CONTENTS

PEOPLE VS MENGOTE ............................................................................................................................3

PEOPLE VS GO ..........................................................................................................................................8
PITA VS CA ................................................................................................................................................12
PEOPLE VS MENDOZA ..........................................................................................................................19
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL VS SOLUTA ..............................................................................................27
PEOPLE VS MARTI ..................................................................................................................................33
PEOPLE VS ARA ......................................................................................................................................40
PEOPLE VS PEAFLORIDA ..................................................................................................................53
MORENO VS AGO CHI ...........................................................................................................................62
PEOPLE VS ANG CHUN KIT .................................................................................................................65
PEOPLE VS LUA ......................................................................................................................................70
PEOPLE VS FIGUEROA .........................................................................................................................75
NOLASCO VS PANO ...............................................................................................................................81
PEOPLE VS MARISCO ...........................................................................................................................86
ESPANO VS CA ........................................................................................................................................95
CARROLL VS US ......................................................................................................................................99
PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT ...................................................................................................................128
MUSTANG LUMBER VS CA .................................................................................................................132
PAPA VS MAGO .....................................................................................................................................141
PACIS VS PAMARAN ............................................................................................................................149
HIZON VS CA ..........................................................................................................................................152
PEOPLE VS QUE ...................................................................................................................................162
PEOPLE VS VALDEZ.............................................................................................................................169
MICLAT VS PEOPLE .............................................................................................................................175
FALARDO VS PEOPLE .........................................................................................................................187
HARRIS VS US .......................................................................................................................................203
PEOPLE VS DAMASO ...........................................................................................................................206
PEOPLE VS VELASCO .........................................................................................................................213
PEOPLE VS LESANGIN ........................................................................................................................218
PEOPLE VS BAULA ...............................................................................................................................227
1

VEROY VS LAYAGUE ...........................................................................................................................235

DE GARCIA VS LOCSIN .......................................................................................................................240
ROLDAN JR VS ARCA ..........................................................................................................................243
PEOPLE VS DAMASO ...........................................................................................................................250
ESQUILLO VS PEOPLE ........................................................................................................................257
POSADAS VS CA ...................................................................................................................................267
MANALILI VS CA ....................................................................................................................................271
MALACAT VS CA ....................................................................................................................................280
GUAZON VS DE VILLA .........................................................................................................................287

PEOPLE VS MENGOTE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the
stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon
was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the
poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in evidence by the trial
judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone
call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later
1
narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, they there saw two men "looking from side
to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant,
was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later
identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken
from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence
Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a
firearm, to wit:
one
(1)
Serial No. 8720-T

cal.

38

"S

&

W"

bearing

without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who
identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on

June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police,
2
indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he
owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted"
3
on him at the time of his arrest.
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted over the
objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to Mengote's
conviction
for
violation
of
P.D.
1866.
He
was
sentenced
to reclusion
4
perpetua.
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its
illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an
incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a
warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is
the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be
repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His
reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule
113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was
arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b)
of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at
least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts
"created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense
had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What
offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and
in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have been
different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a
darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street
shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking
in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze
of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting
from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers,
as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the
policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the
informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North
Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the
impending crime.
5

In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because
there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to
6
be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was
carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused,
be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless
arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently
established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred
from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence.
7

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was
unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than
the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually committing or attempting to commit
an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no
probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a
warrant.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that
the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they aware of
the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As
for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had
been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to
possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
9

In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, this Court declared:

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil.
859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or
actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro,

10

thus:

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime
about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no
allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the
Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding
his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any
person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or
attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over
liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is
sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal
arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against
Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not only in the
brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the constitutional
rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward
makes her representation even more commendable.

The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-zealousness
to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered
inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of
persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not been
observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and
ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS GO
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116001. March 14, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUISITO GO y KO alias KING LOUIE, accusedappellant.

[G.R. No. 123943. March 14, 2001]

LUISITO GO y CO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 22, 1992, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, SPO1 Mauro Piamonte and SPO3 Candido
Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the Calamba Police, went to the police outpost at
Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to follow up an intelligence report that methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a
regulated drug, was being supplied there. Police civilian agent Ronnie Panuringan arrived and reported to them
that he saw accused-appellant Luisito Go, also known as King Louie, enter the Flamingo Disco House with two
women. Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in accused-appellants waist. Together, the three policemen
proceeded to the Flamingo, which was located about a hundred meters away from the outpost.
When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the owner that they were conducting an
Operation Bakal, whereby they search for illegally possessed firearms. The owner allowed them in and told a
waiter to accompany them. They went up to the second floor of the disco. The waiter turned on the lights, and the
police officers saw accused-appellant and his lady companions seated at a table. They identified themselves and
asked accused-appellant to stand up. When the latter did so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his
waist. SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of the gun, but accused-appellant was unable to produce
any. Instead, accused-appellant brought out the drivers license of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte
confiscated the gun, which was later identified as a 9mm Walther P88, Serial Number 006784, with a magazine
containing ten (10) rounds of live ammunition. Accused-appellant was invited to the police precinct for questioning.
On the way out of the disco, accused-appellant asked permission to bring his car, which was parked
outside. The police officers accompanied accused-appellant to his car, a Honda Civic with license plate number
TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed a Philippine National Police identification card hanging
from the rearview mirror. He asked accused-appellant if he was a member of the PNP, and he said no. The police
officers asked accused-appellant for his drivers license and the registration papers of the vehicle, but he was
unable to produce them. When accused-appellant opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card and found that
the same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers saw pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on
the backseat and floor of the car. They asked accused-appellant why he had these items, but he did not say
anything. Instead, accused-appellant suggested that they talk the matter over, and intimated that he had
money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they should talk at the police headquarters. Accused-appellant took out an
attach case from the car and opened it. There were two black clutch bags inside. Accused-appellant opened the
first bag, which contained shiny white substance wrapped in cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00
in cash.
The police officers brought accused-appellant to the police station. When they arrived at the precinct, they
turned over the attach case together with the two black clutch bags to the investigator. The investigator found

eight cellophane bags containing granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the attach
case was opened, the police officers found that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an improvised burner,
[1]
magazines and newspapers.
Consequently, two Informations were filed against accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34. The first Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C,
charged accused-appellant with violation of Article III of R.A. 6452 (Dangerous Drugs Act), committed as follows:
That on or about October 22, 1992 at Brgy. I, Crossing, Municipality of Calamba, province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized/permitted by law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody 750 grams of
[2]
methamphetamine hydrochloride known as SHABU, a regulated drug, in violation of the above-stated law.
The other Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C, charged accused-appellant with violation of
P.D. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about October 22, 1992, at Flamingo Beerhouse, Crossing, Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named not being licensed or authorized by
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1)
caliber .9mm marked WALTHER with serial number 006784 with one (1) magazine loaded with ten (10) live
[3]
ammunitions of same caliber, in violation of the aforementioned law.
After a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant in the two criminal cases, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused in Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C, to be GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of having in his possession of 750.39 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug. He is hereby sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and a fine of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS; and in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C, the accused
is also found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
Considering that the accused appears to be detained at the Makati Police Station, jailer, Makati Police Station is
hereby ordered to commit the accused to the New Bilibid Prison, Bureau of Correction, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. The bond posted by the accused in Criminal Cases No. 3308-92-C & 3309-92-C, are hereby ordered
[4]
cancelled.
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C directly to this Court, considering
that the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, which appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 116001.
On the other hand, accused-appellant brought his appeal of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C
[5]
before the Court of Appeals. In an Amended Decision dated February 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed
accused-appellants conviction but modified the penalty imposed by the trial court by sentencing him, in addition to
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, to pay a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000.00),
[6]
citing Section 8 of R.A. 6425, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Hence, this petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. 123943.
The two cases were consolidated.

[7]

Accused-appellant assails the validity of his arrest and his subsequent convictions for the two crimes. Both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the arrest and subsequent seizure were legal. A review of the
records at bar shows no reason to depart therefrom.
The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of arrest having been
[8]
issued prior thereto, is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional
[9]
cases where an arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the presence of a peace
officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellants waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly
visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant could not show any license for the
firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized
exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of appellants valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in
[10]
Rule 126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in his car of
drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place
from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have been made during an illegal
search. As such, the seized items do not fall within the exclusionary clause, which states that any evidence
obtained in violation of the right against warrantless arrest cannot be used for any purposes in any
[11]
proceeding. Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects found at the scene of the
crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against
appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in
[12]
evidence.
Under P.D. 1866, the essence of the crime is the accuseds lack of license or permit to carry or possess
[13]
firearm, ammunition, or explosive. Possession by itself is not prohibited by law. In prosecutions for illegal
possession of firearm, the element of absence of license to possess the firearm may be established through the
[14]
testimony of or a certification from a representative of the Firearms and Explosives Bureau of the Philippine
[15]
National Police (FEB-PNP), attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm. In this case, a representative
[16]
of the FEB-PNP testified that accused-appellant was not a holder of any gun license. Moreover, a
[17]
certification to that effect was presented to corroborate his testimony. These pieces of evidence suffice to
[18]
establish the second element of the offense of possession of unlicensed firearms. However, in a vain attempt to
exculpate himself, accused-appellant presented for the first time an alleged firearm license, which was described as
Annex 2 of his petition. Accused-appellants counsel admitted that said document was not presented below for
[19]
some reason. Whatever those reasons are, he did not specify. The document, however, is dubious. It is too
late in the day for accused-appellant to proffer this very vital piece of evidence which might exculpate him. First,
the reception of evidence is best addressed to the trial court because it entails questions of fact. It should be
[20]
emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts. Second, the document marked as Annex 2 of the petition in
G.R. No. 123943 is not the license referred to, but an order of the trial court resetting the date of
[21]
[22]
arraignment. Third, there is attached to the petition a firearm license which is a mere photocopy and, as such,
cannot be appreciated by this Court. Indeed, considering that this was the one piece of evidence which could spell
accused-appellants acquittal of the unlicensed firearm charge, and assuming that, as shown in the face of the
license, it was issued on October 7, 1992, there should be no reason for its non-production during the trial. Fourth,
and most importantly, the genuineness of the purported license becomes all the more suspect in view of the
Certification issued by the FEO-PNP that accused-appellant was not a licensed firearm holder.
Anent the certification issued by the FEO-PNP to the effect that Luisito Go y Ko was not a licensed gun holder,
accused-appellant claims that he was not the person alluded to therein because the correct spelling of his middle
name is not Ko but Co. Whatever the correct spelling of his name is, the fact remains that he had no license on
the day the gun was found in his possession. All that he could present then was a photocopy of his application for
[23]
gun license, which is not the equivalent of a license. Appellant testified that he presented a firearm license to the
[24]
police, but he could not produce that alleged license in court. If appellant was indeed a licensed gun holder and
if that license existed on October 22, 1992, he could have easily presented it to the police when he was asked for
his papers inside the disco, or if the alleged license was in his car, he could have easily shown it to them when they
went to his car. Otherwise, he could have easily asked his lawyer or relative to bring the license to the police
precinct when he was being investigated. Despite several opportunities to produce a license, he failed to do so. In
fact, during trial, he never presented any such license. And on appeal, he could only submit for the first time and
for unknown reasons an alleged photocopy of a purported license. The only plausible conclusion that can be drawn
is that there was no such license in the first place. Hence, his guilt of illegal possession of firearm was duly
established.
Accused-appellants guilt for illegal possession of shabu has likewise been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The white crystalline substance found in his possession, upon laboratory examination, were positively
[25]
identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

10

The bulk of accused-appellants defense revolves around the factual findings of the trial court. It should be
recalled that factual findings of the trial court, if supported by evidence on record, and particularly when affirmed by
[26]
the appellate court, are binding on this Court. As discussed above, the records substantiate the trial courts and
the appellate courts findings as to accused-appellants culpability. There is no reason to depart from these findings
as no significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered,
[27]
would have altered the outcome of the case. Moreover, questions as to credibility of witness are matters best left
to the appreciation of the trial court because of its unique opportunity of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witness deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to
[28]
the reviewing tribunal.
In the case at bar, the trial court found:
The narration of the incident by the police is far more worthy of belief coming as it does from law enforcers who are
presumed to have regularly performed their duties and were not demonstrated to have been unduly biased against
[29]
the accused.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals held that:
(T)he findings of fact of the trial court are generally respected by the appellate court, unless they are found to be
[30]
clearly biased or arbitrary. We do not find any in these cases.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, committed in 1992, regardless of whether the firearm is low
powered or high powered, was punished with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, as provided in P.D.
[31]
1866. However, under R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1997, the penalty was lowered to prision
[32]
correcional in its maximum period and a fine of P30,000.00, if the firearm is classified as low powered. In this
case, the unlicensed firearm found in appellants possession was a 9mm Walther pistol, which under the
amendatory law, is considered as low powered. Inasmuch as the new law imposes a reduced penalty and is, thus,
[33]
more favorable to accused-appellant, the same may be given retroactive effect. Therefore, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of
P30,000.00.
On the other hand, the crime of illegal possession of regulated drug, under the law in force at the time of the
commission of the offense in this case, was punished by imprisonment of from six (6) years and one (1) day to
[34]
twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00, regardless of the amount of drugs
involved. Hence, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of firearm is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00. The decision of the trial
court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 750.39 grams of shabu and
drug paraphernalia, is likewise AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P12,000.00. The shabu and subject drug paraphernalia seized from appellant shall be destroyed as provided by
law.
SO ORDERED.

11

PITA VS CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
LEO PITA doing business under the name and style of PINOY PLAYBOY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO CABRERA, respondents.
William C. Arceno for petitioner.
Casibang, Perello and De Dios for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a "men's magazine", seeks the review of the decision of the Court of
1
Appeals, rejecting his appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, dismissing his complaint for injunctive
relief. He invokes, in particular, the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures of the Constitution, as
well as its prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law. There is no controversy as to the
facts. We quote:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of
Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services
Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto
Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various
student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and
co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and
their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or
circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which
is not per seobscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press.
By order dated December 8, 1 983 the Court set the hearing on the petition for preliminary
injunction on December 14,1983 and ordered the defendants to show cause not later than
December 13, 1983 why the writ prayed for should not be granted.
On December 12, 1983, plaintiff filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining
order. against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"
Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing's

12

pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. The Court granted the temporary restraining
order on December 14, 1983.
In his Answer and Opposition filed on December 27,1983 defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the
confiscation and burning of obscence reading materials on December 1 and 3, 1983, but claimed
that the said materials were voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the police authorities, and
that the said confiscation and seizure was (sic) undertaken pursuant to P.D. No. 960, as amended
by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. In opposing the plaintiffs
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, defendant pointed out that in that anti- smut
campaign conducted on December 1 and 3, 1983, the materials confiscated belonged to the
magazine stand owners and peddlers who voluntarily surrendered their reading materials, and that
the plaintiffs establishment was not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.
On January 5,1984, plaintiff filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants and/or their agents
can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial finding is made
on whether said magazine is obscene or not".
The restraining order issued on December 14,1983 having lapsed on January 3,1984, the plaintiff
filed an urgent motion for issuance of another restraining order, which was opposed by defendant
on the ground that issuance of a second restraining order would violate the Resolution of the
Supreme Court dated January 11, 1983, providing for the Interim Rules Relative to the
Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which provides that a temporary restraining order
shall be effective only for twenty days from date of its issuance.
On January 9, 1984 defendant filed his Comment and/or Rejoinder Memorandum in support of his
opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on January 16,
1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy
Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se
or not".
On January 16, 1984, the Court issued an order granting plaintiffs motion to be given three days "to
file a reply to defendants' opposition dated January 9, 1984, serving a copy thereof to the counsel
for the defendants, who may file a rejoinder within the same period from receipt, after which the
issue of Preliminary Injunction shall be resolved".
Plaintiff's supplemental Memorandum was filed on January 18, 1984. Defendant filed his Comment
on plaintiff s supplemental Memorandum on January 20, 1984, and plaintiff filed his "ReplyMemorandum" to defendants' Comment on January 25, 1984.
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a
2
writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal upon the grounds, among other things, as follows:
We cannot quarrel with the basic postulate suggested by appellant that seizure of allegedly
obscene publications or materials deserves close scrutiny because of the constitutional guarantee
protecting the right to express oneself in print (Sec. 9, Art. IV), and the protection afforded by the
constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure (Sec. 3, Art.IV). It must be equally
conceded, however, that freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to
protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have
laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications (Sec. I , Art. 201,

13

Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No. 969). Also well settled is the rule
that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes certain exceptions, as when
there is consent to the search or seizure, (People vs. Malesugui 63 Phil. 22) or search is an
incident to an arrest, (People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169; Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637) or is
3
conducted in a vehicle or movable structure (See Papa vs. Magno, 22 SCRA 857).
The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following errors:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that
the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's
magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that
the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was
submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary
4
injunction.
The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to pronounce what "obscene" means
5
or what makes for an obscene or pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the
test, in determining the existence of obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene,
is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
6
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." "Another test," so Kottinger further declares, "is
7
that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. " Kottinger hastened to say, however,
8
that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that
9
ultimately, the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."
Yet Kottinger, in its effort to arrive at a "conclusive" definition, succeeded merely in generalizing a problem that has
grown increasingly complex over the years. Precisely, the question is: When does a publication have a corrupting
tendency, or when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities? And obviously, it is to beg the question to
say that a piece of literature has a corrupting influence because it is obscene, and vice-versa.
Apparently, Kottinger was aware of its own uncertainty because in the same breath, it would leave the final say to a
hypothetical "community standard" whatever that is and that the question must supposedly be judged from
case to case.
About three decades later, this Court promulgated People v. Go Pin, 10 a prosecution under Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code. Go Pin, was also even hazier:
...We agree with counsel for appellant in part. If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown
in art exhibit and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people
interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were
used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed
artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of
secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the
exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to
see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and
persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and
improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste,
and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in
11
a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures.
xxx xxx xxx
As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided.
It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if "the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake
12
but rather for commercial purposes," the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.

14

13

It was People v. Padan y Alova , however, that introduced to Philippine jurisprudence the "redeeming" element
that should accompany the work, to save it from a valid prosecution. We quote:
...We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still or moving pictures of
women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In those
cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of the
same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or
the human body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux vivants. But an actual
exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In
it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity,
indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and
14
lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. ...
Padan y Alova, like Go Pin, however, raised more questions than answers. For one thing, if the exhibition was
attended by "artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and
15
improve their artistic tastes," could the same legitimately lay claim to "art"? For another, suppose that the
16
exhibition was so presented that "connoisseurs of [art], and painters and sculptors might find inspiration," in it,
would it cease to be a case of obscenity?
Padan y Alova, like Go Pin also leaves too much latitude for judicial arbitrament, which has permitted an ad lib of
Ideas and "two-cents worths" among judges as to what is obscene and what is art.
17

In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, the Court, following trends in the United States, adopted
the test: "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material
18
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in
the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than isolated passages,
which were central toKottinger (although both cases are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the
final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the determination of obscenity
essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law
enforcers.
It is significant that in the United States, constitutional law on obscenity continues to journey from development to
development, which, states one authoritative commentator (with ample sarcasm), has been as "unstable as it is
19
unintelligible."
20

Memoirs v. Massachusettes, a 1966 decision, which characterized obscenity as one "utterly without any
21
redeeming social value," marked yet another development.
22

The latest word, however, is Miller v. California, which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established
23
"basic guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
24
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
25

(A year later, the American Supreme Court decided Hamling v. United States which repeated Miller, and Jenkins
26
v. Georgia, yet another reiteration of Miller. Jenkins, curiously, acquitted the producers of the motion
picture, Carnal Knowledge, in the absence of "genitals" portrayed on screen, although the film highlighted
contemporary American sexuality.)
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the
27
reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem . Apparently, the courts have
assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has
allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable
to society. And "[t]here is little likelihood," says Tribe, "that this development has reached a state of rest, or that it
will ever do so until the Court recognizes that obscene speech is speech nonetheless, although it is subject as in
all speech to regulation in the interests of [society as a whole] but not in the interest of a uniform vision of how
28
human sexuality should be regarded and portrayed."

15

In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to
suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So
is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid
advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the
present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet their works are considered
29
important literature today. Goya's La Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the
world's most prestigious museums.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the
divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and has not been, an easy one to
answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. We share Tribe's disappointment over the discouraging trend in
American decisional law on obscenity as well as his pessimism on whether or not an "acceptable" solution is in
sight.
In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic than rushing to a "perfect" definition of
"obscenity", if that is possible, as evolving standards for proper police conduct faced with the problem, which, after
all, is the plaint specifically raised in the petition.
However, this much we have to say.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In
free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and
30
present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v.
31
Bagatsing, "the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action ...
32
lies on the. . . authorit[ies]."
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and
33
present danger." "It is essential for the validity of ... previous restraint or censorship that the ... authority does not
34
rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require."
"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present
35
danger test."
The above disposition must not, however, be taken as a neat effort to arrive at a solution-so only we may arrive at
one-but rather as a serious attempt to put the question in its proper perspective, that is, as a genuine constitutional
issue.
It is also significant that in his petition, the petitioner asserts constitutional issues, mainly, due process and illegal
search and seizure.
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that
the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that
must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the
Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of
evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to
warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were
not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to
carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals has no "quarrel that ... freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the right
36
to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals." Neither do we. But it brings us
back to square one: were the "literature" so confiscated "pornographic"? That we have laws punishing the author,

16

publisher and sellers of obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960
37
and P.D. No. 969)," is also fine, but the question, again, is: Has the petitioner been found guilty under the
statute?
The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in
38
disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, We defined police power as "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
39
welfare ." Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by
themselves, authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of
the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process
of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees
themselves lay down procedures for implementation. We quote:
Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints,
engravings, sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in Section 1
hereof (Art. 201), RPC as amended) shall be governed by the following rules:
(a) Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the Government to be destroyed.
(b) Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an acquittal, the
obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings or other materials and
articles involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 (referring to Art. 201) hereof shall
nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the Chief of Constabulary.
(c) The person aggrieved by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen
(15) days after his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretary of National
Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of National Defense shall be final and
unappealable. (Sec. 2, PD No, 960 as amended by PD No. 969.)
Sec. 4. Additional Penalties. Additional penalties shall be imposed as follows:
1. In case the offender is a government official or employee who allows the violations of Section I
hereof, the penalty as provided herein shall be imposed in the maximum period and, in addition,
the accessory penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall likewise be
40
imposed .
Under the Constitution, on the other hand:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become
43
unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, We counter-minded the orders of the
Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises of We Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila
dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. We have greater reason here to reprobate the questioned raid, in the
complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no
different from Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech, whether political or
"obscene".
The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing),
provide:

17

SEC. 12. Search without warrant of personarrested. A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
44
offense.
but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must
be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against
any party, under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code.
We reject outright the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would free the accused of
45
all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant," and that "violation of penal law [must] be
46
punished." For starters, there is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished". Second, to say that
the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful
search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent
Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the petitioner.
We make this resume.
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion,
an obscenity rap is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene",
and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference
and action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion.
4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for;
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code;
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the
properties seized are indeed "obscene".
These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable statutes, or remedies against
47
48
abuse of official power under the Civil Code" or the Revised Penal code .
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It
appearing, however, that the magazines subject of the search and seizure ave been destroyed, the Court declines
to grant affirmative relief. To that extent, the case is moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.

18

PEOPLE VS MENDOZA
SYNOPSIS
For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charged with
parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two informations. Accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the merits commenced, following which, a judgment of conviction
was rendered. Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of conviction. The Court ruled that although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial
evidence, conviction is proper if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; GUILT OF THE ACCUSED DULY
ESTABLISHED BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. After going through the evidentiary record, we find no
reasons to disagree with the trial court and are convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza
has been duly established. Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence,
conviction is proper if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person (Pecho vs.
People, 262 SCRA 518 [1996]). Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom
a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt (People vs. Damao, 253 SCRA 146 [1996]). While
admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by accusedappellant, the established circumstances abovestated, however, constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with
each other and with the hypothesis that accused-appellant is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that
he is not. And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational
circumstances corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted
by the accused (People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA 546 [1996]). The unbelievable story of accused-appellant that
the killing was perpetrated by the smuggling syndicates man is all too plainly a mere concoction of accusedappellant designed to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; RELATIONSHIP PER SE OF A WITNESS WITH THE VICTIM DOES
NOT NECESSARILY MEAN HE IS BIASED. Accused-appellant strives to persuade us that the trial court
erred in giving full credence to the testimony of his father-in-law, Alipio Eusebio, and his own daughter,
Charmaine Mendoza. But having been in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial courts
appreciation of their testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect (People vs.
Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731 [1996]). As established by the prosecution, and this is admitted by accusedappellant, even before he and his family went to the birthday party of his relative, he and the victim had
already several occasions of altercation. Such fact was shown when accused-appellant left his wife and
daugther at the party without informing them where he would be. The victims father, Alipio Eusebio, attested
to the fact that accused-appellant and his daughter, Cecilia had been quarrelling. Accused-appellant
suspected that Cecilia was having an illicit relationship with another man. He contends that Alipio is not a
credible witness for the prosecution in view of his relationship with the victim and that Alipio resents him on
account of his having children with another woman. It is basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with
the victim does not necessarily mean he is biased. The Court finds improbable and contrary to human
experience accused-appellants claim that Alipio testified for no other purpose but revenge. It was not shown
that Alipio was actuated by improper motive, thus, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE RETRACTION BY A PROSECUTION WITNESS DOES NOT NECESSARILY VITIATE
THE ORIGINAL TESTIMONY. Accused-appellant virtually banks, for acquittal, on Charmaines retraction.
But the trial court correctly disregarded the same. The first time Charmaine took the witness stand was in
December, 1988, barely a month after her mothers death. Her recantation was made two years later when
she was already in the custody of accused-appellant who was allowed to go out on bail. Charmaines first
testimony was to the effect that she saw her father, accused-appellant, hiding a gun under the bed, and her
subsequent testimony was that she saw no such act. Such contradictory statements should not discredit
Charmaine as a witness. The present rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and
disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and probabilities and improbabilities of the
case (People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 234 [1995]). Moreover, mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony. Testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and
disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should
be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made carefully and keenly

19

scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change discriminatingly analyzed (Molina vs. People, 259
SCRA 138 [1996]). The trial court believed that the testimony given by Charmaine for the defense did not alter
her former testimony for the prosecution. The second declaration was received with caution, and it did not
impressed the trial court. Neither are we persuaded to hold otherwise for it must be borne in mind that
Charmaine was living with and dependent upon her father, accused-appellant, at the time she gave her
second declaration.
4. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES CANNOT BE EXTENDED TO ACTS COMMITTED BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. Accusedappellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001, the fatal weapon,
and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant, there had been a dispute
between him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife carried wherever she went, and
not about the fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man. But this claim is belied by the
overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of the fatal weapon. Charmaine
testified that the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her mother was shot.
And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father. Defense witness, Antonio
Gabac, when asked by the Las Pias police investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the same was
surrendered to him by accused-appellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal gun by
accused-appellant himself and a mission order authorizing him to carry the said weapon. But accusedappellant claims that these documents were illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to
privacy of cohmunication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure. The Solicitor
General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies. The case in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the occasion to
rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
ones person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion. In the instant case, the memorandum
receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellants father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private
citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; USE OF AN UNLICENSED FIREARM CONSIDERED ONLY AS SPECIAL
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE AND NOT A SEPARATE OFFENSE. Although the prosecution duly
established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866 was committed,
fortunately for accused-appellant, Republic Act No. 8294 which took effect on July 7, 1997 amended the said
decree and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in
murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense. (People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998).
Withal, accused-appellant may be held liable only for parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of
use of an unlicensed firearm. This notwithstanding, that is, despite the presence of such aggravating
circumstance, the penalty imposed for the crime of parricide which is reclusion perpetua, may no longer be
increased. The death penalty cannot be imposed upon accused-appellant since the killing occurred in
November, 1988, when the imposition of the capital penalty was still proscribed.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109279-80. January 18, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. OCTAVIO MENDOZA y LANDICHO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
MELO, J.:
On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to death. The trial court found
her husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her death. However, the real victim of this unfortunate occurrence
is the spouses only minor child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now left to the care of her maternal grandparents.

20

For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charge with
parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two Informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 636
th

That on or about the 11 day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable
motive, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a .38 caliber revolver
one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal gunshot wounds which
directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 637
th

That on or about the 11 day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, control and direct custody a firearm one .38 caliber revolver, Colt with Serial
No. 41001 and Four (4) live ammunitions use in the crime of parricide, without first securing the necessary license
or permit therefor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 38-39, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the merits commenced,
following which, a judgment of conviction was rendered, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
1. In Criminal Case No. 636, and finding accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of PARRICIDE, defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties attendant thereto.
He is further ordered to pay to Alipio Eusebio the amount of P66,000.00 for the funeral, wake, burial and incidental
expenses that said Alipio Eusebio spent by reason of the death of his daughter Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza.
And to Charmaine Mendoza the accused is hereby ordered to pay her the following
1. P50,000.00 for causing the death of her mother Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza;
2. P100,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3. P25,000.00 for and as attorneys fees.
Plus costs of the proceedings.
Accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho is further deprived of his civil and parental rights over his child Charmaine
Mendoza and he cannot inherit from her.
2. In Criminal Case No. 637, and finding the accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions, used in the Commission of Parricide, defined and
penalized under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Presidential decree No. 1878-A said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law.

21

The firearms and ammunitions used, a Colt Revolver Cal. 38, with a Serial Number 41001 is hereby forfeited in
favor of the government together with all the ammunitions.
With costs against the accused.
Conformably with the Circular of the Honorable Supreme Court, the accused is hereby ordered committed to the
Bureau of Corrections.
The accused, if he appeals the decision is not entitled to Bail.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 76-77, Rollo.)
Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in
I
. . . substantially and almost totally relying on illegally procured and/or inadmissible, unauthenticated, questionable
documents, in grave violation of accuseds constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
II
. . . almost substantially and wholly relying in the incredible coached and unreliable direct testimony of the minor
daughter of accused and victim, Charmaine Mendoza, despite the evident grave conflicts or contradictions thereof
to the facts clearly and decisively testified by and/or findings of the police investigators.
III
. . . not believing the decisively clear and straight forward testimony of the accused as corroborated by his witness.
IV
. . . ultimately convicting accused for the separate offenses of parricide and Illegal Possession of Firearms despite
the police investigators undisturbed findings of a shooting and stabbing incident, a situation consistent with the
decisively clear postulate of the defense.
V
. . . not considering, even assuming merely for the sake of argument, but without conceding, that the crime of
parricide was committed, the law and doctrine that if a firearm is used in the commission of a killing (Homicide,
parricide, etc.) the same, as now mandated by Republic Act No. 8294 (known as Revilla Law) must only be
considered an aggravating circumstance. This is consistent to the rule that Penal laws favorable to the accused
shall have retroactive effects.
The facts as established by the evidence for the prosecution are as follows:
On November 11, 1988, accused-appellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza, and their then 10-year-old daughter
attended the birthday party of a relative of accused-appellant held at McDonalds in Harrison Plaza. While the party
was going on, accused-appellant left and proceeded to Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant where he had some
beer. When it was time for Cecilia and Charmaine to go home, they could not find accused-appellant, hence, they
decided to just leave, proceeding directly to their residence at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III,
Pamplona, Las Pias (p. 4, Appellees Brief.).

22

Cecilia and Charmaine arrived home at around 7 oclock in the evening but accused-appellant was not yet
there. After a while, mother and daughter left for the house of Cecilias parents in Bacoor, Cavite to bring some
perfume for Cecilias brother, Francisco (p. 5, Ibid.).
At about 9 oclock in the evening, Cecilia and Charmaine left Bacoor. They rode a jeepney and at the gate of
the subdivision where they live, they saw the car of Rowena Hernandez, Cecilias god-daughter, and they hitched a
ride home. Finally home, they saw their car already parked in the garage of their neighbor. All the lights in their
house were on but the screen door was locked. They knocked at the window but accused-appellant did not
respond. A moment later, however, accused-appellant opened the back door and mother and daughter went
straight to the masters bedroom (Ibid.).
While inside the masters bedroom, accused-appellant who was drunk instructed Charmaine to get cold water
and to douse him. She willingly obliged, after which she was told to go to her room. She change her clothes and
readied herself for bed. While in her room, Charmaine heard her parents quarrelling over the issue of Cecilia and
Charmaine having left accused-appellant at the party. Thereafter, Charmaine suddenly heard three
gunshots. Running out of her room, Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia down on the floor of their living room,
bleeding profusely. Charmaine saw accused-appellant hiding a gun under the bed in her parents room (pp. 56, Ibid.).
Charmaine ran towards her gasping and bleeding mother and held her. Then, accused-appellant asked
Charmaine to call her Aunt Dolores Mendoza to inform her of the death of Cecilia. Dolores could not believe
Charmaine and talked to accused-appellant instead (Ibid.).
Meanwhile, the victim bled to death on the floor.
Accused-appellant subsequently called his brother-in-law, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and told him that Cecilia had
been shot and is already dead. Gabac, on the other line, told accused-appellant not to touch anything and that he
would be arriving shortly. When Gabac finally arrived, he and accused-appellant carried the lifeless body of Cecilia
into accused-appellants car and brought her to the Perpetual Help Hospital.
Cecilia Mendoza was pronounced dead on arrival. The autopsy report indicated the cause of death as follows:
Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds of the back and left shoulder
Upon receiving information about the shooting incident, Chief Investigator Cpl. Leopoldo Africa, together with
investigators Cpl. Prudencio Parejas, Cpl. Gorgonio Nortales and Pfc. Rolando Almario, proceeded to the hospital
to investigate the incident, but accused-appellant refused to give any statement or comment. Thereafter , the
policemen invited Antonio Gabac to accompany them to the crime scene at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes,
Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias. While they were inspecting the premises, Cpl. Africa noticed something tucked
inside Gabacs waist. He promptly told Gabac Pare pakisurrender mo nga iyong baril. Gabac immediately
handed Cpl. Africa a .38 caliber revolver with Serial No. 41001 and with two empty shells and two live
rounds. Gabac informed Africa that the gun was handed to him by accused-appellant when Gabac arrived at the
crime scene to respond to the call of accused-appellant for assistance (p. 7, Ibid.)
Cecilias father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughters death, and that valuables were being
taken out of his daughters house, decided to remove, together with his sons, the remaining pieces of property
therein, including accused-appellants personal effects (p. 8, Ibid.)
From the aforestated personal effects of accused-appellant, Alipio found Mission Order No. 86-580-893 dated
November 7, 1986 issued to accused-appellant by Col. Eladio Gonzales, PAF (GSC), Acting Wing Commander,
th
580 Aircraft Central Warning Wing, Villamor Airbase, Pasay City, which authorized accused-appellant to carry a
Colt Revolver, .38 Caliber with Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986 to December 15, 1986. There was also
a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10, 1986, approved by Captain Luis L. Salanguit of the
Philippine Air Force and Lt. Col. Ramon Bandong and issued to one Octavio L. Mendoza, Captain, PAF, Assistant
Director for Personnel which described the firearm as One Colt Revolver SN 41001 (p. 52, Rollo).
Accused-appellant tested positive for the presence of nitrates (p. 50, Ibid.).
Accused-appellants own account of the incident is to the effect that before the shooting incident on the night
of November 11, 1988, he and his wife Cecilia were arguing about the latter carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber
revolver, and that a few weeks earlier they likewise argued because he found out that his wife was still supporting
her parents as well as her brothers and sisters.

23

Further, accused-appellant claimed that he saw men roaming near their house and that he had received death
threats over the telephone because Cecilia owed $35,000.00 to some people, in relation to her jewelry and
perfumes business. She also allegedly owed people some cash which was coursed through her by workers from
Saudi Arabia to be sent to their relatives in the Philippines (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 14-19).
Accused-appellant claimed that he went home at around 7 oclock on the night of November 11, 1988, after his
wife, Cecilia, and daughter, Charmaine, had left him at the party. When his wife and Charmaine arrived, they
proceeded to the masters bedroom, after which, her daughter kissed him goodnight. He and his wife were then left
alone in their room and at that moment, his wife showed him some money and uttered Dad, okey na. She also
brought out the .38 caliber revolver from her bag then changed her clothes, and went to the bathroom, and he fell
asleep (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 21-28).
Thereafter, accused-appellant declared, he was suddenly awakened by an unusual sound or shot outside their
room. When he went out, he saw his wife wounded and bleeding, and he felt and heard somebody run from the
backdoor of their house which banged. Consequently, he ran outside and pursue the intruder who ran from the
backdoor, but accused-appellant claimed that he only went up to their gate because of his concern over his wifes
condition.
When he went back, he woke up Charmaine, and seeing the condition of Cecilia, both of them cried. After a
while, he called up his brother-in-law, policeman Antonio Gabac (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 32, p. 34, p. 37) and
the two of them then brought Cecilia to the hospital.
In the hospital, some police investigators from the Las Pias Police Station asked accused-appellant about the
incident, but he refused to comment. He was later invited to the police station for investigation, but due to the
advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, he never gave any statement to the police about the incident.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. While he admitted having been married to Cecilia on
February 28, 1976, he claimed that his wife was killed by somebody else. Further, even as he denied possession
of a .38 caliber revolver, he admitted to have been authorized to carry a .45 caliber between the years 1968 and
1969 (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 7 and 68).
Accused-appellant swore that he had no reason to kill his wife because he loved her. However, he admitted to
have sired children by another woman (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 51).
The trial court did not give credence and weight to the defenses theory that the victim was engaged in illegal
activities which supposedly led to her death. Rather, the trial court found that accused-appellant had the
opportunity and the propensity to commit the crime (pp. 66-67, Rollo).
Accordingly, although the evidence was partly circumstantial, the trial court made a pronouncement that all
elements which were needed to arrive at a conclusion that accused-appellant killed his wife were present and that
no proof had been established by him to overturn its findings (p. 67, Ibid.).
After going through the evidentiary record, we find no reasons to disagree with the trial court and are
convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza has been duly established.
Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is proper if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person (Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518 [1996]). Direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt (People vs. Damao, 253 SCRA 146 [1996]).
During the trial of the case, it was duly established that the only persons residing at No. 2 Tramo Street,
Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias, were the Mendozas, namely, accused-appellant Octavio, his
daughter Charmaine, and his now deceased wife Cecilia. On the night Cecilia was shot to death, no one was there
except these three persons. Accused-appellant struggled to persuade the trial court of his innocence by denying
that he killed his wife, insinuating that another person is the killer. This stance of denial is negative self-serving
evidence which deserves no evidentiary weight (People vs. Gondora, 265 SCRA 408 [1996]). The insinuation of
accused-appellant that some convenient intruder perpetrated the killing is absolutely without basis and
unsubstantiated. It is plainly an afterthought, a devised plot to escape just punishment. In fact, accused-appellant
even refused to give any statement or comment to the police investigators to enlighten them about the shooting
incident. If indeed, Cecilia was shot and killed by somebody else as claimed by accused-appellant, it would surely
have been but natural for him, as a husband to cooperate with police authorities for the speedy apprehension of the
gunman, by informing them immediately of the alleged intruder-killer. But he did not and instead, he took the

24

advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, to keep silent about the incident when the police conducted the investigation,
which is rather odd if he really were innocent. Verily it was only on November 16, 1992, or 2 years after the
incident that he came out with the story about the handy intruder. He kept silent for two long years.
Accused-appellant strives to persuade us that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of his
father-in-law, Alipio Eusebio, and his own daughter, Charmaine Mendoza. But having been in a better position to
observe the witnesses, the trial courts appreciation of their testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves
the highest respect (People vs. Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731 [1996]).
As established by the prosecution, and this is admitted by accused-appellant, even before he and his family
went to the birthday party of his relative, he and the victim had already several occasions of altercation. Such fact
was shown when accused-appellant left his wife and daughter at the party without informing them where he would
be. The victims father, Alipio Eusebio, attested to the fact that accused-appellant and his daughter, Cecilia, had
been quarrelling. Accused-appellant suspected that Cecilia was having an illicit relationship with another man. He
contends that Alipio is not a credible witness for the prosecution in view of his relationship with the victim and that
Alipio resents him on account of his having children with another woman.
It is basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not necessarily mean he is
biased. The Court finds improbable and contrary to human experience accused-appellants claim that Alipio
testified for no other purpose but revenge. It was not shown that Alipio was actuated by improper motive, thus, his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
The testimony of Charmaine that she saw accused-appellant, her father, hide a gun under his bed, leads us to
believe that accused-appellant killed his own wife. Accused-appellant cannot escape criminal liability on his theory
that when Charmaine testified for the prosecution, her testimony did not appear to be a naturally spontaneous
narration, but rather evidently a coached one. According to to him, this theory was bolstered when she cried and
suddenly, embraced accused-appellant in public view.
On the contrary, the fact that Charmaine cried during her testimony is mute evidence of her credibility, this,
being in accord with human behavior and nature. It must have been a most traumatic and painful experience for
her, at a very tender age, to testify in court against her own father whom she loves and respects as shown by the
act of embracing him.
Accused-appellant virtually banks, for acquittal, on Charmaines retraction. But the trial court correctly
disregarded the same. The first time Charmaine took the witness stand was in December, 1988, barely a month
after her mothers death. Her recantation was made two years later when she was already in the custody of
accused-appellant who was allowed to go out on bail. Charmaines first testimony was to the effect that she saw
her father, accused-appellant, hiding a gun under the bed, and her subsequent testimony was that she saw no such
act. Such contradictory statements should not discredit Charmaine as a witness. The present rule is that testimony
of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and
probabilities and improbabilities of the case (People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 234 [1995]). Moreover, mere retraction
by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony. Testimony solemnly given in court
should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the
subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made
carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change discriminatingly analyzed (Molina vs.
People, 259 SCRA 138 [1996]).
The trial court believed that the testimony given by Charmaine for the defense did not alter her former
testimony for the prosecution. The second declaration was received with caution, and it did not impressed the trial
court. Neither are we persuaded to hold otherwise for it must be borne in mind that Charmaine was living with and
dependent upon her father, accused-appellant, at the time she gave her second declaration.
Another fact which militates against accused-appellants denial that he killed his wife is that the paraffin test
conducted on him yielded positive results. Notably, this test was conducted a day after the shooting incident.
Accused-appellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001, the fatal
weapon, and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant, there had been a
dispute between him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife carried wherever she went,
and not about the fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man.
But this claim is belied by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of the
fatal weapon. Charmaine testified that the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her

25

mother was shot. And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father. Defense
witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Pias police investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the
same was surrendered to him by accused-appellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal
gun by accused-appellant is further established by the memorandum receipt signed by accused-appellant himself
and a mission order authorizing him to carry the said weapon (p. 66, Rollo). But accused-appellant claims that
these documents were illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication
and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure (p. 154, ibid.).
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies. The case in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the
occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the
immunity of ones person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellants
father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
Finally, contrary to accused-appellants claim that he was licensed and authorized to carry a .45 caliber pistol,
the certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief, Records, Legal and Research Branch of the Firearm and
Explosive Unit, dated December 29, 1989, shows that accused-appellant is not a licensed firearm holder of any
kind (p. 69, Rollo).
While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by accusedappellant, the established circumstances abovestated, however, constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each
other and with the hypothesis that accused-appellant is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypotheses that he is
not. And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances
corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by the accused
(People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA 546 [1996]). The unbelievable story of accused-appellant that the killing was
perpetrated by the smuggling syndicates man is all too plainly a mere concoction of accused-appellant designed
to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 was committed, fortunately for accused-appellant, Republic Act No. 8294 which took effect on
July 7, 1997 amended the said decree and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense (People vs. Molina, G.R. No.
115835-36, July 22, 1998).
Withal, accused-appellant may be held liable only for parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of
use of an unlicensed firearm. This notwithstanding, that is, despite the presence of such aggravating circumstance,
the penalty imposed for the crime of parricide which is reclusion perpetua, may no longer be increased. The death
penalty cannot be imposed upon accused-appellant since the killing occurred in November, 1988, when the
imposition of the capital penalty was still proscribed.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

26

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL VS SOLUTA

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163087

February 20, 2006

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,

vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA,
and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
1

The present Petition for Review on Certiorari partially assails the Court of Appeals Decision of March 26, 2004
holding herein petitioners Silahis International Hotel, Inc. and Jose Marcel Panlilio, along with Floro Maniego and
Steve Villanueva, civilly liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code, for violation of respondents
constitutional right against unreasonable search of their office.
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the Vice President for Finance of his co-petitioner Silahis International
Hotel, Inc. (hotel), while respondents Rogelio Soluta (Soluta), Joselito Santos, Edna Bernate (Edna), Vicenta Delola
(Vicenta), and Florentino Matilla (Matilla) were employees of the hotel and officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union
Chapter, the hotel employees union (the union).
Petitioners version of the antecedents of the case are as follows:
In late 1987, as Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego), General Manager of the Rapier Enforcement Professional
Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA) which the hotel contracted to provide its security force, had been
receiving reports that sale and/or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were going on in the union
office at the hotel and that there existed a theft syndicate, he conducted a surveillance, with the approval of Panlilio,
2
of suspected members and officers of the union.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal secretary Andy Dizon, Maniego, Bulletin reporter Nonoy
Rosales, and REPISA security guard Steve Villanueva (Villanueva) entered the union office located at the hotel
basement, with the permission of union officer Henry Babay (Babay) who was apprised about the suspected illegal
activities, and searched the premises in the course of which Villanueva found a plastic bag under a table. When
3
opened, the plastic bag yielded dry leaves of marijuana. Panlilio thereupon ordered Maniego to investigate and
report the matter to the authorities.
On the other hand, respondents version follows:
On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker
room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard pounding sounds outside, prompting
her to open the door of the locker room upon which she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to
4
5
recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. She
even saw one of the men hid something behind his back. She then closed the door and went back to bed. Soon
after she heard the door of the union office opened.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office,
Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.

27

Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith, Efren
Guevarra, who tried to assist him, Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed Bautista open the door. At that instant, men in
barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions, drawing them to run to the
6
female locker room, and to thereafter proceed to the Engineering Office where they called for police assistance.
While awaiting the arrival of the police, Babay and Panlilio, on the latters request, met. At the meeting, Panlilio told
Babay that they proceed to the union office where they would settle the mauling incident, to which Babay replied
that the door of the office could not be opened. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and
the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who
7
even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an
8
investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers, namely: Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Soluta,
Teodoro Gimpayan, Vicenta, Edna, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos, Renato Lina, Avelino
9
Meneses, Matilla, and Norman Agtani was filed before the Fiscals Office of Manila, for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act).
10

An Information indicting the union officers was subsequently filed by the Fiscals Office before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila.
After trial, Branch 5 of the RTC acquitted the accused. The trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, with the specimen and/or the marijuana flowering tops allegedly found inside the Union Office
occupied by the accused not admissible in evidence, coupled by the suspicious circumstance of confiscation, for
lack of sufficient evidence, accused Henry Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Rogelio Soluta, Teodoro F. Gimpayan,
Vicente Delola, Edna Bernate, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos, Avelino Meneses, Florentino
Matilla and Norman Agtani, are ACQUITTED of the charge. The bonds they put up for their provisional liberty are
cancelled.
The Branch Clerk is directed to turn over the custody of the seized plastic bag containing flowering tops of
marijuana to the NBI Director as Permanent Custodian of the seized Dangerous Drugs.
SO ORDERED.

11

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter filed before the Manila RTC a
12
Complaint against petitioners et al. including prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista and Atty. Eduardo Tutaan who
assisted in the prosecution of the case against them, for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional
right against illegal search.
13

After trial, Branch 55 of the Manila RTC, by Decision dated June 2, 1994, held the hotel, Panlilio, Maniego and
Villanueva jointly and severally liable for damages as a result of malicious prosecution and illegal search of the
union office. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants Silahis International
Hotel, Inc., Jose Marcel Panlilio, Floro Maniego and Steve Villanueva, individually and collectively, jointly and
severally, to pay to:
1. Plaintiffs Union, Rogelio S. Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna BernateDacanay, jointly, the sum of P70,900.00 as actual damages, and the further sum of P1,000.00 each for the
same plaintiffs, except the Union, in the same concept and nature.
2. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay
the sum of P100,000.00 each for moral damages.
3. Plaintiffs Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna-Bernate-Dacanay the sum of
P30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.

28

4. To all the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of P30,000.00 for and as attorneys fees.
The complaint, insofar as plaintiff Erlisa Ilustrisimo and defendants Ramos, Bautista and Tutaan are concerned, is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All the counterclaims of the defendants are likewise dismissed for lack of factual and legal basis.
Costs against the remaining defendants.
SO ORDERED.

14

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial courts decision. It found herein petitioners et al.
civilly liable for damages for violation of individual respondents constitutional right against illegal search, not for
malicious prosecution, set aside the award of actual damages to respondent union, and reduced the award of
actual damages to individual respondents to P50,000. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the first paragraph of the dispositive portion should read:
"1. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay, jointly,
the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages, and the further sum of P1,000.00 each for the same plaintiffs in the
same concept and nature."
The Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

15

Hence, the present petition of Panlilio and the hotel, they contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE IN THAT:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLICATION OF PEOPLE V. ARUTA (288 SCRA 626[1998]) AND
SECTION 13, RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE INSTANT CASE IS
LEGALLY FLAWED.
2. PETITIONERS SEARCH OF THE UNION OFFICE IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS ENTIRELY
16
REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
17

While petitioners concede that the appellate court correctly cited the principles enunciated in People v. Aruta and
18
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it gravely erred when it applied Aruta to justify
petitioners alleged liability under Article 32 of the New Civil Code. They argue that Aruta does not involve Article 32
19
as nowhere in the decision is there any reference to Article 32.
Similarly, petitioners argue that being private persons, they are not covered by the standards set forth in Aruta as
the constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures is not meant to be invoked against private
20
individuals.
21

Petitioners further argue that the search of the union office was reasonable under the circumstances, given that
the hotel owns the room where the union holds office; the search was not without probable cause as it was
conducted precisely due to reports received by petitioners that the union office was being used as a venue for
22
illegal activities, particularly the sale and/or use of prohibited drugs; and the search was conducted with the
23
consent and in the presence of union officer Babay.

29

The petition fails.

Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
xxxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community and not infrequently
susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against. As the
Code Commission noted,
xxxx
(3) Direct and open violations of the Penal Code trampling upon the freedoms named are not so frequent as those
subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not come within the pale of the penal law. It is in these cunning devices of
suppressing or curtailing freedom, which are not criminally punishable, where the greatest danger to democracy
lies. The injured citizen will always have, under the new Civil Code, adequate civil remedies before the courts
because of the independent civil action, even in those instances where the act or omission complained of does not
24
constitute a criminal offense.
The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly
liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the
defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose,
25
which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of
the plaintiff.
In the present case, as priorly stated, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of
illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers.
Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union
office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of
Babay.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptional instances
when a warrantless search is allowed by law. Petitioners violation of individual respondents constitutional right
against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
26

In MHP Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, a case for unfair competition, the progression of time between the
receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of the therein private respondents premises showed that there
was sufficient time for the therein petitioners and the raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Yet they did not
apply for one. They went on with the raid and seized the goods of the therein private Respondents. Under the
circumstances, this court upheld the grant of damages by the trial court to the therein private respondents for
violation of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.

30

As for petitioners contention that property rights justified the search of the union office, the same does not lie. For
respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the search
27
and seizure.
Neither does petitioners claim that they were allowed by union officer Babay to enter the union office lie. Babays
account of why petitioners and company went to the union office to consider Panlilios suggestion to settle the
mauling incident is more credible, as is his claim that he protested the search, and even asked if they were armed
with a search warrant.
While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing
28
evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof. There must be proof of the following:
(a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver
must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence shows otherwise, however.
That a violation of ones constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the basis for the recovery of
damages under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code, there is no doubt. Since the
29
complaint filed before the trial court was for damages due to malicious prosecution and violation of constitutional
right against illegal search and seizure, the award by the trial court of actual damages to respondent union was
correctly set aside by the appellate court.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved
30
party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the
illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual
respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and
(10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(6) Illegal search;
xxxx
(10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners magnify the citation by the appellate court of Aruta allegedly "to justify [their] liability" under Article 32 of
the Civil Code, which petitioners allege is erroneous as said case did not involve Article 32.
Aruta was, however, cited by the appellate court, not to justify petitioners liability but to rule out the legality of the
search in the union office as the search was not done as an incident of a lawful arrest.
31

Petitioners cite People v. Marti to support their thesis that the determinants in the validity of the constitutional right
against searches and seizure cannot be invoked against private individuals.
But the ruling of this Court in Marti, a criminal case, bears on the issue of whether "an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of [ones] constitutional rights, [may] be invoked against the State." In other words, the issue in
that case was whether the evidence obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity without the
participation of the State, is admissible.

31

The issue in the present civil case, however, is whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of
constitutional rights. As reflected above, Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows
so.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing ratiocinations, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

32

PEOPLE VS MARTI
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:p
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and
Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife,
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang
Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes
(the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita
Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the
contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of
shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II,
8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer
insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of
the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for
shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His
curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried
leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took
several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

33

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6,
1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14,
1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the
rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a
photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of
the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane
wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside
the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered
that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which
allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves
were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after
signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being
the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27,
1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the
attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the
dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were
marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND
SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED
FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL
PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief,
p. 1;Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,
Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

34

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the
1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
uponprobable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)

effects against
shall issue but
or affirmation of
the place to be

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts
which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81
S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible
any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling
earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not
affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling
and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache
& Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos,
144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No.
81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured
by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of
a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his
residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .

35

. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain
from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show
that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended
to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his
dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched
the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of
police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses
are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal.
App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d
938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of
a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence*** complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of
it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it
available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained
through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental
action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing
appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should
not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the
evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument
stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 78; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the
NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest

36

of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no
search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is
not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on
the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559,
71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122
[1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody
of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is
no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals
finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between
individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to
declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
(Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1,
p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of
the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured
by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be
emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of
either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof
(SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30,
1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone
else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by
an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a

37

private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in
serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally
applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to
privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the
undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to
indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave
statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of
his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and
their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear
from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation
as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his
constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original
Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination.
As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled
confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and
nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was
utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner
of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant
met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship
the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave
the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and
contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half
an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the
purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As
stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the
marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The
Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship
the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed
to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989];
People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was
previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January

38

1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise
convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances
(People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172
SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records
further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number.
Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated
in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the
owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

39

PEOPLE VS ARA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 185011

Present:

- versus -

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
*
DEL CASTILLO, JJ.

SPO3 SANGKI ARA y MIRASOL,

MIKE TALIB y MAMA, and JORDAN MUSA y
Promulgated:
BAYAN,
Accused-Appellants.
December 23, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the December 13, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00025B entitled People of the Philippines v. SPO3 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, Mike Talib y Mama, Jordan Musa y
Bayan, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9 in Davao City, convicting accusedappellants of violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

Three Informations charged accused-appellants Sangki Ara, Mike Talib, and Jordan Musa, as follows:

Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against Ara

That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, willfully,
unlawfully and consciously traded, transported and delivered 26.6563 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu, which is a dangerous drug, with the aggravating circumstance of trading,

40

transporting and delivering said 26.6563 grams of shabu within 100 meters from [the] school St.
Peters College of Toril, Davao City.
[1]

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Talib

That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, willfully,
unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control one (1) plastic sachet of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, weighing 0.3559 gram, which is a dangerous drug.
[2]

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Musa

That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, without being authorized by law, willfully,
unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control five (5) big plastic sachet[s] of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu weighing 14.2936 grams, which is a dangerous drug.
[3]

CONTRARY TO LAW.

During their arraignment, accused-appellants all gave a not guilty plea.

Version of the Prosecution

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero, PO2
Ronald Lao, SPO1 Bienvenido Furog, PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr., SPO4 Rodrigo Mallorca, and PO2 Jacy Jay Francia.

In the morning of December 20, 2002, a confidential informant (CI) came to the Heinous Crime Investigation
Section (HCIS) of the Davao City Police Department and reported that three (3) suspected drug pushers had
contacted him for a deal involving six (6) plastic sachets of shabu. He was instructed to go that same morning to
St. Peters College at Toril, Davao City and look for an orange Nissan Sentra car.

[4]

Police Chief Inspector Fulgencio Pavo, Sr. immediately formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO3
Reynaldo Capute, SPO4 Mario Galendez, SPO3 Antonio Balolong, SPO2 Arturo Lascaos, SPO2 Jim Tan, SPO1
Rizalino Aquino, SPO1 Bienvenido Furog, PO2 Vivencio Jumawan, Jr., PO2 Ronald Lao, and PO1 Enrique Ayao,
Jr., who would act as poseur-buyer.

[5]

The team proceeded to the school where PO1 Ayao and the CI waited by the gate. At around 8:45 a.m., an
orange Nissan Sentra bearing plate number UGR 510 stopped in front of them. The two men approached the
vehicle and the CI talked briefly with an old man in the front seat. PO1 Ayao was then told to get in the back seat

41

as accused-appellant Mike Talib opened the door. The old man, later identified as accused-appellant SPO3 Ara,
asked PO1 Ayao if he had the money and the latter replied in the positive. Ara took out several sachets with
crystalline granules from his pocket and handed them to PO1 Ayao, who thereupon gave the pre-arranged signal of
opening the car door. The driver of the car, later identified as accused-appellant Jordan Musa, tried to drive away
but PO1 Ayao was able to switch off the car engine in time. The back-up team appeared and SPO1 Furog held on
to Musa while PO2 Lao restrained Talib. PO1 Ayao then asked Ara to get out of the vehicle.

[6]

Recovered from the group were plastic sachets of white crystalline substance: six (6) big sachets, weighing
26.6563 grams, from Ara by PO1 Ayao; five (5) big sachets, weighing 14.2936 grams, from Musa by SPO1 Furog;
and a small sachet, weighing 0.3559 gram, from Talib by PO2 Lao.

[7]

The three suspects were brought to the HCIS and the seized items indorsed to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic Chemist Austero, who conducted the examination, found that
the confiscated sachets all tested positive for shabu.

[8]

Version of the Defense

The defense offered the sole testimony of Ara, who said that he had been a member of the PNP for 32 years,
with a spotless record. On December 20, 2002, SPO3 Ara was in Cotabato City, at the house of his daughter
Marilyn, wife of his co-accused Musa. He was set to go that day to the Ombudsmans Davao City office for some
paperwork in preparation for his retirement on July 8, 2003. He recounted expecting at least PhP 1.6 million in
retirement benefits.

[9]

Early that morning, past three oclock, he and Musa headed for Davao City on board the

latters car. As he was feeling weak, Ara slept in the back seat.

Upon reaching Davao City, he was surprised to see another man, Mike Talib, in the front seat of the car
when he woke up. Musa explained that Talib had hitched a ride on a bridge they had passed.

[10]

When they arrived in Toril, Ara noticed the car to be overheating, so they stopped. Ara did not know that
they were near St. Peters College since he was not familiar with the area. Talib alighted from the car and Ara
transferred to the front seat. While Talib was getting into the back seat, PO1 Ayao came out of nowhere, pointed
his .45 caliber pistol at Ara even if he was not doing anything, and ordered him to get off the vehicle. He saw that
guns were also pointed at his companions. As the group were being arrested, he told PO1 Ayao that he was also a
police officer. Ara insisted that he was not holding anything and that the shabu taken from him was planted. He
asserted that the only time he saw shabu was on television.

[11]

The Ruling of the Trial Court

42

The RTC pronounced accused-appellants guilty of the crimes charged. In its Decision dated March 1, 2003,
the trial court held that the prosecution was able to establish the quantum of proof showing the guilt of accusedappellants beyond reasonable doubt. It further ruled that the intercept operation conducted by the buy-bust team
was valid.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing the Court finds the following:
In Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002, the accused herein SANGKI ARA Y MASOL, Filipino,
55 years old, widower, a resident of Kabuntalan, Cotabato City, is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, and is CONVICTED of the crime of violation of Sec. 5, 1st paragraph of Republic
Act 9165. He is hereby imposed the DEATH PENALTY and FINE of TEN MILLION PESOS (PhP
10,000,000) with all the accessory penalties corresponding thereto, including absolute perpetual
disqualification from any public office, in view of the provision of section 28 of RA 9165 quoted
above.
Since the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in the
area which is only five (5) to six (6) meters away from the school, the provision of section 5
paragraph 3 Article II of RA 9165 was applied in the imposition of the maximum penalty against the
herein accused.
In Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002, the accused herein MIKE TALIB y MAMA, Filipino, of
legal age, single and a resident of Parang, Cotabato, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt,
and is CONVICTED of the crime of violation of Sec. 11, 3rd paragraph, Article II of Republic Act
9165. He is hereby imposed a penalty of Imprisonment of SIXTEEN (16) YEARS and a fine of
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 300,000) with all the accessory penalties
corresponding thereto.
In Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 the accused herein JORDAN MUSA Y BAYAN, Filipino,
30 years old, married and a resident of Cotabato City, is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt and is CONVICTED of the crime for Violation of Sec. 11, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165. He is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and FINE of
FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 400,000) with all the accessory penalties
corresponding thereto.
SO ORDERED.

[12]

As the death penalty was imposed on Ara, the case went on automatic review before this Court.
[13]

Conformably with People v. Mateo,

we, however, ordered the transfer of the case to the CA.

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

Contesting the RTC Decision, accused-appellants filed separate appeals before the CA. Talib claimed that it
was erroneous for the trial court to have used the complaining witnesses affidavits as basis for ruling that their
arrest was valid. He also cited as erroneous the trial courts refusal to rule that the prosecutions evidence was

43

inadmissible. Lastly, he questioned the failure of the buy-bust team to follow the requirements of RA 9165 on
proper inventory of seized drugs.

Ara and Musa filed a joint brief, alleging the following: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Motion to
Suppress and/or exclude illegally obtained evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying the Demurrer to Evidence;
(3) the trial court failed to consider that the criminal informations did not allege conspiracy among the accused; and
(4) the trial court erred in ruling that the intercept operation was valid.
The CA affirmed the trial courts decision with some modifications on the penalty imposed. It ruled that a
majority of the errors raised in the appeal referred to technicalities in the conduct of buy-bust operations that did not
invalidate the police officers actions. On the issue of the evidence presented, the CA held that the presumption
that police officers performed their duties in a regular manner was not overturned.

The appellate court resolved the issue of the validity of the buy-bust operation by stating that the law requires
no specific method of conducting such an operation. It ruled that to require a warrant of arrest would not accomplish
the goal of apprehending drug pushers in flagrante delicto. The CAs Decision emphasized that all the elements
necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs were established.

The fallo of the December 13, 2007 CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed
March 1, 2003 Decision is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification insofar as the death
penalty imposed upon accused SPO3 Sangki Ara is concerned. Accordingly, his penalty is hereby
reduced to life imprisonment pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
SO ORDERED.

[14]

On December 17, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The
parties, save for Musa, manifested their willingness to forego the filing of additional briefs.

The Issues

Reiterating the matters raised before the CA, accused-appellants alleged the following:
I
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the arrest of the accused-appellants was valid
based on the affidavits of the complaining witnesses
II
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the apparent defects and inconsistencies in the
affidavits of the complaining witnesses

44

III
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider the suppression or exclusion of
evidence
IV
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt

Talib also raises the following grounds for his acquittal:

I
Whether the arrest of Talib was illegal and the evidence confiscated from him illegally obtained
II
Whether the police officers who conducted the illegal search and arrest also deliberately failed
and/or violated the provisions of RA 9165
III
Whether the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses and their respective affidavits were gravely
inconsistent

Ara and Musa additionally raise the following issues:

I
Whether the trial court erred in denying the Demurrer to Evidence
II
Whether the trial court failed to consider that the criminal informations did not allege conspiracy
among the accused

III
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the intercept operation was valid

Accused-appellant Musa also avers that the CA erred in convicting him since the prosecution failed to prove
the corpus delicti of the offense charged.

The Ruling of this Court

What are mainly raised in this appeal are (1) whether the buy-bust conducted was valid; (2) whether the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs were sufficiently established; and (3) whether the chain of
custody over the shabu was unbroken.

Warrantless Arrest and Seizure Valid

45

In calling for their acquittal, accused-appellants decry their arrest without probable cause and the violation of
their constitutional rights. They claim that the buy-bust team had more than a month to apply for an arrest warrant
yet failed to do so.

Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust operation has long been held as a
legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a form of entrapment employed as an effective way of apprehending a
criminal in the act of commission of an offense.

[15]

We have ruled that a buy-bust operation can be carried out after

a long period of planning. The period of planning for such operation cannot be dictated to the police authorities who
are to undertake such operation.

[16]

It is unavailing then to argue that the operatives had to first secure a warrant of

arrest given that the objective of the operation was to apprehend the accused-appellants in flagrante delicto. In fact,
one of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is
when a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a
peace officer or private person.

It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to arrest accused-appellants. Probable
cause, in warrantless searches, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has
been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula for determining
probable cause, for its determination varies according to the facts of each case.

[17]

Probable cause was provided by

information gathered from the CI and from accused-appellants themselves when they instructed PO1 Ayao to enter
their vehicle and begin the transaction. The illegal sale of shabu inside accused-appellants vehicle was afterwards
clearly established. Thus, as we have previously held, the arresting officers were justified in making the arrests as
accused-appellants had just committed a crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1 Ayao.

[18]

Talib and Musa were also

frisked for contraband as it may be logically inferred that they were also part of Aras drug activities inside the
vehicle. This inference was further strengthened by Musas attempt to drive the vehicle away and elude arrest.

Moreover, the trial court correctly denied the Motion to Suppress or Exclude Evidence. We need not reiterate
that the evidence was not excluded since the buy-bust operation was shown to be a legitimate form of entrapment.
The pieces of evidence thus seized therein were admissible. As the appellate court noted, it was within legal
bounds and no anomaly was found in the conduct of the buy-bust operation. There is, therefore, no basis for the
assertion that the trial courts order denying said motion was biased and committed with grave abuse of discretion.

Prosecution Established Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt

For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be established: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.

[19]

All these requisites were met by the prosecution.

46

In contrast, Ara, the sole defense witness, could only proffer the weak defenses of denial and alibi. He
expressed surprise at having Talib in his car and claimed he was framed and that the shabu confiscated from him
was planted. According to the trial court, however, Aras lying on the witness stand was so intense as he tried very
hard in vain to win the Courts sympathy.

[20]

Given the prosecutions evidence, we rule that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties has not been overturned. The presumption remains because the defense failed to present clear and
convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an
improper motive.

[21]

Ara could not explain why his fellow police officers, who did not know him prior to his arrest,

would frame him for such a serious offense.

Validity of Buy-Bust Operation

Likewise questioned by the defense in the affidavits of the police officers was the allegation that there was
a legitimate buy-bust operation. No marked money was presented to back up the police officers claims. This
argument lacks basis, however. There are requirements that must be complied with in proving the legitimacy of
drug buy-bust operations. Nevertheless, this Court has ruled that presentation of the marked money used is not
such a requirement. In the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money does not
create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution, as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proved
and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court.

[22]

In the instant case, the police officers

testimonies adequately established the illegal sale of shabu. The shabu was then presented before the trial
court. The non-presentation of the marked money may, thus, be overlooked as a peripheral matter.

Talib further contends that it is incredible that a shabu transaction would be carried out in a very open and
public place. Contrary to Talibs claim, however, judicial experience has shown that drug transactions have been
conducted without much care for an inconspicuous location.

Thus, we observed in People v. Roldan:

Drug pushing when done on a small level x x x belongs to that class of crimes that may be
committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is
made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public
place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their
illegal trade these factors may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has
sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall, in front of a
[23]
store, along a street at 1:45 p.m., and in front of a house.

47

It is also argued as impossible to believe that even if there was already a deal between the informant and
accused-appellants, it was the apprehending police officer who acted as the buyer and that he requested to see
the shabu first

before

showing

the

money.

These

claims

by

Talib

are

similarly

undeserving

of

consideration. First, there is no uniform method by which drug pushers and their buyers operate. Second, the
choice of effective ways to apprehend drug dealers is within the ambit of police authority. Police officers have the
expertise
operations.

to
[24]

determine

which

specific

approaches

are

necessary

to

enforce

their

entrapment

Third, as long as they enjoy credibility as witnesses, the police officers account of how the buy-bust

operation transpired is entitled to full faith and credit.

[25]

Lastly, these arguments are merely incidental and do not

affect the elements of the crime which have been, in the instant case, sufficiently established.

Talib also alleges that during his testimony, SPO1 Furog was not certain as to the reason he was
apprehending Musa. Another claim is that SPO1 Furog, when examined by the prosecutor and two different
defense lawyers, allegedly made relevant inconsistencies in his testimony. The pertinent exchange reads:
Direct Examination of SPO1 Furog:

Prosecutor Weis:
Q

What was your basis for stopping [Musa] from letting the car

A
I made him [stop] the car[.] [W]e [had] to check them first because
[that] Ara [had] the suspected shabu.

go?
I think Ayao saw

Cross-Examination of SPO1 Furog:

Atty. Estrada
Q
When you arrested Musa as you said, it was because he
attempted to drive the car
away, that was it?
A
The most, when SPO3 Sangki Ara told us that he was a PNP member and when we saw
the substances from the two of them first.
xxxx
Q

You are referring to Musa and Ara?

Yes sir.

[26]

xxxx
Atty. Javines
Q

Ayao did not arrest [Ara] inside the vehicle?

A
Only I rushed to the vehicle. I dont know if he directly
arrested him when he saw the
[27]
substance and [got] out of the
vehicle but I saw him get out from the vehicle.

48

The alleged inconsistencies in SPO1 Furogs reason for apprehending Musa are, however, insignificant and
do not merit much consideration as well. The questioned parts in the testimony of SPO1 Furog do not dent the
totality of evidence against accused-appellants. To repeat, the elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs and
illegal possession of drugs were both sufficiently established. Although SPO1 Furog was not categorical in
explaining his basis for apprehending Musa, the arrest of the latter must be considered as part of a legitimate buybust operation which was consummated. Musas arrest came after the pre-arranged signal was given to the backup team and this served as basis for the police officers to apprehend all those in the vehicle, including Musa.

Denial of Demurrer to Evidence

Although alleged by accused-appellants Ara and Musa, no reason was given in the appeal as to why the trial
court erred in denying their Demurrer to Evidence. Whatever their basis may be, an action on a demurrer or on a
motion to dismiss rests on the sound exercise of judicial discretion.

[28]

[29]

In Gutib v. CA,

we explained that:

A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make
out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole
evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a
demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to
sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

Here, the trial court found competent and sufficient evidence to support a conviction of all three accusedappellants. We see no reason to overturn the trial courts finding.

Allegation of Conspiracy in Information Not Necessary

We find no merit in accused-appellants insistence that conspiracy should have been alleged in the separate
Informations indicting them. We agree with the appellate court, which succinctly stated that conspiracy was not
alleged precisely because they were charged with different offenses for the distinct acts that each of them
committed. Ones possession of an illegal drug does not need to be conspired by another who, on his part, also
possessed an illegal drug.

[30]

The three separate indictments against Ara, Musa, and Talib do not need to allege

conspiracy, for the act of conspiring and all the elements of the crime must be set forth in the complaint or
information only when conspiracy is charged as a crime.

[31]

Requirements of RA 9165 on Proper Inventory

Musa contends that since the markings on the seized items were only made at the police station, there is a
great possibility that these were replaced. The result, he argues, would be a lack of guarantee that what were
inventoried and photographed at the crime laboratory were the same specimens confiscated from the accused.

49

As recently highlighted in People v. Cortez

[32]

[33]

and People v. Lazaro, Jr.,

RA 9165 and its subsequent

Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require strict compliance as to the chain of custody rule. The
arrest of an accused will not be invalidated and the items seized from him rendered inadmissible on the sole ground
of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Article II of RA 9165. We have emphasized that what is essential is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the
custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the
seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.

[34]

The chain of custody in the instant case did not suffer from serious flaws as accused-appellants argue. The
recovery and handling of the seized drugs showed that, as to Ara, first, PO1 Ayao recovered six plastic sachets of
white crystalline substance from Ara and marked them with both his and Aras initials. Second, the sachets were
likewise signed by property custodian PO3 Pelenio. Third, PO1 Ayao signed a Request for Laboratory Examination
then personally delivered the sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Fourth, SPO4 Mallorca then
received the sachets at the crime laboratory.

As to Musa, first, SPO1 Furog seized the sachets from Musa and marked each with his own
initials. Second, an Inventory of Property Seized was then made by SPO4 Galendez. Lastly, SPO1 Furog later
submitted a Request for Laboratory Examination of the five (5) sachets weighing a total of 14.2936 grams to the
PNP Crime Laboratory.

As to Talib, first, PO2 Lao seized a small sachet from Talib during the buy-bust operation. Second, PO2 Lao
delivered a Request for Laboratory Examination of one (1) sachet of suspected shabu weighing 0.3559
gram. Third, SPO4 Mallorca also received the items at the PNP Crime Laboratory.

Forensic Chemist Noemi Austeros examination of the sachets confiscated from all accused-appellants
showed that these were positive for shabu. During trial, the seized items were identified in court. The five (5)
sachets taken from Musa were marked Exhibits A-1 to A-5, while the sachet seized from Talib was marked
Exhibit B. The six (6) sachets taken from Ara were marked Exhibits B1-B6.

We are, thus, satisfied that the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of
the shabu in all three criminal cases against accused-appellants.

The rest of the arguments interposed are evidently without merit and do not warrant discussion.

50

Penalties Imposed

Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Talib

The crime of illegal possession of drugs is punishable by Sec. 11 of RA 9165, as follows:
Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. x x x
xxxx
3)
Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of x x x
methamphetamine hydrochloride x x x.

Talib was sentenced to imprisonment of sixteen (16) years and a fine of PhP 300,000.

Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Musa

The provision Musa was charged of violating provides the following penalty:
(1)
Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;

Musa was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 400,000.

Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against Ara

The crime of illegal sale of shabu is penalized by Sec. 5, Art. 11 of RA 9165:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.

The same section contains the following provision:

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of
any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one
hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

51

Since the sale of shabu was within five (5) to six (6) meters from St. Peters College, the maximum penalty of
death should be imposed on Ara. Pursuant to RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines, however, only life imprisonment and a fine shall be meted on him.

Ara was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 10,000,000. He, however, is no longer eligible for
parole.

What distinguishes this case from others is that one of the accused-appellants was a police officer himself
who should have known better than to break the law he was duty-bound to enforce. What is more, he is charged
with the crime of selling illegal drugs, an offense so horrendous for destroying the lives of its victims and their
families that the penalty of death used to be imposed on its perpetrators. No one could have been more deserving
of such a punishment than someone who should be enforcing the law but caught pushing drugs instead. As it was,
the death penalty was indeed originally imposed on SPO3 Ara, who had been in the service for more than 30 years.

The ill effects of the use of illegal drugs are too repulsive and shocking to enumerate. Thus, once the
charges of sale and possession of said drugs are established in cases such as this, any errors or technicalities
raised by the suspects should not be allowed to invalidate the actions of those involved in curtailing their illegal
activities. The punishments given to drug pushers should serve as deterrent for others not to commit the same
offense. No price seems high enough for drug dealers to pay; it is just unfortunate that the penalty of death can no
longer be imposed because it has been abolished.

As the penalties meted out to all three accused-appellants are within the range provided by RA 9165, we
affirm the CAs sentence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00025B entitled People of
the Philippines v. SPO3 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, Mike Talib y Mama, Jordan Musa y Bayan is AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant Sangki Ara is not eligible for parole.
SO ORDERED.

52

PEOPLE VS PEAFLORIDA
SECOND DIVISION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,

G.R. No. 175604

Present:
*

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
BRION, JJ.

- versus -

SALVADOR PEAFLORIDA, JR.,

Y CLIDORO,
Appellant.

Promulgated:

April 10, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
[1]

Subject of this appeal is the Decision

2006, affirming in toto the judgment

[2]

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01219, dated 31 July

of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, Branch 30, in Criminal Case

No. T-1476. The trial court found appellant Salvador Peaflorida y Clidoro guilty of transporting marijuana and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of one million pesos.

The Information against appellant reads:

th

That on or about the 7 day of June, 1994, in the afternoon thereat, at Barangay Huyon-huyon,
Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to sell, possess and to deliver with the use
of a bicycle, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control
and custody, [o]ne bundle estimated to be one (1) kilo more or less, of dried marijuana leaves
(Indian Hemp) without the necessary license, permit or authority to sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug from a competent
officer as required by law.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

[3]

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

Two police officers and one forensic chemist testified for the prosecution.
SPO3 Vicente Competente (Competente) narrated that in his capacity as chief of the Investigation and
Operation Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) station in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip
from an asset that a bundle of marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another
barangay in Tigaon, Camarines Sur.

[4]

Major Domingo Agravante (Agravante), chief of police of Tigaon, then

organized a team composed of Competente as team leader, SPO2 Ricardo Callo (Callo), SPO1 Portugal, PO3

53

Pillos and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay
[5]

Huyon-huyon.

They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and

found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper together with other grocery items. The amount
of P1550.00 was also found in appellants possession. The police officers confiscated these items and took
photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the headquarters where he was booked.

[6]

Callo, who was the chief intelligence officer of Tigaon PNP, recounted that at around 1:00 p.m. on 7 June
1994, he was called by Competente and was briefed about the operation. While they were in Nasulan, the
members of the police team caught a man riding a bicycle who turned out to be appellant. Callo saw the marijuana
wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper in the bicycle of appellant so the latter was brought to the police
headquarters and turned over to the desk officer.

[7]

Major Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory Regional Office No. V, was
presented as an expert witness to identify the subject marijuana leaves. She related that after taking a
representative sample from the 928-gram confiscated dried leaves, the same was tested positive of marijuana. The
findings were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-26-94 dated 9 June 1994.

[8]

Appellant denied the accusations against him. Appellant, who is a resident of Huyon-huyon, Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, testified that in the morning of 7 June 1994, he first went to the house of Igmidio Miranda
(Miranda) in Sagnay, Camarines Sur. The latter accompanied appellant to the house of Arnel Dadis in San
Francisco, Tigaon to buy a dog. They, however, failed to get the dog; prompting them to leave. On their way home,
they met Boyet Obias (Obias) who requested appellant to bring a package wrapped in a newspaper to Jimmy
Gonzales (Gonzales).

[9]

Appellant placed it in the basket in front of his bicycle and Gonzales proceeded to the

Tiagon town proper. He and Miranda parted ways when they reached the place. Appellant dropped by the grocery
store and the blacksmith to get his scythe. On his way home, he was flagged down by the police and was invited to
go with them to the headquarters. Upon inspection of the package in his bicycle, the police discovered the subject
marijuana. Appellant tried to explain that the package was owned by Obias but the police did not believe him. He
was sent to jail.

[10]

Miranda corroborated the testimony of appellant that the two of them went to San Francisco, Tigaon,
Camarines Sur in the morning of 7 June 1994 to buy a dog. On their way back to the town proper of Tigaon, they
met Obias who requested appellant to bring a package, which Miranda thought contained cookies, to
Gonzales. Upon reaching the town proper, they parted ways.

[11]

On 26 October 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
transporting a prohibited drug, a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known
as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

54

WHEREFORE, the accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] is hereby sentenced to suffer the

penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00)
Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with law, in case of insolvency for the fine and
for him to pay the costs.
The accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] shall be entitled to full credit of his preventive
imprisonment if he agreed to abide with the rules imposed upon convicted person, otherwise, he
shall be entitled to four-fifth (4/5) credit thereof.
The subject marijuana consisting of 928 grams, possession thereof being mala prohibita,
the court hereby orders its confiscation in favor of the Government to be destroyed in accordance
with law.
This court, however, hereby recommends to His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, through the Honorable Secretary of Justice to commute the above penalty herein
imposed, being too harsh; accordingly, the said penalty imposed to accused Salvador
Peaflorida[,Jr] shall be six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day ofprision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

[12]

In convicting appellant, the trial court lent credence to the testimonies of the police officers, thus:
Now going over the evidence adduced, the court is convinced that the accused Salvador
Peaflorida[,Jr.] committed the offense of illegal possession of 928 grams of marijuana, if not, of
transporting it, as charged. This is so, because it appears undisputed that on June 7, 1994, at
about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon police officers Vicente Competente and his four (4) other copolice officers apprehended the accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] on the roadside at Nasulan,
Huyon-huyon, Tigaon, Camarines Sur [,] then riding on his bicycle and placed on the still structure
at its front, a thing wrapped in a newspaper and found to be 928 grams of marijuana. No ill-motive
has been presented by the defense against the police officers Vicente Competente and
companions by falsely testifying against the accused Salvador Peaflorida, Jr. So, the conclusion
is inevitable that the presumption that the police officers were in the regular performance of their
duties apply. The confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case and the arrest of the
accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] by the said police officers being lawful, having been caught in
flagrante delicto, there is no need for the warrant for the seizure of the fruit of the crime, the same
being incidental to the lawful arrest. Rightly so, because a person caught illegally possessing or
transporting drugs is subject to the warrantless search. Besides, object in the plain view of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
[13]
presented as evidence.

In view of the penalty imposed, the case was directly appealed to this Court on automatic review. Pursuant to
[14]

our decision in People v. Mateo,

however, this case was referred to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court

affirmed appellants conviction on 31 July 2006.

In a Resolution

[15]

dated 14 February 2007, the parties were given to file their supplemental briefs, if they so

desire. Both parties manifested their intention not to file any supplemental brief since all the issues and arguments
have already been raised in their respective briefs.

[16]

Hence, the instant case is now before this Court on automatic review.

55

In assailing his conviction, appellant submits that there is doubt that he had freely and consciously
possessed marijuana. First, he claims that the alleged asset did not name the person who would transport the
marijuana to Huyon-huyon. In view of the vague information supplied by the asset, the latter should have been
presented in court. Second, upon receipt of the information from the asset, the police officers should have first
investigated and tried to obtain a warrant of arrest against appellant, instead of arbitrarily arresting him. Third,
appellant maintains that he is not aware of the contents of the package. Fourth, upon arrival at the headquarters,
the police did not determine the contents and weight of the package. Fifth, appellant argues that the findings of the
forensic expert are questionable because there is doubt as to the identity of the package examined.

[17]

Prefatorily, factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witness' credibility are
entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirm the
findings.

[18]

Indeed, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses since it has observed
[19]

firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.

After a review of the records of this

case, we find no cogent reason to disregard this time-honored principle.

We shall retrace the series of events leading to the arrest of appellant and resolve the issues raised by him.

Acting on an assets tip, a police team was organized to apprehend appellant who was allegedly about to
transport the subject marijuana. Appellant is wrong in concluding that the asset did not name appellant. As early
as 16 November 1996, appellant through counsel had already conceded in his Memorandum

[20]

filed with the trial

court that based on the tip, he was about to transport the contraband. It further cited excerpts from the result of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the judge on Competente, and we quote:
Q:
A:

Did your [a]sset tell you the place and the person or persons involved?
Yes[,]sir.

Q:
A:

Where and who?

He said that marijuana is being transported from Tigaon town to Bgy. Huyon-huyon by
[21]
Salvador Peaflorida, Jr.

Moreover, on cross-examination, the defense counsel even assumed that according to the assets tip it was
appellant who was assigned to deliver the contraband. And the witness under cross-examination affirmed it was
indeed appellant who would be making the delivery according to the tip:
Q:
A:

Will you inform this Honorable Court who has given you the tip that the accused was
going to deliver that marijuana[?] [W]ho is [this] person?
It was a confidential tip.

56

Q:
A:

Now, but [sic] on June 1 you were in your office?

Yes[,] sir[.] I was in the office.

Q:

Since your office is just near the Municipal Trial Court of Tigaon and you were given a tip
that Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] will be delivering marijuana, why did you not get a
[w]arrant of [a]rrest?

xxx
Q:

A:
Q:
A:

The tip that was given to you that it was Salvador Peaflorida [who] will be dealing
marijuana on that date and according to you Salvador was to travel from a certain
town to Tigaon, is that the tip?
Yes[,] sir[.] That he would deliver marijuana.
So, at the time that you form[ed] a team, Salvador was nowhere to be seen, you have not
seen the shadow of Salvador?
When the tip was given to us[,] I have not seen him[.] [B]ut the tip is he will deliver from
[22]
Tigaon to Huyon-huyon, that is why we chased him. [Emphasis supplied]

Prescinding from the above argument, appellant insists that the asset should have been presented in
court. He invoked the court ruling in People v. Libag,

[23]

wherein the non-presentation of the informant was fatal to

the case of the prosecution. Libag cannot find application in this case. In that case, the crime charged was the
sale of shabu where the informant himself was a poseur-buyer and a witness to the transaction. His testimony as a
poseur-buyer was indispensable because it could have helped the trial court in determining whether or not the
appellant had knowledge that the bag contained marijuana, such knowledge being an essential ingredient of the
offense for which he was convicted.

[24]

In this case, however, the asset was not present in the police

operation. The rule is that the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction
nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would merely be corroborative and
cumulative. Informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve
their invaluable service to the police.

[25]

Competente testified that his team caught up with appellant who was riding a bicycle. He saw the
marijuana in a package which appellant was carrying inside his basket, thus:
Q:
A:

And so as the team leader x x x and in connection with the instruction of Chief Domingo
Agravante, what did you do?
We used the mobile and proceeded to the place, to the route where the marijuana was
being transported.

Q:
A:

When you said we to whom are you referring to?

The team.

Q:
A:

Were you able to go to the place as you said?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

So, upon reaching the place, [sic] what place was that?
Sitio Nasulan, Barangay Huyon-huyon, Tigaon, Camarines Sur.

57

Q:
A:

And upon reaching the place together with the other member of the team, what did you find
if you found any?
We overtook our suspect while riding in a bicycle and we stopped him.

Q:
A:

And did the suspect stop?

Yes[,] sir.

Q:
A:

Tell us the name of your suspect?

Salvador Peaflorida[,] Jr. y Clidoro.

Q:

And after stopping the accused in this case, what else did you do[,] if any[,] together with
the team?
When we saw the marijuana and other groceries in his bicycle we invited him to the
[26]
headquarters.

A:

Callo also confirmed that he saw appellant transporting and in possession of the subject marijuana:
Q:
A:

When you reached there[,] what happened next?

We have not reached yet [sic] the Huyon-huyon proper. [W]e are in Nasulan when we met
the man who had with him the marijuana.

xxx
Q:
A:

After you talked with the person with marijuana[,] what happened next?
We saw on his bicycle a wrap[ped] marijuana.

Q:
A:

Who was in possession of that?

Salvador Peaflorida[,] Jr.

Q:
A:

How is that person related to the accused in this case now?

He is the one, sir.

Q:
A:

Kindly describe to us the marijuana that you are able to tell that it was marijuana?
It was wrapped on [cellophane] and newspaper. We saw the edges of the marijuana.

Q:

For the [record], kindly describe to us the edges of the marijuana[;] its appearance and
color.
[27]
It was like a shape of ream of coupon bond and the color is green.

A:

These positive and categorical declarations of two police officers deserve weight and credence in light of the
presumption of regularity accorded to them and the lack of motive on their part to falsely testify against appellant.

Appellant resorts to a challenge on the validity of his arrest predicated on lack of a warrant of arrest. The
OSG correctly justifies the failure to apply for an arrest warrant because at that point, time was of the essence in
appellants apprehension, noting in the same breath that there is no law requiring investigation and surveillance
upon receipt of tips from assets before conducting police operations.

[28]

The police officers succinctly testified on

this point when cross-examined, viz:

58

Q:
A:

Will you inform this Honorable Court who has given you the tip that the accused was going
to deliver that marijuana, who is that person?
It was a confidential tip.

Q:
A:

Now, but [sic] on June 1 you were in your office?

Yes[,] sir[.] I was in the office.

Q:

Since your office is just near the Municipal Trial Court of Tigaon and you were given a tip
that Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] will be delivering marijuana, why did you not get a [w]arrant
of [a]rrest from the court?
There was no time to apply for a search warrant because just after the information was
received, we proceeded.

A:

xxx
Q:

If that is true, Mr. Competente that you were given a tip, the most that you will do is first see
the Judge of Tigaon in as much as you have not seen yet [sic] the said person carrying
marijuana?
There was no time for us to apply, because the marijuana is being delivered so we have no
more time to see the Judge.

A:

xxx
Q:

Are you aware of the law that illegally confiscated marijuana cannot be used in court?

FISCAL SOLANO: Conclusion of law.

A:
Yes, sir[.] [I]f it is illegally confiscated it cannot be used in court.
ATTY. CLEDERA: Despite that prohibition under the rules[,] you insisted in apprehending Salvador
Peaflorida[,Jr.] without warrant of arrest inspite of the fact that you know that restriction?
A:
Our apprehension was in plain view.
Q:
A:

How can you see that it was in open view when according to you the house of Salvador is
120 meters[?] [H]ow can you see that distance?
I could see that because the marijuana was carried in his bicycle, we have seen it.

Q:
A:

In what street?
Huyon-huyon[,] Sitio Nasulan, Tigaon, Camarines Sur.

Q:
A:

About what time did you see him?

1:00 oclock sir.

xxx

[29]

The police was tipped off at around 1:00 p.m. that appellant was transporting marijuana to Huyonhuyon. Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit and already
committing a crime. The arrest was effected after appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding
his bicycle and carrying with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then already being
committed. Under the circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a
crime. Thus, the warrantless arrest is justified.

59

Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as broker in any of such transactions. x x x.

Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to another.

[30]

In the instant case,

appellant was riding his bicycle when he was caught by the police. He admitted that he was about to convey the
package, which contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales.
Appellant, however, denies any knowledge that the package in his possession contained marijuana. But
the trial court rejected his contention, noting that it was impossible for appellant not to be aware of the contents of
the package because marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma x x x which would have alarmed
him.

[31]

Taking one step further, the appellate court went on to declare that being mala prohibita, one commits the
crime under R.A. No. 6425 by mere possession of a prohibited drug without legal authority. Intent, motive or
knowledge thereof is not necessary.

[32]

Appellant, in the main, asserts that he did not freely and consciously possess marijuana.

[33]

In criminal

cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused
knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be present
together with his possession or control of such article. Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to
contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over
the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to
[34]

explain absence of animus possidendi.

Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an
accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus
possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually
must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.

[35]

Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of possession in the instant case. First, the
marijuana was found in the bicycle he himself was driving. Second, the police officers first readily saw in plain view
the edges of the marijuana leaves jutting out of the package. Third, it is incredulous that appellant did not ask
Obias what the package contained when the latter requested him to do the delivery errand since the package was
wrapped in a newspaper and weighed almost one kilogram. The same observation was reached by the trial court:

60

Finally, it is very hard for the court to accept the claim of the accused Salvador
Peaflorida[,Jr.] that he does not know that the thing wrapped in a newspaper which Boyet Obias,
now dead, requested the accused Peaflorida[,Jr.] would deliver to a certain Jimmy Gonzales
whose present whereabouts is not known, was a marijuana. Its odor is different especially from
tobacco. This was observed by the court during the trial of the case, everytime the wrapper
containing the subject marijuana with a volume of 928 grams is brought to court its odor is
noticeable. For the accused Peaflorida[,Jr.], not to notice it is hard to believe. Rightly so,
because marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma very different from (and not
[36]
nauseating) unlike tobacco. This aroma would have alarmed him.

Furthermore, it appeared from the cross-examination of appellant that Obias was an acquaintance. In the
ordinary course of things, one is expected to inquire about the contents of a wrapped package especially when it is
a mere acquaintance who requests the delivery and, more so, when delivery is to a place some distance away.
Anent appellants claim that the package examined by Arroyo was not the one confiscated from him, the
appellate court had this to say:
SPO3 Competente testified that marijuana was confiscated from appellant. The pictures of
appellant, together with the items seized from him, depict a package containing dry leaves
suspected to be marijuana. On the other hand, Forensic Chemist Arroyo testified that the
specimen she examined was delivered to her by Major Agravante on June 9, 1994 or two days
after the apprehension. From these series of events, it can be inferred that the package
confiscated from appellant and the specimen delivered to Forensic Chemist Arroyo for laboratory
[37]
examination were one and the same.

Despite intense grilling from the defense counsel, Arroyo never faltered and was in fact consistent in
declaring that she received the specimen from Agravante on 9 June 1994 and immediately conducted the
laboratory test.

Finally, the lower courts correctly sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of one million pesos by virtue of the amendment to Section 4, R.A. No. 6425 by R.A. No. 7659.

[38]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines
Sur, Branch 30 in Criminal Case No. T-1476, finding appellant Salvador Peaflorida y Clidoro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

61

MORENO VS AGO CHI

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4680

January 9, 1909

ROBERTO MORENO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
AGO CHI (alias GO CAY CHI), defendant-appellee.
Roberto Moreno, in his own behalf.
No appearance for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
The facts presented in this case seem to be as follows:
In the month of May, 1904, a complaint was presented against the defendant charging him with the crime of
assassination. He was arrested and tried for said crime in the Court of First Instance in the city of Manila. The
plaintiff and appellant was appointed by the court to defend the defendant de oficio during the progress of the trial.
The defendant at the close of the trial was found guilty of the crime charged and was sentenced with the penalty of
death. From that sentence the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. That court, after a consideration of the
case, on the 30th day of April, 1906, modified the finding of the lower court and sentenced the defendant to be
1
imprisoned for a period of twenty years of reclusion temporal. The defendant was represented in the Supreme
Court by another lawyer.
At the time the defendant was arrested under the complaint presented in the Court of First Instance, the officer
making the arrest found upon his person about P700, which said officer took possession of and deposited the same
with the clerk of the court.
On the 30th day of October, 1906, the plaintiff presented a petition in the Court of First Instance setting up that his
services in defending the defendant de oficio in said court were reasonably worth the sum of P600, and prayed the
court to make an order directing the clerk to turn over to him (the plaintiff and appellant), of the money which had
been taken from the defendant, the sum of P600. No action was taken upon this petition of the plaintiff and
appellant until the 3rd day of January, 1907, when the plaintiff and appellant filed with the Court of First Instance a
copy of an execution which had been issued by Jose M. Quintero, justice of the peace of Manila, from which copy
of the writ of execution it appears that said justice had rendered a judgment against the defendant and in favor of
the plaintiff, on the 27th day of December, 1906, for the sum of P550 and costs. At the time of this judgment by the
justice of the peace it is to be supposed, at least, that the defendant was in Bilibid Prison, serving the sentence of
the Supreme Court, and the record does not disclose whether or not she was present during the trial or had
received any notice of the action pending against him in said court of the justice of the peace.
On the same day (the 3rd day of January, 1907) the plaintiff and appellant presented another petition to the Court
of First Instance, praying that the court order the clerk to pay to him, out of the money in his hands, the sum of
P559.24, to apply on said judgment obtained before the justice of the peace. On the 4th day of January, 1907, the
judge of the said Court of First Instance fixed the 5th day of January for the hearing on the said petition and ordered
that the defendant be brought into the court for the purpose of being heard upon said motion. The record discloses
that the defendant was brought into court on the day fixed for the hearing and then and there stated to the court
that he was willing that a portion of the money originally taken from him by the officer making the arrest might be
applied upon the execution, but that he wished some of it reserved for his own use.

62

After hearing the respective parties, the judge of the lower court ordered that the clerk pay to the plaintiff and
appellant, out of said money, the sum of P50 and further ordered that the balance should be retained by the clerk
for the benefit of the defendant. From this order of the lower court the plaintiff appealed.
The plaintiff and appellant makes two assignments of error as follows:
First. That the court erred in arbitrarily fixing the value of the services rendered by him in the trial of said cause at
the sum of P50, and in not ordering the clerk to pay to him the sum of P550.
Second. That the lower court erred in not ordering the clerk of the court to pay to the plaintiff or to the sheriff of the
said court, a sum equal to the amount mentioned in said execution.
The fact is not denied that the money which the plaintiff and appellant is attempting to secure was taken from the
defendant at the time of his arrest and was by such officer turned over to the clerk of the court.
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which
was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the
means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause; but there
is very serious doubt whether an officer making an arrest has the right to take from the defendant any property
found upon his person, unless for some of the reasons just mentioned. (Rex vs. Burgis, 7 Carrington and Payne,
English Reports, 488; Houghton vs. Bachman, 47 Barber, N.Y., 388; 1st Bishop's Criminal Procedure, secs. 210212.)
Unless some of these special reasons exist the officer should not deprive the defendant of the possession of his
property. (Rex vs. Johnson, 11 Modern Reports, English, 62; Rex vs. Jones, 6 Carrington and Payne, 343.)
To deprive the defendant of his money or property under other circumstances than those mentioned above is to
deprive him, perhaps, of the lawful means of defense. (Rex vs. Jones, supra; Clark's Criminal Procedure, 71; 1st
Bishop's Criminal Procedure, secs. 210-212.)
But what becomes of the property of the person arrested when the officer making the arrest has taken possession
of the same and after the termination of the trial it appears conclusively that such property was in no way connected
with the commission of the offense for which the defendant was arrested? If the property was in no way connected
with the commission of the offense, at the termination of the trial it is the duty of the court to order the officer in
possession of the same to return it to the defendant. The custody of the officer of such property in no way deprives
the defendant of his right therein and such custody should be considered as the custody of the defendant under
these circumstances.
But the question arises, may third persons, creditors for example of the defendant, obtain a lien or claim upon such
property while it is in the possession of such officer? We are of the opinion, and so hold, that third persons,
creditors, etc., can not acquire any claim or lien upon such property while thus in the hands of the officer, which
they might not acquire had the property remained in the custody of the defendant himself. To hold otherwise would
lead to unlawful and forcible searches of the person under cover of criminal of debts. When it is fully shown that the
collection of debts. When it is fully shown that the property so taken was in no way connected with the crime
charged, the court should not permit any advantage to be taken of the defendant, by reason of the fact that he had
been deprived of his property by the officer and against his will. (Commercial Exchange Bank vs. McLeod, 65 Iowa,
665; 54 American Reports, 36; 1 Archibald Criminal Pleading and Procedure, 34, 35; Wharton's Criminal Pleading
and Practice, sec. 61.)
It is therefore, the duty of the judge, under facts such as existed in this case, at the close of the trial to order such
property returned to the defendant.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore hereby reversed and it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded
to the lower court with direction that an order be issued returning to the defendant the money or property which was
taken from the person at the time of his arrest. So ordered.

