Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DALLAS COUNTY
12/23/2014 10:51:18 PM
GARY FITZSIMMONS
DISTRICT CLERK
Teresa Jones
NO. DC-14-14655
CITY OF DALLAS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JGC DALLAS, L.L.C., GOLDEN
PRODUCTIONS, L.L.C. and 11327
REEDER ROAD (in rem),
Defendants.
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This Court has jurisdiction of all parties to the suit due to their location
and operation in Dallas County, Texas. Further, this Court has jurisdiction under the
DEFENDANTS COUNTERCLAIM INCLUSIVE OF THIRD PARTY ACTIONS Page 1
Declaratory Judgments Act, Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Sections 15.001, 15.011, 15.012 and 15.013 of
the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.
jurisdiction and waived any claim of sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 41A-11,
Dallas City Code. Counter-Plaintiffs and Third Party Counter-Plaintiffs claims under
Chapter 41A, Dallas City Code are so related to claims in this action and arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence that they form part of the same case or controversy.
Parties
3.
conjunction with Foster, Jaguars) is a Texas limited liability company with its sole
place of business in Dallas County, Texas. JGCs predecessors have operated a licensed
adult business at 11327 Reeder Road, Dallas, Texas since approximately 1998. JGC has
operated an adult cabaret at this location since 2012. Third Party Counter-Plaintiff
Bryan Foster (Foster) is an individual and the Alicensee@ who holds the license under
which JGC operates. Counter-Defendant City of Dallas, Texas (City or Dallas) is a
home rule city located in Dallas County, Texas. Third Party Counter-Defendant David
Brown (Brown or the Chief) is sued solely in his official capacity as the Chief of
Police for the City of Dallas. Counter-Defendant and Third Party Counter-Defendant
may be served with process as follows:
David Brown
Chief of Police
City of Dallas
1400 S. Lamar Street
Dallas, Texas 75215
Preliminary Facts
4.
Jaguars seek to enjoin the application of this section and have same
Section 41A-10
provides:
(b)
5.
Chapter 41A, Section 41A-10(b)(2) of the Dallas City Code mandates the
revocation of a sexually oriented business license for a mere allegation that an operator
allowed possession of a controlled substance by a third party unrelated to Jaguars on the
premises. However under the same Ordinance, this same offense could not be used as a
basis to deny the renewal of a license even if
Foster) was the person charged with the crime and (b) the licensee had been criminally
convicted since the crime is unrelated to the Licensee=s fitness to operate a SOB (see
Section 41A-5(a)(8) listing the offenses which would prohibit issuance of a license).
This use of allegations of an employee allowing third party criminal conduct as the basis
to revoke a sexually oriented business license would terminate all future protected
expression at the licensees premises for one (1) year. The use of past conduct by
customers or an employee such as a waitress to revoke a license constitutes a prior
restraint of expression prohibited under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and Article 1, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. Chapter 41A, Section 41A-10(b)(2)
The Ordinance defines an operator to be any person with on-site, day-to-day managerial control of
the sexually oriented business regardless of whether that person is actually a Designated Operator as
discussed hereinbelow.
2
The definitions of who is a Alicensee@ or an Aapplicant@ as set forth in the Ordinance are virtually
identical. The only distinction is that an SOB license Awill be issued@ to an applicant and a license Ahas
been issued@ to a licensee.
also violates the criteria for ordinances which implicate First Amendment rights as set
forth in United States v. O=Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). This section of the Ordinance
allows a license to be revoked without a showing of culpability or mens rea on the part
of the Licensee, or its ADesignated Operators@3. This provision does not further a
governmental interest unrelated to suppression of free expression as it does not in part,
evaluate the conduct of the licensee. Additionally, this section=s restriction on First
Amendment freedoms is greater than necessary to further any governmental interest
because it terminates a business license based on the Astrict liability@ of the licensee for
the failure of employees to prevent criminal acts. Jaguars further avers that the stated
criteria for the business license revocation is properly viewed as a mere pretext to
suppress and prohibit the constitutionally protected expression which Jaguars features in
that the City has undertaken a course of conduct to shut down a venue it has labeled a
Ateenage drug club@ despite the fact that the activities are licensed, allowed and
protected. The use of draconian means to revoke business licenses causes the license
requirement itself to become a prior restraint designed to suppress the content of the
expression in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1,
Section 8 of the Texas Constitution.
