Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 203605

April 23, 2014

P/C INSP. LAWRENCE B. CAJIPE, P/C INSP. JOELL. MENDOZA, P/C INSP.
GERARDO B. BALATUCAN, PO3 JOLITO P. MAMANAO, JR., P03 FERNANDO
REYS. GAPUZ, PO2 EDUARDO G. BLANCO, PO2 EDWIN SANTOS and PO1
JOSIL REY I. LUCENA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
As narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), on July 28, 2009 Lilian I. De Vera (Lilian)
filed a complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ) charging with multiple
murder the following Philippine National Police (PNP) officers connected with the PNP
Highway Patrol Group (HPG): petitioners P/C Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C Insp.
Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr., P03
Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, PO2 Eduardo G. Blanco, P02 Edwin Santos, and PO1 Josil
Rey I. Lucena (collectively, petitioner HPG officers). The other HPG members were
P/C Supt. Perfecto Palad and P/C Supt. Eleuterio Gutierrez, Jr. Another group of
accused consisted of police officers from the PNP Special Action Force (SAF). 1
In her complaint Lilian alleged that joint elements of the SAF and the HPG conspired
in carrying out a plan to kill her husband, Alfonso "Jun" S. De Vera (Jun) and their
7-year-old daughter, Lia Allana. Lilian said that at around 9:30 p.m. on December 5,
2008 she called Jun to tell him that she was on her way to Pasay City to meet him
and their daughter. She got to Pasay City but the two did not show up. After an
hour, Lilian called their house helper who assured her that Jun and Lia had already
left. Lilian tried calling Jun but she got no answer. She again called their house
helper, who informed her that there had been a shootout in their subdivision. 2
Lilian decided to go home. When she arrived at the entrance of their subdivision,
the police had blocked the area and did not allow civilians to pass through. She got
a call from her house helper who told-her that Jun and Lia had been involved in the
shootout. A certain Hilario Indiana approached Lilian and advised her to go to the
hospital where Lia had been rushed. When she got there, she learned that Lia had
died of gunshot wound on the head. Jun was found dead near a passenger jeepney
with a gunshot wound on his head.3

Witnesses to the shootout said that Jun and Lia were riding in his Isuzu Crosswind
van when police officers wearing Regional SAF vests suddenly fired at the van. Jun
got out, went to the passenger side, and tried to carry Lia out to safety as she had
been wounded. The police officers went after Jun, however, and shot him on the
head.
On December 28, 2009 the DOJ issued a resolution after preliminary investigation
finding probable cause to indict all the police officers involved in the police action
that led to the shooting of Jun and Lia for two counts of murder. On March 15, 2010
the DOJ filed the information before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parafiaque City
in Criminal Cases 10-0280 and 10-0281. On the following day, March 16, petitioner
HPG officers filed an omnibus motion for judicial determination of probable cause
with a prayer to hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants for their arrest. They
also sought the annulment of the DOJ resolution on the ground of violation of their
constitutional rights. Further, they asked that the information be quashed on the
ground that the facts it alleged did not constitute an offense.4
On June 16, 2010 the RTC dismissed the case against petitioner HPG officers for
lack of probable cause against them, given that the witnesses made no mention of
seeing anyone from the HPG group taking part in the shooting and killing of Jun and
his daughter. Instead, the RTC found that the evidence tends to show that petitioner
HPG officers were requested and acted merely as blocking force in a legitimate
police operation and Lilian had not refuted this. On the other hand the R TC issued
an arrest warrant for the accused SAF officers, having found probable cause against
them. Lilian moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order covering petitioner
HPG officers but the RTC denied the same on September 24, 2010.5
On January 21, 2011 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 117756
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part.6 On June 15, 2012 the CA
granted the petition. It ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in failing to
evaluate the sworn statements of the witnesses on whom the DOJ relied on. The R
TC based its finding of lack of probable cause primarily on the absence of evidence
directly linking the petitioner HPG officers to the shooting of the victim and their
physical presence at the crime scene.7
In a special civil action filed before it, however, the CA pointed out that Indiana and
Ronald Castillo executed affidavits stating that petitioner HPG officers joined the SAF
officers in pursuing and shooting Jun while he was bringing Lia to a safer place. The
CA said that, with this evidence, it is for the petitioner HPG officers to rebut such
testimonies at the trial.8 The CA thus ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest
against the petitioner HPG officers.9On October 5, 2012 the CA denied the motion
for reconsideration of its decision and the urgent motion to quash warrants of arrest
and/or motion to suspend the implementation of the warrants of arrest, 10 hence,
this petition.
The Issues Presented

The case presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in granting the OSG's petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, given that the RTC's order of dismissal is a final and
appealable order;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in counting the prescriptive period for filing
a Rule 65 petition from the time of receipt of the court order by the OSG
rather than by the city prosecutor's office; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC judge in holding that no probable cause exists against
petitioner HPG officers and in dismissing the criminal charge against them.
The Court's Rulings
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
The R TC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG
officers.1wphi1 Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that the judge "may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause." The CA should have denied the People's petition
for special civil action of certiorari that assails the con-ectness of the order of
dismissal since Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that such action is available only when
"there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law."
The fact, however, is that Section 1, Rule 122 of the same rules provides that an
appeal may be taken in a criminal action from a judgment or final order like the
RTC's order dismissing the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable
cause. It is a final order since it disposes of the case, terminates the proceedings,
and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect to the case against
petitioner HPG officers. The Court had made a similar pronouncement in Santos v.
Orda, Jr.11 Of course, the People may refile the case if new evidence adduced in
another preliminary investigation will support the filing of a new information against
them. But that is another matter. For now, the CA clearly erred in not denying the
petition for being a wrong remedy.
Petitioner HPG officers point out that, assuming the propriety of the filing of a
special civil action of certiorari against the RTC's order of dismissal, the People had
sixty days from receipt of such order within which to file the action. Here, the
People filed its petition for certiorari 112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by
the city prosecutor of Paraaque, clearly beyond the 60-day period allowed for such
action.

The OSG contends, however, that the reckoning point should be from the date the
Department of Justice or the court gave it notice of the order of dismissal since, as
held in Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan,12 the OSG alone has the authority to
represent the People before the CA. But such a proposition is unfair. There is no
reason for the RTC to serve copy of its judgments or final orders upon the OSG
since it does not enter its appearance in criminal cases before it.
In case of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the public
prosecutor who appears as counsel for the People in such an action and on whom a
copy of the final order is thus served, may file a notice of appeal within the
appropriate time since it is a notice addressed to the RTC and not to the CA. Only
the Office of the Solicitor General, however, may pursue the appeal before the CA
by filing the required appellant's brief or withdraw the same.
In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG before the CA, the public
prosecutor's duty, if he believes that a matter should be brought by special civil
action before an appellate court, is to promptly communicate the facts and his
recommendation to the OSG, advising it of the last day for filing such an action.
There is no reason the OSG cannot file the petition since the People is given sixty
days from notice to the public prosecutor within which to file such an action before
the CA or this Court.
Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People
112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Paraaque,
the petition was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate
review.
Although a purely academic exercise in view of its above rulings, the Court has
taken a look into the merit of the RTC's order of dismissal since it clashes with the
findings of the DOJ investigating prosecutors.
The OSG relies on the affidavits of Indiana and Ronald V. Castillo (Castillo) in
claiming that probable cause exists against petitioner HPG officers.
In the sworn statement he made before the police on December 9, 2008 Indiana
said: "x x x. Tapos narinig ko ang sigaw 'Bro ang driver tumakas andyan sa jeep,
duon nilapitan ng isang naka-Vest na meron pangalan sa likod RSAF at nakabunet at
pinutukan ang driver sa ulo. Tapos nagsalita ang nagsabing RSAF 'Bro may bata
pala.' Kinuha ng RSAF ang bata at dinala sa kanilang sasakyan na kulay puti ng
sasakyan. x x x."13
On the other hand, witness Castillo said in his sworn statement: "x x x. May
dumaang sasakyang papuntang gate ng UPS JV, mayroong sumigaw na mga pulis
'PLATIN NYO, PLATIN NYO.' Biglang hinabol ng dalawang pulis ang nasabing
sasakyan at pinagbabaril. May ilang sandali ay bumalik ang dalawang pulis at sinabi

nila ng 'NAPATAY NA NAMIN ANG DRIVER NG GATE A WAY CAR, ANDOON SA TABI
NGJEEP'."14
It is clear from Indiana's testimony that the man he saw shoot Jun was an RSAF
officer, identified by his assault vest and accompanied by another RSAF officer who
also wore such a vest. Castillo did not see the act of shooting but confirmed that
two police officers gave chase and took shots at the fleeing vehicle then turned back
to announce to their companions that they had killed the driver of the get-away car.
The HPG men belonged to another unit and there is no claim that they wore another
unit's vest. More telling is the crime laboratory report which revealed that none of
the HPG operatives discharged their firearms during the shootout. 15 It did not also
help the prosecution's case that, per Indiana's testimony, the SAF police officers
involved in the shootout carried long firearms, specifically M16 rifle, M16 baby
armalite, and M14.16 But the National Police Commission issued two certifications
dated January 14 and 19, 2010 to the effect that the petitioner HPG officers had not
been issued long firearms from 2007 up to 2010.17
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts
as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. 18 The
prosecution evidence fails to establish probable cause against petitioner HPG
officers.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the Court of Appeals Decision dated June 15,
2012 and Resolution dated October 5, 2012 in CAG.R. SP 117756 and AFFIRMS the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City in Criminal Cases 10-0280 and
10-0281 that dismissed the case against petitioners. The Court ORDERS the
DISMISSAL of the charge against the petitioners P/C Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C
Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr.,
PO3 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, P02 Eduardo G. Blanco, PO2 Edwin Santos, and PO2
Josil Rey I. Lucena. The Court further ORDERS the withdrawal of the warrants for
their arrest.
SO ORDERED.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision dated November 25, 2008
convicting petitioner Corazon Macapagal of the crime of Estafa;2 the Order denying
her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial;3 and the Order4 dated June 29,
2010 denying her Notice of Appeal,5 in Criminal Case No. 98-166722.
For a proper perspective, a brief statement of the factual and procedural
antecedents of the case follows:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the
crime of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount
of P800,000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of
jewelry.6 Petitioner received the decision on
January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise
denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on
July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal7 on August 3, 2009, but the
same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time. 8
Aggrieved, petitioner comes directly before the Court in this petition for review on
certiorari with the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN
DENYING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BY THE HEREIN PETITIONERAPPELLANT.
II.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONVICTING THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193217

February 26, 2014

CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

III.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL FILED
BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT.9
We deny the petition.
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural
infirmities which this Court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioners cause. It
appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal

but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be
discussed below, the petition is bound to fail, because of petitioners complete
disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial courts denial of her
notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. The appeal may be taken as follows:
xxxx
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by
law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
xxxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen days
from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x
x x.
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of
the appeal itself.10 A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a
mode of appeal of a lower courts decision or final order direct to the Supreme
Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision
or final order from which an appeal may be taken.11 The Rules of Court specifically
provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an
appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil
action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition
under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an
outright dismissal.12
The Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the
task of determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned
lawyers to follow the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any
error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the clients cause. 13
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still
dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts.14 Although the Supreme Court

has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this
should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which an application will be directed. 15 Direct resort to this
Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly
and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case. 16
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an
appeal of the trial courts decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so
for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated
earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of
appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her
motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner
attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of
appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her
motion for reconsideration.17 A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed
decision, final order or judgment.18 Failure to comply with such requirement shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.19
The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and
evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders,
resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence
that are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying
on the case records of the lower court.20
Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioners repeated disregard of the
Rules and the Courts lawful orders.1avvphi1 In a Resolution21 dated September 15,
2010, the Court required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
2. petitioner to FULLY COMPLY with the Rules by submitting: (a) an affidavit of
service on the RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor General; (b) a proper
verification in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of
the Rules, and a valid certification of non-forum shopping in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 7, with properly accomplished jurat showing that the affiant
exhibited before the notary public at least one current identification document
issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the affiant as
required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as
amended by Court En Banc Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13SC; and (c) her counsels contact details pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated
10 July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, all within five (5) days from notice. x x x22

Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to require
her counsel to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for noncompliance. Records likewise show that petitioner also failed to file a Reply to
respondents Comment to the petition.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

On August 2, 2011, petitioners counsel submitted his explanation for noncompliance and asked for more time within which to comply with the Courts
resolution, because of heavy workload and his failure to contact petitioner who
apparently transferred residence. In a Resolution23 dated
August 31, 2011, the Court, while granting the motion for extension requested,
admonished petitioners counsel for the unsatisfactory explanation. Yet again,
petitioner failed to file the required Reply prompting the Court again to ask for the
counsels explanation why he should not be disciplinary dealt with. Petitioners
counsel claimed that he could not prepare the required reply because the
documents needed had been destroyed by typhoon "Pedring." He, likewise, pointed
out that he exerted earnest efforts to locate petitioner but he could not do so at that
point.24 After the Court required him again to show cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for not complying with the Courts resolutions, and since his
efforts to communicate with his client proved futile, he asked the Court that he be
relieved of all his duties and responsibilities as counsel on record. 25 In a
Resolution26 dated December 10, 2012, we required petitioner herself to comment
thereon, but no such compliance was made to date.1wphi1
Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all
parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or
some procedural imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice. 27 It is the
duty of the counsel to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign,
to determine which court has appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for
appeal.28 Any error in compliance may be fatal to the client's cause. 29 It should be
stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.
It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in
the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. 30 The
requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless and
trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules
with greater fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189833

February 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier Morilla y Avellano (Morilla)
from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction and that of
his co-accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing
them2 to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00
each.
The Regional Trial Court Judgment
On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel
Dequilla y Regodan (Dequilla) were charged in a criminal information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of
Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicate crime group
as they all help one another, for purposes of gain in the transport of illegal drugs,
and in fact, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding and abetting
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously transport by
means of two (2) motor vehicles, namely a Starex van bearing plate number RWT888 with commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of
Panukulan, Quezon Province, methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug
which is commonly known as shabu, and with an approximate weight of five
hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos, without authority whatsoever.3

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City4 on 1 August 2007 convicted
Morilla and his co-accused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan,
Quezon, of illegal transport5 of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known
as shabu, with an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight
(503.68) kilos. However, it absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the prosecutions
failure to present sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense charged. The
dispositive of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Ronnie Mitra y Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense charged. Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each. Accused
Willie Yang y Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered
immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as
representative sample which is still in the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory is
ordered turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper
disposition.6
The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles
driven by Mayor Mitra and Morilla, one with control number 888 and the other an
ambulance with plate number SFK-372, as the police officers have already acquired
prior knowledge that the said vehicles were suspected to be used for transportation
of dangerous drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon, the information turned
out to be accurate and indeed, the two accused had in their motor vehicles more
than five hundred kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride. 7
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any
knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that he was merely requested to
transport them to Manila on board his Starex van. He explained that he only
accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his
fishing boat. It likewise dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack of
knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that he
was just transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla.
The other passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to
inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an accommodated
passenger of the ambulance.
The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they were
caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles driven by
each of them. Absent any convincing circumstance to corroborate their
explanations, the validity of their apprehension was sustained. 8

The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the
testimonies of the four accused themselves. It was found by the trial court that the
two vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van driven
by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which was ahead
of the ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police officers.
However, the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through
the untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks inside the van.
Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks contained narra wooden
tiles.
Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car
for further inspection. When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white
crystalline granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request Morilla
to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police officers that he was with
Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him pass.9 His request was
rejected by the police officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks turned
out to be sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.10 This discovery prompted the
operatives to chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to
overtake the van and Mayor Mitra was asked to stop. They then inquired if the
mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives noticed that his van was also
loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Thus, Mayor Mitra was also
requested to open the door of the vehicle for inspection. At this instance, Mayor
Mitra offered to settle the matter but the same was rejected. Upon examination, the
contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.11
The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the trial
court for failure on the part of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The court ruled that Dequillas and Yangs mere presence inside
the vehicle as passengers was inadequate to prove that they were also conspirators
of Mayor Mitra and Morilla.12
The Court of Appeals Decision
On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It upheld
the finding of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to
transport several sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their
respective vehicles. The singularity of their intent to illegally transport
methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla agreed to drive
the ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra, who
drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van.13
The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of knowledge of the
illegal contents of the sacks. The claim that the sacks were loaded with wooden tiles
was implausible due to the obvious disparity of texture and volume. 14

Courts Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may be
convicted for conspiracy to commit the offense charged sans allegation of
conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether the prosecution was able to prove
his culpability as alleged in the Information.15
We dismiss his arguments.
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure16 to substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He pointed out that the
Information itself failed to state the word conspiracy but instead, the statement "the
above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of
Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicated crime group
as they all help one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport x x x." He argued that conspiracy was only inferred from the words used
in the Information.17
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information, at
this point, is deemed to have been waived due to Morillas failure to assert it as a
ground in a motion to quash before entering his plea.18

the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of
facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some
complete whole.22In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a
conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport
the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs,
were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the
checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morillas turn to pass
through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary
check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested
Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor
Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and
he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the
said vehicle likewise bears no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under
the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another." 23 It
was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following
the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act
of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is
punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks
containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent,
motive or knowledge.24

Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his
defenses to contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate
courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.19

In a similar case of People v. Libnao,25 this Court upheld the conviction for illegal
transportation of marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag
full of marijuana leaves when they were flagged down on board a passing tricycle at
a checkpoint.

The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.

However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 20 To determine conspiracy, there
must be a common design to commit a felony.21
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group
involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.

Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, 26 the penalty for illegal
transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from
six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683, 27 the penalty was
amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty
thousand pesos. The penalty was further amended in Republic Act No.
7659,28 where the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.

This argument is misplaced.

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and
agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of

From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of P10,000,00.00 to be

paid by each of the accused but amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua following
the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 and the principle of retroactive application

of lighter penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30)
years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it
accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. Life
imprisonment, on the other hand, does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration and carries no accessory penalties.29

instead of Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of P10,000,000.00 by each of the

accused.
SO ORDERED.

The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People, 30 thus:

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate
court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled
that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15
of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683. The decree
provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 toP30,000.00 shall be imposed.
Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659 further introduced new amendments to
Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed
from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00
to P30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00
to P10 million." On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section
20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the amendatory
law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua
under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659
could be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in
view of its having a less stricter punishment.1wphi1
We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held:
"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that
the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the
original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive
application, x x x."
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused,
have, as to him, a retroactive effect," the penalty imposed by the trial court upon
petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment,
which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court
upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed 13 July
2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION with respect to the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion Perpetua

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201858

June 4, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JENNY LIKIRAN alias "Loloy", Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:
Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Branch 8, for the death of Rolando
Sareno, Sr. (Sareno ). In its Decision1 dated July 17, 2006, the RTC disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder and
imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of [P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity; [P]50,000.00 moral damages;
[P]30,000.00 actual damages, and [P]10,000.00 attorney's fee and to pay the
costs. This court has no jurisdiction over Jerome alias Caro Likiran as he is not
impleaded in the information.
SO ORDERED.2
The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March 19,
2000 in BarangayBugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta
and a dance was being held at the basketball court. Prosecution witnesses Celso
Dagangon (Dagangon), Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno
(Goloceno) testified that on said night, they were at the dance together with Sareno
at around 8:00 p.m. After a few hours, while Mercado and Goloceno were inside the
dance area, Jerome Likiran3 (Jerome), the accused-appellants brother, punched
Mercado on the mouth. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that
Jerome was armed with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was holding a
hunting knife, so he backed off. Dagangon and Sareno, who were outside the dance
area, heard the commotion. Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno and shot him
several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back.
It was Dagangon who saw the incident first-hand as he was only three meters from
where Sareno was. Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after
Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point.
Sareno suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular
area.4
The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he
admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion
happened. Heand Jerome stayed within the area where the sound machine was
located and they only heard the gunshots outside. Other witnesses testified in the
accused-appellants defense, with Edgar Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing
incident and that it was some other unknown person, and not the accusedappellant, who was the culprit; and Eleuterio Quiopa stating that he was with the
accused-appellant and Jerome inside the dance hall at the time the commotion
occurred.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellants
culpability.5 Prosecution witness Dagangons positive identification of the accusedappellant was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of
murder.6 The RTC also rejected the accused-appellants defense of denial as it was
not supported by evidence. It also ruled that alibi cannot favor the accusedappellant since he failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime on the night of March 19, 2000.7

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto per assailed
Decision8 dated July 27, 2011, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 10439-00
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the accusedappellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime. The CA, nevertheless, deviated
from the RTCs conclusion that there was conspiracy between Jerome and the
accused-appellant, and that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of
the crime. According to the CA, the information failed to contain the allegation of
conspiracy, and the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish that Jerome and
the accused-appellant ganged up on the victim. 10
The CA, however, sustained the RTCs finding of treachery.11
The accused-appellant protested his conviction.12 According to him, the prosecution
failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accusedappellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the assailant
and his culpability.13
Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, including their assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses. Factual findings of the trial court are, except for
compelling or exceptional reasons, conclusive to the Court especially when fully
supported by evidence and affirmed by the CA.14
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity
of the criminal.15In this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime has been adequately established by the prosecution, more
particularly by the testimony of Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the accusedappellants argument that it was impossible for Dagangon to see the assailant
considering that there was no evidence to show that the place where the crime
occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only three meters away
from the accused-appellant and Jerome and had a good view of them. Moreover,
there was no distraction that could have disrupted Dagangons attention. He even
immediately identified the accused-appellant and Jerome during police investigation,
and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the police beforehand that
the accused-appellant was one of the suspects. 16 Positive identification by a
prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime is
entitled to greater weight than alibi and denial.17 Such positive identification gains
further ground in the absence of any ill motive on the part of a witness to falsely
testify against an accused.18
The accused-appellant also asserted that the information charged him of murder
committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing
his instantaneous death.19 The accused-appellant argued that the evidence on
record established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other person. 20 At this

juncture, the Court notes that the testimony of Dagangon, indeed, identified two
assailants the accused-appellant and his brother, Jerome; however, it was only the
accused-appellant who was charged with the death of Sareno. Defense witnesses
also testified that Jerome died on March 12, 2005.21
The CA disregarded the accused-appellants contention and ruled that "the cause of
death was not made an issue in the court a quo" and the Certificate of Death was
admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of
death.22 And even assuming that the cause of death was an issue, the CA still held
the accused-appellant liable for the death of Sareno on the basis of the Courts
ruling in People v. Pilola.23
The Court reviewed the records of this case and finds sufficient basis for the CAs
disregard of the accused-appellants argument.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated
upon and admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of
Death issued by Dr. Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and
reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of
fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area." 24 Stipulation of
facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used
against the accused.25 In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement
was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may
nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its
admission.26 Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the
regular performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the
victim.27 Note that the certificate of death issued by Dr. Dael provides the following:
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate cause

