Creativity as Sacrifice: an Appreciation and Critique of Jeremy Begbies

Voicing Creations Praise

James M. Watkins
Follow Gods example, therefore, as dearly loved children and walk in the way of love, just as Christ loved us and
gave himself up for us as a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God.1

In the review and secondary literature regarding Jeremy Begbies Voicing Creations
Praise,2 there is very little critique.3 On the one hand, this fact should be seen positively as
warranting the view that Voicing Creations Praise remains one of the most important (if not the
most important) theologies of art written in recent times. On the other hand, however, one
wonders whether the lack of critical engagement with Voicing Creations Praise signals some
unexplored terrain for theologies of art. This is not to say that there has been no critical
engagement, but that these critiques are often superficial pointing out, for example, that Begbies
project takes on too much, or that his project makes too much use of Polanyis theory of
metaphor. Furthermore, Begbie himself regards the constructive portion of Voicing Creations
Praise as a preliminary sketch for a more comprehensive theology of art.
This paper takes a more careful, and critical, look at Voicing Creations Praise than has
yet been attempted. I wish to question Begbies guiding metaphor of the artist as priest of
creation. Specifically, I wish to challenge the adequacy of this metaphor to be a theological
model for human creativity. Because the metaphor of the artist as a priest of creation is central
for the whole of Begbies theology of art, by questioning it we may find ourselves moving in an
alternative direction. Even still, the reader will detect that there is a large amount of agreement
between my own position and that of Jeremy Begbies. I intend to make this common ground
clear in the section, The Strengths of Jeremy Begbies Proposal. Following this section, I
present A Critique of Begbies Theological Model for the Arts that exposes the limitations of
his model for grasping human creativity. Finally, I propose, with the help of William Vanstone,
an alternative model Creativity as Sacrifice that I believe more adequately grasps the reality
of human creativity.
The Strengths of Jeremy Begbies Proposal
I want to highlight two aspects of Voicing Creations Praise that I consider to be its
greatest strengths. The first is Begbies ability to take the best of the sacramental and
reformed traditions to develop his theology of art. The second is his choice to focus his
theology of art on Christs role as mediator of creation. I will consider both of these strengths
one at a time.
The majority of Voicing Creations Praise is taken up with a careful analysis of the most
influential Protestant thinkers who have reflected theological on the arts in the last one hundred
years. First, Begbie explores the theology of Paul Tillich and, second, he explores the theologies
of Neo-Calvinist thinkers such as Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavink, H. R. Rookmaaker and
1

Ephesians 5:1,2.
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991).
3
For example, Corina A. Bos, Michael John Kooy, and Mary Leigh Morbey, Review, Calvin Theological Journal 27
(1992): 418-21, Joseph J. Feeney, Review, Theological Studies, 53 (1992): 584-586.
2

Calvin Seerveld. These two groups might be thought of as representing alternative forms of
theological aesthetics. On the one hand, Tillichs theological aesthetics is more indebted to
Romantic influences, and his views on art might be described as sacramental in the sense that
he regards works of art as bringing viewers into contact with Ultimate Reality. On the other
hand, the Neo-Calvinists are more influenced by the mimetic theory of art, and their theologies of
culture hope to break down the modern compartmentalization that relegates the arts to that which
is beyond rationality. Begbie is not entirely happy with the theologies of art developed by
either group, and so we may regard his own theology of art as an attempt to constructively move
beyond the sacramental and reformed alternatives.4
Begbie borrows the best from both traditions. From the sacramental tradition, Begbie
picks up the notion that human creativity participates in divine creativity, and so operates in a
similar fashion. This view receives perhaps its most influential articulation in the work of S. T.
Coleridge: The primary imagination is a finite repetition of the eternal I AM.5 Begbie carefully
avoids, however, the problematic individualism often implicit in this tradition.
From the reformed tradition, Begbie borrows the notion that artistic creativity is
embedded in humanitys larger vocation in the cosmos. The reformed tradition insists that the
vocation of the artist is fundamentally no different than any other vocation because it is rooted in
Gods commandment to cultivate the world.6 However, Bebgie is critical of the reformed
traditions over-emphasis upon the doctrine of creation as the proper context for a Christian
theology of culture to the neglect of the doctrine of redemption.
The second, and perhaps greatest, strength of Begbies theology of art is his choice to
place both the artists participation in divine creativity and vocation in the cosmos within the
context of redemption. Specifically, Begbie develops a vision of the human artist in light of
Christs mediation of the cosmos. Begbies choice of metaphor directly connects artistic
creativity to a significant New Testament motif: Jesus priestly mediation of creation. For
example, the author of the letter to the Hebrews writes:
He [Jesus] had to be made like his brothers in every respect, so that he might become
a merciful and faithful high priest in the service of God, to make propitiation for the
sins of the people. For because he himself has suffered when tempted, he is able to
help those who are being tempted.7
As this passage suggests, by entering fully into the life of a human being, God is able to
transform the whole of humanity, who are enslaved by sin. Jesus is not only imaged as the high

