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The Mathematical
Basis of Bergson's
Philosophy
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Robin Durie
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University of Exeter
Published online: 21 Oct 2014.

To cite this article: Robin Durie (2004) The Mathematical Basis of

Bergson's Philosophy, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology,
35:1, 54-67, DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2004.11007422
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Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 35, No. I, January 2004

THE MATHEMATICAL BASIS OF BERGSON'S

PHILOSOPHY
ROBIN DURIE

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To create a healthy philosophy you should renounce metaphysics but be a good

mathematician.
Russell, Lecture, 1935

The original impetus for the divergence in the trajectories of analytic and
continental philosophy during the 20th century has, in recent years, become
a subject of scrutiny for both traditions. Most writers are agreed that the two
traditions share a more or less common point of departure, represented by
the shared concerns of Husserl and Frege at the start of the century. After
this, it is argued that Husserl's transcendental tum in Ideas (1913) marks the
moment at which the continental tradition begins to veer away from the
analytic tradition. Subsequently, a fundamental commitment to interiority,
and an affirmation of the irreducibility of subjectivity, are seen to be
hallmarks of the continental tradition. In contradistinction, the analytic
tradition has striven for objectivity. The methodological model to which it
has aspired in seeking to attain this objective has been scientific, and
specifically, mathematical, reflected in the central role accorded to logic by
the analytic tradition. From this perspective, it could therefore be argued
that the two traditions have been developing in opposition a twofold legacy
of Cartesianism - on the one hand, the analytic tradition seeking objectivity
by means of a contemporary reinterpretation of the more geometrico
delineated in the 'Reply to the Second Set of Objections', while, on the
other hand, the continental tradition re-enacts the subjective turn of
Descartes' Meditations.
Arguments of this nature highlight the fact that much of the suspicion of,
and indeed antipathy towards, the style of continental philosophy stem from
a conviction that continental philosophy fails to engage with the
mathematical or logical grounds of an adequate philosophical methodology.
It is just such a conviction that underpins the single text which did as much
as any other to provoke analytic philosophy's disenchantment with the
practices of its continental European sibling, namely, Russell's address to
The Heretics at Cambridge, on the evening of 11th March, 1912. This lecture
was subsequently published simultaneously by Open Court as 'The
Philosophy of Bergson' in volume 22 of The Monist (July, 1912), and as a
separate pamphlet bearing the same title. A revised version of the paper was
then included in Russell's History of Western Philosophy (1945). 1
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Developing the perspective outlined in my opening remarks, I will proceed

to demonstrate how Russell bases his attack on Bergson on mathematical
grounds. I will then seek to assess the extent to which Russell's attack on the
inadequacy of the mathematical basis of Bergson's philosophy - and hence,
as a consequence, on Bergson's philosophy as a whole - is valid. In
conclusion, I propose to indicate how a sufficient appreciation of the
mathematical basis for Bergson's philosophy not only serves to reveal the
gratuity of attacks such as those of Russell, but also opens up new avenues for
appreciating the contemporary significance of Bergsonism.
That mathematics will indeed provide Russell with the grounds for his
attack on Bergson is evident from the opening criticisms he directs towards
Bergson's theories of space and time. Russell begins by correctly identifying
the fundamental role played by the notion of 'separateness' in Bergson's
work. For Bergson argues that the tendency of the intellect is to view things
as separated from one another, and matter so viewed is that which is
separated into distinct things. 2 As a consequence:
things which really interpenetrate each other are seen [by the intellect] as separate solid
units: the extra-spatial degrades itself into spatiality, which is nothing but separateness. Thus
all intellect, since it separates, tends to geometry; and logic, which deals with concepts that
lie wholly outside each other, is really an outcome of geometry.'