63

64

PEOPLE VS ANG CHUN KIT

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109232 December 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANG CHUN KIT also known as "ROMY ANG," accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
ANG CHUN KIT, a Chinese national and reputed to be a member of a Hong Kong-based drug syndicate operating
in Metro Manila, was collared by NARCOM operatives in a buy-bust operation after he sold to an undercover agent
for P400,000.00 a kilo of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu. His car also yielded more of the
regulated drug neatly tucked in a Kleenex box.
On 8 November 1991, at three o'clock in the afternoon, a Confidential Informer (CI) reported to Chief Investigator
Avelino I. Razon that he (CI) had arranged a transaction with a drug dealer interested in selling a kilo of shabu for
P400,000.00 and agreed to consummate the sale at seven o'clock that evening at the lobby of the Cardinal Santos
Medical Center. Chief Investigator Razon immediately organized a buy-bust team composed of Chief Inspector
Rolando Magno as team leader, SPO3 Lolita Bugarin, SPO2 Cesar Jacobo as poseur-buyer, SPO2 Albert San
Jose, and SPO2 Domingo Rubi. Forty (40) bundles of genuine and counterfeit P100-bills were prepared with each
bundle supposed to contain P10,000.00. To camouflage the counterfeit bills genuine P100-bills were placed on the
top and bottom of ten (10) bundles.
At five o'clock in the afternoon the team went to the Cardinal Santos Medical Center. The CI and SPO2 Jacobo who
was carrying the plastic bag of money proceeded to the lobby of the hospital while the others moved around to
avoid detection. At fifteen minutes past seven the accused arrived in a gray Toyota Corolla with Plate No. TBC-958.
He was met at the lobby by the CI who introduced SPO2 Jacobo to him as the person interested to buyshabu. After
allowing the accused a quick look at the bundles of money, SPO2 Jacobo and the CI followed him to the parking lot
where the latter took out from the trunk of his car a blue SM Shoemart plastic bag and handed it to SPO2 Jacobo.
After ascertaining that the bag contained approximately one (1) kilo of shabu, SPO2 Jacobo handed the boodle
money to the accused. Then SPO2 Jacobo casually lit a cigarette to signal to the other NARCOM operatives to
move in and effect the arrest. The other members of the team closed in, placed the accused under arrest and
seized the money from him. They also searched his vehicle and found on the dashboard of his car three (3)
packets more of crystalline substance in a Kleenex box.
SPO3 San Jose brought the regulated drug recovered from the accused to the PC Crime Laboratory where after a
qualitative examination the forensic chemist confirmed the substance found in the SM Shoemart bag and in the
Kleenex box to be shabu and weighing 983.27 grams and 293.70 grams, respectively:
The accused refuted the charges. He tried to explain his presence at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center thus: In
the early evening of 8 November 1991 as he was preparing to have dinner with some friends in Greenhills, San
Juan, he received a telephone call from his friend Johnny Sy asking if he could ride with him to Greenhills to visit a
sick friend at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center. Since he (accused) was able to borrow the car and the driver of
his cousin Roman Ong, he acceded to Johnny. He passed for him and his friend Anthony Co and brought them to
the medical center. Johnny and Anthony alighted in front of the lobby. He proceeded to the parking lot with the

65

driver and answered the call of nature. Then he lit a stick of cigarette. However some twenty (20) to thirty (30)
minutes later, plainclothesmen with guns drawn, Johnny and Anthony in tow, suddenly appeared from nowhere and
arrested him and Uy without informing them the reason for their arrest. He together with Uy, Sy and Co was then
brought to Camp Crame where he was mauled, detained and interrogated without the assistance of counsel. His
repeated requests to make a telephone call to his relatives and counsel were denied.
Loreto Jacobe, the security guard on 12-hour duty at the hospital starting seven o'clock that evening, testified that
from the time he took his post that night until he left there was no untoward incident at the hospital lobby or in its
vicinity as reflected in the logbook. His statements were corroborated by his supervisor Vicente Praga. The
accused concludes that if there was indeed an unusual incident at the lobby, e.g., sale of regulated drugs, then the
security guards on duty would have noted it in their logbook.
1

On 14 August 1992 the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 155, giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, found appellant Ang Chun Kit also known as "Romy Ang" guilty of selling shabu in violation
of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425, as amended, sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered him to pay a fine of
P30,000.00. Hence this appeal.
The accused maintains his innocence and faults the trial court in not holding that the crime could not have been
committed under the circumstances narrated by the arresting officers and that the alleged buy-bust operation was a
frame-up and the evidence merely planted. He argues that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since every piece of evidence presented against him is tainted with constitutional infirmities.
2

We are not impressed. The crux of this appeal hinges on the credibility of witnesses. In People v. Co we said that
"[i]t is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on
appeal with the highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the
3
stand and determine if they are telling the truth or not." Corollarily, in People v. Ballagan we ruled that "[i]n a long
line of decisions this Court has consistently held that the findings of facts of a trial judge who has seen the
witnesses testify and who has observed their demeanor and conduct while on the witness stand should not be
disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, may
affect the outcome of the case. When the issue is one of credibility of witnesses the appellate courts will generally
not disturb the trial court's findings." In the case before us we do not see any fact of substance and value which
may have been overlooked by the trial court. Consequently, we defer to its holding that ". . . indeed the prohibited
drugs in question were confiscated from the accused Ang Chun Kit alias "Romy Ang" when he sold the drugs to
4
poseur-buyer SPO2 Cesar Jacobo."
Moreover, we do not believe that Police Officers Jacobo, Rubi and San Jose, all public officials who enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, will enmesh themselves in falsehood and implicate the
accused unless they have been impelled by an evil or ulterior motive. But neither the accused nor the record offers
any. As correctly observed by the trial court, "[o]f the thousands, nay, millions of people in Metro Manila, why would
5
the police officers single out the accused to be the object of a frame-up." While the accused maintains that he is a
6
victim of a frame-up, which is the usual defense put up by persons accused of being drug pushers, he failed to
substantiate his claim. It is settled that where there is no evidence to indicate that a prosecution witness was
actuated by improper motive the presumption is that he was not so actuated and that he would not prevaricate and
7
cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury; hence his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
The accused underscores what he perceived to be a flip-flopping stance of poseur-buyer SPO2 Jacobo. In one
instance Jacobo said that he saw the shabu at the hospital lobby contrary to the version of the prosecution
witnesses that the prohibited substance was taken from the trunk of the car after the accused, the poseur-buyer
and the CI emerged from the hospital lobby. The defense would lay emphasis on the seeming discrepancy between
the statements of SPO2 San Jose that they did not apply ultraviolet powder on the marked money as that was
being done by the PC Crime Laboratory, and that of SPO2 Jacobo that the marked money was not treated with
ultraviolet powder since they ran out of it.
We do not consider the supposed inconsistencies substantial or of such nature as to cast serious doubt on the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. On the contrary they appear to be more of honest lapses which do not
impair the intrinsic credibility of their testimonies. Thus when later asked by the trial court with regard to the marked

66

money SPO2 Jacobo clarified that after he showed the boodle to the accused the latter immediately left for his car

COURT.
Q: Where did you show the money?
WITNESS.
A: At the lobby of the Cardinal Santos, sir.
Q: After showing the boodle money what did the accused do?
A: He then proceeded to his car, sir.

It is elementary in the rule of evidence that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect
to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration nor the veracity or weight of
9
their testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even serve to strengthen the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony and thus can be considered a badge of truth rather than of
falsehood. Consequently we consider innocuous whatever discrepancies there were in the testimonies of the
government agents.
For sure the alleged inconsistencies do not detract from the established fact that the accused was caught
inflagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation since the arresting agents were able to give an otherwise
clear and convincing account of the circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused. And, in every prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs what is material and indispensable is the submission of proof that the sale of
illicit drug took place between the seller and the poseur-buyer.
The accused submits that "it is beyond human comprehension how such a big transaction, illegal at that, could be
10
perfected . . . in front of the watchful eyes of so many people."
We can comprehend. From the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, which we find credible, the exchange was
casual and swift: the accused was introduced to the poseur-buyer by the CI; he was shown the money; he passed
on the prohibited drug to the poseur-buyer. There was no verification of the identity of the buyer. Neither was the
money counted nor tests conducted to determine the quality and quantity of the regulated drug. There was no
need.
The accused knew the CI who introduced the poseur-buyer to him. There was rapport at once. Thus the transaction
which was consummated in the parking lot of the hospital is no different from an ordinary drug-pushing informal,
casual, daring and swift where the peddlers at times operate in the open and in the presence of other people,
11
12
13
14
e.g., in a billiard hall, in front of a store, along a street at 1:45 p.m., in front of a house, which does not
15
necessarily discourage them from plying their trade as these may even serve to camouflage their illicit trade. As
we have said, there was nothing absurd in such a scenario. The selling of regulated or prohibited drugs to complete
strangers, openly and in public places, has become a common occurrence, a sad fact which this Court has taken
notice of and attributed to the growing casualness of drug pushers in the pursuit of their clandestine activity, as if it
16
were a perfectly legitimate operation involving no particular caution or qualm of conscience. Drug pushers have
become increasingly daring in the operation of their trade and have not hesitated to act openly, almost casually,
17
even in scornful violation of the law, in selling the illegimate merchandise to any and all buyers.
The accused then harps on the testimonies of his witnesses, the security guards on duty, that "there was nothing
18
untoward that happened at the hospital lobby or premises." If we were to believe these security guards in their
version then all the more should we discredit the accused himself who narrated that while he was at the parking lot
of the hospital several armed men and women with drawn guns suddenly swooped down on him, pointed their
weapons at him, ordered him to raise his hands in the air and then arrested him for no apparent reason. Certainly, if
these security guards were conscientious in the performance of their duties, as how the accused would like them to
appear, then they should have noticed and noted in their logbook the arrest of the accused in the hospital parking

67

lot which was just a few meters away from the lobby. Accordingly, we cannot give full faith to the testimonies of
defense witnesses Jacobe and Praga.
The defense also asks the Court to reject the story of the prosecution that the shabu was contained in one plastic
bag instead of several small plastic bags as how drug dealers would normally pack the prohibited drug for easy
concealment. We cannot yield. While the swiftness with which the transaction was undertaken is reminiscent of
small-time drug-pushing, what is involved in the case at bench is not a measly sum of money and a small quantity
of drugs that could be packed in tea bags but a wholesale deal involving P400,000.00 and a kilo of shabu.
The defense then faults the prosecution for its failure to present the marked money and urges the Court to
19
applyPeople v. Distrito where in acquitting the accused we said that "[n]o marked money was seized from (him)
as none passed from the alleged buyers to the alleged sellers." But the reliance on People v. Distrito is misplaced.
We have ruled often enough that the absence of marked money used in buy-bust operations does not create a
20
hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution. Parenthetically, if the defense only read People v. Distrito carefully it
would have realized that in that case there was really no exchange of money as even the policemen admitted that
they arrested the suspect before an actual buy-bust operation could be effected, unlike in the case at bench where
there was an actual exchange of illegal merchandise for money.
The accused also takes to task the absence of a blotter report before the buy-bust operation and the supposed
failure of the apprehending officers to seal the plastic bag of shabu upon its seizure. These are trivialities which do
not abate the fact that the accused was arrested after he unlawfully sold methamphetamine hydrochloride to
NARCOM agents. Suffice it to say that a prior blotter report and the sealing of the plastic bag of shabu are not
indispensable nor required in buy-bust operations.
The defense argues that the shabu found inside the car is inadmissible in evidence as it was procured through an
illegal search and seizure, the same having been found inside the car and not in the person of the accused who
was outside the car. But the search inside the car was an incident of a lawful arrest. It must be remembered that
the accused was with a driver who was inside the car. Upon the arrest of the accused, the arresting agents also
had to neutralize the driver inside the car who could be presumed at that instance to be acting together and in
conspiracy with the accused. For a weapon could have easily been concealed in the dashboard of the vehicle
which was very well within the reach of the driver at that time. Corollarily, in People v. Figueroa we reiterated that
"[t]he warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of
21
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control." Thus whether the
accused gave his consent to the search of the car which the arresting agents say he did, but which he denies, is
immaterial.
We however agree with the accused that his signature on the receipt or lists of items confiscated from him is
inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing that he was then assisted by counsel. In People v. Mauyao we said
that "conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged,
since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. They have been obtained in violation
of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
22
records to show that he was assisted by counsel." With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we
already said in People v. Morico that "when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police
station he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The
Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of
an arrest. It is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is
23
not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction."
But as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, accused Ang Chun Kit's conformity to the questioned documents has
not been a factor in his conviction since his guilt has been adequately established by the detailed and unshaken
testimonies of the officers who apprehended him. Hence even disregarding the questioned documents we still find
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Interestingly, we find it difficult to believe the version of the accused. He did not even present Johnny Sy or Anthony
Co to substantiate his story, much less did he reveal the name of the patient they were to visit in the hospital.
Besides it appears that there was no reason for the accused to wait for Johnny Sy and Anthony Co in the parking

68

lot as they did not have any prior agreement to meet there. On the contrary the accused still had to attend a dinner
somewhere and should not have waited any longer.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Ang Chun Kit also known as "Romy Ang"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A.
6425, as amended, sentencing him to life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

69

PEOPLE VS LUA
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 114224-25. April 26, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO LUA Y NERI, accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES; ACCORDED GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT ON APPEAL. -The thrust of this appeal is laid
on the credibility of the witnesses. Time and again this court has ruled that the findings of the lower court
respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless substantial facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter which if considered would materially
affect the result of the case, this court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court.
2. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES; APPLICABLE IN
CASE AT BAR. - We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court. The appellant
asseverates that the police arrested him at all cost to save face and to project that OPLAN SATURN was
successfully carried out. Such allegation is a mere conjecture bereft of factual basis. In drug related cases,
the accused would most often raise the defense of being framed up. However, for that defense to prosper, the
evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak defense that is easy to concoct but
difficult to prove. In the absence of proof, the presumption is that the police officers regularly performed their
official duties.
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONIES; STANDS IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO
INDICATE THAT THE PRINCIPAL PROSECUTION WITNESS WAS ACTUATED BY IMPROPER MOTIVE
TO FALSELY TESTIFY AGAINST THE ACCUSED. - The appellant failed to convincingly show any ill motive
on the part of prosecution witnesses to testify falsely and to impute to him such grave offenses. It is settled
that where there is no evidence to indicate that a principal prosecution witness was actuated by improper
motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated. He would not prevaricate and cause damnation to one
who brought him no harm or injury.
4.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR MATTERS. - The imputed
inconsistencies regarding the time when the arresting officers arrived at the appellants residence and the date
when the markings on the recovered gun were placed do not affect the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. This Court finds the same too minor to matter, the same having been satisfactorily explained by
the prosecution witnesses. Thus, in People v. Gonzales (G.R. No. 106098, 7 December 1993, 228 SCRA
293) we held that testimonial discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of memory which tend to
strengthen rather than weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.

5. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; ARTICLES SEIZED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF A VALID SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO

A LAWFUL ARREST; ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. - Having settled the issues raised by appellant, the
equally important matter as regards admissibility of the evidence should likewise be passed upon. The buybust operation conducted by the police operatives is a form of entrapment allowed by law. The arrest of the
appellant was lawful having been caught in flagrante delicto. Consequently, there is no need for a warrant for
the seizure of the 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams) the same being the fruit of the crime. With respect
to the body search made by Puno, the same was valid being incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore, the .38
cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the empty shell found in the cylinder are admissible in evidence.
6.

ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST; LIMITED TO BODY SEARCH AND TO THAT
POINT WITHIN THE REACH OR CONTROL OF THE PERSON ARRESTED OR THAT WHICH MAY
FURNISH HIM WITH THE MEANS OF COMMITTING VIOLENCE OR OF ESCAPING. - As regards the brick
of marijuana found inside the appellants house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its
inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made

70

inside appellants house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search
warrant. Such search cannot fall under search made incidental to a lawful arrest, the same being limited to
body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with
the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his
house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his
reach or control.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED FOR THE VIOLATION OF
SECTION 4, ARTICLE II THEREOF; DEPENDS ON THE QUANTITY OF DRUGS INVOLVED. - This Court
finds accused-appellant Rolando Lua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425,
as amended, under which the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to
thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed. However, with the passage of R.A. 7659, which took effect on 31
December 1993, amending certain sections of The Dangerous Drugs Act, the imposable penalty for the sale or
delivery of prohibited drug is prision correccional to reclusion temporal if the quantity involved is less than 750
grams of marijuana. Taking into account that appellant is not shown to be a habitual delinquent and the said
amendatory provision being favorable to him, the quantity of marijuana involved being only 5.3934 grams or
less than 750 grams, the aforestated penalty imposed under R.A. 7659 should be applied. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, and following People v. Simon, the imposable penalty
shall be prision correccional in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (day) to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
8. ID.; P.D. 1866; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. - On the charge of
illegal possession of firearms, we sustain the finding and conclusion of the trial court. The prosecution has
indubitably established the existence of the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets, and the fact that
appellant did not have the necessary license or permit to possess the same. Accordingly, under Sec. 1 of P.D.
No. 1866, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed, the
range of which is seventeen (17) years four (4) months and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. Considering
the pertinent provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by law, while the minimum shall not be lower than the minimum likewise fixed
by law.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ross Bautista Law Firm for accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
[1]

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City finding accused-appellant
[2]
[3]
Rolando Lua y Neri guilty of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. No. 6425 as amended, and of P.D. No. 1866.
Pursuant to OPLAN SATURN, a program addressing the growing drug problem in Bagong Silang, Caloocan
City, a buy-bust operation was conducted by police operatives for the entrapment of Rolando Lua.
At 12 oclock noon of 30 March 1991, Lt. Norberto Surara, Commander of Bagong Silang Police Sub-station,
Caloocan City, and his men discussed plans to serve a search warrant on alleged drug pusher Hilario Talavera and
to conduct a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant Rolando Lua alias Chekwa. To verify the report on the
illegal drug activities of appellant, Ulysses Orlino, a police informer, was dispatched to the vicin of Lua. A few
moments later, Orlino returned confirming the report on appellants illegal operations near his residence at Bo. Sto.
Nio, Tala, Caloocan City. Two teams were formed, one to conduct the buy-bust operation, and the other, to serve
the search warrant on Hilario Talavera. Police Officers Constantino Guerrero, Marino Puno, Jose Marte and
Alfredo Antonio formed the buy-bust team. Guerrero was designated as poseur-buyer. Before leaving the station
Guerrero, in the presence of SPO3 Perfecto Sobejana and other police officers, marked with X and his initials
C.G. 3 P10-bills to be used in the entrapment of appellant.
Guerrero and his buy-bust team arrived at Bo. Sto. Nio at 4 oclock in the afternoon together with their
informant Ulyssess Orlino. Orlino pointed to Guerrero the appellant who was then outside the door of his

71

house. The team strategically positioned themselves near a neighboring house while Guerrero approached
accused-appellant Lua and said, Chekwa, pa score nga, and simultaneously handed him the 3 marked P1Obills. Appellant took the money and went inside his house. Shortly after, he returned with 3 small tea bags of
marijuana which he gave to Police Officer Guerrero. At this juncture, Guerrero signaled to his companions to close
in. He then grabbed appellant by the hand after introducing himself as a police officer and arrested him. Guerrero
recovered the marked money from the other hand of appellant.
When the rest of the team approached Guerrero and appellant Lua, PO Marino Puno noticed something
bulging from the waistline of appellant so he immediately frisked him. Puno lifted Luas shirt and found a .38
cal. paltik in the latters possession. Guerrero who was standing beside the accused grabbed the handgun which
had two (2) live bullets and an empty shell in the cylinder. When Lua was asked where he kept the rest of the
marijuana he unhesitatingly replied that they were inside his house. Accompanied by the police operatives,
appellant went inside his house and in the presence of his wife pointed to the police officers a soapbox containing a
brick of dried marijuana. Puno showed the marijuana brick to those around him including appellants household.
After the operation, appellant together with the pieces of evidence against him, namely, 3 marked P10-bills
with serial numbers RB886096, PF245345, QF260152; 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams); marijuana brick
inside a soapbox (209.00 grams); and, a .38 cal. paltik with two (2) live bullets and an empty shell, were
surrendered to the team leader, SPO3 Perfecto Sobejana, and Lt. Surara who were both waiting at the barangay
hall. SPO3 Sobejana and Patrolmen Guerrero, Puno, Antonio and Marte jointly executed a sworn statement on
their operation.
At six oclock in the evening appellant Rolando Lua as well as the pieces of evidence found in his possession
were referred to PO3 Gilbert Dioso for investigation.
On 1 April 1991 PO3 Dioso prepared a referral letter to the National Bureau of Investigation for laboratory
examination and chemical analysis of the 3 tea bags and the brick of marijuana wrapped in a newsprint and placed
inside a plastic bag. The following day, 2 April 1991, Dioso also prepared a referral letter to the Inquest Fiscal of
Caloocan City for proper evaluation and disposition of the cases against appellant.
On the same day the National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Alicia Liberato submitted her Reports
Nos. DDM-91-249 and DDM-91-250 finding the specimens positive for marijuana.
Parenthetically, on 6 July 1992, PNP Senior Superintendent Antonio T. Sierra, Chief of the Firearms and
Explosive Office, issued a certification that accused-appellant Rolando Lua was not a licensed nor a registered
firearm holder of any kind and caliber after verifying the computerized master list of all licensed firearm holders.
Separate informations for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, and for violation of P.D. 1866
were filed against Rolando Lua.
The appellant has a different account of the events. He says that at around 4 oclock in the afternoon of 30
March 1991 while sleeping in his house with his 3-year old daughter he was awakened from his sleep when a
certain Resty, a security guard of the Tala Leprosarium, handcuffed him. He asked Resty why, but he received no
answer. According to appellant Resty was with three (3) other companions - Rodel Ginco who was also a security
guard at the Tala Leprosarium, Boy Mano who was a civilian, and Police Officer Guerrero. Then he was boarded in
an owner-type jeep and brought to the other barangay in front of Hilario Talavera s house. He also claims he was
transferred to a parked mobile car where he saw Edgardo Calanday inside the car also handcuffed. From where
he was sitting he could see the police operatives walking to and fro inside Talaveras house. Then they were
brought to the administration site outside the Tala Leprosarium where they stayed for an hour, after which they
were brought to the Bagong Silang Detachment where they were detained for three (3) days.
Appellants neighbor, Catalino Hidacan, corroborated the testimony of appellant. Hidacan testified that after
the arrest the persons who nabbed the appellant returned and entered the latters house. However, when they went
out, they were already carrying with them something wrapped in a newspaper while one of them was holding a gun.
Appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court: (a) in sustaining the prosecution and disregarding
completely the testimony of defense witness Catalino Hidacan; (b) in according probative weight to the testimonies
of the police officers on the disputable presumption that they regularly performed their duties thus disregarding the
right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt; and, (c) in not taking
judicial notice of his physical condition when his hands were closed and clinched because of Hansens disease or
leprosy so that it is highly improbable to possess a firearm and violate P.D. 1866.

72

The thrust of this appeal is laid on the credibility of the witnesses. Time and again this court has ruled that the
findings of the lower court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless substantial
facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter which if considered would materially
affect the result of the case, this court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court.
We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court. The appellant asseverates that the
police arrested him at all cost to save face and to project that OPLAN SATURN was successfully carried out. Such
allegation is a mere conjecture bereft of factual basis. In drug related cases, the accused would most often raise
the defense of being framed up. However, for that defense to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and
convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak defense that is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. In the absence of proof, the
presumption is that the police officers regularly performed their official duties. Moreover, the appellant failed to
convincingly show any ill motive on the part of prosecution witnesses to testify falsely and to impute to him such
grave offenses. It is settled that where there is no evidence to indicate that a principal prosecution witness was
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated. He would not prevaricate and cause
[4]
damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury.
Appellant would persuade us that the police narration of facts could not be freed from material inconsistencies,
thus the disputable presumption that the police officers acted regularly in pursuance of their official duties must be
rendered subordinate to the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
We are not convinced. The imputed inconsistencies regarding the time when the arresting officers arrived at
the appellants residence and the date when the markings on the recovered gun were placed do not affect the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. This court finds the same too minor to matter, the same having been
[5]
satisfactorily explained by the prosecution witnesses. Thus, in People v. Gonzales we held that testimonial
discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of memory which tend to strengthen rather than weaken
credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Contrary to appellants claim, the guilt of the
accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of PO Guerrero was sufficient to show
that indeed appellant committed the offenses with which he was charged. It was established that appellant sold
and delivered prohibited drug to PO Guerrero who acted as poseur-buyer knowing fully well that what he sold and
delivered was a prohibited drug.
As regards the third assigned error, we do not find the same compelling enough to exculpate the
appellant. Leprosy or Hansens disease is a chronic granulomatous infection of humans which attacks superficial
[6]
tissues, especially the skin and peripheral nerves. The infection normally results in the loss of touch but the
patient does not really lose his motor functions. Only in severe cases do trauma and secondary chronic infections
[7]
lead to loss of digits or distal extremities. In the case at bar, the appellant failed to show that he can no longer
make use of his hands, thus rendering him incapable of committing the offenses with which he is being
charged. The disease does not deter him from possessing nor of using a firearm in violation of P.D. No. 1866.
Having settled the issues raised by appellant, the equally important matter as regards admissibility of the
evidence should likewise be passed upon. The buy-bust operation conducted by the police operatives is a form of
entrapment allowed by law. The arrest of the appellant was lawful having been caught in flagrante
delicto. Consequently, there is no need for a warrant for the seizure of the 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams)
the same being the fruit of the crime. With respect to the body search made by Puno, the same was valid being
incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore, the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the empty shell found in
the cylinder are admissible in evidence.
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellants house, the trial court correctly ignored it
apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the
warrantless search made inside appellants house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed
with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under search made incidental to a lawful arrest, the same being
limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him
with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his
house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach
or control.
In sum, this court finds accused-appellant Rolando Lua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art.
II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, under which the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed. However, with the passage of R.A. 7659, which took effect on

73

31 December 1993, amending certain sections of The Dangerous Drugs Act, the imposable penalty for the sale or
[8]
delivery of prohibited drug is prision correccional to reclusion temporal if the quantity involved is less than 750
grams of marijuana. Taking into account that appellant is not shown to be a habitual delinquent and the said
amendatory provision being favorable to him, the quantity of marijuana involved being only 5.3934 grams or less
than 750 grams, the aforestated penalty imposed under R.A. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating
[9]
nor aggravating circumstances, and following People v. Simon, the imposable penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken
from the medium period of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
On the charge of illegal possession of firearms, we sustain the finding and conclusion of the trial court. The
prosecution has indubitably established the existence of the .38 cal. paltikand the two (2) live bullets, and the fact
that appellant did not have the necessary license or permit to possess the same. Accordingly, under Sec. 1 of P.D.
No. 1866, the penalty ofreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed, the range
of which is seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua.Considering the pertinent
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by law, while the minimum shall not be lower than the minimum likewise fixed by law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. For violating P.D. 1866, accused-appellant
ROLANDO LUA y NERI is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and 20 days
likewise of reclusion temporalmaximum as maximum; and, for violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended,
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to
two (2) years, six (6) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional medium as maximum, to be served
successively in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant should be credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment upon a showing that he agreed
to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited with fourfifths (4/5) of the time of such preventive imprisonment.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

74

PEOPLE VS FIGUEROA
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R No. 134056. July 6, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT FIGUEROA and BEATRICE

VALERIO, accused.
ROBERT FIGUEROA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellant ROBERT FIGUEROA (hereafter OBET) appeals from the 18 May 1998
[1]
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 259, in Criminal Case No. 97-306,
[2]
convicting him of violation of Section 14-A , Article III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA. No. 7659. His co-accused Beatrice Valerio (hereafter
Betty) was acquitted.
OBET and Betty were indicted under an information, dated 2 April 1997, whose accusatory portion
reads as follows:
That on 16 February 1997 and for sometime prior thereto in Paraaque City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused without authority of law, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture, produce, prepare or process
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug amounting to a 2.4 liters, directly by means of
chemical synthesis.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[3]

When arraigned OBET and Betty each entered a plea of not guilty.

[4]

Trial on the merits then ensued.

The witnesses presented by the prosecution were NBI Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas, NBI
Special Investigator III Pio M. Palencia (hereafter PALENCIA), and NBI Intelligence Agent II Martin
Soriano (hereafter SORIANO).
PALENCIA testified that on 15 February 1997, he was in the office of SORIANO at Project 6,
Quezon City, when they received a call from their informant, a woman, who reported that a certain OBET
was allegedly engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in Makati City. PALENCIA and SORIANO forthwith
instructed their informant to establish contact with OBET for a buy-bust operation. After several hours, the
informant reported that OBET was already waiting for her at No. 1485 Soliman Street, Makati City, with
instructions for her to come alone as soon as she was ready with P150,000. PALENCIA then caused the
dusting of fluorescent powder over ten pieces of authentic P100 bills as buy-bust money and gave them
[5]
to the informant.
On board a taxi, PALENCIA, SORIANO and their informant proceeded to the rendezvous area. They
arrived at half past twelve o'clock in the early morning of 16 February 1997. As the gate was already
open, the informant entered the premises, while PALENCIA and SORIANO discreetly crawled and
positioned themselves near the gate of the house. Strategically positioned, PALENCIA overheard OBET
ask the informant whether she had the money. PALENCIA then saw the informant hand over the money
to OBET. While counting the money, OBET sensed the presence of other people in the area. OBET, who
was in possession of a .45 caliber pistol, fired it twice toward the direction of PALENCIA, while hurrying
towards the house. OBET then held hostage his mistress, Estrella Brilliantes, and her two children for the
next three hours until the arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to whom OBET surrendered. PALENCIA

75

and SORIANO brought OBET, his firearm and the recovered buy-bust money to the WPD Headquarters
[6]
for recording purposes and, thereafter, to the NBI Headquarters.
At the NBI Headquarters, PALENCIA and SORIANO methodically interrogated OBET about the
source of his shabu. OBET eventually volunteered that his source was a certain Betty of 263 El Grande
Street, B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. PALENCIA and SORIANO took OBET to Betty's house as a followup operation. They arrived at around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, 16 February 1997. As OBET called Betty
earlier to tell her that he was arriving, Betty already had the gate opened for them. After parking,
PALENCIA saw Betty waiting for them. Upon seeing OBET in handcuffs, Betty asked what happened.
OBET replied that he was just caught in a buy-bust operation. PALENCIA and SORIANO then tried to
convince Betty to surrender the shabu that OBET insisted was hidden inside the house. As Betty
persistently denied the existence of the shabu, PALENCIA told OBET to confer with Betty. After a while,
OBET proceeded to the kitchen of the guesthouse located outside the main house, followed by Betty.
OBET then promptly pointed to what he termed as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with other drug
[7]
paraphernalia, such as a beaker spray. PALENCIA and SORIANO seized the items.
Thereafter, PALENCIA requested a laboratory examination of all the seized items and an ultraviolet
[8]
light examination over the persons of OBET, Betty and a certain Eva Baluyot. PALENCIA claimed that
based on the certification issued by the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI, all the items seized from
Betty's residence were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride except specimen no.7; while from
among the persons subjected to ultraviolet light examination, only OBET was found positive for
[9]
fluorescent powder.
On cross-examination, PALENCIA admitted that he and SORIANO conducted the search without a
[10]
search warrant, but with the consent of Betty. He also admitted that he did not actually see OBET or
[11]
Betty in the act of manufacturing shabu.
NBI Intelligence Agent II SORIANO corroborated PALENCIA's testimony. He likewise admitted that
the custodial investigation of OBET, during which he divulged Betty as the source of shabu, was
conducted in the absence of any counsel. SORIANO also confirmed PALENCIA's testimony that they
were not armed with a search warrant, but that they conducted the follow-up operation at Betty's house
[12]
under the hot pursuit theory. He further maintained that OBET, after conferring with Betty,
uttered, Ako na nga, ako na nga"(I will do it, I will do it). OBET then proceeded to the dirty kitchen,
pointed to the refrigerator and had it moved. Thereafter, SORIANO saw a plastic pail containing liquid
with floating brown substances.
SORIANO admitted that he and PALENCIA neither witnessed OBET and Betty manufacture shabu
[13]
in the manner described in Section 2(j) of the Dangerous Drugs Act ; nor did they possess evidence,
independent of the items they had seized, that OBET and Betty were engaged in the labeling or
[14]
manufacturing of shabu.
Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas testified that on 16 February 1997, she conducted a
laboratory examination for the presence of any prohibited or regulated drug on eleven different specimens
[15]
(Exhibits "B"-"L"). The result of the examination disclosed that all the specimens except specimen no. 7
[16]
(Exhibit "H") were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. She further observed that specimen
no. 8 (Exhibit I- I-2), the brown liquid with floating solid flakes contained in a plastic pail, was positive for
[17]
epedrine, a substance used in the manufacture of methamphetamine hydrochloride. She opined that
this crude form of shabu would have to undergo chemical processes, like extraction, crystallization,
distillation, before it could be finally converted into shabu's crystalline form. She also conducted a
fluorescent powder examination over the persons of OBET and Betty. Only OBET gave a positive
[18]
result.
On the other hand, OBET testified that while he was watching television on the night of 15 February
1997, he heard the doorbell rang. Upon seeing Eva Baluyot, his childhood friend, he opened the door for
her. Inside the house, Eva handed him a bundle of money and stated that she was buying shabu from
him. OBET emphatically told Eva that he was not engaged in such illegal trade and returned the money.
OBET then accompanied Eva out of the house. At the garage, OBET noticed someone peeping from the
dark; so he told Eva to go back inside the house with him. Eva ignored the request. OBET thus left Eva at
the garage and got his .45 caliber gun from his house. While he was locking the door, his handgun
accidentally fired off, as he forgot that it had already been cocked. This blast was followed by shouts of
people outside claiming that they were NBI men. Uncertain, OBET did not go out of the house but

76

instead told the alleged NBI men to call the Makati Police, specifically Major Reyes. The NBI agents,
however, persisted in convincing OBET to go out of the house. He did get out of his house after three
hours when he heard the voice of Major Reyes. OBET gave to Major Reyes his gun. The Makati Police
and the NBI men thereafter conducted a joint search inside OBET's house which, however, yielded
nothing. OBET was then brought to the Makati Police Headquarters where the incident was recorded.
Thereafter, PALENCIA, SORIANO and another NBI man brought OBET to the house of Betty, his former
live-in partner, at El Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Paraaque City, upon the insistence and information of
[19]
Eva Baluyot.
Upon entering B.F. Homes, SORIANO instructed OBET to call and tell Betty that he was already
near. The gate was already opened when they arrived, and the NBI men freely parked their car at the
garage. Then, PALENCIA and SORIANO alighted from the car and entered Betty's house. OBET was left
in the car under the charge of the third NBI man; hence, he knew nothing of what happened inside Betty's
[20]
house.
For her part, Betty admitted that she was romantically involved with OBET and had a child by him.
She recalled that on 16 February 1997, OBET called at around 6:00 a.m. and requested her to open the
gate for him, as he was already near. She ran down to the garage and opened the gate. Since her car
was parked halfway through the garage, she went to the main house to get her car keys to make way for
OBET's car. But as she came out of the main house, OBET's car was already parked inside the garage.
She noticed that OBET had two companions with long firearms. The two, whom Betty later found out as
NBI men PALENCIA and SORIANO, informed her that they had just come from a buy-bust operation and
that OBET had led them to her house, as there were illegal chemicals kept in the premises. Shocked
[21]
andamazed, she then asked for a search warrant, but the NBI men could not produce any.
Betty further recalled that the NBI men claimed that they found contraband items near the dirty
kitchen at a small space behind the refrigerator where cases of softdrinks were stored. Betty denied any
knowledge that there were illegal chemicals inside her house and that these were manufactured into
[22]
shabu. She also denied knowing Eva Baluyot.
On cross-examination, Betty disclaimed her alleged consent to the search of her house, for she
specifically asked the NBI men for a search warrant. She asserted that she did not see the NBI men find
the shabu paraphernalia because she went up to the second floor of her house. She only saw that the
[23]
NBI men were bringing several items out of her house.
The trial court agreed with the prosecution's theory that the warrantless arrests of OBET and Betty
[24]
were conducted within the purview of valid warrantless arrests enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. It then ruled as valid the consented warrantless search conducted at the house of
Betty. Consequently, it found that the very items seized by the NBI agents at the kitchen of Betty's
guesthouse were admissible as the corpus delicti of the violation of Section 14-A of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Thus, the trial court "believed" that the paraphernalia seized were indispensable to the
processing or manufacturing of shabu into crystallized form. Although it conceded that the prosecution
witnesses did not actually see the crystallization processes, the trial court observed that the
Dangerous Drug Act does not require that there be actual manufacturing activities at the time of the
seizure.
The trial court, however, acquitted Betty for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence that she,
in conspiracy with OBET, manufactured shabu without the requisite authority. It did not arrive at a similar
conclusion as far as OBET was concerned, but declared that based on the evidence on record, OBET's
guilt of the crime charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in the decision of 18 May 1998 the
trial court decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence insufficient to warrant the conviction of accused Beatrice Valerio y del Rosario
for Violation of Sec. 14-a of Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659, this court pronounces her NOT
GUILTY and considering that she is detained at the NBI the NBI is directed to immediately release her from custody
unless there be some reasons for her detention. Finding, however, accused Robert Figueroa GUILTY as charged
[of] the same offense in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, this Court hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and to suffer the accessory
penalties provided by law, specifically Art. VI [sic] of the Revised Penal Code.

77

The Clerk of Court is directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of Robert Figueroa to the Bureau
of Corrections in Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.
Unsatisfied with the verdict, OBET appealed the decision to us. He principally premises his prayer for
acquittal on the failure of the State to show by convincing evidence that shortly prior to or during custodial
investigation, he was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and to be informed of such rights. He asserts that he
did not waive those rights. Thus, whatever admissions were allegedly extracted from him are inadmissible
in evidence. Even assuming that his extrajudicial statements were admissible, Betty's acquittal would
work in his favor because the indictment is based on conspiracy. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act
of all. Therefore, the acts imputed to him were also the acts of Betty, and vice versa. Since the trial court
considered insufficient for conviction the acts of Betty, then he, too, should be acquitted.
In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that not all warrantless
searches and seizures are illegal. For one, a warrantless search and seizure is not unreasonable and
offensive to the Constitution if consent is shown. In this case, the prosecution convincingly proved that
Betty consented to the search of her house. With her consent, Betty validly waived her constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure. Consequently, the items seized in her house by virtue of the
consented search are admissible in evidence against her and OBET.
The OSG also contends that the acquittal of Betty does not per se work to absolve OBET of the
crime charged. Betty's believable disavowal of the location of the paraphernalia and other circumstances
on record reasonably indicative of her innocence cannot redound in favor of OBET. The latter apparently
knew the exact location of the hidden paraphernalia. By such disclosure, it is not far-fetched to conclude
that OBET had been actually engaged in the manufacture of shabu.
We first resolve the question of whether Betty's acquittal would benefit OBET.
We disagree with the theory of OBET that in an indictment based on conspiracy, the acquittal of a
conspirator likewise absolves a co-conspirator from criminal liability. Indeed, the rule is well-settled that
once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is liable for
[25]
the crimes committed by the other conspirators. It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove
conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually responsible for their own respective acts.
Accordingly, OBET's criminal liability in this case must be judged on the basis of his own acts as
established by the quantum of proof required in criminal cases.
We should then determine whether the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt
OBET's guilt for unauthorized manufacture of shabu, a regulated drug.
After a meticulous review of the records and of the evidence adduced by the parties in this case, we
find that what PALENCIA and SORIANO did left much to be desired, thereby resulting in a bungled
prosecution of the case. The evidence for the prosecution miserably failed to prove OBET's guilt of the
offense charged.
The buy-bust operation was a failure because no shabu or other regulated or prohibited drug was
found in OBET's person and residence. No evidence was adduced to show that OBET handed shabu
over to the informant. Yet, he was placed in custody. For what offense he was held in custody does not,
initially, appear very clear on the record.
It was established that OBET fired two shots toward the direction of PALENCIA and SORIANO and
held hostage his mistress and her two children. Yet he was not placed under custodial investigation for
such crimes as grave threats, coercion, illegal possession of firearms, or crimes other than that with which
he was charged.
On the contrary, OBET was held in custody and investigated or interrogated about the source of the
shabu, none of which was found during the buy-bust operation. In short he was held in custody as a
consequence of the failed buy-bust operation and as a follow-up to link him to the source and establish a
conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu. Allegedly, he admitted that the source was Betty. On the basis of
that admission, PALENCIA and SORIANO, together with OBET, proceeded to the residence of Betty.

78

Needless to state, OBET cannot be investigated for anything in relation to shabu while under custody
without informing him of his rights to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. Any waiver of such rights should be in writing and made in the presence of a
[26]
counsel pursuant to Section 12 (1) , Article III of theConstitution. It has been held that these rights
attach from the moment the investigation starts, i.e. when the investigating officers begin to ask questions
[27]
to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect.
It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody questioning,
the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity of official acts does
[28]
not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence, in the absence of proof that the
arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are inadmissible and cannot be
[29]
considered in the adjudication of a case. In other words, confessions and admissions in violation of
Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and more
[30]
so against third persons. This is so even if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily
[31]
given. Such statements are useless except as evidence against the very police authorities who violated
[32]
the suspect's rights.
SORIANO admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET was conducted without the presence of
a lawyer, and there is no proof that OBET waived said right and the right to remain silent. No waiver in
writing and in the presence of a counsel was presented. Thus, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 12 of
Article III of the Constitution any admission obtained from OBET in the course of his custodial
investigation was inadmissible against him and cannot be used as a justification for the search without a
warrant.
The search conducted on Betty's house was allegedly consented to by Betty. Indeed, a consented
search is one of the exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant. InPeople v. Chua Ho San @ Tsay
[33]
Ho San, we pointed out that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving
vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches,
it is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the
[34]
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The third condition does not exist in the
instant case. The fact is, Betty asked for a search warrant, thus:
Q

And of course, these NBI Special Investigators informed you of their purpose is that correct?

Yes sir.

And of course believing that there was nothing in your house you acceded?

No sir, I was asking for a search warrant.

And what was their reply?

They did not have any but that Figueroa had led them to the property.

[35]

Neither can the search be appreciated as a search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of either
Betty or OBET as intimated by the trial court. First, Betty's arrest did not precede the search. Second, per
the prosecution's evidence OBET was not arrested for possession or sale of regulated or prohibited drugs
as a consequence of the buy-bust operation. He surrendered after taking hostage Estrella and her two
children, although he was thereafter held in custody for further questioning on illegal drugs.

79

There is no showing that the house occupied by Betty and the articles confiscated therefrom belong
to OBET. That OBET pointed to PALENCIA and SORIANO the places where the articles were found
provides no sufficient basis for a conclusion that they belonged to him. Even if the articles thus seized
actually belonged to him, they cannot be constitutionally and legally used against him to establish his
criminal liability therefor, since the seizure was the fruit of an invalid custodial investigation.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the 18 May 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 259, Paraaque City, convicting herein accused-appellant Robert Figueroa of violation of Section
14-A, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. He is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and ORDERED immediately released from confinement or
detention unless his continued detention is warranted by virtue of a valid legal cause. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is directed to submit within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this decision a
report on the release of accused-appellant.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

80

NOLASCO VS PANO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F.
APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS
ALTUNA, respondents.
Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated. The
three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the
accused
of
Rebellion
in
Criminal
Case
No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison,
et al." She was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security
Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an
allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had
previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City.
The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however,
respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from
respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at
No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost
a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA."
AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque,
Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was
Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno
to Judge Pao.

81

(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by
Judge Pao but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal
knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA
and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for
1
rebellion.
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party presumably
without a warrant of arrest.
2

(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2
3
wooden boxes, making 431 items in all.
4

(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, the search was made in
the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was
made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed
by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before
the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal
Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE
and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying,
inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases that
5
are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court.
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return, which
AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant
to the Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall
be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying
that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the
Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity
of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware of the
Order of Judge Pao of December 13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued
by respondent RTC Judge Pao; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain
Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or their duly
authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.

82

The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does
not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has
not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness. The
respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be
entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant
with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things
to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples
Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these
groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not
otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding
the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive
or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as
to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they
should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a
general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be
seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
being too general. Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the
objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines.
6
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were described as
'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other subversive
materials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to the search team as to what
articles might be lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than,
the description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of Staff"which this Court
7
declared null and void for being too general.
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the seizure of printed
copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies
subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing
and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all
conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The
search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally
8
objectionable.
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for Search
Warrant.

83

Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col.
Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your
answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)
A Yes, sir,
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for search
warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many
suspicious persons with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's
Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front,
Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these
groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public and support money from foreign and
9
local sources.
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant
10
thereof. Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not
searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical
to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was
general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and
11
does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant is with the
Court that issued it instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records show, however, that
petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In

84

fact, they already questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even during the
inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to
Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful.
Substantially, therefore, while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of the
Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should
be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a criminal
prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is
more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have
the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an
invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILARROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly
provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who
had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest
was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the
search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of
general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises
12
which may be searched. "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the
13
public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals."
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that
the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the
general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are
of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search
warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the
Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission
No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani
Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from
introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case hereby made
permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction
as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to
petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all
irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.

85

PEOPLE VS MARISCO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188611

June 16, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
1

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which
2
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case
No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the
necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency or office.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the following
were stipulated upon:
"1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen Mariacos;
2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from a passenger jeepney;
4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in two (2) bags were
submitted for examination to the Crime Lab;
5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination gave positive
result for the presence of marijuana;
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and submitted for examination
weighed 7,030.3 grams;
7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and

86

8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen,
Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino."
During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a
checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from
Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B.
Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect
or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct
surveillance operation (sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that
was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the
agent described a backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K."
marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then
asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers. Unfortunately,
he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the
said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women.
He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but
one of the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the
bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the
opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and three (3)
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana
fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory
for examination. The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for
marijuana, a dangerous drug.
When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that:
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a
passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one
Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the
jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told that she would only be
carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani
Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them,
arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station. When they were at the police station,
Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of
the bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that she did
3
not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and sentences here (sic) to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court personnel and media.

87

SO ORDERED.

Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering the evidence of the
5
prosecution despite its inadmissibility. She claimed that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly
violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search
warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to
verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant
6
contended that there was no probable cause for her arrest.
7

Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. She alleged that the
apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by
Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and
regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said regulation directs the apprehending team having
initial custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the
same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be
required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious
doubt on the identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed
to prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody
over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the warrantless arrest
8
of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal, justified as a search of a moving
vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of
delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked
9
into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana. The OSG also argued that appellant was now
estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of "not guilty" upon
10
arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence. The OSG brushed aside appellants
argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel
immediately after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the
11
nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was practicable.
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in
12
toto. It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number
of bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto of "carrying and conveying" the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that
appellants warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags when he was aboard the
jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be
delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to whom
those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful
duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At the time,
when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the
other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the
right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been trying to intercept the
transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly as
possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle has
been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the

88

locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be
expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the
moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already
13
left the locality.
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.
Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States agents to conduct searches and
seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or less,
clear parameters in determining which are proper and which are not.1avvphi1
Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used against her. She
claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending
officer.
Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable cause for the
warrantless arrest of appellant.
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126
of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

14

89

Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search was conducted on a
moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate
that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining
15
the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Bagista,

16

the Court said:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from
a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the
seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial
warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of
probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and
17
seizure can be lawfully conducted. Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence
18
against the person arrested.
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to
the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or
19
subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
20
part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is
the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a
requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband
21
from one place to another with impunity.
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a
store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is
conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the
22
locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the
contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It
would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances.

90

Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had
enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants arrest, the police received information
that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to
intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay
Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to
leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal
drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section
13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
23
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary
for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
24
112.
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest
25
if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:
SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium
poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a
broker in such transactions.

91

In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a neighbor who
had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is
26
immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.
Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are
27
not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case. Mere possession
28
and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience designed to
secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.
Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public
29
order.
30

Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another." There is no definitive moment
when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to
transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal
31
act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was
32
committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.
Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable
33
34
presumption that she is the owner of the packages and their contents. Appellant failed to rebut this presumption.
Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.
Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her and her
companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the packages contained and where these
would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney,
appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him the bags he had left with them, and not to
continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular, she alleged
that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated
drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non
35
for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of that crime.
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized dangerous drugs,
to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources
of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:

92

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the police station. At the
station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor
arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other police officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of
marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of
36
marijuana fruiting tops. PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same.
Then the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied by
counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already
previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal, or
make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
37
evidentiary value of the seized items.
Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was immediately brought to the police station
where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal
drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to
appellants claim, the prosecutions evidence establishes the chain of custody from the time of appellants arrest
until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.
While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance with
Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized are
inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question the custody and
38
disposition of the items taken from her during the trial. Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by
Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of
the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the
matter.
Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the
testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any
39
convincing proof to the contrary.
In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her conviction must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

93

94

ESPANO VS CA
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998]

RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner,

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

vs. COURT

OF

APPEALS

and

PEOPLE

OF

THE

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January
[1]
16, 1995, which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner
Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to
possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control twelve (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering tops,
marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law.

[2]

The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14,
1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo
Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to
confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the
alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search
yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there
was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited
[3]
[4]
drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991.
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section, testified that the
articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for
examination tested positive for marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in his house and was awakened
only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro,
and when they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station for investigation and later
indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioners defense as a mere afterthought and found the version of the prosecution
more credible and trustworthy.
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the accused Rodolfo Espano y Valeria
guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6)

95

years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine ofP6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board
without delay.
SO ORDERED.

[5]

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision
of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on the basis of the following: (a)
the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (c) he was denied the constitutional right of confrontation
and to compulsory process; and (d) his conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not properly
identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no compelling reason sufficient to
reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high
degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a better
position to determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during appeal in the
absence of any clear showing that he had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
[6]
weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the appellants.
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than those of the
defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by
reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as
possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of his official duty must prevail.
[7]

In People v. Velasco, this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty which provides:
x x x. Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-bust team are policemen
engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who were motivated either by the desire to extort money or
exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the absence of proof of
any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this
case, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, . . ., must prevail over the self-serving and
[8]
uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed.
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He simply contended that
he was in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of
all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. Moreover, the claim of a
frame-up, like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can just as easily
be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
[9]
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. No clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to
prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecutions failure to present the alleged informant in court cast a
reasonable doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit, since failure of the prosecution to
produce the informant in court is of no moment especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact
that a buy-bust operation had indeed been conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of the policemen who
apprehended petitioner, testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified him as the one they caught
in possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,

96

We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants. There is no compelling reason
for us to overturn the finding of the trial court that the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness for the
prosecution, was straightforward, spontaneous and convincing. The testimony of a sole witness, if credible and
[10]
positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict.
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagans testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that petitioner indeed
committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of conviction was proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon. Rule 113 Section
5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a.
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
xxx

xxx

x x x.

Petitioners arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust
operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs
within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something
to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His
arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being
the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioners residence, however, the same are
inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III,
Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or
[11]
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten
cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioners house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not
fall under the said exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua,

[12]

this Court held:

As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellants house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently
in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search
made inside the appellants house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search
warrant. Such search cannot fall under search made incidental to a lawful arrest, the same being limited to body
search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the
means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when
he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to
a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of
marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it
was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.

97

In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II,
Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Under the said provision, the
penalty imposed is six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand
pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty
shall now depend on the quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7629, Section 20,
[13]
[14]
and as interpreted in People v. Simon and People v. Lara, if the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750
grams, the imposable penalty ranges from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into consideration that
petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the amendatory provision is favorable to him and the quantity of marijuana
involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being
no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall beprision correccional in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months,
while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR
No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum to
TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

98

CARROLL VS US
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Syllabus
1. The legislative history of 6 of the act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, November 23, 1921, c. 134, 42
Stat. 223, which makes it a misdemeanor for any officer of the United States to search a private dwelling without a
search warrant or to search any other building or property without a search warrant, maliciously and without
reasonable cause, shows clearly the intent of Congress to make a distinction as to the necessity for a search
warrant in the searching of private dwellings and in the searching of automobiles or other road vehicles, in the
enforcement of the Prohibition Act. P. 267 U. S. 144.
2. The Fourth Amendment denounces only such searches or seizures as are unreasonable, and it is to be
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens. P. 267 U. S.
147.
3. Search without a warrant of an automobile, and seizure therein of liquor subject to seizure and destruction under
the Prohibition Act, do not violate the Amendment, if made upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle contains such contraband liquor. P. 267 U. S.
149.
4. Various acts of Congress are cited to show that, practically since the beginning of the Government, the Fourth
Amendment has been construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search for contraband in a store,
dwelling-house, or other structure
Page 267 U. S. 133
for the search of which a warrant may readily be obtained, and a search of a ship, wagon, automobile, or other
vehicle which may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. P. 267 U.
S. 150.
5. Section 26, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, provides that, when an officer "shall discover any person in the
act" of transporting intoxicating liquor in any automobile, or other vehicle, in violation of law, it shall be his duty to
seize the liquor and thereupon to take possession of the vehicle and arrest the person in charge of it, and that,
upon conviction of such person, the court shall order the liquor destroyed, and, except for good cause shown, shall
order a public sale, etc. of the other property seized.