DOA

Antecedent cause

Multiple GSW

Underlying cause

Stab wound scapular area (L)28

The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sarenos cause of

death.29
More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and
logical consequence resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he
was not the shooter, it is nevertheless true that the stab wound he inflicted on
Sareno contributed to the latters death. In Quinto v. Andres,30 the Court stated
that:
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter
its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in

producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the
victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the
victim. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away
from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. x x x[.] 31 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
The Court, however, cannot agree with the RTC and CAs conclusion that the killing
of Sareno was attended by treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.
Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements
are shown: a) the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution
affording the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b)
the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted
by the offender.32 Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or
where the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just
triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a
provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the
moment.33
In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact that the
shooting and stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of the moment incident, a
result of the brawl that happened during the barrio dance. The prosecution failed to
show that the accused-appellant and his brother Jerome deliberately planned the
means by which they would harm Sareno. In fact, what was revealed by the
prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an innocent bystander who unfortunately
became a target of the accused-appellant and Jeromes rampage. Consequently, the
accused-appellant should be liable only for the lesser crime of Homicide.
In convictions for homicide, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes
the penalty of reclusion temporal, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years.34 In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period,35 or from fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,36 the maximum of the penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant shall be within the range of reclusion temporal
medium,37 and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the RPC for the offense, 38 or prision mayor in any of its periods,
which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. 39 There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the Court thereby sentences the
accused-appellant to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
With regard to the damages awarded, the Court affirms the award of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) moral
damages, as these are in accord with the Court's judicial policy on the
matter.40 These, on top of the Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) actual damages
and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA. Further, the monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of
six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.41

The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's fees awarded by the RTC as there is
nothing on record proving that the heirs of Sareno actually incurred such expense.
Attorney's fees are in the concept of actual or compensatory damages allowed
under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, 42 and absent
any evidence supporting its grant, the same must be deleted for lack of factual
basis.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00484 is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy"
is hereby found guilty of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE, and is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty often (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum. Further, the award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED.
Interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the
damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
In all other respects, the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199689

March 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. y BINAYUG, a.k.a. "JOJIT," AccusedAppellant.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This appeal challenges the Decision dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03353, affirming the Decision2 dated April 15, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (R TC), Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal Case
No. 10516, which found accused-appellant Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug,
a.k.a. "Jojit" (Constantino), guilty of the crime of illegal sale of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, under Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
1

The Information3 filed before the R TC charged Constantino, as follows:

That on January 20, 2005, in the City of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law and without permit to sell, transport, deliver and distribute
dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
transport, distribute and deliver two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing 0.14 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug to a member of the PNP, Tuguegarao City who acted as a
poseur-buyer; that after receiving the two (2) plastic sachets, the poseur-buyer
simultaneously handed to the accused the marked money consisting of one (1)
piece of FIVE HUNDRED PESO BILL (P500.00) with Serial No. QP278070 and five (5)
pieces of ONE HUNDRED PESO BILL with Serial Nos. SM989053, PS724429,
XM484584, BB048002, and EK6900025 or a total of P1,000.00 and this led to the
apprehension of the accused and the confiscation of the dangerous drug together
with the buy-bust money by the said apprehending law enforcers of the Tuguegarao
City Police Station who formed the buy bust team in coordination with the PDEA.
When arraigned on July 8, 2005, Constantino pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.4 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
On January 20, 2005, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Police Superintendent
(P/Supt.) Mariano Rodriguez (Rodriquez), the Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City,
received a report from a confidential informant (CI) that a certain Jojit was selling
illegal drugs in the said city. P/Supt.
Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-bust group composed of Senior Police Officer
(SPO) 2 Noel Taguiam (Taguiam), SPO2 Alexander Tamang (Tamang), SPO1 Arthur

Blaquera (Blaquera), Police Officer (PO) 3 Edwin Hernandez (Hernandez), and PO3
Rolando Domingo (Domingo). PO3 Domingo was designated as the poseur-buyer.
The buy-bust money, consisting of one P500.00 bill and five P100.00 bills, were
dusted with fluorescent powder and their respective serial numbers were recorded
in the police blotter.5
Around 8:00 in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to Reynovilla St.,
Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao City, the place where, according to the CI, Jojit was
selling shabu. PO3 Domingo positioned himself beside a street light while the rest of
the team hid behind a nearby concrete fence. After waiting for about 45 minutes,
Constantino arrived on board a tricycle. PO3 Domingo recognized Constantino as the
Jojit described by the CI. PO3 Domingo approached Constantino and asked him if he
was Jojit. When Constantino replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo next asked,
"Mayroon ka bang stuff?" ("Do you have stuff?") In response, Constantino inquired
of PO3 Domingo how much he wanted to buy. PO3 Domingo said he wanted to
buy P1,000.00 worth of shabu, simultaneously handing over the buy-bust money to
Constantino, who, in turn, handed two plastic sachets to PO3 Domingo. Thereupon,
PO3 Domingo turned his cap backwards, the pre-arranged signal for the
consummated sale. Upon seeing the signal, the other members of the buy-bust
team approached the scene at once and arrested Constantino, from whom SPO2
Taguiam recovered the buy-bust money.6
Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station where the recovered drugs
and money were turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang. 7 The recovered
drugs were then marked with the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident was recorded
in the police blotter with an inventory of the recovered drugs and money.8
Later that evening, at around ten oclock, P/Supt. Rodriguez and SPO2 Tamang
submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, Camp
Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao City, a request for laboratory examination of two
plastic sachets with white crystalline substance marked as "A-1" and "A-2" to
determine the presence of dangerous drugs;9 as well as both hands of Constantino,
one piece P500.00 bill, and five piecesP100.00 bills, to determine the presence of
the ultra violet powder.10 Per Chemistry Report No. D-08-200511 and Physical
Identification Report No. PI-04-2005,12 prepared by Police Senior Inspector
(P/SInsp.) Mayra Matote Madria,13 Forensic Chemist, the contents of the two plastic
sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; while the other
specimens tested positive for the presence of bright-yellow ultraviolet fluorescent
powder.
Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely
framed-up.
According to Constantino, at around 8:00 in the evening on January 20, 2005, he
was enjoying a joyride with his friend, Jeff Abarriao, on the latters motorcycle,
within the vicinity of Caritan Centro. After 30 minutes, Constantino decided to go
home. While walking along Reyno or Reynovilla St., two vehicles suddenly stopped,

one in front and the other behind him. Five men, all in civilian clothes, alighted from
the two vehicles. Two of the men held Constantinos hands, while another poked a
gun at him, asking him where he came from and ordering him to bring out the
shabu. Constantino answered that he did not know what the men were talking
about. The men then forced Constantino into one of the vehicles. Inside the vehicle,
one of the men frisked and searched Constantino, and told him that he was being
arrested for selling shabu. The men, who were now apparently police officers,
brought Constantino to the Tuguegarao City Police Station. At the police station, the
police officers took Constantinos cellphone and wallet. Also at the police station,
one of the arresting police officers brought out two pieces of plastic sachets and
money and turned it over to one of his companions. At around 9:30 in the evening,
the police officers brought Constantino to the PNP Crime Laboratory, but nothing
happened because he heard that the person who was supposed to conduct the
examination was not around, so, Constantino was brought back to the police
station.14
The following day, January 21, 2005, the police officers again brought Constantino
to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Along the way, one of the police escorts forced
Constantino to hold a certain amount of money. Constantino tried to resist but he
could not really do anything because he was handcuffed. After his examination,
Constantino was detained and was told that he was suspected of selling shabu.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on April 15, 2008, finding Constantino guilty as
charged. The trial court rejected the arguments of the defense, thus:

omissions do not operate to exclude the evidence nor to cause suppression thereof.
They are directory, not mandatory provisions.
4. The chain of custody was not established with certainty.
The Courts comment: The chain is not difficult to trace, and has been established
by evidence, thus:
a. Exhibit "B": The police blotter recording that on 20 January 2005 at
2100 hours, mentioning the two sachets of shabu which according to the
blotter the accused admitted he handed over to Domingo; Domingo had
testified that the markings A-1 NBT and A-2 NBT were placed on the
sachets by Investigator Alexander Tamang;
b. Exhibit "F": Dated January 20, 2005, a request to the PNP Crime Lab
Services for the examination of "two plastic sachet (sic) with white
crystalline substance marked A1 and A2";
c. Exhibit "D": Chemistry Report No. D-08-2005 completed 21 January
2005 reporting a qualitative examination of the contents of two heat-sealed
sachets marked as A1 NBT and A2 NBT and identifying the substance as
"Methamphetamine Hydrochloride".
5. There was no prior coordination with PDEA.

1. The Prosecution failed to give a detailed account of the arrangement with the
accused for the purchase of the shabu.
The Courts response: The testimony of PO3 Domingo was detailed enough,
corroborated by other witnesses. It is the defense that has failed to show in what
crucial detail the prosecutions account is wanting.

The Courts response: None was needed. Exhibit "H" clearly evidences that SPO1
Blaquera was authorized to conduct anti-drug operations. Domingo also answered
the question about coordination with PDEA when he testified: "During that time 3
representatives of the Intelligence Operatives were deputized in the PDEA in the
persons of Noel Taguiam, Arthur Blaquera and the Chief of Police."

2. The police officers categorically admitted that they did not personally know the
accused until they were at the alleged place of transaction.

Hermanos testified in his behalf and his testimony can be reduced to the following
story:

The Courts response: Substantive law does not require this; the rules of evidence
do not. Did they know he was Jojit? Yes, from the description given the informant.
Domingo asked whether he was Jojit. He answered "Yes".

1 He went on a joy-ride that night with his friend aboard a motorcycle;

3. The arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements of Article II, Section
21 of R.A. 9165 that requires that an inventory be taken and that photographs be
taken of the items seized.

3 He was accosted by police officers who, at the time, he did not know to
be police officers;

2 Tiring, he alighted and started to walk along Reyno Villa Street;

4 They took him to the police station and produced the sachets;
The Courts comment: The Police Blotter Entry No. 0270 enumerates the items
seized. This, the Court holds to be substantial compliance. Even assuming, without
admitting, that not all the requirements may not have been complied with, these

5 Next day, while on the way to the Crime Lab, they forced him to hold
marked bills, although he was cuffed.

All told, it is a story that is meant to endeavor to explain the circumstances around
the accuseds arrest and apprehension. For one thing, it is self-serving; for another,
we are not told any reason why the police officers should have wanted to apprehend
him a supposedly guiltless man; third, the Court never heard the testimony of his
friend with whom he was supposed to have had a joy-ride that night. In sum, his
story does not convince this Court.15(Citations omitted.)
The RTC imposed the following sentence upon Constantino:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P500,000.00.16
Maintaining his innocence, Constantino appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that:
1. The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses despite the patent irregularities in the conduct of
the buy-bust operation.
2. The trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant despite the
prosecutions failure to establish that chain of custody of the drug
specimens allegedly confiscated from the accused-appellant.
3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite
the prosecutions failure to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs
constituting the corpus delicti of the offense.
In its Decision dated July 29, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
judgment of conviction of the RTC against Constantino. The appellate court held that
Constantinos defense of frame-up was not worthy of credence as his version of the
incident was not at all corroborated.
Constantino was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to PO3 Domingo, who
acted as the poseur-buyer, therefore, he was legally arrested without a warrant. The
appellate court also found that the chain of custody of the shabu had been
preserved from the time said drugs were confiscated from Constantino to the time
the same drugs were delivered to the crime laboratory and thereafter retrieved and
presented as evidence before the trial court. Lastly, the appellate court stressed that
between the positive and categorical declarations of the prosecution witnesses, on
one hand, and the unsubstantial denial or negative statements of the appellant, on
the other hand, the former generally prevails; and that negative averments,
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, deserve no weight in law,
especially vis-a-vis the time-tested presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty on the part of the apprehending officers.

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 5,
dated 15 April 2008, in Criminal Case No. 10516, is AFFIRMED.17
Consequently, Constantino comes before this Court seeking the reversal of his
conviction by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
In his Supplemental Brief, Constantino contests his conviction, averring
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly, on the
circumstances of the marking of the two plastic sachets containing shabu allegedly
confiscated from him. Different people claim to have made the marking "NBT" on
the two plastic sachets and gave various explanations as to what the initials "NBT"
stand for. In short, Constantino argues that the prosecution failed to establish a
crucial link in the chain of custody of the shabu in this case.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Admittedly, denial is an inherently weak defense, consistently viewed with disfavor
by the courts, being a self-serving negative evidence. In view, however, of the
constitutional presumption that an accused is innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such
presumption by presenting the required quantum of evidence. In so doing, the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense.18
In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence."19 And in the prosecution of these offenses,
the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs and other related articles have been preserved from the time they were
confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court. 20
Article II, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 lays down the procedure to be
followed in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.]
Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 9165 describes in more detail how the foregoing procedure is to be
applied:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items[.]
While police officers are enjoined to strictly comply with the procedure prescribed by
law, the IRR also explicitly excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds, but
only if the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been properly
preserved by the apprehending officers. The integrity and evidentiary value of
seized items are properly preserved for as long as the chain of custody of the same
are duly established.
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002,21 defines
"chain of custody" as follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and
use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of custody of seized items
is established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same. (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn
over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked
illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 23
After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court
finds glaring inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly
confiscated from Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3
Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when, and where the two plastic
sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to question whether the two plastic
sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones confiscated from
Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the seized
shabu at a very early stage.
To recall, the first crucial link in the chain of custody is seizure and marking of the
illegal drug. In this case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic
sachets of shabu from Constantino in exchange for P1,000. However, PO3 Domingo
himself did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets of shabu. Instead, upon
arrival of the buy-bust team with Constantino at the police station, PO3 Domingo
turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who

was also a member of the buy-bust team. PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2
Tamang who put the marking "NBT" on the said sachets of shabu. Below are the
excerpts from PO3 Domingos testimony:

Q If these two plastic sachets will be shown to you again today will you be able to
tell that these two plastic sachets were the same plastic sachets that were handed
by the accused to PO3 Rolando Domingo?

Q If that plastic sachets which was sold to you by Hermanos Constantino is shown
to you will you be able to identify the same?

A Yes, sir.

A Yes, maam.

Q I am showing to you these two plastic sachets kindly tell us if these are the plastic
sachets that were handed to PO3 Rolando Domingo?

Q How were you able to identify the plastic sachets?

A These are the ones, sir.

A There is an initials (sic), maam.

Q Why do you say that these are the two plastic sachets handed by the accused?

Q What initials are you referring to?

A Because I was there and I saw the accused handed the two plastic sachets to PO3
Rolando Domingo, sir.

A A-1 initial NBT and A-2 initial NBT.

Q Why do you know that these are the same plastic sachets?
Q Who placed those initials in the plastic sachets?
A These are the ones, sir.
A The Investigator, maam.
Q And who is the investigator?

Q Mr. Witness, there are markings on these two plastic sachets, do you know whose
markings are these?

A Alexander Tamang, maam.

xxxx

Q Where did he place those initials?

A It was Noel B. Taguiam, sir.

A In the police station after the apprehension, maam.24 (Emphasis supplied.)

The witness is pointing to the marking NBT partly hidden.

However, PO3 Hernandez, another member of the buy-bust team, categorically

pointed to SPO2 Taguiam, also a member of the buy-bust team, as the one who put
the marking "NBT" on the plastic sachets upon the teams return to the police
station, thus:

COURT:
Q Who is Noel B. Taguiam?
A A member of the buy bust team also, sir.

PROS. NICOLAS:
PROS. NICOLAS:
Q During the buy bust operation you stated that the accused handed to the poseur
buyer in the person of PO3 Rolando Domingo two plastic sachets containing as you
claimed methamphetamine hydrochloride, have you seen these plastic sachets at
that time when they handed to PO3 Rolando Domingo?
A Yes, sir.

Q You stated this NBT was placed by one Noel B. Taguiam, why do you know that he
was the one who placed this?
A Because I was present during that time when he placed his initial, sir.

Q Do you know when this Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials on those two plastic
sachets?

Q Is he authorized to make the necessary marking which was requested to be

examined Madam Witness?

A After we conducted the buy bust operation, sir.

A Yes, Maam because he is the one who received the specimen from the one who
deliver it, Maam.

Q How soon Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials after the conduct of the buy bust
operation?
A After a few hours, sir.

Q In this second plastic sachet Madam Witness which you identified earlier, that
there is a marking "A-1," there is another marking NBT, what is this marking all
about Madam Witness?

Q Where did he place those initials?

A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, Maam.27 (Emphases supplied.)

A In our office, sir.25 (Emphasis supplied.)

On cross-examination, P/SInsp. Tulauan confirmed her previous declaration that

SPO3 Tamaray had claimed making the marking on the sachets of shabu:

To complicate things even further, P/SInsp Tulauan,26 the Forensic Chemist, also
declared before the trial court that the marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets of
shabu were made by SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray (Tamaray), the duty officer who
received the specimens at the crime laboratory. P/SInsp. Tulauan testified:

Atty. Aquino
Madam Witness, with respect to that marking made which are "A1" and "A-2", they
are not your markings, is it not?

PROS. ISRAEL:
A Yes, sir.
Q When you received these two specimens Madam Witness, will you please tell us
the physical appearance of these items when you received the same?
A They were heat-sealed and with markings "A-1" and "A-2," your Honor.

Q And with respect also to that NBT marked and placed in that exhibit which you
have earlier identified, you did not see this duty officer placed his markings thereon,
is it not?

B And will you please point to us these markings "A-1" and "A-2" when you received
these items Madam Witness?

A Yes sir but I asked him who placed that marking and he said that he was the one
who placed the initial NBT, sir.28

A This is the markings "A-1" and "A-2," Maam.

The Court already emphasized in People v. Zakaria 29 the importance of marking the
seized item right after seizure:

INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to the markings "A-1" and "A-2" with the use of a black
pentel pen.
PROS. ISRAEL:
Q There is another marking in this plastic sachet Madam Witness marked as NBT,
what is this marking all about?

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs
or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the
marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding
handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking
of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until
disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or
contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody
imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.1wphi1 (Citation
omitted.)

A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, Maam.

Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseurbuyer, despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu

purchased from Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before
turning over the custody of the same to another police officer. This lapse in
procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity of the drugs
actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust and the ones presented before
the trial court, especially considering that three different people, during the interval,
supposedly received and marked the same. To clarify the matter, the prosecution
could have presented as witness either SPO2 Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to directly
validate the marking in court, but unfortunately, the prosecution chose to dispense
with the testimonies of both officers. This omission diminished the importance of the
markings as the reference point for the subsequent handling of the evidence. As a
consequence, an objective person could now justifiably suspect the shabu ultimately
presented as evidence in court to be planted or contaminated. 30
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidences chain of custody is fatal to
its case as the Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved. 31
In light of the foregoing, Constantino is acquitted of the crime charged, not because
the Court accords credence to his defense of frame-up, but because the prosecution
failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 29, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03353, affirming the Decision dated April 15,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal
Case No. 10516, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Hermanos Constantino, Jr.
y Binayug, a.k.a. "Jojit," is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and is ORDERED to be immediately released from
detention unless he is confined for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191360

March 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SHERWIN BIS y AVELLANEDA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a
judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is duty-bound to
establish with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as
evidence against the accused is the same prohibited substance seized from him.
For final review is the September 22, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03348 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) January
31, 2008 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. 7555 finding appellant Sherwin Bis y
Avellaneda (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
5,3 Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 91654 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00.
Factual Antecedents
Appellant was charged before the San Fernando, La Union RTC, Branch 29 with
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of November 2006, in the City of San Fernando,
Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above[-]named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
distribute, sell and deliver three (3) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet[s]
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu", with a
corresponding weight of ZERO POINT ZERO FORTY THREE (0.043) gram; ZERO
POINT ZERO SIXTEEN (0.016) gram; and ZERO POINT ZERO TEN (0.010) gram with
a total weight of ZERO POINT ZERO SIXTY NINE (0.069) gram to PO2 Manuel
Espejo who posed as the poseur-buyer thereof and in consideration of said shabu,

used marked money, a piece of One thousand peso bill (P1,000.00) with serial
number EB 893087, without first securing the necessary permit, license from the
proper government agency.

examination on the specimen yielded positive for the presence of methamphetamine

hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.9
Version of the Defense

CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On January 23, 2007, appellant assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
Version of the Prosecution
On November 26, 2006, a civilian informant tipped the San Fernando City Police
Station about the alleged drug pushing activity of appellant at his residence in
Pagdalagan Norte, San Fernando City, La Union. Hence, a team composed of Police
Officers Manuel Espejo (Espejo), Jose Arce (Arce) and Joselito Casem (Casem) went
to the area on the same day to conduct a surveillance. They stayed at a store about
10 meters away from appellants house and from there saw people coming in and
out. Another surveillance conducted by the same team on the following evening
confirmed that drug activities were indeed happening in that place.

