Bar. Ms. Kim's complaint against Senator Dunn was made shortly
16
after the annual review process for her was commenced, and was merely pretextual to avoid
17
Senator Dunn's oversight, criticism, and review of her.
18
provided a copy or summary of Ms. Kim's complaint to Senator Dunn. What we do know is
19
the unilateral decision to terminate Senator Dunn was made "without cause."
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Fiscal Improprieties
20
21
To date, the State Bar has not
29.
The BOT, upon receiving Ms. Kim's complaint, decided to conduct an
22
"internal evaluation" of Senator Dunn and others and to retain a private firm for that purpose.
23
This was despite the fact that a retired California Supreme Court Justice offered to do the
24
same evaluation, pro bono. The private firm retained by the State Bar had close personal ties
25
with BOT member Miriam Krinsky which ties were never fully disclosed prior to the firm's
26
27
28
-8COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
17
retention. The retention of the private firm, in addition to being an utter waste of State Bar
membership dues, violated State Bar protocol.
30.
The retention of private counsel by the State Bar is a function of the State
The protocol for retaining a private firm is
Bar's Office of General Counsel ("OGC").
simple: if it is determined that the retention of a private firm is needed, the OGC is charged
with selecting the appropriate firm based on experience and cost. The OGC protocol that is
in place attempts to secure the retention of a private firm on financially feasible terms and to
sift out potential conflicts of interest and cronyism with BOT members. Here, that process
was blatantly ignored.
10
3 1.
The selected firm was retained based on the recommendation of BOT member
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Miriam Krinsky. The OGC was never consulted in this process; rather, Holden decided the
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OGC was "conflicted out" from performing its functions. Furthermore, this private firm was
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retained at exorbitant rates. Three billing partners from the private firm that were put on the
14
"evaluation" each billed in excess of $800 per hour.
15
services rendered by that private firm likely exceeds $300,000.00.
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BOT member Miriam Krinsky had a close personal and professional
17
relationship with the private firm's lead billing partner who was assigned to lead the
18
"evaluation." Board Member Krinsky and the lead partner of the private firm had a two
19
decade long relationship beginning when they were co-counsel at the United States
20
Attorney's Office in the 1990s through 2010 when Ms. Krinsky shared office space with the
21
lead partner while she was the Executive Director of the LA County Citizen's Commission
22
in 2010. This was not disclosed to the BOT.
23
24
25
Legislative Compliance Failures

33.
Senator Dunn has raised concerns that the State Bar BOT and Jayne Kim of the
OCTC were not enforcing the provisions of Assembly Bill 1159.
26
27
28
-9COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
18
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prosecute both lawyer and "notario" fraud, a form of unauthorized practice of law ("UPL'')
that preys on California's large immigrant community.
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The bill contained an urgency clause and was therefore effective the date it was
signed into law in October 2013. At or around the same time Ms. Kim was unlawfully
removing the backlog cases from her internal and public reports, she was also not
prosecuting fraud cases pursuant to the legislative will. Ms. Kim's failure to comply with
the legislative mandate was so egregious it prompted the author of AB 1159,
10
Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez, to send a letter demanding answers concerning the lack
11
of enforcement.
12
36.
13
To date, the Legislature's questions about the enforcement of AB 1159 remain
ignored.
Whistleblower Notice
14
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The bill was passed to enhance OCTC enforcement powers to
Assembly and Senate.
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15
37.
On November 3, 2014, Senator Dunn and a group of other individuals
16
employed by the State Bar, through their counsel Geragos & Geragos, APC, submitted an
17
anonymous whistleblower complaint to the State Bar BOT outlining a number of the
18
concerns addressed above. Thereafter, on November 5, 2014, the whistleblowers submitted
19
another letter through counsel, providing further information and evidence of the
20
improprieties outlined herein. Senator Dunn was identified by the BOT as one of the group
21
of whistleblowers.
22
38.
Senator Dunn was given notice of his termination on Friday, November 7,
23
2014 at 5:00 p.m. while he was giving a speech for the State Bar in San Francisco. Senator
24
Dunn received no explanation as to the basis for his termination. Senator Dunn was also
25
instructed by Holden that if he wanted to negotiate a severance agreement, he should not
26
speak to the public or the press about what had taken place. To date, Senator Dunn has not
27
28
- 10 COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
19
been afforded any opportunity to respond to the unilateral notice of his termination or any of
the allegations that may have been made against him.
39.
On November 10, 2014, some of the other whistleblowers that were
responsible for providing information contained in the two whistleblower notices were
targeted with various degrees of retaliation and discipline and believe they are in imminent
jeopardy of being terminated. Like Senator Dunn, the other whistleblowers who have been
loyal, dedicated, and high level employees at the State Bar for many years received no
explanation for the sudden unilateral retaliation against them by the State Bar.
40.
It is with deep sadness and a heavy heart that Senator Dunn has been
10
compelled to bring this action against the State Bar of California, an organization which he
11
loyally served for four years. However, given the glaring injustices, unethical conduct, and
12
massive cover-up that has crippled the State Bar's ability to function, this action has become
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necessary to restore the public trust and confidence in the State Bar, to restore the integrity of
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the organization, and to vindicate Senator Dunn's rights.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

WHISTLEBLOWER LIABILITY AND RETALIATION
16
17
LABOR CODE SECTION 1102.5
18
Senator Dunn Against Defendant the State Bar of California
19
20
41.
Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of
this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
21
42.
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an employee of the State Bar.
22
43.
On November 3, 2014 and November 5, 2014, Plaintiff made whistleblower
23
complaints to the State Bar as detailed above.
24
complaints to the State Bar's BOT about the willful failure of the Chief Trial Counsel Jayne
25
Kim to prosecute UPL fraud which would protect the immigrant community.
Additionally, Plaintiff made numerous
26
27
28
- 11 COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
20
44.
1
2
Director of the State Bar on November 7, 2014 because he was identified as a whistleblower
and because Holden intended to cover up malfeasance in the State Bar and secure his own
agenda in usurping executive authority within the State Bar.

45.
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Holden, Jayne Kim, and Miriam Krinsky. Specifically, the State Bar has terminated Plaintiff
because he reported the serious malfeasance, illegal conduct, and financial improprieties
described above.
46.
conduct violates the fundamental public policy against retaliation of whistleblowers in this
11
State and the protections afforded under Labor Code section 1102.5.
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The termination of Plaintiff on account of his complaints about the unlawful
10
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The State Bar has ratified and condoned the acts and omissions of Defendant
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Plaintiff was given notice of termination from his employment as Executive
As a result of the unlawful treatment of Plaintiff which culminated in his
termination, Plaintiff suffered damages.

48.
Defendants are subject to civil penalties and assessment under Labor Code
section 1102.5.
49.
16
Based on the unlawful acts taken by Defendants, Plaintiff has been deprived of
17
his position as Executive Director of the State Bar. Pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5,
18
Plaintiff Senator Dunn seeks his immediate reinstatement as Executive Director of the State
19
Bar, or alternatively, for the Court to issue an Order to Show Cause regarding why Senator
20
Dunn should not be immediately reinstated based on the unlawful termination by the State
21
Bar.
22
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
23
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
24
Senator Dunn Against Defendant Craig Holden and Board of Trustee ROES
25
26
27
28
50.
Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of
this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

- 12 COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
21
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Defendant Holden breached his fiduciary obligations by engaging
the
conflicted retention of a private firm, condoning and attempting to cover up the unlawful
removal of backlogged State Bar complaints, failing to implement legislation, and
terminating Plaintiff and the DOE whistleblowers for reporting the illegal, improper, and
unethical conduct described above.
11
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as Executive Director of the State Bar, to DOE Whistleblowers 1-7, and to the public.
conduct described above, including but not limited to, authorizing the out-of-protocol and
10
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At all times, Defendant Holden owed a fiduciary duty to the State Bar, Plaintiff
51.
12
53.
As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has been
injured, in an amount according to proof at trial.