This identification of separateness and spatiality is then extended to the

concept of number. Russell states that, in the first chapter of Time and Free
Will, Bergson 'contends that greater and less imply space, since he regards
the greater as essentially that which contains the less.' Russell then claims
that, in the second chapter of Time and Free Will, Bergson 'maintains the
same thesis as regards number.' 4 Taking as his cue Bergson's definition of
number- that 'Number may be defined in general as a collection of units, or,
speaking more exactly, as the synthesis of the one and the multiple' [TFW
75/(E 51] -Russell proceeds to argue that this definition, taken alongside
Bergson's identification of number with spatiality and separateness,
'suffice[s] to show ... that Bergson does not know what number is, and has
himself no clear idea of it.' 5
Russell's argument is straightforward. Bergson's thesis of number is, he
points out, in fact a thesis regarding various collections, to which numbers
may be applied. It is not, however, a thesis about these numbers themselves,
nor indeed about number as a general concept, a concept, namely, which
refers to a property common to any particular numbers. Whether or not
collections do indeed involve spatiality and separateness, it is most certainly
the case that both particular numbers per se and the general concept of
number do not. This is the case simply because both particular numbers and
the general concept of number are purely abstract, and as such, do not
involve any recourse either to space or to separateness. 6
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But what of actual collections, such as the collections of the months of the
year, the signs of the zodiac, and the apostles, to all of which the number 12
can be applied - do these provide sufficient grounds for supporting
'Bergson's contention that every plurality of separate units involves space?' 7
Russell thinks not, and refers to some of Bergson's own examples, such as
that of hearing a clock strike 12. Far from depending upon our 'rang[ing] the
strokes of a clock in an imaginary space,' Russell claims, most people 'count
them without any spatial auxiliary.' This being the case, it demonstrates that
spatialisation, and hence separateness, is not necessary for conceiving
collections. Russell therefore concludes that Bergson's recourse to number,
and hence mathematics, is wholly spurious, commenting that 'as regards
mathematics, he has deliberately preferred traditional errors in interpretation
to the more modem views which have prevailed among mathematicians for
the last half century.' 8
There is, then, from Russell's point of view, a way of doing philosophy
which trades in problems that emerge as a consequence of philosophers'
adherence to assumptions which themselves follow as a consequence of
these philosophers' failure to understand and adopt the findings of
contemporary mathematics. This very failure, we could then argue, is
perpetuated by the tradition of continental philosophy, whereas the analytic
tradition begins to describe its own distinctive trajectory from the moment
that it overcomes this failure.
Whether or not we might wish to give credence to such an account, it
nevertheless behoves us to reflect on the legitimacy of Russell's portrayal of
Bergson. What I now aim to show is that, in fact, Bergson's position is far
more nuanced than Russell allows, and indeed, that it is so precisely because
of his keen awareness of certain theoretical developments in the
'mathematics of the last half century.' In fact, this should not come as a
surprise, since, in 1877, Bergson won first prize in mathematics for the
Concours General, and, with the publication the following year of his 'plane
solution of Pascal' in Nouvelles Annates de Mathematique, it was assumed
that his academic future lay in geometry - indeed, it was expected that he
would enter the Ecole Normale to study mathematics. 9
The first clue we come across suggesting that all is not quite as Russell
makes out is to be found in the long footnote that Bergson appends to the
chapter heading which is itself immediately followed in the body of the text
by the definition of number cited by Russell. In this footnote, Bergson
admonishes a certain F. Pillon for failing to 'distinguish between time as
quality and time as quantity, between the multiplicity of juxtaposition and
that of interpenetration [penetration mutuelle].' Bergson then writes that 'it
is the chief aim of the present chapter to establish ... this vital distinction.'
He goes on to conclude the footnote by observing that 'the verb "to
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distinguish" [distinguer] has two meanings,' meanings which philosophers

have tended to confuse [TFW75-6/CE 51-2]. Let us note at the outset that this
notion of the multiplicity is the same as that which is cited in Bergson's
definition of number, namely, 'the synthesis of the one and the multiple.' 10
On the basis of this note, therefore, I propose to argue that the key to
understanding Bergson's philosophy in general, and his discussion of
number in particular, lies in an appreciation of the way he develops, hand in
hand, a 'theory of multiplicities' and a 'theory of distinctions.' In making
such a claim, I am in part taking my cue from the way in which Deleuze
chose to characterise Bergson's methodology in his pioneering work of the
1950s and 60s. Deleuze consistently argued that the decisive methodological
concept in Bergson's philosophy is that of 'multiplicity'. Thus, in
Bergsonism, he writes that the concept of multiplicity 'is essential from the
perspective of the elaboration of the method,' 11 and he subsequently draws
attention to the fact that multiplicity constitutes the 'fundamental theme of
[Bergson's] encounter with Einstein.' 12 Taking the arguments of Russell's
article alongside Bergson's apparently long-standing opposition to the
mathematisation of duration, it is clearly of the utmost importance to reflect
critically on the lineage of Bergson's appropriation of the concept of
multiplicity, which, as Deleuze has argued, derives in the first instance from
the German mathematician Riemann.
The point of departure for Riemann's thesis is the observation that
classical Euclidean geometry, as a deductive science, begins from a series of
assumptions about the nature of space and the basic constructions within
space, such as points and lines. These assumptions are expressed, as
Riemann notes, in a series of definitions 'which are merely nominal.' The
'essential determinations [wesentliche Bestimmungen]' pertaining to these
assumptions are in fact only set out in the axioms. But this approach begs the
question of 'whether and how far' the connection between the assumptions
about the nature of space, and the assumptions about the basic constructions
within such a space, is necessary, and indeed, of 'whether, a priori, it is
possible.' Riemann argues that this blind spot is a consequence of the fact
that the source of classical geometry is space as it is experienced in everyday
life. Geometry should, instead, begin from 'the general notion of multiply
extended magnitudes [der allgemeine Begriff mehrfach ausgedehnter
Grossen],' what we now know as 'n-dimensional spaces.'
Riemann therefore sets himself the first of two tasks, namely that of
'constructing the notion of a multiply extended magnitude out of general
notions of magnitude.' He specifies in tum that any such magnitude-notions
are themselves possible 'only where there is an antecedent general notion
which admits of different ways of determination [verschiedene
Bestimmungsweisen].' It is precisely such a general notion, capable of
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various ways of being determined, that Riemann intends in his recourse to

