The Concept of Self and Postmodern Painting: Constructing a Post-Cartesian Viewer

Author(s): William V. Dunning

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 331336
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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WILLIAM V. DUNNING

The Conceptof Self and PostmodernPainting:

Constructinga Post-CartesianViewer

Individualmembersof any society sharea common concept of "self," and this concept simultaneously structuresand limits their perceptions
as to the similarities and differences between
themselves and others.' In The Language of the
Self; Anthony Wilden points out that most current sociologists and anthropologists consider
the idea of self to be a tacit constructspecific to
thatsociety in which an individualexists: Claude
Levi-Straussgoes so far as to contend that the
individualtends to disappearentirely within the
social structure.2
As a society's concept of self inevitably
changes, art must also reflect this change in
order to be relevant to both the artist and the
thoughtful viewer. The difference between the
modernand the postmodernconcept of self, and
their respective relationshipto nature, provides
foundationfor some of the structuraldifferences
between modernand postmodernpainting.
Humanshave always speculatedas to the nature of the "individual," and for the last four
hundredyears we have struggledto comprehend
the reality of what we call self. Walter Ong
contends in Orality and Literacy that the first
glimmerings of a personalized self-an introspective analytical conscious awareness of the
individual will-appeared sometime after 1500
B. C., aboutthe time the alphabetwas invented.
He reasonsthatthis change came aboutbecause
society had converted from an oral to a literate
tradition.3
In his study of the history and the motivations
for personalrenown, Leo Braudypoints out that
the humanists of ancient Rome defined individual achievementin terms of public behavior,
and thus the entire society was motivatedby an
urge for personalfame. But medievalChristians
invertedthis Romanhierarchy:they emphasized

private and spiritual values, ratherthan public

behavior, as the primarymark of achievement.
The Church considered earthly life as nothing
but a brief preparationfor the eternal glory to
come, thereforemedievalsociety had little interest in the individual self. Consequently, few
medieval texts are autobiographical,and many
medievalartists remainanonymous.4
Renaissancesociety found a new approachto
classical humanism. Public behaviorwas once
again perceivedas more importantthan the private spirituallife, andthe statusof the individual
was revitalized. Renaissance artists invented
new forms of self-presentation,andthis new and
public self was an external construct ("I am
perceived by others"); but the Reformation
changed the relationshipbetween spiritual and
secular life, and by the seventeenthcentury a
new interiorawarenessof the self had emerged
("I perceive myself").5
Conditionedby this new interiorand intuitive
awareness of self, the seventeenthcentury philosopher,Rene Descartes, offeredWesterncivilization the first rationalnotionof the individual
soul.6 With his new approachto the disciplineof
philosophy,Descartes offered convincingproof
of the existence of the self and the body: he
convinced Europeanthinkersthat the reality of
self was provedby consciousness (Cogito ergo
sum.), and physical realitywas provedby extension of the body in space. He developedthrough
rigorous Euclidean logic the proposal that the
concept of self describes an inalienable nature
thatinvolves consciousness (awareness,feeling,
and volition), while physical existence involves
extension (three-dimensionalextension and potential mobility in space).7
The massive social, economic, and political
changes that took place during the seventeenth