6.
Jaguars both substantive and procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
The City amended its SOB Ordinance in 2008 to create the required position of Designated
Operator. One or more Designated Operators must be identified in the application, must be present on
the premises during all hours of operation, must submit criminal histories and other required documents
as per Section 41A-7.1 and be otherwise qualified to be a licensee.
3
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution.
Revocation of the existing license by the Chief of Police is based solely upon
allegations of conduct by third parties which the reporting officer(s) allege constitute a
crime. No criminal charges have been filed against the Licensee or any Designated
Operator of Licensee. Any charges which have been filed are based merely on an
indictment. There has been no trial to determine if customers/entertainers/employees
engaged in conduct prohibited by the Penal Code of the State of Texas or the criminal
statutes of the United States much less if such conduct was knowingly allowed by the
Licensee. Each of the alleged offenses are defined pursuant to the applicable provisions
of the statutes to be crimes punishable by imprisonment and thus, the state, in the
appropriate criminal forum, will have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the alleged conduct occurred.
7.
Foster, Athe person in whose name a license to operate a sexually oriented business has
been issued . . .@ (41A-2(18)) or a Designated Operator or any high managerial
employee knowingly allowed prohibited criminal acts on the premises operated by JGC.
Nonetheless, the Chief would use the mere allegation of misconduct by a customer, an
entertainer or employee to revoke the license. Section 41A-11 indicates that if the Chief
revokes a license, he must first deliver to the licensee by certified mail, return receipt
requested, or hand delivery written notice of the action and the right to an appeal. The
Ordinance provides a period of thirty (30) days in which to make an appeal to a state
district court after receipt of notice of the decision of the Chief of Police (41A-11(d)).
A copy of the letter of revocation received by the licensee on December 16, 2014 is
marked Exhibit AB@, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Plaintiffs
appeal under the Ordinance stays a . . . revocation pending a judicial determination of
the appeal by the trial court, Chapter 41A-11(d). The City takes the position that the
notice hand delivered to counsel and/or JGCs registered agent on December 11, 2014
meets the notice requirements of the Ordinance. Even though the SOB Ordinance
provides thirty (30) days to appeal and even though an appeal stays the revocation, the
City further takes the position that until the appeal is filed, the City may begin
enforcement on the eleventh (11th) day after notice. This appeal is filed on the 10th day
after the City claims Jaguars was notified.
8.
The use of a mere allegation by the City to deny a license has already been
found to not pass constitutional scrutiny. See Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F.Supp. 106
(N.D. Tex., 1986) wherein Judge Buchmeyer struck down provisions of the Citys first
SOB Ordinance which allowed the denial of a license to an applicant who was Aunder
indictment or misdemeanor information@. Therein the Court found that Aan indictment
or information is not evidence of an applicant=s guilt, but merely indicates . . . an ex
parte procedure navigated solely by a prosecutor . . .@. Id. at 1074. Despite this
holding, the City is again using mere allegations to revoke Plaintiffs= license. Almost
twenty (20) years later, in Millennium Restaurants Group, et al. v. City of Dallas, Cause
No. 3:01-CV-0857-G, the Court again struck down provisions of the Citys subsequent
SOB Ordinance which Acalls for the automatic revocation of the license without
permitting any inquiry into the culpability of the licensee for the unlawful act@. See,
Memorandum Order of Judge A. Joe Fish entered February 21, 2002. Although on its
face, the current Ordinance confers discretion on the Chief of Police, (AChief of Police
shall revoke . . . if the Chief . . . determines . . . that a licensee has knowingly allowed . .