the concept of multiplicity. The key issue that will emerge from this
approach is the principle that 'a multiply extended magnitude is capable of
different measure-relations [verschiedene Massverhiiltnisse], and
consequently that space is only a particular case of a triply extended
magnitude.' Furthermore, because space is only one particular case of a
triply extended magnitude, there are no a priori properties of space which
distinguish it from other triply extended magnitudes. Rather, the
distinguishing properties of space can only be deduced from experience, and,
equally, 'the propositions of geometry cannot be derived from general
notions of magnitude.' Thus, Riemann identifies as his second task the
objective of discovering 'the simplest matters of fact from which the
measure-relations of space may be determined.' These matters of fact would
form the hypotheses for the geometrical system of Euclid; the problem then
remaining would be that of determining whether these hypotheses could be
extended 'beyond the limits of observation,' towards the infinitely great and
the infinitely small.l3
If we consider the various magnitude-notions which constitute the
differing ways in which multiplicity can be determined, then, Riemann
specifies, there are two sorts of multiplicity: on the one hand, a multiplicity
is continuous when 'there exists among these ways of determination a
continuous path [stetiger Obergang] from one to the other;' on the other
hand, a multiplicity is discrete when no such path exists. 14 Thus, in a
magnitude consisting in a determination of a discrete multiplicity, the
elements of this magnitude would be 'separate,' to the extent that no
'continuous path' exists between them.
What then is the relation between these two types of multiplicity, and the
'different measure-relations' of which 'multiply extended magnitudes' are
capable? If we 'distinguish [unterscheiden] ... determinate divisions
[bestimmte Teile]' of a multiplicity, by means, for example, of a 'mark
[Merkmal] or limit [Grenze],' then these determinate divisions of magnitude
can be compared with regard to 'quantity' either by means of 'counting
[Ziihlung]' in the case of discrete multiplicities, or by 'measuring [Messung]'
in the case of continuous multiplicities. Riemann specifies that measuring
'consists in the superposition [Aufeinanderlegen] of the magnitudes
compared.' Two magnitudes can be so compared only 'when one is part of
the other.' In such cases, however, 'we can only determine the more or less
and not the how much.' Furthermore, in the case of such continuous
multiplicities, these measured magnitudes cannot be regarded as 'existing
independently of position [or] as expressible in terms of a unit.' Instead, they
should be regarded as 'regions in a multiplicity.' 15 Thus, to the extent that
one magnitude may be superposed on to another magnitude, then one of

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these magnitudes functions as a 'measure [Mafistab]' for the other. However,