54.
Defendants' conduct was wanton, willful, and malicious giving rise to punitive
damages in favor of Plaintiff.
13
14
WHEREFORE,
15
On the First Cause of Action:
16
1.
For general and special damages in an amount according to proof at trial;
17
2.
For pre- and post-judgment interest according to proof;
18
3.
For costs of suit incurred herein;
19
4.
For attorneys' fees;
20
5.
For damages and fees pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5;
21
6.
For injunctive relief reinstating Plaintiff as Executive Director of the State Bar
Plaintiffs request judgment against the Defendants as follows:
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or, alternatively, for an Order to Show Cause why Senator Dunn (Ret.) should
23
not be immediately reinstated based on the unlawful termination and retaliation
24
by the State Bar; and
25
7.
For all other relief as this Court may deem proper.
26
27
28
- 13 COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
22
On the Second Cause of Action:
1.
For general and special damages in an amount according to proof at trial;
2.
For pre- and post-judgment interest according to proof;
3.
For exemplary damages against Defendants;
4.
For costs of suit incurred herein; and
5.
For all other relief as this Court may deem proper.
7
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DATED: November 13, 2014
By:
. GERAGOS
MAR
BEN . MEISELAS
Atto eys for Plaintiff
SENATOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.)
14
15
16
17
18
TRIAL
DEMAND FOR
Plaintiff Senator Dunn (Ret.) hereby demands a jury trial.
19
20
DATED: November 13, 2014
21
22
23
By:
. GERAGOS
BEN J. EISELAS
Atto ys for Plaintiff
JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.)
24
25
26
27
28
- 14 COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
23
EXHIBIT B
24
Exhibit B
25
Exhibit B
26
Exhibit B
27
Exhibit B
28
Exhibit B
29
Exhibit B
30
Exhibit B
31
Exhibit B
32
Exhibit B
33
EXHIBIT C
34
Exhibit C
35
Exhibit C
36
Exhibit C
37
Exhibit C
38
Exhibit C
39
Exhibit C
40
Exhibit C
41
Exhibit C
42
Exhibit C
43
Exhibit C
44
Exhibit C
45
Exhibit C
46
Exhibit C
47
Exhibit C
48
Exhibit C
49
Exhibit C
50
EXHIBIT D
51
Ji>iafc Df California
(Ermtmissinn on 3Jufrtriai |Jerf0rrnanrE

Ifll Jtofcarb ^freef, ^ u t f e 300
^ a n (IfranriscD, QjA 94105
(415)904-3650
FAX (41 5) 904-3666
February 28, 1995
Honorable Thomas M. Kelly

Judge of the Justice Court
Alpine Judicial District
P. O. Box 515
Markleeville, CA 96120-0515
Dear Judge Kelly:
The Commission on Judicial Performance has determined that
you should be publicly reproved for the following conduct:
"In 1987, before justice court judges were prohibited from
practicing law by California Constitution Article VI 17 and
Government Code 71607, Judge Kelly became attorney of record
for the plaintiff in Okoye v. Citicorp, Los Angeles Superior
Court Case No. C 683268. Judge Kelly signed a complaint
prepared by a Nevada attorney whose law library and office
Judge Kelly sometimes used. Judge Kelly accommodated the
Nevada attorney without receiving a fee or promise of fee, and
without expecting a fee. The attorney had told Judge Kelly
that he intended to handle the case and would file a motion to
appear pro hac vice, seeking the court's permission to appear
as an out-of-state attorney with Kelly, a California attorney,
associated as counsel. However, within a month after the
complaint was filed, the Nevada attorney abandoned his plan to
file the application, and so advised Judge Kelly.
Because Kelly was counsel of record in Okoye v. Citicorp,
the defendant's counsel communicated with Judge Kelly at the
Nevada counsel's address. A demurrer to the complaint was
filed. Judge Kelly and the Nevada attorney discussed the matter
and agreed to stipulate to the demurrer. A first amended
complaint was filed; a demurrer to that complaint was
sustained, as well. No second amended complaint was filed.
During the spring and summer of 1987, defense counsel
contacted Judge Kelly four times to schedule the plaintiff's
deposition. Although Judge Kelly informed the Nevada attorney,
Judge Kelly did not notify the plaintiff. On one occasion,
Judge Kelly told defense counsel that he could not attend a
deposition because he was scheduled on a judicial assignment.
Exhibit D
52
Honorable Thomas M. Kelly

February 28, 1995
Page Two
No discovery pertinent to the merits of the case was
provided to the defense. On July 8, 1987, a motion to compel
production of documents was heard. There was no appearance for
plaintiff. The court ordered production of the requested
documents and ordered sanctions against Judge Kelly and the
plaintiff, which were later paid by the Nevada attorney. Judge
Kelly never notified the plaintiff.
On August 25, 1987, Judge Kelly appeared at a hearing on
defendant's motion to dismiss. This was the first occasion on
which the plaintiff and Judge Kelly met with each other. The
court ordered the case dismissed for failure to file a second
amended complaint, and imposed sanctions of $2,500 on both
Judge Kelly and the plaintiff.
A federal complaint signed by Judge Kelly also was filed on
behalf of the plaintiff, in April of 1987. It was dismissed
for lack of prosecution, and the motion to set the dismissal
aside was dismissed without hearing in December 1987.
The plaintiff sued Judge Kelly and the Nevada attorney for
breach of contract, fraud, and legal malpractice in their
representation of him in the Okoye v. Citicorp case. After a
court trial, the court found Judge Kelly and the Nevada
attorney liable on the cause of action for legal malpractice.
The Nevada attorney was also held liable for breach of
contract. Both were ordered to pay a judgment of $351,000.
The judgment was affirmed on appeal.
The trial court determined that Judge Kelly, by agreeing
that the Nevada attorney would handle the management of the
lawsuits in the absence of a court order permitting the Nevada
attorney to appear as counsel, after signing the complaints
prepared by the Nevada attorney, unlawfully aided and abetted
the unauthorized practice of law, contrary to Business and
Professions Code 6126(a) and Code of Professional
Responsibility Rule 3-101. The commission finds that by his
conduct in the case, including abandoning, for all intents and
purposes, a client for whom he was attorney of record, Judge
Kelly committed a breach of fiduciary duty and committed legal
malpractice. Judge Kelly's conduct constitutes conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
judiciary into disrepute."
This public reproval is being issued with your consent.
Very truly yours,
i / ;
^--N i \
VICTORIA B. HENLEY
Director-Chief Counsel
/
!
Exhibit D
53
EXHIBIT E
54
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
KEVIN SINGER
SUPERIOR COURT RECEIVER/REFEREE
RECEIVERSHIP SPECIALISTS
795 Folsom Street, 1st Floor
San Francisco, California 94107
Telephone: (415) 848-2984
Fax: (415) 848-2301
E-mail: Kevin@ReceivershipSpecialists.com
Property Address:
4655-4677 Meade Street

Richmond, CA 94804
8
9
:tlO
I
SUPERIOR'COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11
COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA
......_:...
cs-
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
CERF SPVI, LLC, a Delaware limited liability)

company,
)
)
)
)
v.
)
CHEROKEE SThIBON VENTURE I, LLC; a )
Plaintiff,
Delaware limited liability company,

PIONEER HI-BRED INTERNATIONAL,
)
INC., an Iowa corporation, LUMIPHORE
)
INC., a Delaware corporation, GERONOVA )
RESEARCH, Inc., a Nevada corporation,
)
)
NANOASIS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a
California corporation, CHEMORAGA, INC., )
a California corporation and DOES
inclusive,
Defendants.
1-50,
)
)
)
)
)
--------
CASE NO:
C12-00284
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR

ORDER AUTHORIZING RECEIVER TO
RETAIN LEGAL COUNSEL;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION OF
KEVIN SINGER IN SUPPORT THEREOF.
=:
Dept.:
ld,,
Wk
31
Judge: Hon. Laurel S. Brady