.@) the City in the present case is indifferent to the culpability of the licensee. Instead,
without any inquiry to or discussion with Jaguars, it immediately revoked the license
based merely upon indictment or arrest of a third party (again, no Designated Operator
or managerial employee has been charged). The Court in Millennium Restaurants
previously found the strict liability feature of the Ordinance was constitutionally suspect
because it did not relate to or further the governmental interest of assuring law abiding
licensees. Moreover, the Court found that imposition of strict liability which the City
argued was a system of Ajustified punishment under a theory of respondent superior@ to
be inappropriate since as in the present case, it would involve judicial approval of
restrictions on the future exercise of First Amendment rights and/or place the licensee in
a Aresponsible relation@ to unlawful conduct which involved imprisonment; neither of
which is supported as a matter of law. See Lady J Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville,
176 F.3d 1358, 1367 (11th Cir. 1999, cert. denied), 529 S.Ct. 753, 2000. In summary,
Judge Fish found that the City=s attempt to revoke a sexually oriented business license
on the basis of criminal convictions based solely on employee conduct was an
unconstitutional prior restraint of First Amendment rights citing Universal Amusement
Company, Inc. v. Vance, 587 F.Supp. 159 (5th Cir. 1978) en banc, aff=d., 445 U.S. 308
(1980) and held that the license revocation was not justified under the third and fourth
prongs of the test set forth in O=Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)4. A true and correct
copy of the Memorandum Order entered by Judge Fish on February 21, 2002 is attached
hereto as Exhibit AC@.
9.
Jaguars rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the SOB
Ordinance of the City. As set forth above, they seek a legal determination of the
construction and validity of same pursuant to C.P.R.C. Section 37.004 and otherwise
(i.e., the Declaratory Judgment Act). In accordance with C.P.R.C. Section 37.006, the
Attorney General of the State of Texas has been served with a copy of Jaguars
Counterclaim and Third Party Action. Jaguars has retained the Law Offices of Roger
Albright to represent them and they seek an award of costs including reasonable and
necessary attorneys fees pursuant to C.P.R.C. Section 37.009.
10.
If the City and the Chief are allowed to proceed with the revocation of
JGCs license, under Chapter 41A, Section 41A-10(b)(2) irreparable harm will result to
Jaguars. The threatened injury to Jaguars outweigh the threatened harm to the City. The
granting of injunctive relief will not disserve the public interests and there is a
substantial likelihood that Jaguars will prevail on the merits. A strong presumption of
The OBrien test states that a content-neutral ordinance survives a constitutional challenge,
despite its adverse impact on the exercise of First Amendment rights, when (1) it is within the
constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial government interest;
(3) the asserted government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the
incidental restrictions on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to furtherance
of that interest (391 U.S. at 377).
DEFENDANTS= ORIGINAL ANSWER INCLUSIVE OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIM - Page 9
customers and goodwill created over a number of years creating a monetary loss which
is difficult to calculate. If, for any reason, the City asserts that the revocation is not
stayed pending final trial of this matter pursuant to Chapter 41A-11(d), JGC requests
that a temporary injunction be entered restraining the Counter-Defendant/Defendant
from revoking the Plaintiffs= sexually oriented business license, and that the status quo
be preserved until this Court enters a final judgment including the adjudication of the
constitutionality of Chapter 41, Section 41-A-10(b)(2), Dallas City Code both facially
and as applied. All conditions precedent to the filing of the Petition have been met.
There are no pending administrative proceedings and further proceedings under the
Ordinance would be futile.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Counter-Plaintiff and Third Party
Counter-Plaintiff pray that the Court grant relief as follows:
1.
of JGCs sexually oriented business license based on the provisions of Chapter 41,
'41A-10(b)(2) Dallas City Code or otherwise and to maintain the status quo pending
final trial;
2.
Following final trial, the Court enter an Order declaring Chapter 41,
applied in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Sections 3 and 8 of the Texas Constitution, (as defined by O=Brien) as it
contains no mens rea requirement, which negates Licensee=s responsibility for the acts
which are the basis of the license revocation. The qualification of the licensee is not
considered by Chapter 41A, Section 41A-10(b)(2), therefore the revocation of the
license based on the acts of an employee is a greater restriction on expression than
necessary to achieve the governmental objective;
4.
37.009;
5.
6.
Such other and further relief to the Court seems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been
served upon the below-listed counsel of record, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
District Courts ECF system on this the 23rd day of December, 2014:
Ms. Melissa A. Miles
Ms. Anna Welch
Assistant City Attorneys
1500 Marilla Street, Room 7BN
Dallas, Texas 75201
/s/ Roger Albright________________
Roger Albright
EXHIBIT "A"
C4lA
SEC. 4lA-1.
