G.R. No.

L-37007

July 20, 1987

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ,petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN
TUVERA, SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal
Case No. D-529 entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.," granting the motion to quash the information
filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo
Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all
of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag,
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with
the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando
Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate
intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas
Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the
municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.(Emphasis supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and
that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge
Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. 1 The elements of this crime are the
following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information which was sustained by respondent
Judge, is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,3 that is, that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the
elements of Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the
police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal
ground. No doubt the last two elements of the crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary
Detention.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a
crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer when the former made this finding in the
questioned order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with
the same because he is not in any way connected with the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera,
Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in him as
a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly
sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a
mere barrio captain;6 (2) That he is neither a peace officer nor a policeman,7(3) That he was not a public official;8 (4) That he had
nothing to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the administration of the
Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as persons in authority and that it was only
upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are
persons in authority;11 and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention.12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted
them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal councilor, arrested Father Feliciano
Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal
building. There, they told him that he was under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public officials were
convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto
Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of the peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and
until 9:00 a.m. of the next day when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime,
Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain include the
following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in
charge of the district in the performance of their duties in such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio;18 to enforce all

laws and ordinances which are operative within the barrio;19 and to organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be
necessary for the maintenance of peace and order within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to say about the above-mentioned
powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For public disorder therein, inevitably
people blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order, what can the barrio captain do?
Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance
and persuading them, where possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons
within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and
mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. 22 A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors
would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller.
Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention.
Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain,
could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary
Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the facts and evidence on record show
that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;26 and that he
only accompanied petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.27
Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the
Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the
information or which do not appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the
facts alleged in the information.28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where the Rules
expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court
held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different
but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only one exception and that is when such facts are
admitted by the prosecution.31lawphi1
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy has already attached in his
favor32 on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely
interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not
only with his consent but at his instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal
Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 119063. January 27, 1997]

JOSE G. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ADELA TEODORA P.
SANTOS, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's order granting the motion
to quash the information for bigamy based on prescription.
On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office an "Affidavit of
Complaint" [1] charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No.
142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant
City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, the petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy. [2]
After appropriate proceedings, Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla filed on 8 January 1992 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City an information, [3] dated 15 November 1991, charging the private respondent with Bigamy allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or before the 2nd day of February, 1957, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being previously united in lawful marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and without the said marriage
having been dissolved, (or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with JOSE G. GARCIA, which
marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 and assigned to Branch 83 of the said court. On 2 March 1992,
the private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the offense as ground therefor. She contended that by the
petitioner's admissions in his testimony given-on 23 January 1991 in Civil Case No. 90-52730, entitled "Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S.
Garcia," and in his complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on 16 October 1991, the petitioner discovered the
commission of the offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), [4] the period of prescription
of the offense started to run therefrom. Thus, since bigamy was punishable by prision mayor, [5] an afflictive penalty [6] which
prescribed in fifteen years pursuant to Article 92 of the RPC, then the offense charged prescribed in 1989, or fifteen years after its
discovery by the petitioner.
The private respondent quoted [7] the petitioner's testimony in Civil Case No.90-52730 as follows:
Q

No, no, just answer. What did you learn from her (Eugenia) about the private respondent?

That she has been married previously in case I don't know it. But she said she has been previously married, in fact I
saw her husband - Rey, a few days ago and they said, "Baka magkasama pa silang muli:"
xxx

ATTY. EVANGELISTA:
Q

When did Eugenia R. Balingit told [sic] that private respondent was already married to another man?

That was when I told her that we are separating now. I told her in tagalog, "na maghihiwalay na kami ni Delia
ngayon." "Ang unang tanong niya sa akin, 'si Rey ba ang dahilan,' ang alam ko po, Rey ang dating boyfriend niya,
kaya ang sabi ko, 'hindi po, Mario ang pangalan, ' napabagsak po siya sa upuan, sabi niya, 'hindi na nagbago."'

When was that when you came to know from Eugenia Balingit, the judicial guardian, that private respondent was
already married to another man when she married you?

That was when the affair was happening and I found out.

What year?

1974. [8]

The portion of the complaint filed on 16 October 1991 before the CSC which the private respondent alluded to, reads as follows:
5. At the time the respondent married the herein complainant she never informed him that she was previously married to a
certain "REYNALDO QUIROCA" on December 1, 1951 wherein she used the name of "ADELA SANTOS" which was part
of her true name "ADELA TEODORA P. SANTOS" as per her genuine Baptismal Certificate issued by the Parish of San
Guillermo, Bacolor, Pampanga, a copy of the said Baptismal Certificate is hereto attached as ANNEX "D";
6.

xxx
7. These facts were discovered only by the herein complainant in the year 1974 where they separated from each other because of
her illicit relations with several men continued use of her alias name "DELIA", without proper authority from the Courts; and
committing a series of fraudulent acts; her previous marriage to a certain "Reynaldo Quiroca" is evidenced by a certification
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX "F"; [9]
In its 29 June 1992 order, [10] the trial court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the criminal case, ruling in this wise:

This court believes that since the penalty prescribed under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for the offense of bigamy is prision
mayor, which is classified as an afflictive penalty under Article 25 of the same Code, then said offense should prescribe in fifteen (15)
years as provided in Article 92 of the Code. The complainant having discovered the first marriage of the accused to one Reynaldo
Quiroca in 1974 when he was informed of it by one Eugenia Balingit, the offense charged has already prescribed when the
information was filed in this case on November 15, 1991. The argument presented by the prosecution that it was difficult for the
complainant to obtain evidence of the alleged first marriage, hence, the prescriptive period should be counted from the time the
evidence was secured will not hold water. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides, thus:
"The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered x x x"
it did not state "on the day sufficient evidence was gathered," thus this Court cannot change the requirements of the law.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above order on 26 August 1992, [11] to which he filed "numerous" supplements
thereto, focusing on the private respondent's many trips abroad which the petitioner claimed suspended the running of the prescriptive
period. These trips were enumerated in the certification [12] issued by Associate Commissioner Ramon M. Morales of the Bureau of
Immigration (BID), which reads as follows:
This is to certify that the name GARCIA/DELIA/S. appears in the Bureau's files of Arrivals and Departures as having the following
travel records:
Departed for HKG on

06/03/77

aboard PR

Arrived from HKG on

07/02/77

aboard PA

Arrived from SYD on

07/09/77

aboard BR

Arrived from GUM on

06/14/80

aboard PA

Arrived from MEL on

07/17/81

aboard PR

Arrived from TYO on

05/20/83

aboard BA

Departed for HKG on

Arrived from SIN

09/22/83

aboard PR

on

09/28/83

aboard PR

Departed for TYO on

04/30/84

aboard PA

Arrived from SFO on

07/03/84

aboard PA

Departed for TYO on

11/19/84

aboard PA

Departed for TYO on

08/05/85

aboard PA

Departed for TYO on

11/17/86

aboard UA

Arrived from LAX

on

12/12/87

aboard UA

Departed for LAX

on

11/30/87

aboard UA

Departed for CHI

on

11/14/88

aboard UA

The trial court disallowed reconsideration of its 29 June 1992 order, finding "no urgent or justifiable reason to disturb or set [it]
aside." As to the sojourns abroad of the private respondent as shown in the certification, the trial court held that the same "is not that
kind of absence from the Philippines which will interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged . . . " [13]
The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. CR No. 14324. He contended
therein that: (a) the trial court erred in quashing the information on the ground of prescription; and (b) the counsel for the accused was
barred from filing the motion to quash the information against the accused. [14] As to the first, the petitioner argued that bigamy was a
public offense, hence "the offended party is not the first or second (innocent) spouse but the State whose law/policy was
transgressed." He tried to distinguish bigamy from private offenses such as adultery or concubinage "where the private complainant
is necessarily the offended party," thus, the prescriptive period for the former should commence from the day the State, being the
offended party, discovered the offense, which in this case was on 28 August 1991 when the petitioner filed his complaint before the
Prosecutor's Office. The petitioner added that the "interchanging use" In Article 91 of the RPC of the terms "offended party,"
"authorities," and "their agents" supports his view that the State is the offended party in public offenses.
Additionally, the petitioner referred to the general rule stated in People v. Alagao [15] "that in resolving the motion to quash a
criminal complaint or information[,] the facts alleged in the complaint or information should be taken as they are." The information in
this case mentioned that the bigamy was discovered in 1989. He admitted, however, that this rule admits of exceptions, such as when
the ground for the motion to quash is prescription of the offense, as provided in Section 4 of the old Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Nonetheless, he advanced the view that this exception is no longer available because of the implied repeal of Section 4, as
the amended Rule 117 no longer contains a similar provision under the rule on motions to quash; and that granting there was no
repeal, the private respondent failed to introduce evidence to "support her factual averment in her motion to quash," which is required
by Rule 117. He further asserted that the factual bases of the motion to quash, viz., the petitioner's testimony in Civil Case No. 9052730 and his complaint filed with the CSC are not conclusive because the testimony is hearsay evidence, hence inadmissible, while
the complaint is vague, particularly the following portion quoted by the private respondent:
7. These facts where discovered only by the herein complainant in the year 1974 when they separated from each other because
of her illicit relations with several men continued use of her alias name "DELIA", without proper authority from the Courts;
and committing a series of fraudulent acts; her previous marriage to a certain "Reynaldo Quiroca" is evidenced by a
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, a copy of which is hereto attached a ANNEX "F";

The petitioner alleged that the phrase "These facts" in said paragraph 7 does not clearly refer to his discovery of the private
respondent's first marriage. Moreover, he doubted whether the term "discovered" in the said paragraph was used in the sense
contemplated by law. At best, the petitioner theorized, the discovery only referred to the "initial, unconfirmed and uninvestigated raw,
hearsay information" which he received from Balingit.
Finally, the petitioner reiterated that the prescriptive period was interrupted several times by the private respondent's numerous
trips abroad.
As regards his second contention, the petitioner argued that the counsel for the private respondent had already stated that he
represented only Delia S. Garcia and not Adela Teodora P. Santos. Consequently, the private respondent's counsel could not ask for
the quash of the information in favor of Adela Teodora P. Santos alias Delia Santos. The petitioner opined that the counsel for the
private respondent should have sought a dismissal of the case in favor of Delia Garcia alone.
The Court of Appeals gave credence to the private respondent's evidence and concluded that the petitioner discovered the private
respondent's first marriage in 1974. Since the information in this case was filed in court only on 8 January 1992, or eighteen years
after the discovery of the offense, then the 15-year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. [16] It further held that the quash of an
information based on prescription of the offense could be invoked before or after arraignment and even on appeal, [17] for under Article
89(5) of the RPC, the criminal liability of a person is "'totally extinguish[ed]' by the prescription of the crime, which is a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability." Thus, prescription is not deemed waived even if not pleaded as a defense. [18]
Undaunted, the petitioner is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals and to compel the respondent court to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. He submits the following
assignment of errors:
I
BIGAMY IS A PUBLIC OFFENSE, CONSEQUENTLY, PRESCRIPTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN COUNTED FROM THE TIME
THE STATE DISCOVERED ITS COMMISSION;
II
A MOTION TO QUASH CANNOT ALSO GO BEYOND WHAT IS STATED IN THE INFORMATION;
III
BY THEMSELVES, THE FACTUAL BASES OF THE MOTION TO QUASH ARE NOT ALSO CONCLUSIVE;
IV
ASSUMING THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTED IN 1974, SAID PERIOD HOWEVER WAS INTERRUPTED SEVERAL
TIMES.
We notice that except for the first two pages of the petition, the deletion of a few paragraphs, the substitution of the term
"petitioner" for "appellant," and the deletion of the contention on the counsel for the private respondent being barred from filing a
motion to quash, the herein petition is a reproduction of the Appellant's Brief filed by the petitioner with the Court of Appeals. Verily
then, the instant petition is a rehash of an old tale. However, the Court of Appeals failed to-sufficiently address several issues raised
by the petitioner, most probably prompting him to seek redress from this Court.
We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The Office of the
Solicitor General was the last to submit a Memorandum for the public respondent. Both the private and public respondents ask for the
dismissal of this petition and the affirmance of the challenged decision.
Petitioner's position is untenable. Denial then of this petition is all it merits.

We shall take up the assigned errors in seriatim.

I
It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But, it is entirely incorrect to state, as the petitioner does, that only the State is the
offended party in such case, as well as in other public offenses, and, therefore, only the State's discovery of the crime could effectively
commence the running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC provides that "[t]he period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . ." This rule
makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the "offended party, the
authorities, or their agents."
Article 91 does not define the term "offended party." We find its definition in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as "the
person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed." [19] The said Section reads as follows:
SEC. 12.
Name of the offended party. -- A complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person against whom
or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known, and
if there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to
whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that "[e]very person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable." [20] Invariably then, the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
This conclusion is strengthened by Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 1.
Institution of criminal and civil actions. -- When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with a criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. x x x
It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances. [21]
The petitioner even admits that he is the offended party in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272. The information therein, [22] which he
copied in full in the petition in this case, describes him as the "offended party" who suffered "damage and prejudice . . . in such
amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code." [23]
The distinction he made between public crimes and private crimes relates not to the discovery of the crimes, but to their
prosecution. Articles 344 and 360 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, are clear on this matter.
II
The petitioner's contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 which
states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably unmeritorious. Even People v. Alagao, [24] which he cites, mentions the
exceptions to the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117 viz., (a) extinction of
criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His additional claim that the exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the
implied repeal of the former Section 4, [25] Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its revision, is
equally without merit. No repeal, express or implied, of the said Section 4 ever took place. While there is no provision in the new
Rule 117 that prescribes the contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal liability, Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the
former Sections 3,4, and 5 of the old Rule 117. The said Section 2 reads as follows:

SEC. 2.
Form and contents. - The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify
distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged. (3a, 4a, 5a). (underscoring supplied for emphasis)
It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal
liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily
follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds. As a matter of fact, inquiry into such facts
may be allowed where the ground invoked is that the allegations in the information do not constitute the offense charged. Thus, in
People v. De la Rosa, [26]this Court stated:
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged,
or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically
admitted. However, as held in the case of People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516, additional facts not alleged in the information, but
admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash. Former Chief justice Moran supports this
theory. [27]
In Criminal Case No. 92-27272, the trial court, without objection on the part of the prosecution, allowed the private respondent
to offer evidence in support of her claim that the crime had prescribed. Consequently, the trial court, upon indubitable proof of
prescription, correctly granted the motion to quash. It would have been, to quote De la Rosa, "pure technicality for the court to close
its eyes to [the fact of prescription] and still give due course to the prosecution of the case" - a technicality which would have meant
loss of valuable time of the court and the parties.
As noted by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, Jr., consultant of the Rules of Court Revision Committee, the aforequoted Section 2 of the new
Rule 117 on "factual and legal grounds" of a motion to quash is based on the De la Rosa case. [28]
III
The petitioner likewise claims that the factual bases of the private respondent's motion to quash are inconclusive. The petitioner
cannot be allowed to disown statements he made under oath and in open court when it serves his purpose. This is a contemptible
practice which can only mislead the courts and thereby contribute to injustice. Besides, he never denied having given the pertinent
testimony. He did, however, term it vague in that it was not clear whether the prior marriage which Eugenia Balingit disclosed to him
was that entered into by the private respondent with Reynaldo Quiroca. It is immaterial to whom the private respondent was first
married; what is relevant in this case is that the petitioner was informed of a prior marriage contracted by the private respondent.
Neither may the petitioner be heard to cast doubt on the meaning of his statements in his sworn complaint filed before the
CSC. We find no hint of vagueness in them. In any event, he has not denied that he in fact discovered in 1974 that the private
respondent had been previously married.
Finally, the petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent's several trips abroad as enumerated in the certification of the
Bureau of Immigration, and cites the second paragraph of Article 91 of the RPC, viz.: "[t]he term of prescription shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago." We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute
the "absence" contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the
Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of
these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.14324 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G. R. No. 156747. February 23, 2005]

ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision [1] dated 22 March
2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22067 entitled, People of the Philippines v.
Alfie Lorenzo, et al.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist,
publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper Abante were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, with the crime of libel. The information, which was raffled off to Branch 93 of said court, reads:
The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and JORDAN
CASTILLO, of the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused ALFIE LORENZO, columnist, ALLEN
MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing editor, ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of Abante a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO
TRINIDAD to public hatred, dishonor, discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and maliciously write, publish, exhibit and circulate and/or cause to be written, published, exhibited and circulated in the aforesaid
newspaper, in its issue of July 13, 1996 an article which reads as follows:
Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi para magkaroon ng writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang ilang bagay na baluktot
at binaluktot pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad.
Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala siya ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili niya, si Direk Toto
Natividad siya? Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong yan sa amin sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni Tito Alfie yan
dahil nga sa amoy-pawis siya pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami naka-shower na, si Joey punas lang nang punas sa katawan niya ng Tshirt niyang siya ring isusuot niya pagkatapos na gawing pamunas!
Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit na galit nga ang mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda noon dahil nagkukulang ang
rasyon namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamang-tama nga lang sa amin ang kanin at ulam, pero sinusugod pa niya ang
kaldero para magkayod ng natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa nga ako madalas diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang pagkain ko sa
kanya.
Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong yan at pagsasalitaan pa niya ng masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang siya tumanaw ng utang
na loob na kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng gutom niya. Hindi ko alam kung may kunsenya pa ang gangyang klaseng tao,
pero sana naman ay makunsensya ka, Pare!
Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga si
Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang matanda hanggat hindi ka pa umuuwi, magsasalita ka pa ng mga
inimbento mo. Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan mo pa ba, dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming binubuyo
na sabihin kay Tito Alfie na tulungan ka rin tulad ng tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na pag-aalaga sa amin. Pero hate na hate ka nga
ni Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang ugali, natatandaan mo pa ba yun? Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang ang lahat ng pinagsasabi mo
para makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie, ani Jordan sa mga nag-interbyu sa kanyang legitimate writers.

Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan ang mga sinabi ng sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya at kapwa niya kuno
Liberty Boys!
thereby publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or an act, omission, condition, status or circumstance and causing
in view of their publication, discredit and contempt upon the person of said JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD a.k.a. JOEY
TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD, to his damage and prejudice.[2]
In an Order dated 16 July 1997, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City, set the
arraignment of the petitioners on 27 August 1997.[3]
On 22 August 1997, petitioners filed before the court a quo an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings
dated 21 August 1997 claiming that they intended to elevate the adverse Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. Despite this motion, the scheduled arraignment of petitioners pushed through on
27 August 1997. During said proceeding, petitioners Lorenzo and Quijano, Jr., together with their co-accused Parajes and Castillo,
refused to enter any plea and so the trial court ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered into the records on their behalf. [4] As for
petitioner Macasaet, his arraignment was rescheduled to 20 October 1997 due to his failure to attend the previously calendared
arraignment.
On 12 September 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private respondent
was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense[5] (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial court received by way of registered mail, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
and to Withdraw Plea dated 3 September 1997. [6] Petitioners argued therein that the trial court committed grave error when it denied
the petitioners Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings and continued with the scheduled arraignment on 27
August 1997. According to petitioners and their co-accused, by the trial judges denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment
and/or Defer Proceedings, he had effectively denied them their right to obtain relief from the Department of Justice. Moreover,
banking on the case ofRoberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals,[7] the petitioners and their fellow accused contended that since they had
already manifested their intention to file a petition for review of the Resolution of the city prosecutor of Quezon City before the DOJ,
it was premature for the trial court to deny their urgent motion of 21 August 1997. Finally, petitioners and their co-accused claimed
that regardless of the outcome of their petition for review before the DOJ, the withdrawal of their not guilty pleas is in order as they
planned to move for the quashal of the information against them.
In an Order dated 26 September 1997,[8] Judge Bruselas, Jr., ruled that with the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, the court
considers the accused to have abandoned their Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea and sees no further need to act on
the same.
In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 23 September 1997, [9] the public prosecutor argued that the RTC, Quezon City,
had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time material to this case, private respondent (private complainant
below) was a resident of both 28-D Matino St. corner Malumanay St., Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and Karen St., Paliparan, Sto.
Nio, Marikina, Metro Manila, as shown in his Reply-Affidavit of 11 October 1996 filed during the preliminary investigation of the
case.
For their part, the petitioners and their co-accused countered that it was incorrect for the public prosecutor to refer to the affidavit
purportedly executed by private respondent as it is axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to quash is limited to a consideration of
the information as filed with the court, and no other. Further, as both the complaint-affidavit executed by private respondent and the
information filed before the court state that private respondents residence is in Marikina City, the dismissal of the case is warranted
for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or information. [10]

On 16 October 1997, petitioners and their fellow accused filed a Supplemental Reply [11] attaching thereto certifications issued by
Jimmy Ong and Pablito C. Antonio, barangay captains of Barangay Malaya, Quezon City and Barangay Sto. Nio, Marikina City,
respectively. The pertinent portion of the barangay certification[12] issued by Barangay Captain Ong states:
This is to certify that this office has no record on file nor with the list of registered voters of this barangay regarding a certain person
by the name of one MR. JOSELITO TRINIDAD.
This further certifies that our BSDOs (have) been looking for said person seeking information regarding his whereabouts but to no
avail.
On the other hand, the certification[13] issued by Barangay Captain Antonio, reads in part:
This is to certify that JOSELITO TRINIDAD of legal age, single/married/separate/widow/widower, a resident of Karen Street, Sto.
Nio, Marikina City is a bonafide member of this barangay.
...
This is being issued upon request of the above-named person for IDENTIFICATION.
During the hearing on 20 October 1997, the trial court received and marked in evidence the two barangay certifications. Also
marked for evidence were page 4 of the information stating the address of private respondent to be in Marikina City and the editorial
box appearing in page 18 of Abante indicating that the tabloid maintains its editorial and business offices at Rm. 301/305, 3/F BF
Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano Sts., Intramuros, Manila. The prosecution was then given five (5) days within which to
submit its comment to the evidence submitted by the petitioners and their fellow accused.
In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply,[14] private respondent contended that the certification issued by the barangay captain
ofBarangay Malaya was issued after he had already moved out of the apartment unit he was renting in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City;
that owners of residential houses do not usually declare they rent out rooms to boarders in order to avoid payment of local taxes; and
that there is no showing that a census was conducted among the residents of Barangay Malaya during the time he resided therein.
As regards the certification issued by the barangay chairman of Sto. Nio, Marikina City, private respondent argued that it is of
judicial notice that barangay and city records are not regularly updated to reflect the transfer of residence of their constituents and that
a perusal of said certification reveals that the barangay captain did not personally know him (private respondent). Finally, private
respondent claimed that his receipt of the copy of petitioners Appeal to the DOJ, which was sent to his alleged address in Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City, proved that he did, in fact, reside at said place.
On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction. [15] The court a quo noted
that although the information alleged the venue of this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the evidence submitted for its
consideration indicated otherwise. First, the editorial box of Abante clearly indicated that the purported libelous article was printed
and first published in the City of Manila. In addition, the trial court relied on the following matters to support its conclusion that,
indeed, jurisdiction was improperly laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the information, the address of private respondent appeared to be
the one in Marikina City although right below it was a handwritten notation stating 131 Sct. Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart,
QC; b) the two barangaycertifications submitted by the petitioners; and c) the Memorandum for Preliminary Investigation and
Affidavit-Complaint attached to the information wherein the given address of private respondent was Marikina City.
On 03 December 1997, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration [16] insisting that at the time the alleged libelous
article was published, he was actually residing in Quezon City. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of
Marikina City at the time of publication of the claimed defamatory article because he understood the term address to mean the place
where he originally came from. Nevertheless, the error was rectified by his supplemental affidavit which indicated Quezon City as his
actual residence at the time of publication of the 13 July 1996 issue of Abante.
On 22 January 1998, private respondent filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration to which he attached an affidavit
executed by a certain Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly the owner of the house and lot in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, where

private respondent supposedly lived from July 1996 until May 1997. She also stated in her affidavit that she was not aware of any
inquiry conducted by thebarangay officials of Barangay Malaya regarding the residency of private respondent in their locality.
Through an Order dated 12 February 1998, the trial court denied private respondents motion for reconsideration, ruling thus:
[Del Rosarios] affidavit appears to have been executed only on 19 January 1998 to which fact the court can only chuckle and observe
that evidently said affidavit is in the nature of a curative evidence, the weight and sufficiency of which is highly suspect. [17]
Undaunted, the public and the private prosecutors filed a notice of appeal before the court a quo.[18] In the Decision now assailed
before us, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts conclusion and ordered the remand of the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated November 24, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City,
in Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903, dismissing the case filed against herein accused-appellees on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.[19]
The Court of Appeals held that jurisprudentially, it is settled that the residence of a person must be his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or abode and for the purpose of determining venue, actual residence is a persons place of
abode and not necessarily his legal residence or domicile. [20] In this case, the defect appearing on the original complaint wherein the
residence of private respondent was indicated to be Marikina City was subsequently cured by his supplemental-affidavit submitted
during the preliminary investigation of the case. Moreover, as the amendment was made during the preliminary investigation phase of
this case, the same could be done as a matter of right pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court.[21]
As for the barangay certifications issued by the barangay chairmen of Barangay Malaya and Barangay Sto. Nio, the Court of
Appeals ruled that they had no probative value ratiocinating in the following manner:
. . . With respect to the requirement of residence in the place where one is to vote, residence can mean either domicile or temporary
residence (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution A Primer, 3rd Ed., p. 209). Therefore, one who is a resident of Quezon City can be a voter of
Marikina if the latter is his domicile. Conversely, a person domiciled in Marikina can vote in Quezon City if he resides in the latter. It
is just a matter of choice on the part of the voter. Thus, logic does not support the supposition that one who is not a registered voter of
a place is also not a resident theref. Furthermore, the right to vote has the corollary right of not exercising it. Therefore, one need not
even be a registered voter at all. The same principle applies to the certification issued by the barangay in Marikina.[22]
The appellate court likewise gave weight to the affidavit executed by Del Rosario and observed that petitioners failed to
controvert the same.
The petitioners thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
promulgated on 6 January 2003.[23]
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B. DEL
ROSARIO.
III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT TRINIDADS PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A CRIMINAL
CASE.[24]
Petitioners insist that the evidence presented before the trial court irrefutably established the fact that private respondent was not
a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous publication saw print. According to them, the information dated 10 July
1997 filed before the RTC of Quezon City indicated private respondents address to be in Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina
City. Further supporting this claim were the affidavit-complaint [25] and the memorandum for preliminary investigation [26] where
references were explicitly made to said address. Thus, petitioners are of the view that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the
supplemental affidavit executed by private respondent claiming that its execution amounted to nothing more than a mere afterthought.
In addition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it took into account the affidavit executed by Del Rosario. They
insist that its belated submission before the trial court and the prosecutions failure to present the affiant to testify as regards the
veracity of her statements undermined the evidentiary value of her affidavit. More, as the affidavit was not formally offered as
evidence, it was only proper that the trial court disregarded the same in dismissing the case.
Finally, petitioners contend that private respondent did not have the requisite personality to appeal from the decision of the trial
court as it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which is authorized by law to institute appeal of criminal cases. Thus, the
Court of Appeals made a mistake in holding that While it is true that only the OSG can file an appeal representing the government in a criminal proceeding, the private complainant
nevertheless may appeal the civil aspect of the criminal case. The case at bar was dismissed due to the alleged improper laying of
venue resulting in the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and not based on the merits of the case. It cannot therefore be
argued that private complainants appeal pertains to the merits of the criminal case as what happened in accused-appellees cited case
in the motion to strike, VicentePalu-ay vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 112995, July 30, 1998). Needless to say, the private
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the dismissed criminal case which he had the right to protect. In the interest of justice
and fair play, therefore, the Brief filed by private complainant in the present case should be treated as pertaining only to the civil
aspect of the case.[27]
In his Comment/Opposition dated 25 April 2003,[28] private respondent reiterated his position that the RTC of Quezon City had
jurisdiction over this libel case. According to him, the affidavit executed by Del Rosario, the alleged owner of the house he leased in
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, established, beyond doubt, that he resided in said place during the time the claimed defamatory article
appeared on the pages of Abante. In addition, he draws attention to the fact that petitioners and their co-accused furnished him a copy
of the petition for review, filed before the DOJ, at the aforementioned address in Quezon City.
Anent the affidavit of Del Rosario, private respondent maintains that the prosecution exerted efforts to present the affiant before
the trial court. Unfortunately, Del Rosario was out of town when she was supposed to be presented and so the public and the private
prosecutors decided to submit for resolution their motion for reconsideration sans the affiants testimony. Citing the case of Joseph
Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, et al.,[29] private respondent avers that this Court had previously admitted the affidavits of
witnesses who were not presented during the trial phase of a case.
As regards the petitioners contention that he (private respondent) did not have the personality to bring this case to the appellate
level, private respondent contends that the proper party to file the Notice of Appeal before the trial court is the public prosecutor as
what happened in this case.
On its part, the OSG filed its Comment dated 07 July 2003 [30] wherein it prayed for the dismissal of this petition based on the
following: First, as the petition is concerned with the determination of the residence of private respondent at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous article, Rule 45 should be unavailing to the petitioners because this remedy only deals with
questions of law.
Second, venue was properly laid in this case as private respondents residency in Quezon City during the time material to this
case was sufficiently established. The OSG claims that the errors appearing in the memorandum for preliminary investigation and in
the affidavit complaint with regard to private respondents residence were corrected through the supplemental affidavit private
respondent executed during the preliminary investigation before the Quezon City prosecutors office.

Third, the OSG takes the view that the public prosecutor was the proper party to file the notice of appeal before the trial court
since its (OSGs) office is only authorized to bring or defend actions on appeal on behalf of the People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought before this Honorable Court of the Court of Appeals.
We find merit in the petition and therefore grant the same.
Jurisdiction has been defined as the power conferred by law upon a judge or court to try a case the cognizance of which belongs
to them exclusively[31] and it constitutes the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. [32] The term derives its origin from two Latin
words jusmeaning law and the other, dicere meaning to declare.[33] The term has also been variably explained to be the power
of a court to hear and determine a cause of action presented to it, the power of a court to adjudicate the kind of case before it, the
power of a court to adjudicate a case when the proper parties are before it, and the power of a court to make the particular decision it is
asked to render.[34]
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. [35] In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals and
People of the Philippines,[36] this Court had the occasion to expound on this principle, thus:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. [37]
The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of
said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363. It provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That
where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is
printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published.
In Agbayani v. Sayo,[38] we summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:
1.
Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2.
If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3.
If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4.
If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.[39]
In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence, he
could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually resided
at the time the purported libelous article was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are utterly
insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating Quezon City at the beginning of the
information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC
Quezon City was invoked either because Abante was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the time
the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and the
absence of both from the very face of the information renders the latter fatally defective. Sadly for private respondent, the information
filed before the trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutors failure to properly lay the basis for
invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of this case.
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in
the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should
contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual
and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first
published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed
and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.[40]
Anent private respondent and OSGs contention that the supplemental affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of
this libel suit cured the defect of the information, we find the same to be without merit. It is jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction
of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. [41] In resolving a motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts contained in the complaint or information should be taken as they are.
[42]
The exception to this rule is where the Rules of Court allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash [43] such as when
the ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused. [44] In these
instances, it is incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the motion to dismiss. As the
present case obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed this action.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals likewise put premium on the affidavit executed by Del Rosario which was attached
to private respondents supplemental motion for reconsideration. According to the appellate court, said document supports private
(respondents) claim that indeed, he was a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous article was published. [45] The
pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, under Rule 10, Section 6 thereof, states:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of
the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting
the supplemental pleading.
By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and augment the allegations contained in the principal
pleading. It does not serve to supplant that which it merely supplements; rather, it ought to co-exist with the latter. Further, the
admission of a supplemental pleading is not something that parties may impose upon the court for we have consistently held that its
admittance is something which is addressed to the discretion of the court.[46]
Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is the requirement that the contents of a supplemental pleading should
deal with transactions, occurrences or events which took place after the date of the pleading it seeks to supplement. A reading of the
supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent discloses no additional or new matters which transpired after he
filed his original motion for reconsideration. The fact that he attached thereto the affidavit of his alleged lessor fails to persuade us

into giving to said supplemental motion the same evidentiary value as did the Court of Appeals. For one, private respondent did not
even bother to explain the reason behind the belated submission of Del Rosarios affidavit nor did he claim that he exerted earnest
efforts to file it much earlier in the proceedings. He must, therefore, bear the consequences of his own lethargy.
Finally, we come to the issue of whether the private prosecutor and the public prosecutor had the personality to file the notice of
appeal before the trial court. Petitioners insist that the OSG should have been the one to file said notice in its capacity as the sole
representative of the [g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in criminal cases. [47]
Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to represent the government in
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. This provision has been carried over to the Revised
Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it only takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the
appellate courts.[48]
The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the Court of Appeals commence?
Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that (i)n appeals by notice of appeal,
the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of
the other parties.[49] When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial courts jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of
course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him. [50] As explained by our former colleague, Justice Florenz
Regalado
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the parties have either thus perfected
their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not
do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to
do so for all the parties.[51]
Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the private and the public prosecutors before
the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the period to perfect
an appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is only after the occurrence of these two incidents
when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins and at which time the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the
government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the 24 November 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
93, Quezon City, dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 113513-14 August 23, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JIMMY CONTE, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

A snake! That is how people call a person who bites the hand that feeds him or who commits a grievous wrong against another to
whom he owes a debt of gratitude. That is probably how Bernardo Crisostomo would call his farm helper, accused-appellant Jimmy
Conte, who allegedly raped the wife and kidnapped and illegally detained the two children of the former.

