G.R. No.

L-29745

June 4, 1973

MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner, vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al., respondent.

Facts:

At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away
from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute
shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the Institute were present and they,
together with the registrar, tried to calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be afraid because
the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across the street.
They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. Mrs. Justitia Prieto, one of
the instructresses, took to the microphone so as to convey to the students the above admonitions more effectively, and she even slapped
three students in order to quiet them down. Miss Frino Meliton, the registrar, whose desk was near the stairway, stood up and tried with
outstretched arms to stop the students from rushing and pushing their way to the stairs. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the
students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby
causing stampede therein.
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of
plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede.
The injuries sustained by Lourdes Fernandez consisted of lacerations in both eyes and on the upper lip, contused abrasions in different parts
of the body, internal hemorrhage and fractures in the second and third right ribs. The cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was
"Shock due to traumatic fractures of the ribs with perinephric hematoma and lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes."
Sec. 491.
Firepro of partitions, exits and stairways. ... All buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise
known as accessorias having less than three stories, having one or more persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently,
and all public or quasi-public buildings having less than three stories, such as hospitals, sanitarium, schools, reformatories, places of
human detention, assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or panciterias, and the like, shall be provided with at least two unobstructed
stairways of not less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the
perpendicular, in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided when required by the chief of the fire
department, said stairways shall be placed as far apart as possible.

Issue:
WON the Ordinance in question only pertain to public buildings?
WON the neglect of respondents to comply with the ordinance is the proximate or remote cause of the incident and that the numerous
events that occurred were sufficient intervening causes to support the fact that the failure of respondents to comply with the Ordinance was only
the remote cause of the death/injuries of the students?
Held:
The ordinance is also applied to private buildings.
The failure of respondents to comply with the Ordiance is the proximate cause of the incident.
Ratio:
It will be noted from the text of the ordinance, however, that it is not ownership which determines the character of buildings subject to its
requirements, but rather the use or the purpose for which a particular building is utilized. Thus the same may be privately owned, but if it is
devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance for instance as a school, which the Realistic Institute precisely was then the
building is within the coverage of the ordinance. Indeed the requirement that such a building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of
only one (1) has no relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership, but does have such relation to the use or purpose for which the
building is devoted.
According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the
violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in
the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time,
in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure
of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation was undue
overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the
single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go
down. But it was precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway
would be adequate for the occupants of the building. Thus, as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence, page 841: "The general principle is that the
violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent." To consider the

violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to
say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by
requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate
cause applies to such violation.
*Sub issue:
A procedural point mentioned by the petitioner is that the complaint did not specifically allege that the ordinance in question had been
violated. The violation, however, as an act of negligence which gave rise to liability, was sufficiently comprehended within paragraph 7 of the
complaint, which reads: .
Par. 7. That the death of Lourdes Fernandez was due to the gross negligence of the defendant who failed to exercise due care and diligence for
the safety of its students in not providing the building with adequate fire exits and in not practicing fire drill exercises to avoid the stampede,
aside from the fact that the defendant did not have a permit to use the building as a school-house.

G.R. No. 72964

January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see
what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the
irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A
quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier
hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano
but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on
said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the
incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio
councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report

the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health
physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no
available medicine. After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a
medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the
medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize
their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When
admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found
that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could
have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital.

Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latters death, or was it due to Javiers own fault that his
wound was infected with tetanus and thus causing his death and also constituting a sufficient intervening cause to extinguish any criminal liability
of Urbano pertaining to Javiers death.
Held:
Urbano did not cause the death of Javier, it was the latters carelessness that led to his demise.
Ratio:
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death
which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanusThe incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur
within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and
patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the
familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus.
The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the
region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend
upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation
period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful
and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing
frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia
may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but
dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset
time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for
severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged,
generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied) Therefore, medically
speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him.
This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and
muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day
after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days.
Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus

after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a
few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.