Martinez Superior Court
725 Court Street

Martinez, CA 94553
25
26
27
28
Page l
Exhibit E
55
RECEIVER'S MOTION TO RETAIN LEGAL COUNSEL
TO:
RECORD:
THE PLANTIFFS, DEFENDANT AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS OF
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on
2012 at the hour of
or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard in Department
31, at the
Martinez Superior Courthouse at 725 Court Street, Martinez, CA
Receiver, Kevin Singer, will and does hereby move the Court to grant his NOTICE OF
MOTION AND MOTION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZING RECEIVER TO RETAIN LEGAL
COUNSEL; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION
OF KEVIN SINGER IN SUPPORT THEREOF.
94553, Superior Court
This Motion is based on this Notice of
10
Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Declaration of Kevin Singer, pleadings,
11
records and files in this action, and oral and documentary evidence
12
hearing on this Motion.
13
DATED: September
14
15
as
may be presented at the
10, 2012
By:
Kevin Singer
Superior Court &
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Page 2
Exhibit E
56
RECEIVER'S .MOTION TO RETAIN LEGAL COUNSEL
u
1
2
INTRODUCTION
1.
Through a stipulation amongst CERF SPVI, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company ("Plaintiff"),
collectively (''the Parties"), the Court granted an Order Appointing Receiver Ex Parte and
Temporary Restraining Order In Aid of Receiver ("Court Order") which was entered on July
12, 2012 and
Singer's ("Receiver") Oath was filed on approximately July
and management of the Property was transitioned to him on August
agreed upon transition date by the Parties.
and CHEROKE SIMEON VENTURE I, LLC
("Defendant"),
attached hereto as "Exhibit 1." The appointed Superior Court Receiver, Kevin
12, 2012, by
Plaintiff's Counsel
15\ 2012.
This was an
10
2.
The collateral for Plaintiff's Deed of Trust is a commercial and industrial building
11
located at
46554677 Meade Street, Richmond, CA 94894 (the "Property"). The Property is
12
commonly referred to as Campus Bay. The Property has a long history of chemical
13
manufactures using the site. In
14
oversight of the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board.
15
"Exhibit 2," is information summarizing the environmental issues surrounding the Property.
16
3.
1997, an environmental cleanup was initiated under the

Attached as
One of Receiver's primary duties is to lease or release the Property or any
17
portion of it on terms acceptable to Plaintiff. Any lease contract entered into will require
18
disclosers regarding the environmental issues.
19
4.
On August
8,
2012
and August
9,
2012,
the Receiver had a disagreement with
20
Defendant's legal counsel over the ability of Defendant to collect past due rents from the
21
tenants.
22
Receiver, and came to an amicable resolution with the Receiver regarding the collection of past
23
due rent, but there remains a disagreement in between the Receiver and Defendant's legal
24
counsel the interpretation of the Court Order.
25
26
Defendant's legal counsel was properly representing her client, respectful to the
5.
Although the Receiver has the ability to write basic pleadings and file papers with
the Court, he is not an attorney. The Receiver is also not an expert in legal environmental
27
28
Page 3
Exhibit E
57
;;
disclosures that will need to be provided to tenants. The Receiver also seeks help from time to
time in interpreting the Court's Order and working with the Parties' legal counsels.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF RECEIVER RETAINING COUNSEL
California Rules of Court 3.1180. Employment of attorney
A receiver must not employ an attorney without the approval of the court. The
application for approval to employ an attorney must be in writing and must state:
(1) The necessity for the employment;
(2) The name of the attorney whom the receiver proposes to employ; and
(3) That the attorney is not the attorney for, associated with, nor employed by an
10
11
attorney for any party.

The Court Order instructs the Receiver as follows (See "Exhibit 1"):
12
8a.)
13
preserve, protect, maintain, and operate the Property ..........;
14
8e.)
15
property managers, accountants, and other persons and professionals as Receiver
16
deems appropriate to effectuate the operation of the Property and to preserve and
17
protect the Property;
18
12)
19
this Court for further orders instructing Receiver.
Receiver shall have the power to take any and all lawful actions necessary to
Receiver is authorized to employ and compensate professionals, including
Receiver, or any party to this action, may from time to time, make application to
20
THE RECEIVER'S REQUEST TO RETAIN LEGAL COUNSEL
21
The Receiver needs to retain legal counsel for the limited purpose of advising the
22
Receivership Estate on the proper way to disclose environmental issues to new tenants to limit
23
the liability of the Receivership Estate. The legal counsel retained by Receiver can also advise
24
the Receivership Estate on interpretation of the Court Order when the Parties are in
25
disagreement as to its interpretation.
26
27
28
The Receiver would like to retain Mia Blackler ("Ms. Blackler") and Manuel
Fishman
("Mr.
Fishman") of Buchalter Nemer. Ms. Blackler is an expert in receivership law

Page 4
Exhibit E
58
\_/
and Mr. Fishman is an expert in commercial lease contra cts and environmental issues. Their
billing rates are
assistance of associates whose billing rates are
3," are their bios.
$440 for Ms. Blackler and $495 per hour for Mr. Fishman and they utilize the
$300
to
$350
per hour. Attached as "Exhibit
WHEREFORE, The Receiver requests that the Court grant the following:
1. The Superior Court Receiver, Kevin Singer, is authorized to retain Mia Blackler and
. e
Manuel Fishman to advise him on any lease negotiations, disclosure issues related to the leas
negotiations and/or contracts, and guidance on interpretation of the Court Order.
9
10
11
2. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and appropriate.
DATED:
September
10, 2012
12
13
14
By:
ks
Kevin Singer
Superior Co
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Page 5
Exhibit E
59
u
1
'.,__;
DECLARATION OF KEVIN SINGER
I, KEVIN SINGER declare and state as follows:
am
a Superior Court Referee and Referee and have acted in that capacity in over 143
cases over the last eleven years.
specializes in Receivership and Referee appointments. If called upon to testify, I could and
would competently do so as to the matters hereinafter set forth based on firsthand knowledge.
I am the President of Receivership Specialists, which
I submit this Declaration in support of the accompanying NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZING RECEIVER TO RETAIN LEGAL COUNSEL;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION OF KEVIN
10
SINGER IN SUPPORT THEREOF;
11
Through a stipulation amongst CERF SPVI, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company
12
("Plaintiff'), and CHEROKE SIMEON VENTURE I, LLC ("Defendant"), collectively (''the
13
Parties"), the Court granted an Order Appointing Receiver Ex Parte and Temporary
14
Restraining Order
15
the Court Order, I was appointed Superior Court Receiver. The parties agreed that the property
16
located at
17
transitioned to my control on August 1,
In Aid of Receiver ("Court Order") which was entered on July 12, 2012. In
4655-4677 Meade Street, Richmond, CA 94894 (the "Property") was to be

2012.
18
2. The Property serves as collateral for Plaintiff's Deed of Trust and is a commercial
19
and industrial building commonly referred to as Campus Bay. The Property has a long history
20
of chemical manufactures using the site.
21
the oversight of the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board.
In 1997, an environmental cleanup was initiated under
22
3. One of my primary responsibilities is to lease or release the Property or any portion
23
of it on terms acceptable to Plaintiff. Any lease contract I have entered into will require
24
disclosers regarding the environmental issues.
25
26
27
28
4.
On August
8, 2012 and August 9, 2012, I had a disagreement with Defendant's
legal counsel over the ability of Defendant to collect past due rents from the tenants at the
Property. Defendant's legal counsel was properly representing her client, respectful to me, and
Page 6
Exhibit E
60
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Dena M. Cruz (CA State Bar No. 121508)

Richard Mooney (CA State Bar No. 176486)
Leena Rege (CA.State Bar No. 236827)
DRY.AN CAvE, LLP
560 Mission Street, 25th Floor
San Francisco, CA. 94105
Telephone: (415)268;,2000.
Facsimile: (415) 2681999
71111
.1 .
:P: l 2 o_,
""
.,. _
..
\: Sb
Attomeys for Plaintiff

CERF SPVI, LLC
8
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA
10
11
SPVI, LLC a Delaware limited liability

company
CERF
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
CASE NO.: CIV C12-00284