CHAPTER41A
Sec.4IA-I.
Sec.4IA-2.
Sec.4IA-3.
Sec.4IA-4.
Sec.4IA-5.
Sec.4IA-6.
Sec.4IA-7.
See. 4IA-7.I.
See.4IA-B.
Sec.4IA-9.
Sec.4lA-lO.
See.4lA-1O.I.
Sec.4IA-IO.2.
,l,
41A2
Sec.4IA-H.
Sec.4IA-12;
Sec. 4IA-13.
Sec.4IA-14.
Sec. 4IA-14.I.
Sec.4IA-14.2.
Sec.4IA-15.
Sec. 4IA-16.
Sec.4IA-17.
See. 4IA-IB.
Sec.4IA-IB.I.
See.4IA-19.
Sec. 4IA-20.
See. 4IA-20.1.
Sec. 41A-2I.
Sec. 41A-22.
Sec. 4IA-23.
Definitions.
Classifica tion.
required.
Issuance of license.
Fees.
Inspection.
Identification records.
Expiration of license.
Suspension.
Revocation.
criminal convictions.
license.
Appeal.
Transfer of license.
Location of sexually oriented
businesses.
Exemption from location restrictions.
Exterior portions of sexually
oriented businesses.
Sign requirements.
Additional regulations for escort
agencies.
Additional regulations for nude
model studios.
Additional regulations for adult
motion picture theaters.
Additional regulations for adult
motels.
cabarets.
ma terial to minors.
Enforcement.
Injunction.
SEC. 41A-2.
DEFINITIONS.
In this chapter:
(1) ACHROMATIC means colorless or
lacking in saturation or hue. The term includes, but is
not limited to, grays, tans, and light earth tones. The
term does not include white, black, or any bold
coloration that attracts attention.
(2) ADULT ARCADE means any place
to which the public is permitted or invited wherein
coin-operated or slug-operated or electronically,
electrically, or mechanically controlled still or
motion picture machines, projectors, or other image
producing devices are maintained to show images to
five or fewer persons per machine at anyone time,
"'~
Dallas City Code
7/08
.1
41A-2
l,:
41A-2
(9)
APPUCANT means:
f
is distingUished by or
characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting,
simulating, describing, or relating to "specified
anatomical areas" or "specified sexual activities."
(8)
L
2
41A2
41A2
and
who:
(A) is listed as a part-time, fuIl
business; or
performs or provides
(B)
entertainment on the sexually oriented business
premises for any form of compensation or
consideration.
(16) ESCORT means a person who, for
consideration, agrees or offers to act as a companion,
guide, or date for another person, or who agrees or
offers to privately model lingerie or to privately
perform a striptease for another person.
(17) ESCORT AGENCY means a person or
business association that furnishes, offers to furnish,
or advertises to furnish escorts as one of its primary
business purposes, for a fee, tip, or other
consideration.
7/08
~41A-2
41A2
amended.
II
.
(J.
.
I
I
I
I
I
l!
l,
,rI
~
I
Dallas City Code
7/08
t
t
41A-2
41A3
the business;
control.
(C)
masturbation,
actual
or
simulated; or
(D) excretory functions as part of or
in connection with any of the activities set forth in
Paragraphs (A) through (C) of this subsection.
24440;24699;25296;27139)
SEC. 41A3.
follows:
(1)
adult arcades;
(2)
(3)
adult cabarets;
(4)
adult motels;
(5)
(6)
stores;
CLASSIFICATION.
i1
!
!
!
,f
!
Dallas City Code
4/10
l,l41A-4
SEC. 41A-4.
OPERATOR REQUIRED.
I.. .
41A-S
I
I
!
I
SEC. 41A-S.
ISSUANCE OF UCENSE.
An applicant is a minor.
L,
&
I
I
I
~
4/10
41A-5
41A-5
(h h) possession of child
pornographYi
(ii) any of the following
offenses as described in Chapter 21 of the Texas Penal
Code:
(5)
not been paid.
or
Reserved.
child;
(A) involving:
(i) any of the following
offenses as described in Chapter 43 of the Texas Penal
Code:
(a a) prostitution;
(bb) promotion
of
for which:
prostitution;
(cc) aggravated promo
tion of prostitution;
(dd) compelling prosti
tution;
(ee) obscenity;
(if) sale, distribution,
or display of harmful material to a minor;
by a child; or
4/10
41A-7
FEES.