G.R. No. L-15688

November 19, 1921

REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

The facts as appearing from the agreed statement, in relation with the complaint, are to the effect that the defendant Railroad Company
operates a line through the district of Daraga in the municipality of Albay; that on January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed over said line,
a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to four houses nearby
belonging to the four plaintiffs respectively, and the same were entirely consumed. All of these houses were of light construction with the
exception of the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa and cogon. The fire
occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind was blowing at the time. It does not appear either in the complaint
or in the agreed statement whose house caught fire first, though it is stated in the appellant's brief that the fire was first communicated to
the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, from whence it spread to the others.
In the fourth paragraph of the complaint which is admitted to be true it is alleged that the defendant Railroad Company was
conspicuously negligent in relation to the origin of said fire, in the following respects, namely, first, in failing to exercise proper supervision
over the employees in charge of the locomotive; secondly, in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated without
having the smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks; thirdly, in using in its locomotive upon this occasion Bataan coal, a
fuel of known inferior quality which, upon combustion, produces sparks in great quantity.

The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of Remigio Rodriguez stood partly within the limits of the land owned by
the defendant company, though exactly how far away from the company's track does not appear. It further appears that, after the railroad
track was laid, the company notified Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed position.
Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestion, though he promised to put an iron roof on his house, which he never did. Instead, he
changed the materials of the main roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon this fact it is contended for
the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the
Railroad Company, and that for this reason the company is not liable. This position is in our opinion untenable for the reasons which we
shall proceed to state.

Issue:
WON it was the negligence of Rodriguez in failing to remove his house on the property of the reailroad company to balame for the cause of
the fire and not the railroad company?
Held:
No, there was no contributory negligence on the part of Rodriguez or any of the plaintiffs for that matter. The decision is founded on these
reasons:
The situation of Rodriguez was impliedly tolerated by the railroad company.
The house of Rodriguez was already built there even before the railroad company acquired the land for laying out its tracks.
The railroad company could have exercised the power of eminent to domain to remove the house of Rodriguez, but it failed to do so.
Ratio:
With respect to the case of Remegio Rodrigueza it is to be inferred that his house stood upon this ground before the Railroad Company laid
its line over this course; and at any rate there is no proof that this plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property in the act of
building his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is that the company, upon making this extension, had acquired the land only, leaving the
owner of the house free to remove it. Hence he cannot be considered to have been a trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was there at the
sufferance of the defendant company, and so long as his house remained in this exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that
might have resulted from fires occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to
have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and

defend himself against the possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use the care of the ordinary prudent
man. (Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co. vs. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. St., 182; 21 Am. Rep., 97.)
In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant
in causing this fire. The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant company and therefore in
dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that circumstance
cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition was not created by himself;
secondly, because his house remained on this ground by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly,
because even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it. (Grand Trunk
Railway of Canada vs. Richardson, 91 U. S., 454; 23 L. ed., 356; Norfolk etc. Ry. Co. vs. Perrow, 101 Va., 345, 350.)lawphil.net
The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line near Remigio Rodrigueza's house, had requested or directed him to
remove it, did not convert his occupancy into a trespass, or impose upon him any additional responsibility over and above what the law itself
imposes in such situation. In this connection it must be remembered that the company could at any time have removed said house in the exercise
of the power of eminent domain, but it elected not to do so.

G.R. No. L-47851

October 3, 1986

JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS, and JUAN F. NAKPIL, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., JUAN J. CARLOS,
and the PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, respondents.
Facts:

The plaintiff, Philippine Bar Association, a civic-non-profit association, incorporated under the Corporation Law, decided to construct an
office building on its 840 square meters lot located at the comer of Aduana and Arzobispo Streets, Intramuros, Manila. The construction
was undertaken by the United Construction, Inc. on an "administration" basis, on the suggestion of Juan J. Carlos, the president and general
manager of said corporation. The proposal was approved by plaintiff's board of directors and signed by its president Roman Ozaeta, a thirdparty defendant in this case. The plans and specifications for the building were prepared by the other third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil
& Sons. The building was completed in June, 1966.
In the early morning of August 2, 1968 an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and its environs and the building in question sustained
major damage. The front columns of the building buckled, causing the building to tilt forward dangerously. The tenants vacated the building