1.
Plaintiff,
2.
v.
CHEROKEE SIMEON VENTURE I, LLC; a

Delaware limited liability company, PIONEER
ID-BRED INTERNATIONAL, INC., an Iowa
corporation, LUMIPHORE INC., a Delaware

corporation, OERONOVA RESEARCH, Inc., a
Nevada corporation, NANOASIS
TECHNOLOGIBS, INC., a California
corporation, CHBMORAGA, INC., a California
corporation and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
20
Defendants.
21
[PldJl"tJili!D] ORDER APPOINTING

RECEIVER EX PARTE
(PD] TEMPORARY
TRAINING ORDER IN AID OF
RECEIVER
(Ex Parte Application, Stipulation to Entry of

Order Appointing a Receiver and Preliminary
Injunction, Declaration of Edward Elanjian,
Declaration of Kevin Singer, Declaration of
Dena M. Cruz, and Oath of Receiver filed
concurrently herewith)
Date: July 12, 2012
Time: 1 :30 p.m.
Dept.: 60
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
I
I
#80494 vt sar
[PROPOSBPJ ORDER Al':POIN'l'ING RBCBIVBREX PARTE AND TRO

CERF SPVI, LLC va. Cherokee Simeon Venture I, LLC.
Contra Costa SUperior Case No. Cl2-00284
Exhibit E
61

;;:
The motion of Plaintiff CERF SPV I, LLC ("Plaintiff'), for an ex parte order appointlng a
receiver and for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction came on for hearing in Department 60 of
this Court on July 12, 2012 at 1 :30 p.m.. Plaintiff appeared by and through its counsel, Dena M.
Cruz; defendant Cherokee Simeon Venture I, LLC (''CSV'') appeared by and through its counsel,
Larisa A. Meisenheimer.
Having read and considered the moving papers, pleadings, and evidence in this matter;
having heard argument of counsel; and being apprised of the premises; it appearing to the Court that:
A. On or about September 6, 2007, Continental Environmental Redevelopment Financial,

LLC (''CERF'') entered into a Loan and Security Agreement (the "2007 Loan
9
10
Agreement") and certain related documents, agreements and ins1nments, as lender, with
11
CSV,
12
certain real property located in Contra Costa County, CA, commonly known as Campus
13
Bay ("Campus Bay'').
14
borrower, to fund, amongst other things, a portion of the cost to remediate
B. Plaintiff is the holder of a promissory note dated September 6, 2007, executed by CSV as
borrower (the ''Note").
15
16
as
C. The Note is secured by a deed of 1rust of even date (the ''Deed of Trust'') executed by
17
CSV in favor of CERF, which Note and Deed of Trust were assigned to Plaintiff on or
18
about September 6, 2007. A copy of the Deed of Trust is attached to theDeclaration of
19
EdwardElanjian (''ElanjianDecl.") as ExhibitB.
20
D. TheDeed of Trust is a lien on the title to Campus Bay (the "Property''). A copy of the
21
Deed of Trust, which contains a legal description of the Property is attached to the
22
Elanjian Deel.
23
Exhibit B.
E. TheDeed of Trust contains a provision whereby all the rents, issues, and profits of the
Property are assigned as additional security on the Note and;
24
25
as
F. The 2007 Loan Agreement and the Deed of Trust contain certain provisions in which
26
CSV consented to the appointment of a receiver for the Property in the event of default
27
under the Borrowing Agreements; and,
28
1
[PROPOSED] ORDER. AP:POINTING RECEIVER BX PARTE AND TRO

#80494 vl saf
CERF SPVI, LLC vs. Cherokee Simeon Venture I, LLC.

Contra Costa Superior Case No. Cl2-00284
Exhibit E
62
u
. '
G. Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint filed in this action Defendant CSV has defaulted on
l
2
its obligations mderthe 2007 Loan Agreement, Note and Deed of Trust (her einafter
collectively the 'Borrowing Agreements") in that CSV (i) failed to pay the outstanding
principal balance ofth.e loan, all accrued and unpaid interest thereon, and all other sums
owing to Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the Borrowing Agreements which were due
and payable on or before September 6, 2010; (ii) failed to pay when due and payable
property taxes assessed against the Property; and, (iii) fiiiled to pay premiums for
insurance required mder the terms of the Borrowing Agreements;
H.
Without admitting to or agreeing with Plaintiff's allegations, CSV stipulated on July 11,
2012, to the appointment of a receive r and a preliminary injunction.
10
11
TIIEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 1HAT:
12
13
ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER
The Court grants Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of a receiver and appoints Kevin
14
1.
15
Singer as receiv er (the "Receiver''}, such appointment to be effective on the
16
of office. Purswmt to the terms of the Deed of Trust, the Receiver does not need to file an
17
undertaldng or bon d.
18
2.
Receiver is appointed by this Court to take possession of the Property.
19
3.
CSV shall surrender possession of the Property to Receiver as of August 1, 2012 (the
20
"Effective Date"), and shall deliver to Receiver all keys, all books and records related to the
21
ownership and maintenance of the Property, checkbooks, ledgers, accomits payable and accounts
22
receivable records, leases, rent rolls, insurance policies and certificates (except as specified in
23
Paragraph 18), executory contracts, plans, specifications and drawings, and all other documents
24
whatsoever related to the ownership and maintenance of the Property (collectively "Books and
25
Records''). Receiver shall take possession and control of all Books and Records, except that
26
Receiver may, in his discretion, choose to leave whatever portions of the Books and Records he
27
decides appropriate in the possession of the. persons possessing the same, provided that Receiver
28
shall have immediate access to these items. Receiver shall retain possession of the Property until the
filing of Receiver s oath

'
2
[PROPOSED] ORDER APPOlNTJNG RECEIVBREX PARTE AND TRO
#80494 vl saf
CERF SP'YI, LLC vs. Cherokee Simeon Venture I, UC.

Contra Costa Superior Case No. C12-00284
Exhibit E
63

::
earlier of further order of the Court or nonjudicial foreclosure of the Property by Plaintiff and/or its
assigns.
4.
personal property, assets, all rents due and hereinafter due, notes, receivables, actions and choses in
action; and,
action, or other evidence of indebtedness and, if need be, bring suit to recover the same in his own
name..
5.
may bein possession there6f, be and they are hereby directed to (i) attom to Receiver, and until the
As of the Effective Date, Receiver shall (i) receive and take charge of the Property and all
(ii) collect all outstanding accounts, receivables, leases, rents, actions and choses in
As of the Effective Date, the tenants in possession of the Property or such other persons as
(ii) to pay over to Receiver, or its duly designated agent, all rents of the
10
further order of the Court;
11
Prop ez:ty now due and unpaid or hereafter to become due. CSV is hereby enjoined and restrained
12
from collecting the rents of the Property as of the Effective Date; and that all tenants of the Property
13
and other persons liable for the rents be and they hereby are enjoined and restrained from paying any
14
rent for the Property to CSV, or its managing agent, its officers, directors, employees, agents, or
15
attomeys.
16
6.
17
possession ofthe Property, CSV is restrained and enjoined until further order of this Court from
18
disposing of silch rents, issues, profits, and revenues of the Property in any manner, other than by
19
turning over such rents, issues, profits, and revenues to Receiver until further order of this Court;
20
7.
21
Plaintiff, for services performed as receiver for the Property pursuant to invoices
22
Plaintiff describing in detail the services perfonned and the hours worked, to be paid as a priority
23
from the rents and revenues of the Property, or otherwise paid by Lender; provided, however, in no
24
event shall Receiver's hourly fee exceed$ 250.00 per hour and $150 per hour for Receiver's support
25
staff;
26
8.
27
the following:
If CSV should receive any rents or revenues from the Property, on or after Receiver takes
Receiver shall be paid fees calculated on an hourly basis, at rates previously provided to
Submitted to
Receiver shall be authorized and empowered to, and when required by this Order must, do
28
3
[PROPOSED] ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER EX PAR'IE AND TRO

#80494Yl Hf
CERF SPVI, LLC vs. Cherokee Simeon Venture I, LLC.

