Exemplars and Scientific Change

Author(s): David L. Hull

Source: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,
Vol. 1982, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1982), pp. 479-503
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
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Exemplars

and Scientific

David

The University

L.

Change'

Hull

of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

A recurrent
theme in the "new philosophy
of science"
is the importance of temporally
extended conceptual
entities
termed variously
dismatrixes
research
ciplinary
(Kuhn 1970),
programs (Lakatos
1970),
scientific
theories
disciplines
(Toulmin
1972),
(McMullin
1976),
and
research
traditions
Each of these macro-conceptual
(Laudan
en1977).
tities
contains
a rich heterogeneity
of constituent
elements.
For example, Kuhn's (1970,
matrixes
pp. 183-187)
in
disciplinary
("paradigm"
his global
include
sense)
symbolic generalizations,
metaphysical
views,
and exemplars
models,
values,
as concrete
problem solutions
("paradigm"
in the narrow sense).
All of the conceptual
entities
listed
above are
"historical
entities"
or "continuants",
the sorts of things that can
change through time.
Toulmin (1972)
and Laudan (1977)
permit total
in elements
changeover
just so long as the transformation
is gradual and
the system remains cohesive
in the process.
such as Lakatos
Others,
insist
on the retention
(1970),
of a "hard core" of some kind.
Numerous problems have arisen
with respect
to the notion of conceptual historical
entities.
In this paper,
I am concerned with only two-how they are to be individuated
and named.
If such conceptual
systems
as "Darwinism"
are internally
if different
quite heterogeneous,
conceptual systems contain
instances
of many of the "same" concepts,
if a
conceptual
system can undergo a total
transformation
of its elements
while remaining the "same" conceptual
system, how are we to tell whether
we have one conceptual
system or two, either
at any one time or through
time?
How can we name such slippery
entities
and continue
to apply the
same name to the same entity
through time?
When disagreements
arise,
how are we to reconcile
them?
In this paper I propose
to answer the preceding
questions
by extending Mayr's (1982)
notion of "population
thinking"
to thinking
itself
As Mayr (1982)
(Ghiselin
1981).
continues
to emphasize,
anyone who
thinks that the populations
that function
in the evolutionary
process
are populations
of similar
organisms has misunderstood
the fundamentals

PSA 1982,
Copyright

V lume 2, pp. 479-503

1983 by the Philosophy

(9

of Science

Association

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480
by deThe reason that the notion of "identity
thinking.
of population
evolution
is that the only similaris so important in biological
scent"
are those
process
that matter in the evolutionary
and differences
ities
If populationthinkor lack of it.
this sort of "identity"
that exhibit
must be treatpopulations
conceptual
ing is to be extended to thinking,
are internally
quite heterogEnespecies
Biological
ed in the same way.
turning over their
ous.
They too can change through time, regularly
that might be conmodifying every trait
possibly
organisms,
constituent
in
share the same "elements"
defining.
Rarely do two species
sidered
the members of two or more species
the sense of the same organisms,but
of the same trait.
The hoodcharacterized
by instances
are frequently
Although evolving
crow both have black feathers.
ed and the carrion
systems, biologists
as evolving
conceptual
are just as slippery
species
the type
and naming them, i.e.,
have worked out ways of individuating
of this paper,
I explain how
In the first two sections
specimen method.
and was
creation
of special
this method arose in the context of theories
I
of evolutionary
theory.
in response
to the acceptance
then modified
groups (such
then show how this method can be extended to handle social
and conceptual
systems (such as Darwinism).
as the Darwinians)
1.

Species

as Natural

Kinds

in the 18th and 19th cenhistory

epogue of natural
During the belle
than presa greater
element of philately
included
turies,
systematics
the most widelike to recall.
During this period,
ent-day systematists
creation.
was some form of special
of species
ly held view on the origin
were
the first members of every species
to some creationists,
According
remained unchanged
species
in the beginning,
and the resulting
created
were introduced
species
to other creationists,
According
thereafter.
in huge masses or a few at a time, as other
in time, either
sequentially
and
believed
that both origins
Many naturalists
went extinct.
species
are miraculous
others that origins
are miraculous
events;
extinctions
are
still
others that both processes
are natural;
while extinctions
is that
of creationism
of all versions
One implication
natural.
equally
exist
at any one time in human history.
a finite
number of species
urgenhad a certain
unknown species
of previously
Hence, the discovery
of the earth felt that
The explorers
who crawled the surface
cy to it.
before they were all taken.
they had best hurry and find their species
had as their
of various
"cabinets"
the keepers
Like stamp collectors,
at least
one good specimen of every
for their collections
task to obtain
species.
with the
coupled
view of species
was usually
creationist
The special
are natural
kinds.
Like other natural
view that species
philosophical
Quite
discrete.
immutable,and
were held to be eternal,
species
kinds,
are
species
that all
creationists
could not very well believe
obviously,
repi.e.,
that throughout all time there existed
eternal;
extensionally
are
they held that species
Instead,
resentatives
of every species.
even when
Species
exist
of the universe.
into the fabric
somehow built
that are not exThe sense in which species
they are not exemplified.
one natAt least
extensively.
varied
could continue
to exist
emplified
on the subposition
every metaphysical
uralist
can be found advocating

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481
In any case,
a common belief
was that species
ject.
among creationists
could cease
to be exemplified
every once in a while and then become relater.
Naturalists
also thought that organisms on occasion
exemplified
could change their species,
but an organism changing its species
was
not the same thing as species
themselves
It was akin to an
changing.
alchemist
a base metal into gold.
transmuting
However, by the 19th century, most naturalists
boundaries
were largely inthought that species'
violate.
The characteristic
as natural
of species
kinds that roused the greatest amount of discussion
was not their immutability
but the discretEness
in conceptual
of their boundaries
On the traditional
space.
"essentialist" view, all genuinely
terms must be defined by means of
meaningful
characteristics
that are severally
and jointly
sufficient
for
necessary
membership.
Either a geometric
figure is a triangle,
or it is not.
No
borderline
cases
can possibly
exist.
Naturalists
at the time were obviously
aware of variation
both within species
and between them.
Not
all members of a particular
were identical
to each other, and
species
at time borderline
cases
existed.
However, they took it as their task
to see through all
this accidental
variation
to the essential
nature of
each species
and to capture
its essence
in a definition
or "diagnosis"
(to use the taxonomic term).
Given a correct
of a particudefinition
lar species,
nearly all organisms belonging
to that species
should possess all
its essential
characters.
Any variation
that might occur was
thought to be merely a function of the limitations
of nature,
the failure of a principle.
Numerous present-day
authors have claimed
that no one from Aristotle
to the present
ever held the preceding
view of species.
Certainly
no
or naturalist
philosopher
held precisely
the view described
above, but
views of this sort were just as surely common during the period under
discussion.
For example,
the importance
of the discreteness
of species'
boundaries
can be seen in a dispute
between William Whewell
(1847,
1853) on one side and John Stuart Mill (1843,
1872) and W. S.
Jevons (1892)
on the other.
According
to Whewell (1847,
vol.
1, p.494),
natural
kinds in mathematics
and certain
areas
of physics
are absolutely discrete,
while in other areas
such as biology,
equally
sharp boundaries
had yet to be discerned.
Hence, the traditional
Method of Definition
could be used for the former sort of natural
kinds,
but for the
latter,
Whewell devised
what he termed the Type Method.
According
to
this method, a typical
representative
of each species
is chosen as its
"type" and other members of the species
are included
in the species
by
means of their relation
to it.
Whewell (1847,
vol.
2, p. 12) was aware that zoologists
defined the
species
category
in terms of "individuals
which have, or may have,
sprung from the same parents."
However, the relation
that another organism in a species
must have to its type was not genealogical
but a
Whewell justified
certain
degree of similarity.
replacing
genealogy
resemble each
so related
with similarity
by noting that "individuals
from such a definition."
other more than those which are excluded
The
only unusual
thing about Whewell's
Type Method was that the conceptual