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49:4 Fall 1991

332

centurycould not havehappenedwithouta major

shift in self-concept: "The overthrow of kings
requiresnot just an explicit political theory or a
set of grievances but also a deep-seatedconviction that kings can be overthrown."8
Descartes had succinctly expressed a version
of the seventeenthcentury concept of self, and
this sense of self would dominate the point of
view of society and its importantpaintersuntil
the middle of the nineteenthcentury. Italianand
French painters during this period were compelled by their assumptionsto depict the external world in a mannerthat accommodatedthis
Cartesianparadigm. These self-centered paintings were geometrically oriented to, and centeredupon, thatspecific site outside the painting
where the painter is geometrically implied to
have stood in orderto view the scene. From the
psychological point of view of a perceptionist
such as Rudolf Arnheim, "the location of an
appropriatelyplaced viewer is a prerequisiteof
the picture'sexistence."9
These paintings were unified by various permutationsof the structuralelements of the Renaissance system of illusion: a unified light
source, the separationof planes, linearperspective, atmospheric perspective, and color perspective all worked in unison to depict every
figure and object in the painting from one specific viewpoint only. Consequently,all the objects in such a paintingexisted in the same unified pictorial space. Arnheim explains that the
Renaissance system of perspective was not invented in order to create likenesses, but "to
providea continuumof space in depth."'?These
paintings were unified in point of view (attitude), as well as viewpoint (location), because
they were inspired by nature, thus they presented a verticalhead-to-footimage.
I maintain that such a painted text presupposes, perhapseven "constructs,"a specific kind
of viewer, in the same mannerthat semiologists
insist that writtentexts may imply or constructa
specific kind of reader.That is, the writerof any
text may presumethathis readershavea specific
awareness, knowledge, or orientation. An author may even attempt to modify the reader's
consciousness, to constructa readerwho might
betterbe able to understandor sympathizewith
his text.
With their unified space and viewpoint, the
self-centered paintedillusions of the ItalianRe-

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

naissance, the baroqueand rococo periods, and
the first half of the nineteenthcentury,construct
a Cartesian viewer. In other words, the very
structureof the painting implies that it is to be
viewed by a single viewer who stands in one
specific location and visually extends a sense of
self through a window-like transparentpicture
plane into an illusionistic pictorialspace in the
painting,as if bothbody andconsciousnessmight
travel into and move throughthe same pictorial
space.
But WalterMichaelspointsoutthattowardthe
end of the nineteenthcentury, Charles Sanders
Peirce, perhaps the most respected American
philosopher,expressedmajordisagreementswith
four principal aspects of the Cartesian method
and spirit." Peirce was not the first to probe
these flaws in the Cartesian method; some of
these concerns were expressed by Descartes's
earliestcritics duringhis own time.'12But Peirce
offered a systematicalternativeapproachto philosophy and the philosophicalself.13
In his arguments, Peirce makes three points
that are importantin the understandingand perhaps in the developmentof the world view that
created postmodernpainting: "1. We have no
powerof Introspection,but all knowledgeof the
internalworldis derivedby hypotheticalreasoning from our knowledgeof externalfacts. 2. We
have no power of Intuition, but every cognition
is determinedlogically by previouscognitions.
3. We haveno powerof thinkingwithoutsigns."14
In short, Peirce contends:We do not intuitan
internalnotion of self as Descartes had insisted;
we arrive at such knowledge externally,by inference and hypothesis (that is we construct a
concept of self by trial and error);furthermore,
we know reality only throughsigns. Peirce developed throughextendedargumentthe concept
that the self does not only interpret;the self is
itself an interpretation.15Peirce argues elaboratelyand convincinglythatwe understandeven
this personal self externally, as a linguistic
sign.'6 The structuralistFreudian psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, agrees with Peirce's construct when he insists: "I identify myself in
Language."17

Kindled by Peirce and fanned by Ferdinand

de Saussure,this sparkof aporiaaboutthe relationshipof the externalto the internalqualityof
self has blossomed into reams of poststructuralist discourse about "inside" and "outside":