Jimmy Conte was charged with serious illegal detention with rape in an information 1 in Criminal Case No. 9006 and with kidnapping
with serious illegal detention in an information 2 in Criminal Case No. 9007 which were filed on 3 October 1990 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan in Puerto Princesa City. However, upon prior leave of court, 3 the information in Criminal Case No.
9006 was replaced by a complaint 4 only for rape, which was signed by the offended party, Gloria Crisostomo, and was filed on 15
February 1991. The accusatory portion of the complaint reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1990, in the evening, at Barangay Jolo, Municipality of Roxas, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force, threat and
intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge for several
times with one GLORIA CRISOSTOMO, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On the other hand, the following is the accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9007:
That on or about the 17th day of September 1990, in the evening, at Barangay Jolo, Municipality of Roxas, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and detain MACRIS CRISOSTOMO and
SARAH CRISOSTOMO, both minor children, by bringing them to Barangay San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City and later
transferred to a house at Baltan Street, Puerto Princesa City for more than five (5) days thereby depriving them of their liberty
until they were retrieved by police authorities last September 24, 1990 at Baltan Street, Puerto Princesa.
The cases were assigned to Branch 52 of the court below.
The evidence for the prosecution consisting mainly of the testimonies of Bernardo, Gloria, and Macris Crisostomo discloses that
appellant Jimmy Conte was a prisoner committed to the Muntinglupa and later transferred to the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farms in
Palawan. Sometime after he was set free, or in July 1990, he went to see Bernardo Crisostomo in New Buncag, Puerto Princesa City,
and pleaded that he be given some employment. Then and there, Bernardo hired him as a helper in the former's coconut plantation in
Barangay Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. He started working in the plantation the following day, gathering coconuts and processing them into
copra. He was made to stay together with the other workers in a structure serving as a copra drier located about twenty meters away
from the house of the Crisostomos. 5
Most of the time, Bernardo was in New Buncag, as he was constructing a house there. Only his wife, Gloria, and two of their seven
children 7-year old Macris and 5-year old Sarah were left in their residence in Jolo. 6
On 17 September 1990 at around 11:00 p.m., Jimmy went to the house of the Crisostomos, sneaked into the room where Gloria and
her children were sleeping, and poked a home-made gun close to Gloria's mouth. He then forcibly stripped off Gloria's dress and panty
causing them to be torn. He pushed Gloria to the floor, threatened to shoot her if she would make any outcry, and laid on top of her.
Enveloped with fear, Gloria could do nothing but cry. Jimmy then removed his brief and forcibly inserted his penis into her genitalia.
After consummating his lustful desires, he got up, sat down beside Gloria, and kept watch over her and the two children. Macris was
then awake, while Sarah was still asleep. Upon seeing and hearing Macris cry loudly, Jimmy slapped him and threatened to kill him
should he make any noise. 7
Jimmy repeated his savage act against Gloria at about 1:00 a.m. and at 4:00 a.m. the next day, 18 September 1990. 8
Later on that same day, Jimmy declared that somebody whom he had earlier contacted would come to buy the carabao of the
Crisostomos. He remained in the house from morning till afternoon waiting for the purported buyer. The latter arrived at 4:00 p.m.,
paid the former the sum of P5,000.00, and took the carabao. All the while, Gloria just kept on crying. At around 9:00 p.m., a cargo
truck arrived. Jimmy took Sarah and threatened to kill her should Gloria refuse to go with him. He then forced her and Macris to board
the vehicle. With Sarah in his arms, he seated himself beside the driver and made Gloria and Macris sit also in the front seat of the
truck. 9
It was about 1:00 a.m. of 19 September 1990 when the truck reached Barangay San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City. Upon Jimmy's order,
Gloria and Macris alighted from the truck. Jimmy, who was carrying Sarah, brought the Crisostomos to a place called Garcellano

Picnic Ground. After negotiating with the person on duty therein, he took the three to a cottage inside the compound. There, he
sexually ravished Gloria once in the early morning, and again, in the evening of that day.10
At dusk of 20 September 1990, Jimmy brought the Crisostomos to a house in Baltan Street, Puerto Princesa City. During their threeday stay there, he had carnal knowledge with Gloria once in the evening and once at dawn of each day. 11
For the whole period that they were in the hands of Jimmy, the Crisostomos were served with meals ordered by him. 12On 21
September 1990, Gloria managed to have the boy who had delivered the food bring to a certain Sgt. Pilapil a letter 13informing him of
their situation and pleading for their rescue. She instructed the boy to send it to the CAFGU Detachment in Roxas, Palawan, through a
passenger jeepney going to that place. 14
In the early morning of 23 September 1990, Sgt. Pilapil went to see Bernardo in his house in New Buncag, Puerto Princesa City, and
gave to the latter the aforesaid letter. After reading the same, Bernardo proceeded to the City Police Station. A certain Sgt. Crisanto
Pantallano volunteered to help him look for his wife and children. Together, the two went to Baltan Street, which was the address
written in the letter. At about 12:00 noon, Bernardo caught sight of Jimmy sitting at the stairs of a house at No. 40 Baltan Street. Sgt.
Pantallano forthwith arrested Jimmy and asked him where the Crisostomos were. Upon being told that the three were in a room at the
upper story of the house, he went to the room and found the Crisostomos there. 15
Appellant Jimmy Conte presented an entirely different version. He declared that he and Gloria were lovers and that the latter planned
their elopement. According to him, sometime after he was released from the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, he worked as a helper in
the coconut plantation of Bernardo Crisostomo at Roxas, Palawan. He and the other workers stayed in the copra drier near the
Crisostomo's house. Gloria visited him many times in the copra drier. At first, he did not give any malicious meaning to those visits.
One day, she sent away the three other helpers from the copra drier. In the next instant, she approached him, undressed herself before
him, and embraced him. This culminated in carnal congress. They had since been doing it thrice each night for eight months. In the
later part of that period, they did it in the residence of the Crisostomos in the same bed where Gloria's two children were sleeping, for
then Gloria had already been abandoned by her husband. Sometime thereafter, Gloria told him that she was pregnant and invited him
to elope, as she was afraid of her husband. They then eloped bringing along with them her two children. While waiting for a boat
bound for Luzon, they stayed in the meantime at the Garcellano Picnic Ground at San Pedro, Puerto Princesa, and later transferred to
Baltan Street. They continued having sexual intercourse in those places. Later, however, he was arrested by a certain Bong Amorao
and his companions, and he was then brought to the police station of Puerto Princesa. 16 While he was detained in jail, Gloria visited
him. She even wrote him a letter, 17 which was handed to him in jail by the daughter of the owner of the house in Baltan Street where
they had stayed. Since he did not know how to read, he let the jail warden read the letter for him, 18 the full text of which is as follows:
Dear Jimmy Conte,
Iniibig kita Jimmy kahit kailan man hindi kita hihiwalayan. Ikaw lang ang aking mahal pinabayaan kasi ako ng asawa ko
kaya nakagawa ako ng hindi maganda talagang gusto kong sumama sa iyo. Sana mahalin mo rin ako tulad ng pagmamahal ko
sa iyo, hindi ka kaya magsisisi sa katandaan kong ito? Mahal na mahal kita Jimmy balikan mo ako dito sa Jolo Roxas
talagang disidido na akong sumama sa iyo Jimmy dahil lang sa asawa kong walanghiya pinabayaan kami.
Hanggang dito na lang Jimmy, I love you!

Ang nagm
Gloria
Jimmy hindi ko sukat akalain na mahuhuli tayo sa ganong araw ngunit huwag kang mag-alala wala kang kasalanan sa mga
pangyayaring ito na naganap, dahil ito ay kagustuhan kong lahat ang nangyari sa ating dalawa. Hindi naman kagustuhan mo
ang pangyayari na ito kong di ako ang may kasalanan. Nagawa ko ito dahil pinabayaan na kami ng aking asawa. Ano man
ang mangyari ako ang bahalang managot sa batas at sa mata ng maykapal.
same
P.S.

Kong tungkol naman sa kalabaw na binibintang sa iyo na ikaw ang nagpabili ay hindi totoo yon, hindi naman ikaw ang
nagbinta eh. Ako naman ang nagbinta ng kalabaw namin hindi naman ikaw. Ako ang bahalang managot ng kalabaw na
bininta ko tutal amin naman yon. At sa tutoo lang hindi mo alam iyon.
same
To boost his theory, Jimmy presented Ruben Ladines, the owner of the house at Baltan Street where he and Gloria and her two
children had stayed; Rolly Nicanor, a detainee at the provincial jail of Palawan and a former resident of Jolo, Roxas, Palawan; and
Cipriano Sumagaysay, the jail warden.
Ruben Ladines testified that sometime in September 1990, a woman, who had introduced herself as Mrs. Gloria Conte, came to his
house and asked for a room to rent. With her then were her two children and a man by the name of Jimmy Conte. Upon being told that
there was a vacant room at the upper story of his house, she offered to rent it and paid a half-month advance rental. The family stayed
there for about ten days. During that period, he observed Jimmy and Gloria to be affectionate to each other. 19
Rolly Nicanor declared that prior to his arrest in Puerto Princesa on 18 March 1991, he was residing at a house about ten to twenty
meters away from that of the Crisostomos in Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. Sometime in 1986, he accidentally killed a barriomate. After that
incident, he went into hiding. But, for several times, he returned to Jolo, and during those times he was there he could see Jimmy and
Gloria going together to the coconut plantation, embracing and kissing each other. This they did from 1987 to 1989. He also saw them
elope at about 4:00 p.m. of 17 September 1990. 20
Cipriano Sumagaysay testified that on 27 September 1990, when he arrived at the Puerto Princesa Jail, he saw an old woman who was
just about to leave the jail. He then asked Jimmy who that woman was, and the latter replied that she was his visitor, Gloria
Crisostomo. About thirty minutes thereafter, a young lady came and gave Jimmy a letter. Upon the latter's request, the jail warden read
the letter and kept it so that it could be used as evidence. 21
After the conclusion of the joint trial of the two cases, the trial court rendered a joint decision convicting the appellant in Criminal
Case No. 9006 of the crime of rape on eleven counts and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua for each crime and to pay the
complainant an indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, but acquitting him of the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal detention
in Criminal Case No. 9007 on the ground that "the acts of taking and holding the children hostage only form part of the threat and
intimidation which the accused employed to insure realization of his carnal designs against their mother." 22
In this appeal, the appellant faults the trial court for (1) giving weight and credence to the testimony of the private complainant that
she was forcibly raped several times by him and (2) finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
It is doctrinally entrenched that the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is generally viewed as correct and is accorded
great weight on appeal, for that court had the advantage of observing the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses while testifying. 23 In
the present case, we find no compelling reason to depart from this rule, for our own assessment of the testimony of the complainant,
Gloria Crisostomo, discloses no fact of substance and value which the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied which, if
considered, might affect the result of this case.
The appellant contends that the guilty verdict cannot be sustained because there is no clear and convincing proof that he forced the
complainant to have sexual intercourse with him for several times He further claims that the threat or intimidation that he would kill
the complainant and her two children was not sufficient to prevent the complainant from putting up some resistance or struggle against
his acts or from shouting in order to get the attention of her neighbors.
We are not persuaded. Under Article 335(1) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by
using force or intimidation. The appellant's acts of poking a gun at the complainant, ripping off her dress and underwear, and pushing
her to the floor constitute force. These acts were followed by an intimidation that he would shoot the complainant should she make
any noise. Thus:
Q And when you saw that Jimmy Conte was inside your room, what did you do?

A He poke a homemade gun on me, sir.

Q In what particular portion of your body was [sic] he poke the gun?
A Near my mouth; sir.
Q When he poke that gun on your mouth, what did he do next?
A He pulled my dress and it was torn, sir.
Q What were you wearing, by the way, that evening?
A A duster, sir.
Q When he pulled your duster and the same was torn, what did you do next?
A He pulled also my panty and it was torn, sir.
Q How about you, what did you do when he destroyed your gown and panty?
A I just cried and cried, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that this Jimmy Conte pulled your gown and pulled down your panty and it was also destroyed,
what did you do next, after that?
A He pushed me and I fell down, sir.
Q You fell down where?
A On the floor, sir.
Q And when you were down on the floor, what did you do next?
A He took off his brief and then he lay on top of me, sir.
Q And when he went on top of you, what did you do?
A He held his penis and placed inside my vagina, sir.
Q What did you do when he did that?
Q I just cried because the gun was beside him and he said if I make noise, he will shoot me, sir. 24
From the aforequoted testimony, there is no shred of doubt that the appellant did rape the private complainant in the evening of 17
September 1990.
But was the trial court correct in convicting the appellant of eleven counts of rape?
Notably, the single complaint filed by Gloria Crisostomo charges the appellant with several crimes of rape, 25 in violation of Section
13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a complaint or information must charge but one offense. Under Sections 1 and
3(e) of Rule 117, the appellant, before entering his plea, should have moved to quash the complaint for being duplicitous. For his

failure to do so, he is deemed to have waived the defect. 26 Hence, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 120, the court could convict him of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them.
After examining the complainant's testimony in its entirety, our minds are at rest on the culpability of the appellant for eleven counts
of rape. On all the ten other occasions that he had carnal knowledge of the complainant, there was admittedly neither physical force
employed by the former nor resistance or struggle on the part of the latter. But, the absence of resistance did not make voluntary the
complaint's submission to the criminal acts of the appellant. 27
It must be recalled that at the outset, or in the first sexual assault, the appellant intimidated or threatened with death the complainant,
which necessary produced reasonable fear in her and deprived her of will and freedom. The intimidation was a continuing one as
shown by his possession of a gun and the threat to kill the children. Thus, the complainant could not bring herself to scream or resist
his sexual assaults. During the succeeding days, he kept her and her children like virtual prisoners and effectively implanted fear in the
complainant's mind by continually carrying her youngest child, Sarah, thereby sending the message that if the complainant would
escape or make any outcry he would kill the complainant and Macris. This message was made louder and clearer when he told the
complainant that he had killed a whole family in his place in Pangasinan, which led to his conviction and service of his sentence at the
Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm. These circumstances were enough to engender a well-founded belief that the appellant was capable of
making good his threats. Her fear was not imagined.
In People vs. Pamor, 28 this Court made this disquisition:
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated or governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to the mind of the victim
and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime. It is enough that it produces fear fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of
the accused, something would happen to her at that moment. It includes the moral kind such as the fear caused by threatening
the victim with a knife or pistol. Where such intimidation exists and the victims cowed into submission as a result thereof,
thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all
her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then offering none at
all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim's participation in the sexual act voluntary.
The appellant also capitalizes on the admission of the private complainant during her cross-examination that she could have escaped
had she wanted to but she dared not. He then quotes the following testimony:
Q You mean to say that the truck only pass by your house and Jimmy Conte ask you to board the truck?
A Yes, sir.
Q And without any protest again you went with Jimmy Conte to board the truck?
A I did not complain anymore because he was carrying my younger child, sir.
Q But while Jimmy Conte was holding your child, you have all the chances to run away if you like?
A Yes. I have a chance to ask for help but what I was thinking was that my child that he was holding, sir.
Q So, what you mean, you have all the chances to leave only you were afraid that Jimmy Conte might kill
your child?
A Yes, sir. 29
It is clear from the complainant's testimony that while she had the chance of running away, she did not grab it because had
she done so her daughter, who was then being carried by the appellant in his arms, could be killed. She must have been
caught in the twin horns of a wild dilemma. For, equally strong with, or even stronger than her desire to escape and to protect