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482
need not be absolutely
boundaries
between species
For Whewell
sharp.
formed a "cluster",
species
some organisms being more central
than others.
Even so, he thought that these fuzzy boundaries
were real.
They
no more changed through time than did the absolutely
discrete
boundaries of more traditional
that the
typologists.
Nor did Whewell believe
distributions
of actual
in conceptual
organisms
space were ever perfectly continuous.
Although every point in character
space might be
occupied
by an organism,
the numbers varied
Most organsignificantly.
isms in a species
And in most cases
tended to cluster
around the type.
large expanses
of character
space between species
were unoccupied.
If "essentialism"
is merely an invention
of later evolutionists
such
as Mayr (1982),
as some authors have claimed,
minor
then Whewell's
modification
should hardly have elicited
much of a response.
After all,
for Whewell, species
remained eternal
and immutable.
They simply were
not absolutely
discrete.
Whewell (1847,
vol.
1, p. 493) himself suspected that his views on the subject
were "so contrary to many of the
received
opinions
respecting
the use of definitions
and the nature of
scientific
propositions,
that they will probably appear to many persons
highly illogical
and unphilosophical."
He was right.
Both Mill (1872,
p. 472)and
Jevons (1892,
p. 723) rejected
Whewell's
Type Method.
They
argued that either
it reduced to the traditional
Method of Definition
or it was not an acceptable
method of classification;
for further discussion
see Ruse (1979,
and Hull (1981,
pp. 125-126)
vol.
2, pp. 133137).
On the "typological"
or "essentialistic"
view of species,
collecting
was relatively
An occasional
mutilation
easy.
or monster to one side,
well serve as a representative
any specimen could equally
of its species.
that was truly variable
Any trait
could not possibly
be part of
a species'
essence.
A naturalist
might sample his species
widely but
not for the purpose of reflecting
any variation
he might find in his
diagnosis.
To the contrary,
the purpose of studying variation
was to
eliminate
it.
On this view, definitions
(or diagnoses)
are the goal of
and after sufficient
systematics,
study, competent observers
must necessarily
agree about appropriate
definitions.
For example,
two naturalists
on opposite
of Australia
collecting
sides
might stumble upon
to the same species.
If these collectors
organisms belonging
are competent naturalists,
they must produce precisely
the same definitions.
In actual
fact,
the state of taxonomy was just the opposite
of what
the typological
species
concept would lead one to expect.
The more exa group was studied,
tensively
frequently
the more difficult
it became
to delimit
its boundaries.
At a single
location,
species
are easy
from each other, but if species
enough to distinguish
are studied across
their ranges,
their definitional
boundaries
become increasingly
difficult to discern.
Attempting to integrate
fossil
species
with extant
forms only complicates
matters further.
As a result,
systematists
worked and reworked their groups as regularly
as stock brokers churn their
and with much the same effect.
accounts
Of greater
significance,
the
diagnoses
so carefully
constructed
by systematists
should have been the
key to resolving
difficult
cases.
Time and again,
the specimens were

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483
Time and again,
what helped.
later workers could not tell
from the pubwhich species
the
had studied,
but an exlished
diagnoses
systematist
often helped bring some order to the chaos.
amination
of his specimens
is an excellent
case in point.
Darwin and his famous finches
to the traditional
Darwin was led to speculate
According
legend,
on
the origin
of species
because
of the distribution
of the finches which
of the Galapagos
he observed
on the various
islands
and
Archipelago
later used these observations
to support his theory of evolution.
As
has shown in some detail,
the historical
evidence
Sulloway(1982)
does
see also
not support this legend;
While at the Gala(Herbert
1980).
Darwin gives no hint that he had any doubts about the
pagos Islands,
immutability
of species.
Not until nine months later,
in 1836, does he
record any doubts on the subject
Nor was Dar(Sulloway
1982, p. 12).
win, on his return to England,
able to use his Galapagos
collection
to
support the theory of evolution
because
his collecting
had been too haphazard.
In particular,
he did not always record the location
at which
the specimen was obtained,
the biogeographic
information needprecisely
ed to test his views on speciation.
As Sulloway
(1982,
p. 18) points
is not all that imporout, locale
tant for a creationist,
not as important as it is for anyone
certainly
who believed,
as Wallace
(1855,
p. 186) did, that every "species
has
come into existence
coincident
both in space and time with a pre-existing
closely
allied
species."
Wallace
had a decided
advantage
over
Darwin.
He went on his voyage intent on testing
his evolutionary
hypothesis.
He could keep his eye out for the relevant
data.
Darwin had
to do everything
in retrospect,
and too often he had not made or recorded the relevant
observations.
Legend notwithstanding,
Darwin did not
use his finches
as a paradigm example of the evolution
of species
by
means of natural
selection
in the Origin (1859)
because
he did not have
the necessary
information.
Upon returning
to England,
Darwin sought the aid of a variety
of
in curating
specialists
his collections.
Chief among these was the
John Gould (1804-1881).
ornithologist
As it turned out, Darwin's
initial
guesses
about the relations
of his birds,
including
the Galapagos
finches,
were mistaken.
For example,
many of Darwin's
varieties,
Gould
claimed were distinct
species.
With the aid of the collections
of other members of the crew of the Beagle,
Darwin produced what has been
termed a "taxonomic
nightmare".
Some order has been brought to Darwin's
finches by subsequent
workers but not because
of Darwin's
published
descriptions.
It was his specimens
and those of his shipmates
that were of
the greatest
If these specimens
help.
had not been preserved,
later
systematists
would have been at a loss to work out the actual
identities
and relations
of Darwin's
finches.
Not until Lack's
(1947)
work did the
myth of Darwin's
finches
become a reality.
2.

