G.R. No.

L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL

BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in
his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and
ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG,
Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C.
Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred
to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsJudges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the
warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance
with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of
the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining RespondentsProsecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in
due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and

declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the
search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible
in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these
papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were
invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be
raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if
unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had
not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could
they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if
any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291
F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence
based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis
supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using
them in evidence against petitioners herein.

Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized,
to wit:

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void.
In this connection, the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets
and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in
case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,

and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right
of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our
books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all
persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold
that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless
and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in
Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to
federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized
in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right
to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had
always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right
to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right
by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of
the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire
system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having
once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions

of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer

permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we
can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the
name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision,
founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the
true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of
a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why
the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other
hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence
to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could
not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June
29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No.
2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the ArmyNavy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences
of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of
the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other
effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over
the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has
Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated
in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or
copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners
is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents,
papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied;
and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the
import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case
are general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3
of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search
warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be,
and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is
made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily
demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the
documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three residences
adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as null and void the such warrants served at

such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves
"the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the
searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not
only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants,
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are
therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente,
have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said
warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the
lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or
illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to
this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and
return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family
residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction
and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all
were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named
personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of

April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.

independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers
and affects seized therefrom.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of
the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After
reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit
court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States,
296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which
the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in
an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th
Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano
vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by
nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held
that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and
scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the
security a man relies upon when heplaces himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his
automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And
when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he
has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an
unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the
warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless
other cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of
differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been
appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we
say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth
Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966).
See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis
supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests
have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted
here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all
the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises
2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate
offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the
filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually,
or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved.
The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the
body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has
been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from
which they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in
the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2,
c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions
such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer
strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17
(1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own
the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs.
United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose
apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United
States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's
president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and
corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were
unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the
suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice
Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he
is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S.
Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years
later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step
further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless
declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where
the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court

conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he had a
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking
to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not
have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of
the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show
ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory
interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of
employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several
employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a
protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villanoconsidered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at"
the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310
F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to
Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to
quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The
Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were
physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against
the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in
the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and
seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party
naked possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F.
2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a
farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management."
The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate
books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim
ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search
in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the
premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the
papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs.
U.S., supra, pointed out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed

solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as
having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as
having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant
was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored
with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See
also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed
432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the
present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from
premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY
DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents
were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners
connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personaland private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were
seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to
this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their
family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing
the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things arepersonal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or
General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were
criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and
seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

BIDIN, J.:p
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional
Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in
relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila,
carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for
the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of
shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the
packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in
Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted
on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside
a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was
placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed
with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau
of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the
bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of
one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers
and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6,
1987; Emphasis supplied).

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock
in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by
the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of
the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI

agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn,
p. 30, October 6, 1987).

communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should
be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed
and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the
styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside
the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job
Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried
marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars
was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the
contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the
said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in
his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the
latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post
Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves.
On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic
Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana
flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but uponprobable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States
Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal
Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE
FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE
THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE
NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS
CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1;Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme
Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20
SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective
search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado
v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by
the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized
the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down
the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971];
Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v.
Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510,
March 14, 1990).

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were
invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other
authorized government agencies.

(citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391
S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:

On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to
be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a
private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private

citizen the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in
which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence*** complained of.
The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he
became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's
contents, and made it available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion
of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the
amendment only proscribes governmental action."

As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers
to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference
by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other
possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from
any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf.
Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States,
116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in
construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and
seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to
governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended
as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as
against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and
the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process
duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking
attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead,
without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in
prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and
seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the
latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and
seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both
instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI
agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the
case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard
operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 1518; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of
the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he
opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody
thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an
illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open,
where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429
SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the
arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US
559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore
v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).

In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was
taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was
initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the
liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection.
But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of
Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the
essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights
does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible
to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas ,
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986;
Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest
or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers,
is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified
by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure,
it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987
Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar,
167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987].
The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition
against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State
and did not shift to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked
against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To
agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also
be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd
interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private
seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of
appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting
him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial
investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and
found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law
enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is
presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.
What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written
statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the
accused here, did you investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused
availed of his constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on
cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that
appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we
have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference
made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the
finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he
was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain
Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the
course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave
him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the
country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, selfserving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a

complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of
four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to
comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court,
"(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the
marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the
Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take
custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so"
(Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to
explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171
SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the
Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal
Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment,
Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an
hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66;
Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must
be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van
Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123
SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant
did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number.
Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant
should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the
contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to
the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are
owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim
otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

KATZ v. UNITED STATES, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

389 U.S. 347
KATZ v. UNITED STATES.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
No. 35.
Argued October 17, 1967.
Decided December 18, 1967.
Petitioner was convicted under an indictment charging him with transmitting wagering
information by telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1084. Evidence of
petitioner's end of the conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic
listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone booth from which the calls were
made, was introduced at the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation since there was "no physical entrance into the area
occupied by" petitioner.
Held:
1. The Government's eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which petitioner
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 350-353.
(a) The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items but extends as well to
the recording of oral statements. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 . P. 353.
(b) Because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, its reach cannot turn on
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. The "trespass"
doctrine of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 , and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 , is no longer controlling. Pp. 351, 353.
2. Although the surveillance in this case may have been so narrowly circumscribed that it could
constitutionally have been authorized in advance, it was not in fact conducted pursuant to the
warrant procedure which is a constitutional precondition of such electronic surveillance. Pp. 354359.
369 F.2d 130, reversed.
Burton Marks and Harvey A. Schneider argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. [389 U.S.
347, 348]
John S. Martin, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting
Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of California under an
eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone from

Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute. 1 At trial the Government was
permitted, over the petitioner's objection, to introduce evidence of the petitioner's end of
telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls.
In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had
been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, [389 U.S. 347, 349] because "[t]here was
no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]." 2 We granted certiorari in order
to consider the constitutional questions thus presented. 3
The petitioner has phrased those questions as follows:
"A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence
obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is
obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth. [389 U.S. 347, 350]
"B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a
search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution."
We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth
Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally
protected area." Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general
constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds
of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with
privacy at all. 4 Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of
governmental invasion. 5But the protection of a person's general right to privacy - his right to be
let alone by other people 6 - is, like the [389 U.S. 347, 351] protection of his property and of his
very life, left largely to the law of the individual States. 7
Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached
great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed
his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected
area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. 8 But this effort to decide
whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects
attention from the problem presented by this case. 9 For the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 ;
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. [389 U.S. 347, 352] See Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 ; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 .
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his
calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would
have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the
booth was not the intruding eye - it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so
simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen. No less than an
individual in a business office, 10 in a friend's apartment,11 or in a taxicab, 12 a person in a
telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it,
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read
the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to
play in private communication.
The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agents in this case should not be
tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique they employed
involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his
calls. It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further
Fourth Amendment inquiry, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 , 464, 466; Goldman v.

United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-136, for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches
and seizures of tangible [389 U.S. 347, 353] property. 13 But "[t]he premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited." Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 . Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead
that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside
the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that
decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only
the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, over-heard
without any "technical trespass under . . . local property law." Silverman v. United States,365
U.S. 505, 511 . Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects people - and not simply "areas" - against unreasonable searches and
seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded
as controlling. The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the
wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance. [389 U.S. 347, 354]
The question remaining for decision, then, is whether the search and seizure conducted in this
case complied with constitutional standards. In that regard, the Government's position is that its
agents acted in an entirely defensible manner: They did not begin their electronic surveillance
until investigation of the petitioner's activities had established a strong probability that he was
using the telephone in question to transmit gambling information to persons in other States, in
violation of federal law. Moreover, the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in duration, to
the specific purpose of establishing the contents of the petitioner's unlawful telephonic
communications. The agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods during which he
used the telephone booth, 14and they took great care to overhear only the conversations of the
petitioner himself. 15
Accepting this account of the Government's actions as accurate, it is clear that this surveillance
was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need
for such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly
apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with
appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts in fact
took place. Only last Term we sustained the validity of [389 U.S. 347, 355] such an
authorization, holding that, under sufficiently "precise and discriminate circumstances," a federal
court may empower government agents to employ a concealed electronic device "for the narrow
and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the . . . allegations" of a "detailed factual
affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense." Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323, 329 -330. Discussing that holding, the Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 , said
that "the order authorizing the use of the electronic device" in Osborn "afforded similar
protections to those . . . of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence."
Through those protections, "no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was necessary
under the circumstances." Id., at 57. 16 Here, too, a similar [389 U.S. 347, 356] judicial order
could have accommodated "the legitimate needs of law enforcement" 17 by authorizing the
carefully limited use of electronic surveillance.
The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon the decisions in Olmstead and
Goldman, and because they did no more here than they might properly have done with prior
judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their conduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent
that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint was
imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before
commencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a
neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe

precise limits established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the
search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been
seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the
sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive [389 U.S. 347, 357] means consistent
with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful "notwithstanding
facts unquestionably showing probable cause," Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 , for
the Constitution requires "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be
interposed between the citizen and the police . . . ." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
481 -482. "Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes," United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
51 , and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 18 - subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 19
It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could ever apply to the sort of search and
seizure involved in this case. Even electronic surveillance substantially contemporaneous with
an individual's arrest could hardly be deemed an "incident" of that arrest. 20 [389 U.S. 347,
358] Nor could the use of electronic surveillance without prior authorization be justified on
grounds of "hot pursuit." 21 And, of course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes
its use pursuant to the suspect's consent. 22
The Government does not question these basic principles. Rather, it urges the creation of a new
exception to cover this case. 23 It argues that surveillance of a telephone booth should be
exempted from the usual requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing
of probable cause. We cannot agree. Omission of such authorization
"bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and
substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the . . .
search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment."
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96.
And bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure
from Fourth Amendment [389 U.S. 347, 359] violations "only in the discretion of the police." Id.,
at 97.
These considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the setting
of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man may be, he is
entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
government agents here ignored "the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to
the Fourth Amendment," 24 a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the
kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case. Because the surveillance here failed to meet
that condition, and because it led to the petitioner's conviction, the judgment must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

G.R. No. L-26177 December 27, 1972

OSCAR VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE JOSE R. QUERUBIN, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Yulo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez and Assistant City
Fiscal (Bacolod) Andres M. Bayona for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p
In accordance with the policy to which this Court is committed, namely, that a colorable claim of
a denial of a constitutional right should not be ignored, petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding, succeeded in having his alleged grievance against respondent Judge, the
Honorable Jose R. Querubin, now retired, heard. He would have us nullify the lower court order
of June 1, 1966 requiring him "to return and deliver to the Provincial Commander, Bacolod City,
the amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden container stated in the receipt issued by the accused
dated April 1, 1966, within forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt of this order." 1 The money in
question formed part of the things seized in accordance with a search warrant previously issued
by respondent Judge himself. Petitioner therefore, to lend plausibility to his plea, was under the
necessity of alleging that less than full respect was accorded his constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure. 2 He would impress on us that full fealty was not shown
to what is ordained by such a guarantee. Assertion of such a disregard of a constitutional
command is one thing; proof is another. What is more, there is included in the petition itself 3 a
written promise of petitioner to return such amount when required. Accordingly, as will be
explained, petitioner did fail to show that he is entitled to the writs of certiorariand prohibition
prayed for.
It was alleged in the petition that on April 23, 1966, in a motion filed with respondent Judge by an
assistant city fiscal of Bacolod City and a special prosecutor of the Department of Justice, it was
set forth that on March 16, 1966, the residence of petitioner was raided by a constabulary and
police team on the strength of a search warrant issued by such respondent Judge, in the course
of which, there was a seizure of the amount of P10,350.00, which was not however deposited in
court, as thereafter its possession was restored to petitioner. It was further stated that an
information for the violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the City
Court of Bacolod against
petitioner. 4 There was an opposition on the part of petitioner to such motion wherein after

asserting that the lower court was without jurisdiction and that the matter had become moot and
academic, because the money was spent in good faith by him for the payment of the wages of
his laborers, it was contended that there was a violation of his constitutional rights not to be
deprived of property without due process of law and to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 5 Subsequently, after a reply to such opposition and a rejoinder were submitted, the
respondent Judge issued the challenged order dated June 1, 1966, the dispositive portion of
which reads: "[In view thereof], the accused Oscar Villanueva is hereby ordered to return and
deliver to the Provincial Commander, Bacolod City, the amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden
container stated in the receipt issued by the accused dated April 1, 1966, within forty-eight (48)
hours upon receipt of this order." 6
There was a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 11, 1966. 7 Hence this
petition. In view of the stress laid therein as to the failure of respondent Judge considering the
circumstances of the case to yield deference to the command of the right against unreasonable
searches and seizure, and the assertion that unless there is a writ of preliminary injunction
issued, respondent Judge will cause the enforcement of the challenged order, thus exposing him
to contempt proceedings and other disciplinary actions if he could not comply with it, this Court
adopted a resolution on June 21, 1966 which reads as follows: "The respondents in L-26177
(Oscar Villanueva vs. Hon. Judge R. Querubin, etc., et al.) are required to file, within 10 days
from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition for prohibition
and certiorari; upon petitioner's posting a bond of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), let
preliminary injunction issue." 8
In the answer filed by the then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a member of this Court,
the question of the alleged violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure was squarely met, thus: "Neither will the assailed orders result in unreasonable
search and seizure for as already said earlier the money and wooden box in question were
confiscated during a gambling raid pursuant to a search warrant issued by the respondent court
after due and appropriate proceedings during which the petitioner and his witnesses were
examined under oath by the respondent court." 9 The point thus raised was sought to be refuted
in petitioner's written memorandum, but in a manner far from persuasive. For he did raise the
specious argument that after the service of the search warrant on March 16, 1966, the motion of
April 23, 1966 for the return of the money came too late, ignoring that the Rules of Court does
require that the things seized be deposited in court. 10 Moreover, to counter the damaging effect
of a written promise, which commendably he did not omit from his petition, that the amount of
P10,350.00 "will be returned ... if the higher authorities will require the return of the same by
legal orders,...," 11 he would rely on his alleged rights as owner. Thus: "While he agreed to return
the money by 'legal orders', this cannot be considered as a limitation on his right of ownership,
because when an agreement conflicts with the provision of law, the latter must prevail. (Article
1306, Civil Code)."12 There was no adequate appreciation of the controlling norms as to the
effects of a seizure under a valid search warrant or one not so challenged. It is on the basis of
such contentions that petitioner would have us issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition.
A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the burden of
demonstrating that there was a denial of a constitutional right sufficient to oust the court of
jurisdiction. On the contrary, what appears undeniable is that the actuation of respondent Judge
was in accordance with law. There can be no question then of a violation of the safeguard
against unreasonable search and seizure.
1. This constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from
interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other
possessions. Since, moreover, it is invariably through a search and seizure that such an

invasion of one's physical freedom manifests itself, it is made clear that he is not to be thus
molested, unless its reasonableness could be shown. To be impressed with such a quality, it
must be accomplished through a warrant, which should not be issued unless probable cause is
shown, to be determined by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, with a particular description of the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked
upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. 13What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose
who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself
not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. 14 In the same
vein, Landynski in his authoritative work 15 could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of "a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and
to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to
value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding
social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards." 16
2. Necessarily, then, if petitioner's alleged grievance, consisting of a disregard of the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure, were substantiated, he could validly raise a
constitutional question of sufficient gravity to entitle him to the remedies sought. For a failure to
respect a constitutional command resulting in a deprivation of a constitutional right is visited by
loss of jurisdiction. 17 Such is not the case, however. He did not even put in issue the validity of
the search warrant, as a result of which there was a seizure of the money in question. For what
were the facts on which the challenged order was based, facts binding on this Court? As set
forth therein: "As a result of the raid conducted by a party of the Philippine Constabulary led by
Lt. Alexander Aguirre at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 16, 1966, in virtue of a search
warrant issued by the undersigned on March 14, 1966, the raiding party was able to arrest eight
(8) participants in the game of "Monte" held in one of the rooms of the house of Oscar Villanueva
at 6th Street, Bacolod City. Among the gambling paraphernalias seized during the raid is cash in
the amount of P10,570.00, which the raiding party submitted to this Court in endorsing the
search warrant, thus subjecting the gambling paraphernalia seized by the raiding party under the
control of this Court. On March 24, 1966 the City Fiscal of Bacolod City filed an information for
Violation of Art. 195 of the Revised Penal Code against the eight (8) apprehended persons
named in the endorsement of the Philippine Constabulary. All the accused pleaded guilty and
[were] convicted by the City Court. Upon recommendation of the Fiscal, however, only the
amount of P220.00 was ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the amount of
P10,350.00 was ordered to be returned to Oscar Villanueva, the owner of the house, who issued
the receipt for the amount with the condition that he will return the money if the higher authorities
will require the return of the said amount." 18 Then respondent Judge, after referring to Philips
vs. Municipal Mayor, 19 stated further in the order now under scrutiny: "In the light of the
aforequoted ruling of the appellate court, it is clear that the Court of First Instance that issued the
search warrant has jurisdiction over the amount of P10,350.00 and its wooden container. With
regard to the contention of the counsel for the accused that the return of the amount of
P10,350.00 is a moot question because the said amount is already spent by the accused,
whatever defenses the accused may invoke to resist the return of the amount of money in
question is futile and untenable by estoppel. The accused in issuing the corresponding receipt of
the amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden box container, agreed to return the said amount and
the box if the higher authorities may so require. The return of the amount of P10,350.00 and its

wooden container. With regard to the contention money in the box is a part and parcel of the
gambling paraphernalia seized by the raiding party of the Philippine Constabulary in the house
of the accused Oscar Villanueva who is at present facing the charge for violation of the gambling
law." 20
Even if the recital of the antecedents of the challenged order were less compelling in thus
lending support to what was done by respondent Judge, still petitioner had failed to make out a
case. For, had he entertained doubts as to the validity of the issuance of the search warrant or
the manner in which it was executed, he was called upon to establish such a claim in court. He
could rely on authoritative doctrines of this Court precisely to seek a judicial declaration of any
illegal taint that he could, with plausibility, assert. 21 That he failed to do. The Rules of Court
made clear what is to be done after the seizure of the property. Thus: "The officer must forthwith
deliver the property to the municipal judge or judge of the city court or of the Court of First
Instance which issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by
oath." 22 The legal custody was therefore appropriately with respondent Judge, who did
authorize the issuance of such search warrant. Even if the money could validly be returned to
petitioner, had it happened that in the meanwhile some other officer of the law had it in his
possession, still, under the ruling of this Court in Molo v. Yatco,23 there should be a motion for its
restoration to petitioner that must be affirmatively acted upon by respondent Judge. Thus: "It
appears from the present case that the documents and other papers belonging to the petitioner
Mariano Molo, which were seized by a special agent of the Anti-Usury Board by virtue of a
warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, came into the possession of said board,
and while it does not appear how said board came to have them in its possession, it is
presumed that it was by virtue of an authority given by said court (see. 334, No. 31, Act No.
190). By virtue of said authority the board became an agent of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in the custody of the documents in question, with the obligation to return them to said court
upon the termination of the investigation for which the board needed them. As the Anti-Usury
Board had found no sufficient evidence to warrant a criminal action against the petitioner for
violation of the Usury Law, and as said board had dismissed the case under investigation, it was
duty bound to return said documents and papers to the Court of First Instance of Rizal so that
the latter might order the return thereof to their owner." 24
Much less could the seizure, the validity of the search warrant being admitted, be open to
question. As was set forth by Justice Malcolm in People v. Veloso: "The police officers were
accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied
by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons
presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of
the crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
any money or property found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime
or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of
committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause,
but not otherwise." 25
3. There is an equally insurmountable obstacle to the grant of petitioner's prayer for the writs
of certiorari and prohibition. There is included, as one of the annexes to his petition, the
following: "Received from Assistant City Fiscal Jesus V. Ramos the sum of [Ten Thousand Three
Hundred Fifty] (P10,350.00) Philippine Currency. This money will be returned to him if the higher
authorities will require the return of the same by legal orders, otherwise the same will not be
returned." 26 It was executed on April 1, 1966 and duly signed by him. As previously noted, he
would dispute the legality of the order requiring the return to enable him to avoid the effects of
such a promise. Not only would he thus ignore his plighted word, but what is worse, he would
impress on this Court a rather unorthodox notion of what legality connotes. His contention as to
the failure of the challenged order to meet such a test is that he is the owner of such an amount.

What he would conveniently ignore was the seizure thereof under a valid search warrant. The
very constitutional guarantee relied upon does not preclude a search in one's home and the
seizure of one's papers and effects as long as the element of reasonableness is not lacking. It
cannot be correctly maintained then that just because the money seized did belong to petitioner,
its return to the court that issued the search warrant could be avoided when precisely what the
law requires is that it be deposited therein. As a matter of fact, what lacks the element of legality
is the continued possession by petitioner. Resort to a higher tribunal then to nullify what was
done by respondent Judge is futile and unavailing.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition and certiorari is dismissed and the writ of preliminary
injunction under the resolution of this Court of June 21, 1966, lifted and set aside. With costs
against petitioner.

G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990

EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA,
QUERUBIN BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA
JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA
HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO,
JOSEFINA ALDIANO, ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS GONZALES,
ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO
GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO
GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA
SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO,
WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN and JAIME
BONGAT,petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police
officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or
"Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro
Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that they have
a common or general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human
rights and the reign of peace and order in their communities. They claim to represent "the
citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before this Court."

The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the petition
contending inter alia that petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the
proper parties to institute the action.

2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the
walls and windows of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open
(destroying some in the process), and then ordering the residents within to
come out of their respective residences.

According to the petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were conducted in Metro Manila:
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan, and Magdalena Streets, Tondo,
Manila.
2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira Extension and San Sebastian
Street, Tondo, Manila.
3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street, Tondo, Manila.
4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks along Aroma Beach up to
Happy Land, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street, and Pacheco Street,
Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan Navotas, Metro Manila.
7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound, Quezon City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo, Manila.

3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the
men are ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks
and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by
the raiders, some of the members of the raiding team force their way into
each and every house within the cordoned off area and then proceed to
conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from the
neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders
ransack their homes, tossing about the residents' belongings without total
regard for their value. In several instances, walls are destroyed, ceilings are
damaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing
frequency that their money and valuables have disappeared after the said
operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome
intrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that
take them to detention centers where they are interrogated and 'verified.'
These arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly issued
by a judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest.
Some hooded men are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.

10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila International Airport, Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.
12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in critical areas
pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests
range from seven (7) persons during the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one
thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on November 3 during the drive at Lower
Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern
of human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is alleged that the following were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early
morning hours, police and military units without any search warrant or
warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence and
sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of
them are in civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.

8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of

the period wherein they can be legally detained without any charge at all. In
other instances, some arrested persons are released without charge after a
few days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the
residents during these illegal operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spotbeatings, maulings and
maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are
subjected to mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted as their
Memorandum after the petition was given due course.

