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Simon vs. CHR (G.R. No.

100150 Jan 5, 1994)


CHRs power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only toviolations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedureessential to carry out its investigatorial powers.
A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by CarlosQuimpo (one of the petitioners) in his
capacity as anExecutive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated HawkersManagement Council under
the Office of the City Mayor, wassent to, and received by, the private respondents (being
theofficers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given agrace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) withinwhich to vacate
the questioned premises of North EDSA.Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the
privaterespondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that theirstalls should be removed to give
way to the "People's Park".On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President RoqueFermo, filed a
letter-complaint (Pinag-samang SinumpaangSalaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners,
asking thelate CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter tobe addressed to then Mayor
Brigido Simon, Jr., of QuezonCity to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls,sari-sari
stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. Thecomplaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.
On 23 July1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "todesist from demolishing the
stalls and shanties at North EDSApending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaintbefore the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners toappear before the CHR. In an Order, dated 25
September1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carryingout the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores andcarinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fineof P500.00
on each of them.Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction:a)to investigate the alleged
violations of the "businessrights" of the private respondents whose stalls weredemolished by the
petitioners at the instance andauthority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b)
to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitionersfor contempt;Held: a) Recalling the
deliberations of the ConstitutionalCommission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that thedelegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights thatwould focus its attention to the more severe cases
of humanrights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentionedsuch areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of politicaldetainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures,
(3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6)
othercrimes committed against the religious." While theenumeration has not likely been meant to
have anypreclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set.In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfortin
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR'sscope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They
have thus seen itfit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for othercases of violations of
human rights that should fall within theauthority of the Commission, taking into account
itsrecommendation." In the particular case at hand, there is nocavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls,sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,erected by
private respondents on a land which is planned tobe developed into a "People's Park". More than
that, the landadjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court cantake judicial notice of, is
a busy national highway. Theconsequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewisesimply
ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which isclaimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the firstplace, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as itmay, looking at the
standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are
notprepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of thestalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia
of the privaterespondents can fall within the compartment of "humanrights violations involving civil
and political rights" intendedby the Constitution.b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is
constitutionallyauthorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof inaccordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHRacted
within its authority in providing in its revised rules, itspower "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirectcontempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties inaccordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for inthe Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt,however, should be
understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedureessential to carry out its investigatorial powers. Toexemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercisedagainst persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body,or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who declineto honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its

investigativework. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for arestraining order) in the instance
before us, however, is notinvestigatorial in character but prescinds from anadjudicative power that
it does not possess.

Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083


Fact:

a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and


"arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth."

The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same
was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."
4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;


2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: YES

petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right
to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is
also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other
who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment

Baldoza v. Dimaano (May 5, 1976)


Administrative Matter in the Supreme Court.Antonio, J.
Facts:


Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Dimaano with abuse of authority
inrefusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of
theMunicipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on peace and
orderconditions of the municipality.

Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official
courtrecords but that the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where
andhow they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has the power to prevent an
improperuse or inspection of its records and furnishing copies may be refuse when the motivation
is notserious and legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site
orpromote public scandal.

In his answer, respondent observed;


o
Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the right.
o
There has been recent tampering of padlocks of the door of the Court and with this, to allowan
indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might do more harmthan good.
o
Request of such a magnitude cannot b immediately granted without adequate deliberationand
advisement
o
Authority should first be secured from the Supreme Court

Case was referred to Judge Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing,
TaalMayor Corazon Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and
cooperationamong officers. This motion was denied by Investigating Judge but he recommended
theexoneration of respondent.

Investigating Judges report avers that complainant was aware of the motion to dismiss and he
wasin conformity with it. Communications between complainant and respondent reveal that
respondentallowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of the respondent under
certainconditions and under his control and supervision.

Under the conditions, the Court found that the respondent has not committed any abuse of
authority
Issue
: WON respondent acted arbitrarily in the premises (when he allowed the complainant to open
andview the docket books of respondent)
Held
: No. The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of
respondentunder certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown
that the rules andcondition imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public
records is predicated onthe right of the people to acquire information on public concern.
Rules/Principles:
In People ex rel. Title Guarantee & T. Co vs. Railly, the Court said:What the law expects and
requires from his is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment, bywhich all persons
resorting to the office, under legal authority, and conducting themselves in an orderlymanner, shall
be secured their lawful rights and privileges, and that a corporation formed in the manner inwhich
the relator has been, shall be permitted to obtain all the information either by searches,
abstracts,or copies, that the law has entitled it to obtain.Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the

purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosityItis not their prerogative to see that
the information which the records contain is not flaunted before publicgaze, or that scandal is not
made of itIt is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to
devise a remedy.