INSPECTION.
(.,
Dallas City Code
4/10
I~
IDENTIFICATION RECORDS.
(2)
(3)
Date of birth.
(4)
(5)
41A-7.1
weight.
(6) Current residence address and
telephone number, and, for designated operators and
adult cabaret entertainers, all residence addresses
during the 12~month period preceding commencement
of an employment or contractual relationship with
the sexually oriented business.
4/10
I
Ii
,i
}
!
(...,l41A-7.1
41AI0
EXPIRATION OF LICENSE.
Each license expires one year from the date of
issuance, except that a license issued pursuant to an
exemption to a locational restriction expires on the
date the exemption expires. A license may be
renewed only by making application as provided in
Section 41A-4. Application for renewal should be
made at least 30 days before the expiration date, and
when made' less than 30 days before the expiration
date, the expiration of the license will not be
affected by the pendency of the application. (Ord.
Nos. 19196; 205S2;21838; 24440; 24699; 27139)
SEC. 41A-9.
SUSPENSION.
(a)
,
,
The chief of police shall suspend a license for a
Veriod not to exceed 30 days if the chief of police
determines that a licensee, an operator, or an
employee has:
SEC. 41A-I0.
REVOCA TION.
10
4/10
41A-IO
REVOCATION, OR DENIAL OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS.
1
i
7/08
41A-IO.2
ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL OF
LICENSE OR SUSPENSION OR
REVOCATION OF LICENSEi
SURRENDER OF LICENSE.
41AI0.2
(.;.
41A13
TRA~SFER
OF LICENSE.
~os.24440i24699;27139)
SEC. 4IA1l.
APPEAL.
~
",
LOCATION OF SEXUALLY
ORIENTED BUSINESSES.
a church;
a public park;
a hospital; or
(7)
a child-care facility.
7/08
41A-13
7/08
13
41A13
(.;
(3)
SEC. 41A-14.
41A-14
RESTRICTIONS.
(a) H the chief of police denies the issuance of
a license to an applicant because the location of the
14
7/08
41A-14
SEXUALLY ORIENTED
BUSINESSES.
establishment;
41A-14.2
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
in length.
(c) A secondary sign may have only one
display surface. The display surface must:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(B)
7/oa
15
<..."
4IA-14_2
4IA-16
and/or
(2)
ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS
video store."
SEC. 41A-16.
(C) "Adult cabaret."
(D) "Adult mote!."
(E)
"Adult
(F)
"Escort agency."
(G)
motion
(a)
picture
ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS
Reserved.
7/08
41A-16
SEC 41A-17.
ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS
THEATERS.
SEC 41A-18.
ADDmONAL REGULATIONS
41A-18.1
7/08
17
~'lA'18.1
the business.
(g) Adult cabaret entertainment must occur
only in the presence of, and be visually observable by,
an employee who is not an adult cabaret entertainer.
A licensee or operator commits an offense if he
knowingly allows adult cabaret entertainment to be
performed in violation of this subsection.
(h) The purpose of Subsections (d), (e), (f), and
(g) of this section is to reduce the opportunity for
unlawful activity such as indecent exposure,
solicitation for prostitution, and prostitution that
occurs in VIP rooms and other areas of adult cabarets
that are not open to the view of management
personnel, law enforcement officers, and customers. By
prohibiting VIP rooms and requiring adult
entertainment to be performed in more open and
visible surroundings, unlawful activity will be
deterred because it will be more readily observable
by management personnel, law enforcement officers,
and customers. (Ord. Nos. 23137; 24440; 24699; 27139)
(..;EC. 41A-19.
REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO
EXHIBITION OF SEXUALLY
41A-19
18
7/08
41A-19
sexual
41A21
MINORS IN SEXUALLY
ORIENTED BUSINESSES.
offense if he knowingly:
cabaret entertainment; or
oriented business.
intercourse,
employee knowingly:
SEC. 41A-21.
ENFORCEMENT.
I
!