herself and her honor was her love for or her inflexible sense of duty to protect her child. She, like most mothers, was liable
to put her child before everything else in the end. Hence, she chose not to escape.
The theory of the appellant that the numerous occasions he had carnal knowledge of the complainant were impelled by the
electricity of mutual love and desire does not inspire belief. As the trial court observed:
The accused is an unlettered former inmate of the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farms. He is a helper in the processing of
copra in the coconut plantation of Bernardo Crisostomo and the complainant in the latter's coconut plantation in
barangay Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. He has not appeared to the court to be possessed of the physical attributes and
charms which could make women swoon and attracted to him in expectation of ecstasy in romance. It would
therefore seem rather farfetched that the complainant would be drawn to him in the manner he had vainly sought to
show by evidence for the defense.
The complainant, on the other hand, is a 43-year old mother of seven (7), and the lawfully-wedded wife of Bernardo
Crisostomo. For 30 years of her married life she had been living with her family in their coconut plantation in
barangay Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. On the basis of her age, the number of children she had brought up and is still
bringing up; the rural environment which, for all those years, must have shaped her norm of conduct in life, all but
make the court skeptical about the trustworthiness of the characterizations by the accused of the morality of
complainant. Such characterization run counter to the generally accepted trait of the common Filipino wife and
mother.
It was because of a letter surreptitiously sent by the complainant to the CAGFU Detachment Commander that the
police and her husband subsequently rescued her and her two children from the accused. If it were true that the
complainant had indeed chosen to forsake her marriage, her children and the man she had been married to and lived
for 30 years, she would not have thwarted the realization of her fantasies by writing that letter thru which, he sought
the assistance of the CAGFU in rescuing her and her children from the accused.
Furthermore, the testimonies of the accused himself and that of Ruben Ladines with respect to the other incidents of
the case could hardly contribute to the probative worth of the evidence for the defense. The accused declared that
before they eloped to Puerto Princesa City he had been having sexual conversation with the complainant three times
nightly, for eight (8) months. Aside from the improbability of his capacity for sexual performance with such
frequency he could not have done so for that length of time as he had been in Jolo, Roxas, Palawan, as helper of the
Crisostomos, for only about two months before they supposedly eloped to Puerto Princesa City.
For his part Ruben Ladines declared, among others, that the accused and Gloria Crisostomo and her children stayed
in the former's house in Baltan Street for almost two weeks. During that period the couple were said to have
comported themselves as husband and wife, and were observed to have been affectionate to one another. The truth of
what this witness asserted, though, is belied by the impressive and convincing evidence that the complainant and her
children were held hostage in that boarding house for only three (3) days. 30
If it were true that the complainant loved the appellant and had illicit sexual relations with him while her husband was away,
then she would not have exerted any effort to contact Sgt. Pilapil in order to be rescued. Neither would she execute an
affidavit pointing to the appellant as her rapist nor would she file a complaint for rape and thereafter undergo the expense,
trouble, inconvenience, and scandal of a public trial for rape. On the contrary, she would have preserved the illicit union by
whatever means to ensure endless gratification of her biological needs. In exposing the evil deeds of the appellant and in
facing the ordeal of a public trial, the complainant showed an honest desire to seek justice.
The alleged letter of the complainant 31 purportedly sent to the appellant while he was detained in jail does not save the day
for him. The trial court "was not impressed by the integrity and trustworthiness" 32 thereof. Neither are we. Our own
examination of the signature "GLORIA" appearing therein readily discloses that it is conspicuously different from the
signature of complainant Gloria Crisostomo in her complaint and sworn statement. 33 That letter was not even properly
identified. Then too, the circumstances under which it was purportedly delivered to the appellant do not at all inspire
credence. According to witness Cipriano Sumagaysay, warden of the City Jail of Puerto Princesa City, the letter was delivered
by a 14-year old girl some thirty minutes after an old lady, who was claimed by the appellant to be the complainant, had

visited the appellant. If indeed the old lady was Gloria Crisostomo, we find neither reason nor rhyme why she would still
send a letter to the appellant a few minutes after she left. Moreover, Gloria who was then only 43 years of age cannot be said
to be an "old lady." Finally, if Sumagaysay actually saw the "old lady," he could have, while on the witness stand, pointed to
the complainant as the "old lady" whom he had seen visiting the appellant. Sumagaysay's testimony was not even
corroborated by the visitor's logbook of the city jail.
All told, the trial court correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on eleven counts and
correctly sentenced him to eleven times of reclusion perpetua. The service of the said penalties shall not, however, exceed
forty years pursuant to Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by C.A. No. 217.34
In view of such convictions, the appellant should, as well be ordered to pay civil indemnity in each case, and not just a single
indemnity of P50,000.00 in all the cases. We hold that, consistent with the current policy of the Court, the appellant should be
ordered to indemnify the complainant in the sum of P40,000.00 in each of the eleven counts of rape.
Whether the trial court correctly acquitted the appellant in Criminal Case No. 9007 is an entirely different matter which is
already beyond our reviewing authority, since a judgment of acquittal becomes final immediately after promulgation. 35
WHEREFORE, subject to the above modification on the award of civil indemnity, the appealed decision of Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan (Puerto Princesa City) in Criminal Case No. 9006 is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against
appellant Jimmy Conte.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 153176. March 29, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC, Branch 19, of the City of Naga and SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J:
For determination in this petition is a question in procedural law - - - whether an information filed by a state prosecutor without
the prior written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor should be dismissed after the
accused has entered his plea under the information.
Petitioner comes before us with a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to
declare as null and void the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 dated February 26, 2002 [1] and April 3,
2002[2] which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the case of People vs. Serafin Saballegue, Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597, and
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of
Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act, in an information which reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, as
proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press with business address at 16 San Mateo St., Peafrancia Ave., Naga City for Violation of
Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, committed as
follows:
That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga
Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, while being the proprietor of Saballegue

Printing Press, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the
premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS
(P6,533.00), Philippine Currency, representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990 to December 1999 (n.i.), and
the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and
28/100 (P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the
law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS and the public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Legazpi City for Naga City. 22 June 2001.
(sgd.) ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO
State Prosecutor
Special Prosecutor on SSS Cases
in Region V[3]
The information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino which states:
I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has been conducted by the undersigned Special Prosecutor in accordance
with law and under oath as officer of the court, that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense has been committed, that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and that the filing of the information is with the prior authority and approval of the Regional State
Prosecutor.[4]
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City presided by respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B.
Garfin. On September 24, 2001, accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-trial. [5] Three
days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss [6] on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written authority
or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.[7]
The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition, [8] against which the accused filed a rejoinder.[9] The People
filed a reply to the rejoinder[10] on December 21, 2001. A rejoinder to the reply[11] was filed by the accused on January 21, 2002.
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its first questioned Order dated February
26, 2002, to wit:
After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so resolves that the Information has not been
filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, thus:
Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval
of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the defendants plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings (People vs. Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750).

The Supreme Court in Villa vs. Ibaez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on lack of authority of the officer who filed the information and on
jurisdiction at the same time, pertinent portions run as follows:
The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all
objections to the information. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear
implication, if not by express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions,
questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Now, the objection to the respondents actuations goes
to the very foundations of jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an
infirmity of the nature noted in the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
Prosecutor Tolentino also contends that having been duly designated to assist the City Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution
of all SSS cases by the Regional State prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V, then that authority may be given
to other than the City Prosecutor. The Court finds this contention to be devoid of merit. The Regional State Prosecutor is not the alter
ego of the Secretary of Justice but a mere subordinate official and if ever the former files cases, it is by virtue of a delegated authority
by the Secretary of Justice. Potestas delegada non potesta delegare (sic) what has been delegated cannot be redelegated.
In his opposition, the state prosecutor also attached a memorandum dated June 22, 2001 by Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M.
Turingan addressed to Provincial Prosecutor and City Prosecutors of Region V directing them to inhibit and to append the following
NOTATION after the certification in the Information for filing.
NOTATION: The herein City/Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting from this case and the Special Prosecution Team on SSS Cases in
Region V is authorized to dispose of the case without my approval in view of the request for inhibition of the SSS Regional Manager
as granted by the Regional State Prosecutor.
A perusal of the Information, however, would readily show that nowhere in the Information has the City Prosecutor of Naga City
appended the above-quoted notation/inhibition. At most, the authority of the special prosecutor is only for the conduct of preliminary
investigations and the prosecution of cases after they are filed. The Court, however, believes that the filing of this Information must be
in conformity with the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 4 of Rule 112.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and for lack of jurisdiction, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS this case without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[12]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that as a special prosecutor designated by the regional state
prosecutor to handle SSS cases within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file the information involving violations
of the SSS law without need of prior approval from the city prosecutor. [13] Letters of commendation from Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuo[14]and Secretary Hernando Perez[15] were offered as proof to show that State Prosecutor Tolentinos authority to file the
information was recognized. In response, the defense pointed out in its opposition that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice
of hearing, hence it ispro forma or a mere scrap of paper. [16]
On April 3, 2002, respondent judge issued the second questioned Order which reads:
Acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino, Special Prosecutor on SSS cases in
Region V, and it appearing that the same has failed to comply with the requirement of notice prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, the same is hereby DENIED for being a mere scrap of paper.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, this petition by the People through Regional State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ.
Tolentino. Petitioner attributes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent
judge, viz:[18]

1. RESPONDENT JUDGE DISMISSED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUPPORTING FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASES;
2. RESPONDENT JUDGE DELIBERATELY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUFFICIENCY OF REBUTTAL
EVIDENCE. THE WORD MAY IN SEC. 4, RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT MANDATORY;
3. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE JUDICIALLY
KNOWN INHIBITION OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
MATTER;
4. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN INTERFERING WITH THE PURELY
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF FILING AN INFORMATION BY RULING ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE FILING
OFFICER TO FILE THE INFORMATION.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment [19] in compliance with this Courts Resolution dated September 23,
2002.[20]It opines that the dismissal of the information is mandated under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Private respondent contends that:[21] 1) the instant petition was filed out of time; 2) the special State Prosecutor is only authorized
to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the information; and 3) the City Prosecutor did not
expressly inhibit himself from handling SSS cases nor signing the information.
We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent contends that the motion for reconsideration filed on April 1, 2002 is late
because it was filed eighteen days after March 14, 2002, the date when petitioner received the first questioned order. Respondent has
overlooked that the 15th day after March 14 is a Good Friday. Hence, petitioners last day to file the motion for reconsideration was on
the next working day after Good Friday, April 1.[22]
Next, respondent argues that having been considered as a mere scrap of paper, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner did
not toll the running of the reglementary period. Respondent, however, erroneously assumes that the present case is an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45. As stated at the outset, this is an original petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65.
Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is clear. It provides that (a) pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not
toll the reglementary period of appeal. (emphases supplied) Hence, the same provision has no application in the case at bar.
The reckoning date is the receipt of the second questioned Order and not the receipt of the first. Section 4, Rule 65, as amended
by En Banc Resolution A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, September 1, 2000, provides, viz:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.-- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)- day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
xxx

xxx

xxx

As shown by the records, petitioner received the first questioned order dated February 26, 2002 on March 14, 2002. [23] A motion
for reconsideration was timely filed on April 1, 2002 [24] which was dismissed for lack of notice of hearing in an Order dated April 3,
2002.[25]This second questioned order was received by petitioner on April 11, 2002. [26] A motion for extension of time to file a petition
for review oncertiorari was filed on April 18, 2002. [27] A motion for leave to file and admit the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus was filed on May 29, 2002.[28] Having been filed within the reglementary period, petitioners motion for
leave to file the instant petition was granted in this Courts Resolution dated July 15, 2002. [29]
We now come to the other issue: whether the prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor is necessary in filing the information at bar.

Petitioner takes the unbending view that the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is no longer required. It is contended
that the Regional State Prosecutor has already directed the city or provincial prosecutor to inhibit from handling SSS cases.
[30]
Petitioner cites the letter of Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan to SSS Regional Director in Naga City dated June 6,
1997[31] and copies of Regional Orders No. 97-024-A [32] and 2001-033[33] dated July 14, 1997 and September 28, 2001, respectively,
showing the designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V. Petitioner relies on Galvez, et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[34] and Sanchez v. Demetriou, et al.[35] to prop up its contention that given the designation of State
Prosecutor Tolentino, the city prosecutor need not participate in the filing and prosecution of the information in the case at bar.
We disagree. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the powers of a Regional State Prosecutor are as follows:
Sec. 8.
The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State Prosecutor. - The Regional State Prosecutor
shall, under the control of the Secretary of Justice, have the following functions:
a)
Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and rules and regulations of the Department of Justice
relative to the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases in his region.
b)
Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces
and cities comprised within his region.
c)

Prosecute any case arising within the region.

d)

With respect to his regional office and the offices of the provincial and city fiscals within his region, he shall:

1)
Appoint such member of subordinate officers and employees as may be necessary; and approve transfers of subordinate
personnel within the jurisdiction of the regional office.
2)
Investigate administrative complaints against fiscals and other prosecuting officers within his region and submit his
recommendation thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review thereof, submit the appropriate recommendation to the
Office of the President: Provided, that where the Secretary of Justice finds insufficient grounds for the filing of charges, he may render
a decision of dismissal thereof.
3)
Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate personnel of the region and submit his recommendations thereon
to the Secretary of Justice who shall have the authority to render decision thereon. (emphases supplied)
The power of administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the
operations of such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with
day-to-day activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and
inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary
for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and
to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them. [36] This is distinguished from the
power of supervision and control which includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs.[37]
The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor,
he has no power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their
inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the
least.
Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those cases, the special prosecutors were acting under the directive
of the Secretary of Justice. They were appointed in accordance with law. Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the regional state prosecutor
granted the power to appoint a special prosecutor armed with the authority to file an information without the prior written authority or

approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. P.D. No. 1275 provides the manner by which special prosecutors
are appointed, to wit:
Sec. 15. Special Counsels. - Whenever the exigencies of the service require the creation of positions of additional counsel to assist
provincial and city fiscals in the discharge of their duties, positions of Special Counsels may be created by any province or city,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, and with salaries chargeable against provincial or city funds. The Secretary of
Justice shall appoint said Special Counsels, upon recommendation of the provincial or city fiscal and regional state prosecutors
concerned, either on permanent or temporary basis.
Special Counsel shall be appointed from members of the bar and shall be allowed not more than the salary rate provided in this Decree
for the lowest rank or grade of assistant fiscal in the province or city where assigned. (emphases supplied)
Under Department Order No. 318,[38] Defining the authority, duties and responsibilities of regional state prosecutors, then
Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III ordered the appointed regional state prosecutors (which included Regional State
Prosecutor Turingan for Region V) to, among others, (i)nvestigate and/or prosecute, upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice,
specific criminal cases filed within the region. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the Secretary of Justice to Regional State Prosecutor
Turingan to investigate and/or prosecute SSS cases filed within his territorial jurisdiction. A bare reading of the alleged letter of
commendation by then Secretary Hernando Perez would show that it does not amount to a directive or even a recognition of this
authority. In fact, while the letter of Secretary Perez commends the efforts of Regional State Prosecutor Turingan in successfully
prosecuting SSS cases, it also negates his authority to prosecute them. Secretary Perez called the Regional State Prosecutors attention
to DOJ Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which states that all important cases of the SSS should be referred to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel.[39] Thus, Regional State Prosecutor Turingan cannot be considered a special prosecutor within the
meaning of the law.
Petitioner argues that the word may is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior written approval is not required, and this
is one such instance. This is too simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word may is mandatory or directory depends on the
context of its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive word may should be read together with the other provisions
in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted provision shows that the word may is mandatory.
It states:
Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action. (emphasis supplied)
Having settled that the prior authority and approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor should have been obtained, we
shall now resolve the more important issue: whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor
in the filing of an information is a defect in the information that is waived if not raised as an objection before arraignment.
We hold that it is not.
The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that demand illumination are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117 in
relation to paragraph 3, Section 4 of Rule 112, to wit:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(a)