First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they allege
that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total
lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite Article VII,
Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis
supplied )
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. ...
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the nature
described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. If the military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out
and catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory
rights of all the people affected by such actions.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive,
invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising
lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The Constitution grants to Government the
power to seek and cripple subversive movements which would bring down constituted authority
and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the
name of security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the
Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian
systems both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is
trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the
least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections which are their
distinguishing features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the Court stated:
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to
be left alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots,
dating back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their
fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where
he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which
he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian
regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the
onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able again
to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish
and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973

Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v.
Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655; 660- 661 [1988]):
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We
have explained in the case of People vs. Burgos(144 SCRA 1)
citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it
could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected
area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa
v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a
man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that
haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of
who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around
him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from
any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf.
Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan J. and Boyd v. United
States, 11 6 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative
work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly
characterize constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritual concept:
the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less
than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed
except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards. (ibid, p. 74.)
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, (342 US 165; 96 L. Ed.
183 [1952]) emphasizes clearly that police actions should not be characterized by methods that
offend a sense of justice. The court ruled:
Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the present
case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this
conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious

squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too

energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking
into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove
what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents this course
of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to
offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack
and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.
It is significant that it is not the police action perse which is impermissible and which should be
prohibited. Rather, it is the procedure used or in the words of the court, methods which "offend
even hardened sensibilities." InBreithaupt v. Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the
same court validated the use of evidence, in this case blood samples involuntarily taken from the
petitioner, where there was nothing brutal or offensive in the taking. The Court stated:
Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing 'brutal' or
'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this case,
under the protective eye of a physician. To be sure, the driver here was
unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of conscious
consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation of
a constitutional light; and certainly the rest was administered here would not
be considered offensive by even the most delicate. Furthermore, due
process is not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction or the
sphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by that whole community
sense of 'decency and fairness that has been woven by common
experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct....
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered as "far
outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the police
action.
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on the determination of
the exact facts surrounding a particular case.
The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderly procedure
ascertains their truth, not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions would immediately
issue as a matter of course. A persistent pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties,
as alleged in the petition, has no place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements made by the petitioners are a
complete lie.

who had joined these operations, witnessed and recorded the events that
transpired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5, 1987,
Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14).
That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged victims who
numbered thousands had not themselves complained.
In her speech during turn-over rites on January 26, 1987 at Camp
Aguinaldo, President Aquino branded all accusations of deliberate disregard
for human rights as 'total lies'. Here are excerpts from her strongest speech
yet in support of the military:
All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human rights have been
shown- up to be total lies.
...To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight, fight with every assurance
that I will stand by you through thick and thin to share the blame, defend
your actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with you the final victory that I am
certain will be ours.
You and I will see this through together.
I've sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.
We have wasted enough time answering their barkings for it is still a long
way to lasting peace. . . . The dangers and hardships to our men in the field
are great enough as it is without having them distracted by tills worthless
carping at their backs.
Our counter-insurgency policy remains the same: economic development to
pull out the roots-and military operations to slash the growth of the
insurgency.
The answer to terror is force now.
Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to make our economic and
social initiatives bear fruit. . . Now that the extreme Right has been
defeated, I expect greater vigor in the prosecution of the war against the
communist insurgency, even as we continue to watch our backs against
attacks from the Right. (Philippine Star, January 27, 1988, p. 1, Annex 15;
emphasis supplied)

The Solicitor General argues:

This a complete lie.
Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to human rights.
Not only that, they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of
the actual operation. They were executed in coordination with barangay
officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit themselves voluntarily
for character and personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents,

Viewed in the light of President Aquino's observation on the matter, it can be

said that petitioners misrepresent as human rights violations the military and
police's zealous vigilance over the people's right to live in peace and safety.
(Rollo, pp. 36-38)
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth. Everything before us consists
of allegations. According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the
saturation drives covered by the petition. No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34,
Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila

International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand persons treated in the illegal and
inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial
court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have
been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the several
thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been charged and none of
those affected has apparently complained.
A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is the statement that local
and foreign co-respondents actually joined the saturation drives and witnessed and recorded the
events. In other words, the activities sought to be completely proscribed were in full view of
media. The sight of hooded men allegedly being used to fingerpoint suspected subversives
would have been good television copy. If true, this was probably effected away from the
ubiquitous eye of the TV cameras or, as the Solicitor General contends, the allegation is a
"complete lie."
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several thousand members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines sought to overthrow the present Government introduces another aspect of the
problem and illustrates quite clearly why those directly affected by human rights violations
should be the ones to institute court actions and why evidence of what actually transpired should
first be developed before petitions are filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the
combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise
quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the
Bill of Rights. This is exactly what happened in the White Plains Subdivision and the commercial
center of Makati during the first week of December, 1989.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal
elements particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials
by elements supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no
rebellion or criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have
been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were
searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights
of squatter and low income families are fully protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the
duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state
may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial
action even in cases such as the present petition where the petitioners do not complain that they
were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the thousands of alleged victims
are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as long as
the Court is convinced that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so
inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to submit
themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions
of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken
without some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain abuses. However, the

remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see
nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot
respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of
force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. A
blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on
one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals
are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their
offices because all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit. Where not
one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the
Supreme Court. It is basically one for the executive departments and for trial courts. Well
meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on
indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme
Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of constitutional litigation
have been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be followed.
If our policy makers sustain the contention of the military and the police that occasional
saturation drives are essential to maintain the stability of government and to insure peace and
order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be
evolved, they should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and
identifying violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference
should bring together the heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National Defense
and the operating heads of affected agencies and institutions to devise procedures for the
prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we
can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure,
no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges
and a hard look by administration officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket
prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably
committed and could be committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain
the alleged banging on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly
areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if these are humble
shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to the conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila,
Malabon, and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their
allegations and where specific erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding General PC-INP
for the drawing up and enforcement of clear guidelines to govern police actions intended to
abate riots and civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and subdue terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed
during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to govern such
actions are promulgated.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of
the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued
for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon
City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and
the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The
plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983,
later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come
to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this
Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness
and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by
the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in
all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise
its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in
the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme
Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is
laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant
petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of
more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the
petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,
Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983,
more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had
waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first
to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had
taught them that everything in this country, from release of public funds to
release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of
executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons
close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President
Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the
printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent,
through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the
Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that
the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to
Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial
efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned
their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against
them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked
as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now
estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of
respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence
does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in
this petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 2082[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place
where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed
therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of
Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended
and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It
would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended
for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously
this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose
Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued
for the search and seizure of the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or
fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means
of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which
the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and
other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained
in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered
and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe
the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of
the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication,
letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication
to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization
known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM"
and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA

892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV
969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No.
PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV
427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history:
the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of
the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress
and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such
historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and
imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended,
which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged
in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in
accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the

absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for
sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses,
according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum
offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all
materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment
remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the
court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed
by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of
U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE
FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation
of our authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the
equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly
set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is
hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt.
Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of
December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building
along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one
group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the
PNB building while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on
its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of
the same day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant
pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a traveling bag.
G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law
enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of
failing to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests.
Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and five
hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak"
placed in a traveling bag, which are prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos. 1
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge
of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on
their testimonies, the court a quo found the following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that
a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988,
with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of

Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket
to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM
office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated
marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp
Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report
stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical
report, the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence" alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant's
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in
evidence.
The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the
alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized
to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the
incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest,
she had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to
cross the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the
road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM
Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman
and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she
added that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.

After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a "Comment and/or
Objection to Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting the admissibility of the items
seized as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of
marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. 2
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a
warrant for the search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the
requirements for applying a search warrant is that the place to be searched must be
specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for
by the NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that
the same would be considered a general search warrant which may be quashed.

Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible
as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno. 5 This exclusionary rule
was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the
houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional
provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As
such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other
forms of restraint. 6
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body
and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation
which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must
perforce be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or
allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a
right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated. 7
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest
of accused-appellant violated the latter's constitutional rights.

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;

4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet
the evidence of the prosecution is even weaker.

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

These submissions are impressed with merit.

In People v. Ramos, 3 this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on
the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it
operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The plain import of the language
of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at
the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are
normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between
person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue
or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. 4

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in

which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search; 9

6. Stop and Frisk; 10 and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 11
The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement
officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons
against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still
be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched. 12
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his
knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all
reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining
probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by
substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with
criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. 13
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be
present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as
evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben, 14 acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted
a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against
persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic
of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red
traveling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his
bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the
bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the
activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant
regarding Aruta's alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot
tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug
traffickers as their "business address". More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His
actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that
Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was
acting suspiciously.

In People v. Malmstedt, 15 the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to
obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily
ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the operation.
The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility
to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the
police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Aruta's
identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was
searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement.
Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista, 16 the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles
coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they
received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of
accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause
to search accused-appellant's belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM
informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence
obtained in the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case
differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police
officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, 17 the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area
of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon
reaching the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be
"high" on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what
he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained
marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant
to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the
fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for
conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were
present which, when taken together with the information, constituted probable causes which
justified the warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause
necessitates a reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the
morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an
informant named "Benjie" that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be leaving for Baguio City on
December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a
large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant
alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a traveling bag even as the informant pointed her out
to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her
traveling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found dried
marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days
before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain.
From the information they had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first,
they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the
arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against
him.

accused-appellant for these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected,
pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential
information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be
bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the
following day. This intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity, the particular crime he
allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for
the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular
No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even
after court hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating
Encinada's constitutional right.

As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin 19 where, this Court observed
that:

In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag, accused-appellant
must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to
commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when
the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as
clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to
suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any
semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search
of accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not
having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically
follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest.
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in
favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against

Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond
cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a
search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search,
both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law. 18

. . . accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and
so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately
arrest him.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and
seizure of accused-appellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in "plain
view" under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as
shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the
bag to ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag be justified as a search of a
moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accusedappellant was apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact,
she was accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao, 20 applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas
v. Court of Appeals. 21 In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions
were accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable
manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them
to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never
attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as such.
Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke
a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and
emergency circumstances, as applied in People v. De
Gracia. 22 In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was being used as
headquarters by the RAM during a coup d' etat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of
armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building refused to open the
door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions
inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The

existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was
probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the
instant case.

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what

happened next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would
be consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of
her constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily
submitted herself to search and inspection citingPeople v. Malasugui 23 where this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person
or premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.

Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to
examine the two chairs that he carried, what did you do next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in
between the two chairs.

In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to
Aling Rosa, what happened after that?
A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents
and confronted her with our informant and asked her what she
was carrying and if we can see the bag she was carrying.

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, we believe that appellant based on the transcript quoted above did not voluntarily
consent to Bolonia's search of his belongings. Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a
warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the
performance of duty." (Emphasis supplied)

Q What was her reaction?

Thus, accused-appellant's lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her
constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held
in People v. Barros: 27

A She gave her bag to me.

Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?
A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.

24

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General's contention for the Malasugui case is
inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless
arrest thereby making the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally
lawful. 25 On the contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as expounded above in
detail, is wanting in the instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal.
Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and
illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence
against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in
handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission
or an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People
v. Encinada, 26 where this Court held:
[T]he Republic's counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing
the package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right
against the warrantless search. This he gleaned from Bolonia's testimony.

. . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search

conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to
object"
. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda.
de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused failed
to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a
permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80
Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion
Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in
the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an

invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the

supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights." 28 (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As
clearly illustrated inPeople v. Omaweng, 29 where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified
thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what
did you do?
A When we saw that traveling bag, we asked the driver if we
could see the contents.
Q And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was
any?
A He said "you can see the contents but those are only
clothings" (sic).
Q When he said that, what did you do?
A We asked him if we could open and see it.
Q When you said that, what did he tell you?
A He said "you can see it".
Q And when he said "you can see and open it," what did you
do?
A When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not
clothings (sic) that was contained in the bag.
Q And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did
you do?
A When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some
of the contents and showed it to my companion Fomocod and
when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana. (Emphasis
supplied)

In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be
stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the protection of
the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and
privileges of the Court." He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to
have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the
police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be
secured only if accused-appellant's name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its
arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within
which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
. . . [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and
only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made. 30
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one
without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person
intended to be searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time
was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. "Aling Rosa"
turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was
identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned
themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their passengers.
Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way
hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed.
In any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is
feasible. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in
the trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the
warrantless search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may
not apply in the instant case for the following reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea
of "not guilty" and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the
court's jurisdiction. 32 The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of

the search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply
does not extend this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon
failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a
Demurrer to Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence.
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,

33

which stated:

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid

warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused
person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest,
or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for
and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning
the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a
preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter
necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former an argument that the
Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of
the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is
not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and
seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar,
defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of
the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in
evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellant's objection to the admission
of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the
circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably
inferred from his conduct before or during the trial. (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant
considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an
instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegal and inadmissible
subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to
the letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 34
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally
and civilly liable, theStonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the
exclusionary rule is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against
abuse. This approach is based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that "only in
case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will the wrong be repressed." 35
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional
guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. 36

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73,
Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED
and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other legal
grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ
limited, flexible responses like "stop-and-frisk" which are graduated in relation to the
amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate
or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and
seizure.
The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993
and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon."
In an Information dated April 11, 1988, 1 Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by
Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows: 2
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any
authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug
and knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. 3 With the
agreement of the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail
bond. 4 After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as
a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a decision 5 convicting appellant of illegal
possession of marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: 6
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN
MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II,
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana residue), and
hereby sentences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Appellant remained on provisional liberty. 7 Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a
Notice of Appeal 8dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court 9 promulgated its
assailed Decision, denying the appeal and affirming the trial court: 10

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against appellant.
Respondent Court 11 denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994,
disposing:
ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby
DENIED.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

policemen (Exhibit "A"). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit "D")
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue
for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom
corner of Exhibit "D".
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the
subject marijuana residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on
the stamped portion of Exhibit "D".
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations
of the specimen which she identified. (Exhibit
"E") 13 Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as "crushed marijuana leaves" in
her Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit "F"). 14 These crushed marijuana leaves
gave positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.

The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: 12

At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the AntiNarcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance
along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The
policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named
Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police
Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information
that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle.
They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high
on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then
asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to
resist. Pat Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male
person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo
Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found
suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents.

Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this

examination, she also found that the "crushed marijuana leaves" gave positive results
for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her examinations (Exhibit "G").
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letterenvelope and sealed it. (Exhibit "E"). She then wrote identification notes on this letterenvelope. (Exhibit "E-1").
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit "F" from the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong
prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Exhibit "C")
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front
of the cemetery when he was apprehended. 15
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows: 16

Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl.
Tamondong wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote
"Evidence "A" 4/11/88 Alain Manalili". The white sheet of paper was marked as Exhibit
"E-3". The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit
"E-4").

At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI
was aboard a tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way
to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop
because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under the influence of
marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford
Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the
accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the policemen why he
was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying
marijuana. However, nothing was found on the persons of the accused and the driver.
The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused to the
police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again search the
accused.

Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Section requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue
(Exhibit "D"). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the apprehending

On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signalled the
latter to follow him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused was asked to remove his

The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for
investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet
and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the accused ALAIN
MANALILI y DIZON.

pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion. The policemen turned
over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana.
However, nothing was found, except for some dirt and dust. This prompted the
companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to release the
accused. The accused was led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that
they found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.

Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the
trial court.

At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought
outside the cell and was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen
to call his parents in order to "settle" the case. The policemen who led the accused to
the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl. Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas
was the policeman who told the accused to call his parents. The accused did not call
his parents and he told the policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.

II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the)
accused (and) in ruling that the guilt of the accused had been
proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.

At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the
office of an inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was
found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused not to say anything. The accused
was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.

III
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were material and
substantial and not minor.

Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and
the accused were stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988,
testified. He said that the policemen found nothing either on his person or on the
person of the accused when both were searched on April 11, 1988.

IV
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the
Kalookan City Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched
the accused who was made to take off his pants at the police headquarters but no
marijuana was found on the body of the accused.

The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that

the accused was framed for the purpose of extorting money.
V

Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures
showing that tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery. 17

The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when

the evidence presented is consistent with both innocence and
guilt.

The Rulings of the Trail and the Appellate Courts

The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the
strength of the arresting officers' testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were "neutral and
disinterested" witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during the performance of their
duties. Substantially they asserted that the appellant was found to be in possession of a
substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this charge was merely "trumped up,"
because the appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor
moved for a reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on
speculations, surmises or conjectures. On the alleged "serious" discrepancies in the testimonies
of the arresting officers, the appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial
to impair the essential veracity of the narration. It further found petitioner's contention that he
could not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana residue to be without merit, because
the forensic chemist reported that what she examined were marijuana leaves.

VI
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the
prosecution which are inadmissible in evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him,
(2) the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts
of the defense of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his
conviction.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.

First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized

During a Stop-and-Frisk
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending
that they were products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated July 5,
1994, which was adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of
the marijuana leaves was waived because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings
below nor did he object to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even
assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to
a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In
the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, 18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat
him for weapon(s):
. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment,
and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken. 19
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective
crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate
circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though
there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This was the legitimate
investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached
petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a street
corner for an extended period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same
store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy
police work for an officer of 30 years' experience to have failed to investigate this behavior
further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held
that what justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by
exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and
subject to challenge. 20Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence
as a "fruit of the poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute. 21 The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search
incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs
search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search
and seizure." 22 In People vs. Encinada, 23 the Court further explained that "[i]n these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction
by law is in the place to be searched."
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, 24 the Court held that there were
many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated
National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting
suspiciously. They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live
ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the
legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search the bag only
after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late
under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while
obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance
that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery,
which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his
experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious
behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession: 25

FISCAL RALAR:

A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.

Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the

Caloocan Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan City?

Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him
what he was holding in his hands?

A Because there were some informations that some drug

dependents were roaming around at A. Mabini Street in front of
the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.

A He tried to resist, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat.
Angel Lumabas and one Arnold Enriquez, what happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the
Caloocan Cemetery then when we called his attention, he tried to
avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and introduce
ourselves as police officers in a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when
you chanced upon him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you
chanced upon was high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying
manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided
you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers
in a polite manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?

Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?

A I requested him if I can see what was he was (sic) holding in his
hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a
marijuana (sic) crushed residue.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner effectively waived
the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to
object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right
against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the
right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive,
thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 26Otherwise, the Courts
will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not
deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case,
however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation
before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of
criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the
errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on
appeal. 27
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers' testimony contained "polluted,
irreconcilable and unexplained" contradictions which did not support petitioner's conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is
accorded great weight and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and
deportment as they testified before it. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been
overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially affect the
result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule. 28

We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:

(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies
in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to
impair the essential veracity of their narration. In People vs. Avila, it was held that
"As long as the witnesses concur on the material points, slight differences in their
remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their
statements.
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the
bestowal of full credence on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record.
Despite Pat. Lumabas' contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint
Affidavit 29 signed by both arresting policemen. The question of whether the marijuana was found
inside petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that petitioner did not
deny possession of said substance. Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that
marijuana was found in petitioner's possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor and
does not destroy Espiritu's credibility.30
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item
or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 31
The substance found in petitioner's possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida
Pascual to be crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of authority to possess these leaves
was established. His awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on
drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he resisted when asked to show and identify the
thing he was holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding
marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to
believe the extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case
against the arresting officers or present any evidence other than his bare claim. His argument
that he feared for his life was lame and unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail
and continued to be on bail as early as April 26, 1988. 32Since then, he could have made the
charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frameup, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate. 33
The Proper Penalty
The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as
amended) by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of
imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act requires the
imposition of an indeterminate penalty:
Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,

and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other
law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall
not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No.
4225.)
Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death
penalty or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of
misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to
those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose
maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already
sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in
Section 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty
for illegal possession of marijuana:
Sec. 8. . . . .
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and
a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use Indian hemp.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years. 34
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as
minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND
PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

REGALADO, J.:
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae impressionis case through
the present petition wherein the parties have formulated and now pose for resolution the
following issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search
warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter,
issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial
jurisdiction. 1
The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from the findings of
respondent Court of Appeals 2 on which there does not appear to be any dispute, to wit:

From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be
gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the
CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search
warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25
Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23,
1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No.
95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM,
armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense
alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor
Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to
CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials
and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during
the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises
searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them
were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER
Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case
No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.
On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation,
Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired
Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the
Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of
Evidence Illegally Obtained.
On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the
challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the
quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant
was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and
Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules
and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court
(National Capital Judicial Region);. . .
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge,
having been denied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners
have come to this Court via the instant petition, raising the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH
WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A
WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE
LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.
xxx xxx xxx

Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of the trial court, by
denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it had
issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now
impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us.
We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in support of their
submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and intent
of the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous
doctrines, in the area of law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do
not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has the
competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible
jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial
jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution of
one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid compounding the
seeming confusion, these questions shall be discussedseriatim.
I
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the
search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is directed toward
the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is
sought to be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for the
search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue
in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having
been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention
of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It
would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is
inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed
in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and
purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the
institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. 4 A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name
of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. 5 A search warrant is in the
nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. 6
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search
warrants, 7 such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a
court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a
court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as
formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing
issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, 8 or all writs, warrants, summonses, andorders of courts of justice or judicial

officers. 9 It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding
to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the
judgment, 10 or a writ,warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice. 11
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules
to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in
anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial
clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be
filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be
filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are
then located. This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different
venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where different trial courts
have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal offense.
In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position may create,
we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the
venue of criminal actions and which we quote:
Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the
offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.
(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any
other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory
where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including
the place of departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its
voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of
the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the
vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein
under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper
court in which the charge is first filed. (14a)
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial
agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of the
uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It
would be doubly so if compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of
said warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same from what may
later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.
Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the
Judiciary Act of 1948 12 or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act, 13 have never required the

jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the
silence of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory
omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean that the formulators of the
Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations
of national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who
would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such conditions or restrictions,
under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be reasonably construed as trenching on
judicial legislation. It would be tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something
that has been omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embraced therein. 14
Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case has
already been filed in a particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure evidence to be
presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant,
upon proper application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such application
would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to
be no further complications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such
articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed hereafter.
3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the
respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which correspond to the
thirteen judicial regions, 15invite our attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority
granted by
law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court 17 over
which the particular branch concerned shall exercise its
authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to
search that place." Support for such position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court,
that is, Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4,
1987.
We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of
general application to all instances involving search warrants and in all courts as would be the
case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the
Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for search
warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas
and only with respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under
the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue
search warrants would not apply tosingle-sala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule
sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure
which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative Order No.
3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts," was the source of thesubject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order was issued pursuant to
the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of which states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional
Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be

deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of

determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a
procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred
by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section
17 thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall
be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city
or municipality within the same region as public interest may require, and such assignment shall
not be deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a new
appointment for the judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per
se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that nonobservance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the
limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority
pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated
to the three executive judges the administrative areas for which they may respectively issue
search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to
the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129.
Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of
power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the place
to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from
exercising the same power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to
provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its predecessor, Administrative
Circular No. 13, had a number of requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search
warrants, if they had been filed with the executive judge, among the judges within his
administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and ordered
instead that such applications should immediately be "taken cognizance of and acted upon by
the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial
Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes
enumerated therein.
Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive
jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves
directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other
judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them to so act
only on applications involving search of places located within their respective territorial
jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the
assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and
not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No. 13 even
specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of that provision, thus:
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized
thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be
distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of
this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has
been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search
warrant. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case
can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only
the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to
search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is
pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction
to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the
executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in
Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the
place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search
warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and
place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction
over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under
the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it
was implemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.
This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional range of
enforcement of search warrants.
II
As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional trial
court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial
jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise.
1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search
warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest.
Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the
time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for
the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the
warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, 19 said
warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced
or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our
Rules at ten days 20 but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be
enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein
which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.
We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules
would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent specific mention
thereof, and the same not being inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions
which are presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a contrary
interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced.
A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that
writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province only
with the approval of the former court of first instance. 21 Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
the enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial
court. 22 On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first
instance were enforceable throughout the Philippines, 23 under the Interim or Transitional Rules
and Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only

within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that said provision
be set out in full:
3. Writs and processes.
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of
the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court
may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases,
without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Emphasis
ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in
unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a
regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly
provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a
judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or
impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary,
the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere
in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no
distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated in
paragraph (b).
2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search
warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to
detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or
prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for
the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more
onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of
jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a
search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark
case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno,et al., 24 the searches in the corporate offices in Manila and
the residences in Makati of therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants
issued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the
Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were never challenged on
jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently nullified for being general warrants.
3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously
invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal searches and seizures. We do not believe
that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction
wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we
swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what
could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly"
court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action.
Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in
Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, 26 and
all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for
or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the

warrant 27 would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the
distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really
compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such
constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable
indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and
liberty.
On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now
and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence,
political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a
search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact
that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination
in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded
precaution, obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as
quoted by respondent court:
This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information
which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is
secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not
hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the
place to be searched is located. 28
The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign
judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one
district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county
and made returnable before the justice of still another district or another court having jurisdiction
to deal with the matters involved. 29 In the present state of our law on the matter, we find no such
statutory restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the
enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.
III
Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in
the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search
warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as
evidence in said criminal case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our
jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13
of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search
warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may
be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant
must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the
application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court
with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in
and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate
higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and

objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression
as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for
said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation,
a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not
cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently
be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available,
existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the
hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall
likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is
not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the
warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with
the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in
different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original
jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have
been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on
applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T.
CHIONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID
KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals. 1 Said judgment dismissed the People's petition for certiorari to
invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court
dated February 9, 1996. 2 as well (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion for
reconsideration. 3 Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of
illegal possession of explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:

never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however

returned to the respondents upon order of the court on respondents' motion
or request. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of
plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without
the items described in the search warrant are; (a) three (3) Ingram machine
pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted
chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and
ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return
was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects
including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was no showing
that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.
4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged; **" and on the same date, submitted their
"Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare
Evidence Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated
comment on petition forcertiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular
inspection of the premises searched was conducted by respondent Judge
and the following facts had been established as contained in the order
dated January 30.1996 ** to wit:

1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I.

Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on
December 15, 1995, 4

1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment

No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigail's Variety Store;

2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the
warrant, and

2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in the

building as it is correspondingly called only as
"Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"

3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within
five (5) days "to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner
considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search Warrant."

3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's

Variety Store;

The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search
warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain,
who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail
Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95)
against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1,
immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four
(4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings,
papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, tshirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to
$3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were

4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass

from Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1
have its own respective doors used for ingress and
egress.
There being no objection on the said observation of the
Court, let the same be reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order duly granting
the motion to quash search warrant**; 5

7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion

to dismiss** ;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a
motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order quashing
the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondents filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the motion
for reconsideration** ;
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order denying the
motion for reconsideration**; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents
filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the
Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the
Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for lack
of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:

d) ** ** it is very clear that the place searched is

different from the place mentioned in the Search
Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR. INSP
Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4
Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED
CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being
RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN
were not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say
TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the
Search Warrant the words "KATABI", or "KADIKIT" or
"KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang
papasukin namin" or if they happen to be an ENGLISH
speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their
mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS
"RESIDE" or "ADJACENT" or "BEHIND" or "NEXT to
ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place they are going to
raid."**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful
occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any member of the
family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living room
at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law. 9

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place
described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial
Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not objected to by
the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The place
searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then residing,
was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and separate from, and in no
way connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place
stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutor's claim that the sketch submitted to Judge
Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant, actually depicted the
particular place to be searched was effectively confuted by Judge
Casanova who pointed out that said "SKETCH was not dated, not signed by
the person who made it and not even mentioned in the Search Warrant by
the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead **directed them to search
Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207** in the Order **dated December 15,
1995" this, too, being the address given "in the Application for Search
Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James
Brillantes, the Team Leader." The untenability of the claim is made more
patent by the People's admission, during the hearing of its petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in truth "not
attached to the application for search warrant ** (but) merely attached to the
motion for reconsideration." 7
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following
observations of Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28,
1996, viz.: 8

4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as
required by the warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or
77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court. 10
5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash
search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco
vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the
Supreme Court in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the
prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one
court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another court or
branch thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that search warrant
is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The
criminal case is more substantial than the search warrant proceedings, and
the presiding Judge in the criminal case has the right to rule on the search
warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans
cases).
6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in
light of "Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the
special civil action ofcertiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of
Appeals the following errors, to wit:

1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the

proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latter's
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be
searched;"
2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not
attached to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence** to the
contrary;"
3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"
4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be
diminished by the tardiness by which the return is made;"
5) hastily applying "the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a
substitute for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at bar
clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule;" and
6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence to prove the
validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly resolved
without informing petitioner thereof."
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly
issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or
more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the
warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the
search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place
to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the
Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected the
search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the
competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken
therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be
so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind the first of four (4) separate apartment units
(No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" was not what the Judge who issued warrant
himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the premises
to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a
description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the
search warrant: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207. Area-F, Bagong Buhay
Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made
more particular and more restrictive by the Judge's admonition in the warrant that the
search be "limited only to the premises herein described."
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct
places in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate
and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are

contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a person could
pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of
the others, and may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police
officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the residential units at the
rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the store
and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand
the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the warrant
which directs that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described," "Abigail Variety
Store Apt 1207" thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store they did
not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own
definite idea of the place to be searched clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch
they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application was sufficient
particularization of the general identification of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of
Staff, AFP, 11 allegedly to the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the
place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal,
immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for
seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City;" Two (2) warrants issued No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was made to the
execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City" because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This
was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it
was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one place.
Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2) distinct
addresses, and that in fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City" appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that
evidently, this was the address the Judge intended to be searched when he issued the second
warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the "obviously typographical
error," the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the official court file. 12
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error"
involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a
place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos,
the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants
in question. In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be
searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is
neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the
warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search
is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had

represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the
officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as
the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door
to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion
which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description
of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant
itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacalla's
finding of probable cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A perusal of the record however
shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge
Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the identities of the
police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. 13 In Judge Casanova's view, said inconsistencies,
being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts
on which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before
Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is,
to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant which, of course, is the only place
that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not that which the police officers who
applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to searchand-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was
a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none
for Apartment No. 1 the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and
precisely the place in which the private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:

14

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the things to be seized.
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on
probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too,
that it particularly describe the place to be searched, 15 the manifest intention being
that the search be confined strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought

into operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained in violation ** (inter alia of
the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 16
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be
made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building
housing the store and the residential apartment units the place to be searched being plainly
marked was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had
been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among
others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the
return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive "evidence
which ** (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the trial court;" or (5)
the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously
availed of. The resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that
the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant is
different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument
that anyway the premises searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and
originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that where a
search warrant has been "issued by a court other than the one trying the main criminal case,"
the "proper recourse" of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing
court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of the warrant is
afterwards filed. 17 In support, it cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down by this
Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals 18 concerning "possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more
accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the
search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be
used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second guideline reads: 19
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main
criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may
be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any
proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by
the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings
for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the
criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is
not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be
filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing
Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not
cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other,
and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against
forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly
applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by
the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the
criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved
in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to

suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to

prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed
by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The
resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to
any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional
Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the
criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or for
the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have properly been
presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action
had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence
was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in
accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September
11, 1996 which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders
of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in Criminal
Case No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED
without pronouncement as to costs.

witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be
struck down.
The Case
Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 praying for (1) the nullification of Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; 2 and (2) the issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him
to desist proceeding with IS No. 95-167.
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, 3 this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the
respondents to comment on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP Traffic
Management Command filed its 31-page Opposition 4 to the Petition, together with 90 pages of
annexes. 5 On February 22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment 6 agreeing with petitioners that the writs prayed for must be granted. After petitioners
filed a Reply to the Opposition, the Court gave due course to the Petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.

SO ORDERED.

In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its February 5,
1997 Resolution, 7 required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to prepare the memorandum for the
public respondents. After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997, 8 the Court in
its September 24, 1997 Resolution gave him a non-extendible period ending on October 31,
1997 within which to file the required memorandum. In view of Dacera's manifestation that he
was only a nominal party and that he had yet to receive the records of the case from the PNP,
the Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution, ordered the Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the
PNP Traffic Management Command to file its memorandum within thirty days from notice;
"otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for decision." 9 Even after the expiration of the
said period, the required pleading was not yet received by this Court.

G.R. No. 122092 May 19, 1999

Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOU's refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as a
waiver of its privilege to do so.

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR.,

RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA,
NICEFORO V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL,
ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I.
ABAD and HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS
UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the requisites for the issuance of search warrant must be followed strictly. Where the judge fails
to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the

The Facts
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant
before the said RTC of Quezon City, staring: 10
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines,
located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession
or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives,
which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in
committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in
the premises herein described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to
take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described
properties:

Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16
US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI
submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s]
cal. 40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal.38
revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s],
assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and
ten (10) handgrenades.

premises and to seize and bring the articles above-described and make an
immediate return there[of] 14
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and
seized the following: 15
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

11

Attached to the application were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2
Cecilio T. Morito, 12 as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements
of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.

01 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 Elisco

02 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 (Tampered) Elisco

After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the
contested search warrant, 13 the pertinent portion of which reads:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under
oath, SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable cause to believe that
the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located
at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented
by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or
control the following:

03 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171702 Elisco

04 M16Rilfe 5.56 Defaced Elisco
05 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco
06 M16Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco

Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal 5.56

07 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171337 Elisco

Ten (10) M14 US rifles

08 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco

Two (2) AK-47 rifle(s)

09 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 (Tampered) Elisco

Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]

10 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171167 (Tampered) Elisco

Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.

11 M16Rifle 5.56 170881 (Tampered) Elisco

Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]

12 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170897 Elisco

Ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s]

13 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171509 Elisco

Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]

(With pending

Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms

case-Casaway Case)

Ten (l0) handgrenades

14 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171754 Elisco

in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms,

Ammunition and Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought
before this Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate
search daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned

15 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170881 (Tampered) Elisco

16 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174637 Elisco
17 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171366 Elisco

18 M16Rifle 5.56 RP1714637 (Tampered) Elisco

06 Rifle Grenade 11 rounds

19 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174610 Elisco

07 Hand Grenade 4 pcs.

20 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171367 (Tampered) Elisco

AMMO DAM POST NO. 24

01 M14 7.62 1499694 Elisco

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

02 M14 7.62 889163 Elisco

01 M16 5.56 171425 (Tampered) Gyno Corp.

01 BAR Cal. 30 865975 Royal

02 Machine Pistol .22 651 (Tampered) Landmann

01 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 384181 US Carbin

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

02 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 998201 US Carbin

01 M1 (short) 3 pcs.

01 Garand M1 Cal. 30 1194008 Springfield

02 M16 (long) 1 pc.

02 Garand M1 Cal. 30 3123784 Springfield

03 M14 8 pcs.

01 Shotgun 12 Gauge H359704 Omega

04 Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs.

02 Shotgun 12 Gauge 9211 Homemade

05 Mag Assy Cal .22 1 pc.

(Paltik)

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01 M16 73 rounds

01 M16 (long) 29 pcs.

02 M14 160 rounds

02 M16 (short) 48 pcs.

03 M1 Garand Cal .30 30 rounds

03 Carbine M1 171 pcs.

04 Rifle Grenade 1 round

04 BAR 19 pcs.

MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

01 M16 2,023 rounds

01 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171725 Elisco

03 Carbine M1 276 rounds

02 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco

04 M-60 Cal. 7.62 1,800 rounds

03 M16 5.56 RP 132320 Elisco

05 M1 Garand 1,278 rounds

04 Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec

Pistol

07 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor

05 Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H)

08 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor

Shotguns

09 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

10 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor

01 M16 (long) 3 pcs.

11 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359723 Armscor

02 M16 (short) 4 pcs.

12 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor

03 Intratec 1 pc.

13 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor

04 US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.

14 Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

15 Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB

01 M16 147 rds.

16 Shotgun 12 Gauge Defaced Not

02 Cal .30 5 rounds

Indicated

03 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

04 Carbine 5 rounds

01 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds.

05 Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds

02 M16 2,349 rds.

06 9 MM 30 rounds

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16

01 Carbine (defective) 76 pcs.

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

02 Cal. 22 -do- 16 pcs

01 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 Armscor

03 M16 (long-defective) 2 pcs.

02 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor

04 M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs.

03 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor

05 Thompson (defective) 8 pcs.

04 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor

06 Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs.

05 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor

07 BAR (defective) 2 pcs.

06 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 Armscor

Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a
"Motion to Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a "Supplemental
Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence." 17
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners'
motions. 18 On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order 19 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.20
Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause:

21

I
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave
abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash
Search Warrant No. 799(95). Probable cause [has] not . . . been sufficiently
established and partaking as it does of the nature of a general warrant.
II
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave
abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash
Search Warrant No. 799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully served or
implemented.
III
Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with
grave abuse of discretion his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings
in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a preliminary matter, we
shall also discuss respondents' argument that the Petition should be dismissed for raising factual
questions.
This Court's Ruling

In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising
questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain
that the Petition merely assails the "factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and regularity of
its implementation. 22
This argument is not convicting. It is settled that "there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 23 In the present case, petitioner do not
question the truth of the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which
those findings were arrived at, a procedure which they contend was violative of the which those
Constitution and the Rules of Court. We agree that the Petition raises only question of law, which
may be resolved in the present case.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant
The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures and the basic
conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, 24 detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows:
Sec. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

The petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions

More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present;
(2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses
he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or
affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5)
the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 25

In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail court failed to examine
personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared
during the hearing for the issuance or the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched
was not described with particularity.

STENOGRAPHER:
Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation,
address and other personal circumstances.
WITNESS:

No Personal Examination

SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married,

policeman, c/o Camp Crame, Quezon City, SOU, TMC.

of the Witnesses
In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was valid,
stating that "before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching questions to the
applicant and the witnesses in order to determined whether there was probable
cause . . .." 26 (Emphasis supplied.) This was supported by the Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, which argued that "it is erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not
propound searching questions upon applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the
witnesses he produced." 27 The records, however, proclaim otherwise.
As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by (1)
the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Moriro, (2) a summary of
information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for
Pascua and Bacolod however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared
before the trial court. Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the
search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod: 28
COURT:
Where is the witness for this application for search
warrant?
P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he failed
even to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound
questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod
(whose testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper). Obviously, His Honor relied mainly
on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in this language:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant
and the witnesses he may procedure and attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.
xxx xxx xxx
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents
of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification
of the application. 29

COURT:

Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to

Swear the witness.

Facts Personally Known to Him

STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)

Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth
before this Court?
WITNESS:
Yes Ma'am.

Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his
testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of
PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition,
he stated:
Q How do you know that said the properties were
subject of the offense?
A Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case
build up for several days, we gathered informations
from reliable sources that subject properties [which] are

in their possession and control [are] the herein

described properties subject of the offense. (Summary
of Information dtd Oct. '94. SS's of Mario Enad and
Felipe Moreno both dtd 30 Nov '94 are hereto
attached). 30
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security
guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not meet the
requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. He declared:
Q This is an application for Search Warrant against
Paper Industries Corporation located at PICOP
Compound Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
How come that you have knowledge that there are
illegal firearms in that place?
A At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by
our Commander to investigate the alleged
assassination plot of Congressman Amante.

A Yes, sir.
Q What did you f[i]nd . . .?
A I found . . . several high-powered firearms being kept
in the compound of PICOP.
Q Where are those located?
A Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.
Q Inside the compound?
A Located inside the compound.
Q Then what?

Q In the course of your investigation, what happened?

A Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or

office.

A We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged

assassination plot are employees of PICOP.

Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries

Corporation has its own security guards?

Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of

PICOP, what did you do?

A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.

A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the

compound of PICOP in Tabon.

Q You mean to say that their own security guards

guarded the PICOP?
A Yes, sir.

Q What did you find . . .?

A I found . . . several high-powered firearms.
Q How were you able to investigate the compound of
PICOP?
A I exerted effort to enter the said compound.

Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the

security guards are illegally obtained?
A I believe they have no license to possess highpowered firearms. As far as the verification at FEU,
Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they have no license.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Q By what means?

Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security

Agency?

A By pretending to have some official business with the

company.

A I conducted the inquiry.

Q So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the

compound of PICOP?

Q What did you find out?

A They are using firearms owned by PICOP.

Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?

A Yes, sir.
Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security
Agency has no firearms of their own?
A No high-powered firearms.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have
you seen inside the compound of PICOP?
A There are M-16 armalite rifles.

government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed
except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards." 34 Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description
will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the
described items are to be found in particular place. 35
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place with particularly. It
simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such
premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of
the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The
PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800
miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five
hectares." 36 Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority
to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound. 37

Q What else?
A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US
rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, .45 caliber pistols, several
handgrenades and
ammos. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound
was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guard were not licensed.
He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before
the trail court PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms.
Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy
aforementioned "no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the
PNP or to present it during the hearing. Such certification could have been easily obtained,
considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also
based. In People v. Judge Estrada, 32 the Court held:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the
best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The
introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the
existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance,
the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such
evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could
easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at
the time of the application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason
therefor during the examination by the judge.
Particularity of the
Place to Be Searched
In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search, the Constitution to be
searched only to those described in the warrant. 33 Thus, this Court has held that "this
constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy
of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach of

In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement,
because they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the
warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because
they were not among those identified during the hearing. 38
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not
made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asucion. Moreover, the fact that the
raiding police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed
firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be
searched. 39 Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant the place
indicated in the warrant or the place identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled for
mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforces.
Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, 40 this Court ruled that the police had no authority to search
the apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they
intended it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be
changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:
. . . In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting
of the minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the
warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to
substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have
been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a
place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place
actually searched although not that specified in the warrant [was]
exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in the supporting evidence. What is material in determining the
validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they
submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers'
theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at
the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or

modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such
a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the
search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as
the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the
power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated
in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process,
and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the
Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the
police officers conducting the search. (Emphasis supplied.)
Seized Firearms and Explosives
Inadmissible in Evidence
As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95)
issued by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint
docketed as IS No. 95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State
Prosecutor Dacera, to whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a
subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of the preliminary
investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search warrant. They argued,
as they do now, that the illegal obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal
Complaint. Their motion was denied. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same
fate. In the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that "State
Prosecutor Dacera cannot have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No.
95-167." 41
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding." 42 As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence
was "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures." 43 Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Without this
exclusionary rule, the constitutional right "would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means evidence means of coercing evidence
. . .." 44
In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and
other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally obtained
pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the Complainant and the proceedings before State
Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and
order in the country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so
only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people.
Indeed, "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason."

45

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Illinois v. Gates
Argued October 13, 1982
Reargued March 1, 1983
Decided June 8, 1983
462 U.S. 213
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
Syllabus
On May 3, 1978, the Police Department of Bloomingdale, Ill., received an anonymous letter
which included statements that respondents, husband and wife, were engaged in selling drugs;
that the wife would drive their car to Florida on May 3 to be loaded with drugs, and the husband
would fly down in a few days to drive the car back; that the car's trunk would be loaded with
drugs; and that respondents presently had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement.
Acting on the tip, a police officer determined respondents' address and learned that the husband
made a reservation on a May 5 flight to Florida. Arrangements for surveillance of the flight were
made with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the surveillance
disclosed that the husband took the flight, stayed overnight in a motel room registered in the
wife's name, and left the following morning with a woman in a car bearing an Illinois license plate
issued to the husband, heading north on an interstate highway used by travelers to the
Bloomingdale area. A search warrant for respondents' residence and automobile was then
obtained from an Illinois state court judge, based on the Bloomingdale police officer's affidavit
setting forth the foregoing facts and a copy of the anonymous letter. When respondents arrived
at their home, the police were waiting, and discovered marihuana and other contraband in
respondents' car trunk and home. Prior to respondents' trial on charges of violating state drug
laws, the trial court ordered suppression of all the items seized, and the Illinois Appellate Court
affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the letter and affidavit were
inadequate to sustain a determination of probable cause for issuance of the search warrant
under Aguilar v. Texas,378 U. S. 108, and Spinelli v. United States,393 U. S. 410, since they
failed to satisfy the "two-pronged test" of (1) revealing the informant's "basis of knowledge" and
(2) providing sufficient facts to establish either the informant's "veracity" or the "reliability" of the
informant's report.
Held:
1. The question -- which this Court requested the parties to address -- whether the rule requiring
the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should
be modified so as, for example, not to require exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable
Page 462 U. S. 214
belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment, will not
be decided in this case, since it was not presented to or decided by the Illinois courts. Although
prior decisions interpreting the "not pressed or passed on below" rule have not involved a State's
failure to raise a defense to a federal right or remedy asserted below, the purposes underlying
the rule are, for the most part, as applicable in such a case as in one where a party fails to
assert a federal right. The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the federal

exclusionary rule does not affect the application of the "not pressed or passed on below" rule.
Nor does the State's repeated opposition to respondents' substantive Fourth Amendment claims
suffice to have raised the separate question whether the exclusionary rule should be modified.
The extent of the continued vitality of the rule is an issue of unusual significance, and adhering
scrupulously to the customary limitations on this Court's discretion promotes respect for its
adjudicatory process and the stability of its decisions, and lessens the threat of untoward
practical ramifications not foreseen at the time of decision. Pp. 462 U. S. 217-224.
2. The rigid "two-pronged test" under Aguilar and Spinelli for determining whether an informant's
tip establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant is abandoned, and the "totality of the
circumstances" approach that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations is
substituted in its place. The elements under the "two-pronged test" concerning the informant's
"veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge" should be understood simply as closely
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical question whether
there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause existed. This flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the
accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does
the approach that has developed from Aguilar and Spinelli. Pp. 462 U. S. 230-241.
3. The judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause to
search respondents' home and car existed. Under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis,
corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work is of significant
value. Cf. Draper v. United States,358 U. S. 307. Here, even standing alone, the facts obtained
through the independent investigation of the Bloomingdale police officer and the DEA at least
suggested that
Page 462 U. S. 215
respondents were involved in drug trafficking. In addition, the judge could rely on the anonymous
letter, which had been corroborated in major part by the police officer's efforts. Pp. 462 U. S.
241-246.
85 Ill.2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN,
POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 462 U. S. 246. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 274. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 291.
Page 462 U. S. 216
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for violation of state drug laws after police
officers, executing a search warrant, discovered marihuana and other contraband in their
automobile and home. Prior to trial, the Gateses moved to suppress evidence seized during this
search. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower state courts granting the
motion. 85 Ill.2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981). It held that the affidavit submitted in support of the
State's application for a warrant to search the Gateses' property
Page 462 U. S. 217
was inadequate under this Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Texas,378 U. S. 108 (1964),
and Spinelli v. United States,393 U. S. 410(1969).
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the Fourth Amendment to a magistrate's
issuance of a search warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous informant's tip.
454 U.S. 1140 (1982). After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument on this question,
however, we requested the parties to address an additional question:

"[W]hether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States,232 U. S.
383 (1914), should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of
evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent
with the Fourth Amendment."
459 U.S. 1028 (1982).
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we framed for the parties was not
presented to the Illinois courts and, accordingly, do not address it. Rather, we consider the
question originally presented in the petition for certiorari, and conclude that the Illinois Supreme
Court read the requirements of our Fourth Amendment decisions too restrictively. Initially,
however, we set forth our reasons for not addressing the question regarding modification of the
exclusionary rule framed in our order of November 29, 1982. Ibid.
I
Our certiorari jurisdiction over decisions from state courts derives from 28 U.S.C. 1257, which
provides that
"[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could
be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: . . . (3) By writ of certiorari, . . .
where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution,
treaties or statutes
Page 462 U. S. 218
of . . . the United States."
The provision derives, albeit with important alterations, see, e.g., Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38
Stat. 790; Act of June 25, 1948, 1257, 62 Stat. 929, from the Judiciary Act of 1789, 25, 1
Stat. 85.
Although we have spoken frequently on the meaning of 1257 and its predecessors, our
decisions are in some respects not entirely clear. We held early on that 25 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 furnished us with no jurisdiction unless a federal question had been both raised and
decided in the state court below. As Justice Story wrote in Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 35 U.
S. 392 (1836): "If both of these requirements do not appear on the record, the appellate
jurisdiction fails." See also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch 344 (1809). [Footnote 1]
More recently, in McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,309 U. S. 430, 309 U. S.
434-435 (1940), the Court observed:
"But it is also the settled practice of this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, that it
is only in exceptional cases, and then only in cases coming from the federal courts, that it
considers questions urged by a petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in the courts
below. . . . In cases coming here from state courts in which a state statute is assailed as
unconstitutional, there are reasons of peculiar force which should lead us to refrain from
deciding questions not presented or decided in the highest court of the state whose judicial
action we are called upon to review. Apart from the
Page 462 U. S. 219
reluctance with which every court should proceed to set aside legislation as unconstitutional on
grounds not properly presented, due regard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to state
courts requires us to decline to consider and decide questions affecting the validity of state
statutes not urged or considered there. It is for these reasons that this Court, where the
constitutionality of a statute has been upheld in the state court, consistently refuses to consider
any grounds of attack not raised or decided in that court."
Finally, the Court seemed to reaffirm the jurisdictional character of the rule against our deciding
claims "not pressed nor passed upon" in state court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Duel,324 U. S. 154, 324 U. S. 160 (1945), where we explained that, "[s]ince the [State] Supreme
Court did not pass on the question, we may not do so." See also Hill v. California,401 U. S.
797, 401 U. S. 805-806 (1971).