Exhibit E
64
i-."!t'Gftke'opertjroh
\_}
::
, iBffe'{F:ll\W,;;-Ifo. ---
The power to possess,
manage and operate the Property shall include the power to assume or reject executory contracts,
including leases. Except as stated in Paragraph 18 ofthis Order. the power to possess, manage, and
operate shall also include the right to exclude from the Property anyone, including CSV and any
persons claiming under or through CSV, who are not in possession ofthe Property under valid lease
1O
or rental agreements or acting pursuant to an order or authority granted by the Department of Toxic
11
Substances Control ("DTSC'') or other government agency.
12
operations or management of any busess operated wi1hin the Property, nor, is Recei ver required to
13
assure that
14
within the Property conform to Califomia state law.
any required licenses and per.mi.ta applicable to any business currently conducted at or
(b)
15
Receiver shall not be responsible for the
Rents and profits: Receiver shall have the right and power to take possession
16
and control ofany rents, profits, or income whatsoever generated by the Property ("Rents") after the
17
Effective Date, including any pre-paid Rents and profits, Rents and profits due and owing, and any
18
Rents and profits which become due and owing thereafter on the Effective Date, whether held by
19
CSV, its property managers, tenants, or any other third party. Receiver shall deposit all funds
20
received in an FDIC insured deposit account ("Receivership Account,,). Receiver may receive and
21
endorse checks constituting income from the Property.

(c)
22
Management of the Property's Revenues: Receiver shall man.age the daily
23
operations ofthe Property and collect and hold all Rents, profits and other revenues generated by the
24
use and occupancy ofthe Property in the Receivership Account for which the authorized signatory
25
shall be Receiver and, at Receiver's option, designated agents ofReceiver. Receiver shall pay the
26
noimal, ordinary, and necessary operating expenses ofthe Property from the rents and other
27
revenues collected from the Property, subject to the limitations set forth in paragraph numb ered 8G)
28
below; otherwise, such costs shall be paid by Plaintiff following Receiver's delivery to Plaintiff of
#804!>4 vl 1sf
4
[PROPOSED] ORDBR. APPOINTING RECEIVER EX PAR.TB ANDTRO
CERF SPYJ, LLC vs. Cherokee Simeon Venture 1, LLC.
Exhibit E
65
invoices describing such expenses in detail. All Rents, profits and revenue generated by the use and
occupancy ofthe Property shall be applied first to the payment of Operating Expenses.
Expenses shall include, without limitation, insurance, maintenance and repairs, utilities, payroll,
administration, refunds of security deposits, real property taxes, and assessments. Operating
Expenses shall not include, and Receiver shall not pay without further order of this Court or
Plaintiff's written consent: (i) any alle ged obligations owed to CSV, its agents, assigns, or to any
entity, person, partnership or cotporation owned, in whole or in part, by, related to, or otherwise
affiliated with CSV, or (ii) any obligations or payments owed, or claimed to be owed, to any junior
lien holder. All Rents, profits and revenue generated by the use and occupancy of the Property shall
10
then be applied to other fees, costs or expenses associated with the Property, as permitted by the
11
tenns of this Order.

(d)
12
Operating
Protection of the Prqpert;y and Insurance: Receiver shall have the power to,
13
and is ordered to, protect the Receivership Estate. "Receivership Estate" shall mean the Property,
14
Rents and profits, and other income derived from the Property and assets from any destruction, or
15
waste.
16
there ls sufficient insurance coverage to protect Plaintiff's security interest in the Property. If
17
necessary,
18
provided that the Receivership Estate's funds and required insurance
19
maintain existing insurance policies (except the PLL Insurance Policy referenced in Paragraph 17(b)
20
below) and pay any premiums due from available funds of the Receivership Estate. Receiver shall
21
not be persomtlly liable for any insurance claims arising before or after the appointment of a receiver
22
and procuremcmt of sufficient insurance. If insurance is not currently in place and cannot be
23
obtained by Receiver, the Court shall be notified within 30 days from the
Receiver shall determine upon taking possession ofthe Receivership Estate whether or not
Receiver shall attempt to procure sufficient insurance coverage as soon as practicable,
available.
Receiver may
date of this Order.
:iiiillia:eampell$ate
(e)
24
are
;Jl-l!i<:-Mt,
25
26
- ,;4;),
27
28
s
t/80494 vl saf
[PROPOSED] ORDBRAPPOINTIN"G RBCBIVBREX PARTE AND TRO

CERF SPVI, LLC. vs. Cherokee Simeon Venture!, LLC.
Exhibit E
66
shall file in this action a detailed inventory of all property
undertaking and Oa1h are filed, Receiver
of the Receivership Estate. Receiver shall also file a supplemental inventory thereof; if necessary.
Periodic Accounting: Receiver shall provide periodic statements of account
(g)
4
that include a
summary
of the ootivities of Receiver and any property manager, a schedule of
receipts and disbursements, a summary of Receiver and its professional's interim fees and expenses,
.6
and other such information as the Court may direct. Receiver sba11 file said accounting with. the
Court and shall serve upon Plaintiff's counsel and CSV' s counsel a copy of said accounting.
Receiver shall file a final report within 3 0 days after the termination of the receivership.
(b.)
. 1 o
Authorized Disbursements and Actions. Receiver shall be authorized, in the
exercise of Receiver's business judgment, to do, without limitation, the following:
11
(i)
12
Collect past due Rents and profits from tenants or former tenants of the
Property, and collect Rents and profits while this Order is in effect;
13
(ii)
Lease or r&-lease the Property or any portion of it on terms acceptable
16
(iii)
Evict tenants;
17
(iv)
As set forth in paragraph 8(c) above, pay Operating Expenses related
(v)
Incm and pay such other expenses as are reasonably necessary for
14
to P1aintiff;
15
to the Property.
18
19
Receiver to perform his duties;
20
Receiver's Initial Accounting: Within 30 days after the date Receiver's
(f)
21
(vi)
Retain, in Receiver's discretion, a working capital fund in an amount
22
sufficient for payment of Receivership expenses;
23
(vii)
Investigate and evaluate the financial condition and history of the
24
Property in order to determine their value and expenses, provided that such investigation does not
25
substantially increase the costs of the receivership over the compensation provided to Receiver
26
herein without Plaintiff's consent or further order of this Comt;
(viii)
27
28
Investigate and evaluate the Property for the presence of any readily
apparent dangerous conditions, hazardous waste, substances or chemicals that is not the subject of
6
[PROPOSED] ORDER APPOINTING R,BCBIVBREXPARTE AND TRO
CERFSP"YI, UC vs. Cherokee Simeon Venture[, UC.
#80494 vl saf
Contra Costa Superior Case No. Cl2M00284
Exhibit E
67

"'
.
.. ,
'
20, 2011 Revised Draft Feasibility Stady and Remedial Action Plan for Lots 1,2, and 3,
the JUly
Campus Bay, Richmond, California ("Draft FSRAP'') or any revision or
(ix)
Subjeotto the terms of this Order,
amendment to same;
pay any necessary maintenance
required for health and safety reasons, property management fees, including :reimbursement for costs
on a monthly basis from the assets now held, or which may be received by, t1re Receivership Estate,
subject to.the final review of this Court;
(x)
Upon request of Pl Receiver shall tum over to Plaintiff, to be

lease proceeds net of (i) Receiver fees and expenses, (ii)
applied toward the indebtedness, any
Operating Expenses, and (iii) Receiver's working capital fund;