I borrow this categorization from Loren Wilkinson, Art as Creation or Art as Work, Crux 19 (1983): 23-28.

Biographia Literaria, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983 [1817]),
387.. For a recent appropriation of Coleridges views on the imagination see, Robin Stockitt, Imagination and the
Playfulness of God (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011).
6
The Neo-Calvinists reflected upon art and culture from the perspective of the cultural mandate. By cultural
mandate I mean the primal command to subdue the earth which is interpreted as the meaning of the imago Dei
in Gen. 1:26-27. For a helpful articulation of this approach see Brian J. Walsh and J. Richard Middleton, The
Transforming Vision (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984), 52-6.
7
Heb 2:17-18.

priest who offers a sacrifice, but also as the sacrifice itself.8 In the next section, I will offer some
questions and criticisms regarding the role that the sacrificial motif plays in Begbies theology of
art. For the time being, however, I wish to emphasize that he is correct to view the arts through a
theological model of redemption.
In contrast to Begbies theological model of redemption, one could view the arts through
a theological model of revelation. According to this model, the primary purpose of the arts is
communication from artist to audience. Dorothy Sayers, for example, argues for such a model in
her essay Toward a Christian Aesthetic.9 While Sayers writings often appeal to artists and
theologians alike, her over-emphasis on revelation is limiting both theologically and artistically.
Theologically, she conceptualizes Christs mediation as a unilateral communication from God to
humanity. Artistically, she regards the artist as communicator and the audience as contemplator,
and so she tends not to consider the ways in which these postures can be switched.10
Begbies theological model, on the other hand, highlights the reciprocity between artist
and audience. For Begbie, Christ is the exemplar of authentic artistic creativity. The Spirit plays
a significant role by ensuring that Jesus human response is truly a human response. 11 Just as
God enters into the full reality of being a human to offer a response on humanitys behalf, so also
the artist is called to immerse himself in the cosmos and oblate its praise to the Creator. He
writes, human creativity, at its highest, will be a corporate participation in the vicarious
humanity of Christ through the Spirit, which enables, gathers up and focuses the praise of
creation, directing it towards the Father.12 As Begbie suggests in his later writings, the
relationship between Creator and creation is characterized by exchange; by gift and return.
Human creativity, in its own appropriate way, participates in this exchange by offering its own
return, sharing through the Spirit in the creative purpose of the Father as he draws all things to
himself through his Son.13
In summary, I wish to highlight two things about Begbies theology of art. First, he
views the arts through a theological model of redemption, and, second, he regards artists as
participating in Gods triune redemption of creation. Some may object that these are merely two
components of Voicing Creations Praise, and that Begbies theology of art includes much more.
That this is true cannot be disputed, but it is my belief that Begbies notion of the artist as priest
of creation is the central feature of his theology of art, and so it is here that I will focus my
critique.
A Critique of Jeremy Begbies Theological Model for the Arts
By referring to Begbies theological model, I have already implied something about the
methodology he employs to develop his theology of art. Theological models are systematic