since the corollary of this is that, with regard to the compared magnitudes, it
is only the more and the less that can be determined, rather than the how
much, and that, as a consequence, such measured magnitudes cannot be
expressed in terms of a unit, then it must be concluded that the 'principle of
the metric relations [Princip der Mafiverhiiltnisse]' of a continuous
multiplicity 'must come from outside.' In the case of a discrete multiplicity,
on the other hand, 'the principle of its metric relations is given in the notion
of it,' precisely to the extent that its divisions of magnitude can be compared
with regard to quantity by means of a counting, the unit of which thereby
expresses the measured magnitude. 16
Today, there is absolute agreement regarding the 'classic' status of
Riemann's text within the history of mathematics. Equally, it is
acknowledged that the significance of Riemann's thinking wasn't fully
appreciated until Einstein was able to utilise the mathematical apparatus that
had been developed on the basis of Riemann's text to give rigorous
expression to the physical ideas underpinning his theory of relativity.
Bearing this in mind, let us now recall Russell's conclusion to his critique
of Bergson, namely, that Bergson's recourse to number, and hence
mathematics, is wholly spurious, and that 'as regards mathematics, he has
deliberately preferred traditional errors in interpretation to the more modem
views which have prevailed among mathematicians for the last half century.'
The implication of Russell's comment is that Bergson is ignorant specifically
about the developments in number theory which had taken place between
around 1860 and 1910. The traditional errors to which Russell refers would
appear to apply to the traditional philosophical theories of number Platonism, which holds that numbers are abstract entities existing
independently of the mind; psychologism, which claims that numbers are in
fact ideas in the mind (a theory initially held by Husserl in his Philosophy of
Arithmetic (1893), but then devastatingly undermined in the Prolegomena to
his Logical Investigations (1901)); and intuitionism, which argued that
number was a product of a process such as counting. Russell's emphasis on
the role of counting in his critique of Bergson suggests that he takes Bergson
to be an intuitionist. These traditional theories were ultimately supplanted by
the development of set-theory, on the basis of which numbers were viewed
as sets, such that the axioms of the theory of, for example, natural numbers i.e., arithmetic -were true to the extent that they were true of specific sets. In
turn, the properties of numbers, the relations between them, and the
operations which could be applied to them, were understood as properties of,
relations between, and operations on sets. This set-theoretical approach to
number was initiated by Cantor, on the basis of developments in pure
mathematics that had taken place during the latter half of the 19th century.
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To be sure, Bergson is not proposing a set-theoretical account of number.

But nor, I believe, is he simply reverting to one of the traditional theories,
such as that of intuitionism. Rather, the role of number arises specifically
within the context of his adoption of Riemann's theory of multiplicities, and
he adopts this theory precisely to enable an account of time to be developed
which neither reduces to, nor relies upon, a more fundamental spatiality. I
will examine the legitimacy of Bergson's recourse to the Riemannian theory
of multiplicities in due course, but first I want to confirm that Bergson does
indeed return to Riemann, and at the same time to show how this move
undermines Russell's specific criticisms, as well as the more general claim
he makes, that the flaws in Bergsonism can be traced back to its inadequate
mathematical foundation.
Time and Free Will shares with many of Bergson's other works the
conviction that seemingly insurmountable problems in the history of
philosophy - in this case, that of free will - may in fact be a consequence of
the analytic tendency of language and conceptual thought to establish precise
distinctions. The accomplishment of such distinctions rests upon a certain
discontinuity between concepts, or the things which are represented by such
concepts. But, Bergson claims, this discontinuity also characterises space,
and so, he proceeds to argue, it may well be the case that, in its analytic
tendency, conceptual thought is 'illegitimately translating' the 'unextended
[l'inetendu] into the extended, quality into quantity,' thereby introducing
contradictions into thought which are the mark of the 'confusion of duration
[Ia duree] with extensity [l'etendue], of succession with simultaneity, of
quality with quantity.' [TFW xix-xx/CE 3] Now, while it is evident that
Bergson is, from the outset, establishing a series of equivalencies - between
quantity and extensity, which are properties appropriate to space, on the one
hand; and between duration, quality and the unextended on the other - the
more fundamental notion is that of discontinuity. Equally, the force of this
argument also depends on Bergson being able to establish the reality of the
non-discontinuous, which, by implication, characterises duration, quality and
the unextended.
The first chapter of Time and Free Will begins to respond to this latter
objective by examining the admissibility of the practice of 'psychophysics,'
that branch of psychology which seeks to measure the intensity of psychic
states. Bergson's argument is that, in order to measure psychic states, the
intensities would have first to be quantified. Bergson then proceeds to
demonstrate that intensive states cannot be thus quantified, and therefore
cannot be measured. However, in arguing in this way, Bergson does not want
to deny that there are indeed differences between psychic states. Rather, he
will seek to establish that such differences are qualitative in nature rather
than quantitative. But in what does this distinction consist?

