Ko vs PNB

Facts:
Petitioners filed in the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 14 for Annulment of
Mortgage, Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale, Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-21064 and T-21065 and Deed of Sale with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and Restraining Order. The complaint alleged that the assailed mortgage and the
foreclosure proceedings were null and void since the written consent of petitioners,
as beneficiaries of the mortgaged property, were not secured. Respondent bank
denied the claim and alleged that in the execution of the mortgage, petitioners in
fact gave their consent.
During the course of the proceedings, petitioners and their counsel failed to attend
a scheduled trial. Upon motion of respondent bank, the complaint was dismissed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that they have been
continuously pursuing negotiations with respondent bank to purchase back the
property and have gained positive results. Respondent bank countered that from
the time the complaint was filed, a period of three years had elapsed but petitioners
failed to prosecute their case, showing lack of interest in the early resolution
thereof. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed an appeal in the Supreme Court.
Issue: W/N the appeal is proper.
Held: Petition is denied
Petitioners erred in filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court instead of filing an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Section 3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable
cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon the motion of
the defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the
court.
Upon the order of dismissal, petitioners counsel filed a timely motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Considering that an order of
dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on the merits,
petitioners counsel should have filed a notice of appeal with the appellate court

within the reglementary period.[5] Instead of filing a petition under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the proper recourse was an ordinary appeal with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 41, which provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.
(a)
Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party x x
x. (Emphasis supplied)
The rule is clear. In order to perfect an appeal all that is required is a pro
forma notice of appeal. Perhaps due to failure to file a notice of appeal within the
remaining two days of the appeal period, petitioners counsel instead filed the
instant petition. The rules of procedure, however, do not exist for the convenience
of the litigants. These rules are established to provide order to and enhance the
efficiency of our judicial system. They are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked
by mere expedience of invoking substantial justice. In Balindong v. Court of
Appeals[6] we stated:
Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when
for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules
of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to explain its failure to comply with the rules. Procedural
law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of
justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or whimsicality in the
settlement of disputes. The enforcement of procedural rules is
not antithetical to the substantive rights of the litigants. The
policy of the courts is to give effect to both procedural and substantive
laws, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution
of the dispute between the parties.

NOCUM V. LUCIO TAN

Doctrine: Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint
since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constitutin the
plaintiff's cause of action. Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may
be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates to trial and not jurisdiction. In
contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an
essential element of jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Lucio Tan filed a complaint for damages (moral and exemplary) for alleged
malicious and defamatory imputations against him in 2 articles of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer. Petitioners Inquirer and reporter Nocum , and ALPAP and Capt.
Umali, in their respective joint answers alleged that the complaint stated no
cause of action. ALPAP and Capt. Umali also alleged that the venue was
improperly laid. The complaint failed to state the resdience of complainant Lucio
Tan at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where
the libelous article was printed and first published.
RTC of Makati: Complaint was dismissed without prejudice on the ground of
improper venue
Lucio Tan filed an omnibus motion seeking reconsideration and admission of the
amended complaint now alleging that "This article was printed and first
published in the City of Makati" and that " This caricature was printed and first
published in the City of Makati."
RTC then set aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the defect in the
original complaint has already been cured in the Amended complaint which can
still be properly admitted purusuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of CivPro since
the Order of Dismissal was not yet final. Also, the amendment was merely
formal.
2 petitions for certiorari were then filed (one by Nocum and PDI, one by ALPAP
and Umali) but CA dismissed the petition. The motions for reconsideration were
likewise denied. Thus, the appeal at the SC. After the filing of comment by Tan
and the reply filed by PDI and Nocum, SC resolved to give due course to the
petition.
Contention of PDI and Nocum: Art 360 of RPC vests jurisdiction over all civil and
criminal complaints for libel on the RTC of the place (1) where the libelous article
was printed and first published; or (2) where the complainant, if pirivate person,
resides; or (3) where the complaint, if a public official, holds office. Thus, since
the original lcomplaint stated only the business adress of Lucio Tan and not his
actual residence or the place of printing and first publication, the original
complaint failed to confer jurisdiction on the RTC.
iSSUE:/ HELD:
Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case on the basis of the original
complaint? YES.
RATIO:
Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the
latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
causes of action. Here. RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was
filed before it. Tan's cause of action is for damages arising from libel, jurisdiction of
which is vested with the RTC. Art. 360 of RPC provides that is the CFI that is
specifically designated to try a libel case.
Jurisdiction is different from venue. (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
determine a case while venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b)

Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue is a matter of procedural law; (c)

Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter, venue
establishes a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, or the petitioner and
the respondent; and (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the
parties while venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In this case, the additional allegations in the Amended Complainant as to place of
printing and first publication referred only to the question of venue and not
jurisidiction. They would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would failure to
include them divest RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. Tan's failure to allege these
allegations gave the court, the power upon motion by a party, to dismiss on the
ground that the venue was not properly laid.
The amendment was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court,where
originally it had none. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for
the action. Venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction except in criminal actions.
Assuming that the venue was improperly laid, the issue would be procedural, not a
jurisdictional impediment. In civil cases, venue may be waived. By dismissing the
case on the ground of improper venue, RTC had jurisdiction over the case. PDI and
Nocum recognized RTC's jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint by
questioning the propriety of venue instead of a motion to dismiss.
Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do
not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than
substantive. Venue relates to trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal
actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of
jurisdiction.
Estoesta vs. CA
Facts:
October 7, 1974 spouses Simeon Estoesta Sr. and Lucia Estoesta, filed an action for
the annulment of the sale of a house and lot located at 54-A Legaspi Street, Project
4, Quezon City, more particularly described as Lot No. 14-a, Block No. 461 now Lot
No. 28, Block No. 61, made by petitioners' daughter Trinidad Estoesta in favor of
private respondent Luis Villamor.
Payments of the monthly amortizations to the Philippine Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) were made by petitioners through their daughter Trinidad
Estoesta; that for convenience and in order to facilitate transactions with the PHHC,
petitioners acceded to Trinidad Estoesta's request that the house and lot be
transferred in her name so the former executed a document transferring their rights
to the latter; that because of the simulated Transfer of Rights, upon full payment of
the value of the house and lot, PHHC executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Trinidad
Estoesta; that Trinidad Estoesta obtained TCT No. 145066 on September 19, 1969
from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

Trinidad Estoesta executed on August 5, 1974 another Deed of Sale in favor of

private respondent Luis Villamor.
Court renders judgment in against defendants Trinidad Estoesta with cancellation
and reconveyance of Title in favor of petitioners.
Motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied.
Filed an appeal in appellate court with motion for 30 days extension to file an
appeal that was favorably granted.
Petitioners, thru counsel, filed a motion to set aside the Order and to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the appeal was not perfected on time and the decision
dated August 15, 1978 had become final and executory.
Appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court upholding the validity of the
sale. Motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied.
Issue: W/N the lntermediate Appellate Court acquire jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal despite the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.
Held:
Petition is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals sought to be implemented
in
Civil
Case
No. 19319 being null and void, it cannot therefore, be legally executed.
Private respondent filed his notice of appeal, appeal bond and motion for extension
of time to file record on appeal only on August 7, 1979, hence, clearly the appeal
was not perfected within the reglementary period. All these notwithstanding
petitioners' motion to dismiss the appeal was denied by the trial court and when
reiterated in the Court of Appeals, it was not acted upon, even when said Appellate
Court promulgated it decision adverse to petitioners.
Well-settled is the rule that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
reglementary period allowed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. If
no appeal is perfected on time, the decision becomes final and executory by
operation of law after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal.
Being final and executory the decision in question can no longer be altered,
modified, or reversed by the trial court or by the appellate court.
Judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction has no binding force and effect.