Kants Critical Account of Freedom

Reath, Andrews (Edited by Graham Bird), A Companion to Kant

Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006

Freedom and Moral Law

Andrew Reaths claim in Kants Critical Account of Freedom comes simply

stated: freedom and moral law mutually imply each other. For this, Reath cited two
supporting arguments; to wit, (1) If an agent is subject to the moral law, that agent is
transcendentally free; (2) If an agent is transcendentally free, that agent is subject to
the moral law. According to Reath, the warrant for ascribing free will is our
consciousness of the authority of the moral law. But before presenting his claim, Reath
made a careful analysis of Kants Account of Freedom then discussed about
transcendental freedom and practical freedom based on Kants Second Critique.
Furthermore, he presented the possibility of free will according to Kants first critique.
He concluded with the assertion of the reality of the freedom.
Reath asserted that it is necessary to look into distinction between phenomena
and noumena. As stated, he treated phenomenal and the noumenal as two different
standpoints that we adopt toward action in different contexts. Thus, the distinction
between phenomena and noumena signifies the prospect of viewing human actions from
two different standpoints. As phenomena, human actions are caused by the empirical
laws which means it follows from temporally prior conditions; as noumena, human
actions guided by choice, in which one has the capacity to initiate an action that is not
governed by empirical laws. Reath endorses the intelligible character of human actions,
which is the noumena, as a ground for the reality of freedom of the will; human actions
with intelligible character shows that we can be motivated to act by principles of
reason; that the rational activity is guided by normative principles, which are
essentially different in kind from empirical laws that determine how events follow from
temporally prior conditions. Consequently, Reath presented Kants Groundwork that
demonstrates a conceptual connection between the moral law as a principle of reason
and free will; argues from the possession of theoretical reason to the existence of free
will, and from there the authority of the law. An agent acting based on her reasons on

the fact that it is required as a moral law, then the agent acts independently on
determination by empirical conditions. According to Reath, by establishing that we are
subject to and can act from moral law, the fact of reason establishes that we are free.
Therefore, moral law implies freedom of the will.
In conclusion, as Kant stresses, reality of freedom of the will is not an object to
theoretical knowledge. Kant has not given theoretical proof that we are free, nor is free
will given in intuition. Rather the warrant for ascribing assertion that we have free will
is our consciousness of the authority of the moral law [p.290].
Andrews Reaths article Kants Critical Account of Freedom is a vivid and
substantial work regarding the idea of Kant on freedom. However, one may find difficult
time reading since it seems prerequisite to have a background on Kant or the author
must have been more straightforward with the explanations. Overall it is a good, wellwritten article with a well-supported claim on the reality of freedom of the will based on
Kants account.