7/08
19
I
f
t:
'lA2'
41A-23
SEC. 41A-22.
INJUNCTION.
in a structure:
20
7/08
EXHIBIT "B"
"
City of Dallas
December t t, 2014
,/
.'
Page 2
Bryan Foster
December 11, 2014
Pursuant to the Dallas City Code, this revocation may be appealed to the Pennit and
License Appeal Board or a state district court. An appeal to the Pennit and License
Appeal Board must be made within 10 calendar days after the receipt of this notice or it
becomes finaL An appeal to the state district court must be filed within 30 days after the
receipt of this notice.
Any questions concerning the ordinance or the appeal process should be directed to the
Dallas City Secretary's Office at 214-670-3738.
Sincerely.
DAVID O. BROWN
CHIEF OF POLICE
~~
Deputy Chief of Police
Narcotics Division
Investigations Bureau
Dallas Police Department
EXHIBIT "C"
----I
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. FEB2Iml!
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MILLENNIUM RESTAURANTS
GROUP, INC., d/b/a CABARET
ROYALE, ET AL.,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
: '11,..' ...... ,
Fy
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)
)
AND
3:01-CV-0857-G
)
)
)
)
)
Intervenors,
)
)
~.
)
)
Defendants.
..
-~-.-- ~-
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Bolton ("Bolton").l For the reasons discussed below, the motion for summary
judgment is granted.
I. BACKGROUND2
-2
-3
Based on an ostensible concern for the effect that a sexually oriented business
such as the one operated by Millennium can have on surrounding neighborhoods,
Chapter 41A imposes significant obstacles to the opening of adult cabarets and other
establishments featuring erotic entertainment and expression. MSJ at 4; Plaintiffs'
Appendix at 7, 8, IS. There are, among other things, restrictions on lawful locations
for such businesses (Sec. 41A-13), special licensing requirements (Sec. 41A-4), and
limitations on the individuals who may hold licenses (Sec. 41A-5). MSJ at 4-5;
Chapter 41 A, Plaintiffs' Appendix at 15, 7, and 7-10, respectively. Millennium has
met all of the statutory requirements for the presentation of erotic dance to the
public and it has done so continually and lawfully for years. MSJ at 5; Plaintiffs'
Appendix at 61-62.
The City proposes to revoke Millennium's license on the basis of 41A
1O(b) (6) of Chapter 41A, a provision of the Sexually Oriented Business Ordinance
which states:
(b) The chief of police shall revoke a license if the chief of
police determines that one or more of the following is true:
***
(6) On two or more occasions within a 12-month period, a
person or persons committed an offense occurring in or on
the licensed premises of a crime listed in Section 41A
-4
4
Section 41A-5(a)(8)(A)(ii)(aa) defines public lewdness as an actionable
offense. MSJ at 5, n.3; Plaintiffs' Appendix at 8-9.
-5
This statutory indifference to the culpability of the licensee is carried over into
the operation of the ordinance in practice. MSJ at 6; Plaintiffs' Appendix at 13,24,
57-58. A dancer who has accused of violating the ordinance is sent a notice by mail
of a misdemeanor violation. MSJ at 6; Plaintiffs' Appendix at 58. The license holder
is not given notice of the first, or of any subsequent, citation. MSJ at 6; Plaintiffs'
Appendix at 57-58. Once two convictions have been obtained, the chief of police
must revoke the license. MSJ at 5; Chapter 41A, 41A-IO(b)(6), Plaintiffs' Appendix
at 12-13.
All of the convictions for public lewdness on which the City proposed to
revoke the license at issue here were based on conduct occurring during the course of
a dance performance. MSJ at 7; Plaintiffs' Appendix at 61. The conduct involved
was protected expression which at some point crossed the line from lawful to
unlawful.
II. ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show
that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving parties are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
FED.
5
The disposition of a case through summary judgment "reinforces the
purpose of the Rules, to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
(continued... )
-6
law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving part[ies]." Id. The
movants make such a showing by informing the court of the basis of their motion and
by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material
fact issues. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, must demonstrate that no genuine
issue of material fact exists. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
Once the movants make this showing, the nonmovants must then direct the
court's attention
to
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 32324. To carry this
burden, the "opponent[s] must do more than simply show ... some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Zenith
&dio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmovants must show
that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in their
favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
5( ... continued)
actions, and, when appropriate, affords a merciful end to litigation that would
otherwise be lengthy and expensive." Fontenot v. Upjohn Company, 780 F.2d 1190,
1197 (5th Cir. 1986).