The Type Specimen

The acceptance
such as Wallace's

Method

of evolutionary
1855 law, into

theory transmuted numerous curiosities,

solved problems (Laudan
1977).
It also

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484
As before,
between organisms and their species.
changed the relation
nexus, but no longer could one
organisms are part of their genealogical
must universally
relations
assume, as Whewell had, that genealogical
relations.
Although the point was extremely
with similarity
coincide
in definitions
similarities
encapsulated
felt,
slow in making itself
If
nexus.
by organisms as nodes in the genealogical
had been displaced
through time, one changing into another or one
species
evolve gradually
memslowly into two, then the search for "typical"
species
splitting
at best.
For example,
upon reading
is questionable
bers of a species
"On
of his Type Method, Darwin responded,
(1853)
discussion
Whewell's
for the likeis no more wanted than to account
my theory an 'Exemplar'
Although this
1981, p. 260).
(Ospovat
ness of members of one Family."
arDarwin rejected
the abstract
cryptic,
comment is more than a little
ancesand replaced
them with actual
philosophers
of idealist
chetypes
For Darwin spethat need not in every case be typical.
tors,organisms
as the Batree, as historical
cies became segments of the phylogenetic
Just as the Baroque period will never return, extinct
roque period.
cannot re-evolve.
species
of the sort described
above,
confusion
of the terminological
Because
formalevolved
systems of rules and regulations
gradually
systematists
As these codes were developed,
codes of nomenclature.
ized in various
to taxonomic
a very strange notion began to emer?e and become central
initially
As the name indicates,
type specimen method.
practice--the
a
as the type specimen for a species
strove to designate
systematists
If later workers came to think that a particular
type
member.
typical
it with anas it might be, they replaced
specimen was not as typical
led systematists
to
The resulting
confusion,
rapidly
other specimen.
and to rule that once a specimen had been
put an end to this practice
it could not be replaced
except in cases
as a type specimen,
designated
The sole function of the type specimen is to be the
of duplication.
the type speciNo matter in which species
name bearer for its species.
The crucial
decision
made by sysits name goes with it.
men is placed,
functions
for specimens,
that
two different
was to disentangle
tematists
For
them rigidly.
and that of designating
of typifying
their species
the notion of a "typithat form unimodal distributions,
those species
of character
but given the wide variety
cal" member has some point,
in nature,
too often it does
exhibited
distributions
species
by actual
is necessary.
As Mayr (1969,
p.
Instead
an array of specimens
not.
consist
of variable
this position,
popula"Species
369) has expressed
this variability.
No single
and no single
specimen can represent
tions,
in the Aristotelian
sense."
specimen can be typical
in terms of simple,
In cases
in which species
cannot be characterized
of characters,
no specimen,
including
unimodal distributions
coincident
of its species.
However,
could possibly
be "typical"
the type specimen,
about
cases
that fit our common sense intuitions
even in those special
for keeping the naming functhere is still
ample justification
species,
of exception,
With the rarest
any orgtion separate
from description.
and one
one species
anism chosen at random must belong to a species,
Our ideas of character
however, can be
distributions,
only.
species
of
a variety
A systematist
may think that he has collected
mistaken.

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485
from a single
specimens
when later workers decide
that his
species,
"single"
species
consisted
actually
of two or more sibling
species.
in which the selection
of a "typical"
Hence, even in those cases
specthat increased
the likelihood
imen is feasible,
lead
knowledge will
to change their minds about character
systematists
distributions
is
sufficiently
high to warrant excluding
the name bearing
specimen from
No matter how typical
or aberrant
these exercises.
systematists
may
take a type specimen to be at any one point in time, it can serve just
as well as the name bearer for its species.
As Simpson (1940,
p. 413) put the point in his seminal paper, "items
as bases
called
have been used in taxonomy in three ways:
'types'
for
and as fixed points
to which
as standards
of comparison,
definitions,
of taxonomy as involving
names are attached.
The modern conception
the
from samples makes it impossible
inference
of population
characters
for
the same items properly
to serve all three of these purposes."
Simpson
the term"type" for the last function,
recommends reserving
accordingly
as a fixed point for attaching
a taxonomic name to a taxon (see also
Williams
1940).
Later Simpson (1945,
his position
p. 29) expressed
on
type specimens
even more forcefully.
"It is a natural
but mistaken assumption that types are somehow typical,
that is, characteristic,
of
the groups in which they are placed.
It is, of course,
desirable
that
they should be typical
because
then they are less likely
to be shifted
about from group to group, carrying
their names with them and upsetting
nomenclature,
but there is no requirement
that a type be typical,
and
it frequently
happens that it is quite aberrant."
Whether Simpson was enunciating
a new but compelling
position
or only
into words a conviction
putting
that had already
been widespread
for
some time is difficult
to decide.
But with surprising
rapidity,
the
role of the type specimen as a name bearer became standard
taxonomic
practice.
For example,
in the first modern textbook on biological
systematics,
and Usinger (1953,
Mayr, Linsley
p. 236) state,
"It is very
difficult
to characterize
or to define a taxonomic entity solely
by
means of words.
As a result,
many of the Linnaean
and early post-Linnaean species,
particularly
among the invertebrates,
are unidentifiable
on the basis
of the description
alone.
It is obvious
that more secure
standards
are needed to tie scientific
names unequivocally
to objective
taxonomic entities.
These standards
are the types, and the method of
using types to eliminate
ambiguity
is called
the type method."
On one interpretation,
all
the type specimen method does is to free
the type specimen from participating
in the inevitable
disagreements
that go on continually
in biological
systematics
about splitting,
lumping and shifting
boundaries.
Once a systematist
has decided
on his species and their limits,
he can then check where the specimens
designated
as types happen to fall and assign
names accordingly.
If he recognizes
a new species
for which there is no type specimen,
he must designate
a
particular
specimen as such.
If two specimens previously
designated
as
the type specimens
for different
species
end up in a single
species,the
temporally
prior type specimen becomes the name bearer
for his newly
combined species
and the other type specimen is demoted.
As might be

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486
expected,
example,
specimen
different
are held

the type specimen method is not without its difficulties.

For
Randall
and Nelson (1979)
point out a case in which the same
was designated
as the type specimen for three
of a parrotfish
Periodic
species
belonging
to two different
genera!
congresses
to resolve
such problems.

Nor does the type specimen method eliminate

a role for the
entirely
in systematics.
On a conservative
instudy of character
distributions
terpretation
of this method, the diagnoses
published
by systematists
define the designated
In each case,
species.
though the type specimen
may be aberrant,
it must at least
fall within the range of variation
established
and Starr 1968).
On a more radiby the systematist
(Heise
I favor, character
cal interpretation,
the interpretation
distributicns
are secondary
to the genealogical
nexus.
The type specimen,
like all
is merely one node in this nexus.
The type specimen method
organisms,
works by tying down a name to one chunk of the genealogical
nexus via
a single
No matter how the boundaries
are reasnode in that nexus.
includes
a particular
sessed,
whatever species
type specimen must be
called
by the name associated
with that specimen.
Characters
are3still
important but only as an aid to inferring
the genealogical
nexus.
3.

Scientific

Communities

In recent years an increasing

number of authors have been paying attention
to the social
structure
of science,
especially
the social
groups into which scientists
organize
themselves.
tend to
Philosophers
of such concerns,
be extremely suspicious
fearing that some sort of
social
relativism
lies
behind them.
However, I think that scientific
communities play several
important roles
in science,
roles
that have
to do with such epistemological
little
concerns.
For example,
much of
the coherence
and continuity
that is so characteristic
of conceptual
in science
development
results
and continuity
from the coherence
of
the groups of scientists
these views.
developing
unless atSimilarly,
tention
is paid to cooperating
and competing factions
in science,
many
of the positions
that scientists
take on particular
issues
are all but
inexplicable.
Frequently,
a relatively
minor tenet in an emerging research program becomes elevated
in importance because
of the incessant
on this tenet by the opponents
attacks
of the program.
One of the most common and intuitive
ways of dividing
scientists
into groups is by means of intellectual
"A paradigm is what
agreement.
the members of a scientific
community share,
a scienand, conversely,
tific
of men who share a paradigm."
community consists
(Kuhn 1970, p.
176).
Unfortunately,
this position
simply will not do.
If by "paradigm" Kuhn means disciplinary
matrix,
rarely do any two scientists
agree totally
on every element of their common matrix.
If by "paradigm" Kuhn means exemplar,
of opinion
differences
still
remain.
Certainly much more agreement exists
among the members of a scientific
community about the value of their concrete
puzzle
solutions,
but in every
community I have studied,
the agreement is never total.
As Palter
(1974,
p. 314) pointed
out some time ago in reaction
to the writings of
Kuhn and Lakatos,
any concensus
that might exist
on a given scientific