Appellant denied all the allegations against him. He claimed that while he was going
out of his house at around 10:00 p.m. of November 28, 2006, Espejo, whom he did
not know at the time, suddenly grabbed him. He was then taken to a place near the
highway where he was frisked. When nothing was found on his possession, he was
taken to the police station at Pagdalagan. From there, he was whisked away to the
main police station in San Fernando City on the pretext that he would be asked on
something and would be released the following day. Upon reaching the main police
station, however, Espejo showed him three aluminum foils and three plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance which were allegedly found on him.
On cross examination, appellant claimed to not know Espejo, Arce and Casem prior
to the November 28, 2006 incident. That except for the said incident, there was no
other reason for the said police officers to file a case against him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The said police officers immediately reported the matter to their superior who
ordered them to conduct a buy-bust operation on November 28, 2006. Espejo was
designated as poseur-buyer while Arce and Casem were to serve as back-ups.
Following the usual procedure, Espejo was provided with a P1,000.00 bill bearing
the initials "MCE" as marked money.
At about 10:40 p.m., the team proceeded to the target area on a tricycle. Upon
arriving at the locus criminis, Arce and Casem posted themselves at a store near
appellants house while Espejo approached appellant who was standing in front of
his house. He told him, "Pards pakikuha ng isang bulto." Appellant looked at Espejo
and asked "where is your money?" After Espejo handed the P1,000.00 bill to
appellant, the latter went inside the house. He emerged after a while and gave
Espejo three plastic sachets placed in another plastic container. Convinced that the
white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachets is shabu, Espejo made the prearranged signal by putting his hand on top of his head. At once, Espejo introduced
himself together with Arce and Casem who already rushed to assist him, as
members of the San Fernando City Police. Forthwith, appellant was placed under
arrest and apprised of his constitutional rights.
Thereafter, he was brought to the police station wherein a further search on him by
Espejo yielded aluminum foils6and the marked money.
In the meantime, Espejo marked the three plastic sachets he bought from appellant
with the initials "MC-1," "MC-2" and "MC-3."7 Afterwards, the team brought the
Request for Laboratory Examination8 together with the confiscated items to the
Regional Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service. The results of the laboratory

According full faith and credence to the version of the prosecution, the RTC found
that the elements necessary to prove the illegal sale of dangerous drugs have been
sufficiently established.10 It debunked appellants denial after considering the
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in line with the presumption that
law enforcement officers have performed their duties in a regular manner.
Consequently, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in its Decision11 of January 31, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Sherwin Bis, GUILTY as charged and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Php500,000.00 and to pay costs.1wphi1
The three (3) sachets of shabu with a total weight of 0.069 gram is hereby
confiscated and ordered turned over to PDEA for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.12
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, appellant questioned the RTC Decision on the ground that his guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He also averred that the police officers failed
to regularly perform their official functions.

Concurring with the findings and conclusions of the RTC, the CA affirmed the said
lower courts judgment in its now assailed Decision 13 of September 22, 2009,
disposing thusly:

appellant as the one who sold the illegal drugs to Espejo, the poseur-buyer, in a
planned buy-bust operation, as well as to the other surrounding circumstances that
transpired during the said operation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the January 31, 2008 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 7555, is
AFFIRMED.

Chain of custody properly established.

SO ORDERED.14
Unable to accept both lower courts verdict of conviction, appellant is now before
this Court for final determination of the very same issues he submitted before the
CA.

Appellant posits that the prosecution did not strictly comply with the procedures laid
down in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations regarding the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items.
Non-compliance therewith, he argues, casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and
the identity of the suspected shabu allegedly bought and confiscated from him.
On the matter of handling the confiscated illegal drugs after a buy-bust operation,
Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 provides:

Our Ruling
We find no merit in the appeal.
Credibility of witnesses not affected by minor inconsistencies.
Appellant points out inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Espejo and Arce, to wit: (1) Espejo testified that he found the aluminum foils and
the marked money tucked on appellants waistline while Arce testified that he saw
Espejo frisk appellant and found the specimen in the latters pocket; (2) Espejo
stated that appellant was then wearing basketball shorts while Arce described him
as wearing a six-pocket short pants. Appellant argues that these inconsistent
statements render Espejo and Arce incredible witnesses.
The Court is not convinced. While there are indeed minor contradictions in Espejo
and Arces testimonies, the same are nevertheless inconsequential and do not
detract from the proven elements of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
As the CA correctly observed:
The foregoing inconsistencies, however, relate only to minor matters and do not
touch on the essence of the crime. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncement by
the Supreme Court that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies
of witnesses referring to minor details which do not touch the essence of the crime
do not impair their credibility.15
It is now too well-settled to require extensive documentation that "inconsistencies in
the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral
matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the
accused."16Significantly, in the case at bench, the testimonies of the said witnesses
for the prosecution were in harmony with respect to their positive identification of

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;
Accordingly, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165
which implements the afore-quoted provision reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items;
Case law has it that non-compliance with the abovequoted provision of RA 9165 and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations is not fatal and will not render an accuseds
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. "What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of

the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused."17
In the present case, the totality of the prosecutions evidence shows the integrity of
the drugs seized to be intact.1wphi1The identity of the drugs was proven and the
chain of its custody and possession has been duly accounted for and not broken.
This can be gleaned from the testimonies of Espejo and Arce who narrated that from
the moment the items were seized from appellant, the same were brought to the
police station where Espejo marked them with his initials "MC-1," "MC-2" and "MC3," properly inventoried, and, together with the laboratory request, were
immediately delivered by Espejo himself to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. Police Inspector
Melanie Joy Ordoo conducted an examination on the specimens submitted with the
corresponding markings and concluded that the three heat sealed transparent
plastic sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
drug. Incidentally, this conclusion is bolstered by the defenses admission 18 of the
existence and due execution of the request for laboratory examination, the
Chemistry Report and the specimens submitted. Moreover, Espejo, when confronted
during trial, identified the three plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance as the very same items confiscated from the appellant. 19 Under the
situation, this Court finds no circumstance whatsoever that would hint any doubt as
to the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the items subject matter of this
case. "Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless
there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with"20 and in such case, the burden of proof rests on the appellant.21 Here,
appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden. Moreover, and as aptly observed
by the CA, appellant did not seasonably question these procedural gaps before the
trial court. Suffice it to say that objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.22

Penalty
Section 5 of RA 9165 provides the penalty for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
viz:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transporation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. -The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of the law, appellant was properly
sentenced by the lower courts to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine off P500,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 22, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 03348, which affirmed the Decision dated January 31, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union in Criminal Case No.
7555 finding accused-appellant SHERWIN BIS y AVELLANEDA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine
off P500,000.00, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

In fine, the prosecutions evidence positively identified appellant as the seller of

white crystalline substance found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,
a dangerous drug, for P1,000.00 to Espejo, a police officer who acted as a poseurbuyer in a buy-bust operation. The plastic sachets containing the said substance
presented during the trial as Exhibits "F-1 to F-3" were positively identified by
Espejo as the same substance which were sold and delivered to him by appellant
during the said operation.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

Appellants defense of denial properly rejected.

Appellants defense hinges principally on denial. But such a defense is unavailing
considering that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate buy-bust
operation. "The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed
by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common
and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act."23

G.R. No. 200304

January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The prosecutions version of the events was primarily drawn from the testimonies of
P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.

The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated May 31, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201. Said decision affirmed with
modification the Joint Decision2 dated August 6 2009 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which
convicted the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and
illegal possession of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of Section 15
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,3 which was allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute
any regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or
offer for sale, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams,
45.34 grams, 51.45 grams, 41.32 grams and 20.14 grams or with a total weight of
TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-EIGHT (247.98) grams contained in
six (6) transparent plastic sachets of white crystalline substance known as "Shabu"
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug. 4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an alleged violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,5 which was said to be
committed in this manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and
there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control 1.61 grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10
grams, 0.17 grams, 0.21 grams, 0.24 grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams,
[0].51 grams or all with a total weight of four point zero three grams of white
crystalline substance contained in twelve (12) transparent plastic sachets known as
"SHABU" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription thereof.6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 23.
Upon motion7 of the appellant, however, said case was allowed to be consolidated
with Criminal Case No. 98-164174 in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41.8 On
arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. 9 The pre-trial
conference of the cases was held on July 27, 1998, but the same was terminated
without the parties entering into any stipulation of facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the
following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Jean Fajardo, 11 (2) P/Insp.
Marilyn Dequito,12 and (3) Police Officer (PO) 2 Christian Trambulo.13Thereafter, the
defense presented in court the testimonies of: (1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y
Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina Arejado,15 and (3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecutions Case

P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential

informant went to their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was
engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an
employee of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant,
alias Don promised him a good commission if he (the informant) would present a
potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the commanding officer of their office.
P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buy-bust
against alias Don. She formed a team on the same day, which consisted of herself,
PO2 Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa.
P/Insp. Fajardo was the team leader. With the help of the informant, she was able to
set up a meeting with alias Don. The meeting was to be held at around 9:00 p.m.
on that day at Cindys Restaurant located in Welcome Rotonda. She was only
supposed to meet alias Don that night but she decided to bring the team along for
security reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting
place with the informant. The members of her team positioned themselves
strategically inside the restaurant. The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias
Don as the buyer of shabu. She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of
the NBI and he replied in the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein she
would buy 250 grams of shabu forP250,000.00. They also agreed to meet the
following day at Cindys Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindys
Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her outside the establishment when
she arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she had the money with
her. She brought five genuine P500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five
bundles of play money to make it appear that she had P250,000.00 with her. After
she showed the money to alias Don, he suggested that they go to a more secure
place. They agreed for the sale to take place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3,
1998 in front of alias Dons apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The
team proceeded to the Western Police District (WPD) Station along U.N. Avenue for
coordination. Afterwards, the team held their final briefing before they proceeded to
the target area. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to
scratch her hair, which would signify that the deal had been consummated and the
rest of the team would rush up to the scene. The team then travelled to the address
given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the
two vehicles they used were parked along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo
and the informant walked towards the apartment of alias Don and stood in front of
the apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a
male companion. Alias Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told
him that she wanted to see the drugs first. Alias Don gave her the big brown
envelope he was carrying and she checked the contents thereof. Inside she found a
plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in size, which contained white crystalline
substance. After checking the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same
was indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched
her hair to signal the rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo

identified herself as a narcotics agent. The two suspects tried to flee but PO2
Trambulo was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the
shabu. When she asked alias Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell
shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF" on the
genuine P500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the arrest of the two
suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The suspects rights
were read to them and they were subsequently booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the appellant
Donald Vasquez. She learned of his name when he brought out his NBI ID while he
was being booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the name of the appellants
companion was Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police
station. P/Insp. Fajardo explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the
appellant, the latter handed the same to Siscar who was present the entire time the
sale was being consummated. Upon receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a
green plastic bag, Siscar looked at the contents thereof and uttered "okey na to."
P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the same to the Crime
Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1 Agravante. She
handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then turned it over to P/Insp.
Taduran, the forensic chemist on duty. The police officers previously weighed the
drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at the crime laboratory weighed the
specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the results of the
laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the
buy-bust operation were actually contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed
inside a brown envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated from the
appellant, she put her initials "JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there
were markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga"
but she did not bother to check out what they were for or who made them. When
she interrogated the appellant about the brown envelope, she found out that the
same was submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also learned that
the appellant worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She
identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her team recovered, which
sachets she also initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also stated that after the
appellant was arrested, PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the two
suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant.
The 12 sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a white envelope. P/Insp.
Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the envelope. As to the 12 sachets, the
same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed by PO2 Trambulo. 22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardos. PO2
Trambulo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant
reported to them about the illegal drug activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay
then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo to form a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to
set up a meeting with alias Don at Cindys Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon
City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp. Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp.
Fajardo later told the members of the team that she convinced alias Don that she
was a good buyer of shabu and the latter demanded a second meeting to see the
money. After the initial meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay about
what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo was
furnished with five genuine P500.00 bills together with the boodle play money.
P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials in the genuine bills below the name "Benigno
Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the office. When they arrived at Cindys

Restaurant past 10:00 p.m., alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed
the boodle money to alias Don and after some time, they parted ways. P/Insp.
Fajardo later told the team that alias Don decided that the drug deal would take
place in front of alias Dons rented apartment on Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. After
an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize themselves with the area. They
then proceeded to the WPD station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp.
Fajardo conducted a final briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the
immediate back-up arresting officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp.
Fajardo to scratch her hair to indicate the consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo
was to signal the same to the other members of the team. 23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3,
1998. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the direction of alias Dons
apartment, while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself near a parked jeepney about 15
to 20 meters from the apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at
the street perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the gate with
another person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if
asking for something but P/Insp. Fajardo gestured that she wanted to see
something first. Alias Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope, which the
latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to alias Don a green plastic bag
containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal. When PO2
Trambulo saw this, he immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to
the suspects. He was able to recover the buy-bust money from alias Dons male
companion. Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic
sachets of suspected drugs. The same were placed inside a white envelope that was
tucked inside alias Dons waist. PO2 Trambulo marked each of the 12 sachets with
his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers then informed the suspects of
their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio. 24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter
retained possession thereof. The envelope contained six pieces of plastic bags of
white crystalline substance. When they got back to their office, the team reported
the progress of their operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were
booked and the required documentations were prepared. Among such documents
was the Request for Laboratory Examination of the drug specimens seized. PO2
Trambulo said that he was the one who brought the said request to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, along with the drug specimens.25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her
examination of the drug specimens seized in this case. She explained that P/Insp.
Macario Taduran, Jr. initially examined the drug specimens but the latter was
already assigned to another office. The results of the examination of P/Insp.
Taduran were laid down in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito
first studied the data contained in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98 and
retrieved the same from their office. She entered that fact in their logbook RD-1798. She then weighed the drug specimens and examined the white crystalline
substance from each of the plastic sachets. She examined first the specimens
marked as "A-1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequitos
examination revealed that the white crystalline substances were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also examined the contents of 12 heatsealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained crystalline substances. The 12
plastic sachets were marked "B-1" to "B-12." The white crystalline powder inside
the 12 plastic sachets also tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

P/Insp. Dequitos findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-1798.27

specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and his wallet
containing P2,530.00.

The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary

evidence: (1) photocopies of the five original P500.00 bills28 used as buy-bust
money (Exhibits A-E); (2) Request for Laboratory Examination 29 dated April 3, 1998
(Exhibit F); (3) Initial Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the
specimen submitted for examination tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order31 dated September 2, 1998 (Exhibit H);
(5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-1071-9832 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6)
Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O); (7) Big brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8)
Small white envelope (Exhibit Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC);
(10) Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint Affidavit of
Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report35 (Exhibit GG); (14) Request for Medical Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15)
Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip 38 of
Reynaldo Siscar (Exhibit JJ).

Angelina Arejado, Donalds neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the

apartment and apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from the apartment
terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)

The Defenses Case

As expected, the defense belied the prosecutions version of events. The appellants
brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a concise summary of the defenses
counter-statement of facts. According to the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory Aide II
at the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His duties at the time included being a
subpoena clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from different police
agencies to have their specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day
and night duties, and during regular office hours and in the absence of the
laboratory technician, he would weigh the specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would
receive subpoenas from the trial courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a
Special Order to testify, or bring the drug specimens, to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial Statistics
between 6:00 to 9:00 oclock p.m. Thereafter, he took a jeepney and alighted at
Stop and Shop at Quiapo. From there, he took a tricycle to his house, arriving at
9:45 oclock that evening, where he saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the
latter a confidential informant of the narcotics agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 oclock in the morning, Donalds household help, Anatolia
Caredo, who had just arrived from Antipolo that time, was eating while Donald was
asleep. She heard a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and
thereafter two (2) men entered, poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by
three (3) others. The door to Donalds room was kicked down and they entered his
room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun at him.
He saw that there were six (6) policemen searching his room, picking up what they
could get. One of them opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donalds]
possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two (2)
cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned
by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope marked as
DD-93-1303 was intended for presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug

The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form 41 dated
April 3, 1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel Bernabe
Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3) Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List
of Hearings44 attended by Donald Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization
Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director Arturo A. Figueras dated March 27,
1998 (Exhibit 5); and (6) List of Evidence46 taken by Donald Vasquez from 19961998 (Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC
gave more credence to the prosecutions evidence given that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was
not overcome. The trial court held that the appellant did not present any evidence
that would show that the police officers in this case were impelled by an evil motive
to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify against him. Also, the trial
court noted that the volume of the shabu involved in this case was considerable,
i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal sale and illegal possession,
respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact helped to dispel the possibility
that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police officers.
Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the police officers
regarding the illegal drug peddling activities of the appellant prevailed over the
latters bare denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up by the
police, the trial court pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper authorities, or
asked help from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and
identify in Court the xerox copy of the Disposition Form which she issued to the
accused and the Affidavit dated April 17, 1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from
Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting Deputy Director, Technical Services of the NBI to
testify and identify the Letter issued by the said Acting Deputy Director in order to
corroborate and strengthen his testimony that he was indeed authorized to keep in
his custody the said shabu to be presented or turned over to the Court as evidence,
and he should have filed the proper charges against those police officers who were
responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to do the same.
Further, the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel] Pagulayan
and Letter dated March 27, 1998 issued by Acting Deputy Director) presented by
the accused in Court could not be given weight and credence considering that the
said persons were not presented in Court to identify the said documents and that
the prosecution has no opportunity to cross-examine the same, thus, it has no
probative value.47
The trial court, thus, decreed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y
SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.
2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P5,000,000.00; and
2. In Crim. Case No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III in Relation to
Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as Amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FOUR THOUSAND
(P4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby
forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), upon the finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The
appellate court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp.
Fajardo on the conduct of the buy-bust operation was found to be clear and
categorical. As the appellant failed to adduce any evidence that tended to prove any
ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely charge the appellant, the Court
of Appeals held that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties on the part of the police officers had not been controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The
August 6, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila
in Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years,
four months and one day of prision correccional in its medium period, as
maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on
two grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done
by the police officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs
seized from him.51 He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant
or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact

that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest
against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the
evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti
of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant posits that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove
that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was
an employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with the
duty to bring drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this case, we
resolve to deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of
his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on
arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against
them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission
to the trial courts jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover
police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of
Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest
made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the
warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the
illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v.
Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain
view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if]
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot
pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of
his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs,
the following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer
and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a prosecution of
illegal sale of drugs, "what is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the
elements of illegal possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.58

In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established
that a buy-bust operation was legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3,
1998 to entrap the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified
the appellant as the one who sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were
contained in a big brown envelope for the price of P250,000.00. She likewise
identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the markings she placed
thereon after the same were seized from the appellant. When subjected to
laboratory examination, the white crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags
tested positive for shabu. We find that P/Insp. Fajardos testimony on the events
that transpired during the conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed and
straightforward. She was also consistent and unwavering in her narration even in
the face of the opposing counsels cross-examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the drug
specimens seized and the buy-bust money, P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to
the recovery from the appellant of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu.
After the latter was arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a
body search on the appellant. This search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more
plastic sachets, the contents of which also tested positive for shabu. The testimony
of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account
dovetailed the formers narration of events. Both police officers also identified in
court the twelve plastic sachets of shabu that were confiscated from the appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the
narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police
officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there be evidence to the contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to
ascribe, much less satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely incriminate him. The appellant
himself even testified that, not only did he not have any misunderstanding with
P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in fact did not know them
at all.60 In the absence of evidence of such ill motive, none is presumed to exist. 61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the
appellant to criminally or administratively charge the police officers herein for falsely
framing him up for selling and possessing illegal drugs. Such a move would not have
been a daunting task for the appellant under the circumstances. Being a regular
employee of the NBI, the appellant could have easily sought the help of his
immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him from his
predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence were mere
photocopies of documents that supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep
drug specimens in his custody. That the original documents and the testimonies of
the signatories thereof were not at all presented in court did nothing to help the
appellants case. To the mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant
failed to persuade amid the positive and categorical testimonies of the arresting
officers that the appellant was caught red-handed selling and possessing a
considerable amount of prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court
overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its
discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment of the facts and the
credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and
weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual

findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this
Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able
to establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III, in
relation to Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, state:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and
Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of
the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed. SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and
9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be
applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far
beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the

Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for

the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity. (Emphases supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of regulated
drugs, the appellant was found to have sold to the poseur-buyer in this case a total
of 247.98 grams of shabu, which amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams
required by the law for the imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be
aggravating circumstances, the death penalty.

considering that in Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a
conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. 65
Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the
appellant was a regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such
fact, however, cannot be taken into consideration to increase the penalties in this
case to the maximum, in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.66 Such a special aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which arises
under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum
period,67 was not alleged and charged in the informations. Thus, the same was
properly disregarded by the lower courts.
All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the appellant.

Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.1wphi1 Thus, in this case, considering that no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances attended the appellants violation of Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals correctly
affirmed the trial courts imposition of reclusion perpetua. The P5,000,000.00 fine
imposed by the RTC on the appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 98164175, the Court of Appeals properly invoked our ruling in People v. Tira 64 in
determining the proper imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in Tira that:
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable
penalty of possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu,
is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated
drug subject of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY

IMPOSABLE PENALTY

Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams

prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams

prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams

reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams

reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)

Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the
appellant amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision
correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance in this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant
should be the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper
imposable penalty. In Criminal Case No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176830

February 11, 2014

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his
capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U.
VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185587
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained skeletal remains of individuals believed
to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members
of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military
informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct invocation of
this Courts jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these petitions considering that
petitioners have chosen to take recourse directly before us and that the cases are of
significant national interest.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require
consideration. Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and economy,
this Court will pass primarily upon the following:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

G.R. No. 185636

RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190005
VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION

2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed

under the political offense doctrine.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2 seeking the annulment of the
orders and resolutions of public respondents with regard to the indictment and
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners for the crime of multiple murder.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu
(Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12
undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero). 3 The letters requested appropriate
legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners
herein along with several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade
of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio
Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.4Recovered from the grave site
were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation
VD.5

The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional Office 8 was
immediately dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct crime investigation, and
to collect, preserve and analyze the skeletal remains.6 Also, from 11-17 September
2006, an investigation team composed of intelligence officers, and medico-legal and
DNA experts, conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from alleged relatives
of the victims DNA samples for matching.7
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard to the
identities of the skeletal remains and even the length of time that they had been
buried. The report recommended the conduct of further tests to confirm the
identities of the remains and the time window of death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case Secretariat of the
Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with the
names of ten (10) possible victims after comparison and examination based on
testimonies of relatives and witnesses.11
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation
VD. All of them swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again.
They also expressed belief that their relatives remains were among those
discovered at the mass grave site.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad, 12 Leonardo C.
Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P.
Tabara. They narrated that they were former members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.14 Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo
(Ocampo),15 Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),17 and
Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18 were then members of the Central Committee.

those of their witnesses.22 Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counteraffidavit.23 Petitioners Echanis24 and Baylosis25 did not file counter-affidavits because
they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of
appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary investigation. 26 However,
petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served
a subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing
of an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein, for the death of the following: 1)
Juanita Aviola, 2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5)
Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin Dalmacio, 9)
Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11) Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13)
Ciriaco Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado, and 15) Ereberto Prado.29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as
state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital to the success of the
prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent with regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge
Abando) on 28 February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of the Resolution
recommending the filing of the Information.32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." 33 He ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their
temporary liberty.34

According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to implement

Operation VD, namely, (1) the Intel Group responsible for gathering information on
suspected military spies and civilians who would not support the movement; (2) the
Arresting Group charged with their arrests; (3) the Investigation Group which would
subject those arrested to questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or the
"cleaners" of those confirmed to be military spies and civilians who would not
support the movement.19

On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R.
No. 176830 seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and
the 16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the
unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition. 36

From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and
executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant to Operation VD.21

Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others
(including petitioners Echanis and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-944 was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC
Makati).39 Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues
that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the

On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a
subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and

crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in

furtherance of rebellion.40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition
and the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary
injunction, and set42 the case for oral arguments on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed
its Comment on 27 March 2007.43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral
arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper
remedy of petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process
during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of
arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the
rebellion charge against him in the RTC.44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10
days.45 On 3 April 2007, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner
Ocampo under a P100,000 cash bond.46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single
Information filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15
counts of murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and
New Informations on 11 April 2007.47 In an Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge
Abando held in abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended the
proceedings during the pendency of G.R. No. 176830 before this Court. 48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28
January 2008 by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March
2007.49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the
Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant. 50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.51 Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration 52 dated 30 May 2008, but
before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order dated 12 June
2008 transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of the Clerk
of Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance with the Resolution
dated 23 April 2008 of this Court granting the request of then Secretary of Justice
Raul Gonzales to transfer the venue of the case.

The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by Judge
Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP Custodial Center in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their
Supplemental Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration.55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the proceedings of
the case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to
Quash and/or Dismiss.57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment
of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of
Judge Medina.58 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185587, prayed for the
unconditional and immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the issuance of
a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain his further
incarceration.59
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the
annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008
Order of Judge Medina.60 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185636, prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner Baylosis. 61
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009. 62
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two cases
with G.R. No. 176830.63 We required64 the OSG to comment on the prayer for
petitioner Echaniss immediate release, to which the OSG did not interpose any
objection on these conditions: that the temporary release shall only be for the
purpose of his attendance and participation in the formal peace negotiations
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009; and that his temporary release shall
not exceed six (6) months.65 The latter condition was later modified, such that his
temporary liberty shall continue for the duration of his actual participation in the
peace negotiations.66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis
under a P100,000 cash bond, for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace
negotiations.67

Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition 68 to petitioner

Ladlads motion to quash before the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing
on the motion on 13 February 2009.69
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the motion to quash. The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied on 27 August
2009.71
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May
2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge Medina.72 The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with G.R.
Nos. 176830, 185587 and 185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its comment
thereon. The OSG submitted its Comment74 on 7 May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R. Nos.
185636 and 185587.75 These Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December
201076 and on 21 January 2011,77 respectively. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed
their Consolidated Reply78 on 7 June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail. 79 On 21 July
2011, petitioner Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail. 80 The OSG
interposed no objection to the grant of a P100,000 cash bail to them considering
that they were consultants of the NDFP negotiating team, which was then holding
negotiations with the GRP peace panel for the signing of a peace accord. 81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and
fixed their bail in the amount ofP100,000, subject to the condition that their
temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the
peace negotiations.82
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013.
OUR RULING
Petitioners were accorded due
process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
A. Preliminary Investigation

A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." 84 It is conducted to protect the

innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. 85 While the
right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.86
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails
the opportunity to be heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity for the
presentation of the respondents side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the
investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a
reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent
who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the
complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
evidence in support of one's defense."88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to
be heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present ones own side of
the story cannot claim denial of due process.90
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad claims that
he was not served a subpoena due to the false address indicated in the 12 undated
letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor
Vivero.92 Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their formal entry of
appearance before the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a
subpoena through his counsels addresses.93 Thus, they were deprived of the right
to file counter-affidavits.
Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp.
Almaden and Army Captain Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit
of Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case without furnishing petitioner Ocampo a
copy.94 The original affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 14 September 2006 stated
that a meeting presided by petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the launching
of Operation VD was agreed upon.95Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his
Counter-affidavit dated 22 December 2006 stating that he was in military custody
from October 1976 until his escape in May 1985.96 Thereafter, the Supplemental
Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 12 January 2007 admitted that he made a
mistake in his original affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place in June
1985.97 Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied the opportunity to reply to the
Supplemental Affidavit by not being furnished a copy thereof.
Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter
deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution by 19 days, effectively denying
petitioner Ocampo his right to due process.98

As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent portion
of Prosecutor Viveros Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last
known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their
witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they
could no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas.
On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and
Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and
Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
appearance by their respective counsels.99
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be
subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given
an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation
remains valid.100The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a
respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.101

case."106 Having opted to remain passive during the preliminary investigation,

petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since
their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampos allegation of collusion to
surreptitiously insert the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records.
There was nothing surreptitious about the Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly
alludes to an earlier affidavit and admits the mistake committed regarding the date
of the alleged meeting. The date of the execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was
also clearly stated. Thus, it was clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo
had submitted his counter-affidavit. Should the case go to trial, that will provide
petitioner Ocampo with the opportunity to question the execution of Zacarias
Piedads Supplemental Affidavit.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was denied the right
to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished
a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire
case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted
that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of
several other witnesses107 attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas
on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due
process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their
last known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the
attached documents or evidence.

As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to
appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of
the Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of
receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This
is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:

Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address "53
Sct. Rallos St., QC,"102 which had never been his address at any time. 103 In
connection with this claim, we take note of the fact that the subpoena to Fides Lim,
petitioner Ladlads wife,104 was sent to the same address, and that she was among
those mentioned in the Resolution as having timely submitted their counteraffidavits.

Sec. 3. Period to appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/
reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis
supplied)

Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlads counsel filed a

formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006.105 Prosecutor Vivero had a reason
to believe that petitioner Ladlad had received the subpoena and accordingly
instructed his counsel to prepare his defense.

Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12

March 2007,108 the former had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a
motion for reconsideration before the latter or an appeal before the Secretary of
Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition for certiorari
directly before this Court on 16 March 2007.

Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsels formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to
participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.

B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest

We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not

expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the

judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements
of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners.109
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested."110 Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for
the determination thereof.111 In fact, the judges personal examination of the
complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining
the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and
supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his
evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and
require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining
its existence.113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly
examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have
inevitably dismissed the charge against them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo
alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in the record that
were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. 115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial
judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial judges in the
issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v.
Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule,
be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will
not lie to cure errors in the trial court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties,
the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as the
conclusions of law. x x x.
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the
Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or
evidence appended to the Information.

Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits
of the complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no
probable cause for petitioners indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of
warrants for their arrest. As stated above, the trial judges appreciation of the
evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered with in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he sufficiently complies with the
requirement of personal determination if he reviews the [I]nformation and the
documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the
accused is probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged." 118
Judge Abandos review of the Information and the supporting documents is shown
by the following portion of the judges 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by
the Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the following documents:
Affidavits of Complainants, Sworn Statements of Witnesses and other pertinent
documents issued by the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, PNP, Region VIII and
Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures of the grave site and skeletal remains, this court
has the findings [sic] of probable cause in the commission by all mentioned accused
of the crime charged.119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and
issuance of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily
questions of fact that are normally not within the purview of a petition for
certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a
ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of
a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume
the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." 121
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing
is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of
rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion
alone.

However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge
respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the
well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the institution of criminal
charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion
of the public prosecutor.123

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been
simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of
the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in
double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it
becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in
furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be
conclusively demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in
furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind
the alleged murders can be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top
leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused
knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the
accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is
not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v.
CA,126 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were
indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with
leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of
its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information
upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section
19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The
court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
(Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has

been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first
jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is
for the same offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or
the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent,
by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid
plea during arraignment.128
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against
petitioners and several others.129
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944.1awp+
+i1 Even before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati,
petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition before this
Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for the
inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and
independence.130 When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and
Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No.
06-944.131We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then
that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the P100,000 cash bond
posted before the Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty
until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila.1wphi1

The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis,
Baylosis and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional
release from detention under the cash bond of P100,000 each shall continue under
the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their
actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the
government or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila,
whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty of the government to inform this Court the
moment that peace negotiations are concluded.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila,
Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of
Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on
temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until the termination of
the proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G.
Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail
granted by this Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the
peace negotiations with the government are concluded or terminated, or until the
termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 202122

January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEOANRDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19,
2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03794, which
affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness meted out by
Branch 113, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556CFM and 04-1557-CFM.2
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted
Rape. The Informations for the three charges read as follows:
I. For the two counts of Rape:

Criminal Case No. 04-15 5 6-CFM

That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the common law spouse of the minor
victims mother, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of
[AAA3], a minor 13 years of age, by then and there mashing her breast and
inserting his finger inside her vagina against her will.4
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the stepfather of [AAA], a
minor 13 years of age, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said minor against her
will.5
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
Criminal Case No. 04-1558-CFM
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the common law spouse of minor victims
mother by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape against
the person of minor, [AAA], a13 years old minor by then and there crawling towards
her direction where she was sleeping, putting off her skirt, but did not perform all
the acts of execution which would have produce[d] the crime of rape for the reason
other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor
victims mother who confronted the accused, and which acts of child abuse debased,
degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor complainant
as a human being.6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges
filed against him.7 After the completion of the pre-trial conference on September 16,
2004,8 trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and
sexual abuse took place on three (3) different dates, particularly [in December
2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.

AAAs parents separated when she was [only eight years old 9]. At the time of the
commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with
herein accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her
mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and
nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident].
AAAs mother was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking
advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of
[her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then
started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his
penis into AAAs anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA
immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December
2003] incident for fear that [Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in
the event that she would expose the incident to anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than
once. According to AAA, in February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had
again been molested by [Pareja]. Under the same circumstances as the [December
2003 incident], with her mother not around while she and her half-siblings were
asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this
time, [Pareja] caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.
With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it
was AAAs mother who saw [Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter
AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAAs mother immediately brought AAA
to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated to the
barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x
x x.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit
of the Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March
29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional Medico-Legal Report Number 2004-03-0091.
Her medico-legal report stated the following conclusion:
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5-7 oclock area, Type of hymen:
Crescentic
xxxx
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medico-legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped,
AAAs mother then filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.

To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA
against him as his defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her
as she is the daughter of his live-in partner and that they all stay in the same
house.
Contrary to AAAs allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible
that the alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the
layout of their house and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual
abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters
wide by ten (10) meters, and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit
inside the house. Further, the vicinity where their house is located was thickly
populated with houses constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice
but to sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he
could possibly still go about with his plan without AAAs siblings nor their neighbors
noticing the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled
against him by AAA. He contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as
an act of revenge because AAA was mad at [him] for being the reason behind her
parents separation.10

The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum
of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave
more weight to the prosecutions evidence as against Parejas baseless denial and
imputation of ill motive. However, due to the failure of the prosecution to present
AAAs mother to testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had
to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack
of evidence. The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAAs testimony for
being hearsay evidence as she had no personal knowledge of what happened on
March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals,
which on January 19, 2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal
Case Nos. 04-1556 and 04-1557, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED and, consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by
Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region in
Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 04-1556 to 04-1557 are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14
Issues

Ruling of the RTC

On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape
but convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December
2003 and February 2004 incidents, respectively. The dispositive portion of the
Decision11 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from
the charge of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 04-1558, for want of evidence.
In Crim. Case No. 04-1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of
Lasciviousness and he is meted out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision
[correccional] as maximum.

Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court 15 and posited before us the
following errors as he did before the Court of Appeals:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON
THE PROSECUTION WITNESS TESTIMONY.16

In Crim. Case No. 04-1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape,
and he is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:

The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.

The private complainants actuations after the incident negate the possibility that
she was raped.18

Parejas main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony
of AAA in convicting him for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is
attacking the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA
acted as if nothing happened after the alleged sexual abuse.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Parejas conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAAs testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it
was riddled with inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow
certain guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v.
Sanchez,20 we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of
the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of
a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position
to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower
courts findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting
the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the
RTC. (Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique
opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a
vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this
Court."21 While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no
substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate
courts on the matter of AAAs credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony are generally
expected.22 As this Court stated in People v. Saludo23:

Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such
an offense is not analogous to a persons achievement or accomplishment as to be
worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological
wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which
her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim
cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the
traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a
testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness.24 The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential
matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The
inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter
pertaining to AAAs ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of
rape becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of
the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other
words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the
accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge on the
date of the commission of the crime."26 Moreover, the date of the commission of the
rape is not an essential element of the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v.
Ladrillo,28 implying that our rulings therein are applicable to his case. However, the
factual circumstances in Ladrillo are prominently missing in Parejas case. In
particular, the main factor for Ladrillos acquittal in that case was because his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him was violated when the Information against him only stated that the crime was
committed "on or about the year 1992." We said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule
110, of the Rules Court which requires that the time of the commission of the
offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint
will permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The Information is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accusedappellant of the date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12)
months of 1992 but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991
and 1993, for which accused-appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts.
Hence, the failure of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the
commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of
the commission of the offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accusedappellant of his right to intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly refute
the charges against him. At most, accused-appellant could only establish his place
of residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for the particular time
he supposedly committed the rape.

xxxx
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that
accused-appellant raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the
commission of the offense as alleged was based merely on speculation and
conjecture, and a conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of
evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the
Information.29 (Citation omitted.)
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents
were not specified, the period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short,
unlike "on or about the year 1992." Moreover, Ladrillo was able to prove that he had
only moved in the house where the rape supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore
negating the allegation that he raped the victim in that house in 1992. 30
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim in
Ladrillo contributed to his eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were
not enough to reverse Ladrillos conviction, viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness testimony that
militates heavily against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial
court. Considered independently, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial
courts judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in
relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they
exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment. 31 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the
crime charged against him to exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi,
which, together with the other evidence, produced reasonable doubt that he
committed the crime as charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the accusations
against him and even imputed ill motive on AAA.
As regards Parejas concern about AAAs lone testimony being the basis of his
conviction, this Court has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be
sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and
reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the
accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single
witness in a rape case.32 (Citations omitted.)
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAAs sleeping siblings

Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA,
considering that their house was so small that they had to sleep beside each other,
that in fact, when the alleged incidents happened, AAA was sleeping beside her
younger siblings, who would have noticed if anything unusual was happening. 33
This Court is not convinced. Parejas living conditions could have prevented him
from acting out on his beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed
that many of the rape cases appealed to us were not always committed in seclusion.
Lust is no respecter of time or place,34 and rape defies constraints of time and
space. In People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor
couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
problem despite the presence of other persons around them. Considering the
cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to
quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of
family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible
to copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor
incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while
the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing children
sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions
and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellants contention that there
can be no rape in a room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape
can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that "lust is no
respecter of time and place," and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of
places. (Citations omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAAs demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was
raped. He said that "the ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of
her strength and courage to thwart any attempt to besmirch her honor and blemish
her purity." Pareja pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area such that
any commotion inside their house would have been easily heard by the neighbors,
thus, giving AAA the perfect opportunity to seek their help. 36 Moreover, Pareja said,
AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the authorities negates the
possibility that he indeed committed the crimes. AAAs belated confession, he
claimed, "cannot be dismissed as trivial as it puts into serious doubt her
credibility."37
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by
shifting the blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse.
However, this Court has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be
expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure
of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will
not imply that the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that

person was intimidated into submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is
committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse,
moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.38 In this case, AAAs lack
of resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his
threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the incident.
AAAs conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by
Pareja is also not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape,
cannot be expected to act within reason or in accordance with societys
expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an
irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act
as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a
human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there
is a standard reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of
them had to cope with different circumstances.39
Likewise, AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper
authorities is insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should
be remembered that Pareja threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the incidents.
In People v. Ogarte,40 we explained why a rape victims deferral in reporting the
crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons
close to her or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the
conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges against the
accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is
not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file
criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain,
rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders making good their
threats to kill or hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt
force or penetrating trauma upon examination of AAAs hymen, "cannot be given
any significance, as it failed to indicate how and when the said signs of physical
trauma were inflicted." Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAAs hymen
sustained trauma cannot be utilized as evidence against him as the alleged sexual
abuse that occurred in December, was not by penetration of the vagina. 41
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the
basis of the sole testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado, 42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.

Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to

conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAAs anus
at the time she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical
examination actually bolsters AAAs claim of being raped by Pareja on more than
one occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution failed
to capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja
cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young
and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially
of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed
against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly
improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the
world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not
true. (Citations omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was
charged and convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of
Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the concept of
rape with the recognition of sexual violence on "sex-related" orifices other than a
womans organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crimes expansion to cover
gender-free rape. "The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of
rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of rape by sexual assault as
differentiated from the traditional rape through carnal knowledge or rape through
sexual intercourse."44Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on
rape in the Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,

another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital
or anal orifice of another person."

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse,
also known as "organ rape" or "penile rape."45 The central element in rape
through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.46
2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called
"instrument or object rape," or "gender-free rape." 47 It must be attended
by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of
paragraph 1.48
In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as
follows:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second,
the offender may be a man or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the
second, the offended party may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the
vagina, while the second is committed by inserting the penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital
or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the
second.
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by
sexual assault is "by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into

AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his
penis into her anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the
February 2004 incident, she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in
December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual assault.
In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the Court of Appeals found,
clear, positive, and probable.50
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is
rape through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual
assault even though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material
differences and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the
first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Consequently,
to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape
through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness
under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule
120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is
a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisin correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.53 (Citation
omitted.)
Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident,
and were sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged
against Pareja was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights
because said crime is included in the crime of rape.54
Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the
People of the Philippines, as represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more
diligence in crafting the Information, which contains the charge against an accused.
The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is done 55
to the State, that its penal laws are not broken and order maintained; to the victim,
that his or her rights are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished
for his crime. A faulty and defective Information, such as that in Criminal Case No.
04-1556-CFM, does not render full justice to the State, the offended party, and even
the offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should always see to it that the
Information is accurate and appropriate.
Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM:
The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the
prosecution against Pareja, especially AAAs testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found
AAAs declaration on the rape in the December 2003 incident credible enough to
result in a conviction, albeit this Court had to modify it as explained above.
However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt,
was fully satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second
count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, or the February
2004 incident, the RTC considered AAAs confusion as to whether or not she was
actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Parejas favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated
that aside from sucking her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina.

However, she was not able to give a clear and convincing account of such insertion
during her testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what
followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that
Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that
Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the
material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the
February 2004 incident. Nonetheless, Parejas acts of placing himself on top of AAA
and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we
have discussed above, is included in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked
both her breasts in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted
by the courts a quo of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with
the attribution of ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases
against him because she was angry that he caused her parents separation. Pareja
added that these cases were initiated by AAAs father, as revenge against him. 57
Such contention is untenable. "AAAs credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by
such imputation of ill motives.1wphi1 It is highly unthinkable for the victim to
falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge." 58Furthermore,
motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from
giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim. 59 In People v.
Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she
has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong
done to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are
given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is
prisin correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 61 the
minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the
penalty next lower in degree,62 i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and
1 day to 6 months.63 The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall come from
the proper penalty64 that could be imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of
Lasciviousness,65 which, in this case, absent any aggravating or mitigating

circumstance, is the medium period of prisin correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4

months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.66
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as
follows: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity;67 P30,000.00 as moral damages;
and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,68 for each count of acts of lasciviousness.
All amounts shall bear legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accusedappellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness,
defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He
is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum; and is
ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as
moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of acts of
lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.

G.R. No. 170462

February 5, 2014

RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 24,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28899. The CA affirmed, with
modification on the amount of damages, the joint decision 3 dated April 16, 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cauayan City, Isabela, finding Rodolfo
Guevarra and Joey Guevarra (petitioners) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.
Factual Antecedents
Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and
homicide under two Informations which read:

SO ORDERED.