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Held:
(a) That the primary purpose is the seizure and destruction of the contraband liquor, and the provisions for forfeiture
of the vehicle and arrest of the transporter are merely incidental. P. 267 U. S. 153.
(b) Hence, the right to search an automobile for illicit liquor and to seize the liquor, if found, and thereupon to seize
the vehicle also and to arrest the offender, does not depend upon the right to arrest the offender in the first
instance, and therefore it is not determined by the degree of his offence -- whether a misdemeanor under 29, Title
II of the Act, because of being his first or second offence, or a felony because it is his third, and the rule allowing
arrest without warrant for misdemeanor only when the offence is committed in the officer's presence, but for a
felony when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony, is not the
test of the validity of such search and seizure. Pp. 267 U. S. 155, 267 U. S. 156.
(c) The seizure is legal if the officer, in stopping and searching the vehicle, has reasonable or probable cause for
believing that contraband liquor is being illegally transported in it. P. 267 U. S. 155.
(d) The language of 26 -- when an officer shall "discover " any person in the act of transporting, etc. -- does not
limit him to what he learns of the contents of a passing automobile by the use of his senses at the time. P. 267 U.
S. 158.
(e) The section thus construed is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. P. 267 U. S. 159.
6. Probable cause held to exist where prohibition officers, while patrolling a highway much used in illegal
transportation of liquor, stopped and searched an automobile upon the faith of information previously obtained by
them that the car and its occupants, identified by the officers, were engaged in the illegal business of "bootlegging."
P. 267 U. S. 159.
Page 267 U. S. 134
7. When contraband liquor, seized from an automobile and used in the conviction of those in charge of the
transportation, was shown at the trial to have been taken in a search justified by probable cause, held that the
Court's refusal to return he liquor on defendants' motion before trial, even if erroneous because probable cause
was not then proven, was not a substantial reason for . reversing the conviction. P. 267 U. S. 162.
8. The Court notices judicially that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that Detroit, and its
neighborhood along the Detroit River, which is the international boundary, is one of the most active centers for
introducing illegally into this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. P. 267 U. S. 160.
Affirmed.

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This is a writ of error to the District Court under Section 238 of the Judicial Code. The plaintiffs in error, hereafter to
be called the defendants, George Carroll and John Kiro, were indicted and convicted for transporting in an
automobile intoxicating spirituous liquor, to-wit: 68 quarts of so-called bonded whiskey and gin, in violation of the
National Prohibition Act. The ground on which they assail the conviction is that the trial court admitted in evidence
two of the 68 bottles, one of whiskey and one of gin, found by searching the automobile. It is contended that the
search and seizure were in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore that use of the liquor as evidence was
not proper. Before the trial, a motion was made by the defendants that all the liquor seized be returned to the
defendant Carroll, who owned the automobile. This motion was denied.
The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal prohibition agents, and one
Peterson, a state officer, in December, 1921, as the car was going westward on the highway between Detroit and
Grand Rapids at a point 16 miles outside of Grand Rapids. The facts leading to the search and seizure were as
follows: on September 29th, Cronenwett and Scully were in an apartment in Grand Rapids. Three men came to that
apartment, a man named Kruska and the two defendants,
Page 267 U. S. 135
Carroll and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to them as one Stafford, working in the Michigan Chair Company in
Grand Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of whiskey. The price was fixed at $13 a case. The three men said
they had to go to the east end of Grand Rapids to get the liquor and that they would be back in half or threequarters of an hour. They went away, and in a short time Kruska came back and said they could not get it that
night, that the man who had it was not in, but that they would deliver it the next day. They had come to the
apartment in an automobile known as an Oldsmobile Roadster, the number of which Cronenwett then identified, a
did Scully. The proposed vendors did not return the next day, and the evidence disclosed no explanation of their
failure to do so. One may surmise that it was suspicion of the real character of the proposed purchaser, whom
Carroll subsequently called by his first name when arrested in December following. Cronenwett and his
subordinates were engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the
Prohibition Act. This seems to have been their regular tour of duty. On the 6th of October, Carroll and Kiro, going
eastward from Grand Rapids in the same Oldsmobile Roadster, passed Cronenwett and Scully some distance out
from Grand Rapids. Cronenwett called to Scully, who was taking lunch, that the Carroll boys had passed them
going toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to catch up with them to see where they were going. The officers
followed as far as East Lansing, half way to Detroit, but there lost trace of them. On the 15th of December, some
two months later, Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty, with Peterson, the State officer, were going
from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on the road to Detroit, when Kiro and Carroll met and passed them in the same
automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to Grand Rapids. The government agents turned
Page 267 U. S. 136

101

their car and followed the defendants to a point some sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where they stopped them
and searched the car. They found behind the upholstering of the seats, the filling of which had been removed, 68
bottles. These had labels on them, part purporting to be certificates of English chemists that the contents were
blended Scotch whiskeys, and the rest that the contents were Gordon gin made in London. When an expert witness
was called to prove the contents, defendants admitted the nature of them to be whiskey and gin. When the
defendants were arrested, Carroll said to Cronenwett, "Take the liquor and give us one more chance and I will
make it right with you," and he pulled out a roll of bills, of which one was for $10. Peterson and another took the two
defendants and the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids, while Cronenwett, Thayer and Scully remained on the road
looking for other cars of whose coming they had information. The officers were not anticipating that the defendants
would be coming through on the highway at that particular time, but when they met them there, they believed they
were carrying liquor, and hence the search, seizure and arrest.
Page 267 U. S. 143
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The constitutional and statutory provisions involved in this case include the Fourth Amendment and the National
Prohibition Act.
The Fourth Amendment is in part as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person, or things to be seized."
Section 25, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, c. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 315, passed to enforce the Eighteenth
Amendment, makes it unlawful to have or possess any liquor intended for use in violating the Act, or which has
been so used, and provides that no property rights shall exist in such liquor. A search warrant may issue and such
liquor, with the containers thereof, may be seized under the warrant and be ultimately destroyed. The section
further provides:
"No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such unless it is being used for the
unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in part used for some business purpose such as a store, shop,
saloon, restaurant, hotel, or boarding house. The term 'private dwelling' shall be construed to include the room or
rooms used and occupied not transiently but solely as
Page 267 U. S. 144
a residence in an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house."
Section 26, Title II, under which the seizure herein was made, provides in part as follows:

102

"When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of
transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other
vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being transported contrary to law.
Whenever intoxicating liquors transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer he shall take
possession of the vehicle and team or automobile, boat, air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall
arrest any person in charge thereof."
The section then provides that the court, upon conviction of the person so arrested, shall order the liquor destroyed,
and, except for good cause shown, shall order a sale by public auction of the other property seized, and that the
proceeds shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States.
By Section 6 of an Act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, c. 134, 42 Stat. 222, 223, it is provided that, if
any officer or agent or employee of the United States engaged in the enforcement of the Prohibition Act or this
Amendment, "shall search any private dwelling," as defined in that Act, "without a warrant directing such search," or
"shall without a search warrant maliciously and without reasonable cause search any other building or property," he
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to fine or imprisonment or both.
In the passage of the supplemental Act through the Senate, Amendment No. 32, known as the Stanley
Amendment, was adopted, the relevant part of which was as follows:
"Section 6. That any officer, agent or employee of the United States engaged in the enforcement of this Act or
Page 267 U. S. 145
the National Prohibition Act, or any other law of the United States, who shall search or attempt to search the
property or premises of any person without previously securing a search warrant, as provided by law, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not to exceed $1000, or imprisoned not to exceed one
year, or both so fined and imprisoned in the discretion of the Court."
This Amendment was objected to in the House, and the Judiciary Committee, to whom it was referred, reported to
the House of Representatives the following as a substitute.
"Sec. 6. That no officer, agent or employee of the United States, while engaged in the enforcement of this Act, the
National Prohibition Act, or any law in reference to the manufacture or taxation of, or traffic in, intoxicating liquor,
shall search any private dwelling without a warrant directing such search, and no such warrant shall issue unless
there is reason to believe such dwelling is used as a place in which liquor is manufactured for sale or sold. The
term 'private dwelling' shall be construed to include the room or rooms occupied not transiently, but solely as a
residence in an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house. Any violation of any provision of this paragraph shall be
punished by a fine of not to exceed $1000 or imprisonment not to exceed one year, or both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."

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In its report, the Committee spoke in part as follows:

"It appeared to the committee that the effect of the Senate amendment No. 32, if agreed to by the House, would
greatly cripple the enforcement of the national prohibition act and would otherwise seriously interfere with the
Government in the enforcement of many other laws, as its scope is not limited to the prohibition law,
Page 267 U. S. 146
but applies equally to all laws where prompt action is necessary. There are on the statute books of the United
States a number of laws authorizing search without a search warrant. Under the common law and agreeably to the
Constitution, search may in many cases be legally made without a warrant. The Constitution does not forbid
search, as some parties contend, but it does forbid unreasonable search. This provision in regard to search is, as a
rule, contained in the various State constitutions, but notwithstanding that fact, search without a warrant is
permitted in many cases, and especially is that true in the enforcement of liquor legislation."
"The Senate amendment prohibits all search or attempt to search any property or premises without a search
warrant. The effect of that would necessarily be to prohibit all search, as no search can take place if it is not on
some property or premises."
"Not only does this amendment prohibit search of any lands, but it prohibits the search of all property. It will prevent
the search of the common bootlegger and his stock in trade, though caught and arrested in the act of violating the
law. But what is perhaps more serious, it will make it impossible to stop the rum running automobiles engaged in
like illegal traffic. It would take from the officers the power that they absolutely must have to be of any service, for if
they cannot search for liquor without a warrant, they might as well be discharged. It is impossible to get a warrant to
stop an automobile. Before a warrant could be secured, the automobile would be beyond the reach of the officer,
with its load of illegal liquor disposed of."
The conference report resulted, so far as the difference between the two Houses was concerned, in providing for
the punishment of any officer, agent or employee of the Government who searches a "private dwelling" without a
warrant, and for the punishment of any such officer,
Page 267 U. S. 147
etc., who searches any "other building or property" where, and only where, he makes the search without a warrant
"maliciously and without probable cause." In other words, it left the way open for searching an automobile, or
vehicle of transportation, without a warrant, if the search was not malicious or without probable cause.
The intent of Congress to make a distinction between the necessity for a search warrant in the searching of private
dwellings and in that of automobiles and other road vehicles is the enforcement of the Prohibition Act is thus clearly
established by the legislative history of the Stanley Amendment. Is such a distinction consistent with the Fourth

104

Amendment? We think that it is. The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such
as are unreasonable.
The leading case on the subject of search and seizure is Boyd v. United States,116 U. S. 616. An Act of Congress
of June 22, 1874, authorized a court of the United States, in revenue cases, on motion of the government attorney,
to require the defendant to produce in court his private books, invoices and papers on pain in case of refusal of
having the allegations of the attorney in his motion taken as confessed. This was held to be unconstitutional and
void as applied to suits for penalties or to establish a forfeiture of goods, on the ground that, under the Fourth
Amendment, the compulsory production of invoices to furnish evidence for forfeiture of goods constituted an
unreasonable search even where made upon a search warrant, and that it was also a violation of the Fifth
Amendment, in that it compelled the defendant in a criminal case to produce evidence against himself or be in the
attitude of confessing his guilt.
In Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383, it was held that a court in a criminal prosecution could not retain letters of
the accused seized in his house, in his absence and without his authority, by a United States marshal
Page 267 U. S. 148
holding no warrant for his arrest and none for the search of his premises, to be used as evidence against him, the
accused having made timely application to the court for an order for the return of the letters.
In Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States,251 U. S. 385, a writ of error was brought to reverse a judgment
of contempt of the District Court, fining the company and imprisoning one Silverthorne, its president, until he should
purge himself of contempt in not producing books and documents of the company before the grand jury to prove
violation of the statutes of the United States by the company and Silverthorne. Silverthorne had been arrested, and,
while under arrest, the marshal had gone to the office of the company without a warrant and made a clean sweep
of all books, papers and documents found there, and had taken copies and photographs of the papers. The District
Court ordered the return of the originals, but impounded the photographs and copies. This was held to be an
unreasonable search of the property and possessions of the corporation and a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
and the judgment for contempt was reversed.
In Gouled v. United States,255 U. S. 298, the obtaining through stealth by a representative of the Government,
from the office of one suspected of defrauding the Government, of a paper which had no pecuniary value in itself,
but was only to be used as evidence against its owner, was held to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It was
further held that, when the paper was offered in evidence and duly objected to, it must be ruled inadmissible
because obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure, and also in violation of the Fifth Amendment
because working compulsory incrimination.
In Amos v. United States,255 U. S. 313, it was held that, where concealed liquor was found by government officers
without a search warrant in the home of the defendant,

105

Page 267 U. S. 149

in his absence, and after a demand made upon his wife, it was inadmissible as evidence against the defendant
because acquired by an unreasonable seizure.
In none of the cases cited is there any ruling as to the validity under the Fourth Amendment of a seizure without a
warrant of contraband goods in the course of transportation and subject to forfeiture or destruction.
On reason and authority, the true rule is that, if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable
cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure
are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and
seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and
rights of individual citizens.
In Boyd v. United States,116 U. S. 616, as already said, the decision did not turn on whether a reasonable search
might be made without a warrant; but for the purpose of showing the principle on which the Fourth Amendment
proceeds, and to avoid any misapprehension of what was decided, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Bradley, used language which is of particular significance and applicability here. It was there said (page 116 U. S.
623):
"The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the
payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for
the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him. The two things
differ toto coelo. In the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other, it is not.
The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the
Page 267 U. S. 150
common law, and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the duties
payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past, and the like seizures have
been authorized by our own revenue acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by
Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43, contains provisions to this
effect. As this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the
Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as
'unreasonable,' and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment. So, also, the supervision
authorized to be exercised by officers of the revenue over the manufacture or custody of excisable articles, and the
entries thereof in books required by law to be kept for their inspection, are necessarily excepted out of the category
of unreasonable searches and seizures. So, also, the laws which provide for the search and seizure of articles and
things which it is unlawful for a person to have in his possession for the purpose of issue or disposition, such as

106

counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, implements of gambling, &c., are not within this category.Commonwealth v. Dana, 2
Met. (Mass.) 329. Many other things of this character might be enumerated."
It is noteworthy that the twenty-fourth section of the Act of 1789, to which the Court there refers, provides:
"That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially appointed by either of them for that
purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect
any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed, and therein to search for, seize, and secure
any such goods, wares or merchandise, and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any
Page 267 U. S. 151
particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they or either of them shall, upon application on oath or
affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day
time only) and there to search for such goods, and if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial, and
all such goods, wares, and merchandise, on which the duties shall not have been paid or secured, shall be
forfeited."
Like provisions were contained in the Act of August 4, 1790, c. 35, Sections 451, 1 Stat. 145, 170; in Section 27 of
the Act of February 18, 1793, c. 8, 1 Stat. 305, 315, and in Sections 68-71 of the Act of March 2, 1799, c. 22, 1
Stat. 627, 677, 678.
Thus, contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and in the
following Second and Fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between
goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course of
transportation and concealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be put out of reach of a search
warrant. Compare Hester v. United States,265 U. S. 57.
Again, by the second section of the Act of March 3, 1815, 3 Stat. 231, 232, it was made lawful for customs officers
not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to
duty or had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge
of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares or merchandise thereon, which they
had probable cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and
the vehicle or beast as well, for trial
Page 267 U. S. 152
and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816, 3 Stat. 315, for a year and expired. The Act of February 28,
1865, revived Section 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, c. 67, 13 Stat. 441. The substance of this section was

107

reenacted in the third section of the Act of July 18, 1866, c. 201, 14 Stat. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the
Revised Statutes as Section 3061. Neither Section 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked
as unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated a operative by this Court in Cotzhausen v.
Nazro,107 U. S. 215, 107 U. S. 219. See also United States v. One Black Horse, 129 Fed. 167.
Again, by Section 2140 of the Revised Statutes, any Indian agent, sub-agent or commander of a military post in the
Indian Country, having reason to suspect or being informed that any white person or Indian is about to introduce, or
has introduced, any spirituous liquor or wine into the Indian Country, in violation of law, may cause the boats,
stores, packages, wagons, sleds and places of deposit of such person to be searched, and if any liquor is found
therein, then it, together with the vehicles, shall be seized and proceeded against by libel in the proper court and
forfeited. Section 2140 was the outgrowth of the Act of May 6, 1822, c. 58, 3 Stat. 682, authorizing Indian agents to
cause the goods of traders in the Indian Country to be searched upon suspicion or information that ardent spirits
were being introduced into the Indian Country, to be seized and forfeited if found, and of the Act of June 30, 1834,
Section 20, c. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 732, enabling an Indian agent having reason to suspect any person of having
introduced or being about to introduce liquors into the Indian Country to cause the boats, stores or places of deposit
of such person to be searched and the liquor found forfeited. This Court recognized the statute of 1822 as justifying
such a search and seizure in American Fur Co. v. United States, 2 Pet. 358. By the Indian
Page 267 U. S. 153
Appropriation Act of March 2, 1917, c. 146, 39 Stat. 969, 970, automobiles used in introducing or attempting to
introduce intoxicants into the Indian Territory may be seized, libeled and forfeited as provided in the Revised
Statutes, Section 2140.
And again, in Alaska, by Section 174 of the Act of March 3, 1899, c. 429, 30 Stat. 1253, 1280, it is provided that
collectors and deputy collectors, or any person authorized by them in writing, shall be given power to arrest persons
and seize vessels and merchandise in Alaska liable to fine, penalties or forfeiture under the Act and to keep and
deliver the same, and the Attorney General, in construing the Act, advised the Government:
"If your agents reasonably suspect that a violation of law has occurred, in my opinion they have power to search
any vessel within the 3-mile limit according to the practice of customs officers when acting under Section 3059 of
the Revised Statutes, and to seize such vessels."
26 Opinions Attorneys General 243.
We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes to show that the guaranty of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the
beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house
or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship,

108

motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Having thus established that contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other
vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come now to consider under what circumstances such search
may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable
Page 267 U. S. 154
if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travelers may be so
stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering
the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.
But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without
interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for
believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. Section 26, Title II, of the National
Prohibition Act, like the second section of the Act of 1789, for the searching of vessels, like the provisions of the Act
of 1815, and Section 3061, Revised Statutes, for searching vehicles for smuggled goods, and like the Act of 1822,
and that of 1834 and Section 2140, R.S., and the Act of 1917 for the search of vehicles and automobiles for liquor
smuggled into the Indian Country, was enacted primarily to accomplish the seizure and destruction of contraband
goods; secondly, the automobile was to be forfeited, and thirdly, the driver was to be arrested. Under Section 29,
Title II, of the Act the latter might be punished by not more than $500 fine for the first offense, not more than $1,000
fine or 90 days' imprisonment for the second offense, and by a fine of $500 or more and by not more than 2 years'
imprisonment for the third offense. Thus, he is to be arrested for a misdemeanor for his first and second offenses
and for a felony if he offends the third time. The main purpose of the Act obviously was to deal with the liquor and
its transportation and to destroy it. The mere manufacture of liquor can do little to defeat the policy of the
Eighteenth Amendment and the Prohibition Act, unless the forbidden
Page 267 U. S. 155
product can be distributed for illegal sale and use. Section 26 was intended to reach and destroy the forbidden
liquor in transportation, and the provisions for forfeiture of the vehicle and the arrest of the transporter were
incidental. The rule for determining what may be required before a seizure may be made by a competent seizing
official is not to be determined by the character of the penalty to which the transporter may be subjected. Under
Section 28, Title II, of the Prohibition Act, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his assistants, agents and
inspectors are to have the power and protection in the enforcement of the Act conferred by the existing laws
relating to the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors. Officers who seize under Section 26 of the Prohibition Act
are therefore protected by Section 970 of the Revised Statutes, providing that:

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"When, in any prosecution commenced on account of the seizure of any vessel, goods, wares, or merchandise,
made by any collector or other officer, under any Act of Congress authorizing such seizure, judgment is rendered
for the claimant, but it appears to the court that there was reasonable cause of seizure, the court shall cause a
proper certificate thereof to be entered, and the claimant shall not, in such case, be entitled to costs, nor shall the
person who made the seizure, nor the prosecutor, be liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or
prosecution: Provided, That the vessel, goods, wares, or merchandise be, after judgment, forthwith returned to
such claimant or his agent."
It follows from this that, if an officer seizes an automobile or the liquor in it without a warrant and the facts as
subsequently developed do not justify a judgment of condemnation and forfeiture, the officer may escape costs or a
suit for damages by a showing that he had reasonable or probable cause for the seizure. Stacey v. Emery,97 U. S.
642. The measure of legality of such a seizure is,
Page 267 U. S. 156
therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which
he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported.
We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of liquor in transport in vehicles. It is certainly
a reasonable distinction. It gives the owner of an automobile or other vehicle seized under Section 26, in absence
of probable cause, a right to have restored to him the automobile, it protects him under the Weeks and Amos cases
from use of the liquor as evidence against him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to damages. On the
other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Government and its officials are given the opportunity which
they should have, to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contraband goods and to
seize them.
Such a rule fulfills the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment. In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used, and when properly supported by affidavit and issued after judicial approval, protects
the seizing officer against a suit for damages. In cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the
seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause. United States v.
Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963, 972.
But we are pressed with the argument that, if the search of the automobile discloses the presence of liquor and
leads under the statute to the arrest of the person in charge of the automobile, the right of seizure should be limited
by the common law rule as to the circumstances justifying an arrest without warrant for a misdemeanor. The usual
rule is that a police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have
been guilty of a felony, and that he may only arrest without a warrant one guilty of misdemeanor if committed
Page 267 U. S. 157

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in his presence. Kurtz v. Moffitt,115 U. S. 487; Elk v. United States,177 U. S. 529. The rule is sometimes expressed
as follows:
"In cases of misdemeanor, a peace officer, like a private person, has at common law no power of arresting without
a warrant except when a breach of the peace has been committed in his presence or there is reasonable ground for
supposing that a breach of peace is about to be committed or renewed in his presence."
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 9, part III, 612.
The reason for arrest for misdemeanors without warrant at common law was promptly to suppress breaches of the
peace, 1 Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 193, while the reason for arrest without warrant on a reliable report of a
felony was because the public safety and the due apprehension of criminals charged with heinous offenses
required that such arrests should be made at once without warrant. Rohan v. Sawan, 5 Cush. 281. The argument
for defendants is that, as the misdemeanor to justify arrest without warrant must be committed in the presence of
the police officer, the offense is not committed in his presence unless he can by his senses detect that the liquor is
being transported, no matter how reliable his previous information by which he can identify the automobile as
loaded with it.Elrod v. Moss, 278 Fed. 123; Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544.
So it is that, under the rule contended for by defendants, the liquor, if carried by one who has been already twice
convicted of the same offense, may be seized on information other than the senses, while, if he has been only once
convicted, it may not be seized unless the presence of the liquor is detected by the senses as the automobile
concealing it rushes by. This is certainly a very unsatisfactory line of difference when the main object of the section
is to forfeit and suppress the liquor, the arrest of the individual being only incidental, as shown by the lightness
Page 267 U. S. 158
of the penalty. See Commonwealth v. Street, 3 Pa.Dist. & Co. Reports, 783. In England at the common law, the
difference in punishment between felonies and misdemeanors was very great. Under our present federal statutes, it
is much less important, and Congress may exercise a relatively wide discretion in classing particular offenses as
felonies or misdemeanors. As the main purpose of Section 26 was seizure and forfeiture, it is not so much the
owner as the property that offends. Agnew v. Haymes, 141 Fed. 631, 641. The language of the section provides for
seizure when the officer of the law "discovers" anyone in the act of transporting the liquor by automobile or other
vehicle. Certainly it is a very narrow and technical construction of this word which would limit it to what the officer
sees, hears or smells as the automobile rolls by, and exclude therefrom, when he identifies the car, the convincing
information that he may previously have received as to the use being made of it.
We do not think such a nice distinction is applicable in the present case. When a man is legally arrested for an
offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be
used to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution. Weeks v. United States,232 U.
S. 383, 232 U. S. 392; Dillon v. O'Brien and Davis, 16 Cox. C.C. 245; Getchell v. Page, 103 Me. 387; Kneeland v.

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Connally, 70 Ga. 424; 1 Bishop, Criminal Procedure, Sec. 211; 1 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (10th edition), Sec.
97. The argument of defendants is based on the theory that the seizure in this case can only be thus justified. If
their theory were sound, their conclusion would be. The validity of the seizure then would turn wholly on the validity
of the arrest without a seizure. But the theory is unsound. The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not
dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer
Page 267 U. S. 159
has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. The seizure in such a proceeding comes
before the arrest, as Section 26 indicates. It is true that Section 26, Title II, provides for immediate proceedings
against the person arrested, and that, upon conviction, the liquor is to be destroyed and the automobile or other
vehicle is to be sold, with the saving of the interest of a lienor who does not know of its unlawful use; but it is
evident that, if the person arrested is ignorant of the contents of the vehicle, or if he escapes, proceedings can be
had against the liquor for destruction or other disposition under Section 25 of the same title. The character of the
offense for which, after the contraband liquor is found and seized, the driver can be prosecuted does not affect the
validity of the seizure.
This conclusion is in keeping with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the principles of search and
seizure of contraband forfeitable property, and it is a wise one, because it leaves the rule one which is easily
applied and understood and is uniform. Holbck v. State, 106 Ohio St.195, accords with this conclusion. Ash v.
United States, 299 Fed. 277 and Milam v. United States, 296 Fed. 629, decisions by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the fourth circuit, take the same view. The Ash case is very similar in its facts to the case at bar, and both were
by the same court which decided Snyder v. United States, 285 Fed. 1, cited for the defendants. See also Park v.
United States (1st C.C.A.) 294 Fed. 776, 783, and Lambert v. United States, (9th C.C.A.) 282 Fed. 413.
Finally, was there probable cause? In The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, the question was whether the seizure of a French
vessel at a particular place was upon probable cause that she was there for the purpose of smuggling. In this
discussion, Mr. Justice Story, who delivered the judgment of the Court, said (page 22 U. S. 374):
"It has been very justly observed at the bar that the Court is bound to take notice of public facts and geographical
Page 267 U. S. 160
positions, and that this remote part of the country has been infested, at different periods, by smugglers, is a matter
of general notoriety, and may be gathered from the public documents of the government."
We know in this way that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that Detroit and its neighborhood along
the Detroit River, which is the International Boundary, is one of the most active centers for introducing illegally into
this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. It is obvious from the evidence that the prohibition
agents were engaged in a regular patrol along the important highways from Detroit to Grand Rapids to stop and

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seize liquor carried in automobiles. They knew or had convincing evidence to make them believe that the Carroll
boys, as they called them, were so-called "bootleggers" in Grand Rapids, i.e., that they were engaged in plying the
unlawful trade of selling such liquor in that city. The officers had soon after noted their going from Grand Rapids
half way to Detroit, and attempted to follow them to that city to see where they went, but they escaped observation.
Two months later, these officers suddenly met the same men on their way westward, presumably from Detroit. The
partners in the original combination to sell liquor in Grand Rapids were together in the same automobile they had
been in the night when they tried to furnish the whisky to the officers which was thus identified as part of the firm
equipment. They were coming from the direction of the great source of supply for their stock to Grand Rapids,
where they plied their trade. That the officers, when they saw the defendants, believed that they were carrying
liquor we can have no doubt, and we think it is equally clear that they had reasonable cause for thinking so.
Emphasis is put by defendants' counsel on the statement made by one of the officers that they were not looking for
defendants at the particular time when they appeared. We do not perceive that it has any weight. As soon as they
did appear,
Page 267 U. S. 161
the officers were entitled to use their reasoning faculties upon all the facts of which they had previous knowledge in
respect to the defendants.
The necessity for probable cause in justifying seizures on land or sea, in making arrests without warrant for past
felonies, and in malicious prosecution and false imprisonment cases has led to frequent definition of the phrase.
In Stacey v. Emery,97 U. S. 642, 97 U. S. 645, a suit for damages for seizure by a collector, this Court defined
probable cause as follows:
"If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing
that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient."
Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339; The George, 1 Mason, 24; The Thompson, 3 Wall. 155. It was laid down by
Chief Justice Shaw, in Commonwealth v. Carey, 12 Cush. 246, 251 that
"if a constable or other peace officer arrest a person without a warrant, he is not bound to show in his justification a
felony actually committed, to render the arrest lawful; but if he suspects one on his own knowledge of facts, or on
facts communicated to him by others, and thereupon he has reasonable ground to believe that the accused has
been guilty of felony, the arrest is not unlawful."
Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396; Rohan v. Sawin, 5 Cush. 281, 285. In McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. St.
63, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sums up the definition of probable cause in this way (page 69):
"The substance of all the definitions is a reasonable ground for belief in guilt."

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In the case of the Director General v. Kastenbaum,263 U. S. 25, which was a suit for false imprisonment, it was
said by this Court (page 263 U. S. 28):
"But, as we have seen, good faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be grounded on facts
within knowledge of the Director General's agent,
Page 267 U. S. 162
which in the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable."
See also Munn v. e Nemours, 3 Wash.C.C. 37.
In the light of these authorities, and what is shown by this record, it is clear the officers here had justification for the
search and seizure. This is to say that the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient, in themselves, to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which they stopped and searched.
Counsel finally argue that the defendants should be permitted to escape the effect of the conviction because the
court refused on motion to deliver them the liquor when, as they say, the evidence adduced on the motion was
much less than that shown on the trial, and did not show probable cause. The record does not make it clear what
evidence was produced in support of or against the motion. But, apart from this, we think the point is without
substance here. If the evidence given on the trial was sufficient, as we think it was, to sustain the introduction of the
liquor as evidence, it is immaterial that there was an inadequacy of evidence when application was made for its
return. A conviction on adequate and admissible evidence should not be set aide on such a ground. The whole
matter was gone into at the trial, so no right of the defendants was infringed.
Counsel for the Government contend that Kiro, the defendant who did not own the automobile, could not complain
of the violation of the Fourth Amendment in the use of the liquor as evidence against him, whatever the view taken
as to Carroll's rights. Our conclusion as to the whole case makes it unnecessary for us to discuss this aspect of it.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
Page 267 U. S. 163
MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, before his retirement, concurred in this opinion.
The separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS concurred in by MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND.
1. The damnable character of the "bootlegger's" business should not close our eyes to the mischief which will
surely follow any attempt to destroy it by unwarranted methods.

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"To press forward to a great principle by breaking through every other great principle that stands in the way of its
establishment; . . . in short, to procure an imminent good by means that are unlawful, is as little consonant to
private morality as to public justice."
Sir William Scott, The Louis, 2 Dolson 210, 257.
While quietly driving an ordinary automobile along a much frequented public road, plaintiffs in error were arrested
by Federal officers without a warrant and upon mere suspicion -- ill-founded, as I think. The officers then searched
the machine and discovered carefully secreted whisky, which was seized and thereafter used as evidence against
plaintiffs in error when on trial for transporting intoxicating liquor contrary to the Volstead Act (c. 85, 41 Stat. 305).
They maintain that both arrest and seizure were unlawful, and that use of the liquor as evidence violated their
constitutional rights.
This is not a proceeding to forfeit seized goods; nor is it an action against the seizing officer for a tort. Cases like
the following are not controlling: Crowell v. M'Fadon, 8 Cranch 94, 12 U. S. 98; United States v. 1960 Bags of
Coffee, 8 Cranch 398, 403 [argument of counsel -- omitted], 12 U. S. 405; Otis v. Watkins, 9 Cranch 339; Gelston v.
Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 16 U. S. 310, 16 U. S. 318; Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342; Taylor v. United States, 3
How. 197, 44 U. S. 205. They turned upon express provisions of applicable Acts of Congress; they did not involve
the point now presented, and afford little, if any, assistance toward its proper solution. The Volstead Act does not, in
terms, authorize arrest or seizure upon mere suspicion.
Page 267 U. S. 164
Whether the officers are shielded from prosecution or action by Rev.Stat. Sec. 970 is not important. That section
does not undertake to deprive the citizen of any constitutional right, or to permit the use of evidence unlawfully
obtained. It does, however, indicate the clear understanding of Congress that probable cause is not always enough
to justify a seizure.
Nor are we now concerned with the question whether, by apt words, Congress might have authorized the arrest
without a warrant. It has not attempted to do this. On the contrary, the whole history of the legislation indicates a
fixed purpose not so to do. First and second violations are declared to be misdemeanors -- nothing more -- and
Congress, of course, understood the rule concerning arrests for such offenses. Whether different penalties should
have been prescribed or other provisions added is not for us to inquire; nor do difficulties attending enforcement
give us power to supplement the legislation.
2. As the Volstead Act contains no definite grant of authority to arrest upon suspicion and without warrant for a first
offense, we come to inquire whether such authority can be inferred from its provisions.
Unless the statute which creates a misdemeanor contains some clear provision to the contrary, suspicion that it is
being violated will not justify an arrest. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed and applied, in harmony with

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rules of the common law. United States v. Harris,177 U. S. 305, 177 U. S. 310. And the well settled doctrine is that
an arrest for a misdemeanor may not be made without a warrant unless the offense is committed in the officer's
presence.
Kurtz v. Moffitt,115 U. S. 487, 115 U. S. 498 -"By the common law of England, neither a civil officer nor a private citizen had the right without a warrant to make
an arrest for a crime not committed in his presence except in the case
Page 267 U. S. 165
of felony, and then only for the purpose of bringing the offender before a civil magistrate."
Elk v. United States,177 U. S. 529, 177 U. S. 531 -"An officer, at common law, was not authorized to make an arrest without a warrant, for a mere misdemeanor not
committed in his presence."
Commonwealth v. Wright, 158 Mass. 149, 158 -"It is suggested that the statutory misdemeanor of having in one's possession short lobsters with intent to sell them
is a continuing offence, which is being committed while such possession continues, and that, therefore, an officer
who sees any person in possession of such lobsters with intent to sell them can arrest such person without a
warrant, as for a misdemeanor committed in his presence. We are of opinion, however, that for statutory
misdemeanors of this kind, not amounting to a breach of the peace, there is no authority in an officer to arrest
without a warrant unless it is given by statute. . . . The Legislature has often empowered officers to arrest without
warrant for similar offenses, which perhaps tends to show that, in its opinion, no such right exists at common law."
Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 584 -"Any law which would place the keeping and safe conduct of another in the hands of even a conservator of the
peace, unless for some breach of the peace committed in his presence, or upon suspicion of felony, would be most
oppressive and unjust, and destroy all the rights which our Constitution guarantees. These are rights which existed
long before our Constitution, and we have taken just pride in their maintenance, making them a part of the
fundamental law of the land. . . . If persons can be restrained of their liberty, and assaulted and imprisoned, under
such circumstances, without complaint or warrant, then there is no limit to the power of a police officer."
3. The Volstead Act contains no provision which annuls the accepted common law rule or discloses definite intent
Page 267 U. S. 166
to authorize arrests without warrant for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's presence.

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To support the contrary view, Section 26 is relied upon -"When . . . any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law,
intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or aircraft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize
any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being transported contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating liquors
transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer, he shall take possession of the vehicle and team or
automobile, boat, air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any person in charge thereof."
Let it be observed that this section has no special application to automobiles; it includes any vehicle -- buggy,
wagon, boat or air craft. Certainly, in a criminal statute, always to be strictly construed, the words "shall discover. . .
in the act of transporting in violation of the law" cannot mean shall have reasonable cause to suspect or believe that
such transportation is being carried on. To discover and to suspect are wholly different things. Since the beginning,
apt words have been used when Congress intended that arrests for misdemeanors or seizures might be made
upon suspicion. It has studiously refrained from making a felony of the offense here charged, and it did not
undertake by any apt words to enlarge the power to arrest. It was not ignorant of the established rule on the
subject, and well understood how this could be abrogated, as plainly appears from statutes like the following: "An
Act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage," approved March 2, 1789, c. 22, 1 Stat. 627, 677,
678;
"An Act to provide more effectually for the collection of the duties imposed by law on goods, wares and
merchandise imported
Page 267 U. S. 167
into the United States, and on the tonnage of ships or vessels,"
approved August 4, 1790, c. 35, 1 Stat. 145, 170; "An Act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports
and tonnage," approved March 3, 1815, c. 94, 3 Stat. 231, 232. These and similar Acts definitely empowered
officers to seize upon suspicion and therein radically differ from the Volstead Act, which authorized no such thing.
"An Act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act," approved November 23, 1921, c. 134, 42 Stat. 222, 223,
provides -"That any officer, agent, or employee of the United States engaged in the enforcement of this Act, or the National
Prohibition Act, or any other law of the United States, who shall search any private dwelling as defined in the
National Prohibition Act, and occupied as such dwelling, without a warrant directing such search, or who while so
engaged shall without a search warrant maliciously and without reasonable cause search any other building or
property, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined for a first offense not more
than $1,000, and for a subsequent offense not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both
such fine and imprisonment."

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And it is argued that the words and history of this section indicate the intent of Congress to distinguish between the
necessity for warrants in order to search private dwellings and the right to search automobiles without one.
Evidently Congress regarded the searching of private dwellings as matter of much graver consequence than some
other searches, and distinguished between them by declaring the former criminal. But the connection between this
distinction and the legality of plaintiffs in error's arrest is not apparent. Nor can I find reason for inquiring concerning
the validity of the distinction under the Fourth Amendment. Of course, the distinction is
Page 267 U. S. 168
valid, and so are some seizures. But what of it? The Act made nothing legal which theretofore was unlawful, and to
conclude that, by declaring the unauthorized search of a private dwelling criminal, Congress intended to remove
ancient restrictions from other searches and from arrests as well would seem impossible.
While the Fourth Amendment denounces only unreasonable seizures, unreasonableness often depends upon the
means adopted. Here, the seizure followed an unlawful arrest, and therefore became itself unlawful -- as plainly
unlawful as the seizure within the home so vigorously denounced in Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383, 232 U.
S. 391, 232 U. S. 392, 232 U. S. 393.
In Snyder v. United States, 285 Fed. 1, 2, the Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, rejected evidence obtained by an
unwarranted arrest, and clearly announced some very wholesome doctrine:
"That an officer may not make an arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence, without a warrant, has
been so frequently decided as not to require citation of authority. It is equally fundamental that a citizen may not be
arrested on suspicion of having committed a misdemeanor and have his person searched by force, without a
warrant of arrest. If, therefore, the arresting officer in this case had no other justification for the arrest than the mere
suspicion that a bottle, only the neck of which he could see protruding from the pocket of defendant's coat,
contained intoxicating liquor, then it would seem to follow without much question that the arrest and search, without
first having secured a warrant, were illegal. And that his only justification was his suspicion is admitted by the
evidence of the arresting officer himself. If the bottle had been empty, or if it had contained anyone of a dozen
innoxious liquids, the act of the officer would, admittedly, have been an unlawful invasion of the personal liberty of
the defendant. That it happened in this instance to contain whisky, we think,
Page 267 U. S. 169
neither justifies the assault nor condemns the principle which makes such an act unlawful."
The validity of the seizure under consideration depends on the legality of the arrest. This did not follow the seizure,
but the reverse is true. Plaintiffs in error were first brought within the officers' power, and, while therein, the seizure
took place. If an officer, upon mere suspicion of a misdemeanor, may stop one on the public highway, take articles

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away from him, and thereafter use them as evidence to convict him of crime, what becomes of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments?
In Weeks v. United States, supra, through Mr. Justice Day, this court said:
"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise
of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to
forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and
seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of
giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the
laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted
practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have
a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. . . . The efforts of the courts and their officials to
bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
Page 267 U. S. 170
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land."
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,251 U. S. 385, 251 U. S. 391:
"The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that, although, of course, its seizure was an outrage
which the Government now regrets, it may study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may use
the knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form to produce them; that the protection
of the Constitution covers the physical possession, but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the
object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act. Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383, to be sure, had established
that laying the papers directly before the grand jury was unwarranted, but it is taken to mean only that two steps are
required instead of one. In our opinion, such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.
232 U.S. 232 U. S. 393. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all. Of course,
this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained
from an independent source, they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's
own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed."
Gouled v. United States,255 U. S. 298, and Amos v. United States,255 U. S. 313, distinctly point out that property
procured by unlawful action of Federal officers cannot be introduced as evidence.

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The arrest of plaintiffs in error was unauthorized, illegal and violated the guarantee of due process given by the
Fifth Amendment. The liquor offered in evidence was obtained by the search which followed this arrest, and was
therefore obtained in violation of their constitutional
Page 267 U. S. 171
rights. Articles found upon or in the control of one lawfully arrested may be used as evidence for certain purposes,
but not at all when secured by the unlawful action of a Federal officer.
4. The facts known by the officers who arrested plaintiffs in error were wholly insufficient to create a reasonable
belief that they were transporting liquor contrary to law. These facts were detailed by Fred Cronenwelt, chief
prohibition officer. His entire testimony as given at the trial follows -"I am in charge of the Federal Prohibition Department in this District. I am acquainted with these two respondents,
and first saw them on September 29, 1921, in Mr. Scully's apartment on Oakes Street, Grand Rapids. There were
three of them that came to Mr. Scully's apartment, one by the name of Kruska, George Kiro and John Carroll. I was
introduced to them under the name of Stafford, and told them I was working for the Michigan Chair Company, and
wanted to buy three cases of whisky, and the price was agreed upon. After they thought I was all right, they said
they would be back in half or three-quarters of an hour; that they had to go out to the east end of Grand Rapids, to
get this liquor. They went away and came back in a short time, and Mr. Kruska came upstairs and said they couldn't
get it that night; that a fellow by the name of Irving, where they were going to get it, wasn't in, but they were going to
deliver it the next day, about ten. They didn't deliver it the next day. I am not positive about the price. It seems to
me it was around $130 a case. It might be $135. Both respondents took part in this conversation. When they came
to Mr. Scully's apartment, they had this same car. While it was dark and I wasn't able to get a good look at this car,
later, on the sixth day of October, when I was out on the road with Mr. Scully, I was waiting on the highway while he
went to Reed's Lake to get a light
Page 267 U. S. 172
lunch, and they drove by, and I had their license number and the appearance of their car, and knowing the two
boys, seeing them on the 29th day of September, I was satisfied when I seen the car on December 15th it was the
same car I had seen on the 6th day of October. On the 6th day of October, it was probably twenty minutes before
Scully got back to where I was. I told him the Carroll boys had just gone toward Detroit and we were trying to catch
up with them and see where they were going. We did catch up with them somewhere along by Ada, just before we
got to Ada, and followed them to East Lansing. We gave up the chase at East Lansing."
"On the 15th of December, when Peterson and Scully and I overhauled this car on the road, it was in the country,
on Pike 16, the road leading between Grand Rapids and Detroit. When we passed the car, we were going toward
Ionia, or Detroit, and the Kiro and Carroll boys were coming towards Grand Rapids when Mr. Scully and I
recognized them and said 'there goes the Carroll brothers,' and we went on still further in the same direction we

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were going and turned around and went back to them; drove up to the side of them. Mr. Scully was driving the car; I
was sitting in the front seat, and I stepped out on the running board and held out my hand and said, 'Carroll, stop
that car,' and they did stop it. John Kiro was driving the car. After we got them stopped, we asked them to get out of
the car, which they did. Carroll referred to me and called me by the name of 'Fred' just as soon as I got up to him.
Raised up the back part of the roadster; didn't find any liquor there; then raised up the cushion; then I struck at the
lazyback of the seat and it was hard. I then started to open it up, and I did tear the cushion some, and Carroll said,
'Don't tear the cushion; we have only got six cases in there;' and I took out two bottles and found out it was liquor;
satisfied it was liquor. Mr. Peterson and a fellow by the
Page 267 U. S. 173
name of Gerald Donker came in with the two Carroll boys and the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids. They brought
the two defendants and the car and the liquor to Grand Rapids. I and the other men besides Peterson stayed out
on the road, looking for other cars that we had information were coming in. There was conversation between me
and Carroll before Peterson started for town with the defendants. Mr. Carroll said, 'Take the liquor and give us one
more chance and I will make it right with you.' At the same time, he reached in one of his trousers pockets and
pulled out money; the amount of it I don't know. I wouldn't say it was a whole lot. I saw a ten dollar bill, and there
was some other bills; I don't know how much there was; it wasn't a large amount."
"As I understand, Mr. Hanley helped carry the liquor from the car. On the next day afterwards, we put this liquor in
boxes, steel boxes, and left it in the Marshal's vault, and it is still there now. Mr. Hanley and Chief Deputy Johnson,
some of the agents and myself were there. Mr. Peterson was there the next day that the labels were signed by the
different officers; those two bottles, Exhibits 'A' and 'B.'"
"Q. Now, those two bottles, Exhibits 'A' and 'B,' were those the two bottles you took out of the car out there, or were
those two bottles taken out of the liquor after it go up here?"
"A. We didn't label them out on the road; simply found it was liquor and sent it in, and this liquor was in Mr. Hanley's
custody that evening and during the middle of the next day when we checked it over to see the amount of liquor
that was there. Mr. Johnson and I sealed the bottles and Mr. Johnson's name is on the label that goes over the box
with mine, and this liquor was taken out of the case today. It was taken out for the purpose of analyzation. The
others were not broken until today. "
Page 267 U. S. 174
"Q. And are you able to tell us, from the label and from the bottles, whether it is part of the same liquor taken out of
that car? A. It has the appearance of it, yes sir. Those are the bottles that were in there that Mr. Hanley said was
gotten out of the Carroll car."

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"[Cross-examination.] I think I was the first one to get back to the Carroll car after it was stopped. I had a gun in my
pocket; I didn't present it. I was the first one to the car, and raised up the back of the car, but the others were there
shortly afterward. We assembled right around the car immediately."
"Q. And whatever examination and what investigation you made you went right ahead and did it in your own way?
A. Yes, sir."
"Q. And took possession of it, arrested them, and brought them in? A. Yes, sir."
"Q. And at that time, of course, you had no search warrant? A. No, sir. We had no knowledge that this car was
coming through at that particular time."
"[Redirect examination.] The lazyback was awfully hard when I struck it with my fist. It was harder than upholstery
ordinarily is in those backs; a great deal harder. It was practically solid. Sixty-nine quarts of whiskey in one
lazyback."
The negotiation concerning three cases of whisky on September 29th was the only circumstance which could have
subjected plaintiffs in error to any reasonable suspicion. No whisky was delivered, and it is not certain that they
ever intended to deliver any. The arrest came two and a half months after the negotiation. Every act in the
meantime is consistent with complete innocence. Has it come about that merely because a man once agreed to
deliver whisky, but did not, he may be arrested whenever thereafter he ventures to drive an automobile on the road
to Detroit!
5. When Congress has intended that seizures or arrests might be made upon suspicion, it has been careful to say
Page 267 U. S. 175
so. The history and terms of the Volstead Act are not consistent with the suggestion that it was the purpose of
Congress to grant the power here claimed for enforcement officers. The facts known when the arrest occurred were
wholly insufficient to engender reasonable belief that plaintiffs in error were committing a misdemeanor, and the
legality of the arrest cannot be supported by facts ascertained through the search which followed.
To me, it seems clear enough that the judgment should be reversed.
I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND concurs in this opinion.
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122

PEOPLE VS LO HO WING
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88017 January 21, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y SANTIAGO,
defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:p
This case involves the unlawful transport of metamphetamine, a regulated drug under Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended. One of its derivatives is metamphetamine hydrochloride, notoriously known in street parlance as "shabu"
or "poor man's cocaine."
Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were charged
with a violation of Section 15, Article III of the aforementioned statute otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, before Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Only appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng
Huat were convicted. They were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P25,000.00 each, and to pay
the costs. Their co-accused Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness. The pertinent portion of the
information reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1987, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously deliver, dispatch or transport 56 teabags of Metamphetamine, a
regulated drug.
Contrary to law.

The antecedent facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the importation of
illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an evaluation of the information thus received,
a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the suspected syndicate.
As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was carried out to
infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia (hereinafter
referred to as Tia).

