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ABSTRACT. This paper argues that a liberal state is justified in promoting relationships
of conjugal love the form of relationship that is the basis of the institution of marriage
on the grounds that they are essential to the development and maintenance of autonomy. A
deep human need is that the detail of our lives be recognised (accepted, affirmed, granted
importance) by others (or by an other). Autonomy can be compromised when this need is
not met. So a state concerned with autonomy ought to be concerned with relationships in
which people can be given recognition. This argument justifies support for friendship as
well as conjugal love; why is the latter particularly special? The answer is that in conjugal
love partners value each other exclusively (i.e., in a way they do not value anyone else).
Conjugal relations therefore recognise the uniqueness and individual value of a persons
life in a way that friendship does not.
KEY WORDS: friendship, liberalism, love, marriage, recognition
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CHRISTOPHER BENNETT
In this paper I argue that this assumption about the liberal position is
mistaken. Of course, the state ought not to compel people into marriage,
but there are grounds for thinking that the liberal state is justified in
engaging in more subtle forms of support for the institution. For instance,
the state might afford a special legal status to married couples (as it does
at present) reinforcing that with forms of financial assistance such as tax
breaks. I do not go into any of the details of such support: my main point
here is that the liberal state is justified in giving support to the two-person
conjugal relationship over other sorts of intimate relationship.
I argue that the pro-marriage position does not have to conflict with
the liberal view that insists on the priority of individual choice. For if we
look at the preconditions of individual choice, we find that the relationship of conjugal love is of great importance in maintaining an individuals
ability to frame, revise and pursue their conception of the good. By the
phrase conjugal love I mean to capture that type of enduring, close and
to some extent exclusive reciprocal relationship between two adults, based
on mutual affection and esteem, which ideally speaking underlies
marriage (though it can equally well exist in the absence of the formal
marriage bond). I claim that one does not have to believe in anything more
than the value of individual autonomy in order to think that the relationship
of conjugal love is morally important and ought to be supported by the
state.
Some might be sceptical about this idea. Surely, a critic might say,
marriage is responsible for cutting down ones freedom rather than
increasing it. Once one has responsibilities, not just for oneself, but for
another as well, ones freedom to do as one likes is dramatically curtailed
so, for example, goes the stereotypical story about why men are unwilling
to commit. But this criticism rests on too simple a view of freedom.
The notion of autonomy that I have in mind cannot be measured simply
by the sheer numbers of options that are formally available to you. Also
important is ones ability to avail oneself of these options. Autonomy has
to do not simply with the external aspect of freedom, but with internal
factors as well. A person may be (externally) free to a very high extent,
but lonely and lacking in self-respect. As a result they may lose their sense
of the value of their own projects and their own enjoyments. The thought
pursued in this paper is that a sense of ones own worth (self-respect) is a
necessary condition of valuing ones projects and therefore of making use
of freedom. A person who lacks this can become psychologically unable to
avail themselves of the options open to them. On my view, then, autonomy
(the ability to frame, revise and rationally pursue a conception of the good)
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rather than just a universal shared identity. However, in these more impersonal contexts, one might think that it is the universal and shared identity of
citizen that is important rather than particularity: we recognise the person
as having a life, an individuality of their own, in the sense of formally
having the capacity for such a thing, but we do not actually grant recognition to the content of that life. It is this recognising, valuing, sharing
of the content of the others life that is special to intimate relationships.
In intimate friendship, as in conjugal love, we share to some extent
the content of our lives with other people. We can imagine a continuum
between the fully impersonal and the fully intimate relationship, where the
crucial varying factor is the degree to which the content of ones life is
shared with other people.
This is to say that, when you are in a (well-ordered) intimate relationship, another person takes you to be important as the particular person you
are (likes, loves, cares for you as that person) and thinks that the things
that make you that individual those things that make up the content of
your particular life are important in themselves. They value the things
that make you the particular person you are. This means that such a person
values a certain detailed knowledge of you, and acts on the basis of that
knowledge to care for you. The attitude that is demanded by this sort of
intimate relationship is not one that we can expect everyone to take up.
Thus we should not expect our colleagues at work or our fellow citizens to
value these details about us. But it is a form of recognition that we properly
seek in the intimate sphere.