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide:

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province
of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to
kill and without any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed
bolo one Erwin Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab
wounds on the different parts of his body, which injuries would ordinarily cause the
death of the said Erwin Ordonez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Erwin Ordonez, which
prevented his death.4
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province
of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to
kill and without any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed

bolo one David Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab
wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death. 5
Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8,
2000, the true date of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the
CA through the records.6 The parties failed to raise any objection to the
discrepancy.7
On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges. 8 The cases were
jointly tried with the conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre-trial,
the petitioners interposed self-defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a
reverse trial of the case.9
During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the events that
transpired on November 8, 2000.
Version of the Defense
To prove the petitioners' claim of self-defense, the defense presented the
testimonies of Rodolfo, Joey, and the petitioners' neighbor, Balbino Agustin.
Testimony of Rodolfo
Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11 :00
p.m., on November 8, 2000, brothers Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez, together
with their companion, Philip Vingua, forced their way into his compound and threw
stones at his house and tricycle. Through the back door of his house, Rodolfo went
down to the basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to stop. David saw
him, threatened to kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas," hitting him on the
palm of his left hand. Rodolfo responded by reaching for the bolo tucked in the
"so/era" of his house, and hacked and stabbed Erwin and David until the two
brothers fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin and David lying on the ground,
Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to the hospital. He stayed in his
house until the policemen arrived.
Testimony of Joey
Joey, who was then thirty-one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m.,
on November 8, 2000, he was awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at
their house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela. Through the window, he saw Erwin,
David and Philip breaking into their gate, which was made of wood and interlink
wire and located five ( 5) to six ( 6) meters away from their house. He then heard
his father Rodolfo say to the three men, "kung ano man ang problema bukas na
natin pag-usapan,"10 and David retorted in their dialect, "Okininam nga lakay adda
ka gayam dita, patayin taka."11

Testimony of Balbino
Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at
around 10:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he heard a person from the outside
saying "Sige banatan ninyo na."12 He opened his door and saw David, Erwin and
Philip throwing stones at the house of his neighbor Crisanto Briones. Briones got
mad and scolded the three men, "Why are you hitting my house? Why don't you hit
the house of your enemy, mga tarantado kayo!"13David, Erwin and Philip then aimed
their stones at the petitioners' house. Balbino heard David calling out to Joey, "Joey,
kung tunay kang lalaki lumabas ka diyan sa kalsada at dito tayo magpatayan," 14 but
no one came out of Rodolfo's house. The stoning lasted for about thirty (30)
minutes.
Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo's gate and pull the
gate towards the road. He heard David say to his companions, "koberan ninyo ako
at papasok kami."15 David, Erwin and Philip entered the petitioners' compound and
damaged Rodolfo's tricycle with stones and their ''panabas." Also, he heard Rodolfo
say to David in Filipino that they could just talk about their problems with him the
following day. But David approached Rodolfo and hacked him with a ''panabas."
Rodolfo parried the blow with the back of his hand, and David and Rodolfo struggled
for the possession of the ''panabas."
Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on his
right foot, causing Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the "silung" of their house from
where Rodolfo got "something shiny," and with it stabbed David and Erwin. He saw
the two brothers fall to the ground.
Version of the Prosecution
As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who
survived the hacking.
Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his
brother David and Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the
petitioners' compound. He was walking twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions
when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David was being stabbed by Joey
with a bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was three (3)
meters away from where his brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then
hacked him, hitting his arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin
inside the petitioners' compound and kept on hacking him. He was hacked and
stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately fell to the ground.
Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged
Rodolfo's tricycle.1wphi1 They did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which
was only damaged when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled
by Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound. While they were being hacked and

stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained on them and people outside
the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come
out."16
After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital.
David died in the hospital while being treated for his wounds.
The RTC's Ruling
In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's
version of the incident and found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide. It disbelieved the defense's version
of the events due to material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense
witnesses. It denied the petitioners' claim of self-defense for lack of clear,
convincing and satisfactory supporting evidence.
The RTC explained in its decision that "[w]hen an accused invokes the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of innocence
and assumes the burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the
justification for his act";17 that self-defense is an affirmative allegation which must
be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that
excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking
it.18 The RTC held that the petitioners miserably failed to prove that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, Erwin and David.
Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes for which they are charged, and absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance/s that attended the commission of the
crimes, the Court hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer -In Criminal Case
No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from
Three (3) years and one day of prision correccional as minimum to Nine (9) years of
prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify the victim Erwin Ordonez moral
damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, without any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against the accused.
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging
from Eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to Fifteen (15) years
of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
David Ordonez Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos plus Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Costs against the accused.
The bail bonds of the accused are CANCELLED.

19

The CA's Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of the
crimes charged. As the RTC did, the CA found that Erwin and David committed no
unlawful aggression sufficient to provoke the actions of the petitioners; that
"aggression, to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent, such that there is a real
threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom that
person is seeking to defend."20 Even assuming the truth of the petitioners' claims
that David challenged Joey to a fight and threatened to kill Rodolfo on the night of
November 8, 2000, the CA held that these acts do not constitute unlawful
aggression to justify the petitioners' actions as no real or actual danger existed as
the petitioners were then inside the safety of their own home.
The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense was belied by the
nature and number of wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13) stab
wounds on his arm and back, and David, who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds
on his back and stomach causing his death. These wounds logically indicated that
the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined homicidal
aggression on the part of the petitioners. 21
The CA, however, found error in the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages
awarded by the RTC. Thus, the CA modified the RTC's decision in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Crim.
Case No. Br. 20-1561, appellants RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA are
each ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased David Ordonez the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P.50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages.22
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners raise the following issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELFDEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS
OF SELF-DEFENSE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION.

C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING PETITIONER JOEY GUEVARRA WHO HAS NO PARTICIPATION IN THE
SAID INCIDENT.23
Our Ruling
We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of
October 24, 2005.
At the outset, we emphasize that the Court's review of the present case is via a
petition for review under Rule 45, which generally bars any question pertaining to
the factual issues raised. The well-settled rule is that questions of fact are not
reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions,
among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court's judgment
or the appellate court's misapprehension of the adduced facts. 24
The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this
case. Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great
weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when
supported by the evidence on record.25 We find that both the RTC and the CA fully
considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they
have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the
petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.
In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain
facts and circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome of the present
case, we uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of
these crimes fully established during the trial.
The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an "accused intended to
kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the
victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code is present."26
On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed;
(2) the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and ( 4) the killing was not
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide.27
The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of
wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by the malefactors;

the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing
of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim.28 The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered
and which eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds
Erwin sustained, confirmed the prosecution's theory that the petitioners purposely
and vigorously attacked David and Erwin. 29
In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the
victim Erwin Ordonez would have caused his death were it not for immediate
medical attendance."30
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of
the acts for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven,
would have exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the
petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin,
respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the persons resorting to self-defense.31
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a
threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.32 The element of unlawful
aggression must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded.
There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim
had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to selfdefense.33
As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin
and David were just passing by the petitioners' compound on the night of November
8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by
Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the petitioners'
compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was destroyed. The
manner by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin's
testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged
into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with the nature and
number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did
not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in
fact, the real aggressors.
As to the penalties and damages
awarded
We affirm the penalties imposed upon the petitioners, as they are well within the
ranges provided by law, but modify the damages awarded by the CA.

In addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages

awarded by the CA, we awardP25,000.00 to each of the victims as temperate
damages, in lieu of the actual damages they sustained by reason of the crimes.
Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that temperate or moderate damages may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty.
Also, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate
of six percent ( 6%) per annum from date of finality of the decision until fully paid. 34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated October 24, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the petitioners are
also ordered to pay Erwin Ordonez and the heirs of David Ordonez the amount
of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The petitioners shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the
civil indemnity, moral and temperate damages from the finality of this decision until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188694

February 12, 2014

RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated November 28,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30650 which affirmed the

Decision3 dated June 8, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC)
in Criminal Case Nos. 01-197425 and 01-197426, finding petitioners Ricardo L.
Atienza (Atienza) and Alfredo A. Castro (Castro) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document.
The Facts
Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA, particularly assigned to
its Budget Division and holding the positions of Budget Officer I and Utility Worker
I,4 respectively, at the time material to this case.
On March 20, 1995, at about past noon,5 Juanito Atibula (Atibula), Records Officer I
and Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the CA Reporters Division, was invited
by Castro to attend Atienzas birthday party somewhere along Bocobo Street,
Ermita, Manila. At the party, Atienza introduced Atibula to a certain Dario and asked
him to assist the latter in searching for the CA decision 6 in the case entitled "Mateo
Fernando v. Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc."7 (Fernando), docketed as CA-G.R. No. 36808R.8
Thereafter, Atibula returned to the office followed a few minutes later by Dario
and searched for the aforementioned decision which was found compiled in Volume
260 of the CA Original Decisions. As Dario was scanning through the said volume,
Atibula observed that he was comparing its pages9 to the discolored papers he was
holding.10 Dario likewise scanned Volumes 265 and 267,11 and placed check marks
on the papers he was holding.12
On March 24, 1995, after office hours, Atibula saw Dario outside the CA compound
along Maria Orosa Street.13 As they walked side by side towards the jeepney stop,
Dario requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated September 26, 1968 in one of the
volumes of the CA Original Decisions. However, Atibula refused and immediately
left.14
On April 21, 1995, Atienza offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange
for Volume 260,15 which the latter turned down. Atienza then ridiculed him saying,
"duwag ka, pera na nga ito ayaw mo pa," to which Atibula retorted, "ikaw ang
duwag dahil nagpapakita ka ng kabuktutan."
Disturbed by the situation, Atibula reported the incident to Atty. Arnel
Macapagal16 (Atty. Macapagal), the Assistant Chief of the CA Reporters Division,
who then instructed him (Atibula) to hide Volumes 260, 265 and 267 17 in a safe
place.18
On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 26619 covering the period from
January 28 to February 12, 1969 was missing20 and, hence, immediately reported
the same to Atty. Macapagal. Two days after the discovery of the loss, Atibula
encountered Atienza near the canteen,21 shouting "[p]utang ina mo, Juaning,
pinahirapan mo kami!"22
On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporters
Division,23 handed to Atibula a bag containing a gift-wrapped package which turned

out to be the missing Volume 266. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to
deliver the said package to Atibula.24
Having been notified of Volume 266s return, Atty. Macapagal then directed Atibula
to ascertain who borrowed the volume. Records, however, disclosed no
one.25 Separately, Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of
the decisions and noticed that there were two new documents inserted
therein,26 namely: (a) a Resolution27dated February 11, 1969 (subject resolution),
ostensibly penned by Associate Justice Juan P. Enriquez (Justice Enriquez) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan and Edilberto Soriano,
recalling and setting aside the Entry of Judgment earlier issued in the Fernando
case; and (b) a Decision28 dated April 16, 1970 (subject decision), also ostensibly
penned by Justice Enriquez and concurred in by Associate Justices Jesus Y. Perez
and Jose M. Mendoza, amending the original decision dated September 26, 1968 in
the aforementioned case. Consequently, Atibula reported his findings to Atty.
Macapagal who, in turn, informed Atty. Gemma Leticia F. Tablate (Atty. Tablate),
then Chief of the CA Reporters Division, of the same. They tried to verify the
genuineness, authenticity and existence of the subject resolution and decision, and
found that the compilation of the duplicate original decisions/resolutions of Justice
Enriquez did not bear the said promulgations. Atty. Tablate reported the incident to
then CA Presiding Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr.29 who immediately requested the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation on the matter.30
Laboratory analysis and comparative examination of the subject resolution and
decision31 as well as of a decision in another case found in pages 906 to 922 of
Volume 266 of the CA Original Decisions were conducted by the NBI. 32As a result, it
issued its Questioned Documents Report No. 937-1295,33 finding that: (a) Volume
266 had indeed been altered;34 and (b) the signatures of the CA Justices in the
subject resolution and decision (questioned signatures) and their standard/sample
signatures "were not written by one and the same person," 35 leading to the
conclusion that the questioned signatures were forgeries. 36
Meanwhile, sometime in the second week of July 1995, an inspection of the airconditioning units at the office of the CA Reporters Division was conducted,
whereby it was discovered that the improvised angle bar supporting the air
conditioning unit at the right most end from the main door was corroded with rust
and the portion of the wall holding the same was broken ("may bak-bak na"). 37 NBI
Agents, Atty. Daniel D. Daganzo38 (Atty. Daganzo) and Norman R.
Decampong39 then conducted an ocular inspection of the premises, and, in the
course thereof, interviewed several personnel of the CA Maintenance Division. Said
investigation yielded the following findings: (a) there were no signs of forcible
entry;40 (b) the perpetrators gained entry to the office of the CA Reporters Division
"by passing through the hole on the concrete wall after removing the air
conditioning unit"41 located on the right most [sic] end from the main door; 42 (c)
there was conspiracy to commit the crime of Falsification of Public Document
between Atienza and Dario in view of their "concerted efforts through previous or
simultaneous acts and deeds;"43 and (d) Castro assisted Atienza and Dario "to profit
from the effects of the crime by returning safely the missing volume to the [CA
Reporters Division]."44 Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed by the NBI and
the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman against
Atienza, Castro, and Dario before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau of the OMB, docketed as OMB-0-97-2054,45 charging them for the following
crimes: (a) Falsification of Public Document; (b) violation of Section 3(a) 46 of

Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,47 as amended; and (c) violation of Section 848 of RA
6713.49
After investigation, the charges involving the pertinent provisions of RAs 3019 and
6713 were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence,50 but it was contrarily determined
that there existed probable cause to charge Atienza, Castro, and Dario 51 for the
crimes of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1)52 of the Revised Penal Code53 (RPC), as
amended, and of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) 54 in relation
to Article 171(6)55 of the same code. Thus, the corresponding
Informations,56 respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 01-197425 and 01197426, were filed before the RTC. Petitioners posted bail 57 and, thereafter, pleaded
"not guilty"58 to the charges during their arraignment, while Dario remained at
large.
In his defense, Atienza denied having anything to do with the questioned
incidents59 as he was not even summoned by the CA Clerk of Court or the Chief of
the Reporters Division,60 and became aware of the incident only when he and
Castro were subpoenaed by the NBI Special Investigators. 61 Further, he gave the
alibi that he was out of the office 4 days a week during the months of April to June
1995,62 reporting only on Fridays,63 since he had to perform his duties as Budget
Officer I of the CA Budget Division and Liaison Officer to the Department of Budget
and Management, the Committee on Appropriation of the Congress, Committee on
Appropriation of the lower house, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate and
the GSIS.

Fernando case were inserted in the said volume.69 The RTC further added that the
manner by which petitioners committed the felonious acts reveals a community of
criminal design, and thereby held that conspiracy exists. 70
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed their conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision71 dated November 28, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs judgment of
conviction in toto. It held that while there is no direct evidence showing that the
petitioners committed the crimes charged, the testimonies of Atibula and NBI Agent
Atty. Daganzo with respect to what had transpired before and after Volume 266 was
taken from its shelf, when viewed together with the other circumstances in the case,
constitute circumstantial evidence which sufficiently point to the guilt of
petitioners.72 In addition, it found that Atienzas defenses were self-serving negative
evidence which cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his
participation,73 adding too that while there was no proof of previous agreement
between petitioners to unlawfully take Volume 266 out of the office of the CA
Reporters Division and falsify the subject documents, their conspiracy may be
inferred from the fact that Castro was in possession of the missing Volume 266
which was eventually discovered to have been falsified. 74
Undaunted, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 75 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution76 dated July 7, 2009, hence, the instant petition.

On the other hand, Castro did not endeavor to refute the allegations in the
Informations filed against him and the other accused.64
The RTC Ruling
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision 65 on June 8, 2006, finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Robbery under Article
299(a)(1) of the RPC and Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) in
relation to Article 171(6) of the RPC, and sentenced them to each suffer: (a) the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for the first crime;
and (b) the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years
of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P5,000.00 for the second crime.
In convicting petitioners, the RTC found that "the evidence x x x of the prosecution
is replete with situations and/or events to prove [petitioners] guilt," 66 namely: (a)
Atienza requested Atibula to take out Volumes 260, 265 and 267 of the CA Original
Decisions from the CA Reporters Division, which the latter rejected despite offer of
remuneration; (b) Volume 266 was subsequently discovered to be missing; (c)
access to the missing volume appears to have been acquired by entering through an
opening in the premises of the CAs Reporters Division because the air conditioning
unit occupying the space thereat was taken out for repair earlier; (d) Castro
returned Volume 266 after its loss;67 (e) Volume 266 bore badges of tampering
evidenced by the "non-continuity of the front and the back cover flaps x x x and the
pages of the book/volume differences in the cutting marks on the sides of the
volume and the presence of artificial aging on [its] sides";68 and (f) two (2) new
documents which materially amended the original decision and resolution in the

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not petitioners conviction
for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document should be upheld on
account of the circumstantial evidence in this case proving their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common
experience.77 It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the
test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient
to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be
consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accuseds guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. 78

Applying these principles to the facts that appear on record, the Court finds that no
sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented in this case to establish the
elements of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1)79 of the RPC and Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6)80 of the same code, or
of petitioners supposed conspiracy therefor.
To this end, the Court examines the participation of and evidence against each
petitioner and forthwith explains its reasons for reaching the foregoing conclusions.
A. The Participation of and Evidence Against Castro
Notwithstanding Castros failure to refute the charges against him, the Court finds
no evidence to link him to the commission of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification
of Public Document, contrary to the conclusions reached by the RTC and concurred
in by the CA. To begin with, it is essential to note that Castros purported possession
and eventual return of Volume 266 was only premised upon the statement of one
Nelson de Castro (Nelson), i.e., the Sinumpaang Salaysay81 dated August 9, 1995,
who averred that on May 18, 1995, at around 11:50 in the morning, Castro told him
to pass by his office and there handed him a bag which, as it turned out, contained
the missing Volume 266, viz.:82
Noong Mayo 18, 1995 bandang 11:50 ng tanghali ay tumawag sa telepono si
ALFREDO CASTRO, ng Budget Division, at sinabihan ako na dumaan sa kanyang
opisina dahil mayroon daw siyang ibibigay para sa opisina namin. Pumunta po
naman ako kaagad kay ALFREDO CASTRO sa opisina at iniabot sa akin ang isang
bag na malaki kulay parang pink at may laman at sinabihan pa niya ako na buksan
ko na lang daw ang bag pagdating sa opisina. Pagdating ko sa opisina ay tinawag ko
si Mr. ATIBULA at doon ay binuksan naming dalawa ang bag. Nakita ko sa loob ang
isang bagay na nakabalot sa isang gift wrap at ng buksan namin o alisin ang gift
wrap ay ang Original Decisions, Volume 266 na nawawala mga ilang linggo na ang
nakakaraan.
Nelson was not, however, presented before the RTC during trial, hence, was not
subjected to any in-court examination. It is settled that while affidavits may be
considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public
(here, a public officer authorized to administer oaths), they are still classified as
hearsay evidence unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon and the adverse party is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine
them.83 With the prosecutions failure to present Nelson to affirm his statement that
Castro caused the return of Volume 266,84 the prosecutions evidence on the matter
should be treated as hearsay and, thus, inadmissible to establish the truth or falsity
of the relevant claims. Consequently, there exists no sufficient circumstantial
evidence to prove Castros guilt.
B. The Participation of and Evidence Against Atienza
In similar regard, the prosecutions evidence on the circumstances in this case do
not sufficiently establish Atienzas guilt for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of
Public Document.

While records show that Atienza was positively identified by Atibula as having
attempted to bribe him to take out Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions from
the Reporters Division,85 the fact is that the alleged intercalation actually occurred
in a different document, that is Volume 266.
The discrepancy of accounts on the very subject matter of the crimes charged
dilutes the strength of the evidence required to produce a conviction. At best, the
bribery attempt may be deemed as a demonstration of interest on the part of
Atienza over said subject matter and in this regard, constitutes proof of motive.
However, it is well-established that mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is
not sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is no other reliable
evidence from which it may reasonably be deduced that the accused was the
malefactor.86
In fact, even if Atienzas bribery attempt is taken together with the other
circumstance couched as a relevant link by the prosecution in this case i.e., his
averred encounter with Atibula, on May 11, 1995, or two (2) days after the
discovery of the loss of Volume 266, wherein the latter uttered
"[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami"87 the Court still finds the
evidence to be lacking. This allegation, even if proven as true, does not indicate that
Atienza howsoever affirmed the taking or even the falsification of Volume 266.
Clearly, the utterance was made by Atibula who did not bother to state Atienzas
response thereto or any other subsequent action connected therewith so as to
bolster a finding of guilt. Neither can this circumstance be properly linked to the act
of Castro inviting Atibula to Atienzas party. It would be a stretch to conclude that
this mere invitation, without any other proof of Castros participation, was
instrumental or, at the very least, reasonably connected to Atienza and his own
alleged participation in the above-stated crimes.
In this relation, it may not be amiss to debunk the claim that petitioners conspired
in this case.1wphi1 While direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it
may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose, design, concerted action,
and community of interests,88 records are, however, bereft of any showing as to how
the particular acts of petitioners figured into the common design of taking out the
subject volume and inserting the falsified documents therein. Hence, the
prosecutions theory of conspiracy does not deserve any merit.
All told, the prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked
constitute an unbroken chain of events which lead to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that petitioners are, to the exclusion of the others, indeed the culprits. As
such, their conviction, tested under the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
was not warranted. To be sure, proof beyond reasonable doubt is the degree of
proof that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty in an
unprejudiced mind of the accuseds culpability.89 Such moral certainty is, however,
lacking in this case due to the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence
presented.
C. Jurisdictional Defect: Falsification Case

Also, it bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance
of Criminal Case No. 01-197426 (i.e., the falsification case) since Falsification of
Public Document under Article 172(1)90 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 6 years91) and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2) 92 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129,93 otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended
by RA 7691.94While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect 95 for the first time in
the present petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. Indeed,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law
and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties
or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well-settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time
on appeal.96
D. A Final Word
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to
overcome such presumption of innocence, failing which, the presumption of
innocence prevails and the accused should be acquitted. 97 This, despite the fact that
his innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness or even absence of defense. If
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this case. Courts should be guided
by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably
guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not
commit.98
Accordingly, there being no circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a
conviction, the Court hereby acquits petitioners, without prejudice, however, to any
subsequent finding on their administrative liability in connection with the incidents
in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30650 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document on the ground of reasonable
doubt, without prejudice to any subsequent finding on their administrative liability in
connection with the incidents in this case. The bail bonds posted for their provisional
liberty are consequently cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180016

April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand
Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo
Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated
September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification
the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San
Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal
Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The antecedent facts follow.