in view of its precarious condition. As a temporary remedial measure, the building was shored up by United Construction, Inc. at the cost of
P13,661.28.
On November 29, 1968, the plaintiff commenced this action for the recovery of damages arising from the partial collapse of the building
against United Construction, Inc. and its President and General Manager Juan J. Carlos as defendants. Plaintiff alleges that the collapse of
the building was accused by defects in the construction, the failure of the contractors to follow plans and specifications and violations by
the defendants of the terms of the contract.
Defendants in turn filed a third-party complaint against the architects who prepared the plans and specifications, alleging in essence that
the collapse of the building was due to the defects in the said plans and specifications. Roman Ozaeta, the then president of the plaintiff Bar
Association was included as a third-party defendant for damages for having included Juan J. Carlos, President of the United Construction
Co., Inc. as party defendant.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendants could escape liability from the building due to a fortuitous event which is unforeseeable and inevitable even
if their negligence is established.
Held/Ratio:
The defendants cannot validly invoke the Act of God defense. This is because of the report submitted by the appointed Commissioner
which established their negligence. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by reason
of any defect. To exempt the obligor from its liability these requisites should first concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation
of the injury to the creditor. The report of the Commissioner established that the defects that occurred to the building could be attributed to the
act of man specifically that of the architects and the engineers as well as the builders. This was because of the fact that UCC deviated from the
plans submitted by the architects and their failure to observe the required marksmanship in constructing the building as well as the required
degree of supervision. Nakpil & Sons are also liable for the inadequacies and defect in their submitted plan and specifications. These
circumstances are the proximate causes of the damages that the PBA building incurred. The costs are to be paid by the defendants amounting to
5M which includes all appreciable damages as well as indemnity plus 100,000php for the atty fee.
One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act
of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.

GR 165413

February 22, 2012

PHILAM INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and AMERICAN HOME INSURANCE CO., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and D.M. CONSUNJI INC.,
Facts:

Four gensets from the United States of America were ordered by Citibank, N.A. (Citibank). Petitioner AHIC insured these gensets under
Certificate No. 60221 for USD 851,500 covering various risks. The insurance policy provided that the claim may be paid in the Philippines by
Philam Insurance Co., Inc, AHICs local settling agent.
Citibanks broker-forwarder, Melicia International Services (MIS), transported the gensets in separate container vans. It was instructed by
Citibank to deliver and haul one genset to Makati City, where the latters office was being constructed by the building contractor, DMCI.
MIS was further instructed to place the 13-ton genset at the top of Citibanks building. The broker-forwarder declined, since it had no power
cranes. Thus, Citibank assigned the job to private respondent DMCI, which accepted the task.
On 16 October 1993, DMCI lifted the genset with a crane (Unic-K-2000) that had a hydraulic telescopic boom and a loading capacity of 20
tons. During the lifting process, both the cranes boom and the genset fell and got damaged.
The events leading to the fall, based mainly on the signed statement of DMCIs crane operator, Mr. Ariel Del Pilar, transpired as follows:
The genset was lifted clear out of the open top container by the crane. After clearing the container van, the crane operator, Mr. Ariel del
Pilar, had to position the genset over the vicinity of the storage area. To do this, the boom of the crane carrying the generator set had to be
turned (swing) to face right and stopped when it loomed over the storage area. The genset was swinging as it came to a stop following the
right turn. The crane operator waited for the genset to stop swinging for him to perform the next maneuver. The boom had to be raised
three (3) degrees more from its position at 75 degrees, up to 78 degrees. At 78 degrees the genset could be lowered straight down to the
delivery storage area.
The genset stopped swinging. The crane operator proceeded to raise the boom to 78 degrees. While so doing, the crane operator felt a
sudden upward movement of the boom. The genset began to swing in and out, towards the crane operator, then outward and away. The
body of the crane lifted off the ground, the boom fell from an approximate height of 9 feet, first hitting a Meralco line, then falling to the
ground.
After two days, DMCIs surveyor, Manila Adjusters & Surveyors Co. (MASC) assessed the condition of the crane and the genset. According to
its Survey Certificate, the genset was already deformed.
Citibank demanded from DMCI the full value of the damaged genset, including the cost, insurance and freight amounting to USD
212,850.[14] Private respondent refused to pay, asserting that the damage was caused by an accident.
Thereafter, Citibank filed an insurance claim with Philam, AHICs local settling agent, for the value of the genset. Philam paid the claim for
PhP 5,866,146.