That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b)

That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c)

That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d)

That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e)

That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f)

That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g)

That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h)

That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i)
That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and
(i) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz:
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. (emphasis supplied)
Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior authority or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor is an infirmity in the information that prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Since lack
of jurisdiction is a defect that may be raised as an objection anytime even after arraignment, the respondent judge did not err in
granting the motion to dismiss based on this ground. As basis, they cite the case of Villa v. Ibaez, et al.[40] where we held, viz:
The defendant had pleaded to an information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all
objections to the informations. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear
implication, if not by express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court (now Section 9 of Rule 117), and by a long
line of uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. Now, the objection to the
respondents actuations goes to the very foundation of the jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer
which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.[41] (emphasis supplied)
The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of the filing officer prevents the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over the case is invested
by the act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the complaint or information. [42] Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over
the subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked
with the filing of the information.
In the United States, an information has been held as a jurisdictional requirement upon which a defendant stands trial. Thus, it
has been ruled that in the absence of probable cause, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the criminal offense. [43] In our jurisdiction, we
have similarly held that:
While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two or more courts having concurrent jurisdiction thereon, is a
matter of procedure and not jurisdiction, as suggested by appellant, the moment such choice has been exercised, the matter becomes

jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made when the proper complaint or information is filed with the court having jurisdiction
over the crime, and said court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, from which time the right and power of
the court to try the accused attaches. (citations omitted) It is not for the defendant to exercise that choice, which is lodged upon
those who may validly file or subscribe to the complaint or information under sections 2 and 3 of Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court. [44] (emphasis supplied)
A closer look at Villa would be useful in resolving the issue at hand. In that case, Atty. Abelardo Subido, Chief of the Division of
Investigation in the Office of the Mayor of Manila, was appointed by the Secretary of Justice as special counsel to assist the City
Fiscal of Manila in the cases involving city government officials or employees. Pursuant to his appointment, Atty. Subido filed an
information against Pedro Villa for falsification of a payroll. Atty. Subidos authority to file the information was challenged on the
ground that he was disqualified for appointment under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 144, to wit:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from
his office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his
duties, and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General. [45]
We held, viz:
Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, were
upheld in Lo Cham vs. Ocampo et al., 44 Official Gazette, 458, and Go Cam et al., vs. Gatmaitan et al., (47 Official Gazette, 5092).
But in those cases, the appointees were officials or employees in one or another of the bureaus or offices under the Department of
Justice, and were rightly considered subordinates in the office of the Secretary of Justice within the meaning of section 1686, ante.
The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above decisions. Attorney Subido is a regular officer or employee in the
Department of Interior, more particularly in the City Mayors office. For this reason, he belongs to the class of persons disqualified for
appointment to the post of special counsel.
That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be either an employee or officer in the Department of Justice is
so manifest from a bare reading of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as to preclude construction. And the limitation of
the range of choice in the appointment or designation is not without reason.
The obvious reason is to have appointed only lawyers over whom the Secretary of Justice can exercise exclusive and absolute power
of supervision. An appointee from a branch of the government outside the Department of Justice would owe obedience to, and be
subject to orders by, mutually independent superiors having, possibly, antagonistic interests. Referring particularly to the case at hand
for illustration, Attorney Subido could be recalled or his time and attention be required elsewhere by the Secretary of Interior or the
City Mayor while he was discharging his duties as public prosecutor, and the Secretary of Justice would be helpless to stop such recall
or interference. An eventuality or state of affairs so undesirable, not to say detrimental to the public service and specially the
administration of justice, the Legislature wisely intended to avoid.
The application of the 1951 Villa ruling is not confined to instances where the person who filed the information is disqualified
from being a special prosecutor under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, but has been extended to various
cases where the information was filed by an unauthorized officer as in the case at bar. In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[46] the
Court held that it is a fundamental principle that when on its face the information is null and void for lack of authority to file the same,
it cannot be cured nor resurrected by amendment. In that case, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) conducted
an investigation and filed an information with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. charging him with graft and
corruption. The petitioner sought to quash the information on the ground that the crime charged did not constitute a Marcos crony
related crime over which the PCGG had authority to investigate and file an information. The Court found that the crime alleged in the
information was not among those which PCGG was authorized to investigate under Executive Orders No. 1 and 14 of then President
Corazon Aquino and ruled that the information was null and void. Of similar import is Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[47] where
we ruled that the information having been filed by an unauthorized party (the PCGG), the information was fatally flawed. We noted
that this defect is not a mere remediable defect of form, but a defect that could not be cured.

In Cudia v. Court of Appeals , et al.,[48] we also reiterated the Villa ruling. The accused in that case was apprehended in
Mabalacat, Pampanga for illegal possession of firearms and was brought to Angeles City where the headquarters of the arresting
officers was located. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information in the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. We
invalidated the information filed by the City Prosecutor because he had no territorial jurisdiction, as the offense was committed in
Mabalacat, Pampanga and his territorial jurisdiction was only in Angeles City. We held that an information, when required by law to
be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. [49] Otherwise, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. [50] It is a valid
information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the
accused and the subject matter thereof. The accuseds plea to an information may be a waiver of all formal objections to the said
information but not when there is want of jurisdiction. Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding. An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.[51]
Despite modifications of the provisions on unauthorized filing of information contained in the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure
under which Villa was decided, the 1951 Villa ruling continues to be the prevailing case law on the matter.[52]
The 1940 Rules of Court provided in Rule 113, Section 10 that, if the defendant fails to move to quash the complaint or
information before he pleads thereto, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to
quash except (1) when the complaint or information does not charge an offense or (2) the court is without jurisdiction of the
same. (emphasis ours) Among the enumerated grounds for a motion to quash under Section 2 of the same Rule was (t)hat the fiscal
has no authority to file the information. With only the above two exceptions provided by the 1940 Rules, the Court nevertheless made
the Villa ruling that if the filing officer lacks authority to file the information, jurisdiction is not conferred on the court and this
infirmity cannot be cured by silence or waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
The 1940 Rules of Court was amended in 1964. With only minimal changes introduced, the 1964 Rules of Court contained
provisions on unauthorized filing of information similar to the above provisions of the 1940 Rules.[53]
Then came the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lack of authority of the officer who filed the information was also a ground
for a motion to quash under these rules. The 1985 Rules also provided for waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash under Rule 117,
Section 8, but enumerated the following exceptions to the waiver: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; (c) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished; and (d) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Apparently, the want of jurisdiction under the 1985 Rules refers to jurisdiction over the offense and the person, and not over the
case as in Villa where the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for lack of authority of the officer who filed the information.
Still, despite the enumeration, the Court continued to apply the Villa ruling as shown in the afore-cited Cruz and Cudia cases.
The 1985 Rules was amended in 2000. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide for lack of authority of the
filing officer as among the grounds for a motion to quash and the waiver of these grounds. Similar to the 1985 Rules, the Revised
Rules enumerate the exceptions from the waiver, namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) that the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) that
the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. Under the regime of the 2000 Revised Rules, we reiterated the Villa ruling in the abovecited Romualdez case. With the enumeration of the four exceptions, which was almost a replica of the enumeration in the 1985 Rules,
the 2000 Rules did not intend to abandon Villa. The Villa ruling subsisted alongside the enumerated exceptions under the 1985 Rules,
and it remains to do so under the enumerated exceptions under the 2000 Rules. Neither the Rationale of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure nor the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court evinces any intent to
abandon the doctrine enunciated in Villa.
In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special
Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in
Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information
constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The respondent courts orders dated February 26, 2002 and April
3, 2002 are AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new information by
an authorized officer.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 134744. January 16, 2001]
GIAN PAULO VILLAFLOR, petitioner, vs. DINDO VIVAR y GOZON, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of an information or render it defective. Neither does it
affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the information. Instead of dismissing the information, the court
should hold the proceedings in abeyance and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City (Branch 276) in Civil Case No. 97-134. [1] Dated January 20, 1998,[2] the first Order granted the
Motion to Quash the Informations and ordered the dismissal of the two criminal cases. The second Order dated July 6, 1998, denied
the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts

Culled from the records and the pleadings of the parties are the following undisputed facts.
An Information[3] for slight physical injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 23365, was filed against Respondent Dindo Vivar
on February 7, 1997. The case stemmed from the alleged mauling of Petitioner Gian Paulo Villaflor by respondent around 1:00 a.m.
on January 27, 1997 outside the Fat Tuesday Bar at the Ayala Alabang Town Center, Muntinlupa City. After the severe beating he
took from respondent, petitioner decided to leave the premises together with a friend who was in the restroom when the mauling
incident took place. On his way out, petitioner again met respondent who told him, Sa susunod gagamitin ko na itong baril
ko[4] (Next time, I will use my gun on you).
When the injuries sustained by petitioner turned out to be more serious than they had appeared at first, an Information [5] for
serious physical injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 23787, was filed against respondent. [6] The earlier charge of slight physical
injuries was withdrawn.
At the same time, another Information[7] for grave threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 23728, [8] was filed against respondent
on March 17, 1997.
On April 14, 1997, respondent posted a cash bond of P6,000 in Criminal Case No. 23787 (for serious physical injuries). [9] Instead
of filing a counter-affidavit as required by the trial court, he filed on April 21, 1997, a Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 23728 (for grave threats). He contended that the threat, having been made in connection with the charge of serious physical
injuries, should have been absorbed by the latter. Thus, he concluded, Criminal Case No. 23728 should be dismissed, as the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over it.[10]
In an Order dated April 28, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 23728, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) denied the Motion to Quash,
as follows:

For consideration is a motion to quash filed by accused counsel. Considering that jurisdiction is conferred by law and the case filed is
grave threats which is within the jurisdiction of this Court and considering further that a motion to quash is a prohibited [pleading]
under the rule on summary procedure, the motion to quash filed by accused counsel is DENIED.
WHEREFORE, the motion to quash filed by accused counsel is hereby DENIED and let the arraignment of the accused be set on June
25, 1997 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.[11]
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent was denied by the MTC on June 17, 1997. [12] Thus, he was duly arraigned in
Criminal Case No. 23728 (for grave threats), and he pleaded not guilty.
On July 18, 1997, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Muntinlupa City. This was docketed as Civil Case
No. 97-134. On January 20, 1998, after the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the RTC issued the assailed Order which
reads as follows:
The Judicial Officer appears to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring and denying
the MOTION TO QUASH as a prohibitive motion. The same should have been treated and [should have] proceeded under the regular
rules of procedure. The MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONS filed without preliminary investigation is therefore granted
and these cases should have been dismissed.
Let this Petition be returned to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 80-Muntinlupa City for appropriate action. [13]
The RTC, in an Order dated July 6, 1998, denied the unopposed Motion for Reconsideration, as follows:
Submitted for resolution is the unopposed Motion for Reconsideration filed by Private Respondent.
This Court agrees with the contention of private respondent that the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner in the inferior court is a
prohibited pleading under Rules on Summary Procedure so that its denial is tenable. However, it would appear that the criminal
charges were filed without the preliminary investigation having been conducted by the Prosecutors Office. Although preliminary
investigation in cases triable by inferior courts is not a matter of right, the provision of Sec. 51 par 3(a) of Republic Act 7926 entitled
An Act Converting the Municipality of Muntinlupa Into a Highly Urbanized City To Be Known as the City of Muntinlupa provides
that the city prosecutor shall conduct preliminary investigations of ALL crimes, even violations of city ordinances. This Act amended
the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Since this procedure was not taken against accused, the Order dated January 20, 1998 stands.
The Motion for Reconsideration is therefore denied.[14]
Hence, this Petition.[15]
The Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:[16]

I
Can the court motu propio order the dismissal of the two (2) criminal cases for serious physical injuries and grave threats on the
ground that the public prosecutor failed to conduct a preliminary investigation?
II
Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation be considered a ground to quash the criminal
informations for serious physical injuries and grave threats filed against the accused-respondent?
III

Should respondents entry of plea in the [grave] threats case and posting of cash bond in the serious physical injuries case be
considered a waiver of his right, if any, to preliminary investigation?
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Lack of Preliminary Investigation

Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. [17] A component
part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before
trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process. [18]
However, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.[19] Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the information. [20] The trial court,
instead of dismissing the information, should hold in abeyance the proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation.[21]
Hence, the RTC in this case erred when it dismissed the two criminal cases for serious physical injuries (Criminal Case No.
23787) and grave threats (Criminal Case No. 23728) on the ground that the public prosecutor had failed to conduct a preliminary
investigation.
Furthermore, we do not agree that a preliminary investigation was not conducted. In fact, a preliminary investigation for slight
physical injuries was made by the assistant city prosecutor of Muntinlupa City. The said Information was, however, amended when
petitioners injuries turned out to be more serious and did not heal within the period specified in the Revised Penal Code.
We believe that a new preliminary investigation cannot be demanded by respondent. This is because the change made by the
public prosecutor was only a formal amendment.[22]
The filing of the Amended Information, without a new preliminary investigation, did not violate the right of respondent to be
protected from a hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution; an open and public accusation of a crime; or from the trouble, the
expenses and the anxiety of a public trial. The Amended Information could not have come as a surprise to him for the simple and
obvious reason that it charged essentially the same offense as that under the original Information. Moreover, if the original charge was
related to the amended one, such that an inquiry would elicit substantially the same facts, then a new preliminary investigation was not
necessary.[23]
Second Issue: Motion to Quash

As previously stated, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
information.[24]
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides the grounds on which an accused can move to quash
the complaint or information. These are: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer who
filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more
than one offense is charged, except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; (g) the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or is in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged.[25]

Nowhere in the above-mentioned section is there any mention of a lack of a preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to
quash. Moreover, such motion is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. In the present
case, the RTC therefore erred in granting herein respondents Motion to Quash
Furthermore, we stress that the failure of the accused to assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, either
because he had not filed the motion or had failed to allege the grounds therefor, shall be deemed a waiver of such grounds. [26] In this
case, he waived his right to file such motion when he pleaded not guilty to the charge of grave threats.
In view of the foregoing, we find no more need to resolve the other points raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Orders of the Regional Trail Court of Muntinlupa City
are REVERSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 118813-14. April 8, 1997]
HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman, Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIETTA HOBILLAALINIO in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 62, Bago City, and MAYOR LUIS
MONDIA JR., SGT. RUBEN OLVIDO, PAT. ERNESTO ENESERIO JR., JERRY VISTA, JOEL TREYES, RUFINO
MONDIA, SAMSON MONDIA, MANNY MONDIA, RODRIGO MONDIA JR., NORBERTO ESPAOLA,
ROBINSON GALANZA and NOEL OCCEA, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SEEKING JUSTICE for the killing of her husband Dionesio Odelmo and her father-in-law Jose Odelmo on 31 December 1992,
Corazon Odelmo appeared before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas on 12 February 1993 and filed a complaint for
murder against respondents Mayor Luis Mondia Jr. of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, Sgt. Ruben Olvido, Pat. Ernesto Eneserio Jr.,
Jerry Vista, Joel Treyes, Rufino Mondia, Samson Mondia, Manny Mondia, Rodrigo Mondia Jr., Norberto Espaola, Robinson Galanza
and Noel Occea.
After preliminary investigation the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman concluded that there was probable cause to hold private
respondents liable for the crime charged. Thus, in a resolution dated 10 August 1993 it recommended the filing of an Information for
double murder against all of them before the Sandiganbayan.
However upon review the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) appreciated the evidence antithetically; it found that two (2)
separate crimes of murder were committed but the commission thereof was not in relation to the performance of the duties of private
respondents. In view thereof it recommended on 14 December 1993 the filing of two (2) separate Informations before the Regional
Trial Court of Bago City.
On 28 December 1993 the resolution of 14 December 1993 of the OSP modifying the resolution of 10 August 1993 of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman was approved by petitioner Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
Accordingly, on 17 January 1994 two (2) Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, and on 18
January 1994 the corresponding warrants/orders of arrest were issued. That same day private respondents filed a motion to recall
warrants/orders of arrest on the ground that they had not yet received copy of the complaint, neither had they been furnished by the
Office of the Ombudsman copy of the resolution of 14 December 1993, as required under Sec. 6, Rule II, [1] of Administrative Order
No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman.[2] They claimed that this resulted in a denial of their right to seek reconsideration or
reinvestigation in contravention of Sec.7 [3]of the Administrative Order. Moreover, they posited that the Office of the Ombudsman had
no authority to file the Informations in view of its own finding that the crime was not committed by the accused in relation to their
office. The following day private respondents filed a motion to quash the Informations based on lack of authority.