David vs. Macapagal Arroyo (May 6, 2006) Digest


Facts:
Consists of 7 cases consolidated alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
(PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed
grave abuse of discretion
On February 24, 2006 issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency saying that
the Communist insurgents are in a systematic conspiracy to bring down the government with
Magdalo Group and Gen. Lim and Marine Commander Ariel Querubin (clear and present danger);
suppress terrorism and lawless violence
Pursuant to the order, warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities may be done
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner
Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also
arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters,
documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue
During the hearing, the Solicitor General narrated the events that led to the proclamation of
the Decree: from the discovery of bomb in the PMA Reunion Arroyo was suppose to attend to
factual documents seized from a Magdalo member detailing the military takeover of the
government led by the Philippine Marines
The petitioners did not contend the facts stated by the Solicitor General
Issue:
WON the implementation of PP 1017 is unconstitutional
It encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress/they arrogate unto President Arroyo
the power to enact laws and decrees
It is a deception to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law
It violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly
Ratio Decidendi:
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body
cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it
may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of
our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
o There must be a war or other emergency.
o The delegation must be for a limited period only
o The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
o The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress
The Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees

The President also cannot call the military to enact laws such as laws on family, corporate
laws, obligations and contracts, etc. Under the PP 1017, she can only call out the military to
suppress lawless violence
The President is authorized to declare a state of national emergency. However, without
legislation, she has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting
the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can she
determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of
the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress
Decision:
PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL as far as the calling out of the military to suppress lawless
violence. However, the military cannot enforce other laws
PP 1017 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL when it comes to promulgating Decrees. Only the 2
Houses of Congress can legislate laws
Warrantless arrests and seizures conducted without proof that they are part of rebellion,
lawless violence, and takeover is UNCONSTITUTIONAL

MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, digested


Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
90 Phil. 70 (1951) (Constitutional Law Right to Life and Liberty, Aliens)
FACTS: Herein petitioner, an alien illegally in this country was kept under prolonged detention
while arrangements for his departure are being made filed a petition for habeas corpus. For two
years, the Government has not found ways and means of deporting the petitioner because no ship
nor country would take the latter. It is insinuated that the petitioner might join or aid the disloyal
elements if allowed to be at large.
ISSUE: Whether or not an alien, not enemy, against whom no charge has been made other than
that their permission to stay has expired, may be detained indefinitely for as long as the
Government is unable to deport him.
HELD: No, a foreign national, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally
made or judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. He also has the right to life
and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to human beings. Petitioner is ordered to be
released upon the condition of being under surveillance and exact bail in a reasonable amount with
sufficient sureties. The possibility that he might join or aid disloyal elements if turned out at large
does not justify prolonged detention.

Note: Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent was brought to this country from Shanghai as a
Japanese spy and was arrested upon liberation of this country from the Japanese regime.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni


G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Ponente: Moran, C.J.
Facts:

1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding
general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before
the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military
and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68.
2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military
commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)
3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid
HELD:
1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by
the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an
instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of
international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international
jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian)
guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and
customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the
rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international
law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)
2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because
its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.
3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and
representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.

Orquiola vs Tandang Sora


On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced against
them. They argue that the appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our ruling in Vda. de
Medina vs. Cruz[8] in holding that petitioners are successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as
such, they can be reached by the order of execution in Civil Case No. Q-12918 even though they
were not impleaded as parties thereto. Petitioners submit that Medina is not applicable in this case
because the circumstances therein are different from the circumstances in the present case.
In Medina, the property in dispute was registered under Land Registration Act No. 496 in 1916 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 868 was issued in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
In 1949, Benedicta Mangahas and Francisco Ramos occupied and built houses on the lot without
the PRCs consent. In 1959, PRC sold the lot to Remedios Magbanua. Mangahas and Ramos
opposed and instituted Civil Case No. C-120 to annul the sale and to compel PRC to execute a
contract of sale in their favor. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Mangahas and
Ramos to vacate the lot and surrender possession thereof to Magbanua. The judgment became
final and executory. When Magbanua had paid for the land in full, PRC executed a deed of
absolute sale in her favor and a new title was consequently issued in her name. Magbanua then
sought the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-120. This was opposed by petitioner
Medina who alleged that she owned the houses and lot subject of the dispute. She said that she
bought the houses from spouses Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman, while she purchased the lot
from the heirs of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The latter held the land by virtue of a
Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado Num. 4136, dated April 29, 1894. In opposing the execution,
Medina argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her, claiming that she was not a