Claiming the right of subrogation, Philam demanded the reimbursement of the gensets value from DMCI, which denied liability. Thus, on 19
April 1994, Philam filed a Complaint with the RTC to recover the value of the insured genset.
At the trial court, petitioner Philam did not invoke res ipsa loquitur. Rather, during the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on this sole
issue: Whether or not the damage was the fault of the defendant or within their area of supervision at the time the cause of damage
occurred.

Issue:
WON Philam Insurance Co. successfully proved that DMCI was negligent in the performance of their agreement to lift the genset to the
storage are of CITIBANK and is thus held liable for damages.
Held:
No, the events that transpired was an accident.

Note: In this case, res ipsa loquitur is not applicable, since there is direct evidence on the issue of diligence or lack thereof pertaining to the lifting
of the genset. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.
In any event, res ipsa loquitur merely provides a rebuttable presumption of negligence. On this, we have already pointed out that the evidence
does not prove negligence on the part of DMCI, and that due diligence on its part has been established.
Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome when the plaintiff has
knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence that caused the injury complained of; or when there is direct
evidence as to the precise cause of the accident, and with all the attendant facts clearly present. Finally, neither the presumption nor the doctrine
would apply when the circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no inference of the defendant's liability can reasonably be made,
whatever the source of the evidence.
Absent any finding of negligence, we sustain the CAs findings that DMCI exercised due diligence; that the event is an accident; and that
consequently Philam cannot claim damages for the damaged genset.

Ratio:
For DMCI to be liable for damages, negligence on its part must be established. Additionally, that finding must be the proximate cause of the
damage to the genset. We agree with the CA that Philam failed to establish DMCIs negligence.
Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a conduct that involves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage; or,
more fully, a conduct that falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonably great risk of harm.
Philam blames the conduct of DMCIs crane operator for the gensets fall. Essentially, it points out the following errors in operating the crane:
First, Del Pilar did not give any reason for his act of raising the boom from 75 to 78 degrees at the stage when the genset was already set for
lowering to the ground.
Second, Del Pilars revving of the motor of the boom triggered the chain of events starting with the jerk, then followed by the swinging of the
genset which was obviously violent as it caused the body of the crane to tilt upward, and ultimately, caused the boom with the genset to fall.
It would be a long stretch to construe these as acts of negligence. Not all omissions can be considered as negligent. The test of negligence is as
follows:
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to
take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Applying the test, the circumstances would show that the acts of the crane operator were rational and justified.
Addressing Philams first submission, this Court finds that the records are replete with explanations for why the boom of the crane had to be raised
from 75 to 78 degrees. Although the boom is already in the general area of the gensets storage place, still, it had to be raised three (3) degrees in
order to put it exactly in the proper designation. At 78 degrees, the genset could be lowered straight down to the delivery/storage area. DMCIs
crane operation team determined accordingly that there was a need to raise the boom in order to put the genset in the exact location. Indeed, the
heavy equipment must be secured in its proper place.
Proceeding to the more contentious claim, Philam emphasized the apparent inconsistencies in Del Pilars narration. In his signed statement,
executed 15 days after the incident, Del Pilar stated that when he raised the boom from 75 to 78 degrees, he revved the motor, upon which he felt
the sudden upward movement (jerk) of the boom followed by the swinging of the genset.

Even if Del Pilar failed to mention the slow manner of raising the boom in his earlier signed statement, the reverse is not necessarily established.
Persons are easily liable to commit errors in the recollection of minute details of an important occurrence.
Alternatively, Philam asserts that if care was exercised in operating the crane, and yet the genset was damaged, then it must have been the very
crane itself that was defective.
We cannot give credence to mere conjectures and assumptions on the condition of the crane to prove negligence. In Picart v. Smith, the Court
stressed that abstract speculations cannot be of much value:
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn
of danger.
The speculative assertion of Philam should be supported by specific evidence of the cranes defects. Instead, Philam utterly failed to contradict the
findings of MASC which made an actual site inspection to observe the crane used in lifting the genset. In its Survey Certificate, it stated that:
*U+pon close examination, the crane was observed in actual operation and found to be in satisfactory working condition.
Since Philam failed to convince us of actions that would lay the blame on DMCI, this Court agrees with the CA that DMCI exercised the necessary
care and precaution in lifting the genset.
Firstly, a whole team was involved in transferring the genset. Petitioners did not even the question the acts of the other team members involved in
the crane operations.