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Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat (hereinafter referred to as Lim) by another confidential agent
named George on August 3, 1987. Lim expressed a desire to hire a male travelling companion for his business nips
abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired.
Lim and Tia met anew on several occasions to make arrangements for a trip to China. In the course of those
meetings, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (hereinafter referred to as appellant), whom Tia found out to be the
person he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim.
As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the suspected criminal
syndicate. Meanwhile, the officer-in-charge of OPLAN SHARON 887, Captain Luisito Palmera, filed with his
superiors the reports submitted to him, and officially informed the Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities.
On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight. Before they departed,
Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of return to the Philippines as
declared in his round-trip plane ticket-October 6, 1987 at two o'clock in the afternoon.
The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou, in the People's
Republic of China. Upon arriving there, they checked in at a hotel, and rested for a few hours. The pair thereafter
went to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans of tea. Tia saw the paper tea bags when the cans
were opened for examination during the purchase. Afterwards, they returned to the hotel. Appellant kept the cans of
tea in his hotel room. That evening, Tia went to appellant's room to talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two other
men with appellant. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning substance on a piece of aluminum foil
using a cigarette lighter. Appellant joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance.
Tia asked the latter what they would be bringing back to the Philippines. He was informed that their cargo consisted
of Chinese drugs. Tia stayed in the room for about twenty minutes before going back to his room to sleep.
The next day, October 6,1987, the two returned to Manila via a China Airlines flight. Appellant had with him his red
traveling bag with wheels. Before departing from Guangzhou however, customs examiners inspected their luggage.
The tin cans of tea were brought out from the traveling bag of appellant. The contents of the cans were not closely
examined, and appellant was cleared along with Tia.
The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), then named Manila International Airport, on
schedule. Lim met the newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. Lim talked to appellant, while Tia, upon being
instructed, looked after their luggage. After Lim and appellant finished their conversation, the latter hailed a taxicab.
Appellant and Tia boarded the taxicab after putting their luggage inside the back compartment of the vehicle. Lim
followed in another taxi cab.
Meanwhile, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera was formed to act on the tip given by
Tia. On the expected date of arrival, the team proceeded to the NAIA. Captain Palmera notified the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) Detachment at the airport for coordination. After a briefing, the operatives were ordered to
take strategic positions around the arrival area. Two operatives stationed just outside the arrival area were the first
ones to spot the suspects emerging therefrom. Word was passed on to the other members of the team that the
suspects were in sight. Appellant was pulling along his red traveling bag while Tia was carrying a shoulder bag. The
operatives also spotted Lim meeting their quarry.
Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted them followed them. Along Imelda
Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing the
taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to escape. The
operatives disembarked from their car, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage
compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives
requested from the suspects permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling
bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea
bag from the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white powder resembling
crushed alum came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its contents more closely.
Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three traveling bags opened for inspection.
From the red traveling bag, a total of six (6) tin cans were found, including the one previously opened. Nothing else

124

of consequence was recovered from the other bags. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS Headquarters in
Quezon City for questioning.
Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro Street, Quezon City.
Lim was likewise apprehended and brought to the CIS Headquarters for interrogation.
During the investigation of the case, the six tin cans recovered from the traveling bag of appellant were opened and
examined. They contained a total of fifty-six (56) paper tea bags with white crystalline powder inside instead of tea
leaves.
The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab during the search and seizure was sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory for
preliminary examination. Tests conducted on a sample of the crystalline powder inside the tea bag yielded a
positive result that the specimen submitted was metamphetamine. Samples from each of the fifty-six (56) tea bags
were similarly tested. The tests were also positive for metamphetamine. Hence, the three suspects were indicted.
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the government antinarcotics operatives, to whom the said court applied the well-settled presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties.
Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court, namely:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON THE
ACCUSED AS ILLEGAL.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF DELIVERING,
DISPATCHING OR TRANSPORTING METAMPHETAMINE, A REGULATED DRUG.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING REYNALDO TIA TO TESTIFY FOR THE
2
PROSECUTION.
We affirm.
Anent the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure made against the
accused is illegal for being violative of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. He reasons that the PC-CIS officers
concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had been informed of the date and time of a
arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance. The fact that the search
and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle, appellant argues, does not automatically make the
warrantless search herein fall within the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the necessity of a valid
warrant to effect a search because, as aforementioned, the anti-narcotics agents had both time and opportunity to
secure a search warrant.
The contentions are without merit. As correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure must be supported by
a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth
3
in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a
moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case
clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not
necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.

125

In this connection, We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General, as contained in the appellee's brief,
that the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge
a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
4
that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of
a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
5
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country.
The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of
which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and
time of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause
to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
The second assignment of error is likewise lacking in merit. Appellant was charged and convicted under Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, which reads:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
dispose, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug (emphasis supplied).
The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56) tea bags containing
metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction "or' was used, thereby implying that the accused were being
charged of the three specified acts in the alternative. Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of "delivery"
because the term connotes a source and a recipient, the latter being absent under the facts of the case. It is also
argued that "dispatching' cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or disposed of drugs. As for
"transporting," appellant contends that he cannot also be held liable therefor because the act of transporting
necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is non- existent under the given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which appellant and his coaccused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no doubt that law enforcers caught appellant and
his co-accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited drug. The term "transport" is defined as "to carry or
6
convey from one place to another." The operative words in the definition are "to carry or convey." The fact that
there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. It is immaterial
whether or not the place of destination is reached. Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical
conclusion that he and his co- accused did not intend to bring the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e. they had no
place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was interrupted by the search and
arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already been commenced. Otherwise, there
would be nothing to interrupt.
Therefore, considering the foregoing, since the information included the acts of delivery, dispatch or transport, proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of any of the acts so included is sufficient for conviction under Section
15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense
under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be
considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the offense punished and
suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal
7
intent.
As to the third assigned error, appellant contests the discharge of accused Reynaldo Tia to testify for the
prosecution on the ground that there was no necessity for the same. Appellant argues that deep penetration agents

126

such as Tia "have to take risks and accept the consequences of their actions." The argument is devoid of merit.
The discharge of accused Tia was based on Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which reads in part:
Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case,the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state . . . (emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the discharge of an accused is left to the sound discretion of the
9
lower court. The trial court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist. In
the instant case, appellant does not allege that any of the conditions for the discharge had not been met by the
prosecution. Therefore, the discharge, as ordered by the trial court, stands.
Finally, appellant alleges that the testimony of Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab regarding the facts surrounding the
commission of the offense proves that the discharge of accused Tia is unnecessary. The allegation is baseless.
Appellant himself admits that the sergeant's testimony corroborates the testimony of the discharged accused. The
fact of corroboration of the testimonies bolsters the validity of the questioned discharge precisely because
paragraph (a) of the aforequoted rule on discharge requires that the testimony be substantially corroborated in its
material points. The corroborative testimony of the PC-CIS operative does not debunk the claim of the prosecution
that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of accused Tia.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is thereby DISMISSED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

127

PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:p
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused)
was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a
tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following
day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to
catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to
Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From
1
Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding
Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming
2
from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a
checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an

128

inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus.
Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to
be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply,
the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to
be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspiciouslooking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The
wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused
stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag.
Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam
stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain
hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and
the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a
derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search
of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and
that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple
whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but
because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to
take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other Identification
papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others,
his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought
the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag.
He was told to get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court
did not give credence to accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to raise
such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not
inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2)
months after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling
bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
3
the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs.

129

Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp
Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic
Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that
the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the
prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
5
against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,
there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
6
private person under the following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a
7
lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over
the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause
for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the
8
offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search
9
and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of
10
existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or
11
12
where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way
to Baguio City.

130

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a
Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to
13
obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory
Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of
dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held
that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure
a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where
accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one
of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was
required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so,
only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification
papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the
NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities.
From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the
personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open
his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were
prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information
received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To
deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant,
in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

131

MUSTANG LUMBER VS CA
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN,
JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A.
ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.

[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief,
Special Actions and Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the Second and
Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the
Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila,
and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly
registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No.
NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the
time material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
the Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen
inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw
coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport

132

documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at
[1]
Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of
[2]
the owner.
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the
petitioners lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber;
[3]
and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed
under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber
origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to
[4]
prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical
possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his
[5]
representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders.
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from
14 April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly
the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the ground
that the documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under
[6]
seizure.
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary Factoran the
following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for
operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned
specie) without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck with Plate No. CCK322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its owner fails to
submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from date of
seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if
the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when
recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as the lumber loaded therein for
[7]
transport lumber using recycled documents.
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's
permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumberdealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner
[8]
had already secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events which took place
on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in
accordance with law the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks
[9]
found inside the petitioner's lumberyard.
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for a restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A.
Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to
Branch 35 o the said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search
and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting
of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders

133

of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section
2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No.
897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352
Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumberdealer's permit had already been suspended on 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was
open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the
team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also
came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to the
caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri
Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the stockpiles of
lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport
vehicles loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board
[10]
feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor.
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No.
90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's
president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No.
277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a
[11]
resolution whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri
Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for
illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal documents
[12]
be released to the rightful owner, Malupa.
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III, who served as Chairman of
[13]
the Task Force on Illegal Logging.
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the
RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the
information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession
truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
[14]
including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision
dispositive portion of which reads:

[15]

in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the

WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:

1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3
May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the approximately 311,000 board feet
of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized from the lumberyard
of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April
4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to
report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts
and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;

134

2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before the proper court
regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions loaded in petitioner's truck
bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus
oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks
mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said petitioner, is withheld in
this case until after the proper court has taken cognizance and determined how those lumber, shorts
and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the
petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with
large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the
constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one
of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving
[16]
vehicle. As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April
1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and was still
pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not
[17]
even question. And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore
[18]
contrabands observed during the conduct of the search.
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the
seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search
warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive
in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had
been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September
1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend
Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession
of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence
against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the
RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the
[19]
seizure, raises a prejudicial question.
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, and possession thereof without the required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section
3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued
that exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt,
[20]
illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources.
[21]

In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong
granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal
[22]
documents required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime."
[23]

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991, the People filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.

135

[24]

On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for
lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings
on the issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law
punishing the possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal
documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved has always been
foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is important to
consider is that when appellant was required to present the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful
[25]
possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the period of extension granted to it.
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3
[26]
March 1992. Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
[27]
104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992.
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL
CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative
remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its
license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and
(d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP
No. 33778.
[28]

In its decision of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No.
33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL
CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the
market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted
for various building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is included in the definition of forest
product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the
term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the forest product
involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775,
which provides in part as follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of
the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest
products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting, gathering,
collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or other forest products without the
required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6
February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which the other two were consolidated.

G.R. No. 106424

The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does
not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of
the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is
not prohibited and penalized under the said section.

136

Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed on the ground
that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this
ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
[29]
admitted, constitute the elements of the offense, and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the
sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information
state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No.
277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession
shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products
cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to
an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE
validly charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its
subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent,
without the required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as lumber. They cannot refer to the
lumber in no. (2) because they are separated by the words approximately 200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction
and, and not with the preposition of. They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under
Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 3.

Definitions.
xxx xxx

xxx

(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa,
rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic,
historical, recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private
respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not
included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to
them, the information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond
the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers

137

to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that only lumber has
been envisioned in the indictment.
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that only the facts
alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in determining whether an information
charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary,
the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred
[30]
to, cannot lead one to infer that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and
shorts of various species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (Italics
supplied)
[31]

In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, which served as
the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri
Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supaand for illegal shipment
of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent
Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus
possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such
possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included
in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section
in the definition of Processing plant; which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs
and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses
the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the
[32]
market. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should
[33]
be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between
raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL
CASE and in dismissing the said case.

G.R. No. 104988

We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from
the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were
not accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was

138

a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended
by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a
search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
[34]
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a lawful arrest,
[35]
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search.
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a
continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten
days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be
accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the
search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day,
[36]
provided it is still within the ten-day period.
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber without the
required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither
specified therein nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our
ruling in G.R. No. 106424.

G.R. No. 123784

The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably fail to show prima facie that a
reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and
resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There
is no need to require the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been
suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license had
only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise
dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the authority to seize the
lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:
Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department
Head or his duly authorized representative may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail in view of our
disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the suspension of
the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up blatant
violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably
trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the
commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our
forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of
parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment
by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our
forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

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1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18
October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ri
Chuy Po; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the
respondent Judge on her successor to hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to
show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions
of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CAG.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.

140

PAPA VS MAGO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27360

February 28, 1968

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner of
Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO, as
Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa, Chief
of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon.
Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment
of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date
of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by
petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by
respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever
in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in
Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a
reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of
Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly
deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the
trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit
went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks
consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon
investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain
Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios
Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with
restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among others, that
Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place
to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila
Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa
denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be
not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the
goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that

141

the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under
Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person
without knowledge that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of
Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that
unless restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence,
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the abovenamed police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ
of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary
damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the
respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 now petitioners in the instant case before this Court from opening the
nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November
16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been
opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an
assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496,
including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the
Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with
Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and
detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to
wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the
petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies
provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods
because the full duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department
had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under
Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures and arrests in inland places in
connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago
was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure
proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit
them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed
the court below for the lifting of the restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an
inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the
goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On December 13,
1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the goods,
alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same
should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be
determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no
jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and
that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A
supplemental opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967
seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, and
the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a
manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On
February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for
the release under bond of the goods.

142

On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent
Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent
filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had
been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the
seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition
and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners alleged, among others, that
the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the
disputed goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge,
had no jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496
of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking
judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not
collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly
insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this case. In their
answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by
respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967,
because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure, and identification proceedings against the
nine bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go
after the goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the
customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios
Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be the subject of seizure
and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila Police
Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected without any search
warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by
the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers
have no authority to seize the goods in question because they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that
petitioners are estopped to institute the present action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that
they would not interpose any objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and
taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in
issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all
lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the
tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to
1
enforce tariff and customs laws. The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the
2
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". As long as the importation has not been
terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed
terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at
3
the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties, taxes,
4
fees and other charges must be in full.
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of
5
Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General wherein it is stated
that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as
evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not
been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in
6
the bales upon examination and inventory, shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably

143

to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected)
states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the
"compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted
colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209
dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color),
and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's
handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120
dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9.
The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars.
e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that merchandise, the
7
importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, and that goods released contrary to law are
8
subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs area
the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the
Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and
9
orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, the
Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs
Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties,
taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law.
The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time
the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods
even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings
had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037, decided
by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it appears that
Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and
rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial
shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs
premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon
examination the goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel.
Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting
that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs
had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964,
Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the
Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to
release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no jurisdiction
over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not liable for duties and taxes
because the transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were not in the hands of the importer nor
subject to importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's)
knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of
Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner
of Customs and the Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending seizure and
forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending
decision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and
mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of
Customs and the Collector of Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the
resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered
them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an
additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this
Court held:

144

This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods
and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance was filed (on
October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November
12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e.,
before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to
verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23,
1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from
the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs
custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues from imported
articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and
customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to
have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and
forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to
Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v.
Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the
Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125.
To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect
render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the
Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v.
Averia,supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings
exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature,
while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to
mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of
the Customs authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported
goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its
possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of
Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually
seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of
the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in
question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12,
10
1967. And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to
divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent
Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it,
and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows
that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967
releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department, could not
seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of the Manila
Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for
11
the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was
his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be
12
subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and

145

examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the
presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and
13
examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It
cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the
search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of
any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said
14
assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the
search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was
15
given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo.
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search
warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant
case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to
enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and
also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on
board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
16
warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be
17
entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." It is our considered view,
therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court,
considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code, said as follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and
in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant
between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in
course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of
a search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was made
lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but
also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there
was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find
any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial
and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year and expired.
The Act of February 28, 1865, revived 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441.
The substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14
Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as 3061, Comp. Stat. 5763, 2
Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161. Neither 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked
as unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von
Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make
any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended petition, in the
18
court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. All that they
complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search warrant near the
Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed
under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:

146

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search
warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379,
190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by
defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant
or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition
laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the constitutional provision forbidding
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a
warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is
a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all
of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by
quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn
vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in
immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful
commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the
world before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other
public places is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum
running," which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are
but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on
private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process.
The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees,
from those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of
our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place
without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in
view of all the circumstances under which it is made.
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question
was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for
the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it
necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent Judge Hilarion
U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967 restraining
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case No.
67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; and1wph1.t

147

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
It is so ordered.

148

PACIS VS PAMARAN
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23996 March 15, 1974

PEDRO PACIS, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL R. PAMARAN, as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, and RICARDO SANTOS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General, Dept. of Justice for petitioner.
Juan T. David for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p
For the petitioner Pedro Pacis, then Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, it was vital that this
prohibition proceeding against the then Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, Manuel R. Pamaran, should be instituted.
For unless restrained, the prosecutor was bent on continuing with the investigation of a charge of usurpation of
judicial
1
functions allegedly committed by him, when in the course of his official functions and pursuant thereto, he issued a
warrant of seizure and detention for an automobile owned by respondent Ricardo Santos, who, according to the
records in his office, had not paid the customs duty collectible thereon. To counter such a move, and invoking what
he alleged was a violation of the constitutional provision that only a judge, under the 1935 Constitution could issue
2
a search warrant, respondent Santos filed the aforesaid complaint for usurpation. Based on such an assumption
and with petitioner clearly not being a member of the judiciary, there was plausibility in the claim that he ran afoul of
the penal law. While the matter was pressed with vigor by Attorney Juan T. David, counsel for respondent, the
applicable legal doctrine is on the side of petitioner. It is a well-settled principle that for violations of customs laws,
the power to issue such a warrant is conceded. Thus there is justification for this prohibition suit against respondent
Assistant City Fiscal. On the undisputed facts and in accordance with the controlling legal doctrine, no such offense
as usurpation of judicial function could have been committed. Clearly then, respondent Assistant City Fiscal should
be restrained. So we rule and grant the writ prayed for.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile, model
1957. It was brought into this country without the payment of customs duty and taxes, its owner Donald James
3
Hatch being tax-exempt. It was from him that respondent Santos acquired said car. On June 25, 1964, he paid
P311.00 for customs duty and taxes. Petitioner on July 22, 1964 received from the Administrator, General Affairs
Administration of the Department of National Defense, a letter to the effect that the Land Transportation
Commission reported that such automobile was a "hot car." By virtue thereof, petitioner, through his subordinates,
looked into the records of his office. Thus he did ascertain that although the amount of P311.00 was already paid
for customs duty, the amount collectible on said car should be P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such
discrepancy, on July 22, 1964, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and detention. On
the strength thereof, the automobile was taken while it was parked on Economia Street, Manila, by Department of
National Defense agents who were authorized to do so by virtue of the said warrant. It was then brought to the
General Affairs Administration compound. Then on August 26, 1964, respondent Ricardo Santos, through counsel,
wrote to the petitioner asking that such warrant of seizure and detention issued against his car be withdrawn or
dissolved and the car released on his contention that the issuance of the warrant was unauthorized. He likewise
threatened to proceed against the petitioner for violation of Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code and for damages.

149

Petitioner on August 31, 1964 answered counsel of respondent Ricardo Santos, denying the request for the release
of the car and adverting that the petitioner had, under the law, authority to issue such warrant of seizure and
detention. What followed was the filing by respondent Ricardo Santos on September 15, 1964 of a criminal
complaint for usurpation of judicial functions with the City Fiscal of Manila. It was assigned to then respondent
Fiscal Manuel R. Pamaran for preliminary investigation. As the latter respondent was bent on proceeding with the
4
charge against petitioner, this action was instituted.
Thus the significance attached to the jurisdictional question posed was evident. There was moreover the necessity
for a definite ruling as to whether petitioner in the discharge of his official function did lay himself open to a criminal
prosecution for usurpation of judicial functions, the drive against "hot cars" being then at its height. Not much
reflection was needed to show the chilling effect of a criminal prosecution of this nature on the vigorous
enforcement of customs laws. This Court therefore required respondent to answer so that the matter could be fully
ventilated. It was duly forthcoming, stress being laid on the alleged infraction of the constitutional mandate that a
warrant of search and seizure, to be valid, must be the product of a judicial determination. The question before this
Tribunal is thus clear-cut and well-defined.
As set forth at the outset, the law on the matter is clear. It is undeniable that petitioner, as Acting Collector of
Customs for the Port of Manila, had the requisite authority for the issuance of the contested warrant of seizure and
detention for the automobile owned by respondent Ricardo Santos. What was done by him certainly could not be
the basis of a prosecution for the usurpation of judicial functions. Prohibition is therefore the proper remedy.
1. It is to be admitted that the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure must not be
eroded or emasculated. The right to privacy so highly valued in civilized society must not be diluted. Only upon
compliance then with the proper requisites mandated by law should one's possessions be subject to seizure. That
much is clear. Under the 1935 Constitution the intervention of a judge was well-nigh indispensable. So it was under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916. Even then, however, as shown by the leading
5
case of Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, a 1920 decision, it was the accepted principle following the landmark case ofBoyd
6
v. United States that the seizure of goods concealed to avoid the duties on them is not embraced within the
7
prohibition of this constitutional guarantee. More to the point. In a recent decision of this Court, Papa v.
8
Mago, where the seizure of alleged smuggled goods was effected by a police officer without a search warrant, this
Court, through Justice Zaldivar, stated: "Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a component court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203
of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building,
not being a dwelling house and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package,
box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected
of holding or conveing any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides
that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrantissued by a judge or justice of the
peace ... ." It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
9
enforcement of customs laws."
The plenitude of the competence vested in customs officials is thus undeniable. No such constitutional question
then can possibly arise. So much is implicit from the very language of Section 2205 of the Tariff and Customs
10
11
Code. It speaks for itself. It is not susceptible of any misinterpretation. The power of petitioner is thus manifest.
It being undeniable then that the sole basis for an alleged criminal act performed by him was the performance of a
duty according to law, there is not the slightest justification for respondent Assistant City Fiscal to continue with the
preliminary investigation after his attention was duly called to the plain and explicit legal provision that did not suffer
at all from any constitutional infirmity. The remedy of prohibition lies.
2. The depth of the concern expressed by the Solicitor-General as counsel for petitioner is easily understandable.
No revenue official can be expected to display the proper zeal in plugging all the loopholes of tax or tariff statutes if
the risk of a criminal prosecution is ever present. At the same time, in fairness to respondent Santos, his insistence
on procedural regularity, especially so where there is an alleged invasion of a constitutional right, was in keeping
with the soundest legal tradition. The rule of law would be meaningless if what is ordained by the fundamental law
could be ignored or disregarded. From the foregoing, there was no such infringement. What was done by petitioner

150

was strictly in accordance with settled principles of law. No doubt need be entertained then as to the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention. His liability for any alleged usurpation of judicial function is nonexistent. Such imputation was definitely unfounded. Even if however the matter were less clear, the claim that the
search and seizure clause was in effect nullified is hardly impressed with merit. Considering that what is involved is
an alleged evasion of the payment of customs duties, what was said by Circuit Judge Hutcheson in the Ginsburg
12
decision possesses relevance. Thus: "Based on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, this is another of those cases
in which appellant and appellee, concerning themselves little with the Constitutional words, seize upon particular
words in particular cases to roll them as sweet morsels under their tongues. It may not be doubted that, in respect
of searches and seizures, the decisional gloss which constitutes the common law of the Constitution has created in
the federal courts a climate of opinion favorable to the citizen, less favorable to his oppressors. Neither may it be
doubted that particular decisions have not only struck down particular oppressors but in their vigor and clarity have
set up streams of tendency in accord with which later decisions have run. It remains true, however, that each case
of this kind is a fact case. The correct decision of each depends not so much upon a higher critical examination of
the accumulated decisional gloss as upon a common sense determination of whether, within the meaning of the
word the Constitution uses, the particular search and seizure has been "unreasonable," that is, whether what was
done and found bears a reasonable relation to the authority then possessed and exercised or transcends it to
13
become oppression."
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition prayed for is granted and the successor of respondent Manuel R. Pamaran,
now a criminal circuit court judge, or any one in the City Fiscal's Office of the City of Manila to whom the complaint
against petitioner for usurpation of judicial functions arising out of the issuance of the warrant of seizure and
detention, subject-matter of this litigation, has been assigned, is perpetually restrained from acting thereon except
to dismiss the same. No costs.

151

HIZON VS CA

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WARRANTLESS ARREST; AS A
GENERAL RULE, ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED WITHOUT A JUDICIAL WARRANT IS INADMISSIBLE FOR
ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING; EXCEPTION. - Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and
the arrest of persons without a judicial warrant. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial
warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain
exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3)
search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation of customs laws.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH IN VIOLATION OF CUSTOMS LAWS; A TRADITIONAL EXCEPTION TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF A SEARCH WARRANT; THE SAME EXCEPTION OUGHT TO
APPLY TO SEIZURES OF FISHING VESSELS AND BOATS BREACHING OUR FISHERY LAWS. - Search
and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a
vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a
search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected. The
same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These
vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine
Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws. We thus hold as valid the
warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The
fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; SPECIAL LAWS; ILLEGAL FISHING UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 704; WHEN THE
OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL FISHING IS COMMITTED. - The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person
catches, takes or gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in the
Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates
a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a
fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or
by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat owner, operator of fishermen are
presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UNDER THE FISHERIES DECREE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION. - Petitioners contend that this
presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree violates the presumption of innocence guaranteeed by the
Constitution. As early as 1916, this Court has rejected this argument by holding that: "In some States, as well
as in England, there exist what are known as common law offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime
unless it is made so by statute. The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain welldefined limitations, has the right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such
act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention." The validity of laws
establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is generally conceded that the legislature
has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the
accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection between the
facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from
proof of the other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. In fine, the presumption must be based on facts
and these facts must be part of the crime when committed. The third paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. 704
creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes
the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives or electricity in any fishing boat or in the
possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used
such substances in catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the
fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the discovery of the
substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact

152

presumed is a natural inference from the fact proved. We stress, however, that the statutory presumption is
merely prima facie. It can not, under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude
the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact presumed.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS IN CASE AT BAR HAVE SUCCESSFULLY REBUTTED THE PRESUMPTION
OF GULT. - We now review the evidence to determine whether petitioners have successfully rebutted this
presumption. The facts show that on November 13, 1992, after the Information was filed in court and
petitioners granted bail, petitioners moved that the fish specimens taken from the F/B Robinson be
reexamined. The trial court granted the motion. As prayed for, a member of the PNP Maritime Command of
Puerto Princesa, in the presence of authorized representatives of the F/B Robinson, the NBI and the local
Fisheries Office, took at random five (5) live lapu-lapu from the fish cage of the boat. The specimens were
packed in the usual manner of transporting live fish, taken aboard a commercial flight and delivered by the
same representatives to the NBI Head Office in Manila for chemical analysis. On November 23, 1992, Salud
Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI in Manila conducted three (3) tests on the specimens and found
the fish negative for the presence of sodium cyanide, thus :"Gross weight of specimen = 3.849
kg. Examinations made on the above-mentioned specimens gave NEGATIVE RESULTS to the tests for the
presence of SODIUM CYANIDE." The Information charged petitioners with illegal fishing "with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live
fishes." There was more or less one ton of fishes in the F/B Robinson's fish cage. It was from this cage that
the four dead specimens examined on October 7, 1992and the five live specimens examined on November
23, 1992 were taken. Though all the specimens came from the same source allegedly tainted with sodium
cyanide, the two tests resulted in conflicting findings. We note that after its apprehension, the F/B Robinson
never left the custody of the PNP Maritime Command. The fishing boat was anchored near the city harbor and
was guarded by members of the Maritime Command. It was later turned over to the custody of the Philippine
Coast Guard Commander of Puerto Princesa City. The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings
on the fish samples and this omission raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were
caught with the use of sodium cyanide. The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports
petitioners' claim that they did not use the poison in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by the
ordinary and legal way, i.e. by hook and line of board their sampans. This claim is buttressed by the
prosecution evidence itself. The apprehending officers saw petitioners fishing by hook and line when they
came upon them in the waters of Barangay San Rafael.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119619. December 13, 1996]

RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG
TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK, EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE,
ANGELITO DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA, FRANCISCO ESTREMOS,
ANGEL VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO CASAMPOL, RICHARD ESTREMOS, JORNIE DELA PENA, JESUS
MACTAN, MARLON CAMPORAZO, FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE,
JOSEPH AURELIO, RONNIE JUEZAN, BERNARDO VILLACARLOS, RICARDO SALES, MARLON
ABELLA, TEODORO DELOS REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO
LANGUYOD,
DODONG
DELOS
REYES,
JOLLY
CABALLERO
and
ROPLANDO
ARCENAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Palawan in Criminal Case No. 10429 convicting

153

petitioners of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975.
In an Information dated October 15, 1992, petitioners were charged with a violation of P.D. 704 committed as
follows:
That on or about the 30th day of September 1992, at Brgy. San Rafael, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused crew members and fishermen of F/B
Robinson owned by First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by Richard Hizon, a domestic corporation
duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, being then the owner, crew members and fishermen of F/B
Robinson and with the use of said fishing boat, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another catch, take or gather or cause to
be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery aquatic products in the coastal waters of Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan, with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of
[1]
assorted live fishes which were illegally caught thru the use of obnoxious/poisonous substance (sodium cyanide).
The following facts were established by the prosecution: In September 1992, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the
coastal waters of the city. In response to these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to
assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing.
On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP
Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by muro ami within the shoreline of Barangay
San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of the Task Force
Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in
motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the
city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio
Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police saw two foreigners in the captains deck. SPO3 Enriquez
examined their passports and found them to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large aquarium
[2]
full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked the
license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat
captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation.
At the city harbor, members of the Maritime Command were ordered by SPO3 Enriquez to guard the F/B
Robinson. The boat captain and the two foreigners were again interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command
office. Thereafter, an Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat, its crew and fishermen were
charged with the following violations:
1.

Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa coastal waters without mayors permit;

2. Employing excess fishermen on board (Authorized--26; On board--36);

3. Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board without original passports.

[3]

The following day, October 1, 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get random samples of fish
from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for laboratory examination. As instructed, the boat engineer, petitioner Ernesto
Andaya, delivered to the Maritime Office four (4) live lapu-lapu fish inside a plastic shopping bag filled with
water. SPO3 Enriquez received the fish and in the presence of the boat engineer and captain, placed them inside
[4]
a large transparent plastic bag without water. He sealed the plastic with heat from a lighter.
The specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) sub-office in the city for
[5]
examination to determine the method of catching the same for record or evidentiary purposes. They were
received at the NBI office at 8:00 in the evening of the same day. The receiving clerk, Edna Capicio, noted that the
fish were dead and she placed the plastic bag with the fish inside the office freezer to preserve them. Two days
later, on October 3, 1992, the chief of the NBI sub-office, Onos Mangotara, certified the specimens for laboratory
examination at the NBI Head Office in Manila. The fish samples were to be personally transported by Edna Capicio
[6]
who was then scheduled to leave for Manila for her board examination in Criminology. On October 4, 1992, Ms.
Capicio, in the presence of her chief, took the plastic with the specimens from the freezer and placed them inside
two shopping bags and sealed them with masking tape. She proceeded to her ship where she placed the
specimens in the ships freezer.

154

Capicio arrived in Manila the following day, October 5, 1992 and immediately brought the specimens to the
NBI Head Office. On October 7, 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish
samples and found that they contained sodium cyanide, thus:
FINDINGS:
Weight of Specimen 1.870 kilograms Examinations made on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE
RESULTS to the test for the presence of SODIUM CYANIDE x x x
REMARKS:
Sodium Cyanide is a violent poison.

[7]

In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint at bar
against the owner and operator of the F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by
herein petitioner Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, two other
crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen of the said boat.
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that they are
legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in
fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used this method for one
month and a half in the waters of CuyoIsland. They related that on September 30, 1992 at about 7:00 A.M., they
anchored the F/B Robinson in the east of Podiado Island in Puerto Princesa City. The boat captain and the
fishermen took out and boarded their sampans to fish for their food. They were still fishing in their sampans at 4:00
P.M. when a rubber boat containing members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat
approached them and boarded the F/B Robinson. The policemen were in uniform while the Bantay Dagat
personnel were in civilian clothes. They were all armed with guns. One of the Bantay Dagat personnel introduced
himself as Commander Jun Marcelo and he inspected the boat and the boats documents. Marcelo saw the two
foreigners and asked for their passports. As their passports were photocopies, Marcelo demanded for their
original. The captain explained that the original passports were with the companys head office in Manila. Marcelo
angrily insisted for the originals and threatened to arrest everybody. He then ordered the captain, his crew and the
fishermen to follow him to Puerto Princesa. He held the magazine of his gun and warned the captain Sige, huwag
[8]
kang tatakas, kung hindi babarilin ko kayo! The captain herded all his men into the boat and followed Marcelo
and the police to Puerto Princesa.
They arrived at the city harbor at 7:45 in the evening and were met by members of the media. As instructed
[9]
by Marcelo, the members of the media interviewed and took pictures of the boat and the fishermen.
The following day, October 1, 1992, at 8:00 in the morning, Amado Villanueva, one of the fishermen at the F/B
Robinson, was instructed by a policemen guarding the boat to get five (5) fish samples from the fish cage and bring
them to the pier. Villanueva inquired whether the captain knew about the order but the guard replied he was taking
responsibility for it. Villanueva scooped five pieces of lapu-lapu, placed them inside a plastic bag filled with water
and brought the bag to the pier. The boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, received the fish and delivered them to the
PNP Maritime Office. Nobody was in the office and Andaya waited for the apprehending officers and the boat
captain. Later, one of the policemen in the office instructed him to leave the bag and hang it on a nail in the
[10]
wall. Andaya did as he was told and returned to the boat at 10:00 A.M.
In the afternoon of the same day, the boat captain arrived at the Maritime office. He brought along a
representative from their head office in Manila who showed the police and the Bantay Dagat personnel the original
passports of the Hongkong nationals and other pertinent documents of the F/B Robinson and its crew. Finding the
documents in order, Marcelo approached the captain and whispered to him Tandaan mo ito, kapitan, kung
makakaalis ka dito, magkikita pa rin uli tayo sa dagat, kung hindi kayo lulubog ay palulutangin ko kayo! It was then
that SPO3 Enriquez informed the captain that some members of the Maritime Command, acting under his
instructions, had just taken five (5) pieces of lapu-lapu from the boat. SPO3 Enriquez showed the captain the fish
[11]
samples. Although the captain saw only four (4) pieces of lapu-lapu, he did not utter a word of protest. Under
[12]
Marcelos threat, he signed the Certification that he received only four (4) pieces of fish.

155

Two weeks later, the information was filed against petitioners. The case was prosecuted against thirty-one
(31) of the thirty-five (35) accused. Richard Hizon remained at large while the whereabouts of Richard Estremos,
Marlon Camporazo and Joseph Aurelio were unknown.
On July 9, 1993, the trial court found the thirty one (31) petitioners guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment
for a minimum of eight (8) years and one (1) day to a maximum of nine (9) years and four (4) months. The court
also ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28 sampans and the ton of assorted live fishes
as instruments and proceeds of the offense, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused SILVERIO
GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK
CHOR LUK, EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE, ANGELITO
DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA, FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ARNEL
VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO CASAMPOL, JORNIE DELACRUZ, JESUS MACTAN, FERNANDO BIRING,
MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE, RONNIE JUEZAN, BERNARDO VILLACARLOS, RICARDO SALES,
MARLON ABELLA, TEODORO DELOS REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO
LANGUYOD, DODONG DELOS REYES, ROLANDO ARCENAS and JOLLY CABALLERO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance commonly
known as sodium cyanide, committed in violation of section 33 and penalized in section 38 of Presidential
Decree No. 704, as amended, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances appreciated
and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the aforenamed accused is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from a minimum of EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY to a maximum of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 45, in relation to the second sentence of Article 10 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended:
a)

Fishing Boat (F/B) Robinson;

b)

The 28 motorized fiberglass sampans; and

c)
The live fishes in the fish cages installed in the F/B Robinson, all of which have been
respectively shown to be tools or instruments and proceeds of the offense, are hereby ordered
confiscated and declared forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.

[13]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MERE POSITIVE RESULTS
TO THE TEST FOR THE PRESENCE OF SODIUM CYANIDE IN THE FISH SPECIMEN, ALBEIT
ILLEGALLY SEIZED ON THE OCCASION OF A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND ARREST, IS ADMISSIBLE
AND SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE PETITIONERS CONVICTION OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL FISHING.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE STATUTORY
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UNDER SEC. 33 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 704 CANNOT PREVAIL
AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, SUCH THAT THE GRAVAMEN OF
THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL FISHING MUST STILL BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III

156

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
[14]
COURT AND ACQUITTING THE PETITIONERS.
The Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for petitioners acquittal.

[15]

The petitioners, with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, primarily question the admissibility of the
evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of
petitioners. More concretely, they contend that the NBI finding of sodium cyanide in the fish specimens should not
have been admitted and considered by the trial court because the fish samples were seized from the F/B Robinson
without a search warrant.
[16]

Our constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a judicial warrant. As a
general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
[17]
proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a search incident to a
[18]
[19]
lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in
[20]
violation of customs laws.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been
the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a
vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search
[21]
warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected.
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These
vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine
[22]
Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws.
We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having
engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted
by the trial court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived their right to question
[23]
any irregularity that may have attended the said search and seizure.
Given the evidence admitted by the trial court, the next question now is whether petitioners are guilty of the
offense of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. Again, the petitioners, joined by the Solicitor
General, submit that the prosecution evidence cannot convict them.
We agree.
Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704
as follows:

[24]

which provide

Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally
caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. -- It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or
cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), (m)
and (d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with intent to
use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided: Provided,
That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the Director and subject to such safeguards and
conditions he deems necessary, allow for research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic
products in the specified area: Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in
fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in
neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the
meaning of this section: Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles,
sharks or other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.
It shall, likewise, be unlawful for any person knowingly to possess, deal in, sell or in any manner dispose of,
for profit, any fish or fishery/aquatic products which have been illegally caught, taken or gathered.
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing combustible elements, or
obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for electric fishing in any fishing boat or in the

157

possession of a fisherman shall constitute a presumption that the same were used for fishing in violation of
this Decree, and the discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substance or by electricity shall constitute a presumption that the owner, operator
or fisherman were fishing with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 38. Penalties. -- (a) For illegal fishing and dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products.- Violation of Section 33 hereof shall be punished as follows:
xxx xxx

xxx

(2)
By imprisonment from eight (8) to ten (10) years, if obnoxious or poisonous substances are
used: Provided, That if the use of such substances results 1) in physical injury to any person, the penalty
shall be imprisonment from ten (10) to twelve (12) years, or 2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty
shall be imprisonment from twenty (20) years to life or death;
xxx xxx

x x x.

[25]

The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or gathers or causes to be caught,
taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity,
obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed
when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are found in a
fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat
owner, operator or fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree violates the presumption of
[26]
innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. As early as 1916, this Court has rejected this argument by holding
[27]
that:
In some States, as well as in England, there exists what are known as common law offenses. In the
Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state having the right to declare
what acts are criminal, within certain well-defined limitations, has the right to specify what act or acts shall
constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon
the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any
[28]
criminal intent or intention.
The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is generally conceded
that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the
guilt of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection
[29]
between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the inference of
[30]
one from proof of the other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. In fine, the presumption must be based on
[31]
facts and these facts must be part of the crime when committed.
The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence
is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or
devices for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous substances,
explosives or electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and
operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The ultimate fact
presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this
presumption was made to arise from the discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession
[32]
of the fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact proved.
[33]

We stress, however, that the statutory presumption is merely prima facie. It can not, under the guise of
regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the
[34]
[35]
main fact presumed. At no instance can the accused be denied the right to rebut the presumption, thus:

158

The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men. But the experience of
men has taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be explained so as to rebut such an
inference and an accused person may therefore put witnesses on the stand or go on the witness stand
himself to explain his possession, and any reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent with his
guilty connection with the commission of the crime, will rebut the inference as to his guilt which the
[36]
prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty possession of the stolen goods.
We now review the evidence to determine whether petitioners have successfully rebutted this
presumption. The facts show that on November 13, 1992, after the information was filed in court and petitioners
[37]
granted bail, petitioners moved that the fish specimens taken from the F/B Robinson be reexamined. The trial
[38]
court granted the motion. As prayed for, a member of the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa, in the
presence of authorized representatives of the F/B Robinson, the NBI and the local Fisheries Office, took at random
five (5) live lapu-lapu from the fish cage of the boat. The specimens were packed in the usual manner of
transporting live fish, taken aboard a commercial flight and delivered by the same representatives to the NBI Head
Office in Manila for chemical analysis.
On November 23, 1992, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI in Manila conducted three (3)
[39]
tests on the specimens and found the fish negative for the presence of sodium cyanide, thus:
Gross weight of specimen = 3.849 kg.
Examination made on the above-mentioned specimens gave NEGATIVE RESULTS to the tests for the
[40]
presence of SODIUM CYANIDE.
The Information charged petitioners with illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance
(sodium cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes. There was more or less one ton of fishes in
the F/B Robinsons fish cage. It was from this fish cage that the four dead specimens examined on October 7,
1992 and the five live specimens examined on November 23, 1992 were taken. Though all the specimens came
from the same source allegedly tainted with sodium cyanide, the two tests resulted in conflicting findings. We note
that after its apprehension, the F/B Robinson never left the custody of the PNP Maritime Command. The fishing
[41]
boat was anchored near the city harbor and was guarded by members of the Maritime Command. It was later
[42]
turned over to the custody of the Philippine Coast Guard Commander of Puerto Princesa City.
The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission raises a
reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports petitioners claim that they did not use
the poison in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by the ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook and line
on board their sampans. This claim is buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself. The apprehending officers
saw petitioners fishing by hook and line when they came upon them in the waters of Barangay San Rafael. One of
the apprehending officers, SPO1 Demetrio Saballuca, testified as follows:
ATTY. TORREFRANCA ON CROSS-EXAMINATION:
Q

:
I get your point therefore, that the illegal fishing supposedly conducted at San Rafael is a moro
ami type of fishing [that] occurred into your mind and that was made to understand by the Bantay
Dagat personnel?

:
Upon reaching the place, you and the pumpboat, together with the two Bantay Dagat
personnel were SPO3 Romulo Enriquez and Mr. Benito Marcelo and SPO1 Marzan, you did not
witness that kind of moro ami fishing, correct?

:In other words, there was negative activity of moro ami type of fishing on September 30, 1992 at
4:00 in the afternoon at San Rafael?

Yes, sir.

None, sir.

Yes, sir.

159

:
And what you saw were 5 motorized Sampans with fishermen each doing a hook and line
fishing type?

:
And despite the fact you had negative knowledge of this moro ami type of fishing, SPO3
Enriquez together with Mr. Marcelo boarded the vessel just the same?

Yes, sir. More or less they were five.

Yes, sir.
x x x.

xxx xxx

[43]

The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor
any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession
of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. An Inventory was prepared by the apprehending officers and
only the following items were found on board the boat:
ITEMS

QUANTITY

F/B Robinson

(1) unit

engine

(1) unit

sampans

28 units

outboard motors

28 units

assorted fishes

more or less 1 ton

hooks and lines

assorted

REMARKS

x.

operating
ICE-900-BHP
fiberglass
operating
live

[44]

We cannot overlook the fact that the apprehending officers found in the boat assorted hooks and lines for
[45]
catching fish. For this obvious reason, the Inspection/Apprehension Report prepared by the apprehending
officers immediately after the search did not charge petitioners with illegal fishing, much less illegal fishing with the
[46]
use of poison or any obnoxious substance.
The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on
the four fish specimens. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant the infallible
conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of
sodium cyanide.
Prosecution witness SPO1 Bernardino Visto testified that for the first laboratory test , boat engineer Ernesto
Andaya did not only get four (4) samples of fish but actually got five (5) from the fish cage of the F/B
[47]
Robinson. This Certification that four (4) fish samples were taken from the boat shows on its face the number of
[48]
pieces as originally five (5) but this was erased with correction fluid and four (4) written over it. The specimens
were taken, sealed inside the plastic bag and brought to Manila by the police authorities in the absence of
petitioners or their representative. SPO2 Enriquez testified that the same plastic bag containing the four specimens
[49]
was merely sealed with heat from a lighter. Emilia Rosaldes, the NBI forensic chemist who examined the
samples, testified that when she opened the package, she found two ends of the same plastic bag
[50]
knotted. These circumstances as well as the time interval from the taking of the fish samples and their actual
[51]
examination fail to assure the impartial mind that the integrity of the specimens had been properly safeguarded.
Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat were the ones
engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. As sharply observed by the Solicitor General, the report received by the
Task Force Bantay Dagat was that a fishing boat was fishing illegally through muro ami on the waters of San
Rafael. Muro ami according to SPO1 Saballuca is made with the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net
[52]
submerge in the water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net.

160

[53]

This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to execute. What the
apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their discovered were twenty eight
(28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would
have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was
only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged
with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
15417 is reversed and set aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous
substances defined under the Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

161

PEOPLE VS QUE

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; P.D. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. 277 (ILLEGAL LOGGING); MERE POSSESSION OF
TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS WITHOUT THE LEGAL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED UNDER
EXISTING FOREST LAWS AND REGULATIONS, A VIOLATION THEREOF. - Appellant argues that he
cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to
penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate
the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and
regulations existing at the time of its enactment. Appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. Section
68 of P.D. 705 provides that any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any
certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. Accused-appellant's possession of the subject lumber
without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION SHOULD NOT KILL BUT GIVE LIFE TO THE LAW. Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" to refer to those laws and regulations
which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained
and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase
should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest
products.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; P.D. 705 AS AMENDED BY E.O. 277 (ILLEGAL LOGGING); LIABILITY NOT AFFECTED BY
LEGALITY OF CUTTING, GATHERING, COLLECTING OR REMOVAL.- We also reject appellant's argument
that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if
he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two (2)
distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: In the first offense, one can
raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest
products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession
of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes
from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MOVING
VEHICLES AND SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW, CONSTRUED.- The constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence
in plain view. With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. This is in no way, however gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long
as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they
will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched (People v. Bagista,
214 SCRA 63 [1992])
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES; EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE;
RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT A TEN-WHEELER TRUCK WITHOUT SUPPORTING LUMBER
DOCUMENTS WAS LOADED WITH ILLEGAL LUMBER, SUFFICIENT TO PROVE EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE.- As in Bagista, police officer in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant's
truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a tenwheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two

162

weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they
saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge,
accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the
coconut slabs. When the police asked for the lumber's supporting documents, accused-appellant could not
present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which
justified the extensive search of appellant's truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile
lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accusedappellant.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree
[1]
[2]
(P.D.) 705 as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277.
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task
Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded
with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task
[3]
Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol
around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue
and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They
[4]
followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an
[5]
unnamed person. The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed, accused[6]
appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs.
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate of
lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5)
certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present
[7]
any of these documents. All he could show was a certification from the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification
was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta,
[8]
Pangasinan.
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial
capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force that there were sawn
[9]
lumber under the coconut slabs.
At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three CENRO
personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn
[10]
tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber. When
the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258)

163

pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value
[11]
of P93,232.50.
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of
Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
th

That on or about the 8 day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler
Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products
Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic
meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority
to do so from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[12]

Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile
lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the
[13]
[14]
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal. The PLTP
authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that
the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given
[15]
to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against him. He
contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the
confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of
[16]
the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 and he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by
law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler truck bearing
plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby ordered confiscated in
favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.

[17]

Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors:

[18]

1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as amended by EO 277 for
possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for
the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and
regulations which required certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest
products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused
against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused
under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of
P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the
possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.

164

Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:

Sec. 68.
Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License.
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (emphasis
supplied)
Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those laws and regulations
which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and
would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be
construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest
products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of
timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products
and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin,
issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.
xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be accompanied by a
CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized representative
which has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to
deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or
delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin of the 258
pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a single
document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily showed
documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification issued by
Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a
xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were
cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO
CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson Que on boa
rd truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut palms gathered inside
the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at Nagrangtayan,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.

165

This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of
facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its
final destination, whichever comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to
transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was
apprehended onMarch 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not
only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen
from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which
were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that he
needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and, therefore,
concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police
authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994 addressed to the
OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he would be
transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos
Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did not need a permit to transport the subject
lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A)
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4, 1994, the court has
doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the accused, he filed the letter in
the morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an
employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber
because the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and x x came from PLTP. (Ibid) The letter-request
was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the
accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government agency are
not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any document to a government agency, the agency
gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such document with
the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who
allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on crossexamination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned
the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the person x x but they were already
reshuffled. (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did not know if
that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request, to wit:
x x x
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the fact that I am
hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport agreement. Why
then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he transported the lumber on
March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source.

[19]

xxx
Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense
under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that
the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest
products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:

166

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;
and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second
offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is
legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether
or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of
timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible in
evidence for being fruits of a poisonous tree. Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in
violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court in People vs.
[20]
Bagista, thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be
subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a
search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right
shall, among others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in
cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality
or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellants truck. A member
of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate
number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of
the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck
described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the
truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers
asked for the lumbers supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing
circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of
appellants truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were
thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.

167

The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellants right to counsel under
custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs
Against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

168

PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
[1]

For automatic review is the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as follows:"That on or about September
25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was caught in flagrante delicto and
without authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven
(7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe
(sic) manufactured or derived, to the damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted, cultivated and cultured shall
be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."

[2]

On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed
informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung,
[3]
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his
operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2
Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific
[4]
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same.
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for
the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant
alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw
[5]
seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut. PO2
Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were
[6]
[7]
his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of
[8]
appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for
[9]
analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic
examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for
[10]
marijuana. She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of which confirmed her initial
impressions. She found as follows:

169

"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed inside a white
sack with markings.
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for
[11]
Marijuana, a prohibited drug."
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
that the land cultivated by appellant, on which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of
[12]
Timberland Block B, which formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. This
lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no
[13]
Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September
25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he
[14]
does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see something." This unknown person then brought
appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa
[15]
hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then
asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2
[16]
Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid
[17]
that he admitted owning the marijuana.
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to
uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to
[18]
a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On
the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police
officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging
[19]
activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation." At the
[20]
police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around the vicinity of
[21]
his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away. The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua,
an uncle of the barangay peace officer who had a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were
[22]
found was located between his house and Carlito Pascua's.
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered to rebut appellant's
[23]
claim that the marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he was cultivating. Tipay presented a sketch he
[24]
made, which showed the location of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as well
as the closest neighbor.According to Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the old hut of
[25]
Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of Carlito Pascua. Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no
[26]
surveyor accompanied him when he made the measurements. He further stated that his basis for claiming that
appellant was the owner or planter of the seized plants was the information given him by the police informer and
[27]
the proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants.
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and ownership
of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants punishable
under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal
injection. Costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."

[28]

Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:

I

170

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA
PLANTS DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 9,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUSDELICTI AND THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON
APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE LAND WHERE THE
MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED
[29]
APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA.
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more
than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does
not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the
ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect
that the protection against unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that there was no
search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were
grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact,
immediately spotted by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in
plain view of the police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under
the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the police team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site merely to make a
verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view
of the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in
the area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any
search warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by the accused and there was
no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect,
[30]
hence, no search warrant was required."
[31]

The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a
judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion
of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and
[32]
[33]
should be excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at
least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to
them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession,

171

they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did
not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six
hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
[34]
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle
of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the
doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

[35]

In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant
[36]
was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of
appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for
and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
[37]
object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2
Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal
[38]
plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was
needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain
view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in an
unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by
agents of the State. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which
[39]
includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions. The guarantee refers to "the right of personal
[40]
security" of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's
[41]
unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. To conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the
stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and
seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as
much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as
evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be
used as evidence against appellant.They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible
error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to
convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to
prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we
must now address the question of whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that
appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the following
observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made in
the absence of any independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification;
under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the
constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if given without any
[42]
counsel."