party in Civil Case No. C-120, thus, she could not be considered as a person claiming under
Ramos and Mangahas.
When Medina reached this Court, we held that the decision in Civil Case No. C-120, which had
long become final and executory, could be enforced against petitioner even though she was not a
party thereto. We found that the houses on the subject lot were formerly owned by Mangahas and
Ramos who sold them to spouses de Guzman, who in turn sold them to Medina. Under the
circumstances, petitioner was privy to the two judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos, and thus
Medina could be reached by the order of execution and writ of demolition issued against the two.
As to the lot under dispute, we sustained Magbanuas ownership over it, she being the holder of a
Torrens title. We declared that a Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the
land referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued
and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria, or other title
existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing
with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears
on its face.
Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the petitioner in Medina
acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original action was
commenced and became final and executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot
before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. Second, the right over the disputed land of
the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was based on a title of doubtful
authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by the Spanish Government
in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the right over the land of the
predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized Torrens title. Third,
petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own names, while the petitioner in
Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her
alleged ownership of the land.
We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the
Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered property need not
go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of
such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.[9] It is our view here that the petitioners,
spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the
Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de
Composicion.
Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value? A buyer
in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the
time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property.[10] The determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue which
generally is outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for review. An exception is
when the Court of Appeals failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[11] The instant case is covered by this exception
to the general rule. As found by the Court of Appeals and not refuted by private respondent,
petitioners purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising.[12] Civil Case No. Q-12918
was commenced sometime in 1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of
the land took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918. In other words, the sale to
petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably
rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any
third party claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners
acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.
The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good faith? We note that this is
the first time that petitioners have raised this issue. As a general rule, this could not be done. Fair

play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the first time on appeal
issues that they could have raised but never did during trial and even during proceedings before
the Court of Appeals.[13] Nevertheless, we deem it proper that this issue be resolved now, to avoid
circuitous litigation and further delay in the disposition of this case. On this score, we find that
petitioners are indeed builders in good faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, and is
ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.[14] As earlier discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the
land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards,
they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City
tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had notice of private
respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of
such adverse claim to petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the subject
property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case thereon.[15] Consequently,
private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to
do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. No man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment
rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party
and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are
bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant
thereto.[16] In our view, the spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious
cause to resist the demolition of their house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28,
1999, and its resolution dated December 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing the decision in Civil Case No. Q12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition issued against petitioners. Costs against
private respondent.

Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ
Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the
petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due
to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in
the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.
2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the
Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects
from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued
the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both
premises
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the
corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a

corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein
petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation,
and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly
object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party.
The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things
seized from the offices and the premises).

Hongkong vs olalia
Juan Muoz was charged before a Hong Kong Court with several counts of offenses in violation of
Hong Kong laws. If convicted, he faces a jail term of 7 to 14 years for each charge. After Juan
Muoz was arrested in the Philippines, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of Juan Muoz. On December 20, 2001, Judge X of
RTC-Manila allowed Juan Muoz to post bail. However, the government of Hong Kong alleged that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting him to bail because there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. May Juan
Muoz, a potential extradite, be granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that he
is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. In a unanimous decision the SC remanded to the Manila RTC, to determine whether Juan
Muoz is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. If Muoz is not entitled to
such, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After
all, both are administrative proceeding where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in
issue, the Court said.
Citing the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, the Court
saw the need to reexamine its ruling in Government of United States of America v. Judge
Purganan which limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings. (visit
fellester.blogspot.com)
It said that while our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right under the Constitution.
It further said that even if a potential extradite is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition. It added that extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of potential
extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. (GR
No. 153675, Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia, Jr. and
Muoz, April 19, 2007)

Time inc vs hill


Brief Fact Summary. Defendants published an article and reenacted a play about Plaintiff and his
family being held hostage. The article and play were false, but were portrayed by Defendant to be
the truth. Plaintiff sued Defendant for false light.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Defendants published an article and reenacted a play about Plaintiff and
his family being held hostage. The article and play were false, but were portrayed by Defendant to
be the truth. Plaintiff sued Defendant for false light.

Facts. Hill (Plaintiff), his wife, and five children were held hostage in their suburban Philadelphia
home by three escaped convicts. Plaintiff and his family were released without any harm but the
story made the front pages of the newspapers. Plaintiffs then moved to Connecticut. Time, Inc.
(Defendant) published an article that told of a new Broadway thriller, The Desperate Hours. The
article said Plaintiff and his family rose in heroism in the time of crisis. The article included pictures
of scenes from the play that was to be reenacted in Plaintiffs Philadelphia home. Plaintiff sued
under Sections 50-51 of the New York Civil Rights Law; Defendants publication of the issues gave
the impression that the play was true when in fact it did not accurately recount Plaintiffs actual
experience and Defendant knew the article was false and untrue. Defendant answered that the
article was a subject of a legitimate news article. The trial judge denied Defendants motion to
dismiss and the j
ury awarded Plaintiff $50,000 in actual damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue. Does a publication of a false report on a matter of public interest need only meet the New
York Times test of actual malice to permit recovery in a lawsuit for false light?

Hudgen vs NLRB
Brief Fact Summary. Striking union members picketed in front of a retail store that was located
within a shopping mall. The general manager of the mall threatened the picketers with arrest for
trespassing if they would not leave.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A private shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town and,
therefore, not a state actor subject to the requirements of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution).

