UNITEDAIRLINESvs.

UY
G.R.No.127768,November19,1999
Facts: OnOctober13,1989, respondent,a passenger ofUnitedAirlines,checkedintogetherwithhis
luggageonepieceofwhichwasfoundtobeoverweightattheairlinecounter.Tohisutterhumiliation,an
employeeofpetitionerrebukedhimsayingthatheshouldhaveknownthemaximumweightallowanceper
bagandthatheshouldhavepackedhisthingsaccordingly.Then,inaloudvoiceinfrontofthemilling
crowd,shetoldrespondenttorepairhisthingsandtransfersomeofthemtothelightones.Respondent
accededbuthisluggagewasstilloverweight.Petitionerbilledhimoverweightchargesbutitsemployee
reusedtohonorthemiscellaneouschargesunderMCDwhichheofferedtopaywith.Notwantingtoleave
withouthisluggage,hepaidwithhiscreditcard.Uponarrivalinmanila,hediscoveredthatoneofhisbags
hadbeenslashedanditscontentsstolen.InaletterdatedOctober16,1989,henotifiedpetitionerofhisloss
and requested reimbursement. Petitioner paid for his loss based on the maximum liability per pound.
Respondentconsideredtheamountgrosslyinadequate.Hesenttwomoreletterstopetitionbuttonoavail.
OnJune9,1992,respondentfiledacomplaintfordamagesagainstpetitionerAirline.Petitionermovedto
dismiss the complaint invoking the provisions of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention. Respondent
counteredthataccordingtopar.2ofArticle29,themethodofcalculatingtheperiodoflimitationshallbe
determinedbythelawofthecourttowhichthecaseissubmitted.
Issues:
1)DoestheWarsawConventionprecludetheoperationoftheCivilCodeandotherpertinentlaws?
2)Hastherespondentscauseofactionprescribed?
Held:1)No.WithinourjurisdictionwehaveheldthattheWarsawConventioncanbeapplied,orignored,
dependingonthepeculiarfactspresentedbyeachcase.Conventionprovisionsdonotregulateorexclude
liabilitiesforotherbreachesofcontractbythecarrierormisconductofitsofficersandemployees,orfor
someparticularorexceptionaltypeofdamage.NeithermaytheConventionbeinvokedtojustifythe
disregardofsomeextraordinarytypeofdamage.NeithermaytheConventionbeinvokedtojustifythe
disregardofsomeextraordinarysortofdamageresultingtoapassengerandprecluderecoverytherefore3
beyondthelimitsetbysaidconvention.Likewise,wehaveheldthattheConventiondoesnotprecludethe
operationoftheCivilCodeandotherpertinentlaws.Itdoesnotregulate,muchlessexempt,thecarrier
fromliabilityfordamagesforviolatingtherightsofitspassengersunderthecontractofcarriage,especially
ifwillfulmisconductonthepartofthecarriersemployeesisfoundorestablished.
2)No.Whilehis2ndcauseofaction(anactionfordamagesarisingfromtheftordamagetopropertyor
goods)iswellwithintheboundsoftheWarsawconvention,his1stcauseofaction(anactionfordamages
arisingfromthemisconductoftheairlineemployeesandtheviolationofrespondentsrightsaspassengers)
clearlyisnot.
The2yrlimitationincorporatedinArt.29oftheWarsawConventionasanabsolutebartosuitandnotto
bemadesubjecttothevarioustollingprovisionsofthelawsoftheforum,foreclosestheapplicationofour
ownrulesoninterruptionof prescriptive periods.(Art.29,par.2wasindentedonlytoletlocal laws
determinewhetheranactionshallbedeemedcommenceduponthefilingofacomplaint.)Since,itis
indisputablethatrespondentfiledthepresentactionbeyondthe2yrtimeframehis2ndcauseofaction
mustbebarred.
However,itisobviousthatrespondentwasforestalledfromimmediatelyfilinganactionbecausepetitioner
gavehimtherunaround,answeringhislettersbutnotgivingintohisdemands.True,respondentshould
havealreadyfiledanactionatthefirstinstancewhenpetitionerdeniedhisclaimsbutthesamecouldonly
beduetohisdesiretomakeanoutofcourtsettlementforwhichhecannotbefaulted.Hence,despitethe

expressmandateofArticle29oftheWarsawConventionthatanactionfordamagesshouldbefiledwithin
2yearsfromthearrivalattheplaceofdestination,suchruleshallnotbeappliedintheinstantcasebecause
ofthedelayingtacticsemployedbypetitionerairlinesitself.Thus,respondents2ndcauseofactioncannot
beconsideredastimebarred.

