G.R. No.

101630 August 24, 1992

VICTOR DE JESUS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EDDIE R. ROJAS, MTCC, Br. II, General Santos City, CITY PROSECUTOR FRANKLIN GACAL and
SALUSTIANO SONIDO, respondents.
Vicente Collantes for petitioner.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Victor de Jesus, then Director and Finance Officer of Southern Island Colleges, together with his octogenarian stepmother,
Eugenia de Jesus, who was then the Directress-Chairman of the Board of Directors, was charged with violation of Section 28 (h) of the
Social Security Law for failure to remit the SSS loan amortizations of private respondent Salustiano Sonido, an employee, in the amount; of
P583.35 covering the period from January to August 1988. The Information, signed by Third Assistant City Prosecutor Andres Lorenzo, Jr.,
was filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. II, General Santos City, docketed as Crim. Case No. 16886-2, presided by respondent
Judge Eddie R. Rojas.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground that (a) the City Prosecutor was not authorized to file the Information in the
absence of prior authority from the SSS; (b) the SSS and not the MTCC has jurisdiction over the case; (c) the criminal action has been
extinguished by the sale of his shares in the school before the complaint for estafa was filed against him and his stepmother; and, (d)
damage as an element of estafa was not present in view of Sec. 22 (b) of the Social Security Law which guarantees enjoyment of SSS
benefits by the employee notwithstanding failure of his employer to remit deductions.
On 27 February 1991, respondent Judge denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.

Petitioner challenged before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus the Order of respondent Judge denying his motion to quash.
On 31 July 1991, the appellate court dismissed the petition holding
thus
We refrain from any discussion on the merits of this case since it involves an Order of a
Municipal Trial Court whose decisions are not directly reviewable by this Court. . . . The
instant petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, the proper and
competent tribunal. 2
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by respondent Court of Appeals on 28 August 1991,
petitioner now comes to Us seeking inter alia to set aside the resolutions dismissing his petition.
Outright, We discern a procedural misconception by the Court of Appeals of its jurisdiction over matters
brought to it by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus from Municipal Trial Courts.
Obviously, it is error to hold that decisions of Municipal Trial Courts are not directly reviewable by the
Court of Appeals, and that such petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court being "the
proper and competent tribunal."
Under Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of Supreme Court 3 and with the Regional Trial Courts, for writs
enforceable within their respective regions. 4
Indeed, the refusal of the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of the petition would have been proper
prior to the effectivity of B.P. 129 5 when the writ of certiorari was available in the appellate court only in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As explained in Breslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co. 6

A writ of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari against a lower court is said to be in aid of

the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals within the meaning of section 30 of
Republic Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, and the corresponding
provision of the former Organic Act of the Court of Appeals, if the latter has jurisdiction to
review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the former, and said writs
are issued by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its supervisory power or jurisdiction
over the wrongful acts or omissions of the lower court that are not appealable. But if the
Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction it could not issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition or certiorari in aid of an appellate jurisdiction which it does not have . . .
Perforce, the Resolution of 31 July and 28 August 1991 must be reversed for want of basis in law.
While We are not unaware of the practice of the Court of Appeals of remanding to the proper Regional
Trial Court for appropriate disposition petitions of this nature, yet, this is done only when there is no
cogent reason advanced why the appellate court should hear the case. Plainly, therefore, respondent
Court of Appeals could still have transmitted the petition to the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City not because the former has no jurisdiction but more of convenience and propriety as the latter court
exercises administrative supervision over the Municipal Trial Court as the next higher tribunal in the
judicial hierarchy, instead of the Court of Appeals. Indeed, such established practice is not without basis.
For, in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, 7 penned by Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa (then Associate Justice), this
Court discussed quite extensively the concurrent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Court over judgments and orders of Municipal Courts
We turn now to the second question posed . . . as to the propriety of a direct resort to this
Court for the remedy of mandamus or other extraordinary writ against a municipal court,
instead of an attempt to initially obtain that relief from the Regional Trial Court of the
district or the Court of Appeals, both of which tribunals share this Court's jurisdiction to
issue the writ. As a matter of policy such a direct recourse to this Court should not be
allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with
causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary
writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or
other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is
and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe.
Ordinarily, the next step would be to remand this case to the Court of Appeals to resolve the propriety of
the denial of petitioner's motion to quash. But this is no longer necessary. Since the records are with Us,
We are now in a position to settle the issue with dispatch. Consequently, We opt to meet the issue right
here if only to obviate further delay in this seemingly uncomplicated case.
On the first ground raised by petitioner, Sec. 28 (i) of the Social Security Law provides:
(i) Criminal action arising from a violation of the provisions of this Act may be commenced
by the SSS or the employee concerned either under this Act or in appropriate cases
under the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That such criminal action may be filed by the
SSS in the city or municipality where the SSS provincial or regional office is located if the
violation was committed within its territorial jurisdiction or in Metro Manila, at the option of
the SSS. 8