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While all of the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
motion's opponents, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. /Cress &
Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)), neither conclusory allegations nor
unsubstantiated assertions will satisfy the non-movants' summary judgment burden.
Little v. Liquid Air Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc);
Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992).
1. The Cifj1's Attempt to Revoke Millennium's License Constitutes an
In Universal Amusement Company, Inc. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en bane), aJfd, 445 U.S. 308 (I980), the Fifth Circuit noted that "[a] prior restraint
of expression comes before [theJ court with 'a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity.'" Id. at 165, citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1963). In Vance, the Fifth Circuit considered an effort by Texas authorities to
close an adult theater for one year as a public nuisance on the basis of its showing of
legally obscene, and therefore unprotected, material. The court, in language directly
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applicable to the present situation, found that the use of the nuisance statutes to
accomplish this end would be unconstitutional, holding that:
Read together, Articles 4666 and 4667 clearly create a
prior restraint. The statutes allow the state to close, for
one year, a theatre that has exhibited obscene films.
Unless a bond from $1,000 to $5,000 is posted, the
showing of any motion picture is punishable by contempt
of court. Thus, future conduct that may fall within the
purview of the first amendment is absolutely prohibited
after a finding of unprotected present conduct. It was
precisely this practice that was condemned by the Supreme
Court in the landmark case of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931). Moreover, although a theater operator may
post the bond and show films, he forfeits that bond if one
of the films he has selected is deemed obscene. This
statutory scheme obviously encourages a theater operator
to steer wide of the danger zone by avoiding borderline
films that are nonetheless protected under the first
amendment. The line between obscenity and protected
speech is "dim and uncertain," Bantam Books, supra, 372
U.S. at 66, and difficulty in locating that line leads to self
censorship, a particularly subtle and most insidious form of
the malady.
business has crossed the line from lawful to unlawfu1. 6 Plaintiffs' and Intervenors'
Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("PI Motion") at 11; see also
GayeO' Theatres, Inc. v. CiO' ojMiami, 719 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding
that a city could not use past conduct to enjoin future protected speech).
The City argues that Vance does not apply to this situation and points out that
the "owner or operator remains free to open another business and still engage in
protected activity." Brief in Support of Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment and for Permanent Injunction ("MSJ Response") at 7.
Contrary to the City's assertion, however, Section 41A-10(e) prOvides:
When the chief of police revokes a license, the revocation
vvill continue for one year, and the licensee shall not apply
for or be issued a sexually oriented business license for one
year after the date the revocation became effective.
The continuing validity of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Vance and its
relevance to erotic dancing was expressly acknowledged last year in Chief Judge
Buchmeyer's opinion in LLEH, Inc. v. Wichita CounO', Texas, 121 F. Supp.2d 513
(N.D. Tex. 2000), which strudc down an injunction provision in a local ordinance
governing erotic dancing on the authority of Vance, on the ground that it would
constitute "an unconstitutional prior restraint of free expression entitled to protection
under the First Amendment." 121 F. Supp.2d at 527.
6
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16. The City argues that Millennium and others whose licenses are procured through
the ordinance should be held strictly liable through a theory of respondeat superior
because the ordinance violations are public welfare crimes. Id. The City urges that
Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1367 (11 th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053
(2000). To support this assertion, the City relies on United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658 (1975), and Ladyf. Lingerie, Inc. v. CttyofJacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1367 (11th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053 (2000). Neither of these cases, however,
involved judicial approval of restrictions on the future exercise of First Amendment
rights. Respondeat superior has never been applied, so far as the court can determine,
in the context the City urges. Furthermore, Section 41A-I O(b) (6) does not involve
criminal sanctions. The court declines to create new law that would hold license
holders liable under a theory of respondeat superior.