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In order to quantify anything, it is necessary that a number be applied to

what is to be quantified. Then when comparing objects to which numbers
have been so applied, we are able to determine which of the objects is the
greater on the basis of the 'unequal spaces' occupied by each of the objects
numbered. Specifically, we are able to make this comparison because of the
fact that 'we call that space the greater which contains the other.' [TFW 2/(E
5] This early remark is the basis for Russell's claim that Bergson 'contends
that greater and less imply space, since he regards the greater as essentially
that which contains the less.' 17 But is Russell correct to go on to claim that
Bergson thereby identifies number with space, an identification which would
betray 'that Bergson does not know what number is,' thereby undermining
his philosophical position to the extent that it is founded on a theory of
number?
Certainly, Bergson wants to argue that the relation of container to
contained does not apply to intensive states (we will return to his reasons for
arguing in this way shortly). But it is the precise way in which he formulates
this point that is instructive: he writes that 'intensities ... are unable to be
superposed on each other [ne sont pas choses superposables].' This failure
inevitably returns us to the issue, therefore, of whether indeed 'an intensity
can be assimilated to a magnitude [grandeur].' [TFW 2/(E 6] Bergson's
point here is to draw attention to the fact that people tend to claim that,
although intensity cannot be measured whereas extensity can, nevertheless,
both intensity and extensity can be assimilated to magnitudes, and as a
consequence, we are justified when we talk in terms of being more or less
happy, more or less sad, etc. Since there must be 'something common to
these two forms of magnitude,' people are therefore led to assume that
intensity and extensity do not differ in kind, but are, rather, 'two species of
quantity.' [TFW 3/(E 6] Bergson's language is instructive in the context of
our present discussion because, when he argues that intensities cannot be
superposed, he is directly echoing Riemann's stipulation that 'measure
consists in the superposition of the magnitudes to be compared.' To be sure,
this verbal resonance will require more in the way of supportive evidence if
we wish to establish that Bergson does indeed have Riemann in mind here.
However, if he is indeed referring implicitly to Riemann, then his argument
is of the utmost significance. For Riemann is distinguishing comparison with
regard to quantity in the case of discrete multiplicities - where the
comparison is achieved by counting - and continuous multiplicities - where
the comparison is achieved by measuring. In the case of each multiplicity,
that is, both comparison with regard to quantity, and assimilation to
magnitude, can be accomplished. But Bergson is wanting to argue that
neither measure nor assimilation to a magnitude is appropriate in the case of
intensity.
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Why then does Bergson seek to argue in this way, and why should we
continue to insist on the connection to Riemann? In order to answer these
questions, it is necessary to ascertain in what the essence of quantity
consists. What is at stake in the more or the less with regard to quantity is to
be discerned in that fact that, in order to speak in this way of the more or
less, the initially given quantity must be able to increase or diminish. But if a
quantity x increases, and we subsequently wish to compare the initial
quantity x with the final quantity, to determine which is the greater, then we
must be able to divide, or separate out, the initial quantity x from the final
quantity. [TFW 3/(E 6] Furthermore, if the comparison is to be worthwhile,
then during this process of division, the quantity x must not change. This
seems to me to be the true import of Bergson's argument with regard to
separation - namely, that it is not spatial separateness that is significant,
which is what Russell wishes to claim, but rather, the capacity for
separability, that is definitive of quantity. From this perspective, therefore,
we can begin to argue that, contrary to Russell's claim, Bergson is not
advancing a thesis about number as such, but rather about the conditions of
possibility for counting (where 'countability' is in tum to be understood as
condition for either measuring or assimilation to a magnitude). Thus, the
condition of possibility for counting is that the elements of a multiplicity be
'denumerable' - and, correlatively, if the elements are non-denumerable,
then they cannot be counted. In turn, the condition of denumerability is
precisely that the elements of the multiplicity be distinct, or discontinuous.
Now, the distinctness of elements in a multiplicity does not, as such, require
that they be laid out in space, as Russell would have Bergson argue. Rather,
distinctness, or discontinuity, constitutes the condition for separability. As a
consequence, Bergson should be understood as arguing that the property of
distinctness which characterises the elements of a discrete multiplicity is also
a property that characterises space.
Thus, Bergson will argue that intensities are not quantifiable precisely
because they do not possess this capacity for divisibility or separability.
Now, if our preceding argument is correct, then this way of interpreting
Bergson has a more fundamental significance. For it is tempting to read
Bergson as propounding a series of more or less metaphysical dualisms such as duration/space, quality/quantity, intensity/extensity,
continuous/discrete - between which he then seeks, as we have seen, to
establish an equivalence. The criticism which is then levelled against
Bergson is that none of these concepts is rigorously defined; rather,
Bergson's style of writing consists in a tendency to conflate concepts at
crucial junctures, explaining one in terms of the other. The problem would
then be that at no point does Bergson determine the justification for
establishing the equivalence between the concepts, with the consequence that