(xi)
10
Upon Plaintiff's consent, provide for the payment of all
capital
11
improvements to the Property required to bring the Property to good condition and allow the lease of
12
the Property or any portion of the Property. ReCeiver shall first make any emergency capital
13
improvements or repairs which are necessary, in Receiver's business judgment, to protect persons
14
and the Property from serious bodily harm or damage. Receiver shall promptly notify Plaintiff and
1S
CSV of the need, if any, for any emergency capital improvements;
16
17
(xii)
Contest or protest taxes or assessments with respect to the Property;
{)
Use any federal taxpayer identification numbers relating to the
and,
18
19
Property for any lawful purpose.
20
(i)
General Receivership Powers. In addition to all of the powers set forth above,
hereby vested with all of the
21
and subject to any limitations contained in this Order, Receiver is
22
general powers of receivers in cases of this kind, subject to the direction of this Court.
(j)
23
24
Limitations on Receiver's Authority: Except as provided for above, the
Receiver shall not, absent the consent of Plaintiffor further order of this Court:
25
(i)
Obtain loans, secured or unsecured, on behalf of the Receivership
26
Estate o r encumber the Receivership Estate. Notwithstanding this restriction
27
particularly set forth in paragraph 13 below, Receiver may request loans from Plaintiff at Plaintiff's
28
option and/or election to make any of the repairs and perform any maintenance determined by
on
loans, and as more
#80494 vl saf
[PROPOSBDJ ORDER APPOINTING RBCBIVBR.BX PARTE AND TRO

CERF SPT'l, LLC vs. Cheroke.e Stmeon Venture I, LLC.
Contra Costa Superior case No. Cl200284
Exhibit E
68
Receiver in his business judgment to be necessary to keep the Property in good condition, and any
emergency capital improvements or repairs as allowed above. Any and all loans Receiver obtains
from Pl pursuant to this paragraph, shall be: (i) deemed obligatory advances on the
indebtedness; (ii) added to the balance due; and (iii) secured by the operative Deed of Trust.
(ii)
5
6
Court, execute any documents that (i) result in a subdivision of the Property, or (ii) that result in a lot
line adjus1m.ent of any portion of the Property;
(iii)
8
9
Without the written consent of CSV and Plaintiff, or order of this
Without the written consent of CSV and Plaintiff, or order of this
Court, sell any portion of the Property.

Receiver shall have no responsibility for filing future federal and state income tax retums
1O
9.
11
(''Tax Retum'') or for dissolution of CSV. The responsibility for such filings lie exclusively with
12
csv.
13
10.
14
Estate upon ten (10) days notice to the parties. If no written specific objection is provided to
15
Receiver on all fees and expenses submitted; Receiver may pay its invoice and professional fees and
16
expenses owed from available Receivership Estate funds.
17
day period, Receiver must respond within a reasonable time to the parties with an acceptable
18
explanation. If an agreement cannot be reached, a noticed motion on shortened time will be filed
19
with the Court for approval of the fees and expenses in dispute.
20
11.
21
Receiver has no control, shall be obligations of CSV and may not be refunded by Receiver without
22
an
23
have paid or may pay to Receiver, if otherwise refundable under the terms of their leases or
24
agreements with Receiver1 shall be refundable by Receiver in accordance with the leases or
25
agreements.
26
12.
27
Receiver's fees and expenses will be paid monthly from available funds of the Receivership
If an
objection is received within the ten
Any security or other deposits which tenants have paid to CSV, or its agents, over which
order of this Court or approval of Plaintiff. Any other security or other deposits which tenants
.1.:: .:,,,,,,:,-:.,., ,,_.-'..
'.
miime!fi!:p]ftiontotbisealtti
f0f'OM.ets"'llel.Vtfff0'1f:
28
8
[PROPOSED] ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER EX PARTBANDTRO

#804'4 vl aaf
CERF SPVJ, LLC vs. Cherokee Simeon Venture I, UC.

Exhibit E
69
'0
Receiver is authorized to borrow from Plaintiff such funds as are necessary to perform bis
13.
duties as set forth in tbis Order. No obligation on the part of Plaintiffto advance or loan funds to the
Receiver shall arise prior to the Receiver's preparation of a budget for management and operation of
4.
the Property, and the approval of said budget by Plaintiff. In any event, Plaintiff shall have no
obligation to advance or loan funds to the Receivership Estate except in its sole and absolute
discretion. In consideration for any such advance or loan, Receiver is authorized to and sh.all issue
to Plaintiff certificates of indebtedness ("Receiver's Certificates"), as evidence of receivership
indebtedness for any such advances made by Plaintiff pursuant to this Order. All Receiver's
Certificates shall be executed and delivered to Plaintiff by Receiver as a condition to funding, and
10
shall be numbered in sequential order for redemption purposes. All indebtedness represented by a
11
Receiver's Certi.fi.cate(s) shall be and constitute a lien and charge upon all assets of the Receivership
12
Estate, and with. respect to such assets and estate.
13
14.
14
Receiver is transferred by reason of a judicial foreclosure sale or nonjudicial trustee's sale conducted
15
pursuant to the tenns of the Deed of Trust sued upon in this action, Receiver shall immediately "turn
16
over possession and control of the applicable property, together with the Books and Records, and all
17
personal property associated therewith to the new owner upon presentation to Receiver of a certified
18
copy of the deed evidencing such transfer, or upon Order of this Court made upon an ex parte
19
application, which may be presented without Receiver's or counsel's personal appearance.
20
15.
21
aotions described in paragraph 18.
In the event that the title to a specific prQPerty and the personal property hereby entrusted to
Plaintiff and Receiver shall cooperate with CSV and Zen.eca, Inc., to effectuate the remedial
22
PRELIMlNARY INJUNCTION
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that CSV, along with any of its trustees, property managers,
23
16.
24
co-trustees, partners, employees, agents,' representatives, contractors and any other person or entity
25
under their control \'Related Parties") are hereby enjoined and restrained from:
26
(a)
Committing or permitting waste of the Property;
27
(b)
Removing. transferring or otherwise disposing of the Property or any of its
28
:fixtures
and/or incorporated materials;

9
[PROPOSED] ORDER APPOINTING RBCBIVBR BX PAR.TB AND TRO

i#80494vl sat'
CERF SPY.I, LLC w. Cherokee Stmeon Venture I, LLC.

Contta Costa Superior Case No. Cl2-00284
Exhibit E
70

i:
.''
(c)
Demandmg, collectin& diverting or receiving any Rents of the Property;
(d)
Transferring, moving, selling, leasing or otherwise disposing of any of the
personal property and/or improvements located in or around the Property; and,
In any way interfering with the discharge of the Receiver's duties.
(e)
In addition, CSV and Related Parties shall be obligated to do, and shall be restrained from
17.
doing, the following:

Turnover of Books. and Records: Prior to the Effective Date, CSV shall tum
(f)
7
8
over complete copies of the Books and Records,
originals of the Books and Records to Receiver if so requested by the Receiver. CSV shall assist
as
defined herein, to Receiver. CSV shall deliver
10
Receiver in obtaining complete copies of the same in the event the Books and Records are held by
11
persons or entities other than CSV. CSV shall promptly, upon request by Receiver, furnish to
12
Receiver copies of such other financial infonnation or backup documentation relating to those Books
13
and Records.
(g)
14
Turnover of Insurance Information: CSV shall promptly provide Receiver
15
with the property insurance policies and policy information for the Property. CSV shall make
16
certain that Receiver is named as an additional insured on all applicable policies for the period that
17
Receiver shall be in possession of the Property, except for the Pollution Legal Liability Select Clean-
18
Up Cost Cap Insurance, Policy No. 195 8035 ("PLL Policy") issued by American Intematlonal
19
Specialty Lines Insurance Company, on which the Receiver shall not be named as an additional
20
insured ..
21
18.
22
selling, leasing or otherwise disposing of any of the personal property, fixtures and/or improvements
23
located in and around the properties. In addition, CSV and Related Parties are enjoined and
24
restrained from creating any dangerous conditions on the Property and from interfering with the
25
necessary activities of Receiver.
CSV and Related Parties shall be enjoined and restrained from transfening, appropriating,
26
Notwithstanding the foregoing, CSV and/or Zeneca, Inc., shall have the right upon
27
reasonable written notice to Receiver and Plaintiff, to enter upon the Property to ex.amine, test and
28
inspect the environmental condition of the Property and to perform any and all acts related to the
10
[PROPOSED] 0'.IIDBR. APPOINTING RECBIVBR.EXPARTEAND TRO

#180494 vi sat
CERF SP"Pl, LLC vs. Cherokee Simeon Venture I, LLC.