Clearly, prior consent of the Social Security System (SSS) is not essential before an employee can commence a criminal action arising from
a violation of the Social Security Law. In other words, whether under the Social Security Law or "in appropriate cases under the Revised
Penal Code," the employee can institute criminal suits independently of the SSS.
On the second ground, petitioner submits that it is the SSS and not the regular courts which is empowered to prosecute the alleged estafa
pursuant to Sec. 5 of the Social Security Law. This is untenable. Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits,
contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission, and
any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly
authorized by the Commission and decided within twenty days after the submission of the evidence. The filing,
determination and settlement of dispute shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the
9
Commission.

The foregoing defines the "dispute" falling within the coverage of the Social Security Law and lays down
the procedure to be followed by the SSS in any case filed before it with respect to such "dispute."
Definitely, prosecution of criminal offenses is not alluded to above, as this will require further legislation to
clothe the SSS with the necessary jurisdiction. Consequently, the SSS is not vested with legal
competence to adjudicate criminal complaints and must necessarily seek recourse in the regular courts
for the prosecution of criminal actions arising from violations of the Revised Penal Code and the Social
Security Law. 10
On the third ground, it must be stressed that criminal liability is personal to the offender and cannot be
transferred to another by contract. Criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of
the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. The time
of filing of the criminal complaint is material only for determining prescription. Consequently, petitioner's
reported transfer of his shares in the Southern Island Colleges to Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Colleges
did not extinguish his criminal liability nor transfer the same to his vendee or assignee.
On the fourth ground, the argument that there is no estafa for want of damage since the employee's
entitlement to SSS benefits is not impaired by his employer's neglect to remit loan payments from his
compensation is likewise untenable. It must be noted that petitioner was charged in connection with Sec.
28 (h) of the Social Security Law which states:
(h) Any employer who, after deducting the monthly contributions or loan amortizations
from his employee's compensation, fails to remit the said deductions to the SSS within
thirty days from the date they became due shall be presumed to have misappropriated
such contributions or loan amortizations and shall suffer the penalties provided in Article
Three Hundred Fifteen of the Revised Penal Code, 11
and not under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which is material only in determining the
penalty to be imposed.
Section 28 (h) speaks of two elements which must concur: (1) the employer deducts monthly
contributions or loan amortizations from his employee's compensation, and (2) said employer fails to remit
said deductions to the SSS within 30 days from the date they fall due, after which the employer is ipso
facto presumed to have misappropriated such contributions or amortizations of the employee and
accordingly penalized under Art. 315 of the Penal Code. Plainly, damage is not an element in the act
punished under Sec. 28 (h) as differentiated from the ordinary estafa wherein deceit and damage are
considered essential elements.
Other arguments advanced by petitioner which were not contained in his motion to quash may not be
passed upon in this extraordinary petition, for no abuse of discretion may be ascribed to respondent
Judge when he was not provided with the opportunity to rule thereon.