On 26 January 1994 respondent Judge found that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to furnish private respondents copy of the
resolution of 14 December 1993 depriving them of their right to move for reconsideration or to elevate the matter to a higher office
before the Informations were filed. Consequently she ordered that the execution of the warrants/orders of arrest be held in
abeyance. For the same reason, she also granted the motion to quash the Informations. [4]
The Office of the Ombudsman through the OSP moved for reconsideration insofar as respondent Judge granted the motion to
quash the Informations. It was argued that the failure to furnish a copy of the resolution to private respondents was not an authorized
ground to quash the Informations under Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[5] Furthermore, it invoked Torralba v.
Sandiganbayan[6]as authority on what respondents should have done under the circumstances.
Respondent Judge maintained her ruling, opining that the assailed order was anchored on valid and legal grounds, apparently
referring to Secs. 6 and 7 of Administrative Order No. 7. She stressed that her order had become final since the motion for its
reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period. On 14 July 1994 she denied the motion to reconsider her order. [7]
Imputing grave abuse of discretion and lack or excess of jurisdiction to respondent Judge in granting the motion to quash the
Informations petitioner now comes to us for relief invoking our ruling in Torralba to stress his point. He also asserts that although the
motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed it should nevertheless have been given due course considering the clearly meritorious
grounds and the peculiar structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner further asks the Court to resolve the issue concerning the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute illegal acts and omissions of public officers which respondent Judge did not pass upon.
Private respondents on the other hand charge that certiorari is an improper remedy from an order quashing the Informations for
it cannot substitute for a lost appeal.
We rule for petitioner. Under Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, it is clear that failure of the prosecution to furnish copy of
the resolution to private respondents is not one of the grounds to quash an information. Private respondents' proposition that the
Office of the Ombudsman had no authority to file the Informations would have held solid ground under Sec. 3, par. (c), of the
Rule. But this seems to have been ignored by respondent Judge. Be that as it may, on the assumption that this ground was invoked
and applied, it would still be inappropriate to quash the Informations because the fact that private respondents had not yet been served
with copy of the resolution rendered the filing of the Informations premature, since the avenue for a reconsideration or reinvestigation
was still accessible. It is in this instance that the doctrine in Torralba rightfully comes into play.
In Torralba we found that the averments of petitioners that they had not been served with copies of the final resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the approved modified memorandum of the Special Prosecution Officer as well as the special audit report
were not controverted. The inevitable conclusion then was that petitioners were not only effectively denied the opportunity to file a
motion for reconsideration but were also deprived of their right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the
Informations against them. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that
The incomplete preliminary investigation in this case x x x x does not warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate
the proceedings already had. Neither is the court's jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely affected by deficiencies in the
preliminary investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further proceedings therein and to remand the case to
the Office of the Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary investigation,[8] the outcome of which shall then be indorsed to
(the) Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action.
It is thus manifest that respondent Judge capriciously and whimsically ordered the quashing of the Informations notwithstanding
our ruling in Torralba and Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court.
It is worthy to note that subsequent to Torralba and the issuance of the disputed orders of respondent Judge we addressed the
same issue in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan[9] thus x x x x the failure to furnish the respondent with a copy of an adverse resolution pursuant to Section 6 x x x does not affect the
validity of an information thereafter filed even if a copy of the resolution upon which the information is based was not served upon the
respondent. The contention that the provision is mandatory in order to allow the respondent to avail of the 15-day period to file a

motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation is not persuasive for under Section 7[10] of the said Rule, such motion may, nevertheless,
be filed and acted upon by the Ombudsman if so directed by the court where the information was filed x x x x
Private respondents insist that the remedy of certiorari is improper. While an order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of
denial, is a final order and not merely interlocutory and therefore is immediately appealable, [11] we have ruled that even when appeal is
available as a proper remedy we will sanction a writ of certiorari on the basis of a patent, capricious and whimsical exercise of
discretion by a trial judge[12]or when an appeal will not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the disputed
orders.[13]
While we recognize that certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially a lost appeal, this rule
should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. [14] In the final analysis, certiorari as an extraordinary legal
remedy is intended to annul or void proceedings in order to ensure the fair and orderly administration of justice. Unquestionably, the
circumstances of the present petition warrant direct recourse to this Court.
On the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to file the Informations before respondent Judge, we need only quote Sec. 15,
of RA 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1)
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.
We explained in Deloso v. Domingo,[15] the nature, power and function of the Office of the Ombudsman thus
The clause 'any [illegal] act or omission of any public official' is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may
investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official
duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to
insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in
the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss
investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a
special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions
complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear
that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses 'all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been
committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office' (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order of respondent Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio dated 26 January 1994
insofar as it quashed the Informations as well as the order dated 14 July 1994 denying reconsideration thereof is SET
ASIDE. Respondent Judge having in the meantime died, [16] any other Judge replacing her or to whom these cases may be reassigned
is directed to remand the cases to the Office of the Ombudsman for completion of the proceedings by furnishing copy of the
questioned orders to private respondents and thereafter resolving with dispatch whatever incidents may ensue thereunder, the result
of which shall then be immediately indorsed to the RTC-Br. 62, Bago City, or any other branch to which the cases may be reassigned,
for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 136264. May 28, 2004]
ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICENTE Q. ROXAS,
IRENE AGBADA-CRUZ, SIXTO AGBADA CRUZ, MERCEDES ARISTORENAS and ROMEO GOMEZ and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity) dated November
13, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43884, denying Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyacs petition for certiorari and ruling that the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 227) of Quezon City (RTC for brevity) was correct in denying petitioners motion to quash the information charging
petitioner with falsification of public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988.
The antecedent facts as borne out by the records of the case are accurately narrated in the CA Decision dated November 13,
1998, thus:
An information for falsification of public documents docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 at the RTC of Quezon City was filed
against petitioner along with some others. That information reads:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses LOURDES ANGELES, ESTRELLA MAPA, ATTY. PONCIANO R. GUPIT, and
ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT (under Article 172, first and
last paragraph in relation to Article 171 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of 1986, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, all private individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit the act of falsification of public documents, by then and there falsifying or causing the falsification
of the following documents, to wit:
a)
Certification dated March 10, 1986 purportedly signed by a certain Fernando Dizon, Record Management Analyst of the
Bureau of Land, Central Office, Manila;
(b)
Report dated May 5, 1986 purportedly signed by a certain Jose Mariano, Chief Record Management Division of Bureau of
Land, Central Office, Manila; and
(c)
Sales Certificate and Deed of Assignment allegedly issued by the Bureau of Land in favor of Lourdes Angeles; that despite
the fact that said accused knew all the time that said documents are fake and spurious used the same in the Petition for Reconstitution
of Records of the technical description of Lots Nos. 755, 777, 778 and 783 of the Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. 14, Decree No.
667, GLRO Record No. 5975 and the issuance of Title thereto filed by Estrella Mapa over and involving the aforesaid lots in Land
Registration Case docketed as LRC Case No. 3369 (86) before Branch 99, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and that by virtue of
said falsification and the use of the same as evidence in Court Honorable Presiding Judge Godofredo Asuncion issued an order dated
June 30, 1986 granting said petition, and pursuant thereto the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued Transfer Certificates of Titles
Nos. 348156, 348291 and 348292 in the name of Estrella Mapa thereby embracing and/or encroaching the portions of the properties
belonging to Romeo D. Gomez, Sixto Agbada, Irene Agbada-Cruz and Mercedes Aristorenas whose properties were embraced and
included in the said Transfer Certificates of Titles and in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on two (2) grounds. First, that the officer who filed the information
had no legal authority to do so, and second, that more than one offense was charged in the information.
Pending resolution of the motion to quash, petitioner was arraigned.
By Order of August 23, 1991, Judge Benigno T. Dayaw of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to whose sala
Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was raffled, holding that the grant or denial of Motion to Dismiss whether the accused is arraigned or
not is discretionary on the part of the Court, it citing People vs. IAC, L-66939-41, January 10, 1987, granted the petitioners motion
to quash upon the second ground. Accordingly, the information was quashed.

More than two (2) years after the quashal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 or on October 19, 1993, the Quezon
City Prosecutor filed against the same accused including petitioner two (2) informations for falsification of public documents docketed
at the Quezon City RTC as Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-49988 and 49989. The Informations arose from the questioned acts of
falsification subject of the earlier quashed information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037.
Petitioner later filed with Branch 103 of the RTC of Quezon City to which the informations were raffled a motion for
the quashal thereof on the ground of double jeopardy, citing Section 3(h) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner argued at the court a quo that he would be placed in double jeopardy as he was indicted before for the same offenses and the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
By the assailed Order of December 18, 1996, public respondent, Judge Vicente Q. Roxas of Branch 227 of the RTC of Quezon City to
which the two (2) informations against petitioner, et al, were eventually lodged, held that the information in Criminal Case No. Q-9349988 involved a different document as that involved in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 which had already been quashed. Resolution
of the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49989 was stayed pending the submission by petitioner of the
documents required by the court a quo. Public respondent thus denied the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. Q93-49988 and ordered petitioners arraignment, he holding that said case did not place petitioner in double jeopardy.[2]
Herein petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which denied his petition stating in its Decision that since the
Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037, on petitioners motion, was quashed on the ground that more than one offense was
charged pursuant to Sec. 3 (e) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, [3] he is not placed in double jeopardy by the filing of another
Information for an offense included in the charge subject of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037. [4]
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari assigning the following errors of the CA, to wit:
I. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in disregarding the legal doctrine that THERE IS DOUBLE JEOPARDY,
in the case now pending before Respondent Judge Vicente Q. Roxas;
II. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in not adhering to the decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court, as well
as to applicable jurisprudence on the matter;
III. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in not taking into account that based on the Manifestation and Motion
(To Grant Petition) In Lieu of Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the ORDER of dismissal of
Honorable Judge Benigno T. Dayaw in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 on August 23, 1991 has become final and
executory; and
IV. That the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals ERRED in concluding that an ORDER sustaining the motion to quash
is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, as it has no legal basis.[5]
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that petitioner, by filing the motion to quash and refusing
to withdraw it after he was arraigned, is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy, as his motion to quash constituted
his express consent for the dismissal of the information. However, the OSG advances the view that the criminal case against herein
petitioner may be dismissed for the inordinate delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of filing the proper
information, which is a violation of the accuseds constitutional right to due process of law and to speedy disposition of cases.
Private respondent complainant Irene Agbada-Cruz, in turn, submits that the Court of Appeals committed no error since the
dismissal orquashal of an information is not a bar to another prosecution except when the motion to quash is based on the ground that
(1) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished or that (2) the accused has previously been convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, pursuant to Section 6 in relation to Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. - An order sustaining the motion to
quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 3, subsections (f) and (h) of this Rule.

Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(a)

That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b)

That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused;

(c)

That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(d)

That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(e)

That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses;

(f)

That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(g)

That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(h)

That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or
acquitted of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, private respondent Cruz argues that since the previous information was quashed on the ground of duplicity of offenses charged,
the subsequent filing of a proper information is, therefore, not barred.
In their Memorandum, private respondents-complainants Romeo Gomez and Mercedes Aristorenas contend that (1) jeopardy
does not attach where the dismissal of the information was effected at the instance of the accused; and (2) there was no violation of
petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case since he never raised this issue in the trial court nor in the appellate court, hence,
his silence should be interpreted as a waiver of said right to a speedy trial.
The issues boil down to (1) whether or not the prosecution of petitioner under the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. Q93-49988 would constitute double jeopardy, considering that when the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was previously
quashed, he had already been arraigned, and (2) whether or not petitioners constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has
been violated.
With regard to the first issue, we are in accord with the ruling of the CA that not all the elements for double jeopardy exist in the
case at bench. In People vs. Tac-An,[6] we enumerated the elements that must exist for double jeopardy to be invoked, to wit:
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior
to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as
that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having
been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan,
58 Phil. 851).
Was the duplicitous information a valid indictment? We answer in the affirmative. In People vs. Bugayong,[7] we ruled that
when an appellant fails to file a motion to quash within the time prescribed under Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, he is thus
deemed to have waived the defect in the Information. In People vs. Manalili,[8] we held that an accused, who fails to object prior to
arraignment to a duplicitous information, may be found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged therein and duly proven during the
trial, for the allegation of the elements of such component crimes in the said information has satisfied the constitutional guarantee that
an accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he or she is being charged. Verily, a duplicitous information is valid
since such defect may be waived and the accused, because of such waiver, could be convicted of as many offenses as those charged in
the information and proved during trial.

The validity of the information having been established, we go on to examine whether the other requisites for double jeopardy to
attach are present. In the present case, although there was a valid indictment before a competent court and petitioner, as the accused,
had already been arraigned therein, entering a valid plea of not guilty, the last requisite that the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, is not present.
It should be noted that the termination of Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was upon motion of petitioner who, on April 1, 1991,
filed with the court an Urgent Motion to Quash which was granted by Resolution dated August 23, 1991. In Sta. Rita vs. Court of
Appeals,[9] we held that the reinstatement of criminal cases against the accused did not violate his right against double jeopardy since
the dismissal of the information by the trial court had been effected at his own instance when the accused filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. In this case,
considering that since the dismissal of the previous criminal case against petitioner was by reason of his motion for the quashal of the
information, petitioner is thus deemed to have expressly given his consent to such dismissal. There could then be no double jeopardy
in this case since one of the requisites therefore, i.e., that the dismissal be without accuseds express consent, is not present.
As to whether the subsequent filing of the two informations docketed as Q-93-49988 and Q-93-49989 constitutes a violation of
petitioners constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases, [10] we rule in the negative. We are not convinced by the OSGs
assertion that the cases of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan[11] or Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,[12] are applicable to the case before us. We
see differently. There is no factual similarity between this case before us and the cases of Tatad and Angchangco.
In the Tatad case, there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the termination of the proceedings before the investigating fiscal
onOctober 25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985. The Court found that political motivations played a vital role in activating
and propelling the prosecutorial process[13] against then Secretary Francisco S. Tatad. In the Angchangco case, the criminal
complaints remained pending in the Office of the Ombudsman for more than six years despite the respondents numerous motions for
early resolution and the respondent, who had been retired, was being unreasonably deprived of the fruits of his retirement because of
the still unresolved criminal complaints against him. In both cases, we ruled that the period of time that elapsed for the resolution of
the cases against the petitioners therein was deemed a violation of the accuseds right to a speedy disposition of cases against them.
In the present case, no proof was presented to show any persecution of the accused, political or otherwise, unlike in
the Tatad case. There is no showing that petitioner was made to endure any vexatious process during the two-year period before the
filing of the proper informations, unlike in the Angchangco case where petitioner therein was deprived of his retirement benefits for an
unreasonably long time. Thus, the circumstances present in the Tatad and Angchangco cases justifying the radical relief granted by
us in said cases are not existent in the present case.
We emphasize our ruling in Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan[14] where we held that:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. In the
determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the length of the
delay the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional
guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, we shall examine how such aforementioned factors affected herein petitioners right.
As to the length of delay, it is established that the prosecution did not take any action on petitioners case for two years. From
the time that Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was dismissed on August 23, 1991, the prosecution failed to effect the very simple
remedy of filing two separate informations against petitioner until October of 1993. Indeed, there was a delay in the refiling of the
proper informations. However, the prosecution was never given the opportunity to explain the circumstances that may have caused
such delay precisely because petitioner never raised the issue of the length of time it took the prosecution to revive the case. There is
nothing on record to show what happened during the two-year lull before the filing of the proper informations. Hence, it could not be

ascertained that peculiar situations existed to prove that the delay was vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and therefore, a violation
of petitioners constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
What the records clearly show is that petitioner never asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case. The only ground he
raised in assailing the subsequent filing of the two informations is that he will be subjected to double jeopardy. It was only the OSG
that brought to light the issue on petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case, and only when the case was brought to the
appellate court on certiorari. Even in this petition before us, petitioner did not raise the issue of his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. Again, it was only the OSG that presented such issue to us in the Brief for the State which was only then adopted by petitioner
through a Manifestation datedAugust 3, 1999. We are not convinced that the filing of the informations against petitioner after two
years was an unreasonable delay. Petitioner himself did not really believe that there was any violation of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case against him.
The case which is more in point with the present one before us is Dela Pea vs. Sandiganbayan[15] where we ruled that petitioner
therein, for failing to assert their right to a speedy disposition of their cases, was deemed to have waived such right and thus, not
entitled to the radical relief granted by the Court in the cases of Tatad and Angchangco. The factual circumstances surrounding
herein petitioners case do not demonstrate that there was any violation of petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued pursuant to our
Resolution dated January 17, 2000 is hereby LIFTED and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 227) is
hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with petitioners arraignment in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998]
RENATO CUDIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993 dismissing his petition and finding that he had not
been placed in double jeopardy by the filing of a second information against him, although a first information charging the same
offense had been previously dismissed, over petitioners vigorous opposition.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat, [2] Pampanga, by members of the then
174th PC Company, allegedly for possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City,
where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result
thereof, the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control one (1)
.38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence without
having the necessary authority and permit to carry the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] (Emphasis petitioners.)
The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (hereafter the Angeles City RTC). Upon his
arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the

attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in
Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTCs as to who would handle
cases involving crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to
criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City
RTC.
On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging petitioner with the same
crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to
Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw
the Information, stating that thru inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the Information in
this case, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and
ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga[4] and that the Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which two separate
informations for the same offense had been filed against petitioner. The latter filed his opposition to the motion, but the trial court
nonetheless, granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April 3, 1990.
On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground that his continued prosecution for
the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and
which had been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that the petitioner could not have been convicted under
the first information as the same was defective. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.
Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY DID
NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILE THE FIRST INFORMATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRST JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH BECAUSE
THE FIRST INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.
We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that (n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense x x x. Pursuant to this provision, Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides in part that (w)hen an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, x x x.
In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt
to commit the same or a frustration thereof.[5]
In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the existence of the following:
(a)