Notwithstanding these decisions, however, several of our more recent cases have treated the
so-called "not pressed or passed upon below" rule as merely a prudential restriction.
In Terminiello v. Chicago,337 U. S. 1 (1949), the Court reversed a state criminal conviction on a
ground not urged in state court, nor even in this Court. Likewise, in Vachon v. New
Hampshire,414 U. S. 478 (1974), the Court summarily reversed a state criminal conviction on
the ground, not raised in state court, or here, that it had been obtained in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court indicated in a footnote, id. at 414 U.
S. 479, n. 3, that it possessed discretion to ignore the failure to raise in state court the question
on which it decided the case.
In addition to this lack of clarity as to the character of the "not pressed or passed upon below"
rule, we have recognized that it often may be unclear whether the particular federal question
presented in this Court was raised or passed upon below. In Dewey v. Des Moines,173 U. S.
193, 173 U. S. 197-198 (1899), the fullest treatment of the subject, the Court said
Page 462 U. S. 220
that,
"[i]f the question were only an enlargement of the one mentioned in the assignment of errors, or
if it were so connected with it in substance as to form but another ground or reason for alleging
the invalidity of the [lower court's] judgment, we should have no hesitation in holding the
assignment sufficient to permit the question to be now raised and argued. Parties are not
confined here to the same arguments which were advanced in the courts below upon a Federal
question there discussed. [Footnote 2]"
We have not attempted, and likely would not have been able, to draw a clear-cut line between
cases involving only an "enlargement" of questions presented below and those involving entirely
new questions.
The application of these principles in the instant case is not entirely straightforward. It is clear in
this case that respondents expressly raised, at every level of the Illinois judicial system, the
claim that the Fourth Amendment had been violated by the actions of the Illinois police and that
the evidence seized by the officers should be excluded from their trial. It also is clear that the
State challenged, at every level of the Illinois court system, respondents' claim that the
substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment had been violated. The State never,
however, raised or addressed the question whether the federal exclusionary rule should be
modified in any respect, and none of the opinions of the
Page 462 U. S. 221
Illinois courts give any indication that the question was considered.
The case, of course, is before us on the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. Since the Act of
Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790, jurisdiction has been vested in this Court to review state court
decisions even when a claimed federal right has been upheld. Our prior decisions interpreting
the "not pressed or passed on below" rule have not, however, involved a State's failure to raise a
defense to a federal right or remedy asserted below. As explained below, however, we can see
no reason to treat the State's failure to have challenged an asserted federal claim differently
from the failure of the proponent of a federal claim to have raised that claim.
We have identified several purposes underlying the "not pressed or passed upon" rule: for the
most part, these are as applicable to the State's failure to have opposed the assertion of a
particular federal right as to a party's failure to have asserted the claim. First, "[q]uestions not
raised below are those on which the record is very likely to be inadequate, since it certainly was
not compiled with those questions in mind." Cardinale v. Louisiana,394 U. S. 437, 394 U. S.
439 (1969). Exactly the same difficulty exists when the State urges modification of an existing
constitutional right or accompanying remedy. Here, for example, the record contains little, if
anything, regarding the subjective good faith of the police officers that searched the Gateses'
property -- which might well be an important consideration in determining whether to fashion a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Our consideration of whether to modify the
exclusionary rule plainly would benefit from a record containing such facts.

Likewise, "due regard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to state courts," McGoldrick v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U.S. at 309 U. S. 434-435, demands that those
courts be given an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the actions of state officials,
and, equally important, proposed changes in existing remedies for unconstitutional
Page 462 U. S. 222
actions. Finally, by requiring that the State first argue to the state courts that the federal
exclusionary rule should be modified, we permit a state court, even if it agrees with the State as
a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an adequate and independent state ground.See
Cardinale, supra, at 394 U. S. 439. Illinois, for example, adopted an exclusionary rule as early as
1923, see People v. Brocamp,307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923), and might adhere to its view
even if it thought we would conclude that the federal rule should be modified. In short, the
reasons supporting our refusal to hear federal claims not raised in state court apply with equal
force to the State's failure to challenge the availability of a well-settled federal remedy. Whether
the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule is jurisdictional, as our earlier decisions
indicate, see supra at 462 U. S. 217-219, or prudential, as several of our later decisions assume,
or whether its character might be different in cases like this from its character elsewhere, we
need not decide. Whatever the character of the rule may be, consideration of the question
presented in our order of November 29, 1982, would be contrary to the sound justifications for
the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, and we thus decide not to pass on the issue.
The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the federal exclusionary rule -- suppressing
evidence against respondents -- does not affect our conclusion. In Morrison v. Watson,154 U. S.
111 (1894), the Court was asked to consider whether a state statute impaired the plaintiff in
error's contract with the defendant in error. It declined to hear the case because the question
presented here had not been pressed or passed on below. The Court acknowledged that the
lower court's opinion had restated the conclusion, set forth in an earlier decision of that court,
that the state statute did not impermissibly impair contractual obligations. Nonetheless, it held
that there was no showing that "there was any real contest at any stage of this case upon the
point," id. at 154 U. S. 115, and that without such a contest, the routine restatement
Page 462 U. S. 223
and application of settled law by an appellate court did not satisfy the "not pressed or passed
upon below" rule. Similarly, in the present case, although the Illinois courts applied the federal
exclusionary rule, there was never "any real contest" upon the point. The application of the
exclusionary rule was merely a routine act, once a violation of the Fourth Amendment had been
found, and not the considered judgment of the Illinois courts on the question whether application
of a modified rule would be warranted on the facts of this case. In such circumstances, absent
the adversarial dispute necessary to apprise the state court of the arguments for not applying
the exclusionary rule, we will not consider the question whether the exclusionary rule should be
modified.
Likewise, we do not believe that the State's repeated opposition to respondents' substantive
Fourth Amendment claims suffices to have raised the question whether the exclusionary rule
should be modified. The exclusionary rule is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally," and not "a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved." United States v. Calandra,414 U. S. 338, 414 U. S. 348 (1974). The question
whether the exclusionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been
regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the
party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
Havens,446 U. S. 620 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini,435 U. S. 268 (1978); United States v.
Calandra, supra; Stone v. Powell,428 U. S. 465 (1976). Because of this distinction, we cannot
say that modification or abolition of the exclusionary rule is "so connected with [the substantive
Fourth Amendment right at issue] as to form but another ground or reason for alleging the
invalidity" of the judgment. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. at 173 U. S. 197-198. Rather, the
rule's modification was, for purposes of the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, a separate
claim that had to be specifically presented to the state courts.
Page 462 U. S. 224

Finally, weighty prudential considerations militate against our considering the question presented
in our order of November 29, 1982. The extent of the continued vitality of the rules that have
developed from our decisions in Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383 (1914), andMapp v.
Ohio,367 U. S. 643 (1961), is an issue of unusual significance. Sufficient evidence of this lies
just in the comments on the issue that Members of this Court recently have made, e.g., Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,403 U. S. 388, 403 U. S. 415(1971) (BURGER, C.J.,
dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U. S. 443, 403 U. S. 490 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); id. at 403 U. S. 502 (Black, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, supra, at 428 U. S. 537539 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams,430 U. S. 387, 430 U. S. 413-414 (1977)
(POWELL, J., concurring); Robbins v. California,453 U. S. 420, 453 U. S. 437, 453 U. S. 443444 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Where difficult issues of great public importance are
involved, there are strong reasons to adhere scrupulously to the customary limitations on our
discretion. By doing so, we "promote respect . . . for the Court's adjudicatory process [and] the
stability of [our] decisions." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, fidelity to the rule guarantees that a factual record will be available to us, thereby
discouraging the framing of broad rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts, which may
prove ill-considered in other circumstances. In Justice Harlan's words, adherence to the rule
lessens the threat of "untoward practical ramifications," id. at 367 U. S. 676 (dissenting opinion),
not foreseen at the time of decision. The public importance of our decisions
in Weeks and Mapp and the emotions engendered by the debate surrounding these decisions
counsel that we meticulously observe our customary procedural rules. By following this course,
we promote respect for the procedures by which our decisions are rendered, as well as
confidence in the stability of prior decisions. A wise exercise of the powers confided in this Court
dictates that we reserve for another day the question whether the exclusionary rule should be
modified.
Page 462 U. S. 225
II
We now turn to the question presented in the State's original petition for certiorari, which
requires us to decide whether respondents' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
were violated by the search of their car and house. A chronological statement of events usefully
introduces the issues at stake. Bloomingdale, Ill., is a suburb of Chicago located in Du Page
County. On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale Police Department received by mail an anonymous
handwritten letter which read as follows:
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make their living on
selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in
the condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida,
where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys
back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance will
be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the
trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of
drugs in their basement."
"They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on pushers."
"I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are friends with some
big drugs dealers, who visit their house often."
"Lance & Susan Gates"
"Greenway"
"in Condominiums"

The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the Bloomingdale Police Department to
Detective Mader, who decided to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from the office of the Illinois
Secretary of State, that an Illinois driver's license had
Page 462 U. S. 226
been issued to one Lance Gates, residing at a stated address in Bloomingdale. He contacted a
confidential informant, whose examination of certain financial records revealed a more recent
address for the Gateses, and he also learned from a police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport
that "L. Gates" had made a reservation on Eastern Airlines Flight 245 to West Palm Beach, Fla.,
scheduled to depart from Chicago on May 5 at 4:15 p. m.
Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration for
surveillance of the May 5 Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later reported to Mader that Gates
had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in Florida had observed him arrive in West Palm
Beach and take a taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn. They also reported that Gates went to a room
registered to one Susan Gates and that, at 7 o'clock the next morning, Gates and an unidentified
woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois license plates and drove north-bound on an
interstate highway frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area. In addition, the DEA agent
informed Mader that the license plate number on the Mercury was registered to a Hornet station
wagon owned by Gates. The agent also advised Mader that the driving time between West Palm
Beach and Bloomingdale was approximately 22 to 24 hours.
Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts, and submitted it to a judge of the
Circuit Court of Du Page County, together with a copy of the anonymous letter. The judge of that
court thereupon issued a search warrant for the Gateses' residence and for their automobile.
The judge, in deciding to issue the warrant, could have determined that the modus operandi of
the Gateses had been substantially corroborated. As the anonymous letter predicted, Lance
Gates had flown from Chicago to West Palm Beach late in the afternoon of May 5th, had
checked into a hotel room registered in the name of his wife, and, at 7 o'clock the following
morning, had headed north, accompanied by an unidentified woman,
Page 462 U. S. 227
out of West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used by travelers from South Florida to
Chicago in an automobile bearing a license plate issued to him.
At 5:15 a.m. on March 7, only 36 hours after he had flown out of Chicago, Lance Gates, and his
wife, returned to their home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in which they had left West Palm
Beach some 22 hours earlier. The Bloomingdale police were awaiting them, searched the trunk
of the Mercury, and uncovered approximately 350 pounds of marihuana. A search of the
Gateses' home revealed marihuana, weapons, and other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court
ordered suppression of all these items, on the ground that the affidavit submitted to the Circuit
Judge failed to support the necessary determination of probable cause to believe that the
Gateses' automobile and home contained the contraband in question. This decision was
affirmed in turn by the Illinois Appellate Court, 82 Ill.App.3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980), and by a
divided vote of the Supreme Court of Illinois. 85 Ill.2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981).
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded -- and we are inclined to agree -- that, standing alone, the
anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police Department would not provide the basis for a
magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe contraband would be found
in the Gateses' car and home. The letter provides virtually nothing from which one might
conclude that its author is either honest or his information reliable; likewise, the letter gives
absolutely no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regarding the Gateses' criminal
activities. Something more was required, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there
was probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in the Gateses' home and
car. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 109, n. 1; Nathanson v. United States,290 U. S.
41 (1933).
The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized that Detective Mader's affidavit might be
capable of supplementing
Page 462 U. S. 228

the anonymous letter with information sufficient to permit a determination of probable

cause. See Whiteley v. Warden,401 U. S. 560,401 U. S. 567 (1971). In holding that the affidavit
in fact did not contain sufficient additional information to sustain a determination of probable
cause, the Illinois court applied a "two-pronged test," derived from our decision in Spinelli v.
United States,393 U. S. 410(1969). [Footnote 3] The Illinois Supreme Court, like some others,
apparently understood Spinelli as requiring that the anonymous letter satisfy each of two
independent requirements before it could be relied on. 85 Ill.2d at 383, 423 N.E.2d at 890.
According to this view, the letter, as supplemented by Mader's affidavit, first had to adequately
reveal the "basis of knowledge" of the letterwriter -- the particular means by which he came by
the information given in his report. Second, it had to provide
Page 462 U. S. 229
facts sufficiently establishing either the "veracity" of the affiant's informant, or, alternatively, the
"reliability" of the informant's report in this particular case.
The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal rules that have developed among various
lower courts to enforce the "two-pronged test," [Footnote 4] found that the test had not been
satisfied. First, the "veracity" prong was not satisfied because
"[t]here was simply no basis [for] conclud[ing] that the anonymous person [who wrote the letter
to the Bloomingdale Police Department] was credible."
Id. at 385, 423 N.E.2d at 891. The court indicated that corroboration by police of details
contained in the letter might never satisfy the "veracity" prong, and in any event, could not do so
if, as in the present case, only "innocent" details are corroborated. Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
In addition, the letter gave no indication of the basis of its writer's knowledge of the
Page 462 U. S. 230
Gateses' activities. The Illinois court understood Spinelli as permitting the detail contained in a
tip to be used to infer that the informant had a reliable basis for his statements, but it thought
that the anonymous letter failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an inference. Thus, it
concluded that no showing of probable cause had been made.
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of
knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree,
however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent
requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case, [Footnote 5] which the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as detailed below, they should be understood simply as
closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical question
whether there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a
particular place.
III
This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of
probable cause [Footnote 6] than
Page 462 U. S. 231
is any rigid demand that specific "tests" be satisfied by every informant's tip. Perhaps the central
teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a "practical,
nontechnical conception." Brinegar v. United States,338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S. 176(1949).
"In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These
are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."
Id. at 338 U. S. 175. Our observation in United States v. Cortez,449 U. S. 411, 449 U. S.
418 (1981), regarding "particularized suspicion," is also applicable to the probable cause
standard:
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of
probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common sense
conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same -- and
Page 462 U. S. 232

so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed
not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement."
As these comments illustrate, probable cause is a fluid concept -- turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts -- not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules. Informants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many different types
of persons. As we said in Adams v. Williams,407 U. S. 143, 407 U. S. 147 (1972):
"Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary
greatly in their value and reliability."
Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. "One simple rule will not cover every
situation." Ibid. [Footnote 7]
Page 462 U. S. 233
Moreover, the "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two largely independent channels -- the
informant's "veracity" or "reliability" and his "basis of knowledge." See nn. 4 and <="" a=""
style="box-sizing: border-box;">| 4 and <="" a="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">S. 213fn5|
>5, supra. There are persuasive arguments against according these two elements such
independent status. Instead, they are better understood as relevant considerations in the totalityof-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause determinations: a
deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a
strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability. See, e.g., Adams v.
Williams, supra, at 407 U. S. 146-147; United States v. Harris,403 U. S. 573 (1971).
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of
certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set
forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of
probable cause based on his tip. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37 (CA5 1973).
[Footnote 8] Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of
criminal activity -- which, if fabricated, would subject him to criminal liability -- we have found
Page 462 U. S. 234
rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. Adams v. Williams,
supra. Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and
detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed
first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case. Unlike a totality-ofthe-circumstances analysis, which permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all
the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's tip, the "two-pronged
test" has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips, [Footnote 9] with
undue attention's
Page 462 U. S. 235
being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts presented
to the magistrate.
As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 11 U. S. 348 (1813), Chief Justice Marshall
observed, in a closely related context:
"[T]he term 'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which
would justify condemnation. . . . It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant
suspicion."
More recently, we said that "the quanta . . . of proof" appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings
are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 173. Finely
tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the
evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate's decision. While an effort to fix
some general, numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to "probable cause" may
not be helpful, it is clear that "only the probability, and not a prima facieshowing, of criminal
activity, is the standard of probable cause." Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 419. See Model Code

of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 210.1(7) (Prop.Off.Draft 1972); 1 W. LaFave, Search and

Seizure 3.2(e) (1978).
We also have recognized that affidavits
"are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical
requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper
place in this area."
United States v. Ventresca,380 U. S. 102, 380 U. S. 108 (1965). Likewise, search and arrest
warrants long have been issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who
certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the nature of "probable
cause." See Shadwick v. City of Tampa,407 U. S. 345, 407 U. S. 348-350 (1972). The rigorous
inquiry into the Spinelliprongs and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules
that some have seen implicit in our Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that
many warrants are -- quite properly, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 348-350 -- issued on the basis of
nontechnical,
Page 462 U. S. 236
common sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in
more formal legal proceedings. Likewise, given the informal, often hurried context in which it
must be applied, the "built-in subtleties," Stanley v. State, 19 Md.App. 507, 528, 313 A.2d 847,
860 (1974), of the "two-pronged test" are particularly unlikely to assist magistrates in determining
probable cause.
Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an
affidavit should not take the form of de novoreview. A magistrate's "determination of probable
cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts." Spinelli, supra, at 393 U. S. 419. "A
grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants," Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 380
U. S. 108, is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant; "courts should not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting
affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a common sense, manner." Id. at 380 U. S. 109.
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts
have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the hope of
relying on consent or some other exception to the Warrant Clause that might develop at the time
of the search. In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search
greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring
"the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing
officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search."
United States v. Chadwick,433 U. S. 1, 433 U. S. 9 (1977). Reflecting this preference for the
warrant process, the traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate's probable cause
determination has been that, so long as the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . .
conclud[ing]" that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment
requires no more. Jones v. United States,362 U. S. 257, 362 U. S. 271 (1960). See United
States v.
Page 462 U. S. 237
Harris, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 577-583. [Footnote 10] We think reaffirmation of this standard
better serves the purpose of encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure and is more
consistent with our traditional deference to the probable cause determinations of magistrates
than is the "two-pronged test."
Finally, the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli poorly serves "[t]he most basic function
of any government:" "to provide for the security of the individual and of his property." Miranda v.
Arizona,384 U. S. 436, 384 U. S. 539 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). The strictures that
inevitably accompany the "two-pronged test" cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law
enforcement, see, e.g.,n 9,supra. If, as the Illinois Supreme Court apparently thought, that test
must be rigorously applied in every case, anonymous tips would be of greatly diminished value
in police work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary witnesses, see Advisory Committee's Notes on
Fed.Rule Evid. 701, 28 U.S.C.App. p. 570, generally do not provide extensive recitations of the

basis of their everyday observations. Likewise, as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in this
case, the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is, by hypothesis, largely unknown, and
unknowable. As a result, anonymous tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of
the Spinelli prongs. Yet such tips, particularly when supplemented by
Page 462 U. S. 238
independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise "perfect
crimes." While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is required by the
Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen informants is
not. For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the "two-pronged test"
established by our decisions inAguilar and Spinelli. [Footnote 11] In its place, we reaffirm the
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause
determinations. See Jones v. United States, supra; United States v. Ventresca,380 U. S.
102 (1965); Brinegar v. United States,338 U. S. 160 (1949). The task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the
magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]" that probable cause
Page 462 U. S. 239
existed. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 271. We are convinced that this flexible,
easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that
the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed
fromAguilar and Spinelli.
Our earlier cases illustrate the limits beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a
warrant. A sworn statement of an affiant that "he has cause to suspect and does believe" that
liquor illegally brought into the United States is located on certain premises will not
do.Nathanson v. United States,290 U. S. 41 (1933). An affidavit must provide the magistrate with
a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause, and the wholly conclusory
statement at issue in Nathanson failed to meet this requirement. An officer's statement that
"[a]ffiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe" that heroin is
stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. Aguilar v. Texas,378 U. S. 108 (1964). As
in Nathanson, this is a mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at
all for making a judgment regarding probable cause. Sufficient information must be presented to
the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere
ratification of the bare conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency
of affidavits on which warrants are issued. But when we move beyond the "bare bones" affidavits
present in cases such asNathanson and Aguilar, this area simply does not lend itself to a
prescribed set of rules, like that which had developed from Spinelli.Instead, the flexible, common
sense standard articulated in Jones, Ventresca, and Brinegar better serves the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.
JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent suggests in several places that the approach we take today
somehow downgrades the
Page 462 U. S. 240
role of the neutral magistrate, because Aguilar and Spinelli "preserve the role of magistrates as
independent arbiters of probable cause. . . ." Post at 462 U. S. 287. Quite the contrary, we
believe, is the case. The essential protection of the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, as stated in Johnson v. United States,333 U. S. 10 (1948), is in
"requiring that [the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence] be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Id. at 333 U. S. 13-14. Nothing in our opinion in any way lessens the authority of the magistrate
to draw such reasonable inferences as he will from the material supplied to him by applicants for
a warrant; indeed, he is freer than under the regime of Aguilar and Spinelli to draw such
inferences, or to refuse to draw them if he is so minded.