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487
topic is generally
Just as biologists
incomplete.
were forced to abandon definitions
in terms of statistical
covariation,
philosophers
might
well relax the requirement
of total
agreement for scientists'
belonging
to the same scientific
All they have to do is agree on ecommunity.
nough of the more important issues.
But even this more reasonable
position
is too stringent.
Whether one deals with such massive
and relatively
insignificant
as "physicists"
or with such small ephemgroupings
eral research
groups as the Cold Spring Harbor group, disagreements
can
be found among their members even on fundamentals.
Although the scientists
involved
go to great lengths to emphasize
their areas
of agreement, one extremely important feature
of science
(and possibly
other
endeavors
as well)
is that scientists
can cooperate
with each other even
when they disagree.
The appropriate
relation
for "defining"
the groups
of scientists
that function
in the ongoing process
of science
is cooperation and not agreement.4
For example,
if one attempts to define the Darwinians
in the first
decade after the publication
of the Origin in terms of basic
agreement,
one gets an extremely motley group.
In the early years,
J.D. Hooker,
T. H. Huxley, and Charles
Lyell were important Darwinians.
A. R. Wallace and J. S. Henslow might be included
as welL
Adam Sedgwick, Richard
Owen, William Hopkins and St. George Jackson Mivart were important antiDarwinians.
No weighting
of substantive
beliefs
about science
or biological
species
produces
anything like this division.
In 1859 neither
Henslow nor Lyell believed
in the evolution
of species.
Henslow died
unconvinced,
while Lyell came out openly for evolution
only in 1868 and
then grudgingly
with reservations.
Conversely,
both Owen and Mivart advocated
evolution,
just not "Darwinian"
evolution,
but the same can be
said for Huxley and Wallace.
Huxley agreed with Darwin about the importance of natural
selection
but thought that speciation
might be more saltative
than did Darwin, while Wallace
disagreed
with Darwin on a variety
of counts (Kottler
1980).
Although I think that there are excellent
reasons
for paying attention to areas
of agreement and disagreement
between scientists,
I think
it would be a serious
mistake to delimit
scientific
communities
in this
way.
Instead
the variety
of ways in which scientists
cooperate
with
each other in their research
are much more appropriate
relations
to integrate
scientists
into groups.
Among these relations
are co-authoring
papers,
recommending for positions
and honors, citing
areas
of agreement in published
papers while reserving
disagreements
for private
correspondence,
and so on.
If these measures are used for the Darwinians
during the early years,
a single
community materializes
quite
forcefully.
Of course,
there is a sense in which anyone who pledged
allegiance
to "Darwinism"
counts as a "Darwinian",
but I do not think that the Darwinians
in this broad sense can possibly
be said to form a "community"
or a "group".
Discerning
genuine scientific
communities
is a difficult
undertaking,
as difficult
as delineating
biological
species,
so difficult
that one
is tempted to take the easy way out.
Just as it is easier
to define biological
species
in terms of characters
than to individuate
them by

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488
it is easier
means of their genealogical
to delimit
scientifrelations,
in terms of shared beliefs
ic communities
than by means of the professional
of their members.
relationships
However, the easy way out distorts our understanding
of science
If we are to
beyond all recognition.
understand
the ongoing process
of science,
communigenuine scientific
ties must be discerned.
Sometimes the boundaries
between communities
are not sharp, they frequently
change through time, sometimes one community splits
into two, somewhat more rarely two communities merge into
one.
All these complex relations
are certainly
difficult
to discern,
but they are not only important in their own right,
they are crucial
for our understanding
of what is going on at the conceptual
level.
The similarities
between scientific
communities and evolving
species
might lead one to suspect
that something like the type specimen method
might be usefully
extended
to aid in the individuation
of groups of
scientists.
All one needs to do is to pick a member of a particular
community, any member, and attach
a name to that group by means of this
member.
One advantage
of this method is that it can be used prior to
knowing very much about the group as a group.
It helps if one picks a
central
member, but such estimations
before the fact tend to be faulty,
and the status
of the members of a group can change through time.
A
scientist
who was very important initially
can drop out and a marginal
member become central.
Because
organisms rarely change their species-for all
intents
and purposes
never--no
temporal index need be applied
to the biological
type
do join and
specimen.
However, scientists
leave groups.
Hence the sociological
type specimen must have a temporal index appended to it, e.g.,
Hooker in 1859.
In the history
of science,
sociologically
central
members of a scientific
tend to be conceptually
community also
In spite of his
exemplary.
relative
isolation
in Down, Darwin was still
a fairly censociologically
tral Darwinian.
to say, he also made significant
Needless
contributions
to Darwinism,
but even if he had not, he would still
have to be counted
a Darwinian.
Any member of the group who was genuinely
a member of the
group can function as a type specimen (a name bearer)
for the group.
Hooker, Huxley, and Lyell would all serve equally
well.
of his
Because
isolation
in the United States,
Asa Gray would serve less well,
while
Henslow was so peripheral,
he might not even be counted a member.
Noif Henslow is excluded
however:
tice,
from the Darwinians,
it is not
because
of his conceptual
reservations
but because
he had ceased
to have
sufficient
contact
with the Darwinians
by 1859 and died soon thereafter.
Because
communities of scientists
are sometimes named by means of the
name of a particular
care must be taken not to confuse
scientist,
social
type specimens with eponyms.
When the group is named after a patron
the distinction
saint,
is easy enough to keep in mind.
Mendel was cleaa Mendelian.
ly not sociologically
He had been long dead when Bateson
picked him as a patron saint and eponym for the Mendelians.
All sorts
of considerations
go into naming scientific
groups.
sometimes they are
named after particular
scientists
(the Newtonians,
Darwinians
and Mensometimes after places
delians),
(the Cold Spring Harbor group, the
Columbia Drosophila
group, the Texas group),
and sometimes after views