172

Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used
against him for being violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial
court to have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the police
officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana
plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and independent
counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought information from him regarding the ownership of the
prohibited plants. Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his
purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to
counsel during investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet under
custodial investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent
and independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellants failure to impute any false
motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice;
and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
[43]
counsel. An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person
as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in
[44]
connection with an alleged offense. The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by
[45]
counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel.
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well as
the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation
was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter
[46]
was already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana so
we just asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking
[47]
him..." In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At
this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been
arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
[48]
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." As a suspect, two armed
policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other armed
[49]
[50]
policemen. All had been dispatched to arrest him. From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had
already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even
before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a confession
to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
[51]
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The
records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly
made by an accused during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even
before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during criminal
[52]
investigations, it is also hearsay. Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence,
[53]
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution
must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author
[54]
[55]
thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must
[56]
[57]
likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence. Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be
[58]
introduced at trial."
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the offense
charged. These were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership of

173

said marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link
appellant with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted both
of these proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him. For said evidence is doubly
tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been
conducted without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the
police had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity for the
warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said
marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees
against illegal searches and the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the police
during investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights.The purported confession was made
without the assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said confession
cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a
criminal investigation must have the services of competent and independent counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of
ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional
competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
[59]
contrary is proved..." To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of
evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on
[60]
its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the required
[61]
degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal. In this case, the seized marijuana plants
linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render these
[62]
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." Nor can the confession obtained during the uncounselled
[63]
investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against him. Without these proffered
but proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum
of evidence necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his favor
stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are
declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For
that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in
[64]
favor of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death penalty, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

174

MICLAT VS PEOPLE
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 176077

Present:

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
*
SERENO, JJ.

versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

August 31, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision

[1]

dated October 13,

2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66765 convicting petitioner of
Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

In an Information

[2]

dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was charged for Violation

of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
th

That on or about the 08 day of November 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the authority of law, did
then and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
[METHAMPHETAMINE] HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing 0.24 gram, knowing the same to
be a dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

[3]

175

Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa (P/Insp Dela
Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan
City Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the Caloocan Police Station Drug
Enforcement Unit. The testimony of the police investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), was dispensed
with after petitioners counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the prosecution.

On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness. The testimonies of Abraham
Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father and sister, respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed with after
the prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative in nature.
Evidence for the Prosecution
First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa, Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station who, on
the witness stand, affirmed his own findings in Physical Science Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. D,
D-1, and D-2) that per qualitative examination conducted on the specimen submitted, the white
crystalline substance weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06 gram, 0.07 gram, and 0.06 gram then contained
inside four (4) separate pieces of small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets (Exhs. D-4 to D7) gave positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan Police Station-Drug
Enforcement Unit, Samson Road, Caloocan City, the prosecution further endeavored to establish
the following:
At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose Valencia of the
Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU called upon his subordinates after the (sic) receiving an
INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being
undertaken along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias
Bokbok and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs. E, E-1, and (sic) E-3, and E-4). Immediately, P/Insp.
Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto Palting and is composed of five (5)
more operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De
Ocampo, and herein witness PO3 Antonio. After a short briefing at their station, the team boarded
a rented passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area to verify the said informant and/or
memorandum.
When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at
around 3:50 oclock that same afternoon, they were [at] once led by their informant to the house of
one Alias Abe. PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest
of the members of the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtaincovered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1 meters, he saw Abe
arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. Slowly,
said operative inched his way in by gently pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the
same. Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while

176

Abe, on the other hand, after being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed over to the
former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio
immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3
Fernando Moran for proper disposition. The suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y Cerbo
a.k.a ABE, 19 years old, single, jobless and a resident of Maginhawa Village, Palmera Spring II,
[4]
Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
Evidence for the Defense
On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the incident completely
opposed to the theory of the prosecution. On the witness stand, he alleged that at about 4:00
oclockin the afternoon of November 8, 2002, while he, together with his sister and father, were at
the upper level of their house watching the television soap Cindy, they suddenly heard a
commotion downstairs prompting the three (3) of them to go down. There already inside were
several male individuals in civilian clothes who introduced themselves as raiding police operatives
from the SDEU out to effect his (Abe) arrest for alleged drug pushing. [Petitioner] and his father
tried to plead his case to these officers, but to no avail. Instead, one of the operatives even kicked
[petitioner] at the back when he tried to resist the arrest. Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed
and together with his father, they were boarded inside the police vehicle. That on their way to the
Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a small piece of plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substances allegedly recovered by the raiding police team from
their house. At around 9:00 oclock in the evening, [petitioner] was transferred to the Sangandaan
Headquarters where he was finally detained. That upon [petitioners] transfer and detention at the
[5]
said headquarters, his father was ordered to go home.

On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the
offense charged, rendered a Decision

[6]

convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No.

9165, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, from the facts established, the Court finds the accused ABRAHAM
MICLAT Y CERBO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of possession of a
dangerous drugs (sic) defined and penalized under the provision of Section 11, sub-paragraph No.
(3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, in view of the absence of
aggravating circumstances. The Court likewise orders the accused to pay the amount of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00) as fine.
Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor
of the Government and to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper
disposition.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)

[7]

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
28846.

On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision

[8]

affirming in toto the decision of the RTC, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

177

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)

[9]

In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence
presented by the prosecution were all admissible against him. Moreover, it was established that he was informed of
his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary for the conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.

Hence, the petition raising the following errors:

1.

WHETHER OR NOT A POLICE SURVEILLANCE TEAM SENT TO DETERMINE THE

VERACITY OF A CAMP CRAME MEMORANDUM OF SHABU TRADING ACTIVITY
ATCALOOCAN CITY, WHICH CONVERTED THEIR MISSION FROM SURVEILLANCE TO A
RAIDING TEAM, CAN VALIDLY MAKE AN ARREST AND SEARCH WITHOUT A VALID
WARRANT HAVING BEEN FIRST OBTAINED FROM A COURT OF COMPETENT
JURISDICTION.

2.

WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED WINDOW IS WITHIN THE

MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE FOR A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.

3.

WHETHER OR NOT THE BELIEF OF PO3 ANTONIO THAT THE FOUR (4) PIECES OF
PLASTIC SACHETS ALLEGEDLY BEING ARRANGED BY PETITIONER CONTAINED SHABU
JUSTIFIED HIS ENTRY INTO THE HOUSE AND ARREST PETITIONER WITHOUT ANY
WARRANT.

4.

WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETS CONSTITUTE

AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.

5.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED (SIC) OF HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF HIS
ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST
AND CONTINUED DETENTION.

6.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION BY THE LOWER COURT OF THE PETITIONER, AS

AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ON THE BASIS OF AN ILLEGAL
[10]
SEARCH AND ARREST, IS CORRECT.

Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the subsequent seizure of the arresting
officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs from him. Petitioner insists that he was just watching television

178

with his father and sister when police operatives suddenly barged into their home and arrested him for illegal
possession ofshabu.

Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets inside their house by
one of the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities to
enter his house without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest. Arguing that the act of arranging several
plastic sachets by and in itself is not a crime per se, petitioner maintains that the entry of the police surveillance
team into his house was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a validly issued
search warrant. Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be contemplated as within the
meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest unlawful.

Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was highly questionable,
considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at the place of the arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was
issued for the said evidence.

Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his constitutional rights at any time
during or after his arrest and even during his detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting officer should be
punished accordingly.

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
arrest.

[11]

An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move

for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant
of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

[12]

In the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the
irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is
deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the

179

court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the
conviction of the accused.

[13]

True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of an arrest
made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless
arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a peace office of a private person

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
[14]
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be
present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.

[15]

In the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, he was caught in flagrante delicto and the police
authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest. The established facts reveal that on the date of the arrest,
agents of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Caloocan City Police Station were conducting a
surveillance operation in the area of Palmera Spring II to verify the reported drug-related activities of several
individuals, which included the petitioner. During the operation, PO3 Antonio, through petitioners window, saw
petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to be shabu in the living room of their
home. The plastic sachets and its suspicious contents were plainly exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio, who was
only about one and one-half meters from where petitioner was seated. PO3 Antonio then inched his way in the

180

house by gently pushing the door. Upon gaining entrance, the operative introduced himself as a police
officer. After which, petitioner voluntarily handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic sachets. PO3 Antonio then
placed petitioner under arrest and, contrary to petitioners contention, PO3 Antonio informed him of his
constitutional rights.

[16]

PO3 Antonio then took the petitioner and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets to their

headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Moran. Thereafter, the evidence were marked AMC 1-4, the initials of
the name of the petitioner. The heat-sealed transparent sachets containing white crystalline substance were
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug examination, which later yielded positive results for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.

Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the petitioner, petitioner
was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
within the view of the arresting officer.

As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established exceptions.

Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be carried
out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

[17]

The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is

subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
[18]
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.

[19]

It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain
sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The

181

seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful
arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have
that view
are
subject
to
seizure
even
without
a
search
warrant
and may be introduced inevidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b)
the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion,
he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be
[20]
open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since
petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the
evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which
incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible
in evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense charged.

As to petitioners contention that the police failed to comply with the proper procedure in the transfer of
custody of the seized evidence thereby casting serious doubt on its seizure, this too deserves scant consideration.

Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall

182

be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative

examination;
x x x x.

Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
x x x x.

[21]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with the rule is not
fatal. It does not render petitioners arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.

[22]

What is

essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

[23]

Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity of the drugs seized
from the petitioner was preserved. More importantly, an unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken
from the petitioner was sufficiently established. The factual antecedents of the case reveal that the petitioner
voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the
evidence seized from him were immediately brought to the police station and upon arriving thereat, were turned
over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer. There the evidence was marked. The turn-over of the subject sachets
and the person of the petitioner were then entered in the official blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU, Police
Senior Inspector Jose Ramirez Valencia, endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the National Police
District PNP Crime Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector
Jessie Dela Rosa.

[24]

After a qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter, the

same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

[25]

183

An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established by the prosecution from
the arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the items
seized from the petitioner at his residence were also the same items marked by the investigating officer, sent to the
Crime Laboratory, and later on tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must be established:
(1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession
of the drug.

[26]

Based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the above elements were duly established in

the present case. Mere possession of a regulated drug per seconstitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession
[27]

the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.

It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence
is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner.

[28]

Although not constrained to blindly accept the findings of fact of trial courts, appellate courts can

rest assured that such facts were gathered from witnesses who presented their statements live and in person in
open court. In cases where conflicting sets of facts are presented, the trial courts are in the best position to
recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration from rehearsed spiel, straightforward assertion from a stuttering
claim, definite statement from tentative disclosure, and to a certain degree, truth from untruth.

[29]

In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact of the trial court. No
evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses of the events
which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After a careful evaluation of the records, We find no error was
committed by the RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime charged
against him.

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely denied the accusations against
him and raised the defense of frame-up. The defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed by this
Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with
strong and convincing evidence.

[30]

184

As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate sentence imposed should,
however, be modified.

Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
provides:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess
any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
x x x x.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall
be graduated as follows:
x x x x.
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs
are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or
newly-introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value
or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than
[31]
three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.

From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging

from

Three

Hundred

Thousand

Pesos

(P300,000.00)

to

Four

Hundred

Thousand

Pesos

(P400,000.00). The evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had
in his possession 0.24 gram of shabu, or less than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal authority.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty shall not fall below
the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the
law; hence, the imposable penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months.

185

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
SO ORDERED.

186

FALARDO VS PEOPLE
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
ELENITA C. FAJARDO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 190889

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

January 10, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the
February 10, 2009 Decision
decision

[2]

[1]

of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the August 29, 2006

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner guilty of violating

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended.

187

The facts:

Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as follows:
th

That on or about the 28 day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did then and
there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and
control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN
763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces
short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56
caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were
confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted by members
of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office,
Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive Judge
[3]
Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.

When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

[4]

During pre-trial, they

agreed to the following stipulation of facts:

1.

The search warrant subject of this case exists;

2.

Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search warrant in this case who is
a resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;

3.

Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the evening of August 27, 2002
but does not live therein;

4.

Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;

5.

The search warrant was served in the house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the morning of
August 28, 2002; and

6.

The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested immediately upon the arrival of the
military personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw them in possession of a firearm
[5]
in the evening of August 27, 2002.

As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the CA,

[6]

these are the chain of events that led to

the filing of the information:

In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group
(PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to
respond to the complaint of concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III
Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were
indiscriminately firing guns.

188

Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG proceeded to the
area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered and ran in different directions. The
responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the
house of petitioner.

Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of her shorts, after
which, she entered the house and locked the main door.

To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioners house but, in order to
deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the house as they waited for further
instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the pullout of the police troops. No agreement materialized.

At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2
Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw
something. The discarded objects landed near the wall of petitioners house and inside the compound of a
neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio
announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2)
receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1
US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1
Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search warrant.

The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay captain, barangay kagawad,
and members of the media, as witnesses, the police team proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found
and was able to confiscate the following:

1.

Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;

2.

Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and

3.

Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.

Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess the
confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them.

For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant was defective
because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal
knowledge. They quoted this pertinent portion of the application:

189

That this application was founded on confidential information received by the Provincial
[7]
Director, Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.

They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since petitioner, who was inside
the house at the time of the search, was not asked to accompany the policemen as they explored the place, but
was instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala).

Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt prepared by the raiding
team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.

Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the raiding team arrived.
She averred that such situation was implausible because she was wearing garterized shorts and a spaghettistrapped hanging blouse.

[8]

190

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same were already denied in the
Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying the Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders were not appealed and have thus attained finality. The RTC
also ruled that petitioner and Valerio were estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest since they participated
in the trial by presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they have effectively waived such
irregularities and defects.

In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC explained:
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having served with the
Philippine Army prior to his separation from his service for going on absence without leave
(AWOL). With his military background, it is safe to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is familiar with and
knowledgeable about different types of firearms and ammunitions. As a former soldier,
undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble firearms.
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an
armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for firearms, explosives and ammunition.
Granting arguendo that those firearms and ammunition were left behind by Benito Fajardo, a
member of the Philippine army, the fact remains that it is a government property. If it is so, the
residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the proper place to store those items. The logical explanation is
that those items are stolen property.
xxxx
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical
possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to ones control and
management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils,
the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law[,] the
proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
xxxx
x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that
the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the
same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
xxxx
To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as
amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the
subject firearm ammunition or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject
firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same,
and (b) the negative fact that the accused has no license or permit to own or possess the firearm,
ammunition or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or certification of a
representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit
to possess the subject firearm or explosive (Exhibit G).

191

The judicial admission of the accused that they do not have permit or license on the two (2)
receivers of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and model M1911A1 of M16
Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition, 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live
caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and recovered from their possession during the search
conducted by members of the PISOG, Aklan Police Provincial Office by virtue of Search Warrant
[9]
No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Consequently,

petitioner

and

Valerio

were

convicted

of illegal

possession

of

firearms

and

explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, which
provides:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44,
.45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22
center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an
Order dated October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of law, and held
that the search warrant was void based on the following observations:
[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have personal
knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as required by law. For
one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that point during the application. Also, he failed
to attach to the application a certification to that effect from the Firearms and Explosives Office of
the Philippine National Police. x x x, this certification is the best evidence obtainable to prove that
appellant indeed has no license or permit to possess a firearm. There was also no explanation
given why said certification was not presented, or even deemed no longer necessary, during the
[10]
application for the warrant. Such vital evidence was simply ignored.

Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioners residence were declared inadmissible in
evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the house of petitioner before the warrant
was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the plain view doctrine.

Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a firearm, punishable
under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of

192

three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days
of prision correccional, and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,

3, 2009.

[12]

[11]

but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution dated December

Hence, the present recourse.

At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against petitioner and Valerio charged
duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.

A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated articles confiscated from
Valerio and petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A.
No. 8294.

[13]

Illegal possession of two (2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of

live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45 ammunition is punishable under
paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber
.357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic
and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
[14]
arrested.

On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1
US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number, is penalized under paragraph 1,
which states:
Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or
ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
[15]
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which categorized the
kinds of firearms proscribed from being possessed without a license, according to their firing power and caliber.
R.A. No. 8294 likewise mandated different penalties for illegal possession of firearm according to the above

193

classification, unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty for the illegal possession of any kind of
firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of
Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire dispose, or
possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis ours.)

By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of firearm should now particularly refer to
the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is classified, and should there be numerous guns
confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped according to the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No.
8294, amending P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer suffice to lump all of the seized firearms in one information,
and state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated provision, as in the instant case,

[16]

because different penalties

are imposed by the law, depending on the caliber of the weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous charges.

Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a quashal, but petitioner and Valerio failed
to raise this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a waiver, and they could be convicted of as many
offenses as there were charged in the information.

[17]

This accords propriety to the diverse convictions handed

down by the courts a quo.

Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the search warrant that led to their confiscation, is
now beyond the province of our review since, by virtue of the CAs Decision, petitioner and Valerio have been
effectively acquitted from the said charges. The present review is consequently only with regard to the conviction
for illegal possession of a part of a firearm.

The Issues

Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within
the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was
adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that
any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the
waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that petitioner had knowledge
of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers.

Our Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

194

First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were seized in plain view,
hence, admissible.

No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2,
of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained
through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any of the following circumstances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure
of evidence inplain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

[18]

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

[19]

It applies when the

following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to
eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.

[20]

Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside
petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

195

First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers around the
premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber
pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions
of petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe
that a crime was being committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for the policemen to cordon off the
house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search warrant.

Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio emerge
on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio
holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or
evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing. Indeed, when subsequently recovered, they
turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.

The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are elucidating:

Q
A

When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?

Yes, sir.

Q
A

What were they doing?

They were cordoning the house.

You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that incident. What did he tell
you?
Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun.

A
Q
A

And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned is the police officers were
surrounding?
Yes, sir.

Q
A

Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to 12:00 oclock the following day.

Q
A

At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you recall where were you?
Yes, sir.

Q
A

Where were you?

I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police.

Q
A

While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual incident?
Yes, sir.

Q
A

Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?
Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something.

Q
A

And did you see the person who threw something out of this house?
Yes, sir.

xxxx

196

Q
A

Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw that something outside the
house?
It was Zaldy Valerio.

COURT:
(to witness)
Q
Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
A

Why do you know him?

Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

xxxx
PROS. PERALTA:
Q
When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you do something if any?
A
I shouted to seek cover.
xxxx

197

Q
A

So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, take cover?
I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of the flashlight on the place
where something was thrown.

Q
A

What did you see if any?

I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.

xxxx
Q
A

Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of August 28, 2002, do you recall another
unusual incident?
Yes, sir.

Q
A

And can you tell us what was that incident?

I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was thrown fell on top of the roof of
another house.

Q
A

And you saw that person who again threw something from the rooftop of the house?
Yes, sir.

Q
A

Did you recognize him?

Yes, sir.

Q
A

Who was that person?

Zaldy Valerio again.

xxxx
Q
A

Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something out of the house?
I was on the road in front of the house.

Q
A

Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out of the house?
He was on top of the house.

xxxx
Q
A

Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out?
Yes, sir.

Q
A

What was that?

Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.

xxxx
Q
A

And what did he tell you?

It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.

xxxx

198

Q
A

What did you do if any?

We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.

xxxx
Q
A

Who opened the fence for you?

It was a lady who is the owner of the house.

Q
A

When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you find?
[21]
We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)

The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was
indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and known to be
so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. The liability for their
possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.

The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal possession of part of
a firearm.

In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches, the following disquisitions
in People v. De Gracia

[22]

are instructive:

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical
possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and
management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils,
the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary
concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for
unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the
law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is
a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence of criminal
intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the
special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A
person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act,
and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime),
there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the
prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal
possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to
possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any
other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm.

199

Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No.
1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that
the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the
same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a
firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of
weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive
[23]
possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.

Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when the holder
thereof:

200

(1)

possesses a firearm or a part thereof

(2)

lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.

[24]

We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The
testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were
thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during their disposal.

At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the one in
actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners house. Absent any evidence pointing to
petitioners participation, knowledge or consent in Valerios actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession
of the receivers.

Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from the assumption
that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier that night.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence.

Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.

[25]

The quantum of

proof required by law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.

The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband was not identified with sufficient particularity; as
such, it is impossible to match the same with any of the seized receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated
that he saw Valerio holding two guns when he and the rest of the PISOG arrived in petitioners house. It is not
unlikely then that the receivers later on discarded were components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.

These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner conspired with Valerio in
committing illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence indubitably proving that petitioner
participated in the decision to commit the criminal act committed by Valerio.

Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. The constitutional
presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately overcome by the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.

201

In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not have the corresponding license for
[26]

it.

By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must yield these
requisites:

(a)

the existence of the part of the firearm; and

(b)

the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm to which the seized
part/component corresponds.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings United States Property and the other bearing
Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as Exhibits E and E-1, respectively. They were also identified
by SPO2 Nava as the firearm parts he retrieved af ter Valerio discarded them.
DYKR radio announcer Vega, who witnessed the recovery of the receivers.

[27]

His testimony was corroborated by

[28]

Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it was ascertained that Valerio is not a
duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber of firearms.
submitted a certification

[30]

to that effect and identified the same in court.

[31]

[29]

To substantiate his statement, he

The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the

certification, would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.

[32]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground
that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

202

HARRIS VS US
SYLLABUS
Pursuant to a departmental regulation, a police officer searched a impounded car held as evidence of a robbery.
The search completed, the officer opened the car door for the purpose of rolling up a window and thus protecting
the car and its contents. On opening the door, the officer saw, exposed to plain view, the automobile registration
card belonging to the victim of the robbery. This card was used as evidence in petitioner's trial. Petitioner's
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals over his contention that the card had been illegally seized following
a warrantless search.
Held: The card was subject to seizure and introducible in evidence, since it was not discovered by means of a
search in the technical sense, but was plainly visible to the officer who had a right to be in a position of viewing it.
125 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 370 F.2d 477, affirmed.
Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is
provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or
settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the
information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.

Pursuant to a departmental regulation, a police officer searched a impounded car held as evidence of a robbery.
The search completed, the officer opened the car door for the purpose of rolling up a window and thus protecting
the car and its contents. On opening the door, the officer saw, exposed to plain view, the automobile registration
card belonging to the victim of the robbery. This card was used as evidence in petitioner's trial. Petitioner's
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals over his contention that the card had been illegally seized following
a warrantless search.
Held: The card was subject to seizure and introducible in evidence, since it was not discovered by means of a
search in the technical sense, but was plainly visible to the officer who had a right to be in a position of viewing it.
125 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 370 F.2d 477, affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner was charged with robbery under the District of Columbia Code. D.C.Code Ann. 22-2901. At his trial in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, petitioner moved to suppress an automobile registration
card belonging to the robbery victim, which the Government sought to introduce in evidence. The trial court, after a
hearing, ruled that the card was admissible. Petitioner was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to
imprisonment for a period of

203

Page 390 U. S. 235

two to seven years. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed, holding that the card had been. obtained by means of an unlawful search. The Government's petition for
rehearing en banc was, however, granted, and the full Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction, with two
judges dissenting. We granted certiorari to consider the problem presented under the Fourth Amendment. 386 U.S.
1003 (1967). We affirm.
Petitioner's automobile had been seen leaving the site of the robbery. The car was traced, and petitioner was
arrested as he was entering it near his home. After a cursory search of the car, the arresting officer took petitioner
to a police station. The police decided to impound the car as evidence, and a crane was called to tow it to the
precinct. It reached the precinct about an hour and a quarter after petitioner. At this moment, the windows of the car
were open and the door unlocked. It had begun to rain.
A regulation of the Metropolitan Police Department requires the officer who takes an impounded vehicle in charge
to search the vehicle thoroughly, to remove all valuables from it, and to attach to the vehicle a property tag listing
certain information about the circumstances of the impounding. Pursuant to this regulation, and without a warrant,
the arresting officer proceeded to the lot to which petitioner's car had been towed in order to search the vehicle, to
place a property tag on it, to roll up the windows, and to lock the doors. The officer entered on the driver's side,
searched the car, and tied a property tag on the steering wheel. Stepping out of the car, he rolled up an open
window on one of the back doors. Proceeding to the front door on the passenger side, the officer opened the door
in order to secure the window and door. He then saw the registration card, which lay face up on the metal stripping
over which
Page 390 U. S. 236
the door closes. The officer returned to the precinct, brought petitioner to the car, and confronted petitioner with the
registration card. Petitioner disclaimed all knowledge of the card. The officer then seized the card and brought it
into the precinct. Returning to the car, he searched the trunk, rolled up the windows, and locked the doors.
The sole question for our consideration is whether the officer discovered the registration card by means of an illegal
search. We hold that he did not. The admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the police
regulation is not presented by this case. The precise and detailed findings of the District Court, accepted by the
Court of Appeals, were to the effect that the discovery of the card was not the result of a search of the car, but of a
measure taken to protect the car while it was in police custody. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the
police to obtain a warrant in these narrow circumstances.
Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with the name of the robbery victim on it, was plainly
visible. It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position

204

to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence. Ker v. California,374 U. S. 23, 374 U.
S. 42-43 (1963); United States v. Lee,274 U. S. 559(1927); Hester v. United States,265 U. S. 57 (1924).
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
Though Preston v. United States,376 U. S. 364, is not mentioned in the Court's opinion, I assume it has survived
Page 390 U. S. 237
because, in the present case, (1) the car was lawfully in police custody, and the police were responsible for
protecting the car; (2) while engaged in the performance of their duty to protect the car, and not engaged in an
inventory or other search of the car, they came across incriminating evidence.
Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is
provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or
settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the
information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.

205

PEOPLE VS DAMASO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93516 August 12, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y
Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric
Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz (Records, p. 3). Such information was
later amended to exclude all the above-enumerated persons except the accused-appellant from the criminal
charge. The amended information reads:
That an or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Basilio DAMASO @
Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935 with
magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) live ammunition, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of subversion, filed against said accused in the above-entitled case for Violation of
Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive Order No. 276.
Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866. (Records, p. 20)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged (Records, p. 37). Trial on the
merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accusedappellant interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being
hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant. On these bases, he, thereafter, manifested
that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused (TSN, December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17, 1990,
the trial court rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka
Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866, and
considering that the Violation is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion, pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.

206

The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition and all the articles and/or
items seized on June 19, 1988 in connection with this case and marked and submitted in court as
evidence are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, the same to be turned
over to the Philippine Constabulary Command at Lingayen, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE
CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS
DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY WERE DECLARED
INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE SAME COURT AND THE
SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED BY ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION AGAINST HIM
ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN FURTHERANCE OF
OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION. (pp. 55-66, Rollo)
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the
152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the
presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said
place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and
Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an
underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the
Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found
subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October
23, 1989).
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the
rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested.
They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she
worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by
appellant. When they reached the house, the group found that it had already been vacated by the
occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Bernie Mendoza, the group
looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented
by appellant. The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house,
the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a
member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested
the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay
Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine.
They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa,
Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested
the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the
rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and

207

other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final
inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for
investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the
items confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn, October 31, 1989). (p. 5,
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 91, Rollo)
While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against lawless elements in our society,
We must, however, stress that the latter's efforts to this end must be done within the parameters of the law. In the
case at bar, not only did We find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining
evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented against him is weak to justify
conviction.
We reverse.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole violator of P.D. No. 1866, in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credible
evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the
M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. The prosecution presented two
witnesses who attested to this fact, thus:
Lieutenant Candito Quijardo
Fiscal
Q How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the house?
A He was not around at that time, but according to Luz (Tanciangco) who
mentioned the name Bernie Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house and
at the same time claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza who owns the said items.
(TSN of October 31, 1989, p. 40)
xxx xxx xxx
Q I am showing you another picture which we request to be marked as Exhibit "K2," tell us if it has any connection to the house?
A The same house, sir.
Q Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied the house at Bonuan
Gueset, by the name of Bernie Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did
you find out the identity?
A I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de Guzman.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who could tell the true
identity of Bernie Mendoza?
A The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.
Q Can you name these officers?
A Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt. Federico Castro. (ibid, pp.
54-55)
M/Sqt. Artemio Gomez

208

Q That underground house, do you know who was the principal occupant of that
house?
xxx xxx xxx
A During our conversation with the occupants, they revealed that a certain Ka
Bernie is the one occupying the house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso.
. . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)
Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own
personal knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same
are admissible because of the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one should
not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In People vs. Valero, We emphatically
declared that:
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like
hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for
the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection
may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative
value.
(L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675, emphasis supplied)
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who knew the appellant as
the lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could have exercised his constitutional
right to confront the witnesses and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records do
not show any other evidence which could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the house and the
owner of the subversive items. To give probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the
appellant on this basis alone would be to render his constitutional rights useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will
not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and
seizure proceedings.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2). The
purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the
sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646). However, such right is not absolute.
There are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an
arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L58889, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these exceptions is present in this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered the appellant's house upon
invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados, helper of the appellant; that when Luz Tanciangco opened
one of the rooms, they saw a copier machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, radio set and more
subversive items; that technically speaking, there was no search as the group was voluntarily shown the articles
used in subversion; that besides, a search may be validly conducted without search warrant with the consent of the
person searched in this case, appellant's helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the
appellant's house; and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the same may be seized
without a warrant.

209

We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do
so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant
was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to
enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We Find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was
indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to
open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority.
Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality.
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil.
230, 235). As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if
the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant.
But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to the house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p.
7, Records), does not grant them the license to go inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They
knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before
making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited
away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There
was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all
the menace of a military invasion. (G.R. No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the identification of the
gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was
described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial number
thus:
FISCAL
Q Will you kindly restate again the items that you found inside the house?
Lt. Quijardo:
A When she opened the doors of the rooms that we requested for, we immediately
saw different kinds of books of which we believed to be used for subversive
orientation and the M-14 rifle.
Q In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle which you mentioned?
A In the same room of which the subversive documents were placed.
Q If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able to identify the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a rifle bearing a serial number 1249985 which for purposes
of identification, may we request your Honor, that this rifle be marked as Exhibit
"D."
COURT:
Mark it.

210

FISCAL:
Q Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable Court the relation of that
firearm to the firearm which according to you you found inside the room allegedly
occupied by one Bernie Mendoza?
A This is the same rifle which was discovered during our raid in the same house.
(TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38, emphasis supplied).
The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely a typographical error.
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its correction or lack of it could spell
the difference between freedom and incarceration of the accused-appellant.
In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden to prove the existence of
the firearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the firearm does not have the corresponding license for
it. Since the gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun described in the amended information, the corpus
delicti (the substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been committed) has not been fully
established. This circumstance coupled with dubious claims of appellant's connection to the house (where the gun
was found) have totally emasculated the prosecution's case.
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the argument raised by the defense that the
crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in
connection with the crime of subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is facing a separate charge of
subversion. The defense submits that the trial court should have peremptorily dismissed this case in view of the
subversion charge. In People of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., We set forth in no uncertain terms the futility of
such argument. We quote:
If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence are the very essence of
subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag (G.R. No. 27683, 1976,
73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976]), the Court categorically distinguished subversion from rebellion, and
held:
Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is
a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed
by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the
purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the AntiSubversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a
subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public
uprising and taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere
membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of arms by a
member of a subversive organization against the Government is but a
circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.
(Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission (G.R. 58284, 109 289 (1981]), this
Court said that subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security, while rebellion is a
crime against public order. Rising publicly and taking arms against the Government is the very
element of the crime on rebellion. On the other hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to outlaw the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) , other similar associations and its successors because
their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and grave danger to national security.
The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion, and other illegal
means. This is a recognition that subversive acts do not only constitute force and violence (contrary
to the arguments of private respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One may in fact

211

be guilty of subversion by authoring subversive materials, where force and violence is neither
necessary or indispensable.
Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga impliedly ruled that if an accused
is simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of
common crimes as applied in rebellion would have found application therein. The respondents
relied on the opinion of this Court when it said:
. . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS
NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY
CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS.
Thus,
the
rulings
of
the
Court
in Hernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the validity of the charge under
the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the dictum in the Hernandez
case is not applicable in that case, considering that the legislature deemed it fit to provide for two
distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2)
subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). The practical
result of this may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to
those that obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its
power to enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April
22, 1992).
Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the charge of illegal possession
of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with
no option, but to acquit the accused on reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costsde
oficio.
SO ORDERED.

212

PEOPLE VS VELASCO
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 110592. January 23, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. YOLANDA VELASCO Y PAMINTUAN, accusedappellant.

DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila was herein
appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been found guilty of unlawfully selling shabu, in violation of
Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and (o) of Article 1 of The Dangerous Drugs Act of
[1]
1972 (R.A. 6425).
The prosecutions version of appellants apprehension is as follows:
After close surveillance by the Narcotics Unit of Station 7 of the Western Police District Command confirmed
reports that appellant, notoriously tagged as the Shabu Queen of Quiricada, Tondo, was indeed illicitly peddling
the prohibited drug, a crack team composed of Pat. Ricardo Godoy, Pfc. Lamberto Gan, Pat. Renato Yumang, and
Pat. Eduardo Chiapoco launched a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28, 1991 in Quiricada Street. Pat.
Godoy was the designated poseur-buyer while the rest stealthily positioned themselves around the area. Donning a
basketball outfit as disguise and accompanied by a confidential informant, Pat. Godoy searched for appellant and
found her in an alley beside a creek near her house on Quiricada St. apparently preparing to launder some clothes.
Pat. Godoy told appellant that he wanted to buy shabu and gave her a fifty peso marked bill. Appellant asked him
to wait for a while and went inside her house. When she returned, she reached into her pocket and gave Pat.
Godoy less than a gram of shabu wrapped in aluminum foil known in street parlance as a deck. After the exchange
and upon Pat. Godoys pre-arranged signal, his couching teammates rushed to the scene and immediately
apprehended the appellant. When the police officers asked appellant to open her pockets, they found five more
decks of shabu.
Appellant was then brought to the police precinct for investigation by Pat. Vicente Rodriguez, the officer-incharge of the Narcotics and Anti-hoodlum Section. The six aluminum foils containing shabu were referred to the
Criminal Investigation Laboratory of the Western Police District and tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. A booking sheet and arrest report which recorded the incidents of the operation were prepared by
Pat. Rodriguez, while a joint affidavit of apprehension was executed by the members of the buy-bust team.
On her part, appellant claimed that on June 28, 1991, between 2:30 and 3:00 P.M., she was at home
laundering clothes in her kitchen when police officers, with their guns drawn, suddenly barged into her house. Two
officers held her and frisked her body for shabu while the other two went upstairs, ransacked her room and even
stole some pieces of jewelry belonging to her sister and nieces. She claimed that no shabu was found on her
person nor anywhere within the premises of her house. The police officers allegedly brought her outside and asked
her to locate a certain Minang. Unable to point to Minang whom appellant claims she does not know, the police
officers took her instead. While at the precinct, appellant was again told to locate Minang or think of somebody else
to take her place, otherwise appellant would be charged. The police officers also asked for grease
money. Appellant insisted that she did not know the person they were looking for and that she was poor and could
not give them any grease money. Appellant denied selling shabu to the police officers. and alleged that she had no
idea why she was brought to the police precinct and charged with having sold shabu. She further claimed that she
had never met the police officers before and that she has no knowledge of any reason which might have impelled
them to impute false charges against her. In sum, the defenses of the appellant are denial and frame-up, as she
maintained that the six decks of shabu were planted evidence.

213

The trial court nonetheless found that her defenses could not offset the positive testimony of Pat. Godoy that
his unit received information concerning accused-appellants drug pushing activities from a confidential informant,
that they verified the information by surveillance and that the buy-bust operation was conducted strictly as planned
and as described in the arrest report and joint affidavit of apprehension. Thus, her conviction.
Now before us on appeal, appellant raises a single error in her Appellants Brief, namely: that the trial court
erred in admitting the decks of shabu in evidence against her because they were obtained through a warrantless
[2]
arrest and search. It appears from her Reply Brief with Motion To Dismiss, however, that appellant likewise
[3]
assails the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case. Thus, two issues are up for resolution.
In amplification of her lone assigned error, appellant contends that as she was not committing any offense but
was merely washing clothes in her house when the police officers arrested her unarmed with a warrant, the
warrantless arrest cannot be justified under Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides that:
SEC. 5. Arrest without a warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
xxx

xxx

xxx

And so she posits that there being no valid warrantless arrest, the search incidental thereto which yielded several
decks of shabu is, perforce, illegal.
[4]

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, appellant argues that in line with the case of People v. Simon which
provides for the gradation of penalties depending on the amount of drugs involved, her maximum prison term
should only be six (6) years inasmuch as the decks of shabu seized from her do not even amount to one gram. Her
case is, she concludes, cognizable by the appropriate Metropolitan Trial Court, considering the passage of R.A.
[5]
7691 (effective on April 15, 1994) which expanded the jurisdiction of said inferior court to include exclusive
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, and in effect divested the
Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over her case.
The two issues should be resolved against appellant.
The trial court correctly gave credence and weight to the prosecution evidence that appellant was arrested
in flagrante delicto, thus completely debunking her claims of denial and frame-up, and validating both the
warrantless arrest and search on her person and the use of the confiscated shabu as evidence against her. While
[6]
it is true that the Court, in People v. Ale, recognized that:
By the very nature of anti-narcotics operation, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as
informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is
[7]
great,
there is no showing that appellants apprehension was marred by such official abuse. Appellant failed to establish
that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other
unscrupulous activities who were motivated either by the desire to extort money or exact personal vengeance, or by
sheer whim and caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the
police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the principle that findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses, are entitled to great respect, must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant
[8]
that she had been framed. This becomes all the more so in view of the fact that a claim of a frame-up, like alibi,
is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but
difficult to prove, and is a common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
[9]
[10]
Dangerous Drugs Act. Clear and convincing evidence are required to prove the defense of frame-up which,
unfortunately, are inexistent here. In this connection, appellants attempt to undermine Pat. Godoys credibility, by

214

harping on the seeming improbability that a drug pusher would readily sell prohibited drugs to a complete
[11]
stranger, must be rejected. The Court has repeatedly held that drug pushing when done on a small level, as in
[12]
this case, belongs to those types of crimes that may be committed anytime and at any place. For it is neither
uncommon nor improbable that a drug pusher would sell to a total stranger, since what matters is not the existence
of familiarity between the procurer and pusher but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of
[13]
the drugs. We wind up our discussion on this issue by reiterating the Courts ruling in People v. Simon:
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyer is susceptible
to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not
obtain in the case at bar. Appellants entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a
surveillance was conducted by the team before the buy-bust operation was effected. No ill motive was or could be
attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. Such
lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated
[14]
claim of appellant of having been framed x x x.
Moving on to the jurisdictional issue, appellants position is premised on two relatively recent legal
[15]
developments. The first is R.A. 7659 (effective on December 31, 1993) which amended the penalties imposed
by R.A. 6425. Prior to the effectivity of R.A. 7659, the penalty imposed for the violation of many of the provisions of
R.A. 6425 was life imprisonment to death regardless of the amount of drugs involved. Section 17 of R.A. 7659
introduced the following amendment:
SECTION 17. Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the Crime - The
penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of
this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1.

40 grams or more of opium;

2.

40 grams or more of morphine;

3.

200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

4.

40 grams or more of heroin;

5.

750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;

6.

50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7.

40 grams or more of cocaine hydrochloride; or

8.
In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as
determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the
purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
[16]
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
xxx xxx xxx. (Italics supplied.)
[17]

In the Simon case, the Court has had the occasion to rule that the abovementioned beneficent provisions
can be applied retroactively to judgments which may have become final and executory prior to December 31, 1993
and even to those who are already serving their sentence. This doctrine was reiterated in People v.
[18]
Martinez where the Court held that the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine as a conjunctive penalty

215

shall be imposed only when the shabu involved is 200 grams or more, otherwise if the quantity involved is less than
[19]
the foregoing, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal minus the fine.
x x x the component penalties of prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal shall each be
considered as a principal imposable penalty x x x of the total complex penalty x x x to be imposed separately as
determined by the quantity of the drug involved x x x and that the modifying circumstances shall be used to fix the
proper period of that component penalty. Thus, the Court directed that the quantities (of the different drugs)
enumerated in Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double
or treble the same, to be respectively used as bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three x x x
periods according to the severity thereof.
Under the foregoing directive, since the amount of shabu involved in the instant case is only 0.8020 gram, the
proper imposable component penalty is prision correccional to be applied in its medium period, in the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be
taken from the medium of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4)
years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto
[20]
mayor, the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. (Italics supplied.)
Evidence uncontroverted by the prosecution shows that the total amount of shabu involved in the instant
prosecution is less than one gram. Thus, as correctly argued by appellant, in the absence of any mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the penalty properly imposable upon her should be the same as the penalty imposed in
[21]
the Martinez case.
The second significant legal development is R.A. 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said act vested these courts with
[22]
exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years.
As to the issue of whether or not R.A. 7691 operated to divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over
appellants case, we rule in the negative. It has been consistently held as a general rule that the jurisdiction of a
court to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
[23]
action. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed
to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the
jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the
[24]
enactment of a statute.
A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet
[25]
reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having
retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its
effectivity. Thus, the general rule enunciated above is the controlling doctrine in the case at bar, At the time the
case against the appellant was commenced by the filing of the information on July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court
had jurisdiction over the offense charged, inasmuch as Section 39 of R.A. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
prior to the amendments introduced by R.A. 7659 and R.A. 7691), provided that:
Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. - The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over alt cases involving offenses punishable under this
Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts
shall take exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of age.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision vested concurrent jurisdiction upon the said courts
regardless of the imposable penalty. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant
was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information was
filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A.
7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress,
prospective in nature.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo
against the accused-appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that the

216

proper imposable sentence should be the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as the minimum,
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as the maximum thereof. However, it appearing from
[26]
the records that the appellant has been in jail for more than 4 years and 2 months, thereby having served more
than the maximum imposable penalty, her immediate release from custody is hereby ordered, unless she is
[27]
otherwise detained for some other cause.
SO ORDERED.

217

PEOPLE VS LESANGIN
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112659. January 24, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI (at large), accused, FATI
OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI BHOLA, and ZARIATU AMIDU, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
[1]

[2]

On June 7, 1993, appellants FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI BHOLA, and ZARIATU
[3]
AMIDU pleaded not guilty to the charge of Violation of Section 4, Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
[4]
6425 embodied in an Information, dated April 2, 1993, as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

That on or about the 31st of March, 1993 and sometime prior thereto in Manila and other parts of Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without authority of law,
deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport 8,225.31 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, and/or act
as brokers in any of the aforesaid transactions with or without consideration.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A fourth accused, Thai national SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI, escaped from the Pasay City Jail before the
[5]
arraignment. He remains at large.
The evidence of the prosecution establish that in the early afternoon of May 31, 1993, accused Leangsiri was
arrested at the arrival area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). He was in the act of bringing into the
[6]
[7]
country 8,225.31 grams of heroin hidden under the false bottom of a black suitcase. He informed the authorities
[8]
[9]
that he was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people at the Las Palmas Hotel in Manila.
Leangsiri was brought to the headquarters of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) at the Old MIA for further
[10]
investigation. The head of the command, MAJOR ALBINO SABLAYAN, formed a team, headed by SR. INSP.
[11]
[12]
ADOLFO SAMALA, to conduct follow-up operations in the case. The team and agents of the Bureau of
[13]
Customs proceeded to the Las Palmas Hotel, where they allowed Leangsiri to check into Room 504 with the
[14]
confiscated black suitcase containing the heroin.
At around eight oclock in the evening, two hours after checking in, Leangsiri received a telephone call from his
[15]
contact. Leangsiri was told that the black suitcase would be picked up at about ten oclock that night. He relayed
[16]
the information to his escorts, NARCOM agents SPO3 FABIAN GAPIANGAO and SPO4 ELPIDIO
[17]
BALNEG. Thereupon, the two NARCOM agents positioned themselves inside the washroom, with its door
[18]
opened a fraction to give them visual access to the rest of the hotel room.
On the ground floor and outside perimeters of the Las Palmas hotel, Samala and other NARCOM and Bureau
[19]
of Customs agents were watching for unusual and suspicious events. From where he sat at the hotels coffee
[20]
shop, Samala noticed appellant Amidu paced around the lobby for nearly an hour. At about ten p.m., Amidus co[21]
appellants, Omogbolahan and Bhola, arrived at the hotel. As Amidu flashed a thumbs up sign to them, they all
[22]
headed for the elevator and went up to the fifth floor of the hotel.
[23]

They knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up from the bed in which he sat, opened the door,
[24]
[25]
and let the three appellants in. Leangsiri took the black suitcase and brought it to the dining area of the room

218

where appellants stood in full view of NARCOM agents Gapiangao and Balneg. Leangsiri opened the suitcase and
[26]
displayed its contents to his visitors.
Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2) transparent plastic bags which contained the
[27]
[28]
heroin. After the examination, Leangsiri closed the suitcase and handed it over to appellants. Appellants
started to leave the hotel room with the contraband when Gapiangao and Balneg barged out of the washroom,
[29]
identified themselves as NARCOM agents, and made the arrest.
Minutes later, Samala and his companions joined Gapiangao, Balneg, and the four foreigners in Room
[30]
504. Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola identified themselves by presenting their respective passports.
[31]
Appellant Amidu, on the other hand, merely said she was staying in Room 413 of the same hotel. Further
questioning of appellants revealed that Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted at the Royal Palm Hotel, also located
[32]
in Manila.
Accompanied by the hotels owner and security officer, Samala searched appellant Amidus room. Tucked
within the pages of her telephone and address book was a piece of paper with the name SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI
[33]
[34]
written on it. The paper and Amidus other possessions were confiscated.
The NARCOM and Customs teams then proceeded to the Royal Palm Hotel where appellants Omogbolahan
and Bhola were billeted. The agents coordinated with the security officers of the hotel, who stood as witnesses
when the former entered and searched said appellants room. Their efforts yielded two black suitcases each with
[35]
false bottoms and both smaller than that confiscated from Leangsiri. Masking tape and an empty transparent bag
[36]
were also found in the room.
Appellants denied any involvement in the transport of heroin by Leangsiri. They told a different tale.

[37]

Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were staying at Royal Palm Hotel. On that fateful night of March 31, 1993,
they went to the Las Palmas Hotel to meet co-appellant Amidu and an American named David. When they got to
the fourth floor of the hotel, and as they made their way to Room 413 (Amidus room), they were accosted by some
people who forcibly brought them to Room 504. They explained that they were at the hotel to meet Amidu. Some
of those who intercepted them left the room and returned with Amidu. Appellants money and jewelry were taken
from them. Those who dispossesed them turned out to be policemen.
Appellants were driven to the Royal Palm Hotel. Only one of the policemen entered its premises as appellants
and the others remained in the car. Afterwards, appellants were brought to NARCOM headquarters. Together with
Leangsiri, they were presented to the media as members of an international drug syndicate.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court convicted appellants, finding them guilty of conspiring to transport heroin in
violation of Section 4, R.A. 6425. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding all the accused (herein appellants)
FATI OMOGBOLAHAN y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI BHOLA and ZARIATU AMIDU, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime described in the Information, and hereby sentences them to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment plus
a fine of P30,000 for each of (them).
The case as against accused Suchinda Leangsiri is hereby ordered archived.
The Heroin of about 8,225.31 kgs. is hereby ordered destroyed in the manner provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
On September 9, 1993, appellants filed a motion for new trial grounded on the following
I. THAT ERRORS OF LAW OR IRREGULARITIES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED DURING THE TRIAL
PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF HEREIN ACCUSED (HEREIN APPELLANTS);

219

II. THAT NEW AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE HAS BEEN DISCOVERED WHICH THE ACCUSED (APPELLANTS)
COULD NOT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE HAVE DISCOVERED AND PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL, AND
WHICH IF INTRODUCED AND ADMITTED, WOULD PROBABLY CHANGE THE JUDGMENT.
The purported new and material evidence consists of the testimony of a certain Julita Thach Camerino, a Thai
citizen, who narrated in her affidavit:
1. That (she) is at present a detention prisoner at the Manila City Jail, Old Bilibid Prison Compound, Sta.
Cruz, Manila;
2. That on or about 11:00 oclock in the morning of 31 August 1993, (she) noticed the arrival of
inmates (appellants) into (the prison) compound, and (Amidu) was still crying;
3. That after a few minutes, Zariatu Amidu started banging her head against the concrete wall, but after a few
attempts she was prevailed upon to stop by another woman;
4. That (she) inquired from some of the inmates the reason why Zariatu Amidu was behaving that way, and found
out that she and the two other male detainees were just sentenced by the Court of very severe penalty of life
imprisonment;
5. That (she) pitied (appellants) of the fate that befell them and (her) conscience rebelled and started tormenting
(her) since (she) knows that they are innocent of the crime charged against them of transporting heroin into the
country;
6. That (her) conscience compelled (her) to approach them and voluntarily offered (her) help, if it is still possible
under the situation, whatever assistance (she) could extend to let justice prevail and reveal the truth out of that
incident on the evening of 31 March 1993, at Las Palmas Hotel, because (she) was with the police at the NAIA,
acting as an interpreter between Suchinda Leangsiri and the police when the former was being interrogated at the
NARCOM Headquarters at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in the afternoon of 31 March 1993, and
into the evening of said date at Las Palmas Hotel;
7. That in the process of (her) questioning of Leangsiri, the latter revealed to (them) that he was going to deliver
his stuff of heroin to someone at Las Palmas Hotel but did not identify the person whom he was going to meet at
the hotel nor mention the name/s of the same;
8. That on or about 6:00 oclock in the evening of 31 March 1993, (she), Suchinda Leangsiri, and the police team
arrived at Las Palmas Hotel wherein (she) and Leangsiri were instructed to proceed to the desk counter and checkin, and got Room 504 to occupy;
9. That (she), Suchinda Leangsiri and a police officer whom (she) knew as Emil went to Room 504 to await for
someone who would allegedly pick up the stuff of heroin but the claim or testimony that SPO3 Gapiangao and
SPO4 Balneg were also inside Room 504 together with Suchinda Leangsiri is absolutely false;
10.That at around 9:30 that evening, the police brought inside Room 504 two black males whom (she) later knew
as Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati Omogbolahan Alabi;
11 . That while inside Room 504, (she) heard the two, Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati Omogbolahan Alabi, protesting
and complaining to the police why they were brought inside Room 504;
12. That the two further explained to the police that they were about to visit a lady friend billeted at Room 413 of
the same hotel;
13. That after hearing that information, (she) was requested by Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz to go with him, and (they)
immediately went inside Room 413 and forcibly brought Zariatu Amidu to Room 504 to join with the two male black
nationals already inside;

220

14. That afterwards, (they) brought (appellants) in the vicinity of Royal Palm Hotel, where (they) search the room of
the two black males and found no prohibited drugs;
15. That from Royal Palm Hotel, (they) went back to NARCOM Headquarters at NAIA, where (she) divested the
three black nationals of their cash and pieces of jewelry, and turn them over to Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz for safekeeping;
16. That (she is) am going to state further the other details and related matters in court during my testimony in the
trial of the case against (appellants);
xxx

xxx

xxx

[38]

The trial court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:

xxx

xxx

xxx

The Court reviewed the records of the case, the transcript of stenographic notes, and the pertinent laws and
jurisprudence, and the Court finds, and so holds, that the findings and conclusions regarding the guilt of the herein
accused (appellants), as well as the sufficiency of the evidence against them, are amply supported by the evidence,
and the present motion did not ventilate any new matter as to warrant the said findings to be disturbed and/or set
aside.
With respect to the alleged newly discovered evidence, the Court disagrees with the stance taken by the accused
(appellants) on this point. The testimony of Julita Thach Camerino could not be considered newly discovered, as
said person was brought to the premises of the Court for identification during the trial of this case. Besides, her
testimony, summarized in the undated Affidavit submitted by the accused (appellants) on September 24, 1993,
does not inspire confidence, considering that this witness was convicted by this Court for violation of the dangerous
drugs law, as amended.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[39]

Appellants now impugn the trial courts decision and its denial of their motion for new trial, and raise the
following assignments of error:
I. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE EXISTENCE OF
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ACCUSED;
II. THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO INTRODUCE DIRECT AND/OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES AND
OTHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE THREE ACCUSED.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION AND OTHER EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSEDS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

[40]

We affirm appellants conviction for reasons we shall discuss in seriatim.