Dunning The Concept of Self and PostmodernPainting

the hors d'oeuvre (what is inside or outside the
work); Jacques Derrida-who gave us "deconstruction," the word and the strategy-writes at
length of the parergon(what constitutes the actual work and what may be conceived as beside
the work).'18
Peirce and his concept of the self are particularly interesting to us because his invention,
the science of semiotics, was a powerful influence on Saussure,whose linguistic metaphorhas
become the foundationof twentiethcenturycriticism: formalism, structuralism,poststructuralism, and deconstruction.'19Furthermore,Margaret Iversen insists that Peirce offers a richer
system than does Saussure for the purpose of
formulatinga semiotics of visual art, for while
Saussuretends to focus on the arbitraryqualities
of the linguistic sign proper, Peirce focuses on
the motivated visual signs-the icon and the
index-as well as the unmotivatedsign proper.
Peirce even isolates two useful sub-categoriesof
the iconic sign: images and diagrams.20
Taking a cue from David Carrier in "The
Deconstructionof Perspective," I contend that
traditionalperspectivesatisfiesa Cartesianviewer
who relates to the external world in a series of
momentaryviews, each located at a single point
in space. This external world is typically the
worldof naturein which, at any one moment, all
objects are viewed from a single location. Carrier maintainsthat such a Cartesianviewer presumes that this external world can be represented in a unified, picture-like construct.2'
Consequently,the unified, monolithicsystem of
Renaissance perspective implies or constructs
Cartesian viewers who are inclined to extend
themselves visually into the pictorial space of a
painting (which was inspired by nature). But
such a Cartesianconcept of self may have little
relevanceto today's, perhapsmore mature, pluralistsociety, which we now perceiveto be influenced more by culturethanby nature.
In our postnaturalculture, the abidingawareness of pluralist realities-multiple points of
view-makes us question the completeness, if
not the veracity, of any world that can be fully
depicted from a single viewpoint. The isolated
Cartesianself seems to be an anachronismas we
close the twentiethcentury. Consciously or unconsciously, our painters and critics insist on a
new construct of self, a self that reflects our
current beliefs and understandings. Arnheim

333

contends that in spite of the fact that we have a

strong tendency to perceive the world as centeredaroundthe self, as we maturewe learnthat
our "environmentis dominatedby othercenters,
which force the self into a subordinateposition."22

Postmodernpainters, with their new interest

in a pluralistviewpoint, often reject the single
viewpoint and unified perspectives of the Renaissance,becausethe principalpurposeof such
conventions was to unify the world around a
single center:the viewer. In 1972 Leo Steinberg
introducedthe term "flatbed picture plane" in
reference to the flatbed printingpress-a horizontal bed that supportsa printingsurface. He
maintainsthatthis termdescribesthe stateof the
picture plane after the 1950s, and his idea has
been adoptedby severalcurrentwritersto refer
to: (1) a picture plane that implies a horizontal
surface, and (2) a fragmentedpluralistorientation to pictorial space, which may be a characteristic of many postmodernpainters.23
In the first partof his argument-the implication of a horizontal surface-Steinberg insists
thattraditionalpaintingsare inspiredby the natural world and evoke responses that are normally experienced in an erect vertical posture
with the viewer parallel to the picture plane.
Thereforethe traditionalpictureplane, in paintings inspiredby the observationof nature, "affirms verticalityas its essential condition."24
Steinbergmaintainsthateven modernpainters
such as de Kooning, Kline, Pollock, and Newman-though they were attemptingto breakaway
from Renaissance perspective-were still oriented to a vertical plane, and their work addressed us head-to-footbecause this is the form
mandatedby the constructof the verticalviewer.
It is in this sense, Steinbergcontends, that the
abstractexpressionistswere often referredto as
naturepainters. Thus, when postmodernpainters changed their reference from the vertical to
the horizontalflatbed pictureplane, their paintings began to signify the culture in which they
lived, ratherthan the slowly perishingworld of
nature.
Certainly the postnaturalworld is tyrannized
by human culture, and in such a postnatural
world, dominatedand inundatedby the artifacts
and effects of culture, the works of artists, like
the conceptof self, mustbe shapedby the current
environment-by culture, not nature. Steinberg