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489
they hold or are believed
to hold (phrenologists,
atomuniformitarians,
ists).
The first two ways of naming scientific
communities pin them
down appropriately
to particular
times and place;
the latter
does not
unless
"ideas"
are made particular
in a way that conflicts
strongly with
traditional
usage (see
later
In any case,
the choice
discussion).
of a
particular
scientist
as the type specimen for a particular
group is independent of the name chosen for the group.
The scientist
who serves
to
pin down the name "Darwinians"
to the Darwinians
need not be Darwin.
Any member of the group would do as well.
As I have been using the term"Darwinian"
thus far, it refers to a
small group of scientists
that formed a tightly
knit group during the
first decade or so after the publication
of the Origin.
The fate of
this group can be described
in two ways:
either
it petered out as its
members died or lost interest,
or it expanded to include
almost everyone working in evolutionary
I prefer the first alternative
biology.
because
the "Darwinians"
in the second sense was not much of a social
group (for a classic
example of a groups of scientists
disgradually
integrating,
see MacLeod 1970).
However, in the last decade of the
century,
something peculiar
A new group of scientists
happened.
emerged who came to be called
the "neo-Darwinians".
The old guard Darwinians
did not evolve
into this group; most opposed what they took to be
the excessive
emphasis placed
by the neo-Darwinians
on selection.
Instead,
young scientists
who were "Darwinians"
in only the broadest
sense of the term organized
themselves
into a new scientific
research
group in reaction
to the work of August Weismann (Churchill
1968, 1978).
Once again,
this group can be individuated
by selecting
one of its members as the type specimen and tracing
his professional
relations
to other members of the group.
As should be clear
by now, the designation
of one member of a group
to be the type specimen for a group is not something that the members
of that group do but is a device
employed by others studying the group.
Because
more than one scholar
is likely
to study the same group or
groups,
disagreements
are sure to arise.
As long as everyone keeps in
mind that the designation
of a particular
member of a group as the social
type specimen for that group does not imply anything about the contributions
of this scientist,
one important source for scholarly
squabbling is eliminated.
Because
the choice
of a social
type specimen is
arbitrary
with respect
to contributions,
considerations
of priority
are
good enough to settle
disputes
over who is or is not the type specimen
for a given group.
I am not saying that there will not be disagreement
about the "proper"
name for a group, but such disputes
to one side,
whatever name is settled
on can be attached
unequivocally
to that group
by the social
type specimen.
The one implication
of the type specimen method when extended to apply
to social
groups that I find disquieting
is the inflexible
tying of a
name to the type specimen.
For example,
consider
a hypothetical
situation in which the first
scholar
studying the neo-Darwinians
thinks that
C. J. Romanes (1848-1894)
was a neo-Darwinian
and uses him as the type
specimen for the neo-Darwinians.
Very little
research
would be requimd

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490
a rigid application
of the type
to uncover the mistake.
Nevertheless,
that the name "neo-Darwinian"
be applied
specimen method would require
not to such workers as Thiseltonto Romanes and his scientific
circle,
R. Lankester,
and E. B. Poulton.
are
Dyer,E.
Although such mistakes
of such
liable
to be very rare in intellectual
the imposition
history,
is sure to be renon-standard
terminology
by commentators on science
so.
It must be admitted that cases
in which
sisted
and justifiably
of the rules of nomenclature
blanket
would require
the
application
abandonment of a familiar
name are not unknown in biological
systematics.
More time is spent at the periodic
meetings of the nomenclatural
on such issues
congresses
than on just about any other
hearing appeals
matter.
4.

Conceptual

Systems

to his The Structure

of Scientific
Commenting on the reaction
Revolutions,
Kuhn (1970,
p. 187) remarks that the "paradigm as shared exelement of what I now take to be the most novel
ample is the central
and least
understood
of this book."
One of the problems raised
aspect
by Kuhn's book has come to be known as the problem of incommensurabiliIf scientific
theories
are tightly-knit
inferential
if
ty.
systems,
statements
and if the only rational
even observation
are theory-laden,
way to choose between competing theories
is to derive contradictory
from each, then theory choice
in science
observation
statements
would
seem to be necessarily
a nonrational
As Kuhn sees it, the
process.
of his views is the conclusion
chief misunderstanding
that scientific
Part of the problem is Kuhn's
irrational.
change is fundamentally
habit of equating
inference
with deductive
deductive
inferinference,
and logical
ence with logical,
with rational.
Hence, any inference
is neither
that is not deductive
logical
nor rational.
Certainly
scientific
a matter of deductive
change is not exclusively
inference.
It is not, thereby, nonrational,
let alone irrational.
Rationality
is
a much broader notion than deductive
inference.
The novel feature
of Kuhn's system is the way he intends to circumvent the problem of incommensurability
An
by reference
to exemplars.
the problems for which it was formulated but
exemplar not only solves
also serves as a model or example to "replace
rules as a basis
explicit
for the solution
of the remaining puzzles
of normal science."
(Kuhn
1970, p. 175).
to extrapolate
from one puzzle
People have the ability
solution
to another without being able to formulate any rules
that they
might be using to make these extrapolations.
Kuhn (1977,
p. 472) explicates
this ability
in terms of a "learned
similarity
relation".
The
this notion is, for our purposes,
example Kuhn uses to illustrate
unIt is a father teaching
fortunate.
his child the differences
between
swans, geese and ducks as they stroll
through a park.
As epistemologically
important as the similarity
relation
may be for inferring
geneI agree with biologists
alogy,
such as Mayr and Simpson that theoretically
genealogy
is prior to similarity.
In spite of this disagreement,
Kuhn's main thesis
remains
unaffected.
From the point

of view

of evading

the problem

of incommensurability,

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491
the important issue
is the nature of this similarity
relation.
If it
then Kuhn is right back where he
can be expressed
linguistically,
started.
The words used to express
the similarity
relation
that obtains between an exemplar and its exemplifications
are as liable
to be
as theory-laden
as any others.
If this relation
cannot be expressed
remains problematic.
linguistically,
then its status
It is one thing
to argue that a particular
is not adequately
way of reasoning
captured
by current formal analyses
of inference.
It is quite another to argue
that it is ineluctably
ineffable.
If biological
species
were
really
classes
of similar
relations
be damned),
organisms
(ancestor-descendant
current methods of multivariate
can capture
these correlations
analysis
well enough.
There is nothing ineffable
here.
Problems arise
chiefly
when one attempts to combine genealogy
with similarity.
I am not sure that Kuhnian exemplars
can be used to avoid the problem of incommensurability
I propose to present
(Suppe 1977).
quite a
different
use for exemplars--as
for the individuation
type specimens
of conceptual
To perform the function assigned
systems.
them by Kuhn,
exemplars must be both exemplary and similar
to their exemplifications.
For example,
a good case can be made that Mendel's
way of structuring
breeding
experiments
served as a Kuhnian exemplar for modern genetics.
Most of the early progress
in genetics
was the result
of geneticists
milking Mendel's
it was worth.
exemplar for all
However, problems arise.
This same exemplar can be found in the works of other geneticists
before
In many instances,
anyone heard of Mendel.
it was these characterizations that served as Kuhnian exemplars.
As it turns out, legends
such
as Darwin's
finches are often effective
Kuhnian exemplars,
as effective
as more historically
accurate
examples.
To complicate
matters further,
later applications
of an examplar may have very little
in common with
earlier
applications.
To serve as a conceptual
type specimen,
as a fixed reference
point by
which a name can be attached
to a conceptual
system, an exemplar need
not be especially
exemplary,
nor need it be in any sense similar
to
other elements
in its conceptual
system.
However, it must be a good
deal more concrete
than KuhnI's puzzle
solutions.
I am not sure whether
those philosophers
who have suggested
treating
conceptual
systems as
historical
entities
are completely
aware of the magnitude of the change
that they are suggesting.
I suspect,
as in the case of biology,
remnants of the traditional
view remain.
Concepts are commonly treated
as
atemporal
similarity
classes,
as expression
types.
Two instances
of a
particular
concept
(two expression
tokens)
are instances
of the same
concept
if, and only if in some sense,
they mean the same thing.
A decade or so ago, Kripke (1972)
and Putnam (1973,
1975) caused
quite a stir by suggesting
that singular
terms (in particular
proper
names) and some substance
and kind terms might best be interpreted
as
rigid designators.
In rigid designation,
a name is conferred
in an
initial
baptismal
act (possibly
fictitious)
and thereafter
passed
on in
a link-to-link
reference
preserving
chain.
Regardless
of the appropriateness
of the Kripke-Putnam
analysis
in general,
it accurately
depicts
the way in which systematists
introduce
the names of biological