Contra Costa Superior Case No. Cl2..00284
Exhibit E
71

t
Environmental Indemnity Agreement executed by CSV in favor of CERF, dated September 6, 2007
(''BIA"), related to any agreement or mandate from any governmental entity or official, including but
not limited to, implementing any remedies set forth in a Final Remedial Action Plan for Lots 1,2 and
3, Campus Bay, Richmond, California" ("FSRAP"), or related to other remediation activities
approved by or required by any governmental official or entity. As between CSV and the Plaint:ttI:
all terms and provisions contained in the EIA shall remain in place, including CSV's responsibility
for any damages to the Property as a result any investigatio testing or remedial WQrk it performs on
the Property.
In the
event CSV is unable to provide Receiver with evidence of insurance required by this
10
Order, Receiver,, in its sole discretio may, as set forth in paragraph 8(d) above, elect to acquire the
11
insurance and
allow investigation and/or remediation to occur.
12
19.
CSV and Related Parties shall be restrained and enjoined from transferring or
13
assigning, or encumbering atiy interest in the Property without further order of this Court. In
14
addition, CSV and Related Parties shall be restrained and enjoined from committing or pennitting
15
any waste on the Property or any part thereof: or suffedng or committing or permitting any act on
16
the Property or any part thereof in violation of law or removing or transferring or otherwise
17
disposing of any of the equipmeJrt or fixtures presently on the Receivership Estate or any part
18
thereof; until :further Otder of this Court.
19
20.
20
Procedure section 529.
Plaintiff is not required to file a preUminary injunction bond specified in California Civil
PROVISIONS UPON FORECLOSURE OR TERMINATION OF RECEIVERSHIP
21
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
22
In the event that any or all of the Property is sold in a non-judicial or judicial foreclosure
23
21.
24
proceeding, and the receivership remains in effect. funds previously paid to and held by Receiver
25
.shall continue to be held by Receiver until Receivers final account and report (the "Final Report") is
26
approved by the Court. After Court approval of the Final Report and payment of all Court approved
27
Receivership Estate expenses, Plaintiff shall receive net proceeds in accordance with the operative
28
loan documents attached to and referenced in the Verified Complaint in this matter.
11
[PROPOSED] ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER EX PARTE AND TR.O

#80494 vl saf
CERF SPY!, LLC vs. Cherokee Simeon Venture I, LLC.

Contra Costa Superior Cue No. Cl2-00284
Exhibit E
72

;;
,.
.
.1
22.
In the event that the obligations owing to Plamtiff m:e not fully satisfied by the proceeds of
such sale, or in the event that this action is dismissed or the receivership is terminated for any reason
whatsoever. Receiver, upon Court approval ofR.eceiver's Final Report and payment of all Receivership
Estate expenses, shall be authorized to release, within two (2) business days ofReceiver's receipt of a
'Written request by Plaintiff, all net funds under Receiver's control to Plaintiff to be applied toward any
obligations CSV may owe pursuant to the loan documents set forth in tb.e Complaint. In the event that
this receivership is terminated and.no foreclosure sale of the Properties has occurred or the loan has
been fully satisfied by the proceeds of a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure sale of the Property or
otherwise, all funds under Receiver's control shall be disbursed pursuant to the Court's instructions
10
upon termination of the receivership.
11
23.
12
documents and any obligations incurre d by or to Receiver, Plaintiff and Receiver shall cooperate to
13
promptly prepare and obtain Court approval of a Final Report and an order discharging Receiver and
14
exonerating its bond.
15
24.
16
foreclosure sale, whether judicial or non-judicial, relating to the Note or Deed of Trust and all debt
17
under the Note is fully paid; (ii) Plaintiff consents to the termination of the Receivership; and (ill)
18
the Court issues an order approving the Receiver's Final Report, discharging the Receiver and
19
exonerating its bond, thereby, terminating the Receivership.
Promptly upon the satisfaction of the entire indebtedness to Plaintiff pursuant to the loan
Receiver shall remain an agent of this Court until: (i) the Property and all security is sold at a
20
21
IT IS SO ORDERED.
22
23
JUDITH A. SANDERS
DATED:
JUL 1 2 201Z
Judge of the Superior Court
24
'fro T@
25
26
27
28
12
[PROPOSED] ORDER APPOINTING RBCEIVBRBXPARTE AND TR.O

1#80494 vl aaf
CERF SPT'I, LLC vs. Cherokee Simeon Venture I, LLC.