Court of competent jurisdiction

(b)

Valid complaint or information

(c)

Arraignment

(c)

Valid plea

(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.[6]
It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded not guilty therein, and that the same
was dismissed without his express consent, nay, over his opposition even. We may thus limit the discussion to determining whether
the first two requisites have been met.
As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try the case is essential to
place an accused in jeopardy. The Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60, which originally had cognizance
of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction over the case. In the words of the Solicitor General:
The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City was not the proper venue for
hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA
699). In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the
offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77). Although both
Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56.[7]
It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it must be resolved on the basis of the
law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order
No. 864 of the President of the Philippines, dated January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to
Twelve are hereby defined as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

PAMPANGA

1.
Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City comprising ANGELES CITY and the municipalities of Mabalacat,
Magalang, and Porac as well as part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned. Consequently, notwithstanding the
internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in
lawbooks is the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any trial court.
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to
file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his
jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
xxx

xxx

xxx

b)
Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances
within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In

the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned
by subpoena for the purpose.
xxx

xxx

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses
committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer,
cannot be filed by another.[8] It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the
court does not acquire jurisdiction.[9]
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the information in
question is deemed a waiver thereof. [10] As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to an information before he
filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by
clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, [11] questions relating to
want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among
other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.[12]
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the
complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have
been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the
information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioners subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach
where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. [13]
Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the investigating panel and the same
should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the
mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees. [14] To rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper
protection to the community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have been the remedy sought by
the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals[15] has ruled that even if amendment is proper,
pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information
may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.
In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first
information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof.
As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure
to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
24958 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005]
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, petitioners, vs. HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR.
76, QUEZON CITY, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned, pleaded guilty and were convicted and after they had
applied for probation, may the information be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the ground that the information was
allegedly altered/tampered with?
In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero dated 03 July 1996, [1] accused Marcelo
Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops,
a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 was assigned and raffled to Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced on 16 July 1996 in this wise:[2]
On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA with the assistance of [their] counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano
entered a plea of GUILTY to the crime charged against them in the information.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby find[s] accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, GUILTY of Violation of Section 4,
Republic Act 6425 and they are hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and the period during
which said accused are under detention is hereby deducted pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 5127.
The evidence in this case which is the 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. The Property Custodian is ordered to turn over said evidences to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
On the same date, both accused applied for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.[3]
On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two
separate motions, first, to admit amended Information, [4] and second, to set aside the arraignment of the accused, as well as the
decision of the trial court dated 16 July 1996.[5] In plaintiffs motion to admit amended information, it alleged:
1.

That for some unknown reason both accused herein were charged of (sic) Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, R.P. 6425.

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell, or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops,
a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
When in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for transportation and delivery, with intent to sell and to gain, of FortyFive (45) pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to Metro Manila.
2.

That it is imperative to file an amended information in order to make it conformable to the evidence on hand.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed that the herewith attached Amended Information against both
accused be admitted and subsequently set for arraignment and trial.[6] (Emphasis supplied)
Resolving the motions, the trial court, in its Order dated 03 September 1996,[7] held:

The Motion to Admit Amended Information is hereby DENIED, as this court has already decided this case on the basis that the
accused was arrested in possession of 42.410 grams of marijuana and it is too late at this stage to amend the information.
Another Order[8] of the same date issued by the trial court resolved the second motion in the following manner:
The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well as the Decision dated July 16, 1996, filed by the Public Prosecutor is
hereby GRANTED, it appearing from the published resolution of the Supreme Court dated October 18, 1995, in G.R. No. 119131
Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen Bobares vs. Hon. FRANCISCO H. ESCANO, JR. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court, Leyte Branch 12, Ormoc City which was dismissed by this court on August 20, 1996, the jurisdiction over drug of small
quantity as in the case at bar should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court, although under the statute of R.A. 7659 which took effect
on December 31, 1993 the penalty for possession or use of prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision [correccional] to reclusion
temporal which indeterminate penalty and under the rule on jurisdiction the court which has jurisdiction over a criminal case is
dependent on the maximum penalty attached by the statute to the crime.
The amended Information reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a
prohibited drug, in violation of said law.[9]

[10]

This second information was assigned to Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa,
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572.

Both accused filed a Motion to Quash [11] which was opposed[12] by the People in its Comment/Opposition filed before the trial
court. Subsequently, while the motion to quash before the RTC was as yet unresolved, both accused filed before the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Certiorari[13] which they later moved to withdraw to pave the way for Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City to act
judiciously on their motion to quash.[14] The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 15 November 1996 [15] noted the motion and
considered the petition withdrawn.
In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997, [16] the trial court denied accuseds motion to quash, and scheduled the
arraignment of the accused under the amended information. Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration,[17] duly opposed by the
prosecution,[18] was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 16 April 1997. [19] Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for injunction and temporary restraining order[20] based on the following grounds:[21]
A)
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO VALID
INFORMATION AND, THEREFORE, THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; and
B)
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE RTC, BRANCH
103, HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-66799.[22]
In this Courts resolution dated 23 July 1997,[23] respondents were required to comment on the Petition. They submitted their
Comment on 18 November 1998.[24] Accused filed their Reply[25] on 02 March 2000. In compliance with the Courts resolution dated
29 March 2000,[26] accused and respondents submitted their memoranda, respectively, on 26 May 2000[27] and 26 July 2000.[28]
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the
court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. [29]
The issues boil down to whether or not the first information is valid and whether or not the RTC, Branch 103, where the first
information was filed and under which Criminal Case No. Q-96-66788 was tried, had jurisdiction to try the case.

On the issue of validity of the information, accused and respondents submitted opposing views -- accused insisting on its
validity, whereas respondents asserted that the accused were arraigned under an invalid information. Alleging that there being an
alteration on the first information, hence it failed to reflect the true quantity of drugs caught in possession of the accused, the
prosecution insisted that the first information under which accused were arraigned is invalid.
In accord with the view of the prosecution, the trial court denied the accuseds motion to quash, stating: [30]
. . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled that the earlier information filed against the accused appeared to be sufficient in form. It
was discovered, however, that an alteration was made as to the weight of the marijuana fruiting tops which was placed at only 42.410
grams when the correct amount should have been in kilos. This fraudulent alteration necessarily vitiated the integrity of the
proceedings such that despite the plea of guilt made by the accused it would not bar a subsequent prosecution for the correct offense.
Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the prior proceedings must have been valid, and the lack of any
fundamental requisite which would render void the judgment would also make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such
proceedings.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal procured by accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put
him in jeopardy; and consequently it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense.
Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or by collusion of the offender, for the purpose of protecting
himself from further prosecution and adequate punishment, is no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, either on the
ground that the conviction is void because of the fraud practiced, or that the state is not in any sense a party to it and therefore not
bound by it. (22 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 244-245)
It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of the deceitful maneuvering which led to the erasure of the true weight of
the marijuana fruiting tops as alleged in the information.
They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of prohibited stuff for which they were charged before the information was
tampered with.
They could not feign innocence when they participated in that charade when they pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the decreased weight in the now altered information which merited a much
lighter penalty was irregularly obtained. Hence, they cannot be considered as put in jeopardy by the proceedings in court which was
tainted with fraud.
The accused should not be allowed to make a mockery of justice or to trifle with the courts by participating in a grand deception of
pleading guilty to a lesser offense knowing that they participated/acquiesced to such tampering and then tell the court that they would
be placed in jeopardy for the second time.
We do not agree with the trial court.
FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest proceedings dated 03 July 1996 addressed to the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and received by Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the accused were apprehended for conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with each other in facilitating and effecting the transportation and delivery . . . of fortyfive pieces
of dried marijuana leaves (already in bricks) and weighing approximately forty-five kilos.[31]
In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Ernesto Jimenez Viray, Jr., and arresting officer SPOI Inadio U. Ibay, Jr., it is
stated that the accused were caught with approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops. [32] For some unknown reasons,
however, the Information filed against the accused reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams.
The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first Information under which the accused were arraigned invalid.

Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court under Rule 110 are hereunder quoted:
Section 4. Information defined. An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal
and filed with the court.
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,[33] this Court citing People v. Marquez affirmed:[34]
It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 defines an information as nothing more than an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof.[35]
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant,
and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to
follow the language of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.[36]
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the
manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge
against them, is reasonably complied with.
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110,[37] Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial courts point of view that the accused cannot claim their right against double
jeopardy because they participated/acquiesced to the tampering, we hold that while this may not be far-fetched, there is actually no
hard evidence thereof.[38] Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under
the first information. Granting that alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the setting
aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the
subject of another inquiry.
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People,[39] the Court affirming the finality of a decision in a criminal case, citing Section 7,
Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, stated:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed a judgment [of conviction] becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing
his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information amended defies procedural rules, the decision
having attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11,

provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
In Sanvicente v. People,[40] this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even
an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution
was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. Respondent People of the Philippines argues, citing the
case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan[41] that the trial was a sham. We do not agree with the respondent as the trial in the Galman case
was considered a mock trial owing to the act of a then authoritarian president who ordered the therein respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure a predetermined final outcome of acquittal and
total absolution of the respondents-accused therein of all the charges.[42]
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. In this case, it bears repeating that the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already in
the stage where they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the
information and seek to try again accused for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by motion of the prosecution and at the time when the
accused had already been convicted is contrary to procedural rules and violative of the rights of the accused.
FINALLY, on the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and Bobares v. Escano, Jr.,[43] upon which both trial courts justified
their claim of jurisdiction, was actually based on this Courts resolution dated 18 October 1995 where this Court held:
The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under Section
32 (2) of B. P. 129, as amended by Rep. Act 7691 has been increased to cover offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of the fine (Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June 14, 1994). It appears that the imposable
penalties applicable to the subject cases are within the range ofprision correccional, a penalty not exceeding six years, thus falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC. It follows that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charges
against petitioners.
If we apply the resolution of this Court quoted above, it would seem that the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
case under the first Information. Following that argument, the decision dated 16 July 1996 of the RTC Branch 103 was rendered
without jurisdiction, thus, accused may not invoke the right against double jeopardy.
Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this view owing to the fact that a later resolution superseding the resolution cited by the trial
courts, specifically Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC with jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. Q96-67572. The resolution provides:
RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, DANGEROUS DRUGS, CARNAPPING AND OTHER
HEINOUS CRIMES UNDER R.A. NO. 7659
Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the interest of speedy and efficient administration of justice and subject to the
guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively try and decide cases
of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, AND VIOLATION OF THE ANTICARNAPPING ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES defined and penalized under Rep. Act No. 7659,
committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions:
...
11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR.

Subsequently, A.M. No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August 1996, Re: Clarification on the applicability of Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 51-96 in relation to Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, declared:
. . . [T]he Court Resolved to AMEND the prefatory paragraph in Administrative Order No. 5-96, to read:
Pursuant to Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in the interest of speedy administration of justice and subject to the guidelines
hereinafter set forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively try and decide cases of
KIDNAPPING AND/OR KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A
BANKING OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED,
regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved.
This issue is further settled by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in People v. Velasco:[44]
. . . [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as
applied/interpreted in People vs. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994; 234 SCRA 555), and of the provisions of R.A. No. 7691
expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, still fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). R.A. No. 7659 and
R.A. No. 7691 have neither amended nor modified this Section.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated 14 February 1997 and 16 April 1997
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, are set aside. Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 is ordered Dismissed.
Accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith ordered released from detention [45] unless there may be valid reasons for their
further detention.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129874. December 27, 2002]
JOAN M. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO C. JOVEN, Presiding Judge of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur, and Emmanuel Navarro, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by complainant Joan M. Flores
assailing the Order dated March 4, 1997 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bislig, Surigao del Sur (Branch 29) in Criminal Case
No. 1736-B, granting respondent-accused Emmanuel Navarros Motion to Quash the Amended Information, and the Order dated May
6, 1997, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.[1]
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On January 23, 1996, petitioner caused the filing of a criminal complaint for Rape against respondent Navarro and nine other
persons, namely, Alex Taag, Ramil Toledo, Benjie Pasukin, Marcial Plaza, Jr., Rodulfo Codira alias Babie, Robert Piodo, Daniel
Equibal, Judy Duron and Jorge Azaria, as principals by direct participation. [2] After preliminary investigation, an Information dated
June 14, 1996 was filed with the trial court, accusing Navarro and his other co-accused of the crime of Rape, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1736-B.
On October 18, 1996, before all the accused can be arraigned, Navarro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in Criminal Case
No. 1736-B on the ground that it does not sufficiently describe the crime of rape in any of its forms under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code.[3] On October 23, 1996, the trial court issued an order re-setting the arraignment as the prosecution intends to file several
other cases of rape against the accused.[4]

On November 27, 1996, an Amended Information for Rape was filed in Criminal Case No. 1736-B against Navarro, as the
principal accused, committed as follows:
That on or about the hours from 8:30 oclock to 11 oclock in the evening of January 18, 1996 at Purok 7, Gordonas Village, John
Bosco District, Barangay Mangagoy, Municipality of Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other for a common purpose,
with lewd and unchaste designs, and by means of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloneously (sic) to wit: accused
EMMANUEL NAVARRO has(sic) sexual intercourse with one Joan Flores, against the latters will, while accused Alex Tanag, Ramil
Toledo, Benjie Pasokin y Madis, Marcial Plaza, Jr. y Cubil, Rodulfo Codira alias Babie, Roberto Plodo y Ampalayo, Daniel Equibal y
Degorio, Judy Doron y Quita and Jorge Azaria y Tino held the victim and stood as guard, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Flores.
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659)[5]
Similar Informations for Rape were likewise filed against the other accused, except Judy Duron, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 1795-B, 1796-B, 1797-B, 1798-B, 1799-B, 1800-B, 1801-B and 1802-B, the only difference being that the accusatory portion of
each Information individually named each of them as principal in committing the crime of rape while the other co-accused held the
victim and stood as guard.
Respondent Navarro then filed a motion to quash the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 1736-B on the grounds that:
(1) the Amended Information does not comply with the Order dated October 23, 1996; (2) the allegations in the Amended Information
is in conflict with petitioners affidavit in that the Amended Information named respondent Navarro as the only one who had
intercourse with petitioner while her affidavit mentioned only Rodulfo Codira alias Babie as the culprit; and (3) the Amended
Information does not sufficiently describe the event on the night of January 18, 1996.[6]
On March 4, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed Order granting the motion to quash, finding that Navarro was not one of
those identified by petitioner to have abused her, and that the Information failed to show his particular participation in the crime.
[7]
Navarro, however, was not released from detention as Criminal Cases Nos. 1795-B to 1802-B were still pending.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court per Order dated May 6, 1997 denied the same. [8]
Hence, petitioner, through her private prosecutors, filed the instant special civil action for certiorari.
Meanwhile, Navarros other co-accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. Trial commenced
as regards their respective cases.[9]
On October 3, 1998, Navarro escaped from detention [10] and has remained at large per manifestation of his counsel in his
Memorandum for the Respondents filed with this Court on November 5, 1999.[11]
On November 25, 1998, before the prosecution could present its evidence, it filed a motion to withdraw the respective
Informations against the six principal accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 1795-B, 1796-B, 1797-B, 1798-B, 1800-B and 1801-B for
insufficiency of evidence.[12] The motion was granted by the trial court in its Order dated November 26, 1998, but the other accused
whose cases were withdrawn remained as co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 1736-B (against Navarro), 1799-B (against Rodulfo
Codira) and 1802-B (against Jorge Azaria).[13]
On September 1, 1999, the Court gave due course to herein petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.[14]
Petitioner argues:
9.a

that during the clarificatory hearing conducted in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case by the
Provincial Prosecutors Office, respondent/accused Navarro was identified as one of those nine (9) persons who

sexually abused petitioner, the latter upon seeing respondent, spontaneously cried and declared, right then and there,
that he was even the one who burned her hand;
9.b

that on the alleged ground of insufficiency of the information (i.e., the facts charged do not constitute an offense
because it failed to state with particularity respondent/accused Navarros participation in the act complained
of), public respondent should have realized that to resolve the issue, he need only determine whether the facts
alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by law;[15]