WHEREFORE, as regards the Resolutions of 31 July and 28 August 1991 of respondent Court of
Appeals, the same are SET ASIDE. However, with respect to the Order of 27 February 1991 of
respondent Judge, the writ prayed for is denied and the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, hereby
AFFIRMING his Order denying petitioner's motion to quash. Consequently, respondent Judge is directed
to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 16886-2 pending before his court.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Petition, Annex "F-1." Rollo, p. 58.
2 Rollo, p. 34.
3 Sec. 5 [1], Art. VIII, Constitution.
4 Sec. 21, B.P. 129.
5 January 17, 1983, E.O. No. 864.
6 84 Phil. 618, 622-623 (1949).
7 G.R. No. 74766, December 21, 1987; 156 SCRA 753.
8 As amended by Sec. 15, P.D. 24, S-1972, Sec. 19, P.D. 735, S-1975, and Sec. 13, P.D.
1202, S-1977.
9 As amended by Sec. 3, R.A. 2658; Sec. 2, R.A. 4857, and Sec. 3, P.D. 735,
S-1975.
10 Sec. 28 (i), R.A. 1161, as amended.
11 As amended by Sec. 15, P.D. 24, S-1972.

ROMARICO J. MENDOZA,

G.R. No. 183891

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

- versus -

Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE
OF
PHILIPPINES,

THE
Promulgated:
Respondent.
August 3, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

For failure to remit the Social Security System (SSS) premium contributions
of employees of the Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc. (SATII) of which he was
president, Romarico J. Mendoza (petitioner) was convicted of violation of Section
22(a) and (d) vis--vis Section 28 of R.A. No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of
*

1997 by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 4. His conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.1[1]

The Information against petitioner2[2] reads:

xxxx
That sometime during the month of August 1998 to July 1999, in the City
of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then the proprietor of Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc.,
duly registered employer with the Social Security System (SSS), did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and/or refuse to remit the SSS
premium contributions in favor of its employees amounting to P421, 151.09 to the
prejudice of his employees.
Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 22(a) and (d) in relation to Sec. 28 of
Republic Act No. 8282, as amended (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The monthly premium contributions of SATII employees to SSS which

petitioner admittedly failed to remit covered the period August 1998 to July
19993[3] amounting to P421,151.09 inclusive of penalties.4[4]

1
2
3
4

After petitioner was advised by the SSS to pay the above-said amount, he
proposed to settle it over a period of 18 months 5[5] which proposal the SSS
approved by Memorandum of September 12, 2000.6[6]

Despite the grant of petitioners request for several extensions of time to

settle the delinquency in installments,7[7] petitioner failed, hence, his indictment.

Petitioner sought to exculpate himself by explaining that during the

questioned period, SATII shut down due to the general decline in the economy.8[8]

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, as reflected above, convicted
petitioner, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Romarico J.

Mendoza, guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, he is
hereby meted the penalty of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years.
The accused is further ordered to pay the Social Security System the
unpaid premium contributions of his employees including the penalties in the sum
of P421, 151.09.

5
6
7
8

SO ORDERED. 9[9] (emphasis supplied)

And as also reflected above, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision, by Decision of July March 5, 2007,10[10] it noting that the Social Security
Act is a special law, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith is not a defense in
the commission of the proscribed act.

The appellate court brushed aside petitioners claim that he is merely a

conduit of SATII and, therefore, should not be held personally liable for its
liabilities. It held that petitioner, as President, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of SATII, is the managing head who is liable for the act or omission
penalized under Section 28(f) of the Social Security Act.

Petitioner contended in his motion for reconsideration that Section 28(f) of

the Act which reads:

(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association,

partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or
partners shall be liable for the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.

should be interpreted as follows:

9
10

If an association, the one liable is the managing head; if a partnership, the

ones liable are the partners; and if a corporation, the ones liable are the directors.
(underscoring supplied)

The appellate court denied petitioners motion, hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari.