The image of Christ as a high priest is subdued in Pauls writings, but sacrificial and temple imagery certainly is
present. For Pauline references to Christ as sacrifice see Rom 3:25, 8:3-4; 1 Cor. 5:7. The sacrificial imagery is
perhaps nowhere stronger than in Revelation. See, for example, Rev 5:6-14.
9
In Unpopular Opinions (London: Gollancz, 1946), 29-42.
10
Sayers is actually inconsistent on this point. Although her Trinitarian comparison between divine and human
creativity focuses on the communication of an artistic idea to an audience, she also develops the idea of the Holy
Spirit as the Creator sitting in the place of his audience. See The Mind of the Maker (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.,
1941).
11
Voicing, 176.
12
Ibid, 257. Emphasis mine.
13
Ibid, 179.

metaphors that serve a heuristic function.14 Begbies theological model for art shapes how he
conceptualizes the vocation of the artist, the nature of art and the rules for the proper
appreciation of art. In this section, I first draw out the significance of Begbies theological
model for his understanding of human creativity, and, second, I offer two reasons one
theological and the other artistic for why this model may be problematic.
Begbies model is focused around the metaphor of the artist as a priest of creation.
Models depend upon making comparisons between two different things. To say that the artist is
a priest of creation asks the viewer to think of the artist in terms of Christs priestly role as it is
portrayed in scripture and tradition.
Surprisingly, Begbie is not very self-reflexive about the analogies he makes between
divine and human artistry. It is clear, however, that they play a significant role in his theology of
art. To see their significance, let us return to the idea that artistic creativity participates in divine
redemption, which Begbie borrows from the sacramental tradition. If one is to participate in
Gods redemption of the cosmos, then one will want to pattern ones participation after the God
who is redeeming the cosmos. Begbies theological model provides a framework through which
one can perceive the activity of the artist as either creative or destructive. For example, he says
that in artistic creativity there will be a redeeming of disorder, mirroring Gods redeeming work
in Christ, a renewal of that which has been spoiled15 Furthermore, he uses a comparison
between divine and artistic creativity as a key for the evaluation of art.16
A central theological issue at the heart of Begbies theological model is the relationship
between creation and redemption. The reader will recall that, on this point, Begbie is critical of
the Neo-Calvinists, who he views as driving a wedge between them.17 Begbie concurs with
Emil Brunner who writes, The love of God is the causa finalis of the Creation. In Jesus
Christ this ideal reason for the creation is revealed.18 It is here that I propose questioning
Begbies theological model. What sort of love is this that is manifested in both creation and
redemption? Begbies position on Gods loving creativity does not grant enough attention to
Gods desire for the cosmos, and, as a result, the connection he proposes between creation and
redemption falls apart. Because of the logic of theological models, challenging the way that
Begbie relates creation and redemption will not merely have consequences for his understanding
of theology, but also for his understanding of human creativity
Love is sometimes regarded as manifesting itself in two different opposing forms: agape
and eros.19 Agape is a form of love wholly concerned for the fulfillment of the other, while
eros is concerned with self-fulfillment. The former is desire-less, and the latter is consumed by
desire. This dichotomy between agape and eros does not do justice to the ways in which these
two forms have, in fact, been related to each other,20 but it does go some way toward explaining
why Christians have often been suspicious of erotic love, and why they have been hesitant to

14

For an extended discussion on theological models see Janet Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1985), ch. 6.
15
Ibid, 179. See also 211-15.
16
Ibid, 219.
17
Ibid, 181.
18
Emil Brunner, The Chrisitan Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press,
1952), 13, quoted in bid, 170.
19
For the classic articulation of this dichotomy, see Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip S. Watson (New
York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969).
20
Vincent Brmmer, Model of Love (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 110-18.