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his style of arguing is at best circular. The significance of the interpretation

that I am seeking to advance is that there is, in fact, a rigorous principle
underpinning all of these dualisms, a principle that is strictly defined, that
establishes a dualism which does not simply reduce one of the terms to the
negation of the other, and which, moreover, has a mathematical provenance
in Riemann's theory of multiplicities.
Before we can elucidate this principle, we must first return to the issue of
why it is that intensities are non-denumerable, despite our tendency to talk of
feeling, for instance, more or less happy. For thus far, we have merely
established that distinctness, and hence separability, is the condition for
counting, and thus measurement or assimilation to a magnitude. We have yet
to demonstrate that distinctness, or discontinuity, does not pertain to
intensity as such. In fact, Bergson's discussion allots to intensity something
akin to a midway position between purely qualitative affective sensations,
and extensive quantities, and it will be in this way that he is able to account
for our tendency to apply to intensities concepts more properly limited to
extensity, while at the same time maintaining that 'psychic phenomena [are]
in themselves pure quality or qualitative multiplicity.' [TFW 224/(E 146-7]
Bergson argues that where affective sensations have an external cause, a
cause for which quantity is an appropriate property, there is a tendency for
the sensation to be experienced as an effect of this cause, in such a way that
the sensation 'signifies' its cause, becomes a sign for its quantitative cause,
with the consequence that the quantity appropriate to the cause is transferred
to the sensation. It is just such a sensation, experienced as a sign representing
its quantitative cause, that Bergson means by the notion of intensity. [TFW
70, 90, 224/(E 49, 61, 146-7] As Bergson writes, we 'associate the idea of a
certain quantity of cause with a certain quality of effect; and finally . . . we
transfer the idea into the sensation, the quantity of the cause into the quality
of the effect.' [TFW 42/(E 31] It is in this way that intensity comes to be a
'property of sensation.' [TFW 7/(E 9] Moreover, it is also in this way that
Bergson provides an account, with regard to Riemann, of how this
multiplicity, which, to the extent that its elements are not discontinuous, does
not bear its own metric within itself, comes to secure the principle of its
metric relations 'from the outside.' In this respect, therefore, despite Bergson
disagreeing with Riemann over whether the elements of a non-discrete
multiplicity can be measured, he nevertheless maintains the principle set out
by Riemann that the possibility of quantitatively expressing the relations
between elements of a non-discontinuous multiplicity must be transferred
into the multiplicity from outside.
When we turn to purely affective sensations, we find Bergson arguing that
they are non-denumerable in themselves, and thus have to attain the property
of intensity if they are to be assimilated to a magnitude, because changes in
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sensations 'correspond less to variations of degree than to differences of state

or of nature.' [TFW 17/(E 15] There is a qualitative difference rather than a
quantitative difference, a difference in nature rather than a difference in
degree, between irritation and anger, amusement and happiness,
apprehension and fear, and so forth. For Bergson, fundamental psychic
phenomena such as affective sensations are not 'things which can be
juxtaposed.' Rather, an affective sensation 'alter[s] [modifie1 the shade of a
thousand perceptions or memories, and in this sense, it penetrates fpenetre]
them.' [translation modified; TFW 8-9/(E 10] A sensation, Bergson suggests,
should not be compared to a note which can grow louder or softer, but rather,
to the note 'which gives the tone' to the other instruments in an orchestra.
[TFW 35/(E 26] As we shall see presently, the precise terms in which
Bergson makes this distinction, between 'juxtaposition' and 'penetration,'
are of the utmost significance. For now, let us note that Bergson underscores
that affective sensations which thus penetrate conscious experiences, but
which cannot be juxtaposed, are indivisible. [TFW 32/(E 24] On this basis,
we can confirm once again that for Bergson, quantitative difference, or
difference in degree, is founded on the discontinuity of the elements of the
discrete multiplicity, a discontinuity which in tum entails that these elements
are divisible. On the other hand, qualitative difference, or difference in kind,
would be founded in the non-discontinuity of the elements of what Riemann
had called the continuous multiplicity, and that this non-discontinuity entails
that the elements are indivisible. In what, then, does qualitative difference
consist, if it is different from divisibility?
In the discussion of number, with which Chapter 2 of Time and Free Will
begins, and upon which Russell lays so much critical stress, the key theme is
not, I propose, space as such. Rather, it is this principle of divisibility that we
have been discussing. Whether one follows Bergson's approach, and
conceives of a number as 'a collection of units,' [TFW 75/(E 51] or whether
one follows Russell, and conceives of a number x as the set of all sets with x
elements, a basic condition is that one is able to conceive of the collection or
set both as a unit, or whole, and as a 'sum [that] covers a multiplicity of parts
which can be considered separately.' [TFW 76/(E 52] 18 As a multiplicity of
units or elements, the collection or set is divisible; as a unit, it is indivisible,
in the same sense as the units or elements comprising the collection or set
must themselves remain indivisible (although, when considered in
themselves, rather than as elements of the collection or set, these units or
elements may well be infinitely divisible). 19 The divisibility of the units or
elements consists, as we know, in the discontinuity, and hence, separability
or ability to be juxtaposed, of the units or elements. But, as we noted in
passing above, it is not just the discontinuity of the units or elements that
enables this divisibility. As Bergson specifies: 'It is not enough to say that