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492
is not identical
in every respect
act in systematics
taxa.
The baptismal
no water is involved),
but
to that practiced
by Judeo-Christians
(e.g.,
Both also require refas ritualized
and never fictitious.
it is easily
erence preservation.
The respective
terms cannot change their reference,
although we can find out that we are mistaken about what we thought
their reference
was.
is that it is
The interesting
thing about the Kripke-Putnam analysis
as well as traditicnto certain
terms (such as 'tiger')
applied
general
If Iwere arguing that the names of
al proper names (such as 'Moses').
are general
terms and species
themselves
kinds of
particular
species
with the procedures
of taxonomic practice
some sort, the coincidence
support for
postulated
by Kripke and Putnam might serve as indirect
is that species
are
their views.
However, because
my main contention
I am arguing has, in
not kinds and their names not general,
the position
for the Kripke-Putnam analysis
of rigid
this connection,
no implications
as are the names of all
designation.
The names of particular
species,
That proper names are
spatiotemporally
localized
individuals,
proper.
The interesting
feature
of
rigid designators
should surprise
no one.
the Kripke-Putnam
for our purposes
is that the link-to-link
analysis
chains are themselves
historical
entities
tied down
reference
preserving
to a particular
time and place.
No use of a term not causally
connected
to the original
baptismal
act can be part of this chain.
for my purpose is
analysis
The main weakness of the Kripke-Putnam
do evolve even if the
that it must be reference
preserving.
Species
chains do not.
However, I see no
link-to-link
reference
preserving
"evolve".
Kitcher
(1978)
sets
reason not to let these chains
themselves
for scientists
to use different
toout a way in which it is "possible
to refer to different
entities."
kens of the same expression-type
He does so by means of postulating
a community(Kitcher
1978, p. 536).
for each expression-type.
The reference
based reference
popotential
for a particular
community is the "set of
tential
of an expression-type
of tokens of that type by members of the
events such that production
set."
community are normally instituted
by an event in the associated
Because
defined communities of scien(Kitcher
1978, p. 540).
socially
tists
the reference
of an
potential
are to some extent heterogeneous,
at any one point
is also
liable
to be somewhat variable
expression-type
in time.
Because
the make-up of scientific
communities changes through
for particular
is also
expression-types
time, the referential
potential
to change through time.
likely
I think that what is needed in addition
to a semantic analysis
of
such as the one presented
is a general
analysis
of
reference
by Kitcher,
to solve traditional
semantic
conceptual
systems that is not designed
for indicriteria
problems such as meaning change but merely provides
entities.
The purpose of
viduating
conceptual
systems as historical
this section
On the basis
of the
is to present
just such an analysis.
four conditions
seem necessary:
biological
analog,
descent
is necessary:
replication
(1)
conceptual
entities;
systems which they form must be historical

sequences

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and the

493
local
retention
of information
content in replication
(2)
but global
is necessary,
change must also be possible;
(3)
different
replication
ceptual
system;

sequences

(4)
that integrate
the relations
into a system include
but cannot
tions.

must co-exist

sequences

in the same con-

the elements of a conceptual

be limited
just to inferential

system
rela-

I do not intend to deny that there is some point in recognizing

totally
unrestricted
reference
3 to 1 ratios
in hereditary
types, e.g.,
hundreds of investigators
patterns.
can be found who stumbled
Literally
upon such 3 to 1 ratios
The lists
of precursors
(including
Darwin).
that historians
can produce for any "unit idea" or "theme" in science
are fascinating'.
These lists
are sometimes disparaged
because
some of
the items on a particular
list
are really
not similar
enough to count as
being the same idea.
This is not my complaint
at all.
is
My complaint
that concepts
in this sense do not function
in conceptual
systems as
historical
entities.
to the filiation
of ideas
is not
Paying attention
just good historiography--which
it is--it
is necessary
if conceptual
change is to be interpreted
as a matter of the replication,
competition,
and selective
retention
of ideas.
All three of these notions
apply only
to concrete
not types.
exemplifications--tokens--and
To put it metaphorically,
there is no replication
at a distance.
tokens
Conceptual
must be organized
into more inclusive
but these entities
entities,
are
not those of traditional
semantic categories.
Instead
they are replication sequences.
One might well argue that Lamarck's
notion of the transmutation
of
species
was replicated
in Darwin's
theory of evolution
because
Darwin
was at least
aware of Lamarck's
views as Lyell presented
them in his
of Geology (1830-3),
Principles
but one cannot claim that Darwin was
the transmutationist
replicating
views of Pierre-Jean
Cabanis
(17571808) if no chain of influence
can be traced from Cabanis
to Darwin
(Richards
Local
1982).
retention
of assertive
content is necessary
for
tokens to be part of the same replication
sequence,
but it is far from
sufficient.
Matthew's
(1831)
statement of natural
selection
was nearly
identical
to that of Darwin, but it does not belong in Darwinism as an
historical
entity because
no one seems to have noticed
it or have been
influenced
by it.
The point is not assigning
credit
for originality
but gauging effect.
Truly unappreciated
precursors
do not count.
Matthew was not sociologically
a Darwinian.
Matthew's
views, as similar
as they might have been to those of Darwin, also do not belong in Darwinism.
If tokens of a particular
idea are to build up differentially
in a
conceptual
system, local
similarity
is necessary.
Ideas must be transmitted with some fidelity.
However, long term change must also be possible.
For example,
all but one of the "laws"
usually
associated
with
Mendel's
name at the turn of the century underwent rapid and significant change, butthey belong in the same replication
sequence
because
they are modifications
of previous
tokens.
Conversely,
Goldschmidt's

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494
(1940)
similar

do not belong in Darwinism even though quite

systemic mutations
ideas
introduced
thirty years later may (Gould 1982).

is relevant
Local
similarity
only for conceptual
sereplication
in the same conceptual
Numerous ideas coexist
quences.
system even if
For example,
Darwin's
views on evolution
they are quite different.
In his own version
of
were quite different
from his views on heredity.
In other versions
Darwinism,
they coexisted.
they did not.
Pangenesis
was only one very minor strain
in the larger conceptual
One is
system.
in a
the relations
elements
between the several
tempted to interpret
do play a role
conceptual
system in terms of inference,
and inferences
in integrating
some of the elements of a conceptual
system into a single
As Toulmin (1972)
of syssystem.
puts it, there are at least
"pockets
in scientific
tematicity"
disciplines.
However, the only inferential
that belong in a system are the ones actually
relations
made at the time.
Unnoticed
valid
conclusions
do not.
a well
though perfectly
Similarly,
is that they imply any proposition
known property of contradictions
whatsoever.
Time and again,
later workers have uncovered contradictions
in early formulations
but as long as
of particular
scientific
theories,
these contradictions
no damage was done.
The only
were not exploited,
that belong in a conceptual
inferences
system are those that were actually made.
I am attempting
At this point,
one might suggest
that the distinction
to make reduces
to the distinction
between concepts
as timeless
entities
in something like Popper's
Third World and conceptions
(1972)
as psychoin his Second World.
logical
entities
There is certainly
a point to the
distinction.
in conceptual
None of the elements
systems as historical
entities
are Third World concepts
and some are psychological
states
of
some sort.
tokens are not psychological
However, many conceptual
states.
that retains
the relevant
structure
of its temAny replicate
counts as an element in a replication
plate
of its
sequence,
regardless
vehicle.
The important feature
of replication
is retention
of
physical
information.
Replication
sequences
pass through people's
brains,
books,
and numerous other physical
vehicles.
computers,
the relations
Specifying
that integrate
distinct
replication
seinto conceptual
different
quences
systems and distinguish
conceptual
of unfinished
systems from each other remains the chief piece
business
of the "new philosophy
of science".
Laudan (1977,
pp. 54, 84) lists
the following
that can exist
cognitive
relationships
between two (or
in the same research
tradition:
more) theories
reinforceentailment,
ment, compatibility,
and inconsistency.
implausibility,
For example,
Lyellian
geology and Darwinian
evolution
to some extent supported
each
some conflicts
other, although
existed.
Lyell's
early versions
of uniformitarianism
were steady-state,
while Darwin's
theory implied that
biological
species
undergo real change, both in their make-up and in
their numbers.
Initially
biological
evolution
had to be progressive
on
a variety
of counts--more
more organisms,
species,
increased
complexity,
etc.
Whether or not any clear
sense of direction,
let alone progress,
can be discerned
in biological
evolution
since the Cambrian, however,
remains debatable.
But geological
phenomena and biological
species