The real gist of JUSTICE BRENNAN's criticism seems to be a second argument, somewhat at
odds with the first, that magistrates should be restricted in their authority to make probable
cause determinations by the standards laid down in Aguilar and Spinelli, and that such findings
"should not be authorized unless there is some assurance that the information on which they are
based has been obtained in a reliable way by an honest or credible person."
Post at 462 U. S. 283. However, under our opinion, magistrates remain perfectly free to exact
such assurances as they deem necessary, as well as those required by this opinion, in making
probable cause determinations. JUSTICE BRENNAN would apparently prefer that magistrates
be restricted in their findings of probable cause by the development of an elaborate body of case
law dealing with the "veracity" prong of the Spinelli test, which in turn is broken down into two
"spurs" -- the informant's "credibility" and the "reliability" of his information, together with the
"basis of knowledge" prong of the Spinelli test. Seen 4, supra. That such a labyrinthine body of
judicial refinement bears any relationship to familiar definitions of
Page 462 U. S. 241
probable cause is hard to imagine. As previously noted, probable cause deals
"with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act,"
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 175.
JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent also suggests that
"[w]ords such as 'practical,' 'nontechnical,' and 'common sense,' as used in the Court's opinion,
are but code words for an overly permissive attitude towards police practices in derogation of the
rights secured by the Fourth Amendment."
Post at 462 U. S. 290. An easy, but not a complete, answer to this rather florid statement would
be that nothing we know about Justice Rutledge suggests that he would have used the words he
chose in Brinegar in such a manner. More fundamentally, no one doubts that,
"under our Constitution, only measures consistent with the Fourth Amendment may be employed
by government to cure [the horrors of drug trafficking],"
post at 462 U. S. 290; but this agreement does not advance the inquiry as to which measures
are, and which measures are not, consistent with the Fourth Amendment. "Fidelity" to the
commands of the Constitution suggests balanced judgment, rather than exhortation. The highest
"fidelity" is not achieved by the judge who instinctively goes furthest in upholding even the most
bizarre claim of individual constitutional rights, any more than it is achieved by a judge who
instinctively goes furthest in accepting the most restrictive claims of governmental authorities.
The task of this Court, as of other courts, is to "hold the balance true," and we think we have
done that in this case.
IV
Our decisions applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis outlined above have
consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent
police work. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 269, we held that an affidavit
relying on hearsay "is not to
Page 462 U. S. 242
be deemed insufficient on that score so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is
presented." We went on to say that, even in making a warrantless arrest, an officer
"may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct
observations, so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters
within the officer's knowledge."
Ibid. Likewise, we recognized the probative value of corroborative efforts of police officials
in Aguilar -- the source of the "two-pronged test" -- by observing that, if the police had made
some effort to corroborate the informant's report at issue, "an entirely different case" would have
been presented. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 109, n. 1.
Our decision in Draper v. United States,358 U. S. 307 (1959), however, is the classic case on
the value of corroborative efforts of police officials. There, an informant named Hereford reported
that Draper would arrive in Denver on a train from Chicago on one of two days, and that he
would be carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also supplied a fairly detailed physical

description of Draper, and predicted that he would be wearing a light colored raincoat, brown
slacks, and black shoes, and would be walking "real fast." Id. at 358 U. S. 309. Hereford gave no
indication of the basis for his information. [Footnote 12]
On one of the stated dates, police officers observed a man matching this description exit a train
arriving from Chicago; his attire and luggage matched Hereford's report, and he was
Page 462 U. S. 243
walking rapidly. We explained in Draper that, by this point in his investigation, the arresting
officer
"had personally verified every facet of the information given him by Hereford except whether
petitioner had accomplished his mission, and had the three ounces of heroin on his person or in
his bag. And surely, with every other bit of Hereford's information being thus personally verified,
[the officer] had 'reasonable grounds' to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Hereford's
information -- that Draper would have the heroin with him -- was likewise true,"
id. at 358 U. S. 313.
The showing of probable cause in the present case was fully as compelling as that
in Draper. Even standing alone, the facts obtained through the independent investigation of
Mader and the DEA at least suggested that the Gateses were involved in drug trafficking. In
addition to being a popular vacation site, Florida is well known as a source of narcotics and
other illegal drugs. See United States v. Mendenhall,446 U. S. 544, 446 U. S. 562 (1980)
(POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); DEA, Narcotics Intelligence
Estimate, The Supply of Drugs to the U.S. Illicit Market From Foreign and Domestic Sources in
1980, pp. 8-9. Lance Gates' flight to West Palm Beach, his brief, overnight stay in a motel, and
apparent immediate return north to Chicago in the family car, conveniently awaiting him in West
Palm Beach, is as suggestive of a prearranged drug run, as it is of an ordinary vacation trip.
In addition, the judge could rely on the anonymous letter, which had been corroborated in major
part by Mader's efforts -- just as had occurred in Draper. [Footnote 13] The Supreme Court
Page 462 U. S. 244
of Illinois reasoned that Draper involved an informant who had given reliable information on
previous occasions, while the honesty and reliability of the anonymous informant in this case
were unknown to the Bloomingdale police. While this distinction might be an apt one at the time
the Police Department received the anonymous letter, it became far less significant after Mader's
independent investigative work occurred. The corroboration of the letter's predictions that the
Gateses' car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or so, and
that he would drive the car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not with certainty, that
the informant's other assertions also were true. "[B]ecause an informant is right about some
things, he is more probably right about other facts," Spinelli,393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 427 (WHITE,
J., concurring) -- including the claim regarding the Gateses' illegal activity. This may well not be
the type of "reliability" or "veracity" necessary to satisfy some views of the "veracity prong"
of Spinelli, but we think it suffices for the practical, common sense judgment called for in making
a probable cause determination. It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that
"[c]orroboration through other sources of information reduced the
Page 462 U. S. 245
chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale," thus providing "a substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 269, 362 U. S. 271.
Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained
facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily
not easily predicted. The letterwriter's accurate information as to the travel plans of each of the
Gateses was of a character likely obtained only from the Gateses themselves, or from someone
familiar with their not entirely ordinary travel plans. If the informant had access to accurate
information of this type a magistrate could properly conclude that it was not unlikely that he also
had access to reliable information of the Gateses' alleged illegal activities. [Footnote 14] Of
Page 462 U. S. 246
course, the Gateses' travel plans might have been learned from a talkative neighbor or travel
agent; under the "two-pronged test" developed from Spinelli, the character of the details in the
anonymous letter might well not permit a sufficiently clear inference regarding the letterwriter's
"basis of knowledge." But, as discussed previously, supra, at 462 U. S. 235, probable cause

does not demand the certainty we associate with formal trials. It is enough that there was a fair
probability that the writer of the anonymous letter had obtained his entire story either from the
Gateses or someone they trusted. And corroboration of major portions of the letter's predictions
provides just this probability. It is apparent, therefore, that the judge issuing the warrant had a
"substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]" that probable cause to search the Gateses' home and car
existed. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois therefore must be
Reversed.

G.R. No. 124461 September 25, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH
83, QUEZON CITY; and AIDEN LANUZA, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The People of the Philippines, through this petition for review, seeks the reversal of the order of
respondent Judge Estrella T. Estrada, dated December 7, 1995, which granted private
respondent Aiden Lanuza's motion to quash Search Warrant No. 958 (95), as well as the order
dated April 1, 1996 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.
On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and
Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance of a search warrant
against "Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City," for violation
of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines).
In her application for search warrant, Atty. Cabanlas alleged, among others, as follows:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD,
I received reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence
Group IV, Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said Officer Cabiles
various drug products amounting to Seven Thousand
Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P7,232.00) on May 29,
1995;

1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose

de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license
to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug products from
the BFAD;

The BFAD also submitted with the application a copy of the sketch 4 of the location of Aiden
Lanuza's residence at her stated address.
On the same day the application was filed, the respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No.
958 (95), which reads in full:

1.c. Distribution, sale or offer for sale or transfer of drug

products without license to operate from BFAD is in
violation of Art. 40 (k) of RA 7394 (or "the Consumer
Act").

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report
and the various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic)
plastic bags marked "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2" were
enclosed; and the same are likewise submitted herewith.
xxx xxx xxx. 1 (Emphasis supplied)

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

BRANCH 83 QUEZON CITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

The application, however, ended with the statement that the warrant is to search the premises of
another person at a different address:
3. This is executed to support affiant's application for a search warrant on
the premises of Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay
Cebu. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
In support of the application, the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles, a member of the Regional
Intelligence Group IV of the PNP Intelligence Command, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang,
Laguna, was attached thereto, wherein he declared that:
1. Upon the request for assistance by BFAD, he conducted surveillance for
persons distributing, selling or transferring drug products without license to
operate from BFAD.
2. On May 29, 1995, a certain Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana
St., Mabolo, Cebu City sold to him various drug products amounting to
P7,232.00 and
3 Upon further verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or
premises, the said person and place have in fact no license to operate.
4. Earlier than May 29, 1995, affiant saw a delivery of drug products from
the residence of Ms. Lanuza in 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City to another person.
5. Accompanying this affidavit are the various products sold to/and
purchased by the affiant contained in two (2) plastic bags marked "Lanuza
Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2."
This is executed in support of the affiant's report to BFAD and for whatever
legitimate purpose this may serve. 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Plaintiff,
-versus- SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA,
Defendant.
X-------------------------------X
SEARCH WARRANT
It appears to the satisfaction of this Court, after examining under oath Atty.
Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance
Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) and her witness.
Manuel P. Cabiles, member of the Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence
Command, PNP, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of Article 40(k) in relation to
Article 41 of Republic Act No. 7394 (Consumer Act) has been committed or
about to be committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe
that Ms. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose dela Montana Street, Cebu City has
in her possession and control at said address the following described
properties:
medicines and drugs of undetermined quantity among
which are Bricanyl Tablet, Bisolvon Tablet, Buscopan
Tablet, Buscopan Ampoule, Mucosolvan Ampoule,
Persantin Tablet, Tegretol Tablet, PZA-Ciba Tablet,
Voltaren Tablet, Zantac Ampoule, Ventolin Tablet,
Ventolin Inhaler, Dermovate Cream, Fortum Vial,
Zinacef Vial, Feldene 1M Ampoule, Norvasc Tablet,
Bactrim Forte Tablet, Rochephin Vial, Tilcotil Tablet,
Librax Tablet, Methergin Tablet and Tagamet Tablet

In an order 9 dated July 3, 1995, the respondent Judge noted the inventory of the seized drugs
and authorized the BFAD to retain custody of the same, to have samples of the drugs analyzed
and be brought to the registered drug manufacturers for parallel testing.

which she is selling, distributing and transferring without the necessary

license from the Department of Health.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of
the DAY or NIGHT of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and
take possession of the undetermined amount of drugs and medicines
subject of the offense and to bring the same to this Court to be dealt with as
the law directs.
You are further directed to submit a return of this Search Warrant within ten
(10) days from today.
This Search Warrant is valid within a period of ten (10) days from the date of
issue.
GIVEN UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL of this Court this 27th day of June
1995 at Quezon City.

On August 22, 1995, private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a verified motion 10 praying that
Search Warrant No. 958 (95) be quashed and that the seized articles be declared inadmissible
in any proceeding and ordered returned to the warehouse owned by Folk Arts Export & Import
Company located at Lot No. 38 inside the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street,
Cebu City. The motion is based on the grounds that the search warrant is illegal and null and
void because: (1) it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier
Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of private respondent Aiden
Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City; (2) it was issued for a non-existing
offense; (3) Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly authorized by applicant BFAD to apply
therefor; (4) it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized;
(5) the applicant's witnesses had no personal knowledge of the facts upon which it was issued;
and (6) its implementation was unreasonable as it was enforced on a different or wrong place
which was lawfully occupied by a different or wrong person. 11

Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas, who appeared for the BFAD, opposed 12 the motion to quash the
search warrant, to which the private respondent countered with a reply.
(Sgd.) ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA

After the contending parties had submitted their respective positions without further oral
Second Vice
Executivethe
Judge
arguments,
respondent Judge issued the assailed order 13 dated December 7, 1995,
quashing Search Warrant No. 958 (95). Accordingly, the order dated July 3, 1995 was revoked
all the articles seized were declared inadmissible in any and all proceedings against private
(Emphasisand
supplied)
respondent Aiden Lanuza. Also, the BFAD was ordered to return at its expense all the seized
items to the warehouse of Folk Arts Import & Export Company at Lot No. 38, 516 San Jose de la
On June 28, 1995, the search warrant was served at private respondent Lanuza's residence at
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of the said
the indicated address by a composite team of policemen from the PNP 7th Criminal Investigation
order. 14
Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City.
How the search warrant was implemented was briefly narrated in the Joint Affidavit, 6 dated June
29, 1995, of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Marckbilly Capalungan, both members of the
search and seizure team. They stated in their affidavit that their team, armed with the search
warrant, "conducted a raid at the premises of one AIDEN LANUZA of 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Cebu City . . .;" that "the raid was witnessed by Luis Rivera, Demetrio Panimdim
and Francisco Ojales, both (sic) Brgy. Tanod of Kasambagan, Cebu City;" that "the service of the
(search) warrant resulted in the confiscation of fifty-two (52) cartoons (sic) of assorted medicines
from the possession and control of AIDEN LANUZA;" and that the "said items were brought to
the 7CICRO office for detailed inventory headed by Atty. Lorna F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal
Information and Compliance Division of the BFAD, Manila." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
The present petition, however, narrates a different account of what actually happened during the
implementation of the search warrant. Paragraph 5 of the petition states: "At the commencement
of the search, the members of the team discovered that the premises described as 516 San
Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was actually a five thousand (5,000) square meter
compound containing at least fifteen (15) structures which are either leased residences, offices,
factories, workshops or warehouse. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private
respondent Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said address. Finding no drug products thereat, they
proceeded to search a nearby warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound and address
above stated. This search yielded fifty-two (52) cartons of assorted drug products which were
then inventoried in due course. . . . ." 8(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 1995 order was denied in an
order 15 dated April 1, 1996, impelling petitioner to file the present petition asserting that the
respondent Judge erred:
a) In holding that the defect appearing in BFAD's
application for a search warrant is so "grave" in nature
as to warrant quashal of the search warrant issued
thereunder, considering that such variance is actually a
harmless clerical error.
b) In holding that Atty. Cabanlas was not, authorized by
the BFAD to apply for a search warrant concerning the
unlicensed distribution of drugs, considering that the
grant of BFAD authorization upon her to investigate
fake, misbranded adulterated or unregistered drugs
necessarily contemplates the authority to investigate
the unlicensed activities above noted.
c) In holding that applicant BFAD had failed to
discharge the burden of proving probable cause for
issuance of a search warrant, by failing to present
documentary proof indicating that private respondent
had no license to sell or distribute drug products,
considering that under the authority of Carillo v.
People (229 SCRA 386) the BFAD only had the burden

of proving the negative ingredient of the offense

charged on the basis of the best evidence procurable
under the circumstances.
d) In holding that the place sought to be searched had
not been described with sufficient particularity in SW
No. 958 (95), considering that Aiden Lanuza's
residence at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana
St., Mabolo, Cebu City was not so conspicuously or
notoriously represented to the public as such by her as
to contradict the investigating and serving officers'
perception of the outward appearance of her dwelling,
which led them to believe that the more general
address of 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City referred to her dwelling.
e) In ordering the return of the things seized, the
possession of which is prohibited. 16

The title of the questioned application, which reads:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plain
tiff,
-versus- SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA, For: Violation of Article
516 San Jose de la 40 (k) in relation to
Montana Street, Mabolo, Article 41 of Republic
Cebu City, Act No. 7394 (or the

We granted, the petitioner's application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a
resolution 17 dated June 26, 1996 and restrained the implementation of the assailed orders,
effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.
Private respondent Aiden Lanuza later filed her comment 18 on the petition, but petitioner's reply
thereto was not admitted by this Court in a resolution 19 dated January 13, 1997, for failure by
the Solicitor General to file the same within his first extension of thirty (30) days, that was
granted, but with a warning that no further extension would be given. Instead of filing his reply,
the Solicitor General asked for two (2) more extensions of time, which were denied.
Now to the assigned errors of the respondent Judge raised by petitioner.
The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are inscribed in Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 2. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR
PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES, SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND
FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH
WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE
AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OF AFFIRMATION OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, AND
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE
PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED. (Emphasis supplied)
In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge that the
application for its issuance suffered from a "grave" defect, "which escaped (her) attention,"
considering that it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier
Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of herein private respondent
Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Cebu City. 20

Defendant.
Consumer Act)
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x 21
(Emphasis supplied)
and the allegations contained therein, pertinent portions of which we quote:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD,
I received reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence
Group IV, Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said Officer Cabiles
various drug products amounting to Seven Thousand
Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P7,232.00) on May 29,
1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose
de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license
to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug products from
the BFAD.
xxx xxx xxx
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report
and the various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic)
plastic bags marked "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2" were
enclosed, and the same are likewise submitted herewith.

We nonetheless find such error in the application for search warrant a negligible defect.
xxx xxx xxx. 22 (Emphasis supplied)

unmistakably reveal that the said application was specifically intended against private
respondent Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
She has been the only one identified in the application, as well as in the aforequoted
affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles upon which the application was based, as having
allegedly sold to said SPO4 Cabiles various drugs amounting to P7,232.00 on May
29, 1995, without any license to do so, in alleged violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A.
7394. It is noteworthy that, as stated in the above-quoted paragraph 2 of the
application, the plastic bags which contained the seized drugs and which were
submitted together with the application, were marked as "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and
"Lanuza Bag 2 of 2." These markings with the name "Lanuza" obviously refer to no
other than the herein private respondent. And when the respondent Judge issued the
search warrant, it was directed solely against private respondent Aiden Lanuza at her
address: 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Solicitor General explained the error in the application by saying that on the same day
applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned application on June 27, 1995,
another application for search warrant was also filed against one Belen Cabanero at her
residence at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu City. This can be deduced from the following
examination conducted by respondent Judge on Atty. Cabanlas:
(COURT)
Q. And who is your respondent?
A. Mrs. Aiden Lanuza and the other
one is Belen Cabanero.
Q. Where are they situated?
A. Mrs. Lanuza is situated in No.
516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
Q. About the other?
A. New Frontier Village, Talisay,
Cebu.
Q. Do you have any specific
address at New Frontier Village?
A. It was reported by Mr. Manuel
Cabiles.
Q. Will he be testifying?
A. Yes Ma'am. Your Honor, this is
the vicinity of the New Frontier
Village, Cebu (witness presenting a
sketch) (sic)

Q How about this San Jose de la

Montana. This is just in Cebu City?
A At 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City. 23
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the name and address of one Belen Cabanero
were erroneously copied in paragraph 3 of the application in question. Such defect, as intimated
earlier, is not of such a gravity as to call for the invalidation of the search warrant.
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not
convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to
present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to
sell drugs.
It must be noted that in the application for search warrant, private respondent is charged with the
specific offense of selling drugs without the required license from the Department of Health,
which is in violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A. 7394, and penalized under Article 41 thereof. The
said application was supported by the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles where, in paragraph 3
thereof, he declared that he made a "verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or
premises" and discovered that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had "no license" to sell drugs.
We agree with the respondent Judge that applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas should have
submitted documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no such license.
Although no explanation was offered by respondent Judge to support her posture, we hold that
to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant,
the applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 24
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that
could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary
especially in cases where the issue is the existence or the negative ingredient of the offense
charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and
such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the
same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant
must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of
requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give
meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalties. As
well stated by this Court through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Villanueva vs.
Querubin: 25
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right; but it
could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected
area, primarily one's home but not necessarily thereto confined (Cf. Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 [1966]). What is sought to be guarded is a
man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that
haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of
who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around
him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional

formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from
any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life
(Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 Brennam, J. and Boyd v. United
States, 116 US 616, 630). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative
work, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966), could fitly
characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to
afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is
no less, than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards (Ibid, p. 47). (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the
Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when
he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason
was introduced why such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the nonexistence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a
search warrant. The presumption of regularity cannot be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify it. 26 We apply by analogy our ruling in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.: 27
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the
pirated firms were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search
warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes
at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable
cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrant is not meritorious.
The court cannot presume the duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily
reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets
which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least
substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work.
Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to
compare the with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of
the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations
as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in
the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is
actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the
drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound.
The said warehouse is owned by a different person. Again, the respondent Judge is correct on
this point.

This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the present case, it
must be noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the
compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the
same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse.
With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of
private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or
structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of
the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of
the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private
respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent
sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant,
which is violative of the constitutional requirement.
While the questioned search warrant had all the characteristic of a general warrant, it was
correctly implemented. For, the searching team went directly to the house of private respondent
Aiden Lanuza located at Lot No. 41 inside the compound known as 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. However, the team did not find any of the drug products which were
the object of the search. Frustrated, and apparently disappointed, the team then proceeded to
search a nearby warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po
located at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. It was in the warehouse that drug products
were found and seized which were duly receipted. In the Joint Affidavit of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete,
Jr. and SPO2 Markbilly Capalungan, members of the searching team, is a statement that the
confiscated 52 cartons of assorted medicines were found in the possession and control of
private respondent Aiden Lanuza. This is a blatant falsehood and is aggravated by the fact that
this was committed by officers sworn to uphold the law. In searching the warehouse of Folk Arts
Export & Import Company owned by one David Po, the searching team went beyond the scope
of the search warrant. As the trial court aptly observed:
. . . . The verified motion to quash and reply also show that the search at the
house of defendant-movant yielded negative result and the confiscated
articles were taken from another place which is the warehouse of Folk Arts
Import and Export Company owned by another person. In the return of the
search warrant, it is stated that Search Warrant No. 958 (95) was served at
the premises of 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Cebu City and that during
the search, drug products were found and seized therefrom which were duly
receipted. Accompanying, said return is the Joint Affidavit of two (2)
members of the searching team, namely: SPO2 Froctuoso Bete and SPO2
Markbilly Capalingan, both of the 7th Criminal Investigation Command, PNP,
with station at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gerardo Avenue, Cebu City which
also mentioned only the address as 516 San Jose dela Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City and the confiscation of 52 cartoons(sic) of assorted
medicines purportedly from the possession and control of defendantmovant. However, as indicated in the sketch attached to the application for
search warrant, said Folk Arts Import and Export Company is owned by one
David Po, which is a concrete proof that the searching team exceeded their
authority by conducting a search not only in the residence of defendantmovant Lanuza but also in another place which the applicant itself has
identified as belonging to another person, David Po. The foregoing are
strong reasons to support the conclusion that there has been an
unreasonable search and seizure which would warrant the quashal of the
search warrant. 30
The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search warrant.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued in a
resolution dated June 26, 1996 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

After due hearing, the Court of First Instance through Judge Delfin Jaranilla, decided to overrule
both petitions, declaring that the art metal filing cabinet and the books and papers claimed by
the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., would be returned to Attorney Teopisto B. Remo and to the
company, respectively, as soon as it be proven, by means of an examination thereof to be made
in the presence of the interested parties, that they contain nothing showing that they have been
used to commit fraud against the Government. Only Attorney Teopisto B. Remo appealed from
the decision of the court and he now contends that it committed the nine errors assigned by him
as follows:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, Exhibit B, issued in the
case at bar is unconstitutional and void ab initio and hence can confer no legal right
upon the Government to seize, much less to retain or open the filing cabinet in
question, Exhibit 3.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, which is void ab
initio may not be legalized by evidence secured subsequent to the issuance, or in
consequence, of said illegal search warrant.
3. The lower court erred in not holding that the doctrine of the case of People vs.
Rubio (G. R. No. 35500, 57 Phil., 384), is not applicable to the case at bar.

G.R. No. L-41957

August 28, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SANTIAGO SY JUCO, defendant.
TEOPISTO B. REMO, petitioner-appellant.
Laurel, Del Rosario and Sabido for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General for appellee.

4. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, Exhibit B, was
procured in order to obtain evidence against the defendant Santiago Sy Juco.
5. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, Exhibit B, was issued
solely against the premised occupied by the defendant Santiago Sy Juco, and hence
cannot be used against the premises occupied by a stranger, or the petitioner,
Teopisto B. Remo.
6. The lower court erred in not holding that the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3, is the personal
property of the petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo, and not of the defendant Santiago Sy
Juco.