334

contends that in painting, it was the work of

Dubuffet, Johns, and Rauschenbergthat began
to indicatethis substantialchange in our concept
of self, and art began to demonstratea cultural
influence, ratherthanthatof dying nature.
Though we still exhibit postmodernpaintings
vertically-in the same manneras we tack maps,
plans, or horseshoes to the wall-Steinberg
claims these paintings no more insist or depend
upon a vertical posture than does a tabletop, a
chart, a studio floor, or any "receptorsurfaceon
which objects are scattered, on which data is
entered, on which informationmay be received,
printed, impressed-whether coherently or in
confusion."25He reasons that when Rauschenberg "seized his own bed, smearedpaint on its
pillow and quiltcoverlet,and uprightedit against
the wall," it constitutedhis most profoundsymbolic gesture.26But I am not entirely comfortable with this first portion of Steinberg'sargument-the horizontalorientationof the picture
plane. I do not see the evidence or the result in
currentpaintings,andI do not feel this portionis
convincingly developedor argued.
For instance, the pattern of paint (strokes,
runs, and drips) on Rauschenberg'sBed (1955)
clearly indicates that the bed was first placed
upright, then paintedin that vertical position: it
was not painted and then placed upright, as
Steinberg suggests. This, it seems, should disqualify Rauschenberg'sBed as an example of
the flatbed picture plane since Steinberg does
not hesitateto disqualify Pollock'spaintings.He
reasons that even though Pollock started his
paintings as they lay horizontalon the floor, he
later tacked them to the wall to develop them
further.Thus, he concludes, Pollock "livedwith
the painting in its uprighted state, as with a
worldconfrontinghis humanposture."27Butthe
patternof drips clearly indicatesthat Rauschenberg also lived with Bed "in the uprightedstate"
as had Pollock, and the bed certainly asserts a
strongerhead-to-footorientationthan Pollock's
does.
Furthermore,Steinbergdoes not develop any
important conceptual differences between his
concept of the horizontalorientationof the picture plane and numeroushorizontaldome, floor,
and ceiling paintings from history, which were
orientedto a viewer-perpendicular, ratherthan
parallel, to the surface of the painting-who
standsbelow and looks up at the work. Nor does

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

he include in his invoice the horizontalimplications of Degas' worm'seye and bird'seye views
which afford a near frontalview of a horizontal
surface.
But in spite of this inchoate first section of
Steinberg'sthesis (the horizontalorientationof
the picture plane), I believe the second portion
of Steinberg'stheory (the fragmentedmultiple
viewpoint) stresses an importantdeparturefrom
traditionalperspectivesand merits a more rigorous development. The second portion of this
theory suggestsa new approachto pictorialspace
and an important new concept of the picture
plane.
Even the cubists and the abstractexpressionists-claims Steinberg-assumed that painting
representeda Cartesian"worldspace."But postmodern painters use multiple viewpoints to
createwhathe called a "flatbedpictureplane"a fragmented horizontal picture plane with a
profusion of perspectives refuses to locate the
viewer in any specific position or identity.28
Carrierreasons that the series of visual choices
allows viewers to play with the instructionsthey
receive from the multiple perspectives constructed on such a flatbed surface and create
multiple viewer locations outside the picture
plane. The flatbedpictureplanegeneratesa more
complex relationshipbetweenviewer and painting; "no single point is defined as the right
viewing point."29
Rauschenberglaid his paintings flat, Steinberg insists, in orderto impressseveralseparate
photographictransfers onto their surface, and
these multiple photographsfragmentedthe picture plane. In The Art of Describing, Svetlana
Alpers concurs that the fragmentationof the
image so characteristicof seventeenthcentury
Dutch painting is also a characteristicof photographs. Though the Albertian Italian model
constructeda paintingthatwas perceived "as an
object in the world, a framedwindow to which
we bring our eyes," the northern model perceived the paintingas takingthe place of the eye
itself (or the focal plane of a camera), not as a
plane section throughthe cone of sight.30Consequently the picture plane, the frame, and the
viewer's location is left undefined: "If the picturetakes the place of the eye, then the viewer is
nowhere."31 I contendthe Albertianmodel logically constructs a Cartesian viewer, but the
northernmodel does not. If the northernmodel