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495
over time lent support to each other, although
changing gradually
a scientist
one and reject
might accept
the other without fear of contradiction.
Kelvin's
Conversely,
theory of thermodynamics made both Lyell's
and Darwin's
views less plausible
because
it denied them the
primarily
long expanses
of time that they needed.
For most of their existence,
thermodynamics and the Lyellian-Darwinian
research
program were in conflict.
They were not parts of the same conceptual
system but parts of
It does not follow,
competing systems.
however, that the two systems
were inherently
contradictory.
They could be brought into accord by
adopting
extreme values
for the boundary and initial
conditions
of each.
Thermodynamic deterioration
had to be slowed down as much as possible
while geological
and biological
change had to be speeded up by every
means possible.
Whether or not conceptual
in the way that I am
change can be treated
suggesting
depends on the nature of conceptual
If conceptual
change.
historical
entities
are as distinct
as rivers
in a tributary
system,
problems should be minimal.
At times conceptual
seems to
development
converge on this happy state.
it does not.
Frequently
it is
Usually
more like ocean currents.
Although the Gulf Stream and Humboldt's
Current are not distinguishable
with absolute
precision,
they do have
identity
of sorts.
The factors
that are liable
to complicate
the recgnition
of conceptual
historical
entities
are:
(a) the number of agents
involved,
(b) the number of distinct
sources,
(c) the amount of overlap
in souices,and
(d) the amount of interlineage
If science
borrowing.
were
if the vast majority
egalitarian,
of scientists
working in an area actually
influence
conceptual
development
in that area,
then the recognition of conceptual
historical
entities
would be a formidable
task.
Luckily
for our purposes,
everyone who studies
science
comes to just the
opposite
conclusion.
A very few scientists
at any one time account
for
the vast majority
of change.
Very little
is lost by narrowing one's
attention
to the contributions
of the scientific
elite.
Even if only a few scientists
actually
influence
the course of science at any one time, it may be the case that the sources
of their
views are extremely numerous and disparate.
Upon investigation,
some
multiplicity
does materialize.
For example, William Yarrell's
Law of
Dominance was important in Darwin's
early theorizing
(Hodge 1983),
an
importance
I have yet to find in the work of any other evolutionist
at
the time.
But considerable
overlap
also exists.
The case of Darwin
and Wallace
both reading Malthus is famous, but instances
of similar
confluence
can be expanded indefinitely.
For example,
the work of G. B
Brocchi
(1772-1826)
was as important to Darwin as it was to Lyell
(McCartney 1976, Hodge 1983).
Although citation
analyses
are not infallible
guides
to influence,
they do give some indication
of how diverse influences
actually
are.
Once again,
overlap
is extensive.
In
addition,
scientists
themselves
have introduced
devices
to make the
literature
of their field more manageable--synoptic
works and review
articles.
As any young scientist
soon discovers,
it is extremely difficult
to fight one's way into the mainstream.
Conversely,
once there,
habit alone tends to prolong the effects
of one's work.

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496
to Campbell (1979),
According
interlineage
borrowing is the major
to treating
obstacle
The occasional
conceptual
systems as lineages.
of an element from one lineage
crossover
to another is no more serious
than the occasional
fertile
Nor does
hybrids produced between species.
massive
"hybridization"
make conceptual
evolution
intractable.
totally
in science
two conceptual
Periodically
insystems that were developing
dependently
of each other or even as competitors
merge into a single
new conceptual
system, the merging of Darwinism and Mendelism being a
In animals,
good case in point.
such massive
is at least
introgression
it is common. Real complications
rare;
in plants
are produced by a
moderate amount of interlineage
borrowing.
It is too extensive
to ignore and yet not so extensive
that it simplifies
matters by merging the
two systems into one.
In biological
evolution,
the emergence of reproductive
isolation
tends to exhibit
a sort of threshold
effect.
Studying intellectual
development will be much easier
if similar
conceptual
thresholds
exist.
The appearance
of extensive
interlineage
borrowing
is exaggerated,
however, by the habit of inferring
influence
from similarity.
Assuming that conceptual
systems are sufficiently
to be maidiscrete
the question
ageable,
how they are to be picked out and
then arises
named.
Once again,
the type specimen method seems up to the task.
All
one has to do is to pick a concrete
element in a particular
conceptual
system and use it to attach
the name to the system.
Conceptual
systems
are organized
into part-whole
hierarchies.
In picking
a minimal element as type specimen,
one simultaneously
succeeds
in designating
all
the conceptual
wholes of which itis
part.
The same can be said for the
biological
analog
if higher taxa are construed
as increasingly
inclusive,
nested sections
of the phylogenetic
tree.
For example,
if one
chooses
Linnaeus
as the type specimen human being,
then he can serve as
well to designate
uniquely
the genus Homo, the family Hominidae,
all tte
way up to the entire biosphere,
assuming all
life on earth had a single
Of course,
origin.
of Linnaeus.
nothing hinges on the choice
The rule in conceptual
evolution
is to pick an element,
any element,
and attach
the name via this element.
For example,
if the conceptual
system is Darwinism,
the diagram of phylogeny facing page 117 in the
will do.
Origin (1859)
Kohn (1980,
p. 97) for instance
suggests
that
this diagram of a tree was the "standard
emblem" for Darwinians,
but in
doing so, he is implying much more than is required
of conceptual
type
The notion of a "tree"
specimens.
was conceptually
central
to Darwinism; the conceptual
type specimen need not be.
Darwin's
tree diagram is
one instance
of the diagram-type
"tree",
which has a long set of histcaies (Nelson
and Platnick
1981).
Some belong in the same systems; most
do not.
In fact, Darwin's
particular
diagram seems not to have been
very influential.
Instead,
diagrams such as those produced by Haeckel
(1866)
caught the imagination
of the time.
token of Darwin's
tree can serve
A particular
particular
copy of the Origin in which it occurs.
cies of the printing
process,
it also
serves
to
er copies
of this edition
and only somewhat less
editions.
Once we have reached the level
of the

to individuate
the
Given the contingenindividuate
all the othindirectly
all other
Origin,
the relations