UnitedAirlinesvs.Uy
G.R.No.127768,Nov.19,1999
INTERNATIONALLAW:ApplicabilityoftheWarsawConvention:theConvention'sprovisionsdonot
regulateorexcludeliabilityforotherbreachesofcontractbythecarrierormisconductofits officersand
employees,orforsomeparticularorexceptionaltypeofdamage.NeithermaytheConventionbeinvoked
tojustifythedisregardofsomeextraordinarysortofdamageresultingtoapassengerandprecluderecovery
thereforbeyondthelimitssetbysaidConvention.Likewise,wehaveheldthattheConventiondoesnot
precludetheoperationoftheCivilCodeandotherpertinentlaws.Itdoesnotregulate,muchlessexempt,
thecarrierfromliabilityfordamagesforviolatingtherightsofitspassengersunderthecontractofcarriage,
especiallyifwillfulmisconductonthepartofthecarrier'semployeesisfoundorestablished
FACTS:
October13,1989RespondentWillieUyisapassengerofpetitionerUnitedAirlines,boundfromSan
FranciscotoManila.WhileinSanFrancisco,itwasfoundthatonepieceofhisluggagewasoverthe
maximumweightallowanceof70kg.perbag.AUnitedAirlinesemployeerebukedhimandinaloud
voice,infrontofthemillingcrowd,orderedhimtorepackhisthingsaccordingly.Wishingnottocreatea
scene, Willie did as asked. Unfortunately, his luggage was still overweight so the airline billed him
overweightcharges.WillieofferedtopaythechargeswithaMiscellaneousChargeOrder(MCO)oran
airlineprepaidcreditbutthesameemployee,andanairlinesupervisor,refusedtohonorit,contendingthat
therewerediscrepanciesinthefigures.Thus,Williewasforcedtopaythechargeswithhis American
Expresscreditcard.UponarrivalinManila,Williediscoveredthatoneofhisbagshadbeenslashedandits
contents,amountingtoUS$5,310.00,stolen.
October16,1989hesenthisfirstletterofdemandtoUnitedAirlines.TheairlinedidnotrefuteWillies
allegations and mailed a check representing payment of his loss based on the maximum liability of
US$9.70perpound.Willie,thinkingtheamounttobegrosslyinadequatetocompensatehimforhislosses
aswellasfortheindignitieshewassubjectedto,senttwomoreletterstopetitionerairline,onedated
January 4, 1990 and the other dated October 28, 1991, demanding outofcourt settlement of
P1,000,000.00.
June9,1992WilliefiledacomplaintfordamagesbeforethePhilippinecourts.Hehadtwocausesof
action: (1) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioners employees at the San
FranciscoAirportwhichcausedhimextremeembarrassmentandsocialhumiliation;and(2)theslashingof
hisluggageandthelossofpersonaleffectsamountingtoUS$5,310.00.
Foritspart,UnitedAirlinesmovedtodismissthecomplaintonthegroundthatitwasfiledoutoftime.
UnderArt.29oftheWarsawConvention,therighttodamagesshallbeextinguishedifanactionisnot
broughtwithin2years.However,thesecondparagraphofthesaidprovisionstatedthatthemethodof
calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is
submitted.ItisWilliespositionthatourrulesoninterruptionofprescriptiveperiodshouldapply.Whenhe
senthislettersofdemand,the2yearperiodwastolled,givinghimampletimetofilehiscomplaint.
Thetrialcourtorderedthedismissalofthecase,holdingthatArt.29(2)refersnottothelocalforumsrules

ininterruptingtheprescriptiveperiodbutonlytotherulesofdeterminingthetimeinwhichtheactionwas
deemedcommenced(meaningfiled).Williefiledhismotionforreconsiderationoftheorderofdismissal
onlyonthe14thday.Thetrialcourtdeniedhismotionand2dayslaterWilliefiledhisnoticeofappeal.
UnitedAirlinesthistimecontendedthatthenoticeofappealwasfiledbeyondthe15dayreglementary
periodandshouldthereforebedismissed.TheCA,however,tookcognizanceofthecaseintheinterestof
justiceandruledinfavourofrespondent.Hence,thispetitionforcertiorari.
ISSUE:Whetherornottheactionfordamagesisbarredbythelapseofthe2yearprescriptive
periodunderArt.29oftheWarsawConvention