attribute eros to God. A God whose love includes eros would appear to be a God who desires, a
God who changes, a God who is vulnerable and a God who takes risks.
There are points at which Begbie might seem to attribute an element of eros to Gods
love. For example, he writes, In creating a reality distinct from himself and allowing a measure
of genuine freedom, God risks exposing himself to the pain and rejection it can bring.21 For the
most part, however, Begbie prefers to conceptualize Gods respect for the otherness of creation
as honoring the integrity of creation. To draw out what Begbie might mean by honoring the
integrity of creation, we will need to look beyond Voicing Creations Praise at some of his later
writings, in which he more fully develops a non-competitive relationship between Creator and
creation.
The term non-competition is used in direct contrast to the modern concept of genius,
which encourages the artist to carve out a place for ones individuality and autonomy. 22 Noncompetition, on the other hand, suggests that divine action creates and empowers the actions of
others. Begbie describes the cosmos as a gift given by God that itself is empowered to give.23
The cosmos not only receives gifts from God, but it also returns God with a gift of its own.
In a non-competitive relation, the return of the creature to God is not thought of apart
from the gift of God. As Begbie suggests, such a relation between the gift of God and the return
of the creature is grounded in the incarnation:
In Christ, God receives us by giving a gift which includes a return. In Christs own
life, the Son of God in our midst, receiving and giving are inseparable Christ,
then, is both Gods gift and human return in one person. The giving of God in Christ
is at one and the same time the giving of the Fathers own Son to us, and the return or
counter-gift of the perfect self-offering on our behalf, without sin, vindicated in the
resurrection. Exchange is thus integral to Gods gift in Christ, before any response of
ours.24
In the person of Jesus, one could say that the return of humanity is respected as a genuinely
human return because there is no competition between Gods gift and humanitys return. Indeed,
it is Gods gift that constitutes the freedom of humanity in the first place. Turning then to artistic
creativity, Begbie writes that a serious artist will endeavour to know and honour his material, to
show it courtesy.25
In what specific ways does Begbies non-competitive theology shape the way he
conceptualizes human creativity? Just as the incarnation suggests a non-competitive form of
divine creativity that works within the constraints of the cosmos, so also the human creator finds
freedom working within constraints. Begbie makes a careful analysis of the musical practice of
improvisation, and he suggests that improvisation points towards a respectful transformation
characterized by freedom within constraints.26 Begbie parses the constraints upon the improviser
21

Voicing, 170.
For example, see how Begbie applies this critique to the music of John Cage and Pierre Boulez in Theology, Music
and Time (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 179-203.
23
Ibid,, 252-55. Begbie borrows the language, and also the metaphysical framework, of gift and return from
John Milbanks Can a Gift Be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic, Modern Theology 11 (1995):
119-61.
24
Ibid, 253.
25
See full discussion in Voicing, 208-11.
26
Theology, Music and Time, 179-270,
22

