I lay my argument in one simple thesis: all the perspective so far addressed in understanding

mental states and the mind as a construct can be simplified in the abstract realm. I feel, for instance,
that feelings and the perception of the physical are not divorced. I feel that Rational Behaviorism is
valid at a general level that deals with the abstraction of reality when provided reality as an axiom. As
ironic as it may be, it is valid to explain the mind if there are conditions. However, as it is clear, the
mind has no boundaries but its own; itself, as a construct is perhaps its only limitation. Thus, in regards
to emotions, thoughts, and awareness of the physical are objects of the same type. I feel a mental state
is the basic component that can be used to explain phenomena. And it is important to highlight this idea
for my argument is based on the articulation of the different points of view explored by using
reductionism as the main line of thinking pursued in this mental exercise.
First let me be clear about my take on reductionism and why I feel so strongly to use that
position and thinking process to address the questions posed. I agree and rely on a pragmatic, top to
bottom thinking process, and yet, also aimed at dealing with situations posed in terms of abstractions. It
is easier, in m opinion to deal with the abstract of eventsof realitythis way because abstractions are
defined, absolute, and well behaved. And by well behaved I mean that reductionism can use to
understand reality as the union of a finite and yet vast discrete structures.
In the line of thinking I laid, then yes, you will agree that rational behaviorism is a kind of
eliminatism. First, from the reading I take the following position regarding eliminativism: thatall
knowledgeoftheworldmustultimatelybejustifiedonthebasisofexperience;(2)thatallknowledge
infactoriginatesinexperience.Because Rbism takes the idea that all rational can explain phenomena
and it excludes stimuli that is not rational, then let me make ask this: is experience completely rational?
Thus, is knowledge completely rational, and not involved in mental states of its own? As you can see,
this creates a problem: there is an inconsistency between the way we just defined experience, and the
way we see it as an Ebsim point of view, and the way we experience said experience in real situations,
and how it fails to be addressed when we considered the conditions regarding mental states.
The abstraction I mention in the beginning that allow a better analysis of the mind as a construct
and a phenomena are indeed the six conditions for the mental states. And when taken that into account,
one can easily see that Rbism fails for the following reason: it does not agree with the sixth condition
given in class. That sixth condition is the following: kinds of metal states are systematically correlated
with certain brain states. This condition is paramount because it allows me to take a hard look at a two
situations described in the readings: addiction\depression and language\creativity.
First, let me address addiction\depression as it is easier to understand in terms of how Rbism
fails regarding feelings and stimuli. And on the hand, if you take Analytic Behaviorism everything just
a mental state, there is no physical, there is only perception.