One. We hold that the trial court correctly found that appellants conspired with Leangsiri to transport eightand-a-half kilos of heroin.
Appellants submit a two-pronged argument assailing the finding of conspiracy. The first prong urges that there
is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence linking them to the transport of heroin by Leangsiri. The second prong
posits that only Leangsiris testimony can prove their alleged conspiracy. The running fault in appellants line of
reasoning is obvious to the eye.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
[41]
and decide to commit it. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that conspiracy need not be proved by direct
[42]
evidence. Proof of previous agreement to commit the crime is not also essential to establish conspiracy.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, whose conduct before, during, and after the commission

221

of the crime can show its existence. In a host of cases, we have upheld the finding of conspiracy where it is shown
that the accused acted in concert to attain the same objective.
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
positive
testimonies
of
prosecution
witnesses Gapiangao,
Balneg, and Samala established the concerted acts of appellants aimed at carrying out the unlawful design of
transporting the heroin confiscated from Leangsiri. When Leangsiri was interrogated after his arrest, he
revealed to the authorities that he was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people at the Las Palmas
Hotel. Later, while in Room 504 of said hotel, Leangsiri received a telephone call in the presence of
Gapiangao and Balneg, by which he was informed that the heroin would be picked up from him at ten
oclock in the evening. Shortly before the designated pick-up time, Samala saw appellant Amidu (who had
been waiting in the lobby of the hotel for almost an hour) flash a thumbs up sign to appellants
Omogbolahan and Bhola when they arrived at the hotel. The three (3) appellants then took the elevator and
went up to the fifth floor. They knocked on the door of Room 504, and Leangsiri let them into the room. In
full view of Gapiangao and Balneg, appellants examined Leangsiris heroin, and took it and the suitcase
with the false bottom in which it was hidden. Appellants were on their way out of the room with the
suitcase and heroin when they were arrested by Gapiangao and Balneg. These facts show beyond doubt that
appellants conspired with Leangsiri to transport the illegal drug heroin.
Two. We also hold that there was delivery of the heroin under Section 4 of R.A. 6425, from Leangsiri to
appellants even though Leangsiri and the heroin were already under the control of the NARCOM on the evening
of March 31, 1993. Too far out from the fringes of reason is appellants argument that since the NARCOM agents
had already taken Leangsiri and the heroin into their custody and control, it is the NARCOM agents who should be
liable for transporting the said heroin confiscated from Leangsiri.
Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 provides, inter alia:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
The proviso applies to the NARCOM agents in the case at bar. In bringing Leangsiri and the heroin to Las
Palmas Hotel, the NARCOM agents were performing a lawful act in furtherance of their follow-up operations. They
went to the hotel to apprehend appellants to whom delivery of the illegal drug was to be made.
Appellants also argue that, even assuming arguendo, they were caught in possession of the heroin, they
cannot be held liable under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 because they were neither delivering nor transporting the
[43]
drug. They postulate that said provision does not penalize the recipient of the delivered contraband.
[44]

The same argument was raised and rejected by this Court in People vs. Lo Ho Wing. In Lo Hong Wing, the
authorities gathered from their intelligence and surveillance activities that the accused were going to bring illegal
drugs (shabu) into the country. The accused were arrested while on-board a taxi cab which they hailed and
boarded at the NAIA. In rejecting the defense argument that there was no delivery, transporting or dispatching of
shabu made by the accused therein, we held:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56) tea bags containing
metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction or was used, thereby implying that the accused were being
charged of the three specified acts in the alternative. Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of delivery
because the term connotes a source and a recipient, the latter being absent under the facts of the case. It is also
argued that dispatching cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or disposed of drugs. As for
transporting, appellant contends that he cannot also be held liable therefor because the act of transporting
necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is non-existent under the given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which appellant and his coaccused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no doubt that law enforcers caught appellant
and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited drug. The term transport is defined as to carry
or convey from one place to another. The operative words in the definition are to carry or convey. The fact that
there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. It is immaterial

222

whether or not the place of destination is reached. Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical
conclusion that he and his co-accused did not intend to bring the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e., they had no
place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was interrupted by the search and
arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already been commenced. Otherwise, there
would be nothing to interrupt.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the case at bar, appellants were on their way out of Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel carrying the suitcase with
a false bottom containing 8.5 kilos of heroin when they were arrested by the NARCOM agents. At that point, they
were in the act of conveying the heroin to an unknown destination. Their act was part of the process of transporting
the heroin. They were all involved in a conspiracy. The act of Leangsiri in transporting the heroin is appellants
act. They cannot isolate and separate themselves from Leangsiri, for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Three. We further rule that the heroin (Exhs. C and its sub-exhibits) and the suitcase with false bottom (Exh.
F) are admissible against appellants.
It is inaccurate for appellants to claim that these evidentiary exhibits were formally offered only against
Leangsiri. They were also offered against them. As correctly noted by the Solicitor General in his Brief:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The records show that on July 2, 1993, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio Zuo and State Prosecutor
Reynaldo Lugtu formally offered Exhibits A to Q and their submarkings against Leangsiri, (Omogbolahan), Bhola
[45]
and Amidu (Original Records, pp. 67-71). xxx
Four. We now come to the argument of appellants that the piece of paper found in Amidus hotel room, with
[46]
the name SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI written on it, should not have been admitted by the trial court.
The Revised Rules of Court provide that (a) person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
[47]
[48]
warrant. We interpreted this provision in Nolasco vs. Pao, thus:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided xxx that is to absolutely limit
a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or
her arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense. Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest.
We then held that the warrantless search made by the authorities on the accuseds apartment which was
located a few blocks away from where she was arrested was illegal for being an untenable violation, if not
nullification, of the basic constitutional right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Nolasco, however, has undergone some mutations. In subsequent cases, we validated warrantless searches
[49]
made not only on the person of the suspect but also in a permissible area within his reach. We ruled that
the reach of a valid warrantless search goes beyond the person of the one arrested and includes the premises or
[50]
surroundings under his immediate control. The immediate control test was enunciated in the American
[51]
case of Chimel vs. State of California. In that case, defendant was arrested in his home for burglary of a coin
shop. Afterwards, the arresting officers conducted a search of his entire three-bedroom house, including the attic,
the garage, a small workshop, and drawers. Various items -primarily coins - were found through the search, and
were admitted in evidence against him by the trial court, which convicted him of burglary. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the conviction as it struck down the warrantless search on the ground that the search of
the accuseds home went far beyond his person and the area from within which he might have obtained
either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.
The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the
suspects person and the premises under his immediate control admits of an exception. The exception obtains
[52]
when the Plain View Doctrine applies as explained in People vs. Musa, in this wise:

223

xxx Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.
In Ker v. California, police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that the defendant
husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a passkey to defendants
apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife
emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of
the kitchen, as small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing green leafy
substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting
defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S.
Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of
the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that the discovery of the brick of marijuana
did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. x x x The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the plain view doctrine
and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecutions evidence.
The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor
to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. x x x Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following
limitations on the application of the doctrine.
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused - and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing
Leangsiris name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found tucked
within the pages of appellant Amidus telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and
the piece of paper bearing Leangsiris name cannot be admitted as evidence against appellants. The
inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the
prosecutions case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Five. We uphold the calibration of the credibility of witnesses made by the court a quo. The trial court judge
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses first-hand, and his findings are entitled to great
weight.
The inconsistencies in Gapiangaos, Balnegs, and Samalas testimonies alluded to by appellants hardly relate
to the material parts of their testimonies which sufficiently proved the elements of the crime at bar. It is a wellentrenched rule of evidence that corroborative testimonies, in order to be credible, need not coincide on all
aspects. Given the natural limitations of the human senses, the immaterial and slight discrepancies in the
testimonies of witnesses, far from weakening their probative value, serve to strengthen their credibility. Imperfect
[53]
senses cannot be the source of perfect testimonies.
Neither is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses crumpled by the fact that the testimonies of some
prosecution witnesses during the trial were not exactly and totally reflected in their Joint Affidavit, dated April 1,
[54]
1993. We have held before that:
The general rule has always been that discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and
those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally
incomplete. Affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because they are

224

oftentimes not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired.
[55]
xxx
In checkered contrast, the testimonies of appellants are incongruous with reality. The story proffered by
appellant Omogbolahan, for instance, is too obviously melodramatic and incredible to be believed. His story begins
in February, 1992, with his wife and two children being killed in a civil war in his native land of Liberia. Distraught,
[56]
he decided to migrate to theUnited States of America. He first flew to Thailand, where he stayed for six months
[57]
without managing to learn a single Thai word. Despite his language inadequacy, he was able to land a job in a
cargo company in that country. He did not befriend any Thai national. Neither did he apply for an American visa
[58]
in Thailand.
He then heard from two co-Liberians named Jabar and Samsi that it was easy to obtain an American visa from
the United States embassy in the Philippines. Omogbolahan flew fromThailand to our country. He stepped on
[59]
Philippine soil on March 16, 1993, only to learn that Jabar and Samsi had long left the country. Instead of going
to the United States embassy atRoxas Boulevard or any of the many travel agencies doing business in the country,
he spent his first two weeks here making the rounds of bars and clubs in the Ermita area, hoping to meet fellow
Africans and American citizens who could help him obtain an American visa. In this clubs, he allegedly befriended
[60]
his co-appellant Bhola and an American named David whom he was supposed to meet on the fateful night
of March 31, 1993. Omogbolahan soon moved in with Bhola at the Royal Palm Hotel, and David promised to help
[61]
him obtain his American passport.
Omogbolahans story is clearly a fabrication designed to provide him with a convenient defense and to elicit
sympathy from the courts. The testimonies of his co-appellants are equally incredulous. They are also tattered
with inconsistencies. As observed by the Solicitor General, they could not even get their occupations straight, viz.:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Appellant Zariatu Amidu is a native of Ghana, Africa, 38 years old at the time she testified, a widow and as shown
in her passport, a seamstress by occupation. However, in her testimony, she stated that she is a plain housewife.
(tsn July 21, 1993, pp. 4 and 27)
On the other hand, appellant Yamba Lisasi Bhola is a native of Kinshasha, Zaire, Central Africa, 37 years old at
the time he testified, married and a high school graduate xxx. In his testimony, he stated that he is a trader xxx.
[62]
Later on, he stated that he was working for the New Star Investment in Thailand as marketing officer. (tsn July
16, 1993, p. 23)
Lastly, Fati Omogbolahan Alabi was 27 years old at the time he testified and an elementary graduate and plumber
[63]
according to his passport. In his testimony, however, he claimed to be a technician. (tsnJuly 13, 1993 p. 4).
Six. We finally hold that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying appellants motion for new
trial.
We find appellants first argument in moving for a new trial as baseless. As discussed above, the purported
errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against the substantive rights of appellants do not exist.
Appellants second argument as to the necessity of a new trial is likewise unmeritorious. Section 1, Rule 37 of
the Revised Rules of Court grants an aggrieved party the right to move for new trial on the ground, among others,
of (n)ewly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, and produced at
[64]
the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result (thereof). Newly discovered evidence, in order to
warrant a new trial, must meet three requirements, viz: (1) it must have been discovered after trial; (2) it could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial despite reasonable diligence; and (3) if presented, it would probably
[65]
alter the results of the action.
In the case at bar, appellants were unable to prove that, even with the use of reasonable diligence, they could
not have obtained Camerinos testimony during the trial. On the contrary, as correctly noted by the trial court,
Camerino was identified in open court by appellant Bhola on July 26, 1993.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Camerinos prospective testimony would acquit appellants. Firstly, her affidavit
embodies a narration of events almost identical to that presented by appellants. As has been discussed earlier, the
defense version of what occurred on the evening of March 31, 1993 is incredible and difficult to believe. Secondly,

225

Camerinos claim that she was a member of the team that arrested appellants is belied by the testimony of
prosecution witness Samala on rebuttal, viz:
xxx

xxx

xxx

STATE PROS.:
One Julita Camerino appeared before this Honorable Court and accused through counsel claim she
was a member of the team which arrested the three Africans now the accused in this case. What can you
say to that?
A: I dont know that person, sir.
Q: Were there instances or occasions before the date of March 31, 1993 when you met this Julita
Camerino?
A: I dont know, sir.
Q: You dont recall any?
A: I dont recall any, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Court:
Cross?
ATTY. BORJA:
Capt. Samala, is it not a fact that Julita Camerino served as your interpreter during the custodial
investigation after the arrest of the Thai National in the person of Suchinda Leangsiri?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. BORJA:
She was not there at any moment from March 31 to April 1, 1993 at the police headquarters or at
the Las Palmas Hotel?
A: I dont know that person, sir.

[66]

Her credibility is also questionable considering the fact that she herself has been previously convicted of violating
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision, dated August 31, 1993, and the Order, dated October 11, 1993, of the
RTC of Manila, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 93-118913 are AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.

226

PEOPLE VS BAULA
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132671. November 15, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISANTO BAULA, RUBEN BAULA, ROBERT BAULA
and DANILO DACUCOS, accused-appellants.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In an Information, dated 07 August 1996, accused-appellants were charged with murder before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The accusatory portions of the Information against the indictees
read:
"That on or about the 13th day of December 1995, in the evening, in barangay Sioasio West, Municipality of Sual,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a bolo (tabas), with abuse of superior
strength, treachery and evident premeditation and intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Patrocenia Caburao, inflicting upon her the following:
1. Hacking wound - 3 inches in length; 2 inches deep Rt. Occipital region (nape area) exposing brain tissue;
2. Hacking wound - 4 inches in length; 2 inches deep at mid occipital area exposing damage brain tissue;
3. Hacking wound - 4 inches in length; 1/2 inch deep facial area running across the Rt. Cheek and left cheek
including the nasal area;
4. Hacking wound - 2 inches in height; 1 inch deep at the vertex (top of the head);
5. Abrasion; confluent at the back area.
Cause of death - Brain tissue injury secondary to mortal wounds above which injuries directly caused her death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Patrocenia Caburao.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."

[1]

When arraigned, the accused all entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Trial shortly thereafter ensued.
The relevant facts and events that transpired, according to the prosecution, were briefly narrated in the
People's Brief.
On 13 December 1995, at around eight oclock in the evening, Jupiter Caburao, decided to follow his mother,
Patrocinia Caburao, who had earlier left their house at Barangay Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, to settle her due
obligations at a store, about one-and-a-half kilometers away, owned by a certain Brigida Tumamang. While
traversing the road towards the store, Jupiter noticed a commotion near the creek about ten meters away from
him. He focused his flashlight towards the direction where he heard the commotion and saw accused-appellants
Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a person who was lying on the ground, while accusedappellants Robert Baula and Ruben Baula stood as lookouts. The assault lasted for about four minutes. Accusedappellants fled but not before they had threatened Jupiter with death if he were to divulge the incident to
anyone. Jupiter went near the lifeless body of the victim who turned out to be his own mother. Her head and face

227

sustained four hacking wounds, two of which damaged her brain tissues. Jupiter rushed home and brought his
niece and nephew to the house of a neighbor for their safety. For fear of reprisal from accused-appellants and
believing that the police would be able to solve the gory killing on their own, Jupiter did not reveal the carnage to
either his relatives or the police.
About two o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1995, the police authorities, led by SPO4 Fermin Mirande,
[2]
went to the locus criminis, and took pictures of the body of the victim. The investigation revealed that before the
victim was killed, she had been to Brigida Tumamang's store; that accused-appellants were also at the store having
a drinking spree; that the victim left the store between seven o'clock and eight o'clock in the evening, and that,
fifteen minutes later, accused-appellants also left.
SPO4 Mirande, with several policemen, repaired to the respective houses of accused-appellants. The
policemen asked Ruben Baula and Crisanto Baula for the clothing they wore on the night of the murder. Ruben
Baula gave his bloodstained pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over his bloodstained polo shirt. The
policemen next went to the hut of Danilo Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group found hanging on the wall a
bloodstained bolo. The bloodstained pair of short pants, polo shirt and bolo, together with the victim's dried blood
[3]
[4]
samples, were sent on the same day to the National Bureau of Investigation, Dagupan City Branch Office, for
[5]
[6]
[7]
forensic examination. The results of the examination disclosed that the bloodstains found in the bolo, the
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
bloodstains on the polo shirt and the bloodstains on the pair of short pants had the same type "O" blood as
that of the victim.
The defense had another version of the incident.
Wilson Radovan, the barangay captain of Siwasiw, Sual, Pangasinan, testified that on 13 December 1995, at
around eight o'clock in the evening, while he and the other barangay officials were at their outpost, they heard the
cry of a woman asking for help. Rushing out, they saw Teofila Uson, a barangay mate, who told them that she and
Patrocinia Caburao were being pelted with stones. Teofila Uson said that it was too dark to be able to identify the
person who had attacked them. When the group proceeded to the place of the incident, they saw the lifeless body
of Patrocinia Caburao, beside the road, near the creek. Radovan testified that he did not notice any other person in
the place where the incident occurred. He requested Gene Macatiao, the son-in-law of the victim and one of those
who first arrived in the scene, to inform their relatives and the police.
Ruben Baula testified that in the morning of 13 December 1995, he, together with his co-accused and other
companions, namely, Pepito Ramos, Amber Pagudpod, Francis Amistad and Reny, were harvesting palay, at Sitio
Binabalian, Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, on the land being tenanted by Crisanto Baula. He recounted that
they were there until 4:55 in the afternoon at about which time Crisanto Baula invited the group to eat "merienda" in
the nearby canteen of Brigida Tumamang. He noticed that when they arrived at the store, there were three other
persons partaking of drinks. At about twilight, they left the store of Brigida Tumamang and proceeded to their
respective residences, leaving behind the three persons who continued with their drinking spree. At about three
o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1995, while he was asleep, four policemen and several barangay officials
arrived and asked him if he knew who had killed Patrocinia Caburao. Although he denied any knowledge about the
killing, the policemen, nevertheless, invited him to accompany them to the house of Robert Baula. Arriving thereat,
the policemen likewise questioned the latter about the killing of Patrocinia Caburao. Robert Baula, like his coaccused Ruben Baula, denied any knowledge of the killing. After the interrogation, the police authorities allowed
them to go. Ruben and Robert Baula both vehemently denied that the police ever took any clothing from them.
Accused-appellants, Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos, corroborated the testimony of their co-accused,
Ruben and Robert Baula, in its material points, claiming that in the morning of 13 December 1995, they went to
Sitio Binabalian to harvest palay; that in the afternoon, they took their merienda at the store of Brigida Tumamang;
and that, thereafter, they went home leaving behind the three persons still indulging in drinks at the store of Brigida
Tumamang.
The trial over, the court a quo rendered its judgment on 17 November 1997, convicting accused-appellants of
the crime charged; thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Danilo
Dacucos, Crisanto Baula, Ruben Baula and Robert Baula, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.

228

Pursuant thereto and in relation to Article 63, paragraph 2, No. 2 of the same code, all the aforenamed accused
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Patrocinia Caburao the following:
a. P50,000.00 for the death of Patrocinia Caburao;
b. P15,000.00 for funeral expenses;
c. moral damages of P75,000.00;
d. to pay proportionally the costs.
SO ORDERED."

[12]

Accused-appellants contend in the instant appeal that the trial court has erred (1) in giving full credence to the
belated eyewitness account of Jupiter Caburao ascribing to herein accused-appellants authorship of the crime, and
(2) in admitting in evidence the bolo, polo shirt, and short pants taken by the policemen from accused-appellants in
violation of their constitutional rights.
In convicting accused-appellants, the trial court found the explanation of Jupiter for his delay in reporting what
he knew of the gruesome killing not to be without valid reasons. After all, the court said, he was threatened and he
felt that the authorities could solve the crime even without revealing what he knew.
True, the rule has generally been that where the culpability or innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimony, the assessment made by the trial court thereover is
entitled to a great degree of respect and, absent strong justifications to the contrary, it will not be disturbed on
[13]
appeal. The reason is simple. A trial court gets an opportunity, not equally open to an appellate court, to observe
the expression of witnesses at the stand, including their demeanor under questioning, that makes up a most
significant factor in the proper evaluation of testimonial evidence. Obviously, however, this rule will not apply where
one judge hears the testimony of the witnesses and another judge pens the decision for, in such a case, the thesis
[14]
for the rule is not in the least extant.
[15]

[16]

In the case under review, such as in People vs. Capilitan and People vs. Villapana, the decision was
rendered by the judge who did not conduct the trial and hear the evidence. The Court in acquitting Capilitan of rape,
quoted with approval its previous pronouncement in Villapana similarly acquitting the accused therein, viz:
Additionally, we have to take note that in this case, the judge who heard the evidence for the prosecution is not the
same judge who decided the case. It was Judge Serafin Salvador who heard the testimonies of complainant and
her witness before his retirement. Whereas, it was Judge Romulo Quimbo who decided the case relying solely on
the transcripts of stenographic notes in appreciating Macaranas and her witness testimonies. Even as this Court
has consistently been guided by the precept that findings of trial courts on credibility of witnesses are accorded
great weight and must not be disturbed as it was the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses while they were testifying, this case should be an exception in view of the fact that the Judge who
decided the case is NOT the same judge who heard the evidence (see People vs. Escalante, et al., G.R. No. L371457, August 22, 1984, 131 SCRA 237). Thus, the Court should all the more exercise utmost care in evaluating
the evidence presented in the instant case so as to render justice not only to the accused, but also to the
[17]
complainant and the State as well.
Here, it was Judge Antonio M. Belen who heard the testimony given at the trial, but it was Judge Emilio V.
Angeles who wrote the decision, dated 17 November 1997, solely on the basis of the records of the case. Having
neither personally heard the testimony of the witnesses nor observed their deportment and manner of testifying, his
[18]
assessment on the credibility of witnesses would have to be received with caution on appeal.
Verily, it is not uncommon for a witness to show some reluctance about being immersed in a criminal
[19]
case. The natural reticence of most people to get involved is, in fact, of judicial notice. Thus, it is recognized
that the delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of witnesses
[20]
for, more often than not, such a delay can be satisfactorily explained.

229

In this instance, however, the Court cannot help but doubt as being highly suspect, the belated revelation of
Jupiter on the identity of the assailants. His claim that he did not immediately report the matter to the police relying
on a supposition that the crime could anyway be solved even without his own disclosure appears to be a bit
flimsy. Unlike previous cases where we have ruled otherwise, Jupiter is not just an innocent bystander but the son
of the victim. The raging passion and anger of a son who has just lost a mother in such a brutal manner would
have impelled him to immediately report the crime to the authorities even with an alleged threat upon his life.
It can be accepted that there is yet no real test or a hard and fast rule in ascertaining the truth of the testimony
of a witness to an accurate degree. Nevertheless, testimony that conforms to human knowledge, observation, and
experience is often deemed reliable and that which is repugnant to such standards belongs to the miraculous and
[21]
outside of judicial cognizance. The Court finds that Jupiter's response to the events is far from the natural
reaction of a son who has just witnessed the grisly murder of his own mother. What he has said to have done is
simply not in accord with human nature. With all the bitterness and indignation expected of a person similarly
situated, it is quite odd that he would keep the matter to himself and fail to disclose his knowledge of the crime to
the police authorities, or even to any of his relatives, despite his presence during their investigation of the case. His
belated declaration of the identity of his mother's assailants, some two months after the killing, can but accentuate
the difficulty that the Court would have to face if it were to rely almost completely on his testimony.
A careful reading of the records of this case additionally would reveal significant flaws in the testimony of
Jupiter.
Jupiter testified that he was able to recognize all the accused being barangaymates but failed to recognize the
victim because he was quite distant from the place where the assault took place. He remembered well the number
of times the accused Crisanto and Danilo had allegedly hacked the victim, yet, on further questioning by the trial
court, he could not tell which part of the body of the victim was struck. On direct examination, Jupiter would insist
that he approached the victim after the accused had fled. When asked by the court whether he went close to the
place of the incident, he answered in the negative, stating that he was shocked and frightened. Jupiter testified
that the incident had lasted for four minutes and that he focused his flashlight on the commotion four times, at
intervals of five seconds each, but, again, when queried by the court why he had waited for four minutes before
focusing his flashlight, Jupiter kept silent and did not answer the question.
It would seem unlikely that after Jupiter focused his flashlight on them, accused-appellants would continue
hacking the victim and for the two lookouts, who were supposed to precisely warn their co-accused of the presence
of witnesses, to simply do nothing about it. The most common response of persons committing a crime would be to
flee upon being discovered. Indeed, there should be greater reason for them to do so when that witness happened
to be the son of their victim.
Testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself which, by common experience and observation, could lead to the inference of at least its probability
[22]
under the circumstances. In a criminal prosecution the accused is confronted with the full might of state
[23]
authority. The evidence of the prosecution must thus be strong to pierce the shield of presumptive innocence.
Accused-appellants also take exception to the admissibility of the evidence consisting of the bloodstained
bolo, polo shirt and short pants arguing that, even on the assumption that these articles did belong to accusedappellants, their seizure without a valid warrant has violated their constitutional rights.
Admittedly, the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt and short pants were taken, sans any search warrant, from
accused-appellants Danilo Dacucos, Crisanto Baula and Ruben Baula, respectively, at a time when the police
started to question them about the killing of Patrocinia Caburao.
Section 2, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The above constitutional mandate is complemented by Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution providing that -

230

"Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding" [24]

a rule pronounced by the Court in Stonehill vs. Diokno. The plain import of the fundamental law is thus to say that
between the State and the people stands the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or
[25]
refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. The protection means that the State cannot simply intrude
indiscriminately into houses, or conduct search and seizure thereat or on the person of an individual, and it puts up
[26]
an almost impenetrable shield to protect privacy and accord sanctity against this unlawful form of restraint.
The above proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is not absolute, of course, and the Court
has had occasions to rule that a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid under certain
circumstances. There can, for instance, be a lawful warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rules 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; or seizure of evidence in "plain
[27]
[28]
view," its elements being extant; or search of a moving vehicle; or consented search; or customs
[29]
search. The situation here in question, however, can hardly come within the purview of any of the established
exceptions.
In a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest itself must have to be effected under the
circumstances enumerated by law. One such case is when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the
[30]
peace officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time that the subject articles were allegedly taken from
them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the investigation about the death of
Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police officers were thus likewise
barred from effecting a warrantless search and seizure.
SPO4 Fermin Mirande testified:
Fiscal:
Q. What have you found in the scene of the incident?
Witness:
A. We were able to see the bloodied body of Patrocinia Caburao, sir.
Court:
Q. Dead already?
Witness:
A. Yes, sir, due to multiple hack wounds.
Fiscal:
Q. What have you and your companions done there?
Witness:
A. Since at the time we arrived at the place, we did not immediately gather such evidence to pin point
any suspect. We tried our very best to conduct further investigation as to the place where this victim came
from and we were able to establish that she came at the place where at the place of one store, sir.
Court:
Q. Store of?
Witness:
A. I could no longer.....
Q. In Siwasiw?

231

A. Yes, sir. From that place, according to the information given by the owner of the store, nobody had seen
what is really happened to the victim, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Fiscal:
Q. After you proceeded to the store and you have gathered that information, what transpired next in that
store?
Witness:
A. Since there is an information that there were persons who were drinking at the said store, sir.
Court:
Q. Drinking wine you mean?
Witness:
A. Yes, sir. We exerted our efforts to look for these people, sir.
Fiscal:
Q. Have you ascertain the identities of the persons who were drinking at the store?
Witness:
A. The four (4) suspects were the four (4) accused now, Crisanto Baula, Danilo Dacocos, Ruben Baula and
Robert Baula and they were the one engaged in this drinking spree at the said place, sir.
Court:
Q. All the accused?
Witness:
A. And some other unidentified persons, sir.
Fiscal:
Q. After you ascertain the four (4) accused and some other which were not identified were the one have drunk
at the said store, what transpired next in your investigation?
Witness:
A. We tried to look for these persons, identified persons, sir.
Court:
Q. What happened?
Witness:
A. And we were able to locate them at their respective houses, sir.
Fiscal:
Q. Now, what transpired when you located the four (4) accused at their respective houses?
Witness:
A. We examined their persons if they are really drank at that time but the same no sign that they were
drank but we made on suspicion that one of the accused to where we requested to present his
clothes during the night that he wore during their engagement at the drinking spree in the store, sir.
Court:
Q. Who is this accused?

232

Witness:
A. I have not bring with me the record, sir.
Fiscal:
Q. Can you identify that suspect, if you can see him again?
Witness:
A. One of the Baulas, sir.
Q. How many Baulas?
A. Three (3), sir.
Q. Can you identify by his face?
Atty. Palma:
Already testified, he cannot.
Court:
Q. You look at the accused?
Witness:
A. So far, as of now, I could not exactly identify him, sir, but the moment I could see on my records, I have to
consult my record.
Q. What record?
A. The one presented our transmittal to the NBI, sir.
Q. NBI, Dagupan City?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Regarding what?
A. To determine as to whether the suspected bloodstains of the clothing that is of the victim, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Fiscal:
Q. Now, you said the clothing which you have requested from one of the accused Baula to give to you which
he wore that evening when there was drinking spree in the store, now, what part of the clothing was
stained with blood?
Witness:
A. I could no longer remember, sir.
Q. Now, what else have you done after you had requested this one of the accused Baula to present his
clothes wore at the night of the drinking spree?
A. One of the persons who were engaged in the drinking spree was Danilo Dacocos, sir. We tried to look for
him and we were able to see him at his hut almost one (1) kilometer away from the store, sir, and we were
able to see one (1) bolo which was hang on the wall of the hut.
Court:
Q. Was the bolo has bloodstained?
Witness:
A. There is again a suspected bloodstain, sir, and that cause us to turn over for examination to the NBI, sir.

233

Q. And this is one of the specimen you sent?

A. Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Fiscal:
Q. Now, tell us if there was occupants of this hut of Danilo Dacocos when you saw this bloodstain on
that bolo?
Witness:
A. At the time we discovered the bolo there is no occupant but he was the one living at the said hut, sir.
Q. Why do you know that it was Danilo Dacocos was the one living in that hut?
A. During the interview he admitted that he is living there, sir.
Q. Now, what transpired next after going to this hut of Danilo Dacocos?
A. We took the bolo and sent to the NBI, sir.

[31]

(Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the police officers acted on a mere suspicion that accused-appellants could be responsible for the
commission of the crime and only because of their being at the store where the victim was last seen.
Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause which signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
[32]
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he can be charged. An illegal search cannot be undertaken
[33]
and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that search.
The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short pants have been
voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the
[34]
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the
constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of
[35]
arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and all the accused-appellants are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and ordered to be immediately released from custody unless detained
for some other lawful reason. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

234

VEROY VS LAYAGUE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-95630 June 18, 1992

SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and MA. LUISA VEROY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. WILLIAM L. LAYAGUE, Presiding Judge, Branch XIV, Regional Trial Court at Davao City; and
BRIG. GEN. PANTALEON DUMLAO, Commanding General, PC-Criminal Investigation Service, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This was originally a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:certiorari,
to review the Order of the respondent Judge dated October 2, 1990 denying herein petitioner's Motion for Hospital
Confinement; mandamus, to compel respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' long pending motion for bail; and
prohibition, to enjoin further proceedings on the ground that the legal basis therefore is unconstitutional for being
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village. Catalunan
Grande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the
Social Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias,
Quezon City, where they are presently residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to
two (2) houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises.
The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other
expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to
the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of
an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms
were retained by herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house.
On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP, acting upon a directive issued by
Metrodiscom Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of herein petitioners in Davao City on information
that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the
help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search
warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask
permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center
of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but
relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP,
Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. The authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was relayed by
Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by telephone on the
matter and that the permission was given on the condition that the search be conducted in his presence.
The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in Skyline Village to
conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their
entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen.
However, a locksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading

235

to the children's room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the
search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black
clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP
(samples of which were attached as Annexes "H" and "H-1" of the petition) (Rollo, pp. 49-55) were also found in the
children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing
assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2)
pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book
entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag
containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was
instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of the articles seized, in the house (Annex "F" of the
Petition, Rollo, p. 48). Said receipt was signed by Eric Burgos, one of the caretakers, and George Badiang, the
locksmith, as witnesses. Sgt. Justalero turned over the articles to Sgt. Rodolfo Urbano at the police station.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada who
was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the Department of Justice through Department
Order No. 88 dated May 16, 1990. In a resolution dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing
of an information against herein petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion) (Annex "L" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 71). Hence, on August
8, 1990. an Information for the said offense was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 20595-90 and
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Atty. Leopoldo Veroy and Mrs. Maria Luisa Veroy" (Annex "K" of the
Petition,Rollo, p. 70). No bail was recommended by the prosecution.
The aforementioned resolution dated August 6, 1990 of Fiscal Ponferrada was received by the petitioners on
August 13, 1990. On the same day, the latter filed a Motion for Bail before herein respondent Judge Layague which
was denied on August 17, 1990 for being premature since at that time, petitioners had not yet been arrested.
Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them, herein petitioners voluntarily
surrendered themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since it was the CIS that initiated the
complaint. However, the latter refused to receive them on the ground that his office has not yet received copies of
their warrants of arrest.
In the meantime, on August 15, 1990, herein petitioners were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for various
ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal complaint. On
August 17, 1990, Brig. Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and
placed under guard thereat.
In an Indorsement dated August 20, 1990, the CIS through Capt. Benjamin de los Santos, made its return to the
trial court informing the latter of the voluntary surrender of herein petitioners and the fact that they were under
hospital confinement. Herein Petitioner reiterated their Motion for Bail. In an Order dated August 24, 1990 (Annex
"M" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 74), the hearing for the Motion for Ball was set for August 31, 1990 to enable the
prosecution to present evidence it opposition to said motion. The prosecution filed its written opposition (Annex "N"
of the Petition, Rollo, p. 75) on August 28, 1990, arguing that the evidence of petitioners' guilt was strong and
thereafter presented its evidence.
On September 21, 1990, respondent Judge required the CIS to produce the bodies of herein petitioners on October
1, 1990 for arraignment (Annex "O" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 76). Upon their arraignment, herein Petitioners entered
a plea of not guilty and filed an "Urgent Motion for Hospital Confinement" (Annex "OO" of the Petition Rollo, p. 77)
which was denied by the court in its Order dated October 2, 1990 (Annex "P" of the Petition,Rollo, p. 80). It likewise
ordered their commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center, Ma-a, Davao City pending trial on the merits.
Herein petitioners argued orally a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the prosecution. At the
conclusion thereof, the court a quo issued a second order annex "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 83) denying then
motion for reconsideration and as to the alternative prayer to reopen the motion for hospital confinement, set the
continuance thereof to October 17, 1990. It was further ordered that the petitioners shall remain under the custody
of the PC-CIS pending resolution of the case.
Meanwhile, petitioners were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their physical condition remained erratic. On
or about October 18, 1990, herein petitioners were informed that Brig. Gen. Dumlao had issued a directive for their

236

transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the October 2, 1990 Order (Annex "Q" of the
Petition, Rollo, p. 83). Petitioners made representations that the tenor of the court order warranted maintenance of
the status quo, i.e., they were to continue their hospital confinement. However, Brig, Gen. Dumlao informed them
that unless otherwise restrained by the court, they would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of the trial
court.
Hence, this petition on October 25, 1990 this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, effective immediately
and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering: (a) respondent Hon. William L. Layague to refrain from
further proceeding with petitioners' "Motion for Hospital Confinement" in Criminal Case No. 20595-90 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo Veroy and Ma. Luisa Veroy"; and (b) respondent Brig. Gen. Pantaleon
Dumlao to refrain from transferring petitioners from the St. Luke's Hospital (Rollo, pp. 84-A to 84-C).
On November 2, 1990, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' Motion for Bail (Annex "A" of the
Second Supplemental Petition, Rollo, p. 133). Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition on November 7, 1990
(Rollo, P. 105) and a Second Supplemental Petition on November 16, 1990 (Rollo, p. 120) which sought to review
the order of the trial court dated November 2, 1990 denying their petition for bail.
Acting on the Supplemental Petition filed by Petitioners and taking into consideration several factors such as: a)
that the possibility that they will flee or evade the processes of the court is fairly remote; b) their poor medical
condition; and c) the matters in their Second Supplemental Petition especially since the prosecution's evidence
refers to constructive possession of the disputed firearms in Davao City through the two (2) caretakers while
petitioners lived in Manila since 1988, this Court, on November 20, 1990, granted petitioners' provisional liberty and
set the bail bond at P20,000.00 each (Rollo, p. 141). Petitioners posted a cash bond in the said amount on
November 23, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 143-145).
The petition was given due course on July 16, 1991 (Rollo, p. 211). Respondents adopted their Comment dated
December 28, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 182-191) as their Memorandum while, petitioners filed their Memorandum on
September 9, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 218-269).
As submitted by the respondents, and accepted by petitioners, the petition for mandamus to compel respondent
Judge to resolve petitioners' Motion for Bail, and the petition for certiorari to review the order of respondent judge
initially denying their Motion for Hospital Confinement, were rendered moot and academic by the resolutions of this
Court dated November 20, 1990 and October 25, 1990, respectively. What remains to be resolved is the petition for
prohibition where petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution;
2. Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 6968;
3. Assuming the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1866 the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in admitting in evidence certain articles which were clearly inadmissible for being
violative of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case of Misolas v. Panga,
G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that the declaration of unconstitutionality
of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill
of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy.
Likewise, petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft of
merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or
ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and
where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction (Provincial Board of Cebu v. Presiding
Judge of Cebu, CFI, Br. IV, G.R. No. 34695, March 7, 1989 [171 SCRA 1]). A perusal of the aforementioned laws
would reveal that the legislature provided for two (2) distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms under

237

Presidential Decree No. 1866; and (2) rebellion, coup d' etat, sedition and disloyalty under Republic Act 6968;
evidently involving different subjects which were not clearly shown to have eliminated the others.
But petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in general or vague terms. The
terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various interpretations such that there is no
definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of
constructive possession should be applied. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and
ammunitions. They were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being
charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein the items were
found belongs to them (Memorandum for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 242-244).
Otherwise stated, other than their ownership of the house in Skyline Village, there was no other evidence
whatsoever that herein petitioners possessed or had in their control the items seized (Ibid., pp. 248-250). Neither
was it shown that they had the intention to possess the Firearms or to further rebellion (Ibid., P. 252).
In a similar case, the revolver in question was found in appellant's store and the question arouse whether he had
possession or custody of it within the meaning of the law.
This Court held that:
The animus possidendi must be proved in opium cases where the prohibited drug was found on the
premises of the accused and the same rule is applicable to the possession of firearms. The
appellant denied all knowledge of the existence of the revolver, and the Government's principal
witness stated that there were a number of employees in the store. The only testimony which tends
to show that the appellant had the possession or custody of this revolver is the inference drawn
from the fact that it was found in his store, but we think that this inference is overcome by the
positive testimony of the appellant, when considered with the fact that there were a number of
employees in the store, who, of course, could have placed the revolver in the secret place where it
was found without the knowledge of the appellant. At least there is a very serious doubt whether he
knew of the existence of this revolver. In such case the doubt must be resolved in favor of the
appellant. (U.S. v. Jose and Tan Bo., 34 Phil. 724 [1916])
But more importantly, petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the
door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel"
soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The
items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are
inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that
searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized
exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is
that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was
able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners
were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in
entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed
granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the
circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.

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In a number of cases decided by this Court, (Guazon v. De Villa, supra.; People v. Aminnudin, G.R. No. L-74869,
July 6, 1988 [163 SCRA 402]; Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987 [151 SCRA 279]), warrantless
searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a
search Warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the
criminal actions subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants (People v. Cendana, G.R. No. 84715,
October 17, 1990 [190 SCRA 538]).
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject
thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense
may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the
rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are
therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the
criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]).
Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal
intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there isno crime.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal
possession of firearms is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

239

DE GARCIA VS LOCSIN
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45950

June 20, 1938

LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, petitioner,

vs.
DIEGO LOCSIN, Judge of First Instance of Tarlac,
FELIX IMPERIAL, Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, and the ANTI-USURY BOARD, respondents.
Benigo S. Aquino and Marcial P. Lichauco for petitioner
Adolfo N. Feliciano for the respondent Anti-Usury Board.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant and two orders of the
respondent judge, and the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the
Anti-Usuary Board.
It appears that on November 10, 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the
justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant(Exhibit B) commanding any officer of the law to search the
person, house or store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and
other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said
Almeda "that he has and there (is) just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de
Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria, Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts,
documents, and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in such cases
made and provided." On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine
Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the
petitioner's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who was ill and confined at the
time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several
Papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers and
documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned
over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, six separate
criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure,
the petitioner, through counsel, demanded from the respondent Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents
seized. On January 7. and, by motion, on June 4, 1937, the legality of the search warrant was challenged by
counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution of
October 5, 1937, the respondent Judge of First Instance denied the petitioner's motion of June 4 for the reason that
though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. "En el caso
presente," declared the respondent judge, "teniendo en cuenta que la acusada Por si o por medio de su
representante, no presento protests alguna contra el registro de autos, at verificarse el mismo, o despues de un
tiempo rezonable, el juzgado declare que la citada con su silencio y conducta, ha renunciado implicitanmente a su
derecho a no ser sometido a un registro irrazonable, por lo que no le es pemitido quejarse despues, puesto que
cualquier defecto queha adolecido lo expedicion de la orden de registro y su ejecucion, ha quidado implilcitamente
subsanado." A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order of January 3, 1938. Petitioner
registered her exception. The resolution of October 5, 1937 and the order of January 3, 1938 are sought, together
with the search warrant, Exhibit B, to be nullified in these proceedings.
Paragraph 3, section 1 of the bill of right of our Constitution provides as follows:

240

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to be valid,
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not
by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. These requirements are
complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure (G. O. No. 58), particularly with reference to the duration of the
validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the
corresponding court (secs. 102-104). On more than one occasion, since the approval of the Constitution, we had
emphasized the necessity of adherence to the constitutional requirements on this subject (Alvarez vs. Court of First
Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board [1937], 35 Off. Gaz., 1183; People vs. Sy Juco [1937], G.R. No. 41957;
Rodriguez vs. Villamiel [1937], G.R. No. 44328; and Molo vs. Yatco [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1935) and we do not
deem it necessary to reiterate what has been said or observed in these cases.
In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant.
All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It
does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the
properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within
the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required
by law. (See, secs. 95 and 104, G. O. No. 58.) instead, they were turned over to the respondent provincial fiscal
and used by him in building up cases against the petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued
there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration
purposes is not without basis. The lower court is, therefore, correct in reaching the conclusion that the search
warrant (Exhibit B) was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac.
The important question presented is whether upon the facts and under the circumstances of the present case, there
has been a waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures.
While the Solicitor-General admits that, in the light of decisions of this court, the search warrant was illegally issued,
he maintains "(1) that the petitioner had waived her constitutional right by her acquiescence after the search and
seizure, and (2) that the application for the return of the documents illegally seized was made after an
unreasonable length of time after the date of seizure." Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. (People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 34 Off. Gaz., pp.
2163, 2164; 56 C.J., pp. 1178, 1179; Cf. Rodriguez vs. Villamiel, supra.) The waiver may be either express or
implied (67 C.J., p. 304). No express waiver has been made in the case before us. It is urged, however, that there
has been a waiver by implication. It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear,
first, that the right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (67 C. J., 299.) It
is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She could not have objected
because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly, the
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her
behalf. (56 C. J., p. 1183.) Of course, the petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and
documents. But this was precisely the reason why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usuary Board to
demand the return of the documents seized. In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and her
bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional
right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of the law. (Const. Lim., 8th ed., Vol., I, p.
630.) As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place
the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181.)
As a general proposition, it may be admitted that waiver may be the result of a failure to object within a reasonable
time to a search and seizure illegally made. It must be observed, however, that the petitioner, on several occasions,
and prior to the filing of criminal actions against her, had demanded verbally, through counsel, the return by the

241

Anti-Usuary Board of the properties seized. This is admitted by Adolfo N. Feliciano, acting chief of the board, who
said that the demand was refused simply because no habiamos terminado con nuestra investigacion. (T.s.n., pp.
24-25.) On July 7, 1936, counsel for the petitioner wrote a letter to the Anti-Usuary Board demanding again the
return of the documents withheld. And in connection with the criminal cases pending against the petitioner, similar
demands were made on January 7, 1937 and on June 4, 1937. In the light of these circumstances, we find that the
petitioner did not waive her constitutional right. The delay in making demand for the return of the documents seized
is not such as to result in waiver by implication.
In view of the foregoing, the writ prayed for is granted. The search warrant, Exhibit B, is hereby declared void and
of no effect; the orders of October 5, 1937 and January 3, 1938 of the respondent judge are set aside; and the
respondents Anti-Usuary Board and the provincial fiscal of Tarlac or those acting in their behalf, are hereby ordered
to return and restore to the petitioner all the properties, documents, papers and effects illegally seized from her,
within forty-eight (48) hours from the time this decision becomes final. Without costs. So ordered.

242

ROLDAN JR VS ARCA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975

HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner, Philippine Fisheries
Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch 1)
and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for petitioners.
J. C. Yuseco and A.R. Narvasa for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing his
order dated October 18, 1965, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction thereunder issued.
On April 3, 1964, respondent company filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a civil case docketed as No.
56701 against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex
VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries
Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
On April 10, 1964, respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with respondent court,
but said prayer was, however, denied.
On April 28, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila set aside its order of April 10, 1964 and granted respondent
company's motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, respondent company took
Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by virtue of the abovesaid writ.
On December 10, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Civil Case No. 56701 for failure of therein
petitioner (respondent company herein) to prosecute as well as for failure of therein defendants (petitioners
herein)to appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however, remained in
the possession of respondent company.
On July 20, 1965, petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex
VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions
of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with
dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels.
On August 18, 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges
against the crew members of the fishing vessels.

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On September 30, 1965, there were filed in the court of First Instance of Palawan a couple of informations, one
against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI both for
violations of Act No. 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with
the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as
instruments and therefore evidence of the crime (p. 54, rec.), and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the
vessels (p. 56, rec.).
On October 2 and 4, likewise, the Court of First Instance of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats
in custody.
On October 2, 1965, respondent company filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 62799 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against herein petitioners. Among
others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in
legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated September
13, 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of
the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled.
On October 9, 1965, petitioners, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the above-mentioned complaint,
alleging among others, that: (1) the issuance of the writ would disrupt the status quo of the parties and would
render nugatory any decision of the respondent court favorable to the defendant; (2) that the vessels, being
instruments of a crime in criminal cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, the
release of the vessels sans the corresponding order from the above-mentioned court would deprive the same of its
authority to dispose of the vessels in the criminal cases and the Provincial Fiscal would not be able to utilize said
vessels as evidence in the prosecution of said cases; (3) that as petitioners herein were in possession of one of the
vessels in point, they cannot now be deprived of the legal custody thereof by reason of the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 56701; (4) that petitioner Fisheries Commissioner has the power to seize and detain the vessels pursuant to
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3215 in relation to Sections 903 and 2210 of the Revised Tariff and Customs Code;
(5) that respondents herein have not exhausted administrative remedies before coming to court; (6) that the
compromise agreement approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and indorsed to the
Fisheries Commissioner is never a bar to the prosecution of the crime perpetrated by the crew members of the
vessels belonging to respondent company.
And again, on October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed their memorandum praying for the denial of the application
for preliminary mandatory injunction. On the same day, October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed an urgent motion
to submit additional documentary evidence.
On October 18, 1965, herein petitioners, as defendants in said Civil Case No. 62799, filed their answer to the
complaint with affirmative defenses, reiterating the grounds in their opposition to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and adding that herein private respondent admitted committing the last violation
when it offered in its letter dated September 21, 1965 to the Acting Commissioner of Fisheries, to compromise said
last violation (Exh. 12, pp. 60-61, rec.).
On said day, October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge issued the challenged order granting the issuance of the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by private respondent of a bond
of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels(pp. 95-102, rec.).
On October 19, 1965, herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ
on October 18, 1965 on the ground, among others, that on October 18, 1965 the Philippine Navy received from the
Palawan Court of First Instance two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the
fishing boats in custody and directing that the said vessels should not be released until further orders from the
Court, and that the bond of P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the two
vessels, which are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach of the Government, thus frustrating their
forfeiture as instruments of the crime (pp. 103-109, rec.).1wph1.t
On November 23, 1965, respondent Judge denied the said motion for reconsideration (p. 110, rec.).