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number is a collection of units; we must add that these units are identical
with one another. .. [or if] they are all different from one another ... we agree
in that case to neglect their individual differences and to take into account
only what they have in common.' [TFW 76/CE 52] This shared identity of the
units within a collection corresponds to the common property that is shared
by members belonging to a set. What, then, is of fundamental importance is
that, in a process of division, made possible by the discontinuity between the
elements, the identity of the elements so divided is maintained. The elements
do not suffer any change in themselves as they undergo the process of
division. This is precisely because the process of division consists in nothing
other than a separation of parts from one another, a separability the condition
of which is, as we have seen, founded in the fact that the multiplicity is
discontinuous.
On the basis of this argument, we can begin to determine in what nondivisibility will consist. Let us imagine, for the sake of argument, dividing a
unit which is conceived as such ultimately rather than provisionally. Since,
from this perspective, it does not consist in separable parts, what would be
the effect of such a division? It would, of necessity, change the nature of the
unit essentially. It would create something other than the original unit,
something that would, as a consequence, be unable to continue fulfilling its
role as a unit with regard to the constitution of the number. This is precisely
what Bergson has in mind, I propose, when he talks in terms of a 'change in
nature,' or a 'difference in kind.'
The principle, therefore, that underpins the various dualisms between
which Bergson seeks to establish an equivalence, and which, furthermore,
determines the precise nature of his recourse to the Riemannian theory of
multiplicities, consists precisely in the difference between the two senses of
'to distinguish' to which Bergson, as we noted above, draws attention in the
crucial footnote which supports the opening to Chapter 2 of Time and Free
Will. [TFW 75-6/CE 51-2] The defining characteristic pertaining to the
Riemannian discrete multiplicity, the elements of which are discontinuous, is
that distinguishing the elements is a process that leaves these elements
unchanged. The defining characteristic pertaining to the Riemannian
continuous multiplicity, the elements of which are continuous, is that
distinguishing the elements is a process that changes the elements. Thus,
more properly called, this latter sense of distinction consists not in
quantitative division, but rather in 'qualitative differentiation.' [emphasis
added; TFW 95/CE 64] The difference between the two Riemannian
multiplicities as they are taken up by, and function for, Bergson, therefore,
consists in the difference between the nature of difference which determines
each multiplicity, division on the one hand, differentiation on the other. As
Bergson writes: 'the multiplicity of conscious states, regarded in its original
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purity, is not at all like the discrete multiplicity which goes to form number.
In such a case there is, as we said, a qualitative multiplicity. In short, we
must admit two kinds of multiplicity, two possible senses of the word
'distinguish,' two conceptions, the one qualitative and the other quantitative,
of the difference between same and other.' [TFW 121/CE 80-1] And, because
division leads to no change in the elements of the multiplicity so divided,
Bergson characterises Riemann's discrete multiplicity as the homogeneous
multiplicity. On the other hand, since differentiation leads to a change in the
multiplicity so differentiated, Bergson characterises the Riemannian
continuous multiplicity as heterogeneous multiplicity. 2 Furthermore, each
multiplicity determines the nature of the reality to which they pertain - thus,
for Bergson, the nature of space is homogeneous, whereas the nature of
duration is heterogeneous: 'What we must say is that we have to do with two
different kinds of reality, the one heterogeneous, that of sensible qualities,
the other homogeneous, namely space.' [TFW 97 ICE 66]
Conclusion
The preceding argument reveals the extent to which Russell's criticisms
of Bergson are unfounded. Equally, however, it also reveals the extent to
which the Russellian diagnosis, that a healthy philosophy consists in
renouncing metaphysics in favour of mathematics, is misguided. What is
most striking about Bergson's recourse to Riemann is the way in which
Riemann's reflections on the fundamental axioms of geometry are given an
ontological significance in Bergsonism. It is from such a perspective that one
should understand Bergson's objective, for instance in his work on Einstein's
theory of relativity, of providing a metaphysics to complement science. At
the same time, it is just such a perspective that reveals the poverty of
Russell's formulation of the relation between mathematics and philosophy as
one of mutual exclusivity.
University of Exeter
References
1. Our proposal regarding the mathematical basis of the divergence between analytic and
continental philosophy is inadvertently borne out by Bergson himself when, in an
interview with Jacques Chevalier, he attributes to Russell the following observation: 'For
Bergson, evolution has culminated on the one hand in intelligence, which reaches its
most complete development in the mathematician and, on the other hand, in instinct,
which reaches its peak in bees, ants, and Bergson.' Quoted in The Collected Papers of
Bertrand Russell. Volume 6: Logical and Philosophical Papers 1909-13, edited by John
G. Slater (London: Routledge, 1992), 319. All further citations of Russell will be from
this volume.
2. Russell (1992), 322.
3. Russell (1992), 323; referring to Bergson, Creative Evolution, translated by Arthur
Mitchell (New York: University Press of America, 1984), 210-3; CEuvres, edited by Andre
Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), 674-6.