Dunning The Concept of Self and PostmodernPainting

of the picture plane is identifiedwith the retina,
the viewer cannot logically then extend himself
into the pictorialspace of his own retina.
Each photographin Rauschenberg'spainting
was itself a separateillusion, and each of these
illusions was orientedby its own perspectiveto a
separateviewer location. Steinbergreasons that
in orderto maintainrelationshipsbetween these
fragmentedimages, Rauschenbergwas obliged
to conceive of his picture plane as a surface to
which anything "reachable-thinkable"could be
attached:his paintinghad to become whatevera
billboard or a bulletin board is. If one of the
photographsor collage elements created an unwantedillusion of depth, he casually stainedit or
smeared it with paint as a gentle reminderthat
the surface was flat. Any kind of photographor
object could now be attachedto the surface of a
painting because such objects no longer represented an individual's view of the world, but
rathera scrapof printedmaterial.32
These fragmented images seem impeccably
tailoredto the fragmentedperceptionsof viewers conditioned by rapidly escalating demands
on their attention from a multiplicity of ever
more fragmentedmedia and a plethoraof public
personalities. Braudy says today's viewers are
"collage personalitiesmade up of fragmentsof
public people [and other role modelsi who are,
in turn, made up of fragmentsthemselves."33
Like Rauschenberg, many current painters
tend, throughone pictorialdevice or another,to
preventthe viewer from visually extending into
the pictorial space of the painting. These painters often render their images in multiple perspectives:a series of fragmentedDerrideanapostrophes,digressions-footnotes ratherthana cohesive central text-each in turn, turning away
from the main body or text. Each apostrophe,
each footnote, constructs a different viewing
location or a separatespectator,thus implying a
pluralistratherthan a single viewer.
Steinberg contends that the flatbed picture
plane has liberatedpostmodernpaintingand enabledit to pursuea moreunpredictablecourse.34
The integrity of the picture plane, which once
hinged on the painter'srigorous control of illusion, is now an accepted given. The flatness of
the paintedsurface is no longer a pressing problem that requires repeated proof. As the postmodern novel is no longer obliged to maintaina
single voice or point of view, neither is the

335

postmodernpainting obliged to maintaina single point of view-or viewpoint. Painters no

longer feel obliged, as de Kooningdid, to adjust
each area, stroke by stroke, until it is carefully
resolved into homogeneousconformitywith the
over-allillusionistic "voice" of the painting.
In RecentPhilosophers,JohnPassmorepoints
out that the traditionalview of self equatedpersonal identity with the continuity of memory:
"identity" was our ability to think of ourselves
as being "ourselves" at different times and
places, yet paradoxicallywe insist uponthe continuityof body when we consideran amnesiacto
be the same personas beforethe memoryloss.35
But Saussure's metaphorof the linguistic system, which structuralistshave appliedto all disciplines, has led Derridato propose a new concept of personal identity, a concept with which
the ancient philosopher Heraclitus might have
agreed. Derridadisplaces the idea of identityas
defined by difference-in both the sign and the
self-with the term "differance,"which implies
both differinganddeferring.Ouridentityis now
defined by the mannerin which we are different
from others within a particularsystem, and this
identityis neverfixed, or determined;"our 'nature' is always 'deferred.'"36
Structuralistsand poststructuralistscontend
thatideas andlanguagebelong to no one because
the very concept of ownershipdependsupon an
obsolete concept of the self. Derrida, insists that
structuralismheralds the end of private property, but the real meaning of this statementis:
Poststructuralismportendsthe end of the private
self.37
In "Interweaving Feminist Frameworks,"
Elizabeth Dobie describes currentworks, such
as Hera Totem(1985), by Nancy Spero as separate images-words and icons-on horizontal
pieces of paper, two-hundredfeet long, strung
like unwoundscrolls aroundthe room, or hung
in verticalstrips from the ceiling. Each image is
frontal, seen from a location directly in front of
the image; thus, each image is delineatedfrom a
separateviewing location. Her images are often
appropriatedfrom many different sources and
styles, andthey presenta momentaryimage; the
images are not related in a linear or narrative
sense.38Dobie insists that feministworkrefuses
to strive for a single voice and thus "bears an
intrinsicaffinityto pluralism"[thuspostmodernism].39 Consequently such postmodern works,

336

which alter "the position of women within discourse and their relationto it,"40 are pluralistin
both viewpoint and point of view and might thus
be said to reflect a new and more complex concept of self.
WILLIAM V. DUNNING