HELD:
SupremeCourtheldthatalthoughthe2yearprescriptiveperiodundertheWarsawConventionhaslapsed,
itdidnotpreclude theapplication ofotherpertinentprovisionsoftheCivilCode.Thus,theactionfor
damagescouldstillbefiledbasedontortwhichcanbefiledwithin4yearsfromthetimecauseofaction
accrued.Asfortheactionpertainingtothelossofthecontentsoftheluggage,whileitwaswellwithinthe
bounds of the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court found that there was an exception to the
applicabilityofthe2yearprescriptiveperiodthatiswhentheairlineemployeddelayingtacticsandgave
thepassengertherunaround.
ApplicabilityoftheWarsawConvention:Courtshavediscretionwhethertoapplythemornot
WithinourjurisdictionwehaveheldthattheWarsawConventioncanbeapplied,orignored,dependingon
thepeculiarfactspresentedbyeachcase.Thus,wehaveruledthattheConvention'sprovisionsdonot
regulateorexcludeliabilityforotherbreachesofcontractbythecarrierormisconductofitsofficersand
employees,orforsomeparticularorexceptionaltypeofdamage.NeithermaytheConventionbeinvoked
tojustifythedisregardofsomeextraordinarysortofdamageresultingtoapassengerandprecluderecovery
thereforbeyondthelimitssetbysaidConvention.Likewise,wehaveheldthattheConventiondoesnot
precludetheoperationoftheCivilCodeandotherpertinentlaws.Itdoesnotregulate,muchlessexempt,
thecarrierfromliabilityfordamagesforviolatingtherightsofitspassengersunderthecontractofcarriage,
especiallyifwillfulmisconductonthepartofthecarrier'semployeesisfoundorestablished.
Respondent'scomplaintrevealsthatheissuingontwo(2)causesofaction:(a)theshabbyandhumiliating
treatmenthereceivedfrompetitioner'semployeesattheSanFranciscoAirportwhichcausedhimextreme
embarrassmentandsocialhumiliation;and,(b)theslashingofhisluggageandthelossofhispersonal
effectsamountingtoUS$5,310.00.
Whilehissecondcauseofactionanactionfordamagesarisingfromtheftordamagetopropertyorgoods
iswellwithintheboundsoftheWarsawConvention,hisfirstcauseofactionanactionfordamages
arisingfromthemisconductoftheairlineemployeesandtheviolationofrespondent'srightsaspassenger
clearlyisnot.
Action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of the
respondentsrightsaspassengersiscoveredundertheCivilCode
Consequently,insofarasthefirstcauseofactionisconcerned,respondent'sfailuretofilehiscomplaint
withinthetwo(2)yearlimitationoftheWarsawConventiondoesnotbarhisactionsincepetitionerairline
maystillbeheldliableforbreachofotherprovisionsoftheCivilCodewhichprescribeadifferentperiod
orprocedureforinstitutingtheaction,specifically,Art.1146thereofwhichprescribesfour(4)yearsfor
filinganactionbasedontorts.

ExceptiontotheApplicationofthe2yearprescriptiveperiod:Whenairlineemployeddelayingtactics
Asforrespondent'ssecondcauseofaction,indeedthetravauxpreparatoriesoftheWarsawConvention
revealthatthedelegatestheretointendedthetwo(2)yearlimitationincorporatedinArt.29asanabsolute
bartosuitandnottobemadesubjecttothevarioustollingprovisionsofthelawsoftheforum. This
thereforeforeclosestheapplicationofourownrulesoninterruptionofprescriptiveperiods. Article29,
par.(2),wasintendedonlytoletlocallawsdeterminewhetheranactionhadbeencommencedwithinthe
two(2)yearperiod,andwithinourjurisdictionanactionshallbedeemedcommenceduponthefilingofa
complaint. Sinceitisindisputablethatrespondentfiledthepresentactionbeyondthetwo(2)yeartime
framehissecondcauseofactionmustbebarred.Nonetheless,itcannotbedoubtedthatrespondentexerted
effortstoimmediatelyconveyhislosstopetitioner,evenemployedtheservicesoftwo(2)lawyersto
followuphisclaims,andthatthefilingoftheactionitselfwasdelayedbecauseofpetitioner'sevasion.
Verily, respondent filed his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the period of limitation
prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for damages. However, it is obvious that
respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because petitioner airline gave him the
runaround,answeringhislettersbutnotgivingintohisdemands.True,respondentshouldhavealready
filedanactionatthefirstinstancewhenhisclaimsweredeniedbypetitionerbutthesamecouldonlybe
duetohisdesiretomakeanoutofcourtsettlementforwhichhecannotbefaulted. Hence,despitethe
expressmandateofArt.29oftheWarsawConventionthatanactionfordamagesshouldbefiledwithin
two(2)yearsfromthearrivalattheplaceofdestination,suchruleshallnotbeappliedintheinstantcase
becauseofthedelayingtacticsemployedbypetitionerairlineitself. Thus,privaterespondent'ssecond
causeofactioncannotbeconsideredastimebarredunderArt.29oftheWarsawConvention.
WHEREFORE,theassailedDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsreversingandsettingasidetheappealed
orderofthetrialcourtgrantingthemotiontodismissthecomplaint,aswellasitsResolutiondenying
reconsideration,isAFFIRMED.Lettherecordsofthecaseberemandedtothecourtoforiginforfurther
proceedingstakingitsbearingsfromthisdisquisition.
SOORDERED.