DIAZ, J.:
Upon petition of the agent and representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, named
Narciso Mendiola, who alleged that, according to information given him by a person whom he
considered reliable, certain fraudulent bookletters and papers or records were being kept in the
building marked No. 482 on Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila, occupied by Santiago Sy Juco,
a warrant to search the building in question was issued against said person on March 7, 1933,
by the Court of First Instance of Manila, through Judge Mariano A. Albert. In said warrant, the
peace officers to whom it was directed for execution were required to seize the above-stated
articles for the purpose of delivering them to the court, for the proper action to be taken in due
time. After making the required search the officers concerned seized, among things, an art metal
filing cabinet claimed by Attorney Teopisto B. Remo to be his and to contain some letters,
documents and papers belonging to his clients. Inasmuch as said officers later refused to return
the filing cabinet in question to him, he filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
praying that the Collector of Internal Revenue and his agents be prohibited from opening said art
metal filing cabinet and that the sheriff of the City of Manila likewise be ordered to take charge of
said property in the meantime, on the ground that the warrant by virtue of which the search was
made is null and void, being illegal and against the Constitution. A similar petition was later filed
in the same case by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., the same agents of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue having also seized some books belonging to it by virtue of the above-mentioned
search warrant.

7. The lower court erred in not upholding the inviolability of the contents of the filing
cabinet, Exhibit 3, the same being confidential documents entrusted to the herein
petitioner, Attorney Teopisto B. Remo, by his clients, in his professional capacity and in
connection with cases pending before the courts of justice and administrative
tribunals.
8. The lower court erred in not holding that the Internal Revenue agents gave infringed
the penal laws not only by procuring the search warrant, Exhibit B, against the
premises of the defendant, Santiago Sy Juco, without just cause, but also by
exceeding their authority in enforcing said search warrant against the premises of the
petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo, who is stranger to said search warrant, which acts also
constitute a violation of the domicile of said petitioner; and in not endorsing the matter
to the city fiscal for proper action.
9. The lower court erred in not ordering the return of the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3, intact
and unopened, to its lawful owner, the petitioner Teopisto B. Remo.
The pertinent part of the search warrant in question was couched in the following language:

Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me, Mariano Albert,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
by the complainant on oath of Narciso Mendiola, special investigator,
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Manila, that the defendant, Santiago Sy Juco,
of No. 482 Juan Luna, Manila, keeps illegally and feloniously fraudulent
books, correspondence, and records and that he verily believes upon
probable cause that the said books, correspondence and records at No. 482
Juan Luna, Manila, and the said (personal) property is now being used in
the commission of fraud of the revenue of the Government.
You are therefore commanded to take with you the necessary and proper
assistance and to enter, in the daytime, into the said premises and there
diligently search for fraudulent books, correspondence and records and that
you seize and bring them before the court to be disposed of according to
law.
Given under my hands this 7th day of March, 1933, in the City of Manila.
[SEAL]
(Sgd.) MARIANO A. ALBERT
Judge of Court of First instance of Manila
The affidavit or deposition referred to in the warrant above-quoted contained the following
questions and answers:
TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE HON. JUDGE MARIANO A. ALBERT, Narciso
Mendiola, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? A. Narciso Mendiola, special
investigator, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Manila.

[SEAL]
(Sgd.) MARIANO A. ALBERT
Judge, Court of First Instance, Manila
It appears clear to this court that the question that the appellant wishes to raise by means of the
allege errors attributed by him to the lower court, may be reduced to the following:
1. Is the search warrant in question valid or not, taking into consideration the
provisions of the law and of the Constitution relative thereto?
2. Does the art metal filing cabinet seized by the agents of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue belong to Santiago Sy Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?
3. Could the search warrant in question affect Attorney Teopisto B. Remo, not being
the person against whom it was directed?
4. Had the court authority to order the opening of the cabinet in question for the
purpose of determining, by an examination of the books, documents and records
contained therein, whether or not same were used to commit fraud against the
Government?
1. A question which is very similar to the first one herein raised by the appellant, has been
decided by this court in the negative in its judgment rendered in the case of Alvarez vs. Court of
First Instance of Tayabas and Anti Usury Board, p. 33, ante. According to our laws in force on
the date in question, which do not differ substantially from the provisions of the Constitution of
the Commonwealth in matters regarding search, in order that a search warrant may be valid, the
following requisites, among others, must be present: That the application upon which it is issued
be supported by oath; That the search warrant particularly describes not only place to be
searched but also the person or thing to be seized and that there be probable cause (sec. 97,
General Orders, No. 58: sec. 3, Jones Law; Article III, sec. 1, paragraph 3, Constitution of the
Commonwealth).

Q. Are you the applicant for this search warrant? A. Yes, sir.
Q. do you know the premises situated at No. 482 Juan Luna, Manila? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know who occupy said premises? A. According to the best of my
information, the house is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco.
Q. What are your reasons for applying for a search warrant? A. It has been
reported to us by person whom I considered reliable that in said premises are
fraudulent books, correspondence and records.
I. Narciso Mendiola, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the
foregoing questions and answers and that I found the same to be correct
and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
(Sgd.) NARCISCO MENDIOLA.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of March, 1933, in the City
of Manila, P. I.

In the above-cited case of Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board,
supra, and in that of United States vs. Addison (28 Phil., 566), this court held that the oath
required must be such that it constitutes a guaranty that the person taking it has personal
knowledge of the facts of the case and that it convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual seeking the issuance of the warrant or the person making the averment by hearsay, of
the existence of the requisite of probable cause. It has likewise been held by this court that by
probable cause are meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance thereof. It
has furthermore been held that the true test of the sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance
of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon in case the allegations contained therein prove false (Sate vs. Roosevelt, 244
Pac., 280), and that the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes relative to searches and
seizures must be construed liberally in favor of the individual who may be affected thereby, and
strictly against the State and against the person invoking them for the issuance of the warrant
ordering their execution (Elardo vs. State of Misissippi, 145 So., 615; Fowler vs. U. S., 62 Fed.
[2d], 656; Saforik vs. U. S. Feed. [2d], 892; Boyd vs. U. S., 116 U. S., 616; 29 Law. ed., 746), for
the simple reason that the proceedings of search and seizure are, by their very nature, summary
and drastic ones (Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board, supra,
and the authorities cited therein).
By reading the affidavit which gave rise to the issuance of the search warrant in question, it will
be seen that the latter does not fulfill the necessary conditions in support of its validity. In the first
place, it is not stated in said affidavit that the books, documents or records referred to therein are
being used or are intended to be used in the commission of fraud against the Government and,

notwithstanding the lack of such allegation, the warrant avers that they are actually being used
for such purpose. In the second place, it assumes that the entire building marked No. 482 on
Juan Luna Street is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco against whom the warrant was exclusively
issued, when the only ground upon which such assumption is based is Narciso Mendiola's
statement which is mere hearsay and when in fact part thereof was occupied by the appellant. In
the third place, it was not asked that the things belonging to the appellant and to others also be
searched. In otherwords, the warrant in question has gone beyond what had been applied for by
Narciso Mendiola and the agent who executed it performed acts not authorized by the warrant,
and it is for this and the above-stated reason why it is unreasonable, it being evidence that the
purpose thereof was solely to fish for evidence or search for it by exploration, in case some
could be found. It is of common knowledge that search warrants have not been designed for
such purpose (Gouled vs. U. S., 255 U. S., 298, S. C. R., 65 Law. ed., 647; Uy Kheytin vs.
Villareal, 42 Phil., 886) much less in a case as the one under consideration where it has not
even been alleged in the affidavit of Narciso Mendiola what crime had been committed by
Santiago Sy Juco or what crime he was about commit. On this point said affidavit merely
contained the following allegation: "It has been reported to us by a person whom I considered
reliable that in said premises are fraudulent books, correspondence and records." Therefore, the
first question raised should be decided in the negative.
2. The resolution of the second question depends entirely on the nature of the evidence
presented and the relative preponderance thereof. The only witness who testified that the art
metal filing cabinet belongs to the accused Santiago Sy Juco, is Macario Garcia. Against
Garcia's testimony, we certainly have that of the appellant himself and his witnesses Rufino C.
Wenceslao, Vicente del Rosario, Jose Jeuquenco and Feliciano Belmonte, besides Exhibits E,
F, G, H and L, which conclusively proves that the furniture in question was purchased by said
appellant at the beginning of January, 1933, and that he had it precisely in a room on one of the
upper floors of building No. 482 on Juan Luna Street, which he was then subleasing from
Santiago Sy Juco, to keep his records and those of his clients. On the otherhand, it is
unimportant now to determine whether the furniture in question belongs to Santiago Sy Juco or
to the appellant Attorney Topisto B. Remo. It should have been alleged at the time he applied for
the issuance of the search warrant, to show with the other allegations, reason and evidence that
the issuance thereof was justified because of the existence of probable cause, the latter being a
requisite without which the issuance of the judicial warrant authorizing such search would be
unwarranted. For these reasons, this court concludes that the second question raised calls for
an answer in the negative.
3. After the considerations just made, the third question cannot be resolved except in the
negative. The search warrant in question could not and should not in any way affect the
appellant attorney on the ground that he is not the person against whom it had been sought. It is
Santiago Sy Juco alone against whom the search warrant could be used, because it had been
obtained precisely against him; so much so that Narciso Mendiola, who applied for it, mentioned
him expressly in his affidavit and again did so in his report to his superior, that is, the Collector of
Internal Revenue (Exhibit C); and at the trial of this case, it was insisted that there was necessity
of making the search in the premises occupied by Santiago Sy Juco because an investigation
was then pending against him, for having defrauded the Government in its public revenue. The
doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Rubio(57 Phil., 384), invoked against the appellant,
is not applicable to the case at bar because, unlike in the above-cited case, neither books nor
record indicating fraud were found in his possession, and it is not he against whom the warrant
was issued.
4. It is clear that the court could not and can not order the opening of the art metal filing cabinet
in question because, it having been proven that it belongs to the appellant attorney and that in it
he keeps the records and documents of his clients, to do so would be in violation of his right as
such attorney, since it would be tantamount to compelling him to disclose or divulge facts or
things belonging to his clients, which should be kept secret, unless she is authorized by them to
make such disclosure, it being a duty imposed by law upon an attorney to strictly preserve the

secrets or communications made to him. Such an act would constitute a qualified violation of
section 383, No. 4, and of section 31 of Act No. 190, which read as follows:
An attorney can not, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment; nor can an attorney's secretary stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of client and his employer, concerning any fact, the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. (Sec. 383, No. 4, Act No.
190.)
A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his
client. He shall not be permitted in any court without the consent of his client, given in
open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in professional
consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal matters. (Sec. 31, Act
No. 190.)
For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned by the appellant are very well
founded, the appealed judgment is reversed, and it is ordered that the art metal filing cabinet,
together with the key thereof seized by the internal revenue agent by virtue of the judicial
warrant in question, which is hereby declared null and void, be immediately returned unopened
to the appellant; and that a copy of this decision be sent to the Solicitor-General for him to take
action, if he deems it justified, upon careful investigation of the facts, against the internal
revenue agent or agents who obtained and executed the warrant in question, in accordance with
the provisions of article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, without special pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

VITUG, J.:
On 07 April 1988, the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), through its Agent Lauro C. Reyes,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
(Branch 159) three applications for search warrant against private respondents Tube Video
Enterprises and Edward C. Cham (ASW No. 95), the Blooming Rose Tape Center and Ma.
Jajorie T. Uy (ASW No. 96), and the Video
Channel and Lydia Nabong (ASW No. 97), charging said respondents with violation of Section
56 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 49, otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property, as amended by P.D. No. 1988.
In the three applications for search warrant, NBI Agent Reyes stated under oath that the
respondents had in their possession and control
1. (p)irated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of
which are mentioned in the attached list;
2. (p)osters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, journals,
ledgers, job order slips, delivery slips, stickers and books of account bearing
and/or mentioned the pirated films with titles . . ., or otherwise used in the
videogram business or activities of the defendants; sold, leased, distributed
or possessed for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public
exhibition, journals, ledgers, job order slips, delivery slips, stickers and
books of accounts used in the unlawful videogram business or activities of
the defendants; (and)

G.R. No. 96597-99 October 6, 1994

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORP., PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP.,
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP., UNITED ARTISTS CORP., UNIVERSAL CITY
STUDIOS, INC., WALT DISNEY COMPANY and WARNER BROS., INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TUBE VIDEO ENTERPRISES and EDWARD CHAM,
BLOOMING ROSE TAPE CENTER and MA. JAJORIE T. UY, and VIDEO CHANNEL and
LYDIA NABONG, respondents.
G.R. No. 97156 October 6, 1994
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION,
PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP., TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP., MGM/UA
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY
COMPANY, and WARNER BROS., INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FOX'S VIDEO, INC. and ALFREDO
ONGYANGCO., respondents.

3. (t)elevision sets, video cassette and/or laser disc recorders, dubbing

machines, rewinders, film projectors, U-matic machines, image enhancers,
dubbing machines, tape head cleaners, converters, accessories, equipment
and other machines and paraphernalia, materials or empty/erasable video
tapes and master copies used or intended to be used in the unlawful
exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale lease or disposition of videograms
they are keeping and concealing in the premises abovedescribed. 1
Acting on the applications, then Regional Trial Court Judge Maria
Alicia M. Austria conducted a joint hearing during which she made a personal examination of the
applicant and his witnesses. Finding just and probable cause for granting the application at the
time, Judge Austria issued the corresponding Search Warrants ("SW") numbered 95, 96, and 97.
Private respondents filed their respective motions to quash the three search warrants, citing as
grounds therefor the following:
In SW No. 95

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioners.

Herminio T. Banico, Jr. & Associates for private respondent Lydia Nabong.
Molo, Padua, Salazar, Roldan & Associates for Blooming Rose Tape Center/Ma. J.T. Uy.
RESOLUTION

1. There is no probable cause nor the existence of a satisfactory fact upon

which the search warrant is based;
2. The National Bureau of Investigation has no authority nor the jurisdiction
to initiate the filing of suit against the defendants;

3. The confiscation of defendants' seized articles based on the questioned

search warrant violated the latter's constitutional right against deprivation of
properties without due process.
4. The films in question are not protected by Pres. Decree
No. 1988 in that they were never registered in the National Library as a
condition precedent to the availment of the protection secured by that
decree. The complaint has acquired no right under the same.
5. The mere publication by complainant of its alleged ownership over the
films in question does notipso facto vest in the right to proceed under P.D.
No. 49 as that law requires official registration. Moreover, the said
publication took place only after the application for the questioned search
warrant.2

3. Whether or not search warrants Nos. 95, 96 and 97 are general warrants
and therefore void.
4. Whether or not there was probable cause in the issuance of the search
warrants pursuant to Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure and Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines.
5. Whether or not private complainants who are members of the Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc. (MPAA for brevity) through their
counsel, Atty. Rico Domingo, have sufficiently proven their ownership over
the alleged pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films.
6. Whether or not the items seized by the NBI agents by virtue of SW Nos.
95, 96 and 97 may be ordered released to defendants. 4

In SW No. 96
1. The complainants, one Rico V. Domingo and one Rene C. Baltazar, in
representation of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., have not
proven nor established their ownership over the films listed in Annex "A" of
the search warrant issued by this Honorable Court against the defendants
herein.
2. The information provided by the National Bureau of Investigation agents
and the representatives of the MPAA, Inc. are replete with generalities
insofar as the description of the items to be concerned in violation of the
provisions of Sec. 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Their allegations as
to the offense are presumptuous and speculative in violation of the same
section of the Rules of Court. 3
Private respondents in SW No. 97 adopted the motions filed for the quashal of both SW No. 95
and SW No. 96.
Herein petitioners (the private complainants in the three cases), namely, Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc., Orion Pictures Corporation, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation,
MGM/UA Communications Company, Universal City Studios, Inc., Walt Disney Company and
Warner Bros., Inc., submitted their oppositions to the motions to quash. The movants, herein
private respondents, filed their replies to the oppositions and sought, simultaneously, the release
of the items seized. After a rejoinder was filed, the court a quo considered all the incidents
submitted for resolution.
In a Joint Order, issued on 09 December 1988, Judge Austria defined the issues raised in the
motions to quash thusly:
1. Whether or not the NBI had authority to file the application for search
warrant; whether or not it is the Videogram Regulatory Board under P.D. No.
1987 which has exclusive jurisdiction to file suits against violators of said
law.
2. Whether or not this Court observed due process of law before issuing the
search warrants in question.

Anent the first three issues, Judge Austria ruled that the NBI had the authority to apply for the
search warrants; that in the issuance of the search warrants, due process of law was duly
observed; and that the questioned search warrants were not general in character since the
provision of law violated, i.e., Sec. 56 of P.D. No. 49, as amended by P.D. No. 1988, was clearly
specified. Judge Austria, nonetheless, reversed her former stand initially finding probable cause
for the issuance of the search warrants and ordered the quashal of the search warrants giving
the following reasons:
1. Private complainants were uncertain of their ownership of the titles
subject of the seized video tapes;
2. Complainants did not comply with the requirement that the master tapes
should be presented during the application for search warrants; and
3. Private complainants cannot seek the protection of Philippine laws as
they failed to comply with the deposit and registration requirements of P.D.
No. 49 as amended by P.D. No. 1988. 5
Judge Austria thus ordered the return of all the items seized by virtue of the warrants.
Petitioners appealed the order of Judge Austria to the Court of Appeals, docketed CA-G.R. CV
No. 22133-22135, assigning the following alleged errors:
1. The Court a quo erred in ruling that private complainants were uncertain
of their ownership of the titles subject of the pirated video tapes.
2. The Court a quo erred in ordering the quashal of the search warrants on
the ground that the requirement of producing the "master tapes" during the
application for a search warrant, as enunciated in the 20th Century
Fox case, promulgated on 19 August 1988, was applicable to the facts of
the instant case which transpired on 07 April 1988, and that the same was
not complied with.

3. The Court a quo erred in ruling that appellants do not have a protectable
copyright under Philippine laws for their failure to comply with the deposit
and registration requirements of Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1988. 6

In applying for the search warrants the NBI charged violation of the entire
provisions of Section 56 of P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D.
No. 1988. This included not only the sale, lease or distribution of pirated
tapes but also the transfer or causing to be transferred of any sound
recording or motion picture or other audio visual work.

On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals, through Justice Salome A. Montoya, rendered its
decision sustaining petitioners' first and third assignment of errors but rejecting petitioners'
second assignment of error. It, therefore, still affirmed the quashal of the search warrants.

But even assuming, as appellants argue, that only the sale, lease, or
distribution of pirated video tapes is involved, the fact remains that there is
need to establish probable cause that the tapes being sold, leased or
distributed are pirated tapes, hence the issue reverts back to the question of
whether there was unauthorized transfer, directly or indirectly, of a sound
recording or motion picture or other audio visual work that has been
recorded. 7

Hence, this petition (G.R. No. 96597-99). Another decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in
another case (CA-G.R. No. 20617), involving the same petitioners on substantially identical facts
and issues, was also brought before this Court (G.R. No. 97156). In a Resolution, dated 06
March 1991, this Court consolidated the two petitions.
We affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals.
This Court, in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655) has already
laid down the rule that a basic requirement for the validity of search warrants, in cases of this
nature, is the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which pirated films
are supposed to have been copied. We quote:

With due respect to petitioners, the Court does not see a compelling reason to reexamine its
previous position on the issue.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the
pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search
warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes
at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable
cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious.
The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily
reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets
which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least
substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work.
Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to
compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of
the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations
as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.
We also fully concur with the Court of Appeals when, in resolving petitioners' motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 22133-35, it ratiocinated thusly:
It is not correct to say that "the basic fact" to be proven to establish probable
cause in the instant cases is not the "unauthorized transfer" of a motion
picture that has been recorded but the "sale, lease, or distribution of pirated
video tapes of copyrighted films."

Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National

Bureau of Investigation for violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and sought
its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and private
researchers made discreet surveillance on various video establishments in
Metro Manila including Sunshine Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity),
owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at No. 6 Mayfair
Center, Magallanes, Makati, Metro Manila.
On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a
search warrant with the courta quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure,
among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of which were
enumerated in a list attached to the application; and, television sets, video
cassettes and/or laser disc recordings equipment and other machines and
paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition,
showing, reproduction, sale, lease or disposition of videograms tapes in the
premises above described. In the hearing of the application, NBI Senior
Agent Lauro C. Reyes, upon questions by the court a quo, reiterated in
substance his averments in his affidavit. His testimony was corroborated by
another witness, Mr. Rene C. Baltazar. Atty. Rico V. Domingo's deposition
was also taken. On the basis of the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior
Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Rene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Search
Warrant No. 87-053 for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 49, as amended,
was issued by the court a quo.

G.R. No. 110318 August 28, 1996

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES
CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS
CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and
WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A.
PELINDARIO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:p
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 promulgated on July 22, 1992 and its resolution 2 of May 10, 1993 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, both of which sustained the order 3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati, Metro Manila, dated November 22, 1988 for
the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053 earlier issued per its own order 4 on
September 5, 1988 for violation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property."

The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on December 14, 1987
to Sunshine and/or their representatives. In the course of the search of the
premises indicated in the search warrant, the NBI Agents found and seized
various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or
exclusively distributed by private complainants, and machines, equipment,
television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories all of which were
included in the receipt for properties accomplished by the raiding team.
Copy of the receipt was furnished and/or tendered to Mr. Danilo A.
Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine Home Video.
On December 16, 1987, a "Return of Search Warrant" was filed with the
Court.
A "Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant" was filed but was later
denied for lack of merit (p. 280, Records).
A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The court a
quo granted the said motion for reconsideration and justified it in this
manner:
It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted
films from which the pirated films were allegedly copies
(sic), were never presented in the proceedings for the
issuance of the search warrants in question. The orders
of the Court granting the search warrants and denying
the urgent motion to lift order of search warrants were,
therefore, issued in error. Consequently, they must be
set aside. (p. 13, Appellant's Brief) 5

The material facts found by respondent appellate court are as follows:

Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting private
respondents' motion for reconsideration, thus lifting the search warrant which it had

theretofore issued, to the Court of Appeals. As stated at the outset, said appeal was
dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this petition
was brought to this Court particularly challenging the validity of respondent court's
retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 6 in dismissing petitioners' appeal and upholding the quashal of the
search warrant by the trial court.
I
Inceptively, we shall settle the procedural considerations on the matter of and the
challenge to petitioners' legal standing in our courts, they being foreign corporations
not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have such
license to be able to maintain an action in Philippine courts. In so challenging
petitioners' personality to sue, private respondents point to the fact that petitioners are
the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of
copyrighted motion pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V.
Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as being constitutive of "doing business in the
Philippines" under Section 1 (f)(1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of
Investments. As foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the
right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the absence of a license to do business.
Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant. 7
In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing business in the
Philippines, 8 and contend that private respondents have not adduced evidence to
prove that petitioners are doing such business here, as would require them to be
licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, other than averments in the
quoted portions of petitioners' "Opposition to Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Search
Warrant" dated April 28, 1988 and Atty. Rico V. Domingo's affidavit of December 14,
1987. Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such
exclusive right does not conclusively prove the act of doing business nor establish the
presumption of doing business.9
The Corporation Code provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation
transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors
or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or
administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under
Philippine laws.
The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not
a condition precedent to the maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by
a foreign corporation. However, under the aforequoted provision, no foreign
corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippines, as this phrase is
understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have the license required by
law, and until it complies with the law intransacting business here, it shall not be
permitted to maintain any suit in local courts. 10 As thus interpreted, any foreign
corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in our courts
upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant are
within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but

"doing business" in the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign
corporation from access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign corporation
is without license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has
no capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in
business in the Philippines. 11
Statutory provisions in many jurisdictions are determinative of what constitutes "doing
business" or "transacting business" within that forum, in which case said provisions
are controlling there. In others where no such definition or qualification is laid down
regarding acts or transactions failing within its purview, the question rests primarily on
facts and intent. It is thus held that all the combined acts of a foreign corporation in the
State must be considered, and every circumstance is material which indicates a
purpose on the part of the corporation to engage in some part of its regular business
in the State. 12
No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes
"doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting" business. Each case must be judged in the
light of its own peculiar environmental circumstances. 13 The true tests, however, seem
to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the
business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired
from it and turned it over to another. 14
As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle, subject to
such modifications as may be necessary in view of the particular issue or of the terms
of the statute involved, it is recognized that a foreign corporation is "doing,"
"transacting," "engaging in," or "carrying on" business in the State when, and ordinarily
only when, it has entered the State by its agents and is there engaged in carrying on
and transacting through them some substantial part of its ordinary or customary
business, usually continuous in the sense that it may be distinguished from merely
casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts. 15
The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute doing
or transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that the
term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and
contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some
of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and
subject of its organization. 16
This traditional case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been
adopted with some qualifications in various pieces of legislation in our jurisdiction.
For instance, Republic Act No. 5455 17 provides:
Sec. 1. Definitions and scope of this Act. (1) . . . ; and the phrase "doing
business" shall include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts,
opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing
representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in
any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one
hundred eighty days or more; participating in the management, supervision
or control of any domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the
Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial
dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance
of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident
to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose
and object of the business organization.