Art Department-RandallHall
CentralWashingtonUniversity
Ellensburg, WA 98926
1. This article expands substantially on an idea I first
touched upon in my book (William V. Dunning, Changing
Images of Pictorial Space: A History of Spatial Illusion in
Painting,[Syracuse:SyracuseUniversityPress, 1991], 22126).
2. Anthony Wilden, "Lacan and the Discourse of the
Other" in The Language of the Self trans. with notes and
commentaryby AnthonyWilden (JohnsHopkinsUniversity
Press, 1968), pp. 178-79.
3. WalterJ. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing ofthe Word(New York:Methuen, 1982), pp. 29-30.
4. Leo Braudy, The Frenzy of Renown: Fame and Its
History(New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1986), pp. 1718,213.
5. Ibid., p. 343.
6. CharlesSandersPeirce, "Lowell LectureXI" in Writings of Charles S. Peirce, vol. 1, 1857-1866, ed. Max H.
Fisch (IndianaUniversityPress, 1986), p. 491.
7. Edwin ArthurBurtt, TheMetaphysicalFoundationsof
Modern Physical Science (New York: Anchor, 1954 revised), pp. 105-106.
8. Braudy,TheFrenzyof Renown,p. 342.
9. Rudolf Arnheim, The Powerof the Center:A Studyof
Composition in the Visual Arts (Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1982 revised), p. 49.
10. Ibid., p. 185.
11. WalterBenn Michaels, "The Interpreter'sSelf: Peirce
on the Cartesian'Subject'," in Reader-ResponseCriticism:
From Formalismto Post-Structuralism,ed. Jane P. Tompkins (JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 1980), pp. 188-89.
12. Ibid., p. 190.
13. Ibid., p. 192.
14. CharlesSandersPeirce, "Some Consequencesof Four
Incapacities," in Writingsof Charles S. Peirce, vol. 2,
1857-1866, ed. Max H. Fisch (Indiana University Press,
1986), p. 213.
15. Michaels, "The Interpreter'sSelf," p. 199.

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

16. Ibid., p. 194. Husserl had insisted that because the
signifier "I" refersto a differentpersoneach time it is used,
it constantlytakeson a new signified; Heidegger'sconcept is
"very close to Peirce's concept of the 'I' as one type of
indexical symbol, substitutingthe conceptof designationfor
that of signification" (Wilden, "Lacan and Discourse,"
pp. 179-80).
17. Jacques Lacan, "The Functionof Language in Psychoanalysis"in The Language of the Self; trans. with notes
and commentaryby AnthonyWilden (JohnsHopkins University Press, 1968), p. 63.
18. See Jacques Derrida, Writingand Difference, trans.
Alan Bass (Universityof Chicago Press, 1978), p. 112; and
the "Parergon"section in Derrida, The TruthIn Painting,
trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (University of
Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 15-120.
19. FredericJameson, The Prison-Houseof Language:A
Critical Account of Structuralismand Russian Formalism
(PrincetonUniversityPress, 1972), p. 101.
20. MargaretIversen, "Saussureversus Peirce: Models
for a Semiotics of Visual Art" in The New Art History
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International,
1988), pp. 84-85, 90.
21. David Carrier, "The Deconstructionof Perspective:
Howard Buchwald'sRecent Paintings," Arts Magazine 60
(1985): 28.
22. Arnheim, The Powerof the Center,pp. 4-5.
23. Leo Steinberg, Other Criteria: Confrontationswith
Art (New York:OxfordUniversityPress,
Twentieth-century
1972), p. 82.
24. Ibid., p. 84.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 82.
29. Carrier,"The Deconstructionof Perspective,"p. 28.
30. SvetlanaAlpers, TheArtof Describing(Universityof
Chicago Press, 1983), p. 45.
31. Ibid., p. 47.
32. Steinberg,OtherCriteria,p. 88.
33. Braudy,TheFrenzyof Renown,p. 5.
34. Steinberg,OtherCriteria,p. 88.
35. John Passmore, Recent Philosophers (La Salle, Illinois: Open CourtPublishingCompany,1985), p. 18.
36. Ibid., p. 31.
37. Ibid., p. 33.
38. Elizabeth Ann Dobie, "Interweaving Feminist
Frameworks,"The Journal of Aestheticsand Art Criticism
48 (1990): p. 382.
39. Ibid., p. 381.
40. Ibid., p. 384.