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granted. MSJ Response at 18. The City, however, misapprehends the doctrine of
qualified immunity. "[QJualified immunity is not a defense
to
[a plaintiffs] claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief[.]" See Yates v. Stalder, 217 F.3d 332, 333, n.2
(5th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, Bolton is being sued in his official capacity, not as an
individual,
to
actions against public officials in their official capacities, the doctrine of qualified
immunity plays no part, prohibiting neither the grant of injunctive relief, nor the
award of attorney's fees. See Jackson v. Galan, 868 F.2d 165,168 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that attorney's fees may be awarded against a public official even when the
official is immune from money damages); see also Monell v. Department ofSocial
Services if City if New York, 436 U.S. 658, 700 (1978) ("Indeed, municipalities simply
cannot 'arrange their affairs' on an assumption that they can violate constitutional
rights indefinitely since injunctive suits against local officials under 1983 would
prohibit any such arrangement.") Therefore, for the reasons discussed, Bolton's
assertion of qualified immunity is inapplicable.
B. Millennium's Motion for Permanent Injunction
The standard for a permanent injunction is "essentially the same" as for a
preliminary injunction, in that the plaintiff must show (I) the existence of a
substantial threat of irreparable harm that outweighs any harm the relief would
accord to the defendants, (2) that there is no adequate remedy at law, and (3) that
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granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest. See Calmes v. United
States oj America, 926 F.Supp. 582, 590 (N.D. Tex. 1996). To justify a permanent
injunction, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate actual success on the merits,
rather than a likelihood of success. Id. at 591. As discussed above, Millennium has
demonstrated actual success on the legal merits with respect to its First Amendment
challenges to Chapter 41A.
A'l for irreparable injury to Millennium, the court reiterates the position it
it would suffer irreparable injury to its constitutional rights if the injunction is not
granted. The court agrees with Millennium's assertion that the topless dancing
featured at their cabarets is expressive conduct "within the outer ambit of the First
Amendment's Protection." City oj Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000);
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991). Further, when a case involves
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finds that Millennium has shown that it would suffer irreparable injury if the
injunction were not granted. Millennium has further shown that the threatened
harm to it -- the closing of its business and infringement upon its First Amendment
rights -- outweighs the harm to the City. The City alleges that there will be potential
secondary effects from the granting of an injunction, such as a rise in criminal public
lewdness and prostitution. The court, however, agrees with Millennium, MSJ at 17,
that a halt to the license revocations would pose a minimal threat to the City. Just as
the City has amended Chapter 41A in the past, so it may amend the ordinance again
to comply with the First Amendment. Furthermore, the City has police power to
help control the secondary effects of adult establishments. The injunction granted
herein does not, for example, prohibit the City from arresting entertainers or anyone
else who violates the city ordinance prohibiting "lewd conduct" or violates any other
law in or on Millennium's premises.
Finally, the court finds that Millennium has shown that granting the
injunction will not disserve the public interest. The City argues that the public
interest will be disserved because the City has an important governmental interest in
ensuring that sexual criminal conduct does not occur on the premises of a sexually
oriented business, and that if this injunction is granted, the owners and operators of
sexually oriented businesses would be free to permit this conduct to occur on their
premises without any threat of losing their license to operate. MSJ Response at 22.
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The court disagrees. As discussed above, the granting of a permanent injunction does
not prevent the police from arresting those who violate the City Code or state law by
engaging in criminal activity at the establishments owned and/or operated by
Millennium. Nor does the granting of an injunction prevent the City from amending
Chapter 41A to comply with the First Amendment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Millennium's motion for summary judgment
on its claim for permanent injunction against the City and Bolton is GRANTED.
Within fifteen days of this date, counsel for the plaintiff shall submit a proposed
form of judgment in conformity with this memorandum order.
Funhermore, Millennium is entitled to attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.c.
1983 and 1988. Counsel shall confer to see if agreement on the amount of such
fees can be reached. If agreement is possible, counsel shall submit, within fifteen
days of this date, an agreed order requiring payment by the City in the amount
agreed upon. If agreement is not possible, counsel for Millennium shall submit,
within fifteen days of this date, a motion for the award of such fees, supponed by
affidavit and any necessary documentation. The timing of any response or reply will
be governed by the local rules of this coun.
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SO ORDERED.
February ~, 2002.
A JO FIS
Chief Judge
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