Hegels insight is that through the fact that another person values these
details about us, we come to value them ourselves. The fullest account of
the points that interest us here is contained in his discussion of love, not in
the Philosophy of Right,3 but in a later set of lectures.4 There he says that
in love I gain myself in another person. Now this is a motto that could
stand for the whole idea of recognition. We become ourselves through the
image that we see reflected in the eyes of others, and in the context of structured interactions with others. There are different types of recognition, and
Hegel recognises that we find or develop different aspects of ourselves in
a wide range of contexts rather than in the context of a single relationship:
ultimately we need the three distinct forms of recognition that come from
family, civil society and state. Love therefore represents a particular form
of recognition. Hegel goes on:
3 Though see G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. C. Diethe
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In [my beloved] I have the intuition, the consciousness, that I count for something, in her I
have worth and validity. But it is not only I who counts, she also counts for me. This means
that each person has in the other the consciousness of the other and of the self, this unity.5
Hegel takes himself here to be talking about conjugal love, but something
like this could be said about intimate and reciprocal forms of love and
friendship more generally. Through friendship and love we gain a sense of
our own importance, and the importance of our choices and projects. I shall
argue that such recognition is essential to our autonomous functioning.
Essential to autonomy, the thesis goes, is a form of caring based on detailed
attention to the way ones life is going.
Now one thing missing from this sketch so far is an important proviso.
We cannot get the required recognition from just anyone. Detailed attention from someone with whom I have no wish to engage in such a
relationship gives me, not a sense of my own importance, but rather a
sense of being violated, being stalked, being a person whose subjectivity
is not fully their own. Undesired attention is disempowering rather than
empowering. Rather, for the detailed attention of another person to be a
source of recognition, that person has to be someone we like and want
to be involved with in such an intimate way. This suggests an important
kind of reciprocity to friendship. In order for us to gain a sense of our own
importance from it, the person who gives us this sense must be someone
we take to be important as well.
This reading of Hegel suggests the following view. A deep human need
is that aspects of our lives such as our personal history, our present projects,
our character, be accepted, affirmed, granted importance by others (or by
an other). When this need is not met, it can be difficult to maintain our
sense of the importance of what we are doing. Thus autonomy can be
compromised. One role for intimate human groupings based on mutual
affection is that they allow their members to satisfy this need through a
mutual, detailed, altruism.
T HE D ETAIL OF O UR L IVES
I shall briefly defend this view through a consideration of some of the
problems that we tend to face at some point in our lives. I shall call
these problems part of the detail of our lives. By this I mean that they
are part of the way our lives look when seen close up, as we ourselves
(the ones who are leading them) see them. These range from the relatively everyday to some which are larger and more metaphysical. I take
5 Hegel, quoted in Williams, ibid.
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The argument so far should convince us that, though the liberal state
of course ought not to compel anyone to have friends, it is justified
in giving indirect support to forms of friendship. This might mean, for
instance, support for voluntary and non-purposive associations of civil
society; it might have consequences for the design and layout of residential neighbourhoods and the amenities provided or encouraged there;
it might militate against working practices which enforce geographical mobility or short-term contracts, thus disrupting the formation of
long-term relationships.
However, there are two features of conjugal love which distinguish
it from intimate friendship and which make the two-person relationship
particularly important in relation to the promotion and preservation of
autonomy. The first is something that distinguishes conjugal love from
friendship by degree: a lover is concerned with the whole of your life in
a way that a friend is not. The second is more like a difference in kind: a
lover has the type of concern they have for you only for you (conjugal love
is exclusive).
One thing underlying this exclusivity is surely the thought that the
parties to such a relationship grant each other a particular importance that
they do not grant to their other friends. Lovers can be tempted to express
this with melodramatic phrases like you are the most important thing in
the world to me, but I do not think that this is quite right. For there may
be many people who are important to you in different ways which are
impossible to quantify (parents, children, other friends, etc. how are they
to be ranked in importance?). Perhaps no one is more important to you
than your partner in conjugal love but it does not have to follow that there
are not people who are no less important. Rather it is the particular sort
of importance that you grant your partner that is the key issue, not their
relative ranking in your affections; it is the fact that, as I explain below,
you choose to take responsibility for them as a whole on the basis of the
value you attach to the detail of their life, a responsibility that you do not
assume for anyone else.