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who
is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For
every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted
any business with private complainant.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino
in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the
business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had
some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the
same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's
necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit
the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period
of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale
or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items
entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which
reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond
ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k,
worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in
the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency,
under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the
sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in
possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the
proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and

On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea
of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of
Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of
petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:

However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which
he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then
dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement
to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s
to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of
liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of
FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period
AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion
Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant
Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner
and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30,
2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each
additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE

STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN
EXPERIENCE;

SO ORDERED.

4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS

CASE;

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court
the present petition stating the following grounds:

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated
the following counter-arguments:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION

AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES
THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER

COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT
FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER
ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE
SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR
THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02
MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY,
IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE
INCIDENT;

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the

designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even
more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any
showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. 4 Petitioner is of
the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He
now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court,
admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its
submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best
evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the
admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified
upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that
petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The
established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain
the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the
date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private

complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the
Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the
matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time
on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the
period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time
of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the
foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or
about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's
cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the
precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The
gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the
commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the
failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information
ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which
accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces
of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with
the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was
not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or

for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the
offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his
testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after
almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked
petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could
have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the
deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?

a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where
the items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or
full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand need
not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even
be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even
a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be
tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under
this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that
the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b),
thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus,
the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand,
thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence
of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon
demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as
that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to
prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave
petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the
receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty
(60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the
proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the
same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the
private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by
petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial
court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts,
which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is
even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is
affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by
the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of
evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. 17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this
case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of
crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these
penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the
Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this
question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case
to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae
were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the
matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean
Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral
arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as
counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court
finds the following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties

that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today,
based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago
in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that
would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through
this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another
branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation
without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which
reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a
court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is
not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the
court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of
a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the
remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should
be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is
present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation
wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is
deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph
is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive
the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with
the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this
time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara
opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief
Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal
provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige
lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and
specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it
necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be
entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a
sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such
eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for
an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. 20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their
book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that
justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with
the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties
prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe
or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may
fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all
cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class
of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should
be addressed to the Chief Executive. 22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be
based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 .
However, it would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to
the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy
fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property
be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a selfamending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is
also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to
amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we
know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the
further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously
through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it
aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of
Plunder, from its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the
legislature lowered it toP50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered
the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply,
from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties
do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their
corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not
exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but
does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does
not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does
not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is
committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next
preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5
pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos,
when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender
shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of
earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.

In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision
states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of
the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty
imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still
lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium
period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender
qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even
apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to
arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the
minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present
penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the
crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing
stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap
between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of
determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty
imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of
the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified
but the penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and
1 day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,
punished by prision correccional medium and to prision correccional
maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium
(6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1
day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).

6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to

arresto mayor medium.

violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that
the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,
conditions that no longer exist today.

x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be
modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00
to P2,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium
(6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the
thing subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the
proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even more to
conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them
to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down
as unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici
curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC
violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more
than Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

DEAN DIOKNO:

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental
penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by
Congress.

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28

JUSTICE PERALTA:

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on
substantial distinctions asP10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it
is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those
who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties;
however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00
would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA:

For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two

Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1)
year, did I get you right?

The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Could not be.

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The only remedy is to go to Congress...

Ah ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and determine the value or the amount.

But if we de ... (interrupted)

DEAN DIOKNO:

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of
Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court
cannot fix the amount ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two

Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

Thank you, Dean.

DEAN DIOKNO:

DEAN DIOKNO:

Thank you.

take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty
of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
x x x x29

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the
United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar
Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of
the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be
done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1)
Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty;
(2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because
in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the
state court of South Dakota after it took into account the latters recidivist statute
and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the
maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a
$5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because of
his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are
different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable
penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a
higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the
crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed
upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member
of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping
of the employers loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is
so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the
commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are
dependent on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal,
may create serious implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the
penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public
official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation.
Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or
shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,

if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not
exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six
thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods,
if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money
due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now
becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be
commensurate to the act of embezzlement of P20,000.00 compared to the acts
committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3, 31 wherein the
injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary amount,
the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now
become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation,
the public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or
property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things
(inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act
of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious

Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the
damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the
value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of
the penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the
element of force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an
inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and
this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine
not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to
the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the
penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with
a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is
unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal
entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty
that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2
months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused
exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now
become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1
day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not
exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of
the damage caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does not
exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal,P200.00 will now
become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of P200.00 under the
existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation
will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense
is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications
on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either
expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be
affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a
penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the
property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of
real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering
boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317
(Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of
malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public
monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be
affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar
offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),

Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure
of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible
public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect
crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or
Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended. 34The law treats
cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without
license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified
theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the
penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or
forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the
crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far
as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and
310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this
particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be
some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in
no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code
by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the
present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature
which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal
luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or
to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which
will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised
Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court
that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend
the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to
archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic,
and cultural settings were far different from todays conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that
it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of
such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or
under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite
the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 38 The Court
should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit,
especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the
Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal
branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of
the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a

Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court,
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused
by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions
of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that
was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.
Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to
the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to
pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity
due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a
thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper
penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil
indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would
sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206
that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which
is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum
amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil
indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 39 of the Civil Code also
does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon
the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended
party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted
so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed
as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh,
being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel
punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the
courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other
interpretation than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is
that the incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that
the courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount
of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As
suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all
crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum
in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted
of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that
should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis
and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of
criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 40 in
December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is,
arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the
death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No.
9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground
that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1), 42 Article III of
the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the
imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the
intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot
declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates
unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process,
considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity
to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute
cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded
directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues
never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public
sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition.44

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in
other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be
"flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." 45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and
adapt it to our modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the
current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken
into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be
accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated
and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe
should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no
resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor
studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This
function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar
concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
xxxx

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined
utilizing all of those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ...

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of
Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg
the value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah.

Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That is legislative in nature.

Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not
proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make
the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the
ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v.
People48 is highly instructive, thus:

Thank you, Professor.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the
view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active
duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present
controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three
years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for
inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed
conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the
validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Courts
adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously
adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja. 47 Besides,
Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and
my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation.
Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the
powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and
the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil
indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the
offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of
money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties
are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further,
since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only

With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in
which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in
the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed,
forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the
maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional
maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of
time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with

Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00,
which exceedsP22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within
the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.
Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for
every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall
the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than
the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the
maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for
the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial
duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent
powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious
approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare
trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of
petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March
22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of
the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty
imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be
furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department
of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

The Case
Ricardo Medina Jr. (Ricardo) appeals by petition for review on certiorari the
affirmance of his conviction for homicide with modification of the penalty and civil
liability by the Court of Appeals (CA) through the decision promulgated on July 7,
2003.1 He had assailed his conviction handed down under the decision rendered on
January 31, 2001by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 266, in Pasig City.2 His
brother and co-accused, Randolf Medina (Randolf), was acquitted by the RTC for
insufficiency of evidence.
Antecedents

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161308

January 15, 2014

RICARDO MEDINA, JR. y ORIEL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

This case concerns the fatal stabbing of Lino Mulinyawe (Lino) between 9:00 and
10:00 oclock in the evening of April 3, 1997 at Jabson Street in Acacia,
Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. The stabbing was preceded by a fight during a basketball
game between Ross Mulinyawe, Linos son, and Ronald Medina, the younger brother
of Ricardo and Randolf. In that fight, Ronald had hit Ross with a piece of stone.
Hearing about the involvement of his brother in the fight, Randolf rushed to the
scene and sent Ronald home. Ross was brought to the hospital for treatment. Once
Lino learned that his son had sustained a head injury inflicted by one of the
Medinas, he forthwith went towards the house of the Medinas accompanied by his
drinking buddies, Jose Tapan and Abet Menes. He had a bread knife tucked in the
back, but his companions were unarmed. Along the way, Lino encountered Randolf
whom he confronted about the fight. The two of them had a heated argument.
Although Randolf tried to explain what had really happened between Ross and
Ronald, Lino lashed out at Randolf and gripped the latters hand. Tapan almost
simultaneously punched Randolf in the face. Lino, already holding the knife in his
right hand, swung the knife at Randolf who was not hit. Randolf retreated towards
the store and took two empty bottles of beer, broke the bottles and attacked Lino
with them. Arriving at the scene, Ricardo saw what was happening, and confronted
Lino. A commotion ensued between them. Ricardo entered their house to get a
kitchen knife and came out. Lino made a thrust at Ricardo but failed to hit the latter,
who then stabbed Lino on the left side of his chest, near the region of the heart.
Lino fell face down on the ground. After that, Ricardo walked away, while Randolf
threw the broken bottles at the fallen Lino.
Linos injuries were described as follows:
Fairly nourished, fairly developed male cadaver, in rigor mortis, with postmortem
lividity at the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctive lips and nailbeds are
pale.

BERSAMIN, J.:
HEAD, CHEST AND LEFT KNEE:
Credibility of witnesses is determined by the conformity of their testimonies to
human knowledge, observation and experience.

(1) Lacerated wound, left parietal region, measuring 2 by 0.7 cm, 5 cm

from the midsagittal line.

(2) Abrasion, left parietal region, measuring 1.2 by 0.6 cm, 8 cm from the
anterior midline.
(3) Abrasion left maxillary region, measuring 2 by 0.3, 4.5 cm, from the
anterior midline.
(4) Stab wound, left mammary region, measuring 3.6 by 1.4 cm, 5.5 cm
from the anterior line, 12 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards,
and medialwards, thru the 4th left intercostal space, piercing the
pericardial sac and left ventricle.
Cause of death is Stab wound of the chest.3
On April 4, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City charged Randolf with
homicide.4 The information was amended with leave of court to include Ricardo as a
co-conspirator, alleging thusly:
On or about April 3, 1997 in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and employ personal
violence upon the person of Lino M. Mulinyawe, thereby inflicting upon the latter
stab wound, which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
The Defense claimed that it was Lino who had attacked Ricardo with a knife, and
that Lino had accidentally stabbed himself by falling frontward and into his own
knife.
Judgment of the RTC
In its judgment rendered on January 31, 2001,6 the RTC acquitted Randolf but
convicted Ricardo of homicide. It found no evidence of conspiracy between Randolf
and Ricardo because their actions appeared to be independent and separate from
each other and did not show that they had mounted a joint attack against Lino. It
rejected Ricardos defense that the fatal stab wound of Lino had been self-inflicted,
ratiocinating that:
The fatal wound of the deceased is: stab wound, left mamary [sic] region,
measuring 3.6 by 1.4 cm, 5.5 cm from the anterior midline, 12 cm deep, directed
posteriorwards, downwards, and medialwards, thru the 4th left intercostal space,
piercing the pericardial sac and left ventricle. (See Exh. J).

Randolf Medina testified that Lino Mulinyawe attacked him with a knife held with his
right hand. The trajectory of the stab wound sustained by Lino Mulinyawe at his left
mammary region as shown by the Medico Legal Report and Medico Legal
Examination on the cadaver of the deceased (Exhs. J and L) is incompatible and
inconsistent with the defense of the accused that when Mulinyawe was making a
thrust, he fell frontward and accidentally stabbed himself.
If the knife was held with the right hand of Lino Mulinyawe, the stab wound would
not have been from the anterior midline, 12 cm deep, directed posteriorwards,
downwards, and medialwards, thru the 4th left intercostal space, piercing the
pericardial sac and left ventricle. The trajectory of the stab wound would have been
leftward and upward the body of the deceased if he really fell frontward upon
it.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC disposed and decreed:
WHEREFORE, postulates considered, this Court ACQUITS Randolf Medina for
insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt of the charge of homicide against him.
However, the evidence of the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the
GUILT of the accused Ricardo Medina, Jr. y Oriel for homicide and he is hereby
sentenced with a penalty of imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8)
Months and One (1) day to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) Months of reclusion
temporal in its medium period there being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).
The widow Marivi Mulinyawe is hereby awarded the amount of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) as actual damages and the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, payable by Ricardo Medina, Jr. y Oriel.
The bonds posted by both accused are hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED.8
Decision of the CA
Ricardo appealed, but the CA affirmed his conviction with modification of the penalty
and the civil liability under the decision promulgated on July 7, 2003, 9 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED and
the decision appealed from in Criminal Case No. 112091 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that accused-appellant Ricardo Medina, Jr. y Oriel is hereby
instead sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one
(1) day to prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and

one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and that the award of actual
damages is hereby reduced from Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) to
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) is further granted as death indemnity in addition to the award of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.

IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PETITIONER STABBED
LINO MULINYAWE, DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER SENTENCE BY DISREGARDING
THE PRESENCE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE LACK OF AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDANT TO THE CASE.11

With costs against the accused-appellant.

Ruling of the Court

SO ORDERED.

The appeal has no merit.

After his motion for reconsideration was denied on November 21, 2003, 10 Ricardo
appealed to the Court.

First of all, Ricardo argues that his stabbing and inflicting of the fatal wound on Lino
were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issues
Ricardo now submits the following errors for consideration, namely:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FACTUAL FINDING THAT THE
[PETITIONER] STABBED LINO MULINYAWE IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT:
1. THE PROSECUTION WITHHELD THE PRESENTATION OF THE ACTUAL
KNIVES DURING THE HEARING OF THE CASE WHICH PRESENTATION
AND BLOOD ANALYSIS ON THE TWO KNIVES COULD HAVE PROVEN THAT
LINO MULINYAWE FELL ON HIS OWN KNIFE.
2. THE MEDICO-LEGAL TESTIMONY CORROBORATED THE FACT THAT LINO
MULINYAWE FELL ON HIS OWN KNIFE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ADOPTING THE TRIAL COURTS
OPINION THAT THE FATAL WOUND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SELF-INFLICTED
WHICH WAS THE DIRECT OPPOSITE OF THE OPINION OF THE ONLY MEDICO-LEGAL
EXPERT PRESENTED WHO POSITIVELY TESTIFIED THAT THE FATAL WOUND CAN
POSSIBLY BE SELF-INFLICTED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING THAT THE [PETITIONER]
STABBED THE DECEASED BUT DISREGARDED X X X THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF DEFENSE OF A RELATIVE (ART. 11, RPC) X X X

The argument of Ricardo is a mere reiteration of his submissions that the CA had
already exhaustively considered and passed upon. He has not added anything of
substance or weight to persuasively show that the CA had erred in affirming the
RTC.
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial courts factual findings and
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent
facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such findings and
evaluation.12 This is because the trial courts determination proceeds from its firsthand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and
attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique
position to assess the witnesses credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness,
honesty and candor.13 But here Ricardo has not projected any strong and compelling
reasons to sway the Court into rejecting or revising such factual findings and
evaluation in his favor.
Secondly, Ricardo contends that the State did not present as evidence in court the
two knives wielded by him and Lino despite repeated demands for their
presentation; that had the knives been presented, it could have been demonstrated
to the trial court that the smaller knife used by Lino had more blood stains than the
knife held by him and would fit the size of the mortal wound; that his assertion that
Lino had stabbed himself when he stumbled and lost his balance while swinging his
knife at Randolf would have been thereby validated; and that in his testimony, Dr.
Emmanuel Aranas of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Southern Police District, did
not rule out the possibility that the wounds sustained by Lino were self-inflicted.
The contention deserves no serious consideration.
To start with, the following findings of the CA indicate that the evidence supporting
the conviction for homicide was already overwhelming even without the
presentation of the knife held by the victim, to wit:

Reviewing the records, We find that appellants guilt as the perpetrator of the
unlawful killing of the victim Lino Mulinyawe had been adequately proven by
prosecution evidence, both testimonial and physical. The credible and categorical
testimonies of two (2) eyewitnesses during the entire incident on the night of April
3, 1997, Jeffrey and Sherwin, positively point to appellant as the one (1) who
delivered the single fatal stabbing blow upon the victim while the latter was trying
to counter the assault of appellants brother, co-accused Randolf who was then
holding a broken bottle.1wphi1 The lone knife thrust was directed at the heart of
the victim, the wound penetrating said vital organ up to 12 centimeters deep, the
direction, trajectory and depth of the stab wound clearly showing the intent to kill
him. The medico-legal findings of Dr. Aranas sufficiently corroborate the account of
said eyewitnesses that the victim was attacked frontally and the fatal stab wound
caused by a single-bladed kitchen knife such as the one (1) identified in court,
previously identified by the witness but only the photographs thereof were formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution.
The totality of prosecution evidence more than satisfactorily proves the commission
of the offense and appellants authorship thereof. Contrary to appellants contention,
the non-presentation of blood samples from the victim and the accused as well as
the instrument which accused used in perpetrating his felonious acts do not negate
criminal liability it is enough for the prosecution to establish by the required
quantum of proof that a crime was committed and the accused was the author
thereof. The presentation of the weapon is not a prerequisite for conviction. Such
presentation and identification of the weapon used are not indispensable to prove
the guilt of the accused much more so where the perpetrator has been positively
identified by a credible witness. Appellants insistence, therefore, that the
presentation of the two (2) knives would prove his innocence is futile, irrelevant and
immaterial, in the face of positive identification by two unbiased and credible
eyewitnesses. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without
any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter
prevails over a denial. Denial being negative evidence which is self-serving in
nature, cannot prevail over the positive identification of prosecution witnesses. More
so in this case where the defense of denial is not corroborated by disinterested and
credible witnesses: the mother of the accused whose presence in the crime scene
was not sufficiently established and Edgar Erro whose testimony is found to be
doubtful and not without bias.14
The non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon actually used in the
killing did not diminish the merit of the conviction primarily because other
competent evidence and the testimonies of witnesses had directly and positively
identified and incriminated Ricardo as the assailant of Lino.15 Hence, the
establishment beyond reasonable doubt of Ricardos guilt for the homicide did not
require the production of the weapon used in the killing as evidence in court, for in
arriving at its findings on the culpability of Ricardo the RTC, like other trial courts,
clearly looked at, considered and appreciated the entirety of the record and the
evidence. For sure, the weapon actually used was not indispensable considering that

the finding of guilt was based on other evidence proving his commission of the
crime.16
In addition, the witnesses incriminating Ricardo were not only credible but were not
shown to have harbored any ill-motive towards him. They were surely entitled to full
faith and credit for those reasons, and both the RTC and the CA did well in
according such credence to them. Their positive identification of him as the assailant
prevailed over his mere denial, because such denial, being negative and self-serving
evidence, was undeserving of weight by virtue of its lack of substantiation by clear
and convincing proof.17 Hence, his denial had no greater evidentiary value than the
affirmative testimonies of the credible witnesses presented against him. 18
And, thirdly, Ricardos attribution of serious error to the CA for not appreciating the
justifying circumstance of defense of a relative in his favor was bereft of any
support from the records.
In order that defense of a relative is to be appreciated in favor of Ricardo, the
following requisites must concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression;
and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person
making the defense took no part in the provocation.19 Like in self-defense, it is the
accused who carries the burden to prove convincingly the attendance and
concurrence of these requisites because his invocation of this defense amounts to
an admission of having inflicted the fatal injury on the victim.
In invoking defense of a relative, Ricardo states that his immediate impulse upon
seeing Randolf being attacked by Lino with a knife was to get his own weapon and
to aid in the defense of Randolf. But that theory was inconsistent with his
declaration at the trial that Linos fatal wound had been self-inflicted, as it
presupposes direct responsibility for inflicting the mortal wound. Thus, his defense
was unworthy of belief due to its incongruity with human experience.
Verily, the issue of credibility, when it is decisive of the guilt or innocence of the
accused, is determined by the conformity of the conflicting claims and recollections
of the witnesses to common experience and to the observation of mankind as
probable under the circumstances. It has been appropriately emphasized that "[w]e
have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance." 20
In fine, Ricardo has not convinced the Court in this appeal that the RTC and the CA
overlooked, or misappreciated, or misread some fact or circumstance of weight and
consequence that would have changed the outcome of the case in his favor.