Petitioner maintains, inter alia, that the managing head or president or

general manager of a corporation is not among those specifically mentioned as
liable in the above-quoted Section 28(f). And he calls attention to an alleged
congenital infirmity in the Information 11[11] in that he was charged as proprietor
and not as director of SATII.

Further, petitioner claims that the lower courts erred in penalizing him with
six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment considering the mitigating
and alternative circumstances present, namely: his being merely vicariously liable;
his good faith in failing to remit the contributions; his payment of the premium
contributions of SATII out of his personal funds; and his being economically
useful, given his academic credentials, he having graduated from a prime
university in Manila and being a reputable businessman.

The petition lacks merit.

11

Remittance of contribution to the SSS under Section 22(a) of the Social

Security Act is mandatory. United Christian Missionary Society v. Social Security
Commission12[12] explicitly explains:

No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission in the enforcement

of the laws mandate that the employer who fails to comply with his legal
obligation to remit the premiums to the System within the prescribed period
shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. The prescribed penalty is
evidently of a punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that
employers do not take lightly the States exercise of the police power in the
implementation of the Republics declared policy to develop, establish gradually
and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the
people throughout the Philippines and (to) provide protection to employers
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death.[Section 2, Social
Security Act; Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Social Security Commission, 1
SCRA 10, January 20, 1961] In this concept, good faith or bad faith is
rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no distinction between an employer
who professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and another
who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make such
remittance. From the moment the remittance of premiums due is delayed, the
penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium payments by force of
law. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Failure to comply with the law being malum prohibitum, intent to commit it
or good faith is immaterial.13[13]

12
13

The provision of the law being clear and unambiguous, petitioners

interpretation that a proprietor, as he was designated in the Information, is not
among those specifically mentioned under Sec. 28(f) as liable, does not lie. For the
word connotes management, control and power over a business entity.14[14] There
is thus, as Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection enjoins,15
[15]

. . . no need to resort to statutory construction [for] Section 28(f) of the Social

Security Law imposes penalty on:
(1) the managing head;
(2) directors; or

(3) partners, for offenses committed by a juridical person. (emphasis supplied)

The term managing head in Section 28(f) is used, in its broadest connotation, not
to any specific organizational or managerial nomenclature. To heed petitioners
reasoning would allow unscrupulous businessmen to conveniently escape liability
by the creative adoption of managerial titles.

While the Court affirms the appellate courts decision, there is a need to
modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. The appellate court affirmed the trial
14
15

courts imposition of penalty on the basis of Sec. 28(e) of the Social Security Act
which reads:

Sec. 28. Penal Clause. (e) Whoever fails or refuses to comply with the
provisions of this Act or with the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission, shall be punished by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,0000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), or imprisonment for not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day nor more than twelve (12) years or both, at the discretion of
the court. x x x

The proper penalty for this specific offense committed by petitioner is, however,
provided in Section 28 (h) of the same Act which reads:

Sec. 28. Penal Clause (h) Any employer who after deducting the
monthly contributions or loan amortizations from his employees compensation,
fails to remit the said deductions to the SSS within thirty (30) days from the date
they became due shall be presumed to have misappropriated such contributions or
loan amortizations and shall suffer the penalties provided in Article Three
hundred fifteen [Art. 315] of the Revised Penal Code. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty in this case
should be

x x x prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its

minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be;
x x x x.

Since the above-quoted Sec. 28 (h) of the Social Security Act

(a

special law) adopted the penalty from the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law also finds application.16[16]

Taking into account the misappropriated P421,151.09 and the Courts

discourse in People v. Gabres17[17] on the proper imposition of the indeterminate
penalty in Article 315, the appropriate penalty in this case should range from four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR No. 27630 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of

16
17

prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as

maximum.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.