Now it may be objected that friendships as well as conjugal relationships can be to some extent exclusive. Friendships can be based around the
sharing of certain activities playing football, going for a drink together,
reading Kants Critique of Pure Reason, etc. And similar feelings of jealousy can be experienced when a friend starts to share these activities with
someone else as might be experienced as a result of the influence of an
outsider in the conjugal case. Thus friendships can be (often implicitly)
formed around a certain exclusivity. Still, this does not count against my
claim that conjugal partners have a concern for each other that they do not
have for anyone else.
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Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIII: Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue (1988), 1231,
267.
7 Plato, The Symposium, trans. W. Hamilton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951), 5865.
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that can be spread more widely than a two-person group? One difference
between conjugal love and intimate friendship lies just in the degree to
which one is concerned for the detail of the life of ones beloved, how
detailed ones concern for them is. When one assumes responsibility for
the whole of the others life, one begins to learn about who the other is,
what it is like to be them, what their needs and desires are, etc., in much
greater detail than it is possible to learn about the lives of ones friends.
One thesis in favour of conjugal love might draw on this point to argue,
in effect, from the division of labour. If there were a situation in which
people have many friends who get more or less equal amounts of each
others attention, but where there is no further pairing up, then it may turn
out that no one is actually able to gain sufficiently detailed knowledge of
any other person. For it may turn out that people are spreading themselves
too thinly, given the inevitable pressures on the time we have in which
to get to know someone. So when, in extremis, a person needs someone
who has that knowledge of them, as we discussed above, they might be
unable to find someone in whom to confide. However, this argument is
not conclusive. For one thing, it makes the argument in favour of conjugal
love contingent on time pressures, suggesting that a leisure society might
transcend it. And for another, while it seems plausible that a group of ten
or twenty the members of which give each other roughly equal attention
might be spread too thinly, this does not seem so plausible with a mnage-trois.9 And the defender of marriage wants to rule out the mnage-trois just as much as the group of ten or twenty. So why is two the magic
number?
A better way to understand the importance of conjugal love focuses
instead on the importance of the particular sort of recognition gained by
participants in a relationship of conjugal love. In conjugal love a person
receives recognition of the very detail of their life, recognition of all
aspects of their individuality. Why is the recognition gained in conjugal
love different from that in intimate friendship? In conjugal love another
person chooses to assume responsibility for you as a whole, because they
value the detail of your life. They choose you. Furthermore, they choose
you and not anyone else. The evaluation of you that is expressed in the
choice, and in the very form of the relationship and its structures of
responsibility, singles you out. You have been chosen over everyone else.
This should not make you think that you are more special than everyone
else. But it does quite rightly back up your sense that you are special in
your own right. Being special for someone else affirms and recognises your
9 Cf. P. Gregory, Against Couples, Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1984), 26368,
p. 265.
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sense that the things that make you a particular individual are valuable,
because someone has chosen you for those things. This is different from
the recognition that one gets from ones intimate friends because they have
other friends. You share your intimate friends with others. They do not take
you to be special over and above their other intimate friends. So intimate
friendship cannot communicate quite the same recognition that you are
of special importance as an individual. To your intimate friends you do
not have the unique importance that you do to your lover. Thus intimate
friendship does not reinforce your sense of your importance qua unique
individual, the importance of the particular qualities that make you that
unique individual, in quite the same way.
Of course one large proviso to this is that, as noted above, to affirm
ones sense of ones valuable individuality, one cannot get recognition
from just anyone. If the wrong person offers you this kind of concern
it can be suffocating or intrusive. One seeks recognition from a person
whose recognition one can reciprocate. Thus the ideal of conjugal love
is a reciprocal relationship in which the partners choose each other over
everyone else, and regard each other as special.
If this is right then conjugal love has a special role in reinforcing ones
self-respect. If a condition of valuing ones projects, and thus being able
to pursue ones conception of the good, is that one value oneself; and if
one crucial way in which we value ourselves is through the recognition
we receive from others: then we need a form of recognition that values
us for ourselves, for the detail of our lives. This cannot just be granted
by a political arrangement that gives us rights: such rights may recognise
us as inviolable and irreplaceable, but that is a formal ascription; what we
want to know is that the way our lives are going, what has happened to us,
what we are engaged in, is valuable. Intimate friendship goes some of the
way in providing the sort of recognition we need. In intimate friendship a
person does have a particular concern for the detail of our lives, which they
value, and have chosen us as friends because they value it. But this concern
is partial, in that our friends are typically not concerned with the whole of
our lives, and not exclusively. It therefore cannot fully affirm our sense that
we are special and unique in and of ourselves. This is the role of conjugal
love. So conjugal love has a special role in preserving and promoting our
autonomy.