as occasional (those pertaining to the occasion of the performance), cultural (those pertaining to
the cultural practice of improvisation) and continuous (those, such as embodiment and sonic
order, pertaining to the nature of human existence).27 He suggests that the freedom one
associates with improvisation is made possible through the acceptance of these constraints. For
example, he observes that the cultural constraints upon the artist, such as musical conventions
and techniques, far from being a mere hindrance to the artist, become particularized to the
occasion of the performance.28 In other words, one could say that in musical improvisation the
tradition is drawn upon, adapted and changed to meet the particular needs of a particular
performance.
There are at least two reasons one theological and the other artistic why Begbies
theological model for art, shaped as it is by his non-competitive theology, may be problematic.
Theologically, one could point out that Begbies non-competitive relation excludes eros from
Gods loving creativity because God does not desire the return of the creature. Instead,
exchange is thus integral to Gods gift in Christ, before any response of ours.29 Begbie stands
within a long tradition of understanding the motivation behind Gods redemption as deriving
only from Gods own nature and not from any value in creation. Against this view, one could
argue, with Vincent Brmmer, that if Gods love is not motivated by anything outside of God,
then God does not love us by free choice, since his love is necessitated by his own unchanging
nature, though not by the objects of his love.30 One could also argue, with Gary Badcock, that if
Gods love is not at all motivated by the goodness of the cosmos, then such a love distinguishes
too strongly between creation and redemption. Pure agape love cannot find or discover value in
its object, but can only create it. 31
Artistically, one could argue that Begbies theological model for art does not capture the
costly (i.e. vulnerable and risky) nature of human creativity. Begbies notion of the artist
honoring his material does not capture the costly nature of human creativity because he presents
the artists constraints as more like limiting factors that collaborating partners. The Romantic
tradition regarded human creativity as costly because the price of creative genius was thought to
be a life in isolation; a life obsessed with the pursuit of ones individual dream.32 In my view,
however, human creativity is costly because it takes place in a web of relationships over which
the individual cannot exert total control. The human creator is, fundamentally, a collaborator
whose endeavors are vulnerable and risky because he or she must respond to the needs of
others (e.g. materials, the self, other people and God). The space of composition, as Timothy
Clark puts it, includes a variety of forces beyond the artists agency that can affect the work in
both positive and negative ways.33 .
Begbie recognizes that creativity takes place within a corporate context.34 However,
because Begbies non-competitive view of the relation between Creator and creature excludes
eros from Gods loving creativity, his theological model shifts at this point to the intra27

Ibid, 201-3.
Ibid, 215-21.
29
Ibid, 253.
30
Brmmer, Model of Love, 132.
31
Gary Badcock, The Concept of Love: Divine and Human, in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays
on the Love of God, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 35-6.
28

32

The best articulation and critique of this tradition remains Mary Shelleys Frankenstein.
Timothy Clark, The Theory of Inspiration (Manchester University Press, 2000), 28.
34
Voicing, 180.
33

Trinitarian relationships.35 While the perichoretic relations are a picture of fully satisfied mutual
dependency, whatever vulnerability or risk may be involved in these relations must be
remarkably unlike the human experience of vulnerability and risk. It is my view that the
Creators kenotic relation to creation provides a better theological model for the costliness of
human creativity.
Creativity as Sacrifice
The modern kenotic tradition is, to say the least, fraught with controversy. All outright
dismissals of kenoticism, however, are too hasty and there is much that contemporary
theologians can learn from this long tradition.36 Stephen Sykes argues that the persistent
exploration of kenotic Christologies throughout the Christian tradition is due to the relationship
between kenosis and Christian ritual: kenosis is part of the logic of sacrifice; whereby power
accrues to the believer by its opposite.37 Sykes writes that sacrifice is a process of
communication between the deity and humanity, in which the bridge is a gift, in the Christian
case a gift of Gods own son.38
The connection between the concepts of kenosis and sacrifice is very apparent in
Philippians 2:6-11. The key Greek word here is the verb keno (in noun form kenosis), which is
translated as emptied himself or self-emptying. Some have approached this concept by asking
of what Jesus empties himself. Approaching kenosis in this way seems to disrupt the flow of the
text which, rather than asking us to consider what Jesus gives up, asks us to consider what Jesus
takes on. In these verses, Jesus is the subject of many actions, but there is one action that he
does not do. And this action is harpagmon, to grasp, to use to ones own advantage. Instead,
Jesus empties himself, and this action is related to a series of verbs that Paul subsequently
deploys. Jesus takes on the form of a slave, is born in human likeness, is found in human form,
is humbled and becomes obedient. This series of actions gives the passage a sense of swift
movement that links Jesus self-emptying to his death on the cross.
These verses present a story about Jesus that Paul wants his readers to adopt as a pattern
of thinking, feeling and acting.39 This story helps them to see that, even though suffering is a
present reality for many Christians, God is still at work in this suffering, and there will come a
time when this suffering will be no more. In similar fashion to what Sykes calls the logic of
sacrifice, our own apparent suffering, seen in the light of Christs suffering, can in fact point to
its opposite: victory.
There is also a sense in which the sort of vulnerability that Paul wants for the Philippians
the kind of vulnerability that puts anothers needs first is, unlike suffering, not a passing
reality. It makes sense to see the contrast Paul makes between selfish ambition and acting as if
another is superior in verses 1-4 of chapter 2 paralleled in his contrast between Jesus not using
his equality with God to his own advantage, and instead emptying himself. In other words,
35