The Court needs to raise the civil indemnity from PS0,000.00 to P75,000.00 in order
to conform to the current judicial policy on the matter.21The other awards of civil
liability are sustained because of the absence of any challenge against them.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review for its lack of merit;
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 7, 2003 in all respects, subject to the
MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199070

April 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE R. ESPINOSA and LINDSEY BUENAVISTA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 199237
RAMON CAESAR T. ROJAS for himself and as representative of the HEIRS
OF RAMON ROJAS JR.,Petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE R. ESPINOSA and LINDSEY BUENAVISTA, Respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court are consolidated petitions for review filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the following Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City
(CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. SP No. 05617 entitled "The People of the Philippines, et al. v.
Judge Florian Gregory D. Abalajon et al.": (a) the Resolution dated 21 January 2011
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari (under Rule 65) dated 14 December 2010; 1 and
(b) the Resolution dated 3 October 2011 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
dated 24 February 2011 filed by the People of the Philippines.2
G.R. No. 199070 was filed by the People of the Philippines (petitioner) represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), while G.R. No. 199237 was filed by
Ramon Caesar T. Rojas, for himself and as representative of the heirs of Ramon
Rojas, Jr. (private complainants).
The Facts
On 22 May 2008, Ramon Rojas, Jr. (Rojas), the former Vice-Mayor of Ajuy, Iloilo,
was shot and killed in Sitio Casamata, Iloilo. Rojas was jogging with Armando
Nacional (Nacional) when they met two assailants riding a motorcycle. Rojas was
shot several times resulting in his death. Nacional later testified that Edgar Cordero
(Cordero) shot Rojas while Dennis Cartagena (Cartagena) drove the motorcycle. 3
On 26 May 2008, the Ajuy Municipal Police Office filed a Complaint for Murder
against Cordero and Cartagena in the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutors Office, which was
docketed as I.S. No. 2008-835.4
After examining the testimonies of additional witnesses, the Ajuy Municipal Police
Office filed a second complaint on 2 June 2008 which included Vicente Espinosa alias
"Bulldog" and Lindsey Buenavista alias "Bebe" (respondents).
Espinosa filed his Counter-Affidavit on 27 June 2008, denying any involvement in
the killing.5 In his Counter-Affidavit dated 30 June 2008, Buenavista also claimed
that he did not participate in the killing.6
On 11 July 2008, Renyl Iran, who claimed to be a former bodyguard/helper of
Espinosa, executed an affidavit stating that he personally heard Cartagena,
Buenavista and other members of Espinosas staff planning the murder of several
Ajuy government officials. According to Iran:

[o]n May 27, 2007, at around 9:00 in the evening, [he] was inside the compound
serving beer to Vicente Espinosa, "Aldan" Padilla and "Eddie" Aguillon (Barangay
Kagawad and Barangay Secretary of Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo). Also drinking
with them were Dennis Cartagena alias "Totong" and Lindsey Buenavista alias
"Bebe" who acted as bodyguards of Vicente Espinosa during the last elections.
Vicente Espinosa, "Aldan" Padilla and "Eddie" Aguillon were talking about the last
elections and how they could get even at the group of Mayor Juancho Alvarez and
Vice-Mayor Ramon Rojas, Jr. Then, as [Iran] was leaving their table after serving
them beer, [he] clearly heard Vicente Espinosa telling "Aldan" Padilla and "Eddie"
Aguillon "Ipatumba naton sila. Unahon ta si Vice Ramon" (Lets eliminate them. Lets
get Vice Ramon first.) Then [Iran] [also] heard Vicente Espinosa [say] "Ti ano Bebe
kag Totong, kaya nyo si Vice" (How about it "Bebe" and "Patong", can you do it to
Vice?);
xxxx
In the evening of June 30, 2007 at the compound, [Iran] noticed that Vicente
Espinosa was angry. Then suddenly he called me and asked "Kaya mo patyon si
Juancho?" (Can you kill Juancho?), to which [Iran] answered "Noy, maluoy ka man,
pangita-i lang sang iban dira. Indi ko kaya." (Noy, have pity, just look for other
persons. I cant do it.) Vicente Espinosa then ordered me to [light] some "pwitis"
(pyrotechnic rockets) and aim them at the house of Juancho Alvarez which is just
200 meters away from the compound. As [Iran fired] the rockets towards the house
of Juancho Alvarez x x x Vicente Espinosa was laughing and enjoying[.] 7
The Iloilo Provincial Prosecutors Office recommended the filing of an Information for
Murder against Cordero and Cartagena, but dismissed the case against respondents
in its Resolution dated 12 August 2008. The Iloilo Provincial Prosecutors Office
found that there was no probable cause against respondents:
The evidence submitted falls short of the quantum of proof required for a finding of
probable cause against Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista. Indeed, it is
painful and heartbreaking for the Rojas family, however, the law must at all times be
sustained. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. The possibility of the
guilt of Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista is not being ruled out, but the
principle that [the] "insufficiency of evidence must be resolved consistent with the
theory of innocence."8
Thus, the private complainants filed a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice on 25 August 2008. The petition claimed that the Iloilo Provincial
Prosecutors Office gravely erred in:
1. resolving the preliminary investigation based on degree of "proof beyond
reasonable doubt" rather than degree of proof to establish "probable
cause" against the appellees;

2. holding that the evidence of the appellants are purely circumstantial or

indirect evidence;
3. refusing to give due credence to the straightforward, candid, positive
and, most importantly, unrebutted declarations of the appellants
witnesses, manifesting a clear bias in favor of appellees Vicente Espinosa
and Lindsey Buenavista; and
4. finding no probable cause against appellees Vicente Espinosa and
Lindsey Buenaventura.9
Meanwhile, the Information for Murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo (RTC-Branch 66), which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2008-4303.10 The RTC-Branch 66 also issued warrants of arrest against
Cordero and Cartagena.
On 29 August 2008, a group of armed assailants shot Cartagena and Cordero. While
Cartagena survived, Cordero died of gunshot wounds. Cartagena was arrested and
turned over to the custody of Col. Ricardo Delapaz, Iloilo Philippine National Police
Provincial Director. Thereafter, he was brought back to Iloilo City.
In his sworn statement11 dated 4 September 2008, Cartagena admitted that he was
involved in the killing of Rojas. Cordero shot Rojas while Cartagena drove the
motorcycle. He also claimed that Espinosa paid him and Cordero for killing Rojas.
Cartagena stated:
21. Can you tell me the reason why you and Edgar Cordero shot Vice Mayor Rojas?
Because Vicente "Etik" Espinosa alias "Bulldog" of Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo
paid us[.]
22. Do you really know Vicente "Etik" Espinosa alias "Bulldog"?
Yes. Because I was one of his bodyguards during the elections in May 2007.
23. You said that you are only one of his bodyguards. [D]o you know his other
bodyguards?
Yes. They are Rey Pea, Lindsey Buenavista alias "Bebe" and certain alias "Remy".
xxxx
26. When did Vicente "Etik" Espinosa tell you to murder Vice Mayor Rojas?

Sometime after the end of the election[s] in May 2007.12

Cartagena also claimed that it was Buenavista who shot and killed Cordero on 29
August 2008.13
While the petition for review filed by the private complainants was pending, former
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales issued Department Order No. 360 on 14 May
2009 which created a panel of state prosecutors acting as Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct a new preliminary investigation of the Complaint for Murder filed against
Cordero and Cartagena.14
In its Resolution dated 9 October 2009, the panel found probable cause for Murder
against respondents. Espinosa then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On 12 October 2009, this Court granted petitioners Urgent Petition for Change of
Venue in Criminal Case No. 2008-4303 and ordered the immediate transfer of the
case from RTC-Branch 66 to the RTC-Branch 38, Iloilo City (RTC-Branch 38). 15
On 24 February 2010, former Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera dismissed
the private complainants Petition for Review. The Resolution stated that in view of
the panels finding that there is probable cause to charge respondents with Murder,
the Petition for Review was now moot.
In accordance with the Resolution dated 24 February 2010, then Acting Secretary of
Justice Alberto C. Agra issued Department Order No. 409 directing the Regional
State Prosecutor of Iloilo, who was designated as Acting Provincial Prosecutor, to
"file an amended information for murder in Criminal Case No. 2008-4303, entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Dennis Cartagena and Edgar Cordero." 16 Thus, on 14
July 2010, the Regional State Prosecutor, Region VI, filed with the RTC-Branch 38 an
Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 2008-4303.
On 16 July 2010, Espinosa filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause.17 According to Espinosa:
x x x the sworn statement of Dennis Cartagena x x x is only admissible against
Cartagena and not against his co-accused or co-respondent. x x x [T]he
exclusionary rule on admission and on confession as provided for under Section[s]
30 and 33 of the Rules of Court can be invoked during the preliminary investigation
and reinvestigation of a case.
xxxx
x x x [T]he panel of investigators overstretched their authority and showed manifest
partiality and bias, when in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent Espinosa, they took in consideration the affidavits of Renyl Iran and

Fidel Lavega. Said affidavits were never submitted to the Panel by either party to
form part of their evidence. The affiants were not even called to affirm their
statements.18
Judge Florian D. Abalajon (public respondent) issued the questioned Order dated 12
August 2010 dismissing the Amended Information against respondents. According
to the RTC, "standing alone, the Extra-Judicial Confession of accused Dennis
Cartagena as against his co-accused Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista is
inadmissible and considered hearsay against them."19
The RTC applied the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court:

The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated 7 October 2010.
The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration, the motion for
inhibition and motion to expunge are hereby DENIED, respectively.
HOWEVER, in order to discontinue the lack of faith and trust of complainants private
and public, and petitioner on the impartiality and objectivity of the Presiding Judge,
he voluntarily inhibits himself from further hearing the case following the opinion of
the Supreme Court that

The RTC explained that:

"at the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded
or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case."
(Gutang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124760, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA 76). On the
other hand, the Supreme Court cannot tolerate acts of litigants who for any
conceivable reason seek to disqualify a judge for their own purposes under a plea of
bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment." (People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 44712,
October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 171)

x x x In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that:

Let these cases be therefore returned/forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court
for their proper disposition by the Executive Judge.

Admission by a Conspirator The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the

conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

a.) The conspiracy must first be proved by evidence other than the
admission itself;
b.) The admission relates to the common object; and
c.) It has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
xxxx
Considering that the extrajudicial confession of accused Dennis Cartagena is not
corroborated by independent evidence, it is therefore inadmissible and it would be
unfair to hold accused Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista for trial.
Cartagenas confession is binding only on him and is not admissible against his coaccused Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista. By the rule, his confession is
considered hearsay against his x x x co-accused.20
Petitioner and private complainants filed an Urgent Motion for Inhibition on 26
August 2010 alleging that public respondent was "utterly one-sided" in favor of the
accused and "oppressively biased against the complainants." 21 A Motion for
Reconsideration was later filed on 27 August 2010.

SO ORDERED.22
The Order was received by private complainants on 14 October 2010. 23 Then,
Criminal Case No. 2008-4303 was re-raffled to RTC-Branch 24, Iloilo City (RTCBranch 24).
Aggrieved, the private complainants sought to file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. According to them, they coordinated with the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor, Region VI, Iloilo City (Regional State Prosecutor) and drafted the
petition for certiorari. As evidenced by an Indorsement dated 25 November 2010,
the Regional State Prosecutor forwarded the draft of the petition for certiorari to the
Office of the Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano. On 30 November 2010, counsel
for private complainants Atty. Mehelinda A. Penetrante (Atty. Penetrante) handdelivered the: (a) Indorsement; (b) draft of the Petition for Certiorari; (c) original
pages containing the verification and certification against forum-shopping executed
on 26 November 2010 by private complainant Ramon Caesar T. Rojas; and (d)
original copies containing the signatures of the private prosecutors. 24
Private complainants claimed that the documents were transmitted to the Office of
Hon. Anselmo I. Cadiz, Solicitor General, as evidenced by a letter dated 30
November 2010. The letter erroneously stated that the deadline for filing was 14
December 2010, instead of 13 December 2010. The letter was received by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on 3 December 2010.25 According to the OSG,
the case was assigned to the handling solicitors on 8 December 2010.

On 14 December 2010, the OSG filed before the CA-Cebu a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. The OSG alleged that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:
I. x x x when he ordered the dismissal of [the] amended information
against accused Espinosa and Buenavista despite the [extrajudicial]
confession of their co-accused Dennis Cartagena and corroborating
[evidence] on record establishing their participation in the crime charged;
II. x x x in holding that the [extrajudicial] confession of Cartagena is
inadmissible x x x under Section 30 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court;
III. x x x for excluding the extrajudicial confession in his determination of
the assailed orders.26
Private complainants claimed that they received a copy of the petition sometime
around 23 December 2010. They noticed that on Page 39 of the Petition, the names
of respondents were not listed as one of the parties furnished with a copy of the
pleading. Thus, Atty. Penetrante informed the OSG of the omission in a letter dated
12 January 2011.27
The OSG, through Assistant Solicitor General (ASG) John Emmanuel F. Madamba
and Associate Solicitor (AS) Melissa A. Santos, assured Atty. Penetrante that
respondents were furnished with copies of the petition. However, "the Affidavit of
Service was attached to the original of the petition that was filed with the Court of
Appeals."28 The OSG also stated that private complainants would be furnished with
the proof of service to the private respondents after receipt of the registry cards
from the post office.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Resolution29 dated 21 January 2011, the CA-Cebu dismissed the petition.
According to the court a quo:
A perusal of the Petition revealed there were congenital infirmities:
1. the Petition was filed one day after the 60-day regl[e]mentary period for
filing the Petition for Certiorari, in violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
2. there was no proper proof of service of the Petition to the court a quo
and to private respondents. Certainly, registry receipts can hardly be
considered sufficient proof of receipt by the addressee of registered mail[;]

3. the Petition failed to incorporate therein a written explanation why the

preferred personal mode of filing and service as mandated under Section
11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was not availed of. Verily,
the Explanation referred to Motion for Extension...;
4. there was no competent evidence regarding petitioners identity on the
attached Verifications and Certifications Against Forum Shopping as
required by Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; and
5. the Notarial Certificate in the Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping of private complainant did not contain the office address of the
notary public, in violation of Section 2(c), Rule VIII of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.30
The petitioner and private complainants each filed a petition for review before this
Court.
The Issue
The basic issue raised in both petitions is the propriety of the CA-Cebus dismissal of
the OSGs petition for certiorari based on procedural lapses.
The Ruling of this Court
We note that the OSG failed to follow procedural rules. First, it admitted that it
erroneously computed the deadline for filing the petition. Second, the respondents
were furnished a copy of the petition after its filing. Third, the Explanation required
under Section 11, Rule 13 referred to a Motion for Extension and not a Petition for
Certiorari.
The CA-Cebu dismissed the Petition for Certiorari because of these procedural
errors. Petitioner and private complainants claim that the rigid technical rules should
have been relaxed by the CA-Cebu in view of the circumstances of the case.
Courts are constrained to adhere to procedural rules under the Rules of Court.
Section 6 of Rule 1, however, grants courts leeway in interpreting and applying
rules:
Sec. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.
However, we should point out that courts are not given carte blanche authority to
interpret rules liberally. In Building Care Corporation v. Macaraeg, 31 we pointed out
that:

x x x the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application of

procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that
rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice. 32

3. good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a

reasonable time from the time of the default;
4. the existence of special or compelling circumstances;

The first procedural error was the failure to file the petition within the reglementary
period. Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended under A.M. No. 07-712-SC, provides a strict deadline for the filing of petitions for certiorari:
SECTION 4. When and Where to File the Petition. The petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case
a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted
from the notice of the denial of the motion.

5. the merits of the case;

6. a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules;
7. a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory;
8. the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;

xxxx
We deleted the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 that permitted extensions of the period
to file petitions for certiorari, since sixty (60) days is more than ample time to
sufficiently prepare for filing.33
However, in Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.,
interpretation of the foregoing rule:

34

we allowed a liberal

Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that

the deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso
facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely
prohibited. We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the
deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an
extension of time to file such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express
prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be allowed, subject to this
Courts sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases.
Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 077-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public
interest.35 (Emphasis supplied)
The 60-day period may be extended under any of the circumstances provided in the
earlier case of Labao v. Flores.36 The recognized exceptions are:
1. most persuasive and weighty reasons;
2. to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure
to comply with the prescribed procedure;

9. fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellants

fault;
10. peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
11. in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
12. importance of the issues involved; and
13. exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for
his/her failure to comply with the rules.37
In the instant case, private complainants had to transmit documents to the OSG.
Records clearly show that they were able to do so promptly. On 30 November 2010,
counsel for private complainants Atty. Penetrante submitted to the Office of the
Prosecutor General the draft petition for certiorari, the verification and certification
against forum shopping, the original copies containing the signatures of the private
prosecutors, and the certified copies of the annexes.38 These documents were
received by the OSG on 3 December 2010 only.
Given the circumstances, we hold that the CA-Cebu should have applied the rules
liberally and excused the belated filing.
We now discuss the remaining procedural errors. Respondents were furnished a
copy of the petition after it was filed. According to respondents, this violated Section
1, Rule 65 and Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. The CA-Cebu also found
that the petition lacked a written explanation as required under Section 11, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court. The Explanation attached to the filed petition referred to a

Motion for Extension and not a Petition for Certiorari. The CA-Cebu ruled that there
was no proper proof of service of the petition to the court a quo and to private
respondents. It held that "registry receipts can hardly be considered sufficient proof
of receipt by the addressee of registered mail."
Section 13 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states that for pleadings served through
registered mail, proof of service shall be made through an affidavit of the person
mailing the pleading, and the registry receipts issued by the post office. The OSG
was remiss in its duties as counsel when it failed to serve a copy to respondents
before filing of the petition. As regards the Explanation, it is clear that the erroneous
referral to a "Motion for Extension" instead of a Petition for Certiorari was just a
mere typographical error.
While we acknowledge that the OSG committed glaring errors, we deem it unjust to
penalize private complainants for the OSGs carelessness. It is important to point
out that private complainants quickly informed the OSG of the oversight:
On or about December 23, 2010, the private prosecutors in Iloilo City received by
registered mail copies of the x x x petition for Certiorari signed by AS Melissa A.
Santos and Assistant Solicitor General John Emmanuel F. Madamba which appeared
to have been filed with the Honorable Court through registered mail on December
14, 2010;
It was then that the private prosecutors noticed on Page 39 of the petition under
the "Copy furnished:" portion that the names of the private respondents Vicente
Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista were not among the list of parties who were
furnished with copies of the petition as required by Rule 65. The copies sent to the
private prosecutors also did not include a copy of the OSGs Affidavit of Service.
Thereupon, Atty. Penetrante in a letter dated January 12, 2011 brought this matter
to the attention of the OSG thru ASG John Emmanuel F. Madamba as AS Melissa A.
Santos x x x.
Thereafter, in a reply letter dated January 14, 2011 ASG Madamba and AS Santos
informed Atty. Penetrante (a) that they have actually furnished the private
respondents with copies of the petition but the Affidavit of Services was attached to
the original of the petition that was filed with the [CA-Cebu], and (b) that they will
thereafter furnish her with the proof of service to private respondents as soon as
they have received the registry return receipts from the post office. x x x. 39
As correctly pointed out by private complainants:
Indeed the actual date of filing of the petition as well as compliance with the rest of
the formal and procedural requirements of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
namely OSGs verification and certification on non-forum shopping, the "Copy
Furnished" portion showing service of copies of the petition on the public and
private respondent[s] by registered mail and the required "Explanation" why

personal service of the petition on the respondents was not resorted to were all in
the hands of the OSG. [These] were beyond the control or intervention of the
private petitioners and private prosecutors. After all, the OSG [is the] chief legal
counsel of the State and the People of the Philippines in the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court.40
It would be unjust to penalize private complainants for the negligence of the
OSG.1awp++i1 In Multi-Trans Agency Phils., Inc. v. Oriental Assurance Corp.,41 we
discussed the general rule and exceptions with respect to the effect of counsels
negligence on a client:
x x x [W]hile it is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client, this rule is not
without exception. In cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel, like in
this case, deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application would
result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property, or where the interest
of justice so requires, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the
lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence.42
The case of Building Care involved an appeal which was filed out of time because of
counsels negligence. We disallowed the belated filing because
x x x respondent nor her former counsel gave any explanation or reason citing
extraordinary circumstances for her lawyers failure to abide by the rules for filing
an appeal. Respondent merely insisted that she had not been remiss in following up
her case with said lawyer.43
The circumstances in Building Care are clearly different from the facts of this case.
In the present case, there was a transfer of documents from private complainants
original counsel, Atty. Penetrante to the OSG. This Court has always recognized the
fact that the OSG has a heavy workload. Further, the OSG only received the
documents on 3 December 2010 despite prompt submission of the required
documents.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals-Cebu dated 21 January 2011
and 3 October 2011 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate and give due course to the petition for
review in CA-G.R. SP No. 05617 and to decide the same on the merits.
SO ORDERED.

"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and
protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the
necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or
inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and
support her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong." 1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse,
albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State
policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment 4 dated
April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in
Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, 5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii
ved together since then and raised their four (4) children 6 as they put up several
businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her
husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at
their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on
December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have
sex with him.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 187495

April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION

On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a
Joint Resolution,8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical
injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate criminal information be
filed against the accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The
Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there

wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.

carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's
will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19

Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:

The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty

plea to both indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.

Version of the prosecution

The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her
daughters MMM and 000, which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted
the following events:

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999. 11 On
August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, 12 which
was denied by the trial court in an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date,
the accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both
charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Information15 averring that the name of the private complainant was omitted in the
original informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental
Affidavit dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of
the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates
stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18,
2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means
of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's
will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means
of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have

KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one
of the laborers. They got married after a year of courtship.20 When their first child,
MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store. 21 Later on,
they engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK
managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the
accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality,
however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of
the trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as
KKK's dedication. Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their
parents.23 He would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively
managed the businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand,
did not acquiesce with that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa
Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of the children transferred residence
therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and
sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro
City most of the days of the week.28 On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan,
Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de
Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the
accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well
and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. 30However, in 1997,
he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans
any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was

physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would
threaten her into submission.31

continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm

not feeling well."42

In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his
complaint that she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial
problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home
because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She
disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the
children.32

With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other
enclosing the spouses' bedroom,43KKK's pleas were audible in the children's
bedroom where MMM lay awake.

Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the
accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their
eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already
back in Cagayan de Oro City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went
about their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about
9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the
girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accusedappellant watched television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their
beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him
to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied. 35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but
she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in
a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are
you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our
bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal
pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he
got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall
causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took
her pillow and transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his
desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined
by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well. 38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to
resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on
the sides.39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and
rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands
and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK

Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to
me, have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents'
room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her
parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?" 46 The accusedappellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said:
"[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it again. 47 Since
she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition,
knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it.48 A furious accusedappellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us.
Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and
crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and
asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to
Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother
get up in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom
underwear and covered herself with a blanket.50 However, their breakout from the
room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the
doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay
here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to
go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get
away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed
their way out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to
what happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to
have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let
her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the
family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The
accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner
elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the
girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's
small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant
entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded
that she preferred to sleep with the children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you

will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She
dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After
that, he left the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he
became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the
room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When
she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. 57 At this
point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you." 58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who
yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the
head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened,
the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas
of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed. 59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly
pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do
that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you
wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands,
mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant
put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as
he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a]
flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom. 61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried
upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her
arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the
room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair
disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK
replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with
him even if I don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land
adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she brought food
for her father's laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a
high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a
comfortable life. Through their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually
acquired personal properties and established their own businesses that included a

rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled
coffee, copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He
claimed that on those dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On
October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo
Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's
graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on
October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just
leave him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some com. 64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999
corroborated the above claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the
accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the
accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the
truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed
Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a
fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia,
together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled
truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to
Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck
around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the
accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan
de Oro City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accusedappellant went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to
Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her
revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses as
well as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant
was provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and
business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance
of P3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on November 30,
1996, the amount dwindled to a measly P9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately
report to the police also belies her rape allegations. 67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant
gradually detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for
MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He
was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex.
He tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same when they
had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he
arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed

him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for his permission whenever she
went out.68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accusedappellant several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually
intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to
know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the
Philippine National Police, another one is a government employee, a certain
Fernandez and three other priests.71 Several persons told him about the paramours
of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on
November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player.
Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the
volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned
around and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An
altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the
latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better
off without the accused-appellant because she had somebody young, handsome,
and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and
ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof
going to her and one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did
not push through because the accused-appellant's parents intervened. 74 Thereafter,
KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay
Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18,
1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by
the prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and
straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also
upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in
our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime such as rape
if the same was not truly committed.