A L IBERAL P OLITICS OF C ONJUGAL L OVE
Thus, I conclude, conjugal love is a form of relationship which ideally
speaking can offer us a certain sort of recognition recognition of us
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of people making their own choices about how to live that underpins the
liberal argument for neutrality, then we have the makings of an argument
for state support of that form of marriage based on two-person conjugal
love which does not conflict with liberal neutrality.
Before I conclude, let me briefly consider two criticisms that might be
made of the argument presented here. From the liberal who supports the
importance of autonomy, one criticism might be that, far from promoting
autonomy, the support that we get in conjugal love can merely sustain us
in false views, views that would otherwise be challenged. If substantive
autonomy is our goal that is the development of individuals who do not
merely hold their conception of the good as prejudice but have forged a
reasoned view through subjecting their opinions to the criticisms of others
then it might be said that the support we get from intimates particularly
if these intimates are like-minded can merely insulate us from the force of
criticisms that would otherwise persuade us away from our false opinions.
Now the introduction of this objection allows us to state an important
reservation about what is being claimed here. For the argument is not
meant to suggest that conjugal love will promote autonomy, as if by magic,
in the absence of other favourable social conditions such as an effective
education system, a flourishing and pluralistic civil society, and a healthy
tradition of democratic debate about the good life. All I claim here is that
there are grounds for thinking that conjugal love is one of the institutions
that should be on this list of important preconditions of autonomy that the
liberal state ought to encourage.
The above is an objection from a liberal who shares the concern with
autonomy that is assumed in this paper. It has become evident, however,
that one response to the liberal-communitarian debate is the attempt to
forge a different sort of liberalism, one whose commitment to neutrality
stems not from the supreme value of autonomy, but rather from the
perceived necessity of giving equal recognition to the different cultures
who reasonably aspire to membership of the state.12 One criticism of my
argument from this direction might be that, because it concludes that the
state is justified in offering support for two-person forms of marriage, it
discriminates against groups who hold to forms of marriage or domestic
arrangements that might be less exclusive.
Now insofar as these two strands of liberalism are distinct, it is not
clear that my argument here will convince the proponent of this latter
liberalism. For they presumably want to reject the claim that their position
is rooted in the concern for autonomy from which my argument proceeds.
12 See, e.g., Rawlss argument from the burdens of judgement: Rawls, Political
301
However, one strategy, which I cannot follow out fully here, would be to
query whether recognitional liberalism really does escape a commitment
to autonomy.13 For such a liberal has to have something to say about the
importance of people being allowed to express their own culture. And yet
this argument has to be made without a Kymlicka-style endorsement of
the higher-order good of being free to frame, pursue and rationally revise
ones conception of the good.
What is wrong with forcing people to accept an alien culture? Why
should they be given the political means to sustain their own culture?
Either the answers to these questions are given in terms of individuals
and their good, which leads us back towards freedom, or else we have
to renounce the assumption that the goods we should be concerned with
in politics are ultimately the goods of individuals14 and instead ascribe
intrinsic political importance to the cultures themselves. Here I simply
endorse the assumption that what is politically important is ultimately the
good of individuals.
In conclusion, what I have offered here is an argument in favour of the
two-person relationship which ideally underpins traditional Western marriage arrangements. I have argued that (supplemented, at any rate, by other
favourable social conditions) such a relationship is better for autonomy
than its rivals, and that the liberal state can endorse it without renouncing
its proper neutrality, given that such neutrality is rooted in a concern for
autonomy in the first place.
Department of Philosophy
University of Sheffield
Sheffield S10 2TN
UK
E-mail: c.bennett@shef.ac.uk
13 Such a point can, for example, be made against Rawls, whose position (in Political
Liberalism) rests fundamentally on the importance of the legitimacy of the state, that is,
that it should be justifiable to its citizens. Arguably, legitimacy has such fundamental
importance only if one regards citizens as autonomous and deserving of respect as such.
14 For this view, see for instance, C. Kukathas and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of
Justice and its Critics (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), 1116; C. Taylor, Cross-Purposes:
The Liberal-Communitarian Debate in his Philosophical Arguments (London: Harvard
University Press, 1995), 181203.