Facts. Butler Shoe Co. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the nine retail
locations in Atlanta. One of those stores was located within the North DeKalb Shopping Center,
owned by the Petitioner, Hudgens (Petitioner). After the picketers had been marching for about half
an hour, the general manager of the shopping center threatened to have the strikers arrested if
they did not leave.
Issue. Can a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by members of the public?

JMM Promotions vs CA

Police Power
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists
to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train
performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of
DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artists Record Book which a
performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers
of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge
existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to
bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department
Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate
that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the
women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute
ban against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which would
only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the
method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from
them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable
demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens
the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,


G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director
of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works

and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications.
The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies
at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government,
the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to
prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that
the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.

PMMSI vs CA
Petitioner now comes to this Court via this petition for review,[19] alleging the following grounds:

(A) DISMISSAL OF APPEAL ON PURELY TECHNICAL GROUNDS IS USUALLY FROWNED


UPON; THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED UTMOST LIBERALITY IN
ADMITTING A BRIEF ALREADY FILED; and
(B) APPELLANT ACTUALLY FILED BY REGISTERED MAIL ON MAY 7, 1998 ITS URGENT EXPARTE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANTS BRIEF; THE ATTENDANT
FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CLEARLY SHOW THAT SUCH MOTION HAD BEEN DULY
FILED.[20]
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the CAs dismissal of the appeal due to the late filing of
the appellants brief is proper, in view of the attendant factual circumstances and in the interest of
substantial justice.
Petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure,[21] considering that the
appellants brief has in fact been received by the appellate court, and that, according to petitioner,
the appeal is meritorious.
Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the
amplest opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits[22] and of dispensing with
technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires
it.[23]
In the present case, we are faced with the fact that per official records of the Manila Central Post
Office,[24] no timely motion for extension of time to file the appellants brief was mailed on the date
in question and addressed to the CA and opposing counsel. A careful trace made of the registry
receipts presented by petitioner as the ones issued to it reveals that these receipts correspond to
documents sent on a different date and addressed to different people. This is consistent with the
fact that per official records of the Court of Appeals, and the manifestation of opposing counsel, no
copy of such motion was received by them. Thus, the CA found the appellants brief to have been
filed out of time. It now devolves upon petitioner to refute the presumption of regularity and
convince this Court that a reversal is warranted.
We agree with the CA that the evidence presented by the petitioner is not sufficient to overcome
the presumption of regularity in the preparation of the records of the Post Office and that of the CA.
First, as aforementioned, the registry receipts correspond to documents mailed on a different date
and addressed to different people. Second, the certification made by one Matabai Garcia was
rendered without probative value in view of the official response made by the Postmaster General,
per records of the Ayala Post Office, that the same receipts were not for documents mailed on May
7, 1998, nor were the documents addressed to the CA and opposing counsel.
As consistently reiterated, the power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is
discretionary[25] and not merely ministerial. With that affirmation comes the caution that such
discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.[26]
In the case at bar, we find no reason to disturb the conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
failed to adduce sufficient proof that any inadvertence was caused by the Post Office. Moreover,
no conclusive proof could be shown that a motion for extension was indeed filed at any time. All
these create a doubt that petitioners counsel has been candid in his dealings with the courts.
Needless to stress, a lawyer is bound by ethical principles in the conduct of cases before the
courts at all times.

As a last recourse, petitioner contends that the interest of substantial justice would be served by
giving due course to the appeal. However, we must state that the liberality with which we exercise
our equity jurisdiction is always anchored on the basic consideration that the same must be
warranted by the circumstances obtaining in each case. Having found petitioners explanation less
than worthy of credence, and without evidentiary support, we are constrained to adhere strictly to
the procedural rules on the timeliness of submission before the court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated July 23,
1998 and February 26, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. The denial of the
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 56325 due to the late filing of the Appellants Brief pursuant to Rule 50
(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is hereby declared FINAL.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

MMDA Case
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the
attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of
pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper
disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a
scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. But amidst hard evidence
and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and
procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective
offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our
internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies
and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national
priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving,
if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic
efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with
marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities,
but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of
people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
Facts:
On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment
Code.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);


(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila
Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
Issues:
a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the
cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.
Held:
Regional Trial Courts Order to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in the
complaint, the Court ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up
and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming,
skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.
To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within
six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a
consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of
the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment
facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and
operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and
maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but
also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill
and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal
system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life
in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up
and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free
flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end
up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to
actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other nonbiodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies
and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila
Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTCs Decision
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal. On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine
Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive
departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme
necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge
their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a
need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined
for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark
cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former
splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks
ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and
cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take
responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the
preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men
and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to

keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be
a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision
of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks
outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.

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