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4. Russell (1992), 328; referring to Bergson, Time and Free Will, translated by F.L. Pogson
(London: Macmillan, 1910), 78-9; (Euvres, 53-4. Hereafter cited in the body of the text as
TFW/(E, followed by the relevant page numbers.
5. Russell (1992), 328.
6. Russell (1992), 329.
7. Russell (1992), 329.
8. Russell (1992), 330-1. Following this passage, Russell proceeds to attack Bergson's
refutation of Zeno' s paradoxes, paradoxes which purport to demonstrate that change is
impossible.
9. Cf. the 'Chronology of Life and Works' in Bergson, Key Writings, edited by Keith Ansell
Pearson & John Mullarkey (London: Continuum, 2002), viii.
10. For the record, Russell's citation of this definition necessarily overlooks this identity,
following, as it does, Pogson's authorised translation of 'l'un et du multiple' as 'the one
and the many.' Russell (1992), 328.
II. Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, translated by Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam (New
York: Zone Books, 1991), 39; Le bergsonisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1966), 31.
12. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 'Afterword' to the English translation, 117.
13. All citations from: Bernhard Riemann, 'On the Hypotheses which lie at the Foundations of
Geometry', translated by W.K. Clifford, Nature, vol. 8, no. 183 (1873), 14; Gesammelte
mathematische Werke und wissenschaftlicher Nachlass (Leipzig: Teubner, 1876), 254.
14. Riemann (1873), 14/(1876) 254.
15. Riemann (1873), 14-15/(1876) 254-5.
16. Riemann (1873), 17/{1876) 257. The consequence of this argument, returning to the issue
of the 'simplest matters of fact from which the measure-relations of space may be
determined,' matters of fact would form the hypotheses for the geometrical system of
Euclid, is that 'the reality which underlies space [das Raume zu Grunde liegende
Wirkliche] must form a discrete multiplicity, or we must seek the ground [Grund] of its
metric relations outside it, in binding forces [bindene Kraften] which act upon it.'
17. Russell (1992), 328.
18. This condition goes to the heart of Cantor's use of set theory in his remarkable work in the
second half of the 19th century- in particular, given the significance of the role played by
infinite sets in Cantor's work the question which arises is the extent to which an infinite set
can indeed be 'grasped as a whole.'
19. This indivisibility arises as a consequence of their being conceived as 'ultimate' units,
whereas the divisibility would arise as a consequence of their being conceived as
'provisional' units. [TFW 81/(E 55]
20. Thus Bergson writes: 'In a word, pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of
qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines,
without any tendency to extemalise themselves in relation to one another, without any
affiliation with number: it would be pure heterogeneity.' [TFW 104/(E 70]

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