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497
fan out extensively.
When attempting
to discern
groups of scientists,
one important sort of group that emerges is those scientists
involved
in a dispute.
Both the Darwinians
and their opponents belong in this
group.
additional
effort is needed to distinguish
Very little
between
the Darwinians
as a distinct
group and their opponents
(which in this
case did not form a distinct
The most extensive
group).
conceptual
system will
include
all those systems that are in genuine competition
with each other.
in Darwin's
For example,
day, special
creation,
"idealism",
and Darwinian
evolution
were competing conceptual
systems.
They were soon joined
non-Darwinian
by various
versions
of evolution.
However, numerous conceptual
systems had nothing to do with this dispute; e.g.,
the theology
of the Eastern
Orthodox Church.
Distinguishing
between competing conceptual
systems is much more
difficult
than distinguishing
between competing scientific
groups.
The temptation
to rely solely
on inference
is very strong, but it
should nevertheless
be resisted.
Two macro-conceptual
such as
systems,
Special
Creationism
and Darwinism,
contain
elements that contradict
each other, but contradictory
formulations
also co-exist
within single
conceptual
systems.
For example,
some versions
of Darwinism were totally
others not; some were perfectly
selectionist,
othgradualistic,
ers not; and so on.
two competing macro-conceptual
Conversely,
systems
may be perfectly
compatible,
though for some reason the people
developing these systems are unable to see it (e.g.,
see Yule's
futile
1906
attempt to explain
the compatibility
between continuous
variation
and
Mendelian
inheritance).
If influence
simpliciter
is gauged,
then competing conceptual
systems get lumped together.
In addition
to influence,
one must distinguish between "positive"
and "negative"influence;
i.e.,
between incorporation
and rejection.
Neither of these influences
is simple.
Usually
an element is modified
in the process
of incorporation.
Darwin did not
simply incorporate
Lyell's
views into his own.
He changed them in several significant
respects.
Conversely,
rejection
does not mean simple
exclusion.
Opposing systems influence
each other's
formulation.
For
example,
Darwin's
theory was strongly
influenced
by the theory that Darwin chose to oppose in the Origin--special
creation.
It would have
looked very different
if he had ignored special
creation
and opposed
As difficult
as these relations
"idealism".
are to disentangle
in
practice,
they are the relations
relevant
to discerning
conceptual
systems as historical
entities.
The task may look formidable.
It is, but
some reassurance
can be gathered
by the success
of historians
in worklhg
out the filiation
of past ideas
in science.5
5.

Conclusion

Perhaps the task of dealing

with conceptual
development
as a genuinely temporal process
in which real change occurs
seems so massive tiat
one prefers
to junk the entire
enterprise.
It simply is not worth the
effort.
But one cannot simultaneously
propose to adopt such a perspective and refuse to undertake
the sort of conceptual
reformulation
necessary
to accomplish
the task.
Two alternatives
are possible:

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498
(1)
retain
traditional
ways of treating
expression-types
as classes
of
and superimpose
identical
or similar
expression-tokens
here and there
connections
or
actual
historical
between some of the tokens;
(2)
adopt historical
conceptual
entities
ditional
concepts
into their interstices.

as

fundamental

and fit

tra-

At this stage in the history

of the philosophy
of science,
I find
the second alternative
worth pursuing.
Scientific
communities as
historical
entities
are fundamental to semantic theories
such as those
of Kitcher
(1978).
They cannot be defined in terms of semantic agreement if they are to be used to establish
it.
Conceptual
systems as
historical
entities
are the units of appraisal
in most versions
of the
new philosophy
of science.
That a selection
mechanism for conceptual
change also requires
conceptual
systems to be treated
as historical
entities
is yet another reason to treat them that way.
In this paper I
have argued that both scientific
communities as genuine social
groups
and conceptual
systems can profitably
be treated
as historical
entities
and that each can be individuated
by means of an extension
of the type
if Darwin is selected
For example,
as the social
specimen method.
type
and some element in Darwin's
work is chosen
specimen for the Darwinians
as the conceptual
type specimen for Darwinism, not only can each of
these historical
entities
be individuated
but also they can be connected to each other by the causal
connections
between their respective
type
Darwin did write the Origin of Species.
After all,
specimens.
Notes
I wish to thank John Corliss,
Ernst Mayr, and Christopher
for clarifying
certain
aspects
of the type specimen method.

Meacham

to
2The chaos in biological
nomenclature
prompted de Candolle
(1813)
and Strickland
produce a code for plants
(1842)
for animals.
The First
in 1889 to draft
International
Zoological
Congress was held in Paris
international
rules.
Similar
congresses
have been held periodically
The most recent revisions
of these codes were made in 1975 and
since.
in 1978.
As late as 1901 the International
Rules contained no
appeared
for generic
to type specimens.
Provisions
reference
types were adopted
in 1907 and extended to species
at the Boston congress
at the Monaco
in 1913.
until
Congress
However, formal rules were not fully codified
the Paris
Congress in 1948.
3In his comments Professor
Mayr seemed to be saying that the type
specimen method cannot be extended to social
groups and conceptual
systems because
they change and the type specimen is static.
If so, then
I fail to see how it can work for biological
species.
They are anything
In the discussion
I was made aware
but static
entities.
that followed,
of the general
impression
that I had argued that similarity
is of no in+r
in the evolutionary
portance
process
and in the individuation
of species.
Nothing could be further from my views.
Similarity
is of secondary
imin the individuation
portance
of species,
and local
similarity
is nec-

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499
for selection.
Others in the audience
essary
thought that I was claiming that there are no natural
I think
kinds in biology.
Just because
that one common example of natural
kinds (i.e.,
particular
are
species)
not actually
natural
that there are
kinds does not mean that I believe
no natural
kinds in biology.
I think that sexual
To the contrary,
orkind.
Some organisms at one stage in their
ganisms is a genuine natural
development
at other times asexually.
reproduce
sexually;
Hence, such
organisms change from one natural
kind to another during the course of
their development.
They do not in the process
change their species.
Kauffman in his contribution
to this volume has suggested
other
several
kinds.
biological
natural
4To my amazement, nearly every scientist
I have talked
to disagrees
even violently,
with the preceding
strongly,
claim.
that
They insist
all members of any group of scientists
properly called
by the same name
must be in total
agreement at least
over fundamentals.
Of Darwin's conthe only ones who can count as Darwinians
temporaries,
are those who
agreed with Darwin on all "essentials".
from Darwin neAny departure
cessitates
instant
excommunication.
On this view, there were precious
few Darwinians.
In his comments, Professor
Mayr seemed to reflect
the
usual antipathy
of scientists
toward any scientist
who departs
from the
party line actually
to a scientific
belonging
group as a social
group.
I think the data strongly
support the partial
independence
of cooperation and agreement.
5Certain
evolutionary
biologists
argue that phyletic
evolution
rarely if ever takes place;
i.e.,
that a single
lineage
never (or rarely)
changes extensively
through time while remaining a single
lineage
(Eldredge and Gould 1972).
If phyletic
evolution
does occur,
then bioloare presented
gists
with the problem of whether or not to divide
up a
gradually
evolving
lineage
into successive
chronospecies.
Evolutionary
systematists
such as Mayr argue that a lineage
should be subdivided
into successive
species
if it changes enough.
Others, primarily
the cladists,
disagree.
They argue that one should no more subdivide
a single
lineage
into successive
species
than one should subdivide
an organism
undergoing ontogenetic
development
into successive
organisms
if it undergoes enough change (Hennig 1966).
The parallel
question
for social
groups and conceptual
systems is obvious.
Should the Republican
party
be subdivided
into successive
parties
if it undergoes
sufficientchange?
I have no strong preferences
on the issue,
just so long as the same decision
is made in all three cases.

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500
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