Ibid, 180.
David Brown, Divine Humanity: Kenosis and the Construction of a Christian Theology (Baylor University Press,
2011; C. Stephen Evans, ed., Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God (Oxford University Press,
2006).
37
The Strange Persistence of Kenotic Christology in Being and Truth: Essays in Honour of John Macquarrie, ed.
Alistair Kee and Eugene T. Long (London: SCM Press, 1986), 361.
38
Ibid, 364.
39
This language is borrowed from Stephen Fowl, Philippians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005).
36

emptying ones self, kenosis, is always a pattern for Christian living, but Christians will not
always suffer.
One way to stress the difference between Begbies model and my own is to say that
Begbie emphasizes the doxological nature of Christs mediation, while I am emphasizing the
sacrificial nature of Christs mediation. That the Christian life should be interpreted in light of
Christs suffering and death is not contentious. Pauls strategy of encouraging Christians to view
their lives through the pattern of Christs sacrifice is not limited to Philippians.40 What the
suffering and death of Christ may mean for God, however, is the subject of much more debate.41
To help us see how a kenotic relation between Creator and creature might provide a
theological model for human creativity, let us consider the writings of William Vanstone (192399). Vanstone was an ordained priest in the Anglican Church. Although he never accepted an
academic post, he wrote three books, Loves Endeavour, Loves Expense,42 The Stature of
Waiting43 and Farewell in Christ,44 which reflect a cohesive and powerful theological vision. In
comparison to Begbie, the most distinct contribution that Vanstone makes is his suggestion that
divine creativity creates its own need for the creature.
The kenotic relation between Creator and creature in Vanstones writings is not mere
rhetoric because it entails a cost for God.45 This cost is seen most clearly in Vanstones
suggestion that God has the ability to become the passive object of the cosmos. He grounds this
theological move in a reading of Christs suffering. According to Vanstone, the gospels of Mark
and John signal an important shift in the Garden of Gethsemane when Judas hands Jesus over to
the Jewish authorities.46 Both Mark and John emphasize this twist in Jesus life by portraying
him, after the incident in the garden, as more like a passive object than the active agent who
performs miracles and changes lives. Vanstone illustrates this shift by pointing toward Jesus
words I thirst upon the cross:
Once Jesus offered and promised to assuage the thirst of others: now He needs and
seeks the assuaging of His own thirst, and those who come to Him come not to drink
but to raise a drink to the lips of Jesus. The situation is reversed: Jesus appears now
as the object of that activitythe assuaging of thirstof which, in the earlier phase,
He had claimed to be, and had been, the subject.47
40

Other examples include Rom. 6:1-14, 8:17, 12:1,2; Eph 5:2, 5:25; 2 Cor. 4:7-15; 12:9-10; Gal. 2:19-20: 5:24; 6:14.
For a now classic articulation of a God who suffers in Jesus death see Jrgen Moltmann, The Crucified God
(London: SCM Press, 1974). For a recent defense of an impassible God see Thomas Weinandy, Does God Suffer?
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000).
42
(London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1977).
43
(New York: Morehouse Publishing, 1982).
44
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1997).
45
Talking about God's creative actions as costly naturally raises questions about God's providence, foreknowledge
and sovereignty. I do not have enough space here to wade into the recent debates between classical and open
theists. However, it is important to point out that Vanstone's theology of creation does highlight an important and
too often ignored tension in the biblical narrative. As David Fergusson puts it, in the biblical narrative Gods
sovereignty is surely proclaimed, yet as far as we can tell, that sovereignty does not function unproblematically.
See Divine Providence and Action, in Gods Life in Trinity, ed. by Miraslov Volf and Michael Welker (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2006). Other books that highlight the costliness of God's providence in the Bible include Terrence
Fretheim, The Suffering of God: an Old Testament Perspective (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984) and John
nd
Sanders, The God Who Risks, 2 Edition (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2007).
46
Stature of Waiting, 17-33.
47
Ibid, 28.
41