244

WE rule that the respondent Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion when he issued on October 18, 1965 the order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and when he refused to reconsider the same.
I
When the respondent Judge issued the challenged order on October 18, 1965 and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction pursuant thereto, the fishing vessels were already under the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Palawan by virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4, 1965, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal (pp. 54,
55, rec.), directing the Philippine Navy to detain (pp. 108, 109, rec.) said vessels, which are subject to forfeiture as
instruments of the crime, to be utilized as evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 for illegal fishing
pending in said court (pp. 54-55, rec.). The said vessels were seized while engaging in prohibited fishing within the
territorial waters of Palawan (pp. 45, 48,-53, rec.) and hence within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Palawan, in obedience to the rule that "the place where a criminal offense was committed not only determines the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction"(Lopez vs. Paras, L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA
616, 619). The jurisdiction over the vessels acquired by the Palawan Court of First Instance cannot be interfered
with by another Court of First Instance. The orders of October 2 and 4, 1965 by the Palawan Court of First Instance
expressly direct the Philippine Navy "to hold in custody" the two vessels and that "same should not be released
without prior order or authority from this Court" (pp. 108, 109, rec.). Only the Palawan court can order the release of
the two vessels. Not even the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources nor the Fisheries Commissioner can
direct that the fishing boats be turned over to private respondent without risking contempt of court.
The grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge was heightened by the fact that he did not
reconsider his order of October 18, 1965 after he was informed by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration
filed on October 19, 1965 that the Palawan Court of First Instance had already issued the two orders dated October
2 and 4, 1965 directing the Philippine Navy to hold in custody the fishing boats until further orders.
It is basic that one court cannot interfere with the judgments, orders or decrees of another court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction; because if coordinate courts were
allowed to interfere with each other's judgments, decrees or injunctions, the same would obviously lead to
confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of justice (Ongsinco, etc. vs. Tan, et al., 97 Phil. 330; PNB
vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525; Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Company, 92 Phil. 25; Hubahib vs. Insular Drug
Company, 64 Phil. 119; Hacbang, et al. vs. The Leyte Auto Bus Company, et al., G.R. No. L-17907, May 30, 1963,
8 SCRA, 103, 107-109; NPC vs. Hon. Jesus de Vera, G.R. No. L-15763, Dec. 22, 1961, 3 SCRA, 646, 648;
Cabigao vs. del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Araneta & Uy vs. Commonwealth Insurance Company, 55 OG 431; Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. III, 1970 ed., p. 64).
As early as October 2 and 4, 1965, the two boats were already in custodia legis under the sole control of the
Palawan Court of First Instance. The Manila Court of First Instance cannot interfere with and change that
possession (Hacbang vs. Leyte Bus Co., Inc., supra; NPC vs. Hon. Jesus de Vera, supra).
It is immaterial that the vessels were then in the Philippine Navy basin in Manila; for the same in no way impugns
the jurisdiction already vested in the Palawan court, which has custody thereof through the Philippine Navy. This is
analogous to the situation in Colmenares versus Villar (L-27124, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186, 188-9), wherein We
ruled "where the illegal possession of firearms was committed in the town where the Court sits, the fact that the
firearms were confiscated from the accused in another town does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court" (pp. 186,
189).
It is likewise of no moment that the herein respondents were not notified by the herein petitioners of the seizure of
the questioned vessels by the Philippine Navy, because such previous notice is not required by law.
II
The dismissal on December 10, 1964 of the first Civil Case No. 56701 by the Court of First Instance of Manila had
the necessary effect of automatically dissolving the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued therein on April
28, 1964, directing the return of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (pp. 156-157, rec.). Such a preliminary writ, like any
other interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it was but an incident; because "an ancillary writ of

245

preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the dismissal of the main petition" (National Sugar Workers'
Union, etc., vs. La Carlota Sugar Central, et al., L-23569, May 25, 1972, 45 SCRA 104, 109; Lazaro vs. Mariano,
59 Phil. 6Z7, 631; Saavedra vs. Ibaez, 56 Phil. 33, 37; Hi Caiji vs. Phil. Sugar Estate and Development Company,
50 Phil. 592, 594).1wph1.t
Moreover, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 28, 1964 in Civil Case No. 56701 was directed against
the detention of the vessel Tony Lex VI for violations committed prior to August 5, 1965, and therefore cannot and
does not extend to the seizure and detention of said vessel for violations on August 5 or 6, 1965, which violations
were not and could not possibly be the subject-matter of said Civil Case No. 56701 which was filed on April 3, 1964
(p. 12, rec.).
III
Herein petitioners can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of private respondent for illegal fishing
by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512 approved on March 20, 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to carry
out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, to make
searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives in accordance with the Rules of
Court, of "explosives such as ... dynamites and the like ...; including fishery products, fishing equipment, tackle and
other things that are subject to seizure under existing fishery laws"; and "to effectively implement the enforcement
of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing."
Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in the Philippine
Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau of Customs,
Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters ..."
Section 12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing with
dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor
more than P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6) months nor more than five (5)
years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats, tackles, apparel, furniture, and other
apparatus used in fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act." Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law provides
that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited
to the Government."
The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession and/or finding, of dynamite, blasting caps
and other explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption that the said dynamite and/or blasting
capsand explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and that the possession or
discovery in any fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives, under expert
testimony, shall constitute a presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat, or the fishing crew have been
fishing with dynamite or other explosives." (Emphasis supplied).
Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea
fishery without the corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other
order or regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not more than
P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court;Provided, That in
case of an association or corporation, the President or manager shall be directly responsible for the acts of his
employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his knowledge; otherwise the responsibility shall
extend only as far as fine is concerned: Provided, further, That in the absence of a known owner of the vessel, the
master, patron or person in charge of such vessel shall be responsible for any violation of this Act: and Provided,
finally, That in case of a second offense, the vessel together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be
forfeited to the Government" (Emphasis supplied).
Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 389 of December 23, 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the function, among others, "to assist the proper governmental agencies in the
enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to ... fishing ..." (46 OG 5905, 5911).

246

Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No. 34 of October 27, 1972, authorized any
official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of the Code, to search and seize any vessel or air
craft as well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to search any person on board for any breach or
violation of the customs and tariff laws.
When the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the
fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these
vessels were found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs Code
and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing with explosives and
without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law (pp. 46-47, rec.).1wph1.t
The operation of the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended pursuant to the order dated January 28, 1964 issued
by the Commissioner of Fisheries pending the final determination of the case against it for illegal fishing with
explosives on January 21, 1964 (p. 34, rec.) and remained suspended until its apprehension on August 5 or 6,
1965 (p. 46, rec.).
For illegal fishing with explosives on March 23, 1963, the renewal of the fishing boat license of Tony Lex VI was
suspended for one year from the time said boat was moored at Pier 14 at North Harbor, Manila, without prejudice to
the institution of a criminal case against its owner and/or operator, pursuant to the order dated May 19, 1964 issued
by the Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. 35-36, rec.), the motion for reconsideration of which order was denied by the
Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated August 17, 1964 (pp. 41-42, rec.).
For illegal fishing with dynamite on March 28, 1963, the operation of Tony Lex VI was suspended by the
Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated April 1, 1963 (p. 62, rec.).
For illegal fishing again with explosives on April 25, 1963, the fishing boat Tony Lex VI together with its tackle,
apparel, furniture and all other apparatus used in fishing was ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government and a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was imposed on its owners-operators, without prejudice to the
filing of the necessary criminal action, pursuant to the order of June 2, 1964 of the Commissioner of Fisheries(pp.
37-38, rec.).
Again, for comitting the same violation on June 19, 1963, a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was imposed on the
owners-operators of fishing boat Tony Lex VI pursuant to the order of June 4, 1964 issued by the Commissioner of
Fisheries (pp. 39-40, rec.)..
It appears, therefore, that since January 28, 1964, the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended from operating and
was ordered moored at Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila (pp. 34, 46-47, rec.); and that the fishing vessel Tony Lex VI
was suspended for one year from May 24, 1964 and was actually ordered forfeited to the Government pursuant to
the order of June 2, 1964 for repeated violations of Section 12 of the Fisheries Act (pp. 37- 38. rec.).1wph1.tAs
a matter of fact, when apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965, both vessels were found to be without any license or
permit for coastwise trade or for fishing and unlawfully fishing with explosives, for which reason their owners and
crew were accordingly indicted by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan for illegal fishing with dynamite and without the
requisite license (pp. 48-53, rec.).
As heretofore intimated, the two fishing boats were apprehended on numerous occasions for fishing with dynamite
from March 28, 1963 to March 11, 1964, which violations private respondent, as owner-operator, sought to
compromise by offering to pay a fine of P21,000.00 for all said prior violations.
Such previous violations of Sections 12, 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Act committed by the two fishing boats, Tony
Lex III and Tony Lex VI, from March 28, 1963 until August 5 or 6, 1965, rendered the said vessels subject to
forfeiture under Sections 76 and 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs laws have been
the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be
secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be

247

constitutionally effected (Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857, 871-74; Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80
Phil. 770, 774; Caroll vs. U.S. 267, pp. 132, 149, 158; Justice Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 225;
Gonzales, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1966 ed., p. 300).
The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually
equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.
Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure, is a search
or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest (Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637; Justice Fernando, The Bill of Rights,
1972 ed., p. 224). Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a
person (a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is
reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who
has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of
his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court). In
the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite
and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is
lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an
incident to a lawful arrest.
The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 13, 1965
(pp. 63-64, 158-159, rec.) cannot be invoked by the respondents because the said compromise referred to about
thirty violations of the fisheries law committed by the private respondent from March 28, 1963 to March 11, 1964.
The violations by the two vessels of private respondent by reason of which these vessels were apprehended and
detained by the Philippine Navy upon request of the Commissioner of Fisheries, were committed on August 5 or 6,
1965.
Moreover, the power to compromise would exist only before a criminal prosecution is instituted; otherwise the
Department Secretary or any of his sub-alterns can render criminal prosecutions for violations of the fisheries law a
mere mockery. It is not in the public interest nor is it good policy to sustain the viewpoint that the Department
Secretary can compromise criminal cases involving public, not private, offenses after the indictment had been
instituted in court. The fishing vessels together with all their equipment and the dynamites found therein are not
only evidence of the crime of illegal fishing but also subject to forfeiture in favor of the Government as instruments
of the crime (Art. 45, Revised Penal Code, Sec. 78, Act No. 4003, as amended). Section 80(j) of Act No. 4003, as
amended, precludes such a compromise the moment the Fisheries Commissioner decides to prosecute the
criminal action in accordance with Sections 76 and 78 of the other penal provisions of the fisheries law.
Furthermore, any compromise shall be upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission (Section 80[i], Act
No. 4003), which did not recommend such a compromise for the violation on August 5 or 6, 1965 of Section 12 in
relation to Sections 76 and 78 of Act No. 4003, as amended. On the contrary, the Fisheries Commissioner
requested the Provincial Fiscal to institute the criminal cases (pp. 43-45, rec.) and the Provincial Fiscal filed the
corresponding informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 on September 30, 1965 against the
owners and the members of the crew of the vessels (pp. 48-53, rec.).
It should be noted that in the first indorsement dated September 13, 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources approving the compromise fine of P21,000.00 for the various violations committed previous to
August 5 or 6, 1965 (pp. 34-42, 47, 58-64, 149-155, 158-159, rec.), the Department Secretary "believes that the
offer made by the company was an implied admission of violations of said provisions of the Fisheries Law and
regulations, ..." (pp. 63, 158, rec.). The said approval was granted after the private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the indorsement dated March 5, 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
disapproving the offer by private respondent to pay the fine by way of compromise.
There can be no dispute that the term fishing boat (employed in the second paragraph of Section 12 of the
Fisheries Act applies to the vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. Even private respondent refers to said fishing
boats as fishing vessels "engaged in fishing operations" or "in commercial fishing" in paragraph IV of its complaint
in Civil Case No. 62799 (p. 18, rec.), as well as in its various communications to the Fisheries Commissioner (pp.
60-61, 65, 82, rec.).1wph1.t The two fishing vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI likewise fall under the
term vessel used in Sections 17, 76 and 78, as well as the term boats utilized in the second paragraph of Section
76 of the Fisheries Act. They can also fall under the term fishing equipment employed in Section 4 of Republic Act

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No. 3512; because a fishing equipment is never complete and cannot be effectively used in off-shore or deep-sea
fishing without the fishing boat or fishing vessel itself. And these two vessels of private respondent certainly come
under the term fishing vessels employed in paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 creating the
Fisheries Commission.
Hence, no useful purpose can be served in trying to distinguish between boat and vessel with reference to Tony
Lex III and Tony Lex VI. As a matter of fact, the accepted definition of vessel includes "every description of water
craft, large or small, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water" (Cope versus Vallete,
etc., 199 U.S. 625; U.S. vs. Holmes, 104 Fed. 884; Charles Barnes Co. vs. One Dredge Boat, 169 Fed. 895; and
Yu Con vs. Ipil, 41 Phil. 780).
The word boat in its ordinary sense, means any water craft (Monongahela River Construction, etc. vs. Hardsaw, 77
NE 363, 365). The fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI are likewise vessels within the meaning of the
term vessel used in Sections 903 and 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED
OCTOBER 18, 1965, THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREUNDER AND
THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 23, 1965, ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID, WITH COSTS
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

249

PEOPLE VS DAMASO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93516 August 12, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y
Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric
Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz (Records, p. 3). Such information was
later amended to exclude all the above-enumerated persons except the accused-appellant from the criminal
charge. The amended information reads:
That an or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Basilio DAMASO @
Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935 with
magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) live ammunition, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of subversion, filed against said accused in the above-entitled case for Violation of
Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive Order No. 276.
Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866. (Records, p. 20)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged (Records, p. 37). Trial on the
merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accusedappellant interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being
hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant. On these bases, he, thereafter, manifested
that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused (TSN, December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17, 1990,
the trial court rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka
Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866, and
considering that the Violation is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion, pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.

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The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition and all the articles and/or
items seized on June 19, 1988 in connection with this case and marked and submitted in court as
evidence are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, the same to be turned
over to the Philippine Constabulary Command at Lingayen, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE
CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS
DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY WERE DECLARED
INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE SAME COURT AND THE
SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED BY ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION AGAINST HIM
ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN FURTHERANCE OF
OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION. (pp. 55-66, Rollo)
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the
152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the
presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said
place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and
Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an
underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the
Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found
subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October
23, 1989).
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the
rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested.
They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she
worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by
appellant. When they reached the house, the group found that it had already been vacated by the
occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Bernie Mendoza, the group
looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented
by appellant. The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house,
the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a
member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested
the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay
Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine.
They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa,
Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested
the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the
rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and

251

other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final
inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for
investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the
items confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn, October 31, 1989). (p. 5,
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 91, Rollo)
While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against lawless elements in our society,
We must, however, stress that the latter's efforts to this end must be done within the parameters of the law. In the
case at bar, not only did We find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining
evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented against him is weak to justify
conviction.
We reverse.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole violator of P.D. No. 1866, in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credible
evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the
M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. The prosecution presented two
witnesses who attested to this fact, thus:
Lieutenant Candito Quijardo
Fiscal
Q How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the house?
A He was not around at that time, but according to Luz (Tanciangco) who
mentioned the name Bernie Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house and
at the same time claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza who owns the said items.
(TSN of October 31, 1989, p. 40)
xxx xxx xxx
Q I am showing you another picture which we request to be marked as Exhibit "K2," tell us if it has any connection to the house?
A The same house, sir.
Q Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied the house at Bonuan
Gueset, by the name of Bernie Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did
you find out the identity?
A I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de Guzman.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who could tell the true
identity of Bernie Mendoza?
A The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.
Q Can you name these officers?
A Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt. Federico Castro. (ibid, pp.
54-55)
M/Sqt. Artemio Gomez

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Q That underground house, do you know who was the principal occupant of that
house?
xxx xxx xxx
A During our conversation with the occupants, they revealed that a certain Ka
Bernie is the one occupying the house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso.
. . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)
Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own
personal knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same
are admissible because of the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one should
not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In People vs. Valero, We emphatically
declared that:
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like
hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for
the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection
may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative
value.
(L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675, emphasis supplied)
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who knew the appellant as
the lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could have exercised his constitutional
right to confront the witnesses and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records do
not show any other evidence which could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the house and the
owner of the subversive items. To give probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the
appellant on this basis alone would be to render his constitutional rights useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will
not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and
seizure proceedings.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2). The
purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the
sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646). However, such right is not absolute.
There are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an
arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L58889, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these exceptions is present in this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered the appellant's house upon
invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados, helper of the appellant; that when Luz Tanciangco opened
one of the rooms, they saw a copier machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, radio set and more
subversive items; that technically speaking, there was no search as the group was voluntarily shown the articles
used in subversion; that besides, a search may be validly conducted without search warrant with the consent of the
person searched in this case, appellant's helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the
appellant's house; and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the same may be seized
without a warrant.

253

We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do
so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant
was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to
enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We Find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was
indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to
open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority.
Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality.
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil.
230, 235). As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if
the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant.
But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to the house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p.
7, Records), does not grant them the license to go inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They
knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before
making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited
away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There
was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all
the menace of a military invasion. (G.R. No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the identification of the
gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was
described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial number
thus:
FISCAL
Q Will you kindly restate again the items that you found inside the house?
Lt. Quijardo:
A When she opened the doors of the rooms that we requested for, we immediately
saw different kinds of books of which we believed to be used for subversive
orientation and the M-14 rifle.
Q In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle which you mentioned?
A In the same room of which the subversive documents were placed.
Q If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able to identify the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a rifle bearing a serial number 1249985 which for purposes
of identification, may we request your Honor, that this rifle be marked as Exhibit
"D."
COURT:
Mark it.

254

FISCAL:
Q Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable Court the relation of that
firearm to the firearm which according to you you found inside the room allegedly
occupied by one Bernie Mendoza?
A This is the same rifle which was discovered during our raid in the same house.
(TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38, emphasis supplied).
The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely a typographical error.
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its correction or lack of it could spell
the difference between freedom and incarceration of the accused-appellant.
In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden to prove the existence of
the firearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the firearm does not have the corresponding license for
it. Since the gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun described in the amended information, the corpus
delicti (the substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been committed) has not been fully
established. This circumstance coupled with dubious claims of appellant's connection to the house (where the gun
was found) have totally emasculated the prosecution's case.
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the argument raised by the defense that the
crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in
connection with the crime of subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is facing a separate charge of
subversion. The defense submits that the trial court should have peremptorily dismissed this case in view of the
subversion charge. In People of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., We set forth in no uncertain terms the futility of
such argument. We quote:
If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence are the very essence of
subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag (G.R. No. 27683, 1976,
73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976]), the Court categorically distinguished subversion from rebellion, and
held:
Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is
a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed
by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the
purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the AntiSubversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a
subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public
uprising and taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere
membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of arms by a
member of a subversive organization against the Government is but a
circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.
(Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission (G.R. 58284, 109 289 (1981]), this
Court said that subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security, while rebellion is a
crime against public order. Rising publicly and taking arms against the Government is the very
element of the crime on rebellion. On the other hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to outlaw the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) , other similar associations and its successors because
their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and grave danger to national security.
The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion, and other illegal
means. This is a recognition that subversive acts do not only constitute force and violence (contrary
to the arguments of private respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One may in fact

255

be guilty of subversion by authoring subversive materials, where force and violence is neither
necessary or indispensable.
Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga impliedly ruled that if an accused
is simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of
common crimes as applied in rebellion would have found application therein. The respondents
relied on the opinion of this Court when it said:
. . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS
NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY
CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS.
Thus,
the
rulings
of
the
Court
in Hernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the validity of the charge under
the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the dictum in the Hernandez
case is not applicable in that case, considering that the legislature deemed it fit to provide for two
distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2)
subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). The practical
result of this may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to
those that obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its
power to enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April
22, 1992).
Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the charge of illegal possession
of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with
no option, but to acquit the accused on reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costsde
oficio.
SO ORDERED.

256

ESQUILLO VS PEOPLE
THIRD DIVISION

SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES,

G.R. No. 182010

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

- versus -

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:

Respondent.
August 25, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via petition erroneously captioned as one for Certiorari, Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) challenges the
[1]

November 27, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27894 which affirmed the July 28, 2003
Decision of Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 convicting
Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
(the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The accusatory portion of the Information dated December 12, 2002 indicting petitioner reads:

257

That on or about the 10th day of December, 2002 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, custody and
[2]
control 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). (underscoring supplied)

At the trial, petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary evidence of the
prosecution, particularly the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports issued by National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen (de Belen),

[3]

subject to her defenses, to thus dispense with the

testimony of de Belen.

De Belen recorded the results of the laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet in Dangerous
Drugs Report No. DD-02-613,

[4]

viz:

xxxx

SPECIMEN:

White crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked

SRE and further placed in bigger marked transparent plastic sachet.

xxxx

F I N D I N G S:

Net Weight of specimen = 0.1224 gram

Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for

METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug. x x x

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

258

With respect to the examination of the urine of petitioner, de Belen recorded the results thereof in
Toxicology Report No. TDD-02-4128

[5]

reading:

xxxx

SPECIMEN:

Urine of one SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES. 37 y/o, married, jobless, of no. 1159 Bo.
Bayanihan, Maricaban, Pasay City.

xxxx

F I N D I N G S:

Volume of urine

60 mL.

pH of urine

5.0

Appearance

yellow orange, turbid

Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for the presence of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, and its metaboliteAMPHETAMINE. x x x

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Based on its documentary evidence and the testimony of PO1 Alvin Cruzin (PO1 Cruzin),

[6]

a member of

the Pasay City Police Station Special Operations Group (SOG), the prosecution established its version as follows:

259

On the basis of an informants tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at
around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 toBayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the
activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as Ryan.

As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he
glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow
cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner
started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner
and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however,
petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to
take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case.

After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic sachet

[7]

on which

he marked her initials SRE. With the seized item, petitioner was brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police
Station where P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a memorandum

[8]

dated

December 10, 2002 addressed to the Chief Forensic Chemist of the NBI in Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory
examination of the substance contained in the plastic sachet to determine the presence of shabu, and 2) the
conduct of a drug test on the person of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas soon executed a Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension

[9]

recounting the details of their intended surveillance and the circumstances leading to petitioners

arrest.

Repudiating the charges, petitioner

[10]

gave the following tale:

At around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question, while she was sick and resting at home, several
policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists barged in and asked her whether she knew one named
Ryan who they claimed was a notorious snatcher operating in the area, to which she replied in the negative. The
police officers then forced her to go with them to the Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where she was detained.

While she was under detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which they claimed
contained shabu and recovered from her.

260

In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was planted, stemming from an all too obvious
attempt by the police officers to extort money from her and her family.

Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioners daughter Josan Lee
Tolentino,

[12]

[11]

and family friend Ma. Stella

corroborated petitioners account. They went on to relate that the police officers never informed them

of the reason why they were taking custody of petitioner.

By Decision

[13]

of July 28, 2003, the trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal possession of

Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby
renders judgment finding the accused Susan Esquillo y Romines GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of par. 3 of Section 11, Article II of R. A. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and absent any modifying circumstance to
either aggravate or mitigate the criminal liability of the same accused, and furthermore, applying
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to
Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P350,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus costs.

The 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu involved in this case is

declared forfeited in favor of the Government and ordered to be turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper and appropriate disposition in accordance with the
[14]
provisions of the law.
(underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant to thus render any
evidence obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible.

In its challenged Decision affirming petitioners conviction, the appellate court, citing People v.
Chua,

[15]

held that the police officers had probable cause to search petitioner under the stop-and-frisk concept, a

recognized exception to the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches.

[16]

261

Brushing aside petitioners defense of frame-up, the appellate court noted that petitioner failed to adduce
evidence that the arresting officers were impelled by any evil motive to falsely charge her, and that she was even
found positive for substance abuse.

In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate courts application of the stop-and-frisk principle in
light of PO1 Cruzins failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having merely noticed her
placing something inside a cigarette case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal
principle could only be invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the
suspicion.

[17]

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision
but seeks a modification of the penalty to conform to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9165.

Appellants conviction stands.

Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest before her arraignment. Neither did she take
steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest as well as the
inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof for the first time only on appeal before the appellate
court.

[18]

By such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.

[19]

Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a
search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law
enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was
instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee
after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more
pricked his curiosity.

That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant is
settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:

262

(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for
violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of
automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in plain view;
(7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and
[20]
(8) stop and frisk operations. (emphasis underscoring supplied)

In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, the determination of
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account,
among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.

[21]

Elucidating on what includes stop-and-frisk operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People
v. Chua

[22]

held:

. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat
him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and
suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with
the police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.

This principle of stop-and-frisk search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of
Appeals. In said case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in
a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the
search as akin to a stop-and-frisk. In People v. Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to stopand-frisk the accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the
accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw the policemen, and
the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that
armed persons w[h]ere roaming the vicinity. (emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)

263

What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.

[23]

From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid stopand-frisk operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioners possession - later
voluntarily exhibited

[24]

to the police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed

inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of
her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had
identified himself.

It bears recalling that petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Dangerous Drugs and
Toxicology Reports, subject, however, to whatever available defenses she would raise. While such admissions do
not necessarily control in determining the validity of a warrantless search or seizure, they nevertheless provide a
reasonable gauge by which petitioners credibility as a witness can be measured, or her defense tested.

It has not escaped the Courts attention that petitioner seeks exculpation by adopting two completely
inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one hand, she argues that the stop-and-frisk search upon her
person and personal effects was unjustified as it constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Constitution. In
the same breadth, however, she denies culpability by holding fast to her version that she was at home resting on
the date in question and had been forcibly dragged out of the house by the police operatives and brought to the
police station, for no apparent reason than to try and extort money from her. That her two witnesses a daughter
and a friend who were allegedly present at the time of her arrest did not do anything to report it despite their claim
that they were not informed why she was being arrested, should dent the credibility of their testimony.

Courts have tended to look with disfavor on claims of accused, such as those of petitioners, that they are
victims of a frame-up. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been held as a shop-worn defense of the accused in

264

drug-related cases, the allegation being easily concocted or contrived. For this claim to prosper, the defense must
adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts of government
officials. This it failed to do.

Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of
witnesses prevail over that of petitioner.

[25]

A word on the penalty.

While the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision, it overlooked the error in the penalty imposed
by the trial court. The trial court, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentenced petitioner to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14)
years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum.
Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 provides, however:

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

xxxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall
be graduated as follows:

xxxx

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000) to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin
oil, metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited
to MDMA or ecstacy, PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB and those similarly designed or newly introduced
drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possesses is far

265

behind therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when the offense is punished by a law other
than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same.

The prayer of the Office of the Solicitor General for a modification of the penalty is thus in order.

The Court, therefore, imposes on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.

WHEREFORE,

the

assailed

decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

is AFFIRMED,

with

the MODIFICATION that the penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, as maximum. In all other respects, the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 02-2297
isAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

266

POSADAS VS CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Rudy G. Agravate for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The validity of a warrantless search on the person of petitioner is put into issue in this case.
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of
the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but
his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver
1
2
3
with Serial No. 770196 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and
4
two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further
investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to
possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao
Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on
duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding
petitioner guilty of the offense charged as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court , finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged.
It appearing that the accuse d was below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the commission of
the offense (Art. 68, par. 2), he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN
(10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5) months and
Eleven (11) days of Reclusion Temporal, and to pay the costs.
The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in favor of the government and the
Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn over said items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom,
5
Davao City.
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision
6
was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner.

267

Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or search and
seizure, the items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that
under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that
the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or
private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or
had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police
officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to
flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know
what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police
7
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, as
follows:
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating
the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his light against unlawful search and
seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.
Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

268

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government in
the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not
all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions
which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between
the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in
the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search
thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in
the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after
they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
much too late.
8

In People vs. CFI of Rizal, this Court held as follows:

. . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need
not argue that there are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not
necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except
without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely
a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles
procured.
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor General:
The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose
object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the case
ofTerry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men repeatedly walked past a store window
and returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the
suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced officer, the behaviour of the men indicated that
they were sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When the police officer approached the men
and asked them for their names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of
them, spun him around and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to

269

the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution for the offense of carrying a concealed
weapon, the defense of illegal search and seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court
held that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there
is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather
than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly
in order to determine his identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the
9
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

270

MANALILI VS CA
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997]

ALAIN

MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner,

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

vs.

COURT

OF

APPEALS

and

PEOPLE

OF

THE

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably
there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses -- like
stop-and-frisk -- which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever
vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizens constitutional rights against unreasonable
arrest, search and seizure.

The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its Resolution dated January
20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon.
[1]

In an Information dated April 11, 1988, Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan
City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed
[2]
as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug and
knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
[3]

Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. With the agreement of
[4]
the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing aP10,000.00 bail bond. After trial in due course, the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989
[5]
a decision convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision
[6]
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of
Marijuana residue), and hereby snetences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

[7]

Appellant remained on provisional liberty. Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of
[8]
[9]
Appeal dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court promulgated its assailed Decision, denying
[10]
the appeal and affirming the trial court:

271

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs
against appellant.
Respondent Court

[11]

denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing:

ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellants motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

[12]

At about 2:10 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan
City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan
City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold
Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The
surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the
Kalookan City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a
male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish
eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he
was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could
see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to
examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue
inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was
turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the
confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the accused ALAIN MANALILI
y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the
same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote Evidence A 4/11/88 Alain Manalili. The white sheet of paper
was marked as Exhibit E-3. The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit E-4).
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting a
chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit D). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint
Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit A). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit D)
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The
signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit D.
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana residue at
7:40 oclock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit D.
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the specimen which
[13]
she identified. (Exhibit E) Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as crushed marijuana leaves in her
[14]
Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit F). These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for
marijuana, according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination, she also found
that the crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her
examinations (Exhibit G).

272

After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed
it. (Exhibit E). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit E-1).
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit F from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl.
Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of
Kalookan City. (Exhibit C)
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the
[15]
cemetery when he was apprehended.

Version of the Defense

The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows:

[16]

At about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A.
Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the
driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under the influence of
marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen
were riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused
asked the policemen why he was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying
marijuana. However, nothing was found on the persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the
tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused to the police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said
they would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signaled the latter to follow him. The
neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused
was asked to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion. The policemen turned
over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana. However, nothing was found,
except for some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to
release the accused. The accused was led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that they found
marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell and was led to
the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order to settle the case. The
policemen who led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl. Tamondong. Pat.
Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his parents. The accused did not call his parents and he
told the policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.
At about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an inquest
Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the
accused not to say anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused were stopped by
policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen found nothing either on
his person or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who was made to take off his pants
at the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures showing that
[17]
tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.

273

The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts

The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength of the
arresting officers testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were neutral and disinterested witnesses, testifying
only on what transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially, they asserted that the appellant was
found to be in possession of a substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellants defense that this charge was merely trumped up, because the
appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a reinvestigation before
the city fiscal of Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on speculations,
surmises or conjectures. On the alleged serious discrepancies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the
appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the
narration. It further found petitioners contention -- that he could not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana
residue -- to be without merit, because the forensic chemist reported that what she examined were marijuana
leaves.

Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling that the guilt of the
accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were material and substantial and not minor.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was framed for the purpose of
extorting money.
V
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented is consistent with both
innocence and guilt.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are inadmissible in evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the
credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the defense of extortion,
and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.

274

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-and-Frisk

Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that they were
products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as
memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because
petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their admissibility in evidence. He
adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark
[18]
case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer
to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized
[19]
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention
and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual
arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he
approached petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for
an extended period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24
times; and conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years
experience to have failed to investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what
justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously
[20]
secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a fruit of
the poisonous tree, falling under the exclusionary rule:

275

SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
[21]

This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure,viz.: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2)
search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves
[22]
[23]
of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained
that [i]n these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential
requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such
facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a
[24]
warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals , the Court held that there are many instances where a search and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which is stop-and-frisk. In said
case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and
acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioners bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition,
two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court
said that to require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove
to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police
officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while
obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant
had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police
information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of
the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The
policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During
[25]
such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioners possession:
FISCAL RALAR:
Q

And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Sangandaan,
Caloocan City?

Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming around at A.
Mabini Street in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.

xxx

xxx

xxx

While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and one Arnold
Enriquez, what happened, if any?

We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then when we called his
attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and introduce ourselves as police
officers in a polite manner.

xxx

xxx

Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon him?

That person seems like he is high on drug.

How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was high on drug?

Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.

What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?

xxx

276

He was roaming around, sir.

You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?

We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner, sir.

How did you introduce yourselves?

In a polite manner, sir.

What did you say when you introduced yourselves?

We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.

And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding in his hands?

He tried to resist, sir.

When he tried to resist, what did you do?

I requested him if I can see what was he was(sic) holding in his hands.

What was the answer of the person upon your request?

He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.

xxx

xxx

What was he holding?

He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic) crushed residue.

xxx

Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor Generals contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the
trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had
knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the
[26]
right. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards
and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however,
petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions
under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for
review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be
[27]
pleaded for the first time on appeal.

Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers testimony contained polluted, irreconcilable and
unexplained contradictions which did not support petitioners conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight and respect,
since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless
substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered,
[28]
would materially affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule.
We concur with Respondent Courts ruling:
(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the prosecution
witnesses testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration. In
People vs. Avila, it was held that As long as the witnesses concur on the material points, slight differences in their
remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their statements.

277

However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of full
credence on Pat. Espiritus testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas
[29]
contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit signed by both arresting
policemen. The question of whether the marijuana was found inside petitioners wallet or inside a plastic bag is
immaterial, considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said substance. Failure to present the wallet in
evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in petitioners possession. This shows that such contradiction is
[30]
minor, and does not destroy Espiritus credibility.

Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely
[31]
and consciously possessed the said drug.
The substance found in petitioners possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be
crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioners lack of authority to possess these leaves was established. His awareness
thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he
resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner
knew that he was holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to believe the
extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against the arresting officers
or present any evidence, other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame and
unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as early as April 26,
[32]
1988. Since then, he could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody of the
police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and
[33]
fabricate.

The Proper Penalty

The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) by
sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of
six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or lifeimprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or
espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped
from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive
shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year,
not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5
hereof. (Underscoring supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal
possession of marijuana:
Sec. 8. x x x x

278

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess or use Indian hemp.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of
[34]
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS,as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum,
and to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

279

MALACAT VS CA
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997]

SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
[1]

In an Information filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of
[2]
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as follows:
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary
license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment

[3]

on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
[4]

At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2, while the
prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the
[5]
time they arrested petitioner.
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the
arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police
Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats
reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along
Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two
groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the
corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with [t]heir eyes
[6]
moving very fast.
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty
minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a
[7]
fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waist line. Yus companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were
then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave
[8]
it to his commander.
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims
was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the
previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate
a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions;
however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were
merely standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were
not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached
[9]
them. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.

280

Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan
[10]
were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects,
informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite
Serapios advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the
assistance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioners uncounselled confession (Exh. E), there being no PAO
lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit
of arrest and booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence and
[11]
Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit for examination.
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioners confession knowing it was inadmissible in
[12]
evidence.
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included, among other things,
the examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a request dated 19 March 1991
from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange
tag on the subject grenade detailing his name, the date and time he received the specimen. During the preliminary
examination of the grenade, he [f]ound that [the] major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly
[were] all present, and concluded that the grenade was [l]ive and capable of exploding. On even date, he issued
[13]
a certification stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991.
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at
the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda
to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The
policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their possession. However, he was
arrested with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police
officer. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner [i]to ang tama mo
sa akin. This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioners mouth and said, [y]ou are the one who
shot me. Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several
other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but
[14]
nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where
a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either
[15]
to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. Probable cause
was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an
[16]
investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been premature. The RTC emphasized that Yu and
his companions were [c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens
[17]
the destruction of evidence and the officers [h]ad to act in haste, as petitioner and his companions were acting
suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran
away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus [i]t is reasonable for an officer to
conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the
[18]
officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and
since petitioner [l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the
Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
[19]

In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus found
petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, and sentenced
him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OFRECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
[20]

On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to this
Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR
[21]
No. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs.
In his Appellants Brief

[22]

filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:

281

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM
WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT
THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN
UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions
[23]
provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citingPeople vs. Mengote. As such, the search was
illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and prayed that its
[24]
decision be affirmed in toto.
[25]

In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that petitioner
abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was planted by the police officers; and
second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioners possession was not raised
as an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit D, the hand grenade
seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the
ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was attempting to commit an offense, thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the company of other
suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d]
been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We
need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site especially during times
of political upheaval. As the mere possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacats posture is
simply too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioners failure to rebut the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased
petitioner two days prior to the latters arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted
suspiciously, the accumulation of which was more than sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense
was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty, not to
mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent
persons while maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot conclusion
that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement with the lower court in saying that the
probable cause in such a situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical
considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily
act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote,
was inapplicable in light of [c]rucial differences, to wit:

[26]

which petitioner relied upon,

[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner of a busy street
[would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to
put a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence reports about a
bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about
seven days to observe suspicious movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no
personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days
before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.

282

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the warrantless arrest
and search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was attempting to commit a crime, as
the evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and
Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to
them. Finally, petitioner points out the factual similarities between his case and that of People v. Mengote to
demonstrate that the Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision.
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the penalty imposed by
the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OFRECLUSION PERPETUA, as
maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully possess grenades
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the
minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom
should have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
[27]
[28]
of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
[29]
[30]
Constitution and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. The term life imprisonment as used in Section
9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to
include reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioners Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial courts decision to this Court, yet
the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without jurisdiction, and
consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the petition for review as petitioners Brief for the
Appellant, the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the
memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed to establish
petitioners guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from
petitioners possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to him,
he turned it over to his commander after putting an X mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not
presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade presented in court and identified by police
officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not
immediately after petitioners arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no
evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his
testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated from
petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim
that the grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to
safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a group about to
detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then
considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it
was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police
officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order
to discern petitioners eyes moving very fast.

283

Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by
police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and
Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if
petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was
invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were
invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect
[31]
the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those
[32]
effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of
[33]
moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful
[34]
[35]
arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of
the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion on
the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
[36]
used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
[37]
before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting
officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the
fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
[38]
escaping or committing violence.

284

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of
the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on
petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
[39]
under the Fourth Amendment ***
[40]

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
[41]
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with
a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to
bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a
witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search
petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his
companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares
otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately
collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner
and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu
explicitly declared on cross-examination:
Q

And what were they doing?

They were merely standing.

You are sure of that?

Yes, sir.

And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any commotion?

None, sir.

Neither did you see them create commotion?

None, sir.

[42]

285

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front
waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge,
assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the
trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade
[43]
was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person.
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioners rights solemnly guaranteed in
Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the
decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention,
unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

286

GUAZON VS DE VILLA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990
EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES,
ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD
ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA,
ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO, ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA,
MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE,
MELANIO GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO
GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA
MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO
SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT, petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers represented by
public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers
and leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that they have a common or general interest in the
preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human rights and the reign of peace and order in their
communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before this Court."
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the petition contending inter alia that
petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action.
According to the petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were conducted in Metro Manila:
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan, and Magdalena Streets, Tondo, Manila.
2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira Extension and San Sebastian Street, Tondo,
Manila.
3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street, Tondo, Manila.
4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks along Aroma Beach up to Happy Land,
Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street, and Pacheco Street, Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan Navotas, Metro Manila.

287

7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound, Quezon City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo, Manila.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila International Airport, Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.
12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the
military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during
the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on
November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow
a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is alleged that the following were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police
and military units without any search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one
residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are
in civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of
their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in the process), and then ordering
the residents within to come out of their respective residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the men are ordered to
strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by the raiders, some of the
members of the raiding team force their way into each and every house within the cordoned off
area and then proceed to conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from the
neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders ransack their homes,
tossing about the residents' belongings without total regard for their value. In several instances,
walls are destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating
evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing frequency that their
money and valuables have disappeared after the said operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome intrusions are arrested
on the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are
interrogated and 'verified.' These arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly
issued by a judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded
men are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of the period wherein they
can be legally detained without any charge at all. In other instances, some arrested persons are
released without charge after a few days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the residents during these
illegal operations.

288

10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spotbeatings, maulings and maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are subjected to mental and
physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted as their Memorandum after the
petition was given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they allege that the
accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite Article VII, Section 17 of the
Constitution which provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied )
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. ...
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the nature described by the
petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military and
the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be
consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by such actions.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by the
Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist
activities. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which
would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a
matter of policy in the name of security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of
the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of
the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic
institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional
protections which are their distinguishing features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the Court stated:
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the
privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to
the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own
castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he could
bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number,
regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish
and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,

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and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals(164
SCRA 655; 660- 661 [1988]):
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his privacy
and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We have explained in the case of People vs.
Burgos(144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon
as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily
thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a
man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his
individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind
of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf.
Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan J. and Boyd v. United States, 11 6 630
[1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the
Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional
protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his
privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards. (ibid, p. 74.)
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, (342 US 165; 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952])
emphasizes clearly that police actions should not be characterized by methods that offend a sense of justice. The
court ruled:
Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the present case, we are compelled
to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This
is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of
constitutional differentiation.
It is significant that it is not the police action perse which is impermissible and which should be prohibited. Rather, it
is the procedure used or in the words of the court, methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities." InBreithaupt
v. Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the same court validated the use of evidence, in this case blood
samples involuntarily taken from the petitioner, where there was nothing brutal or offensive in the taking. The Court
stated:
Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking of a
sample of blood when done, as in this case, under the protective eye of a physician. To be sure,
the driver here was unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of conscious consent,
without more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional light; and
certainly the rest was administered here would not be considered offensive by even the most
delicate. Furthermore, due process is not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction or the

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sphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by that whole community sense of 'decency and
fairness that has been woven by common experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct....
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered as "far outweighed by the value of
its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the police action.
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on the determination of the exact facts
surrounding a particular case.
The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderly procedure ascertains their truth,
not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions would immediately issue as a matter of course. A persistent
pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties, as alleged in the petition, has no place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements made by the petitioners are a complete lie.
The Solicitor General argues:
This a complete lie.
Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to human rights. Not only that, they
were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the actual operation. They were executed
in coordination with barangay officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit themselves
voluntarily for character and personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents, who had
joined these operations, witnessed and recorded the events that transpired relative thereto. (After
Operation Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24,
1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged victims who numbered
thousands had not themselves complained.
In her speech during turn-over rites on January 26, 1987 at Camp Aguinaldo, President Aquino
branded all accusations of deliberate disregard for human rights as 'total lies'. Here are excerpts
from her strongest speech yet in support of the military:
All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human rights have been shown- up to be total lies.
...To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight, fight with every assurance that I will stand by you
through thick and thin to share the blame, defend your actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with
you the final victory that I am certain will be ours.
You and I will see this through together.
I've sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.
We have wasted enough time answering their barkings for it is still a long way to lasting peace. . . .
The dangers and hardships to our men in the field are great enough as it is without having them
distracted by tills worthless carping at their backs.
Our counter-insurgency policy remains the same: economic development to pull out the roots-and
military operations to slash the growth of the insurgency.
The answer to terror is force now.
Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to make our economic and social initiatives bear
fruit. . . Now that the extreme Right has been defeated, I expect greater vigor in the prosecution of
the war against the communist insurgency, even as we continue to watch our backs against attacks
from the Right. (Philippine Star, January 27, 1988, p. 1, Annex 15; emphasis supplied)

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Viewed in the light of President Aquino's observation on the matter, it can be said that petitioners
misrepresent as human rights violations the military and police's zealous vigilance over the
people's right to live in peace and safety. (Rollo, pp. 36-38)
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth. Everything before us consists of allegations.
According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the
petition. No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig;
and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand persons treated in
the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial court
to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands
of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those
arrested has apparently been charged and none of those affected has apparently complained.
A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is the statement that local and foreign corespondents actually joined the saturation drives and witnessed and recorded the events. In other words, the
activities sought to be completely proscribed were in full view of media. The sight of hooded men allegedly being
used to fingerpoint suspected subversives would have been good television copy. If true, this was probably effected
away from the ubiquitous eye of the TV cameras or, as the Solicitor General contends, the allegation is a "complete
lie."
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several thousand members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
sought to overthrow the present Government introduces another aspect of the problem and illustrates quite clearly
why those directly affected by human rights violations should be the ones to institute court actions and why
evidence of what actually transpired should first be developed before petitions are filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the combat areas,
enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion
without having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights. This is exactly what happened in
the White Plains Subdivision and the commercial center of Makati during the first week of December, 1989.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements particularly
because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the
communities where the "drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or criminal
activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested.
There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning" could not be achieved
even as the rights of squatter and low income families are fully protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court
to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may not encroach upon the rights
of the individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition where
the petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the
thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation drives,"
as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of the alleged
pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to submit themselves voluntarily for character and
personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted
by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain
abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see
nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent
demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the
rights of people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would
limit all police actions to one on one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific

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individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices
because all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit. Where not one victim
complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically
one for the executive departments and for trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of
the events cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military, and the police to the
Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of constitutional litigation have
been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be followed. If our policy makers
sustain the contention of the military and the police that occasional saturation drives are essential to maintain the
stability of government and to insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and
policemen must not only be evolved, they should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses
and identifying violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference should bring together
the heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National Defense and the operating heads of affected
agencies and institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be
given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard look by administration officials at the
policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably committed and could be
committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the kicking in
of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of
residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to the
conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City
where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and where specific erring parties may be
pinpointed and prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding General PC-INP for the drawing up and enforcement of clear
guidelines to govern police actions intended to abate riots and civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and
subdue terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed during the police actions
are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.

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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF UMIL ETC VS RAMOS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and
RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD,
T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA.
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO
NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT.
JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
AROJADO,respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.

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Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.

Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.

PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been consolidated because of the
similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective
respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at
liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not
available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed
in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no
preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds that the
persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and
that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or
instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an

295

offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant,
1
was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of
his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpushave
been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests
without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed
against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence
Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of
the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the
killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively
identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired
at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who
conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15
February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the
original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto
Umil,Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and
the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February
1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were
accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot
and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a
2
criminal case who has been released on bail.
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a
day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in

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connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As
stated by the Court in an earlier case:
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested
illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within
the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any
other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels
find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion
or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining
3
them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. . . .
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double
Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the
sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as
4
held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson:
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the
defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient
in form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which,
and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were
irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been released on a writ
of habeas corpusor now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we
need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant,
is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato
Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the
National United Front Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in
the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade
for which she had no permit or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the
NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about the operations of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former
comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff
member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka

297

Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988,
pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the
house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation
Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the
search, the following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms,
ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS Headquarters for
investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff
member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of
Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the military agents that he is
a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato
Constatino, and other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as
"Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the
following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled telephone number of
Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead
provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next day (13
August 1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as
military agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted
a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.

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The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals,
vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live ammunition
for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16
Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought
to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the
investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had no
knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after which an information
charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was
filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at
P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and
Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the
PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is
now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or members of the National
United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or traversed by said petitioners. The contention
5
must be deemed admitted. As officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was
justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was
additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license to
possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without
warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC and,
when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both
carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T.
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was
still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When
frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or
license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to
PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:
a) Voluminous subversive documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing
ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1) magazine
containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP,
by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.

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On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were forwarded to the
Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was
recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that
the informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary
investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a
Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no previous
warrant of arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying
unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and void for want of a
preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information
may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or
person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a
lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice.
Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for
a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner
prescribed in this Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against them, the prosecutor made
identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was conducted because the
accused has not made and signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended; that based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe
that the crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed against them in court.
Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since
she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on 12 May
1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant

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issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a
house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by
Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny
Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky
Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When
Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her
with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny
Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to a
preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is
justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a warrant and she refused
to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court,
as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession when they were arrested,
did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no
evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in these cases to
accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be
seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is
absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with
6
a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth
surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel
movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the military at the residence of Renato
Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid
at Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military.
It was a result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former
members of the underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date,
nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino when raided yielded communication
equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that other members of his
group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a "stake-out" operation whereby some
members of the raiding team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the
raid and Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted
suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his person were
letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that,
Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and Buenaobra,
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the
military agents to believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit
Constantino's residence considering that Constatino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did

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come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the military
agents, not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's
flimsy and bare assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on
the day they were arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect her arrest without
warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be
denied that Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of
the latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper
taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any
plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under the time, place
and circumstances of the events in question, especially considering that at the time of petitioner's
arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found
in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a camp, but
were arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude tat
they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is
detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng
Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the
Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home
located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a
group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under
arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and
placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany
him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila where he was
interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before the respondent
Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the
General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano
7
A. Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty.
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the Information filed
against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging
him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest since
petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during
a press conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on
nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give into their demands to
lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of

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the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we
heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also
announced the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on
8
November 23, 1988.
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen
9
the slip. He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the
corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil
hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts,
bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo
10
na. (emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for questioning and brought to
police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against
11
him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of
the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent court,
he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail as recommended.
However, we find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00
only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission of Narciso
Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30
o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of
T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil
Regal who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as on of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers,
without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for questioning.
Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso
Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by the trial court in an
order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga,
was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on
13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter
resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian,
Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in
the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna are based upon the facts and the
law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police
without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co-accused

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Ramil
Regala
in
the
killing
of
12
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta:

Romulo

Bunye

The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not
presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime.
For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making
the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section
4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement
13
in Ilagan vs. Enrile, that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against the
person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is issued by the court where said information
14
has been filed. The petitioners claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial
regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation and
collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said
doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and,
most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the
criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This,
petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary
State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the
Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really
unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan
case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of thehabeas
corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment
or before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to
15
take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, "in all
petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the
moment petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and
"only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact
been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be
done in all future cases ofhabeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be
promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond
for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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