Presidential Decree No. 1789, 18 in Article 65 thereof, defines "doing business" to

include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called
"liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are
domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a
period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more; participating in the
management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or
corporation in the Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance
of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the
business organization.
The implementing rules and regulations of said presidential decree conclude the
enumeration of acts constituting "doing business" with a catch-all definition, thus:
Sec. 1(g). "Doing Business" shall be any act or combination of acts
enumerated in Article 65 of the Code. In particular "doing business"
includes:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Any other act or acts which imply a continuity of commercial dealings or
arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or
works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, or in the
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of
the business organization.
Finally, Republic Act No. 7042 19 embodies such concept in this wise:
Sec. 3. Definitions. As used in this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) the phrase "doing business shall include soliciting orders, service
contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches;
appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who
in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one
hundred eight(y) (180) days or more; participating in the management,
supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in
the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or
of the purpose and object of the business organization: Provided, however,
That the phrase "doing business" shall not be deemed to include mere
investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations
duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such
investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in
such corporation; nor appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in
the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own
account.
Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory
standards, petitioners are not barred from maintaining the present action. There is no

showing that, under our statutory or case law, petitioners are doing, transacting,
engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a
license before they can seek redress from our courts. No evidence has been offered
to show that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or any other
specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.
Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission 20 stating that its records do not show the registration of petitioner film
companies either as corporations or partnerships or that they have been licensed to
transact business in the Philippines, while undeniably true, is of no consequence to
petitioners' right to bring action in the Philippines. Verily, no record of such registration
by petitioners can be expected to be found for, as aforestated, said foreign film
corporations do not transact or do business in the Philippines and, therefore, do not
need to be licensed in order to take recourse to our courts.
Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Omnibus
Investments Code lists, among others
(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts. Concrete and
specific solicitations by a foreign firm, or by an agent of such foreign firm,
not acting independently of the foreign firm amounting to negotiations or
fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or service contracts, regardless of
where the contracts are actually reduced to writing, shall constitute doing
business even if the enterprise has no office or fixed place of business in
the Philippines. The arrangements agreed upon as to manner, time and
terms of delivery of the goods or the transfer of title thereto is immaterial. A
foreign firm which does business through the middlemen acting in their own
names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants,
shall not be deemed doing business in the Philippines. But such indentors,
commercial brokers or commission merchants shall be the ones deemed to
be doing business in the Philippines.
(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the
Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an independent
status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its own account, and
not in the name or for the account of a principal. Thus, where a foreign firm
is represented in the Philippines by a person or local company which does
not act in its name but in the name of the foreign firm, the latter is doing
business in the Philippines.
as acts constitutive of "doing business," the fact that petitioners are admittedly
copyright owners or owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of motion
pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an indicium of doing business
which would require them to obtain a license before they can sue upon a cause of
action in local courts.
Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of petitioners,
with express authority pursuant to a special power of attorney, inter alia
To lay criminal complaints with the appropriate authorities and to provide
evidence in support of both civil and criminal proceedings against any
person or persons involved in the criminal infringement of copyright or
concerning the unauthorized importation, duplication, exhibition or
distribution of any cinematographic work(s) films or video cassettes of
which . . . is the owner of copyright or the owner of exclusive rights of

distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s) between . . .

and the respective owners of copyright in such cinematographic work(s), to
initiate and prosecute on behalf of . . . criminal or civil actions in the
Philippines against any person or persons unlawfully distributing, exhibiting,
selling or offering for sale any films or video cassettes of which . . . is the
owner of copyright or the owner of exclusive rights of distribution in the
Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s) between . . . and the respective
owners of copyright in such works. 21
tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see how exercising one's
legal and property rights and taking steps for the vigilant protection of said rights,
particularly the appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can be deemed by and of
themselves to be doing business here.
As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the
State simply because it enters into contracts with residents of the State, where such
contracts are consummated outside the State. 22 In fact, a view is taken that a foreign
corporation is not doing business in the State merely because sales of its product are
made there or other business furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged
agent, whether a corporation or a natural person, where such activities are not under
the direction and control of the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the alleged
agent as an independent business. 23
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent
dealer who has purchased and obtained title from the corporation to the products sold
are not a doing of business by the corporation.24 Likewise, a foreign corporation which
sells its products to persons styled "distributing agents" in the State, for distribution by
them, is not doing business in the State so as to render it subject to service of process
therein, where the contract with these purchasers is that they shall buy exclusively
from the foreign corporation such goods as it manufactures and shall sell them at
trade prices established by it. 25
It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging an attorney
to represent it in a Federal court sitting in a particular State is not doing business
within the scope of the minimum contact test.26 With much more reason should this
doctrine apply to the mere retainer of Atty. Domingo for legal protection against
contingent acts of intellectual piracy.
In accordance with the rule that "doing business" imports only acts in furtherance of
the purposes for which a foreign corporation was organized, it is held that the mere
institution and prosecution or defense of a suit, particularly if the transaction which is
the basis of the suit took place out of the State, do not amount to the doing of
business in the State. The institution of a suit or the removal thereof is neither the
making of a contract nor the doing of business within a constitutional provision placing
foreign corporations licensed to do business in the State under the same regulations,
limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic corporations. Merely
engaging in litigation has been considered as not a sufficient minimum contact to
warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 27
As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private respondents' basis
for arguing that petitioners are barred from maintaining suit in the Philippines. For
allegedly being foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines without a
license, private respondents repeatedly maintain in all their pleadings that petitioners
have thereby no legal personality to bring an action before Philippine Courts. 28

Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court
are lack of legal capacity to sue 29 and that the complaint states no cause of
action. 30 Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of
his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or
does not have the character or representation he claims. 31 On the other hand, a case
is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real
party in interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. 32 The term "lack
of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue."
While the former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real
party in interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss
based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; 33 whereas the second can be
used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the
face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. 34
Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for barring
recourse to our courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting
business in the Philippines should properly be "lack of capacity to sue," not "lack of
personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have been violated is
undeniably such, if not the only, real party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for
failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain any
suit before our courts.
Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Court's rejection of the common procedural
tactics of erring local companies which, when sued by unlicensed foreign corporations
not engaged in business in the Philippines, invoke the latter's supposed lack of
capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure to first acquire
a local license is based on considerations of public policy. It was never intended to
favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or nationals in case of
breach of valid obligations or violation of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or
entities simply because they are not licensed to do business in the country. 35
II
We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive application to the present
controversy of the ruling in20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., promulgated on August 19, 1988, 36 that for the determination of probable cause to
support the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving
videograms, the production of the master tape for comparison with the allegedly pirate
copies is necessary.
Petitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant is addressed to the discretion
of the court subject to the determination of probable cause in accordance with the
procedure prescribed therefore under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126. As of the time of
the application for the search warrant in question, the controlling criterion for the
finding of probable cause was that enunciated in Burgos vs. Chief of Staff 37 stating
that:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

According to petitioners, after complying with what the law then required, the lower
court determined that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant,
and which determination in fact led to the issuance and service on December 14,
1987 of Search Warrant No. 87-053. It is further argued that any search warrant so
issued in accordance with all applicable legal requirements is valid, for the lower court
could not possibly have been expected to apply, as the basis for a finding of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving
videograms, a pronouncement which was not existent at the time of such
determination, on December 14, 1987, that is, the doctrine in the 20th Century
Fox case that was promulgated only on August 19, 1988, or over eight months later.
Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the quashal of the search warrant by the lower court on the strength of
that 20th Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes into the very essence of probable
cause. At the time of the issuance of the search warrant involved here, although
the 20th Century Fox case had not yet been decided, Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
embodied the prevailing and governing law on the matter. The ruling in 20th Century
Fox was merely an application of the law on probable cause. Hence, they posit that
there was no law that was retrospectively applied, since the law had been there all
along. To refrain from applying the 20th Century Fox ruling, which had supervened as
a doctrine promulgated at the time of the resolution of private respondents' motion for
reconsideration seeking the quashal of the search warrant for failure of the trial court
to require presentation of the master tapes prior to the issuance of the search warrant,
would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. 38
Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of the 20th Century Fox ruling by
the trial court in resolving petitioners' motion for reconsideration in favor of the quashal
of the search warrant, on this renovated thesis:
And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively, it must be noted that in
the 20th Century Fox case, the lower court quashed the earlier search
warrant it issued. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the quashal on
the ground among others that the master tapes or copyrighted films were
not presented for comparison with the purchased evidence of the video
tapes to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the
former.
If the lower court in the Century Fox case did not quash the warrant, it is
Our view that the Supreme Court would have invalidated the warrant just
the same considering the very strict requirement set by the Supreme Court
for the determination of "probable cause" in copyright infringement cases as
enunciated in this 20th Century Fox case. This is so because, as was stated
by the Supreme Court in the said case, the master tapes and the pirated
tapes must be presented for comparison to satisfy the requirement of
"probable cause." So it goes back to the very existence of probable
cause. . . . 39
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the
rudiments of fair play, it is our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot
be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of Search Warrant
No. 87-053. Herein petitioners' consistent position that the order of the lower court of
September 5, 1988 denying therein defendants' motion to lift the order of search
warrant was properly issued, there having been satisfactory compliance with the then
prevailing standards under the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well
taken. The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from

petitioners in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and
jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the
finding of probable cause.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares that
"(j)udicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines."
Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent
source of law; it cannot create law. 40 While it is true that judicial decisions which apply
or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines,
still they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of
what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of
the Philippines. 41Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority
as the statute
itself. 42
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of the
above disquisition, this Court emphatically declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. 43 that the principle of prospectivity applies not only to original or amendatory
statutes and administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so, to judicial
decisions. Our holding in the earlier case of People vs. Jabinal 44 echoes the rationale
for this judicial declaration, viz.:
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8
of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system." The interpretation
upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the
date that the law was originally passed, since this Court's construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law. . . . , but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof . . . . (Emphasis supplied).
This was forcefully reiterated in Spouses Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 45 where the Court expounded:
. . . . But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also
subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the
familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already
become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]). The same
consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to
decisions enunciating new doctrines. . . . .

The reasoning behind Senarillos vs. Hermosisima 46 that judicial interpretation of a

statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the
Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the interpreted law carried into effect, is all too familiar. Such judicial doctrine does not
amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a construction or
interpretation of a pre-existing one, and that is precisely the situation obtaining in this
case.
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of
the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when
there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. 47 To
hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if
there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. 48
There is merit in petitioners' impassioned and well-founded argumentation:
The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
164 SCRA 655 (August 19, 1988) (hereinafter 20th Century Fox) was
inexistent in December of 1987 when Search Warrant 87-053 was issued by
the lower court. Hence, it boggles the imagination how the lower court could
be expected to apply the formulation of 20th Century Fox in finding probable
cause when the formulation was yet non-existent.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, the lower court was convinced at that time after conducting
searching examination questions of the applicant and his witnesses that "an
offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense (were) in the place sought to be searched" (Burgos v. Chief of
Staff, et al., 133 SCRA 800). It is indisputable, therefore, that at the time of
the application, or on December 14, 1987, the lower court did not commit
any error nor did it fail to comply with any legal requirement for the valid
issuance of search warrant.
. . . (W)e believe that the lower court should be considered as having
followed the requirements of the law in issuing Search Warrant No. 87-053.
The search warrant is therefore valid and binding. It must be noted that
nowhere is it found in the allegations of the Respondents that the lower
court failed to apply the law as then interpreted in 1987. Hence, we find it
absurd that it is (sic) should be seen otherwise, because it is simply
impossible to have required the lower court to apply a formulation which will
only be defined six months later.
Furthermore, it is unjust and unfair to require compliance with legal and/or
doctrinal requirements which are inexistent at the time they were supposed
to have been complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . If the lower court's reversal will be sustained, what encouragement can
be given to courts and litigants to respect the law and rules if they can
expect with reasonable certainty that upon the passage of a new rule, their

conduct can still be open to question? This certainly breeds instability in our
system of dispensing justice. For Petitioners who took special effort to
redress their grievances and to protect their property rights by resorting to
the remedies provided by the law, it is most unfair that fealty to the rules and
procedures then obtaining would bear but fruits of
injustice. 49
Withal, even the proposition that the prospectivity of judicial decisions imports
application thereof not only to future cases but also to cases still ongoing or not yet
final when the decision was promulgated, should not be countenanced in the jural
sphere on account of its inevitably unsettling repercussions. More to the point, it is felt
that the reasonableness of the added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling for the
production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for determination of probable
cause in copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification.
It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose from search warrant
proceedings in anticipation of the filing of a case for the unauthorized sale or renting
out of copyrighted films in videotape format in violation of Presidential Decree No. 49.
It revolved around the meaning of probable cause within the context of the
constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures, as applied to copyright
infringement cases involving videotapes.
Therein it was ruled that
The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the
pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search
warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes
at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable
cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious.
The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily
reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets
which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least
substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work.
Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to
compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of
the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations
as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.
For a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the factual antecedents of 20th
Century Fox, the pertinent portions of the decision therein are quoted hereunder, to
wit:
In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search
warrants against the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the

application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on
the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement
of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the
lower court stated in its questioned order dated January 2, 1986:
According to the movant, all three witnesses during the
proceedings in the application for the three search
warrants testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet,
Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or
representative of the Twentieth Century Fox
Corporation will testify on the video cassettes that were
pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of
the alleged piracy. The witness Bacani also said that
the video cassettes were pirated without stating the
manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that
has knowledge of that fact.

dismissed as not supported by competent evidence and

for that matter the probable cause hovers in that grey
debatable twilight zone between black and white
resolvable in favor of respondents herein.
But the glaring fact is that "Cocoon," the first video tape
mentioned in the search warrant, was not even duly
registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of
Opposition p. 152 record.) So, that lacking in the
requisite presentation to the Court of an alleged master
tape for purposes of comparison with the purchased
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those
seized from respondents, there was no way to
determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of
the film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox.
xxx xxx xxx

On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping

of the allegedly pirated tapes was from master tapes
allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox,
because, according to him it is of his personal
knowledge.
At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior
NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that when the
complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI, the
master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were shown
to him and he made comparisons of the tapes with
those purchased by their man Bacani. Why the master
tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated
tapes were not shown to the Court during the
application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that
bare statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand.
Again as the application and search proceedings is a
prelude to the filing of criminal cases under PD 49, the
copyright infringement law, and although what is
required for the issuance thereof is merely the presence
of probable cause, that probable cause must be
satisfactory to the Court, for it is a time-honored precept
that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender
under our laws should be interpreted in strictissimi
juris against the government and liberally in favor of the
alleged offender.
xxx xxx xxx
This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a
matter of fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of Rights
in our 1973 Constitution.
So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that
master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were
compared to the purchased and seized video tapes
from the respondents' establishments, it should be

The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in
the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated
P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses
did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony
which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private
respondents. Only the petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during
the application for the issuance of the search warrants stated that he had
personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the
petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much credence to his
testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated
tapes were not shown to the court during the application (Emphasis ours).
The italicized passages readily expose the reason why the trial court therein required
the presentation of the master tapes of the allegedly pirated films in order to convince
itself of the existence of probable cause under the factual milieu peculiar to that case.
In the case at bar, respondent appellate court itself observed:
We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted doctrine is that the pirated
copies as well as the master tapes, unlike the other types of personal
properties which may be seized, were available for presentation to the court
at the time of the application for a search warrant to determine the existence
of the linkage of the copyrighted films with the pirated ones. Thus, there is
no reason not the present them (Emphasis supplied ). 50
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the
presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search
warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining
the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement caseswhere there is doubt
as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and
careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that
said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or
similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed within
the factual matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could
unfairly fault the writer with the vice of overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of
undue generalization.

In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed the application for
search warrant with the lower court following a formal complaint lodged by petitioners,
judging from his affidavit 51 and his deposition,52 did testify on matters within his
personal knowledge based on said complaint of petitioners as well as his own
investigation and surveillance of the private respondents' video rental shop. Likewise,
Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, stated in his affidavit 53 and
further expounded in his deposition 54 that he personally knew of the fact that private
respondents had never been authorized by his clients to reproduce, lease and
possess for the purpose of selling any of the copyrighted films.
Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were corroborated by Rene C.
Baltazar, a private researcher retained by Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc.
(MPAA, Inc.), who was likewise presented as a witness during the search warrant
proceedings. 55 The records clearly reflect that the testimonies of the abovenamed
witnesses were straightforward and stemmed from matters within their personal
knowledge. They displayed none of the ambivalence and uncertainty that the
witnesses in the 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This categorical forthrightness in
their statements, among others, was what initially and correctly convinced the trial
court to make a finding of the existence of probable cause.
There is no originality in the argument of private respondents against the validity of the
search warrant, obviously borrowed from 20th Century Fox, that petitioners' witnesses
NBI Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo and Rene C. Baltazar did not
have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their respective testimonies and that
said witnesses' claim that the video tapes were pirated, without stating the manner by
which these were pirated, is a conclusion of fact without basis. 56 The difference, it
must be pointed out, is that the records in the present case reveal that (1) there is no
allegation of misrepresentation, much less a finding thereof by the lower court, on the
part of petitioners' witnesses; (2) there is no denial on the part of private respondents
that the tapes seized were illegitimate copies of the copyrighted ones not have they
shown that they were given any authority by petitioners to copy, sell, lease, distribute
or circulate, or at least, to offer for sale, lease, distribution or circulation the said video
tapes; and (3) a discreet but extensive surveillance of the suspected area was
undertaken by petitioners' witnesses sufficient to enable them to execute trustworthy
affidavits and depositions regarding matters discovered in the course thereof and of
which they have personal knowledge.
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do,
that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the
copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause and
that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object evidence,
with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted fact
is made through demonstrations involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding
magistrate. 57 Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of
testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of
evidence tending to prove the factum probandum, 58 especially where the production in
court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of
proportion to its evidentiary value. 59
Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory provisions relating to search
warrants prohibit their issuance except on a showing of probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation. These provisions prevent the issuance of warrants on loose,
vague, or doubtful bases of fact, and emphasize the purpose to protect against all
general searches. 60 Indeed, Article III of our Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof
that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined

personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized; and Sec. 3 thereof provides that any evidence
obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
These constitutional strictures are implemented by the following provisions of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon
satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or
that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
The constitutional and statutory provisions of various jurisdictions requiring a showing
of probable cause before a search warrant can be issued are mandatory and must be
complied with, and such a showing has been held to be an unqualified condition
precedent to the issuance of a warrant. A search warrant not based on probable cause
is a nullity, or is void, and the issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation, arbitrary. 61 It
behooves us, then, to review the concept of probable cause, firstly, from
representative holdings in the American jurisdiction from which we patterned our
doctrines on the matter.
Although the term "probable cause" has been said to have a well-defined meaning in
the law, the term is exceedingly difficult to define, in this case, with any degree of
precision; indeed, no definition of it which would justify the issuance of a search
warrant can be formulated which would cover every state of facts which might arise,
and no formula or standard, or hard and fast rule, may be laid down which may be
applied to the facts of every situation. 62 As to what acts constitute probable cause
seem incapable of definition.63 There is, of necessity, no exact test. 64
At best, the term "probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground
of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged; 65 or the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite an
honest belief in a reasonable mind acting on all the facts and circumstances within the
knowledge of the magistrate that the charge made by the applicant for the warrant is
true. 66
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute
certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is not concerned with
the question of whether the offense charged has been or is being committed in fact, or

whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only whether the affiant has reasonable
grounds for his belief. 67 The requirement is less than certainty or proof , butmore than
suspicion or possibility. 68
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 69 It being the duty of the
issuing officer to issue, or refuse to issue, the warrant as soon as practicable after the
application therefor is filed, 70 the facts warranting the conclusion of probable cause
must be assessed at the time of such judicial determination by necessarily using legal
standards then set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to be
crafted thereafter.
As already stated, the definition of probable cause enunciated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief
of Staff, et al., supra,vis-a-vis the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126, were the
prevailing and controlling legal standards, as they continue to be, by which a finding of
probable cause is tested. Since the propriety of the issuance of a search warrant is to
be determined at the time of the application therefor, which in turn must not be too
remote in time from the occurrence of the offense alleged to have been committed, the
issuing judge, in determining the existence of probable cause, can and should
logically look to the touchstones in the laws theretofore enacted and the decisions
already promulgated at the time, and not to those which had not yet even been
conceived or formulated.
It is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court attempt to define
probable cause, obviously for the purpose of leaving such matter to the court's
discretion within the particular facts of each case. Although the Constitution prohibits
the issuance of a search warrant in the absence of probable cause, such
constitutional inhibition does not command the legislature to establish a definition or
formula for determining what shall constitute probable cause. 71 Thus, Congress,
despite its broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and
seizures, 72 does not venture to make such a definition or standard formulation of
probable cause, nor categorize what facts and circumstances make up the same,
much less limit the determination thereof to and within the circumscription of a
particular class of evidence, all in deference to judicial discretion and probity. 73
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular
requirement (the presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox) not
provided nor implied in the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond the realm of
judicial competence or statesmanship. It serves no purpose but to stultify and constrict
the judicious exercise of a court's prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of
determining the existence of probable cause to a mere ministerial or mechanical
function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that the existence of
probable cause is or should be determined solely by a specific kind of evidence.
Surely, this could not have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and
we do not believe that the Court intended the statement in 20th Century Fox regarding
master tapes as the dictum for all seasons and reasons in infringement cases.
Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from the records that the lower court
followed the prescribed procedure for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, with them
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (2) an
examination personally conducted by the judge in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and witnesses on facts