Of particular significance to Vanstone is the Greek wordparadidomithat the gospel writers

use to describe Judas betrayal.48 Vanstone observes that the verb paradidomi is, in itself, a
neutral, ambivalent word, and translating it as betrayal can obscure this. Vanstone believes
that Judas is considered by the gospel writers to be the one who merely hands over Jesus, and
that Jesus passion is freely accepted, and not forced upon him by his betrayer.
Vanstone fleshes out the significance of Gods choice to need his creatures in terms of a
story about human creativity. He recalls a time when two boys came to him looking for
something to do on their holiday break from school. Vanstone suggested that they build a model
of an area around a waterfall in the West of Ireland which both he and the boys had recently
visited. He told them where they could find materials, offered them a room for their project, and
gave them some instruction on how to begin.
Although the project began without much excitement, it quickly became an obsession:
they would work long hours and miss meal times. He notes how
the placing of each stone and twig was a matter for careful discussion. Each was, as
it were, surveyed and its possibilities assessed. One would be split or cut so that it
would fit a certain place. It would be placed: and then came the moment of waiting
to see if it was right.49
Vanstone goes on to say that
As the model grew and became of greater value, each step in its creation became of
greater moment and was taken with greater intensity of care. Each item that was
placed seemed to possess greater power to make or to mar. [...] The once
contemptible sticks and stones now had a certain power over those who were using
them -- a power to effect or negate the completion of that which was being made, and
so to satisfy or frustrate those who were making it. The two boys became vulnerable
in and through that which, out of virtually nothing, they had brought into being.50
Vanstone pulls out three important aspects of his story. First, the boys had to wait and see if
that which emerged was right.51 Second, the boys gave to their workmanship a certain
power52 over themselves that it would not have had were it not their workmanship. Third, the
disproportion between creator and workmanship is overcome by the gift of value. He calls
the act of creation the work of love,53 and it is only love that solves the mystery of why the
particularities of creation are so important to the creator, or why contemptible sticks and stones
can become the holiday obsession of two boys. These elements form the heart of Vanstones
comparison between divine and human creativity.

48

49

50

Ibid, 1-16.
Loves Endeavour, Loves Expense, 31.