Exhibit E
73
EXHIBIT F
74
Exhibit F
75
Exhibit F
76
Exhibit F
77
Exhibit F
78
Exhibit F
79
Exhibit F
80
Exhibit F
81
EXHIBIT G
82
Exhibit G
83
Exhibit G
84
Exhibit G
85
Exhibit G
86
Exhibit G
87
Exhibit G
88
Exhibit G
89
Exhibit G
90
Exhibit G
91
EXHIBIT H
92
Exhibit H
93
Exhibit H
94
Exhibit H
95
Exhibit H
96
Exhibit H
97
Exhibit H
98
Exhibit H
99
Exhibit H
100
Exhibit H
101
Exhibit H
102
Exhibit H
103
Exhibit H
104
Exhibit H
105
Exhibit H
106
EXHIBIT I
107
Exhibit I
108
Exhibit I
109
Exhibit I
110
Exhibit I
111
Exhibit I
112
Exhibit I
113
Exhibit I
114
EXHIBIT J
115
Exhibit J
116
EXHIBIT K
117
Exhibit K
118
Exhibit K
119
Exhibit K
120
Exhibit K
121
Exhibit K
122
Exhibit K
123
Exhibit K
124
Exhibit K
125
Exhibit K
126
EXHIBIT L
127
Exhibit L
128
EXHIBIT M
129
Exhibit M
130
Exhibit M
131
Exhibit M
132
Exhibit M
133
Exhibit M
134
Exhibit M
135
Exhibit M
136
Exhibit M
137
Exhibit M
138
Exhibit M
139
Exhibit M
140
Exhibit M
141
Exhibit M
142
EXHIBIT N
143
Exhibit N
144
Exhibit N
145
Exhibit N
146
Exhibit N
147
Exhibit N
148
EXHIBIT O
149
Exhibit O
150
Exhibit O
151
Exhibit O
152
Exhibit O
153
Exhibit O
154
Exhibit O
155
Exhibit O
156
Exhibit O
157
Exhibit O
158
Exhibit O
159
Exhibit O
160
Exhibit O
161
Exhibit O
162
EXHIBIT P
163
Exhibit P
164
Exhibit P
165
Exhibit P
166
Exhibit P
167
Exhibit P
168
Exhibit P
169
Exhibit P
170
EXHIBIT Q
171
Exhibit Q
172
Exhibit Q
173
Exhibit Q
174
Exhibit Q
175
Exhibit Q
176
Exhibit Q
177
Exhibit Q
178
Exhibit Q
179
Exhibit Q
180
Exhibit Q
181
Exhibit Q
182
EXHIBIT R
183
Exhibit R
184
Exhibit R
185
Exhibit R
186
EXHIBIT S
187
Exhibit S
188
Exhibit S
189
Exhibit S
190
Exhibit S
191
Exhibit S
192
Exhibit S
193
Exhibit S
194
EXHIBIT T
195
Exhibit T
196
Exhibit T
197
Exhibit T
198
Exhibit T
199
Exhibit T
200
Exhibit T
201
Exhibit T
202
Exhibit T
203
Exhibit T
204
Exhibit T
205
Exhibit T
206
Exhibit T
207
EXHIBIT U
208
Exhibit U
209
Exhibit U
210
Exhibit U
211
Exhibit U
212
Exhibit U
213
Exhibit U
214
Exhibit U
215
Exhibit U
216
Exhibit U
217
Exhibit U
218
Exhibit U
219
Exhibit U
220
Exhibit U
221
Exhibit U
222
Exhibit U
223
Exhibit U
224
Exhibit U
225
Exhibit U
226
Exhibit U
227
Exhibit U
228
Exhibit U
229
Exhibit U
230
Exhibit U
231
Exhibit U
232
Exhibit U
233
Exhibit U
234
Exhibit U
235
Exhibit U
236
Exhibit U
237
Exhibit U
238
Exhibit U
239
Exhibit U
240
EXHIBIT V
241
Exhibit V
242
Exhibit V
243
Exhibit V
244
Exhibit V
245
Exhibit V
246
Exhibit V
247
Exhibit V
248
Exhibit V
249
EXHIBIT W
250
Exhibit W
251
Exhibit W
252
Exhibit W
253
Exhibit W
254
Exhibit W
255
Exhibit W
256
Exhibit W
257
EXHIBIT X
258
Exhibit X
259
Exhibit X
260
Exhibit X
261
Exhibit X
262
Exhibit X
263
Exhibit X
264
Exhibit X
265
Exhibit X
266
Exhibit X
267
Exhibit X
268
Exhibit X
269
Exhibit X
270
Exhibit X
271
Exhibit X
272
EXHIBIT Y
273
Exhibit Y
274
Exhibit Y
275
Exhibit Y
276
Exhibit Y
277
Exhibit Y
278
Exhibit Y
279
Exhibit Y
280
Exhibit Y
281
EXHIBIT Z
282
Exhibit Z
283
Exhibit Z
284
Exhibit Z
285
Exhibit Z
286
Exhibit Z
287
Exhibit Z
288
Case 2:14-cv-09104-GW-JC Document 3-1 Filed 11/25/14 Page 1 of 153 Page ID #:345
EXHIBIT AA
289
Exhibit AA
290
Exhibit AA
291
EXHIBIT BB
292
Exhibit BB
293
Exhibit BB
294
EXHIBIT CC
295
Exhibit CC
296
Exhibit CC
297
EXHIBIT DD
298
Exhibit DD
299
Exhibit DD
300
Exhibit DD
301
Exhibit DD
302
Exhibit DD
303
Exhibit DD
304
Exhibit DD
305
Exhibit DD
306
Exhibit DD
307
Exhibit DD
308
Exhibit DD
309
EXHIBIT EE
310
Exhibit EE
311
Exhibit EE
312
Exhibit EE
313
Exhibit EE
314
Exhibit EE
315
Exhibit EE
316
Exhibit EE
317
Exhibit EE
318
Exhibit EE
319
Exhibit EE
320
Exhibit EE
321
Exhibit EE
322
Exhibit EE
323
Exhibit EE
324
Exhibit EE
325
Exhibit EE
326
Exhibit EE
327
Exhibit EE
328
Exhibit EE
329
Exhibit EE
330
Exhibit EE
331
Exhibit EE
332
Exhibit EE
333
EXHIBIT FF
334
Exhibit FF
335
Exhibit FF
336
Exhibit FF
337
EXHIBIT GG
338
Exhibit GG
339
Exhibit GG
340
EXHIBIT HH
341
Exhibit HH
342
Exhibit HH
343
Exhibit HH
344
Exhibit HH
345
EXHIBIT II
346
Exhibit II
347
Exhibit II
348
Exhibit II
349
Exhibit II
350
Exhibit II
351
Exhibit II
352
Exhibit II
353
Exhibit II
354
Exhibit II
355
EXHIBIT JJ
356
Exhibit JJ
357
Exhibit JJ
358
Exhibit JJ
359
Exhibit JJ
360
Exhibit JJ
361
Exhibit JJ
362
Exhibit JJ
363
Exhibit JJ
364
Exhibit JJ
365
EXHIBIT KK
366
Exhibit KK
367
Exhibit KK
368
Exhibit KK
369
Exhibit KK
370
Exhibit KK
371
Exhibit KK
372
Exhibit KK
373
Exhibit KK
374
Exhibit KK
375
EXHIBIT LL
376
Exhibit LL
377
Exhibit LL
378
Exhibit LL
379
Exhibit LL
380
EXHIBIT MM
381
Exhibit MM
382
Exhibit MM
383
Exhibit MM
384
Exhibit MM
385
Exhibit MM
386
Exhibit MM
387
EXHIBIT NN
388
Exhibit NN
389
Exhibit NN
390
Exhibit NN
391
Exhibit NN
392
EXHIBIT OO
393
Exhibit OO
394
Exhibit OO
395
Exhibit OO
396
Exhibit OO
397
Exhibit OO
398
Exhibit OO
399
Exhibit OO
400
Exhibit OO
401
Exhibit OO
402
EXHIBIT PP
403
Exhibit PP
404
Exhibit PP
405
Exhibit PP
406
Exhibit PP
407
EXHIBIT QQ
408
Exhibit QQ
409
Exhibit QQ
410
Exhibit QQ
411
Exhibit QQ
412
Exhibit QQ
413
Exhibit QQ
414
Exhibit QQ
415
Exhibit QQ
416
Exhibit QQ
417
EXHIBIT RR
418
Exhibit RR
419
Exhibit RR
420
Exhibit RR
421
Exhibit RR
422
Exhibit RR
423
Exhibit RR
424
Exhibit RR
425
Exhibit RR
426
Exhibit RR
427
Exhibit RR
428
EXHIBIT SS
429
Exhibit SS
430
Exhibit SS
431
Exhibit SS
432
Exhibit SS
433
Exhibit SS
434
Exhibit SS
435
Exhibit SS
436
Exhibit SS
437
Exhibit SS
438
Exhibit SS
439
Exhibit SS
440
Exhibit SS
441

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Case 2:14-cv-09104-GW-JC Document 1 Filed 11/25/14 Page 1 of 52 Page ID #:1

Patricia Barry, Esq. (SBN 59116)

Arch Cunningham (SBN 210625)

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 2:14-cv-09104-GW-JC Document 1 Filed 11/25/14 Page 2 of 52 Page ID #:2

SACRAMENTO, District Attorney JAN

Case 2:14-cv-09104-GW-JC Document 1 Filed 11/25/14 Page 3 of 52 Page ID #:3

sued individually and in her official capacity;

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B. Statutory and Regulatory Framework Related to

C. The Various Appointments of Mr. Singer In This Class

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION

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(Violation of Separation of Powers Clause) .. 36

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY

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Books/Records. (RJN, Exhibit B, RG 10-499443). Mr. Singer, a non-lawyer, is filing contempt

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this case, stating in his declaration, (RJN, Exhibit E, pg. 3, 5):

UNLAWFUL DETAINER MOTION 501, DEFENDANT HUMBERTO RUIZ, JR.S

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Exhibit G, pg. 2/28, pg. 3/18-19).

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of state law in all matters and rulings related to this case.

Mr. Singers principal place of business which is located in Los Angeles.

other possible locations.

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14. The class, to be represented by Archibald Cunningham and Humberto Ruiz, is

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4th 119, 135.6

that are adverse to the interests of the members of the Class.

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the underlying receiver issues moot.

apprehensive of suing judges.

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so that they may collect their various fees.

is also a principal in Receivershp Specialists. His duties with Receivership Specialists is

28. RECEIVERSHIP SPECIALISTS. (John Rachlin, Rick Marguis). Receiver

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served a Notice to Vacate on Plaintiff and evicted him on November 6, 2014.

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or practice of allowing court-appointed receivers to practice law without a license.

practice of allowing court-appointed receivers to practice law without a license.

practice of allowing court-appointed receivers to practice law without a license.

and engaged in the UPL. (RJN, Exhibit BM).

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1, pg. 10, 18).

clients. (RJN, Exhibit DLB).

abetting Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit SS).

Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit EE, Exhibit G).

abetting Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit I).

Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit H).

Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit Y).

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abetting Mr. Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit V).

Singers UPL. (RJN, Exhibit M).

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individual capacity and his official and administrative capacity.

56. Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye. Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye is the

ORDER ON EX PARTE APPLICATION (AUTHORIZING RECEIVER)

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