The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the
accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering
against KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised
on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense
witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16,
1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant
[P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of
(P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA
held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the
amendment of the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not
prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the
amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the
victim herself and the corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to
establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353.
The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did
not negate the commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not
necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are
husband and wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there
must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and
intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing
of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape;
what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the
accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are
spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her
right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.

The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when
she stated that she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape
when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical
injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan
de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes, considering that
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about four or five
hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED.

Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment
was justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the
property of her father until she marries to become the property of her husband. 87 If
a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her
from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage
and the law denied her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of
coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved,
allowing him to bring order within the family.90

SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court
notified the parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective
supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the
appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to
adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through
counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro
City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or
intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal
bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help
from police authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate and of blood
traces in KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of
'bride capture' whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an
heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's
chastity but rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible
marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her
daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property
and if a man raped his wife, he was merely using his property.86

This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept.
Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to
make a contract, sue another, own personal property or write a will. 91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived
the irrevocable implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital
exemption rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife,
for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself
in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of
America (USA) and England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually
assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his
wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration
of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator." 94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was
Commonwealth v. Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show
marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of
them citing Hale's theory as basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband
was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his
wife.97 The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital

right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in
raping her.98

and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being x x

x."102 (Citations omitted)

In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA
demanding for its abolition for being violative of married women's right to be
equally protected under rape laws. 99

By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the
District of Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other
states granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the
wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to
consent.103

In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the
application of the rule in cases where the husband and wife are living apart
pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires such living
apart," or a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation. 100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of
Appeals of New York declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta 101 for
lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape.
The decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory,
ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and
nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the
exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property
rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest
scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York
statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual
intercourse has been cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x
x Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not
simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading,
violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes
severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such
an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage
has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on
demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license
for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the
same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a
husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he
should seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or
forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law
doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband and that the legal
existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this
State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any modem society is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity

III. Marital Rape in the Philippines

Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until
now. It appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the
RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form.
According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape
under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband
should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse. 105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UNCEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the
first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against
women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and
women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns. 107 The
country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women
in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a
policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet
incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate
means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination
against women.108

In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines

enshrined the principle of gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in
Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The Philippines also
acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international
law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality.
In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of
the RPC.109 The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from
the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and
perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2
thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by
the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty:
Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in
defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without
regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is

demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the
deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265
and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape'
due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our
lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general
definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never
agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal
husband who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital
rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17
years of private practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I
can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that
prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we
don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is
why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now
being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here for
marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife
to go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she
cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that
prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C
because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction
there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for
something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why
we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically
House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape,
it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual
assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our
understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband
who is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that
correct?

married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the]
husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It
was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged
with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]

MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already
stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime
of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for
sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes
under this bicameral conference committee report are all now denominated as rape
whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is
only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of
punishing the husband who forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But
please do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the
sanctity of marriage. x x x.110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is
not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can
be implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was
in the House version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will notice,
it only says, that because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you
cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's
blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot
raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the marriage contract
does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop
referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape,

HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does
not mean you can have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by
depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that
cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko
lang, it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the same
definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that
this rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance
when a husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is
understood that this rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect
of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove
marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain
the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it
because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should understand that
a husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made
clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is
that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost
want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I
mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women and they would understand that it is
half achieved.

HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or
creating a new crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence
the fact that he is husband is not, does not negate. 111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion.
The only disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are
two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or
intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial.
The fact that the husband and wife are separated does not come into the picture. So
even if they are living under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant
circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape. 112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on
marital rape, it does not actually change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the
doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the
husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one
another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think there is any need to
change the concept of rape as defined presently under the revised penal code. This
do[es] not actually add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is
merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that she was really
brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual intercourse
against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed against her by the
husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It does not
change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x. 113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed
by R.A. No. 9262,114 which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual
violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the
family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result
in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed

against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a
woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts
of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications
and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do
indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in
the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any
sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of
non-personal violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for
23% incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women
experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%)
experienced sexual violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied
consent theory. In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of
sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were
theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a
legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated
differently from ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the
presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual
community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife. 116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent
theory evolved have already been superseded by modem global principles on the
equality of rights between men and women and respect for human dignity
established in various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The
Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional
role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to

achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of such
measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital
rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's
body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always
obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated 118 by the UN
General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the
forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against
women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any
act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual
or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts,
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private
life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to,
the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including
battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence,
marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to
women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; 119 (Emphasis
ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will
commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA
W and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under
R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband
who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is
fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal120 to that
he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to
engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines

cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet

irrational notions on marital activities121 that have lost their relevance in a
progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this
rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
spontaneous and mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and
wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense
of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each
other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in
deepening marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital
union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or
intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and
protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his
indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may
legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill an essential marital obligation.125 But he cannot and should not demand sexual
intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in
terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws126 ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to
give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or
class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by
other persons or other classes in like circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to:
(a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that
where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three
forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed
in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords
protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man
alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against
married rape victims over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married
women raped by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape
victims.

Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting
the argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license
should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an
unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse
with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case
she refuses.

It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and
attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its
evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value
have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be
disturbed on appeal.132

Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and
decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual
and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. 129 Women do
not divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason
that human rights are inalienable.130

After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of
the entire records of the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses'
testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its findings.

In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital
rape nor provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to
interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of
judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can
the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it
would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them
differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and
the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own
legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of
guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship
between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the
established legal principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution
of rape cases and found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction
meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the
victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the
testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted
solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, dutybound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts
must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent
with human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility,
the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.131

Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and
spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never
wavered neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She
remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous
cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly
explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him
despite her refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him
in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order
not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to
have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his
request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her
panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the
small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged
him to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her
two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted. 133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is
likewise unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the
previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters
were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated
her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to
stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up.
MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded
them that as the head of the family he could do whatever he wants with his wife. To
demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and
thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down
her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still
aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot
withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed
his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the

room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or
fond of sex."135

A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?

Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element
that must be proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress. 136
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force,
threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b)
the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12
years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from
her through force and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral
certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you
remember what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off
his hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or
knocking her lap which means that he wanted to have sex."
Q So, what did you do after that?
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture
the witness is sobbing)

A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.
xx xx
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
Q So after that what else did he do?
A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter
how I wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her
testimony.
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode
on you and held your two hands?
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is
aching."
Q How did you say that to your husband?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxxx
A I shouted when I uttered that words.
xxxx
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?

Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
xxxx

A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137

On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

(Cross-Examination)

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. AMARGA;

ATTY. LARGO

Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove
your panty?

Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie
forcible.

A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because
according to you he normally do that if he have sex with you?

Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?

A Yes, Sir.

A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and
I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."

Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?

Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?

A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't
want to have sex with him at that time.

A It was tom.

Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A Yes, Sir.

Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he
do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me
and succeeded in having sex with me.139

Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove
your nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.138

The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by

gripping her hands, flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order
to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual
intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon
KKK. His actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that
he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously
demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge
his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on
their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he
exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal
bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to
the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's

husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No
consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were
no indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent
was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist
yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent was desired. The
significant point when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear to the
victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is
when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK
comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have
hit him to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an
element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove
resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the
accused-appellant to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual
congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she
refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it
may be just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the
force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had
in mind141 or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to
bow into submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's
panties or the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence
or absence of blood on the victim's underwear that determines the fact of
rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not
necessary to prove rape.144These details do not pertain to the elements that produce
the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman against her
will or without her consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy, the
evidentiary circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the
present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak,
inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness
who stated that force was not applied based on the position of her hymenal
laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical
violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's
testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
146

The corroborative testimonies of

MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative
value as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed
that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the
victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual
intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not
on whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were
in harmony with KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to
and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration.
MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, dont do that to me, have pity on
me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant
went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother,
the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother
who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was
prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion
from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled
while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accusedappellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's
bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a
beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the
accused-appellant barged inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an
argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and
OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the
children because he is the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase
where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the
accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the
accused-appellant, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual
and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17,
1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal
and physical resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when
MMM saw her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October
16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room,
and her categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes - all
generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her will.

Failure to immediately report to the

police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because
they failed to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK
belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting
sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife
to submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that
she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr.
(Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave
threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant. 151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No.
8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it
was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor
Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common
factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more
cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief
that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A
husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or
trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the
stigma and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the
intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable
explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not
fatal in view of the credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness
stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it
underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations.
Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and
inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court. 152
Ill motive imputed to the victim

The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief
as it is riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The
prosecution was able to establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank
account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI).
Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount
of P3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have
entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being aware of such
loan, he admitted that approximately P3 Million was spent for the construction of
their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's
allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in the bank. 153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain
how Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy
birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also
did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of
the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to
present the original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's
supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his
claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man would not have the
temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some of whom
he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand
are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to
infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to
extricate himself out of this legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's
unfounded suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent
to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to
present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is
harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as
defense, the accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual
intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This admission is
inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be
irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and
unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who
had no improper motive to testify falsely.154

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between
the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed
when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the
two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta
in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission
of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to
adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be
at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime.
Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de
Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which was available to the accused
appellant at any time.156 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the
situs criminis at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and
credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight
to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify
against the accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was
sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful
declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of
overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's
narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the
physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason
and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of
raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted
upon the accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." 157

The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral
damages are granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of
rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the
experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape
took place.1wphi1 Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there
being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate
amount is P50,000.00159 and not P75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of
domestic violence, an award ofP30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative. 160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a
woman's value and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age,
physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to
anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored
fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be
her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that
our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive
husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape
their wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By
marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy
over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to
marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in
sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He
can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal
constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and
biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails
mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual
cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement,
menacing personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this
regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place
to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person

who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable under the
pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.

The crime is aggravated by the minority the victim being twelve years old (12) at
the time of the incident.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further
ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199871

When arraigned on June 6, 2007, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.4

Trial on the merits ensued.
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
To prove the charges against accused-appellant, Edwin Canon, Jr. [Edwin, Jr.]
testified that in the morning of 22 April 2007, he and his brother were on their way
home when he saw [appellant] chasing AAA on a grassy area located at the
outskirts of their barangay. Not minding the two, they left and proceeded home.
That same morning, he learned that people were looking for AAA so he told his
father of what he saw. His father in turn informed the barangay officials and, after
conducting a search, AAAs lifeless body was found in a swamp near the place where
Edwin, Jr. saw [appellant] chasing the victim. On cross-examination, Edwin, Jr.
maintained that he was able to see and recognize [appellant] and AAA from a
distance of about 50 to 60 meters before they ran towards the knee-high cogon
grass area. According to him, [appellant] stopped and looked at them before
running after the victim.

June 2, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WILFREDO SOLANO, JR. y GECITA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Wilfredo Solano, Jr. y Gecita was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide in an Information1 that reads as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 2007 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning,
at Sitio Okdo, Barangay Palanas, municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design, by means of force, threat and intimidation, and by
employing personal violence upon "AAA,"2 a 12-year old girl, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with her against her will
and without her ,consent, and after the sexual assault said accused strangled x x x
"AAA," resulting [in] the immediate death of said victim, to the damage and
prejudice of her legal heirs.

Meanwhile, prosecution witness Nestor Armenta [Nestor] fortified his Sinumpaang

Deklaracion and claimed that in a grassy place in Barangay Palanas, he saw
[appellant] holding an unconscious AAA by her armpits and [dragging] her while
she was facing up lying on the ground. Upon seeing him, [appellant] gave him a
dagger look, so, he hurriedly left the place and proceeded to the barangay proper
where he reported the matter to the barangay tanod.
On cross-examination, Nestor testified that he was about 9 meters away from
where he saw [appellant] drag AAA. When he arrived at the town proper, he learned
that there was a search for AAA so he relayed what he saw to Chief Tanod Zaldy
Campo [Chief Tanod Campo] and went home. Thereafter, he was informed that the
body of AAA was found in the place where he saw [appellant] dragging the victim.
On further questioning, he asserted that he knew AAA because he was the caretaker
of the fishpond owned by the victims mother. He also knew [appellant] because he
was a friend of his father.
xxxx
On the other hand, Chief Tanod Campo claimed that after Edwin Canon, Sr. [Edwin,
Sr.] reported the matter to them[, a] group of about 30 persons, some of whom
were relatives of AAA, proceeded to the swampy area where Edwin, Jr. saw
[appellant] and AAA. At around 7 oclock in the evening, with the aid of a petromax,

they saw the body of AAA buried in mud. When asked to explain the pictures taken
from the crime scene, the witness described that AAA was naked when they found
her and her dress was tied on the neck and the panty was in one leg already. Being
the only suspect, they proceeded to the house of [appellants] uncle to apprehend
him. According to him, [appellant] confessed to raping and killing AAA when
investigated at the barrio hall. He was remorseful and repentant when investigated
and did not react when they told him that they found the body of AAA in the
swamp.
On cross-examination, Chief Tanod Campo testified that x x x after his arrest,
[appellant] verbalized to them his innocence and that he was the one who
convinced [appellant] to surrender.
xxxx
According to [Municipal Health Officer Dr. David Daza], his examination of AAAs
genitalia showed that there was blood oozing out from her vagina which was
marked with hymenal lacerations and presence of suspected spermatozoa thereby
indicating that she was subjected to sexual intercourse.
[Appellant] denied that he raped and killed AAA. He maintained that on the day of
the incident, he and his two cousins were at the house of his uncle, Ernesto Solano
to watch over the palay. Around 1 oclock in the afternoon, he was summoned by
Chief Tanod Campo and brought to the barangay hall.
Thereat, [a relative of "AAA"] asked him whether he saw AAA and when he
answered in the negative, ["AAAs" relative] threw a punch at him. After that, he
was instructed by his uncle to go home but at around 10 oclock in the evening,
some military men arrested him and brought him to the Municipal Hall of Pilar,
Sorsogon. x x x
x x x On cross-examination, he admitted that he personally knows the family of the
victim since he worked for them for less than a year. When he learned about the
alleged rape of his sister by [a relative of "AAA"] sometime in the year 2000, he quit
his job with them. x x x He also admitted holding a grudge against the [family of
"AAA"] but denied that he knows anything about AAAs death. He also did not know
of any reason why prosecution witnesses Edwin, Jr., Edwin Sr., Nelson and Chief
Tanod Campo would testify against him inasmuch as he was in good terms with
them. Lastly, [appellant] admitted that the place where he was then staying can
easily be negotiated by walking or any means of transportation and that he could
leave the place and return to it easily.5
On May 18, 2009, the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 51 rendered its
Decision6
finding appellant guilty as charged based on the following circumstantial evidence:

The accused was seen chasing the victim at the approximate time of the
perpetration of the crime and at the hilly and grassy place where the victim was
found;
The uncontroverted fact that the accused was seen dragging the motionless victim
lying with her face up by another prosecution witness near the same place where he
was also seen chasing the victim;
There was no other person last seen together with the victim;
The uncontroverted testimony of some prosecution witnesses regarding the
extrajudicial confession made by the accused that he admitted raping and killing the
victim and on the basis thereof he was apprehended and detained in the evening of
the day of the incident in question;
The finding of the examining physician who conducted the autopsy that the victim
was subjected to sexual intercourse when she was still alive manifested by several
lacerations and blood found on her genitalia;
Death of the victim by strangulation and the fact that the body of the victim was
found submerged in the muddy area very near the place where the accused was
seen chasing the victim and likewise very near the place where the accused was
likewise seen dragging the victim.
The accused admitted being angry at the [family of "AAA"] after he learned that his
sister who by then was already in Manila was raped by [a relative of "AAA]. 7
The trial court did not lend credence to the alibi of appellant. It observed that not
one of appellants cousins who were supposed to be with him when the incident
happened stepped forward to corroborate appellants testimony. Besides, the trial
court noted that the place where appellant was supposedly present was located in
the same barangay where the rape and homicide was committed. As such, it was
not physically impossible for appellant to be present at the place where the crime
was committed. The trial court also found that appellant harbored ill-feelings toward
the family of "AAA" after learning that a relative of "AAA" raped his sister. Lastly, the
court a quo considered the minority of "AAA" as the prosecution satisfactorily
established that "AAA" was only 12 years of age during the commission of the
crime.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused WILFREDO
SOLANO JR. y GECITA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole.

In keeping with current jurisprudence the accused shall pay the heirs of "AAA" the
amount of P50,000.00 for her death and P50,000.00 for having been raped. He is
likewise held liable in the amount of P75,000.00 in moral damages and P25,000.00
as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages not supported by competent proof.
There having been alleged and proven the minority of the victim, the same is taken
as an aggravating circumstance which presence further more entitles her heirs [to]
the award of P50,000.00 in exemplary damages.

Appellant claims that the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the

prosecution are insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He insists
that it was highly improbable for prosecution witness Edwin Jr. to have seen him
chasing "AAA" from a distance of 50 to 60 meters or even identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime.14Appellant also assails the testimony of Nestor that he saw
appellant dragging the victims body towards the swamp considering the lack of
explanation why he was in the vicinity or how he reached the place. 15

SO ORDERED.8

The appeal lacks merit.

Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision 9 dated July 14, 2011, the
appellate court affirmed in full the trial courts Decision. It ratiocinated that -

"Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt."16 In this case, it is beyond doubt that all the
circumstances taken together point to the singular conclusion that appellant, to the
exclusion of all others, committed the crime. As found by the trial court and
affirmed by the appellate court, the victim was last seen in the presence of the
appellant.1wphi1 Edwin Jr. saw appellant chasing the victim. Nestor also saw
appellant dragging the motionless body of "AAA." The body of the victim was
eventually found buried in the mud near the place where she was last seen with the
appellant. Appellant admitted holding a grudge against the family of "AAA" because
he believes that a relative of "AAA" had raped his [appellants] sister. The autopsy
report showed that "AAA" was raped and strangled. Likewise, appellant could not
ascribe any ill-motive on the part of prosecution witnesses Edwin Jr., Edwin Sr. and
Nestor whom he even considered as friends.

So viewed, We find no reason to overturn the findings of the RTC with respect to
[appellants] culpability. In this case, the prosecution duly established that (1)
[appellant] was seen by Edwin, Jr. chasing the victim; (2) [appellant] was also seen
by Nestor chasing the victim; (3) the body of the victim was found in a swamp
located near the place where Edwin, Jr. and Nestor last saw [appellant] and AAA
and; (4) upon his arrest, [appellant] was remorseful, repentant and did not react
when they told him that they found the body of AAA in the swamp. All these
circumstances have remained unrefuted by [appellant] which indubitably
demonstrate an unbroken chain of events from which a reasonable conclusion
pointing to [appellant] as the culprit may be derived. From all indications,
[appellants] culpability had been duly established by his presence at the scene of
the crime and his conduct towards AAA prior to her disappearance and eventual
death.10

We agree with the appellate courts ratiocination that The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this appeal.
In a Resolution12 dated February13, 2012, we required the parties to file their
Supplemental Briefs; however, both opted to adopt the brief that they have filed
before the Court of Appeals.13

x x x while no direct evidence was adduced by the prosecution, We, however, agree
with the trial court that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to hold
[appellant] for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide. As proven by the
prosecution, AAA was last seen in the company of [appellant] as the person chasing
the victim on a grassy area located at the outskirts of their barangay. Contrary to
the [appellants] supposition, We find that the distance of about 50-60 meters is
enough for one person to recognize another persons face. This is especially true
since it had been established by one witness that [appellant] turned his face
towards him x x x and that he was able to see him before AAA ran towards the
knee-high cogon grass.1wphi1
The same is true with respect to the accounts of Nestor. [Appellants] attempt to
taint the truthfulness of his testimony on the mere fact that he failed to testify on
how he was able to reach the area or the reason why he was on that place at the
time he saw [appellant] and AAA, finds no leg to stand on. Needless to state, the
circumstances alluded [to] by [appellant] are trivial and merely refer to insignificant
matters which hardly affect the credibility of the witness. What is more important is
that Nelsons testimony, which had been considered worthy of credit by the trial
court, had withstood the gruelling cross-examination of the defense. 17

As regards the penalty, both the trial court and the appellate court correctly
sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Both courts
also properly awarded the heirs of "AAA" the amounts ofP100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages,
andP50,000.00 as exemplary damages.18 However, all damages awarded shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment 'until
fully paid in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the July 14, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 04010 affirming the May 18, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon City, Branch 51 finding appellant Wilfredo Solano, Jr. y Gecita guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the

penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, to pay the heirs of "AAA"
Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all
damages awarded from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.