Ibid.
Ibid, 33.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid, 34.
51

Vanstone views Gods act of creation as a loving bestowal of value, and the incarnation
as the portrayal of the cost of divine redemption as God seeks to reclaim the value that was lost,
and to bring the world to a good end. Unlike Begbies understanding of the love manifested in
both creation and redemption, Vantones includes a desire an element of eros for the value of
the cosmos. Similarly, the costly nature of human creativity derives from the value, the time and
energy, that human creators pour out upon the objects of their efforts.
In light of Vanstones theological model, constraints upon human creativity take on a
more positive, even collaborative role. Because this power of response lies outside the boys
control, their activity is risky even in the midst of an activity that is clearly purposive and
directed toward an end. It is at this point that one sees the significant difference between
Vanstones understanding of creativity and the non-competitive theology offered by Begbie.
Vanstone argues that the response of the creature has the power to affect God and to affect the
course of divine creativity, but that this power is granted by God to the creature. He arrives at
the paradoxical conclusion that God waits upon a response from the creature that he cannot
provide, but that he nevertheless created.
If one takes Vanstones model for human creativity seriously, one can accept
vulnerability and risk as positive components of ones creative endeavours. Some examples
from the arts may help to explain what I mean.
The contemporary land artist Andy Goldsworthy encourages his own vulnerability to the
possibility that his work will fail. Many of his sculptures take on the character of pure geometric
shapes and volumes (such as circles, spirals, cubes, cones, lines, etc.) Geometry provides
Goldsworthy with a creative tension that contributes to sculptures that are full of energy. In an
interview about a recent installation at the Palacio de Cristal in Madrid, he discussed some of the
difficulty and joy of working within a geometrically defined space. He says,
What I am trying to make is related to the building, but the materials that I choose to
work with are very strong and theres a resistance there, so Ill never achieve
perfection And I know that when I actually undertake to make this sculpture in
Madrid that I will have a real love-hate relationship with it; I already anticipate some
anxiety about failing, or about parts of the work failing. But I also know that when I
leave and come back and look at it again, that wrongness will give it life. I think that
if I could control it completely, the sculpture would have deadness about it.54
Somewhat ironically, striving for perfection provides Goldsworthy with an element of
vulnerability that he perceives as actually enhancing the quality of his work.
Goldswothys art is an interesting example of how Vanstones kenotic understanding of
the relation between Creator and creature might be applied to the relationship between artist and
material, but what about the artists relationship to her audience? One might think of the way in
which works of art often possess an excessiveness beyond the artists original intention. As
Rowan Williams puts it,
Imagination produces not a self-contained mental construct but a vision that escapes
control, that brings with it its shadow and its margins, its absences and ellipses, a
dimensional existence as we might call it.55
54
55

Goldsworthy, En las entraas del rbol, 183, emphasis added.

Grace and Necessity: Reflections on Art and Love, (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse, 2005), 147.

There is no need to propose the death of the artist. Instead, one might think of the relationship
between artist and audience as like a dialogue in which both contribute to the meaning of the
work. Kendall Walton has proposed thinking about works of art as like props in games of makebelieve.56 His view highlights the sense in which artistic creativity is typically for others, and the
artist cannot control, nor even anticipate, all of the various games that others will play with their
work. This lack of control over the interpretations of their works need not be scorned by artists,
but may be seen as an opportunity to engage the audience in creative participation.
Vanstone offers a kenotic vision of Gods creativity in which the Creator freely chooses
to take on vulnerability and risk in relation to the cosmos. For the artist, however, vulnerability
and risk are typically experienced as necessary components of creativity. As the above examples
suggest, the theological model of creativity as sacrifice helps us to see these costly aspects of
human creativity not simply as hindering or limiting the human creator, but also as making a
positive contribution to the creative work.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have endeavored to present a theological model for human creativity. I
approached the notion of creativity as sacrifice by way of a more careful and attentive reading
of Begbies Voicing Creations Praise than has yet been attempted. It was my goal to
constructively criticize Begbie project. I identified several areas of agreement, but I also posed
questions that led me in a different direction. I then turned to the writing of William Vanstone
for assistance in fleshing out what it might mean to look at human creativity in light of Christs
sacrificial love. It was my argument that, in comparison to Begbies theological model, viewing
human creativity as sacrifice is more theologically coherent and more artistically appropriate. In
the course of this argument, however, it will be obvious to many readers that there are still many
more questions to be answered. On the theological side, a God who freely chooses to need raises
a host of metaphysical issues that must be addressed. Futhermore, speaking of the Creators
desire, vulnerability and risk must be justified by a careful reading of scripture. On the artistic
side, more dialogue is needed with philosophy and the social sciences. Claims about the costly
nature of human creativity can be explored in greater detail by carefully interpreting the
experience of human creativity. Clearly there is more work to be done. In addition to presenting
one way of reflecting theologically on human creativity, I hope that this essay also has shown
that doing theology of art can be an exciting task that searches for connections between a variety
of disciplines.

56

Mimesis as Make-Believe (Harvard University Press, 1993).