personally known to them; and, (3) the taking of sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to the records.
Thereafter, the court a quo made the following factual findings leading to the issuance
of the search warrant now subject of this controversy:
In the instant case, the following facts have been established: (1)
copyrighted video tapes bearing titles enumerated in Search Warrant No.
87-053 were being sold, leased, distributed or circulated, or offered for sale,
lease, distribution, or transferred or caused to be transferred by defendants
at their video outlets, without the written consent of the private complainants
or their assignee; (2) recovered or confiscated from defendants' possession
were video tapes containing copyrighted motion picture films without the
authority of the complainant; (3) the video tapes originated from spurious or
unauthorized persons; and (4) said video tapes were exact reproductions of
the films listed in the search warrant whose copyrights or distribution rights
were owned by complainants.
The basis of these facts are the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior
Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, and Rene C. Baltazar. Motion
Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) thru their counsel, Atty. Rico V.
Domingo, filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation against
certain video establishments one of which is defendant, for violation of PD
No. 49 as amended by PD No. 1988. Atty. Lauro C. Reyes led a team to
conduct discreet surveillance operations on said video establishments. Per
information earlier gathered by Atty. Domingo, defendants were engaged in
the illegal sale, rental, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of
copyrighted films of MPAA without its written authority or its members.
Knowing that defendant Sunshine Home Video and its proprietor, Mr. Danilo
Pelindario, were not authorized by MPAA to reproduce, lease, and possess
for the purpose of selling any of its copyrighted motion pictures, instructed
his researcher, Mr. Rene Baltazar to rent two video cassettes from said
defendants on October 21, 1987. Rene C. Baltazar proceeded to Sunshine
Home Video and rented tapes containing Little Shop of Horror. He was
issued rental slip No. 26362 dated October 21, 1987 for P10.00 with a
deposit of P100.00. Again, on December 11, 1987, the returned to Sunshine
Home Video and rented Robocop with rental slip No. 25271 also for P10.00:
On the basis of the complaint of MPAA thru counsel, Atty. Lauro C. Reyes
personally went to Sunshine Home Video at No. 6 Mayfair Center,
Magallanes Commercial Center, Makati. His last visit was on December 7,
1987. There, he found the video outlet renting, leasing, distributing video
cassette tapes whose titles were copyrighted and without the authority of
MPAA.
Given these facts, a probable cause exists. . . . 74
The lower court subsequently executed a volte-face, despite its prior detailed and
substantiated findings, by stating in its order of November 22, 1988 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and quashing the search warrant that
. . . The two (2) cases have a common factual milieu; both involve alleged
pirated copyrighted films of private complainants which were found in the
possession or control of the defendants. Hence, the necessity of the
presentation of the master tapes from which the pirated films were allegedly

copied is necessary in the instant case, to establish the existence of

probable cause. 75
Being based solely on an unjustifiable and improper retroactive application of the
master tape requirement generated by 20th Century Fox upon a factual situation
completely different from that in the case at bar, and without anything more, this later
order clearly defies elemental fair play and is a gross reversible error. In fact, this
observation of the Court in La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, et al., supra,
may just as easily apply to the present case:
A review of the grounds invoked . . . in his motion to quash the search
warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate for quashing a
warrant. They are matters of defense which should be ventilated during the
trial on the merits of the case. . . .
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal of the requisite of presentation
of the master tapes in copyright infringement cases, as the prime determinant of
probable cause, is too exacting and impracticable a requirement to be complied with
in a search warrant application which, it must not be overlooked, is only an ancillary
proceeding. Further, on realistic considerations, a strict application of said requirement
militates against the elements of secrecy and speed which underlie covert
investigative and surveillance operations in police enforcement campaigns against all
forms of criminality, considering that the master tapes of a motion picture required to
be presented before the court consists of several reels contained in circular steel
casings which, because of their bulk, will definitely draw attention, unlike diminutive
objects like video tapes which can be easily concealed. 76 With hundreds of titles being
pirated, this onerous and tedious imposition would be multiplied a hundredfold by
judicial fiat, discouraging and preventing legal recourses in foreign jurisdictions.
Given the present international awareness and furor over violations in large scale of
intellectual property rights, calling for transnational sanctions, it bears calling to mind
the Court's admonition also in La Chemise Lacoste, supra, that
. . . . Judges all over the country are well advised to remember that court
processes should not be used as instruments to, unwittingly or otherwise,
aid counterfeiters and intellectual pirates, tie the hands of the law as it seeks
to protect the Filipino consuming public and frustrate executive and
administrative implementation of solemn commitments pursuant to
international conventions and treaties.
III
The amendment to Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49 by Presidential Decree
No. 1987, 77 which should here be publicized judicially, brought about the revision of
its penalty structure and enumerated additional acts considered violative of said
decree on intellectual property, namely, (1) directly or indirectly transferring or causing
to be transferred any sound recording or motion picture or other audio-visual works so
recorded with intent to sell, lease, publicly exhibit or cause to be sold, leased or
publicly exhibited, or to use or cause to be used for profit such articles on which
sounds, motion pictures, or other audio-visual works are so transferred without the
written consent of the owner or his assignee; (2) selling, leasing, distributing,
circulating, publicly exhibiting, or offering for sale, lease, distribution, or possessing for
the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition any of the
abovementioned articles, without the written consent of the owner or his assignee;
and, (3) directly or indirectly offering or making available for a fee, rental, or any other

form of compensation any equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or any material with

the knowledge that such equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or material will be used
by another to reproduce, without the consent of the owner, any phonograph record,
disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which sounds, motion pictures or other audiovisual recordings may be transferred, and which provide distinct bases for criminal
prosecution, being crimes independently punishable under Presidential Decree No.
49, as amended, aside from the act of infringing or aiding or abetting such
infringement under Section 29.
The trial court's finding that private respondents committed acts in blatant
transgression of Presidential Decree No. 49 all the more bolsters its findings of
probable cause, which determination can be reached even in the absence of master
tapes by the judge in the exercise of sound discretion. The executive concern and
resolve expressed in the foregoing amendments to the decree for the protection of
intellectual property rights should be matched by corresponding judicial vigilance and
activism, instead of the apathy of submitting to technicalities in the face of ample
evidence of guilt.
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to
underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a
copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the
copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy,
which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person,
without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do
which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright. 78
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the
pirate, in such cases, did not know what works he was indirectly copying, or did not
know whether or not he was infringing any copyright; he at least knew that what he
was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. In determining the question of
infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an important
consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a
large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of
the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially
and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to
constitute a
piracy. 79 The question of whether there has been an actionable infringement of a
literary, musical, or artistic work in motion pictures, radio or television being one of
fact, 80 it should properly be determined during the trial. That is the stage calling for
conclusive or preponderating evidence, and not the summary proceeding for the
issuance of a search warrant wherein both lower courts erroneously require the
master tapes.
In disregarding private respondent's argument that Search Warrant No. 87-053 is a
general warrant, the lower court observed that "it was worded in a manner that the
enumerated seizable items bear direct relation to the offense of violation of Sec. 56 of
PD 49 as amended. It authorized only the seizur(e) of articles used or intended to be
used in the unlawful sale, lease and other unconcerted acts in violation of PD 49 as
amended. . . . 81
On this point, Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc., et al. vs. Ruiz, et al., 82 instructs and
enlightens:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized
when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will

ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer
may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec 2,
Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). . . . If the articles desired to be seized
have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said
offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in
handy merely to strengthen such evidence. . . .
On private respondents' averment that the search warrant was made applicable to
more than one specific offense on the ground that there are as many offenses of
infringement as there are rights protected and, therefore, to issue one search warrant
for all the movie titles allegedly pirated violates the rule that a search warrant must be
issued only in connection with one specific offense, the lower court said:
. . . . As the face of the search warrant itself indicates, it was issued for
violation of Section 56, PD 49 as amended only. The specifications therein
(in Annex A) merely refer to the titles of the copyrighted motion pictures/films
belonging to private complainants which defendants were in
control/possession for sale, lease, distribution or public exhibition in
contravention of Sec. 56, PD 49 as amended. 83
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search
warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes is not
to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein
issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.
It is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with the registration and
deposit requirements under Presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for invoking
the court's protective mantle in copyright infringement cases. As explained by the
court below:
Defendants-movants contend that PD 49 as amended covers only
producers who have complied with the requirements of deposit and notice
(in other words registration) under Sections 49 and 50 thereof. Absent such
registration, as in this case, there was no right created, hence, no
infringement under PD 49 as amended. This is not well-taken.
As correctly pointed out by private complainants-oppositors, the Department
of Justice has resolved this legal question as far back as December 12,
1978 in its Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos which stated that Sections 26 and 50 do not apply to
cinematographic works and PD No. 49 "had done away with the registration
and deposit of cinematographic works" and that "even without prior
registration and deposit of a work which may be entitled to protection under
the Decree, the creator can file action for infringement of its rights". He
cannot demand, however, payment of damages arising from infringement.
The same opinion stressed that "the requirements of registration and
deposit are thus retained under the Decree, not as conditions for the
acquisition of copyright and other rights, but as prerequisites to a suit for
damages". The statutory interpretation of the Executive Branch being
correct, is entitled (to) weight and respect.

xxx xxx xxx

Defendants-movants maintain that complainant and his witnesses led the
Court to believe that a crime existed when in fact there was none. This is
wrong. As earlier discussed, PD 49 as amended, does not require
registration and deposit for a creator to be able to file an action for
infringement of his rights. These conditions are merely pre-requisites to an
action for damages. So, as long as the proscribed acts are shown to exist,
an action for infringement may be initiated. 84
Accordingly, the certifications 85 from the Copyright Section of the National Library,
presented as evidence by private respondents to show non-registration of some of the
films of petitioners, assume no evidentiary weight or significance whatsoever.
Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential Decree No. 49 reveals that even with
respect to works which are required under Section 26 thereof to be registered and
with copies to deposited with the National Library, such as books, including composite
and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories and gazetteers; and periodicals,
including pamphlets and newspapers; lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations
prepared for oral delivery; and letters, the failure to comply with said requirements
does not deprive the copyright owner of the right to sue for infringement. Such noncompliance merely limits the remedies available to him and subjects him to the
corresponding sanction.
The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the decree which prefaces its
enumeration of copyrightable works with the explicit statement that "the rights granted
under this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of
the following classes of works." This means that under the present state of the law, the
copyright for a work is acquired by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation
even in the absence of registration and deposit. As has been authoritatively clarified:
The registration and deposit of two complete copies or reproductions of the
work with the National Library within three weeks after the first public
dissemination or performance of the work, as provided for in Section 26
(P.D. No. 49, as amended), is not for the purpose of securing a copyright of
the work, but rather to avoid the penalty for non-compliance of the deposit
of said two copies and in order to recover damages in an infringement
suit. 86
One distressing observation. This case has been fought on the basis of, and its
resolution long delayed by resort to, technicalities to a virtually abusive extent by
private respondents, without so much as an attempt to adduce any credible evidence
showing that they conduct their business legitimately and fairly. The fact that private
respondents could not show proof of their authority or that there was consent from the
copyright owners for them to sell, lease, distribute or circulate petitioners' copyrighted
films immeasurably bolsters the lower court's initial finding of probable cause. That
private respondents are licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board does not
insulate them from criminal and civil liability for their unlawful business practices. What
is more deplorable is that the reprehensible acts of some unscrupulous characters
have stigmatized the Philippines with an unsavory reputation as a hub for intellectual
piracy in this part of the globe, formerly in the records of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and, now, of the World Trade Organization. Such acts must not be
glossed over but should be denounced and repressed lest the Philippines become an
international pariah in the global intellectual community.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals,

and necessarily inclusive of the order of the lower court dated November 22, 1988,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the court a quo of September
5, 1988 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-053 is hereby REINSTATED,
and said court is DIRECTED to take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate
proceedings as may be called for in this case. Treble costs are further assessed
against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the
privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to
the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own
castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he
could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number,
regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must
cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence shag be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and
order require otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure
conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as
evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be
temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.

G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986

JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF
MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE, respondents.

CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the
Constitution. As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law,
we do annul.

The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The
petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt
Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of
the charge against the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the
judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched
and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. 5
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable
cause must refer to only one specific offense. 7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate

Vicente J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of
the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition did not
appear in the corresponding provision of the federa Constitution of the United States which
served as our model it was then already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that
body, readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by
the Convention. 8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The municipal or city judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions
in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with
the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of the
complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say,
however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his
application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in
the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida,
both of whom likewise presented to me their respective affidavits taken by
Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command
at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed and
sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof
to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same.
Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before me. 10
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only
"to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because "the
application was not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion is that he would not have
asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to
him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents
of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the
record, together with the affidavit presented to him.
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant
and the witnesses he niay produce and attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it wifl be found later that his
declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the

depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's
deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had
already been taken by the undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of
mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a
prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application,
standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore
necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the
apphcant's claims. 14
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and
not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or proforma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not
simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both
claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of
their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the
questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by
Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition
candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own
suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted
him to possible misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw
eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was supposedly
done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the house while he
was near the gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliber pistols
and two were.38 caliber revolvers. 19
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could
be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether
it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts
related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts
were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously
omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant
sought was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the
Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who
practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible
challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed

presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no
choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case, 21 the manifestation merely of
our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of
the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not
resist.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the
quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal
procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take
cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised. 28

The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized
from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military
authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of
P.D. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could be taken even
without a warrant.

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is
hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985,
is made permanent. No costs.

Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto
was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's
premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se.Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may
not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and
looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search
warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the
necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of
possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant
and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search
may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when the person being arrested is frished for
weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be
inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior
upon a showing of probable cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the
operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's
jurisdiction. 25The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an
illegal search. 26 And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if
they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. 27
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The
respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that
these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence,
the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the
petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the
exclusionary principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973
Constitution. While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed
to go free because "the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the
exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction" against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in
case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "
The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the
criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case,
however, the said articles must remain incustodia legis.

SO ORDERED.

The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of
gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter
them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the situation
aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in
a number of casualties. 2
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were
arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The
military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and
several rounds of ammunition found in the premises. 3
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover
the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and
to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right
against self-incrimination. 4
The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the return of the articles
alleged to have been illegally seized, referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the
regional trial court, Zamboanga City. 5After receiving the testimonial and documentary evidence
of the parties, he submitted the report and recommendations on which this opinion is based. 6
The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were
taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said
report and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance. 7
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the incident in
question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) thatRIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO ET AL., respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and
elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov.
Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. 1
The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was not unlike the
feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a
locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright
(although the last part is not included in the modern refinement).

Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify
their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders. 8 There was also the
suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order
problem generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. 9
Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact
that the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the
constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. As eloquently affirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan: 10

The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace,
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times
and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not
excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the
repressions committed therein against the petitioners.
It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the arbitrary treatment they
received to take them into custody; but that is a criminal argument. It is also fallacious. Its
obvious flaw lies in the conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the strength
alone of unsubstantiated reports that they were stockpiling weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice.
At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact
even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as
summarily pronounced by the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not
have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent
and the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it does
simply signify is that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the
Constitution, to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment.
Every person is entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged
against the rest of the people who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a
majority of one.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made their illegal raid, they
certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is truly regrettable for it was incumbent on
them, especially during those tense and tindery times, to encourage rather than undermine
respect for the law, which it was their duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme
over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the
respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or
not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to
make the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the
petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent.
They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant
before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be
spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive
measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes
required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's
premises with all the menace of a military invasion.
Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be
nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law
enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything

they see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well
delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN civil
courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged into the
beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just force his
way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed,
even the humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered
in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may enter.
But the King of England may not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 13
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a
crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is
no allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under
the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge
of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. 14
If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the
firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of
the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. 15 As
Judge Learned Hand observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. 16 Pending
determination of the legality of such articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject
to such appropriate disposition as the corresponding courts may decide. 17
The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners deserves
slight comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only.
As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material."
The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded operations should remain in
the past, banished with the secret marshals and their covert license to kill without trial. We must
be done with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those who are supposed to uphold
the law must not be the first to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his
concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, 19 "It is time that the martial law regime's legacy of
the law of force be discarded and that there be a return to the force and rule of law."
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and democratic, where every individual
is entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid
sentinel for all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby
declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence
against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia
legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the
respondent Judge against Benjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb.
Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay,
another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the
said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search
warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and
investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential, information they received
that the said places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and "chop-chop"
vehicles. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in anticipation of criminal
cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho.
On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants
and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and
90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, armed with Search Warrant Nos. 90-11 and 90-12, NBI
agents searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they recovered various highpowered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Meanwhile, another search was
conducted at the house at No. 326 McDivitt St. Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque, by another team of
NBI agents using Search Warrant Nos. 90-13, 90-14 and 90-15. The said second search yielded
several high-powered firearms will explosives and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition.
The simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio and
telecommunication equipment, two units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace vans) and one motorcycle.
Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, the NBI agents found
out that no license has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in
question. Likewise, the radio agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any
person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question. Likewise, the radio transceivers
recovered and motor vehicles seized turned out to be unlicensed and unregistered per records
of the government agencies concerned.
On May 22, 1990, the raiding teams submitted separate returns to the respondent Judge
requesting that the items seized be in the continued custody of the NBI (Annexes "O", "P", and
"Q", Petition).
G.R. No. 94902-0 April 21, 1999
BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, respondents.

On May 28, 1990, the petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said Search Warrants,
contending that:
1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause:
2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being general warrants;

PURISIMA, J
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Order, dated July 26, 1990, of Branch LXXVII of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque, which denied petitioners' Motion to Quash Search
Warrants emanating from the same Court. Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any
case or cases filed or to be filed against them and to return immediately the said items, including
the firearms, ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets,
transceivers, two units of vehicles and motorcycle.

3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements set forth by
the Constitution;
4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the Revised Rules of Court; and
5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued.
On July 26, 1990, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order denying the said Motion To
Quash interposed by petitioners.

Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of
any probable cause therefor. They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by
NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under
controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the
surveillance and investigation testified unequivocally that they saw guns being carried to and
unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein.
In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance together
with his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witness personally saw the
weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to. NBI Agent
Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van
and brought to the aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside
the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore
decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was based on the
personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the question of
whether or not a probable cause exists is one which must be determined in light of the
conditions obtaining given situations. In Luna v. Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence
of a probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who
conducted the required examination of the applicants and the witnesses.
After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions
arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent
judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the
one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching
questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and
determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the
surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of
any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal
examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the
reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.
Petitioners brand as fatally defective and deficient the procedure followed in the issuance of
subject search warrants, reasoning out that the same did not comply with constitutional and
statutory requirements. They fault respondent Judge for allegedly failing to ask specific
questions they deem particularly important during the examination of the applicants and their
witnesses. To buttress their submission, petitioners invite attention to the following question, to
wit:
"How did you know that there are unlicensed firearms being kept by Benjamin Kho at No. 45 Bb.
Ramona Tirona St., Phase I, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila?" (TSN, Ali Vargas, May 15,
1990, p. 4).
Petitioners argue that by propounding the aforequoted question, the respondent Judge assumed
that the firearms at the premises to be searched were unlicensed, instead of asking for a
detailed account of how the NBI agents came to know that the firearms being kept thereat were
unlicensed.
This stance of petitioners is similarly devoid of any sustainable basis. Nothing improper is
perceived in the manner the respondent Judge conducted the examination of subject applicants
for search warrants and their witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked

them searching questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in
compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn
statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent records
of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining Judge to determine what
questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of
inquiry the existence or absence of a probable cause.
Petitioners claim that subject search warrants are general warrants prescribed by the
Constitution. According to them, the things to be seized were not described and detailed out, i.e.
the firearms listed were not classified as to size or make, etc.
Records on hand indicate that the search warrants under scrutiny specifically describe the items
to be seized thus:
Search Warrant No. 90- 11.
Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as
transmitters, transceivers, handsets, scanners,
monitoring device and the like.
Search Warrant No, 90-13.
Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as
transmitters, transceivers, handsets, radio
communications equipments, scanners, monitoring
devices and others.
The use of the phrase "and the like" is of no moment. The same did not make the search
warrants in question general warrants. In Oca v. Maiquez (14 SCRA 735), the Court upheld the
warrant although it described the things to be seized as "books of accounts and allied papers."
Subject Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to:
Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and
ammunitions for the said firearms.
Search Warrant No. 90-14 states:
Chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts.
The Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory
requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise
and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities.
Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would
not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since the element of time is very
crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in researching on the details to be embodied
in the warrant would render the purpose of the search nugatory.
In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could not have been in a position to know
before hand the exact caliber or make of the firearms to be seized. Although the surveillance
they conducted did disclose the presence of unlicensed firearms within the premises to be

searched, they could not have known the particular type of weapons involved before seeing
such weapons at close range, which was of course impossible at the time of the filing of the
applications for subject search warrants.

with a piece of cloth, his hands were tied behind his back and he was made
to lie face down.
4. Defendant Kho's hands were immediately tied behind his back (initially
with a rag and later with the electric cord of a rechargeable lamp) and was
restrained in a kneeling position with guns pointed at him throughout the
duration of the search. It was only after the search was completed and the
seized items stuffed in carton boxes (and a T-bag) that his hands were
untied so he can sign the search warrants which he was forced to do.

Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants did not render the same
general. Retired Justice Ricardo Francisco's book on Criminal Procedure has this useful insight:
A description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate
nor necessarily precise; and its nature will necessarily vary according to
whether the identity of the property, or its character, is the matter of concern.
Further, the description is required to be specific only so for as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow. . . .
In People v. Rubio (57 Phil 384), the Court held that, ". . . But where, by the nature of the goods
to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical
description be given, for this would mean that no warrant could issue."
It is indeed understandable that the agents of respondent Bureau have no way of knowing
whether the guns they intend to seize are a Smith and Wesson or a Beretta. The surveillance
conducted could not give the NBI agents a close view of the weapons being transported or
brought to the premises to be searched. Thus, they could not be expected to know the detailed
particulars of the objects to be seized. Consequently, the list submitted in the applications for
subject search warrants should be adjudged in substantial compliance with the requirements of
law.
Petitioners contend that the searching agents grossly violated the procedure in enforcing the
search warrants in question. The petition avers supposedly reprehensible acts perpetrated by
the NBI agents. Among the irregularities alluded to, are:
1. The raiding team failed to perform the following before breaking into the
premises:

5. All throughout the search, defendant Kho and his companions were kept
in the dining room and continuously intimidated of being shot while the
raiders search all the rooms all by themselves and without anybody seeing
whatever they were doing.
The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcerment of the challanged search warrants
is not within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the
validity of the issuance of the warrant. The manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the
search are not an issue to be resolved here. As aptly opined and ruled by the respondent Judge,
petitioners have remedies under pertinent penal, civil and administrative laws for their problem
at hand, which cannot be solved by their present motion to quash.
According to petitioner Kho, the premises searched and objects seized during the search sued
upon belong to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of which he is an
agent and therefore, the NBI agents involved had no authority to search the aforesaid premises
and to confiscate the objects seized.
Whether the places searched and objects seized are government properties are questions of
fact outside the scope of the petition under consideration. The Court does not see its way clear
to rule on such issues lest it preempts the disposition of the cases filed by the respondent NBI
against the herein petitioners.

a. Properly identify themselves and

showing necessary credentials
including presentation of the
Search Warrants;

Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives and Violation of
Section 3 in relation to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the AntiCarnapping Act of 1972, have been instituted against the petitioners, the petition for mandamus
with preliminary and mandatory injunction to return all objects seized and to restrain respondent
NBI from using the said objects as evidence, has become moot and academic.

b. Furnishing of Search Warrants

and allowing the occupants of the
place to scrutinize the same;

WHEREFORE, or want of merit and on the ground that it has become moot and academic, the
petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.1wphi1.nt

c. Giving ample time to the

occupants to voluntarily allow the
raiders entry into the place and to
search the premises.
2. The team entered the premises by climbing the fence and by forcing open
the main door of the house.
3. Once inside the house, the raiders herded the maids and the sixteen
year-old son of defendant Kho into the dining room where they were
confined for the duration of the raid. In the case of the son, he was gagged

SO ORDERED.