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the private prosecutors who initiated the instant petition have no personality to file
the same as it is vested with the public prosecutors, [16] and that the assailed order of the trial court finds support in the records of the
case as petitioner herself testified during preliminary investigation that she became unconscious after she was sexually abused by
Rodulfo Codira alias Babie and she did not know who took turns in abusing her.[17]
Anent the issue whether or not the petitioner has the personality or the right to file herein petition for certiorari We rule in the
affirmative. A perusal of the petition filed in this case shows that petitioner herself caused the preparation and filing of the present
petition and filed the same through the private prosecutor[18]. It is beyond question that petitioner has the right or personality to file the
petition, through her private prosecutors, questioning the dismissal of the criminal case against respondent Navarro. For obvious
reasons, the public prosecutors who filed the motion to dismiss which was granted by the trial court would not initiate the action.
As early as 1969 in the case of Paredes vs. Gopengco,[19] it was already held that the offended party in a criminal case has
sufficient interest and personality as a "person aggrieved" to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the rules in order to promote its object.
Later, in Mosquera vs. Panganiban,[20] we recognized the right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which
deprives them of due process, subject to the limitation that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused
in double jeopardy. Citing Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,[21] we held:
Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal
case is granted to any party, except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy.
In People v. Guido, [57 Phil. 52 (1932)] this Court ruled that the word party must be understood to mean not only the government
and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party
injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand
civil liability arising from the offense. The right of the offended party to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari from an
[interlocutory] order rendered in a criminal case was likewise recognized in the cases of Paredes v. Gopengco [29 SCRA 688 (1969)]
and People v. Calo, Jr., [186 SCRA 620 (1990)] which held that offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and
personality as person(s) aggrieved to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in
line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object. . . .
More recently, in Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc .,[22] we held that the private respondent therein, as private complainant,
has legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [23] This is so because a special civil action
for certiorari may be filed by the persons aggrieved, which, in a criminal case, are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. Having an interest in the civil aspect of the case, the complainant may file such action, in his name, questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds.[24]
We further ruled in the Perez case that while it is only the Office of the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals, the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in
criminal proceedings before the courts of law.[25]
Finally, double jeopardy does not apply. The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been

convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. [26] The third requisite is not
present in the instant case. Private respondent Navarro has not been arraigned.[27]
The next issue to be resolved is whether or not the writ of certiorari should issue in this case. Again, we rule in the
affirmative. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the
Information filed against Navarro in Criminal Case No. 1736-B.
First, contrary to the finding of the trial court, the records of this case adequately show that respondent Navarro was identified as
one of those who sexually abused petitioner. In her Sworn Statement executed on January 23, 1996 before MCTC Judge Antonio K.
Caon, petitioner, while admitting that it was only Rodulfo Codira alias Babie whom she personally knew, nevertheless stated that
she knew by face her other perpetrators as they once in a while pass by her residence or frequent their neighborhood. She further
declared under oath that she was able to identify them later at the police station during line-up, viz.:
7. Q How do you come to know that it was they Emmanuel Navarro alias Tawing, Marcial Plaza, Jr. alias Dodong, Bengie
Pasokin, Rodolfo Codera alias Babie, Jorge Azaria alias Cocoy, Robert Piodo, Judy Duron and Daniel Equibal sexually abused you.
A - Beforehand, I only know personally one of them Rodolfo Codera alias Babie all others were only familiar through their faces
because once in a while they will passed(sic) by our residence as they were residence(sic) or frequenting our neighborhood. There at
the police station, the police lined them up for my identification with whom I have identified one by one according to their individual
participation.[28] (Emphasis Ours)
Petitioner later confirmed respondent Navarros identity when, during clarificatory questions propounded by Fiscal Caedo at the
Bislig Municipal Jail on March 25, 1996, she pointed to Navarro as one of those who came into the room after Babie left. She also
tagged Navarro as the one who burned her hand. Thus:
Q

After he left you, what happened?

After Babie left me, there were others who entered the room.

Those who entered the room, can you recognize their faces?

Yes.

If you see these persons who entered the room, can you recognize them:

Yes.

FISCAL CAEDO:
We will request the private complainant to see the inmates inside Cell No. 1 and Cell No. 2, for
her to identify the accused.
INMATES INSIDE CELL NO. 1 AND CELL NO. 2 were presented one by one.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Is he the one? (inmate no. 8)

He is the one, he burned my hand (witness spontaneously pointed to inmate no. 8 while crying.)

What is your name?

Inmate No. 8 - Emmanuel Navarro.[29]

The Court cannot fathom how the trial court concluded that respondent Navarro was not one of those identified by petitioner as
one of her perpetrators when the Sworn Statement executed by petitioner, as well as her response to the clarificatory questions of the
Fiscal, not only narrated the facts and circumstances surrounding her ordeal, but also explicitly and categorically identified respondent
Navarro and his other co-accused as her alleged rapists.
Secondly, we find the Amended Information against respondent Navarro to be sufficient. Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a complaint or information, to be sufficient, must state the name of the accused, designate the
offense given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time of
the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed. [30] In addition, it must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and
undertake his defense.[31]
Particularly in rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated
therein, i.e., (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the
woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.[32]
In this case, the Information sufficiently alleged that respondent Emmanuel Navarro, by means of force, had sexual intercourse
with petitioner against her will. It contained all the essential elements of rape as defined by law. The allegations describe the offense
with sufficient particularity such that respondent Navarro will fully understand what he is being charged with. The Information also
sufficiently alleged respondent Navarros criminal culpability/liability for the crime, to wit: accused EMMANUEL NAVARRO has
(sic) sexual intercourse with one Joan Flores, against the latters (sic) will. This is based on petitioners own account of the incident
wherein she stated that her perpetrators, including respondent Navarro, took turns in sexually abusing her[33].
One final point. We observed that the original records of Criminal Cases Nos. 1736-B [34], 1799-B[35] and 1802-B[36] pending with
the trial court were elevated to this Court. However, the records of the said cases do not show any resolution of this Court requiring
the elevation of the records thereof. The Order dated July 26, 2002 purportedly requiring the elevation of the original records of the
above criminal cases to the Supreme Court, referred to in the transmittal letter dated August 14, 2002, signed by Clerk of Court
Domingo P. De Castro, is not found in the records of herein case. In effect, the trial judge was unnecessarily precluded from
proceeding further with the other pending cases, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 1799-B and 1802-B. Although Navarro was a coaccused in said cases, he is not the principal accused therein. He is only one out of the nine other co-accused. In addition, Navarro had
not been arraigned for the reason that he jumped bail and remains at large up to the present.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari. The assailed Orders of the trial court dated March 4, 1997 and May 6,
1997 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1736-B is REINSTATED and the trial judge is directed to proceed
therewith and immediately issue a warrant of arrest against accused Emmanuel Navarro.
Considering that Criminal Cases Nos. 1799-B and 1802-B are still pending trial with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 29),
Bislig City, the Clerk of Court of this Court is directed to cause the return of the original records thereof with immediate dispatch to
the said trial court for further proceedings.
Atty. Domingo P. de Castro, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 29), Bislig City is required to show cause, within
ten (10) days from receipt of copy of herein decision why he should not be cited for contempt of court and administratively charged in
elevating the original records of Criminal Cases Nos. 1799-B and 1802-B without proper authority, thereby unduly delaying the trial
of said cases which are not involved in the present petition which concerns accused Navarro only.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127107. October 12, 1998]
PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC, petitioners, vs. HON. SESINANDO VILLON in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 54; HON. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, in his capacity
as Secretary of Justice; MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT, SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN YABUT and
FORTUNATO MALLARI, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum [1] and by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment [2] in this
special civil action forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners, children of the
deceased Police Officer 3 (PO3) Virgilio Dimatulac of Masantol, Pampanga, may be summarized as follows:
A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE ISSUED BUT WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN
BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE LAW; and (2) FILING THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE
DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL FROM SAID PROSECUTORS RESOLUTION TO THE OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROCEEDING WITH
THE ARRAIGNMENT AND IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE ARRAIGNMENT AND
RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AND THE
SUBMISSION OF VITAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED
BY THE ACCUSED.
C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN RECONSIDERING HIS ORDER FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER AND
DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO
MURDER.
The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the antecedents.
On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.
On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of MacabebeMasantol in Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol Police Station against private respondents Mayor Santiago
Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit,
Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain
Danny, and a certain Koyang/Arding. The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-360. After conducting a preliminary
examination in the form of searching questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate Serafin B. David of the
MCTC issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-affidavits.
Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were arrested; while only Francisco Yambao
submitted his counter affidavit.[3]
On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution [4] in Criminal Case No. 95-360 finding
reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof. His
findings of fact and conclusions were as follows:
That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago Docsay Yabut, including
two John Does identified only as Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, went to Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of looking
for a certain PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.
At first, the accused, riding on [sic] a truck, went to the Municipal Hall of Masantol, Pampanga inquiring about PO3
Virgilio Dimatulac. Thereafter, they went to the house of Mayor Lacap for the purpose of inquiring [about] the [the
location of the] house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, until finally, they were able to reach the house of said Virgilio Dimatulac
at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.
Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused were all riding, stopped and parked in front of
the house of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of the accused descended from the truck and positioned themselves around
the house while others stood by the truck and the Mayor stayed [in] the truck with a bodyguard.
Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao went inside the house of Virgilio Dimatulac [and] were even
offered coffee.
[A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to Virgilio Dimatulac to go down to see the Mayor outside in
front of his house to say sorry.
[W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down from his house, suddenly [a] gun shot was heard and then, the son of Virgilio
Dimatulac, Peter Paul, started to shout the following words: What did you do to my father?!
One of the men of Mayor Docsay Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as a consequence, he died; and before he expired,
he left a dying declaration pointing to the group of Mayor Docsay Yabut as the one responsible.
That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused Docsay Yabut ordered his men to go on board the truck and
immediately left away leaving Virgilio Dimatulac bleeding and asking for help.
On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago Docsay Yabut gave money to accused John Doe Dan/Danny and
Francisco Boy Yambao was asked to bring the accused John Doe to Nueva Ecija which he did.
Further, accused Santiago Docsay Yabut told his group to deny that they ever went to Masantol.
The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on the complainant and the witnesses presented, [is] satisfied
that there is a [sic] reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder was committed and that the accused in conspiring
and confederating with one another are probably guilty thereof.
Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy.
That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of arrest were issued against Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut,
Servillano Yabut, Francisco Yambao, Avelino David, Casti David, Catoy Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Boy dela Cruz, Lito
Miranda and Juan Magat with no bail recommended.

However, with respect to accused Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, the court directed the police authorities to furnish the
court [a] descriptio personae of the accused for the purpose of issuing the needed warrant of arrest.
The accused were furnish [sic] copies of the complaint and affidavits of witnesses for them to file their counter-affidavits in
accordance to [sic] law.
As of this date, only accused Francisco Boy Yambao filed his counter-affidavit and all the others waived the filing of the
same.
A close evaluation of the evidence submitted by the accused Francisco Yambao which the court finds it [sic]
straightforward and more or less credible and seems to be consistent with truth, human nature and [the] natural course of
things and lack of motives [sic], the evidence of guilt against him is rather weak [compared to] the others, which [is why]
the court recommends a cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty, and the courts previous order of no bail for
said accused is hereby reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward the entire records of the case to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further action, together with the bodies of accused Francisco Yambao and Juan
Magat to be remanded to the provincial Jail of Pampanga.[5] (underscoring supplied)
In a sworn statement,[6] petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac narrated that Mayor Santiago Yabut, accompanied by a number of
bodyguards, went to the residence of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac to talk about a problem between the Mayor and Peter Pauls uncle, Jun
Dimatulac. Virgilio warmly welcomed the group and even prepared coffee for them. Servillano and Martin Yabut told Virgilio to
come down from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but hardly had Virgilio descended when Peter Paul heard a gunshot. While
Peter Paul did not see who fired the shot, he was sure it was one of Mayor Yabuts companions. Peter Paul opined that his father was
killed because the latter spoke to the people of Minalin, Pampanga, against the Mayor. Peter Paul added in a supplemental statement
(Susog na Salaysay)[7] that he heard Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay,[8] Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano of the Masantol Municipal Police Station in Masantol,
Pampanga, declared that on 3 November 1995, between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., while he was at the police station, three men approached
him and asked for directions to the house of Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano recognized one of the men as SPO1 Labet Malabanan of
Minalin, Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them directions, but one of the three returned to ask whether PO3 Virgilio
Dimatulac was on duty, to which Soriano replied that Dimatulac was at home. The group left on board a military truck headed for San
Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. Later that day, SPO2 Michael Viray received a telephone call at the police station reporting that
someone had shot Virgilio Dimatulac.
Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. However, it is not
clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private respondents Santiago Yabut, Servillano
Yabut and Martin Yabut (hereafter YABUTs). All of the accused who had not submitted their counter-affidavits before the MCTC,
except accused Danny and Koyang/Arding, submitted their counter-affidavits to Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso Flores.
In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, [9] Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that the YABUTs and the
assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy with one another, but that the offense committed was only
homicide, not murder. In support of such finding, Alfonso-Flores reasoned thus:
The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. It must be noted that to constitute
treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit, 1) the employment of the [sic] means of execution were give [sic] the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and 2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted xxx.
In the instant case, the presence of the first requisite was clearly established by the evidence, such that the attack upon the
victim while descending the stairs was so sudden and unexpected as to render him no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. However, the circumstances, as portrayed by witness Peter Paul Dimatulac, negate the presence of the second
requisite. According to the said witness, the victim was already descending when Mayor Yabut commanded the assailant
to shoot him, and immediately thereafter, he heard the gunshot. This would therefore show that the assailant did not
consciously adopt the position of the victim at the time he fired the fatal shot. The command of Mayor Yabut to shoot
came so sudden as to afford no opportunity for the assailant to choose the means or method of attack. The act of Mayor
Yabut in giving the command to shoot further bolster[s] the fact that the conspirator did not concert the means and method
of attack nor the manner thereof. Otherwise there would have been no necessity for him to give the order to the
assailant. The method and manner of attack was adopted by the assailant at the spur of the moment and the vulnerable
position of the victim was not deliberately and consciously adopted. Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and the
crime reasonably believe[d] to have been committed is Homicide as no circumstance would qualify the killing to murder.
Alfonso-Flores then ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that:
1.
An information be filed with the proper court charging Santiago, Servillano and Martin all surnamed Yabut,
and one John Doe alias Danny as conspirators in the crime of Homicide;
2.
The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap a.k.a. Casti David, Francisco Yambao,
Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Bladimir Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari, Aniano Magnaye, Gilberto Malabanan,
Jesus dela Cruz and Joselito Miranda.
Bail of P20,000.00 for each of the accused is likewise recommended.
The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a hearing on 11 January 1996 and clarificatory questions were
propounded only to Peter Paul Dimatulac.

On 23 February 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein petitioners, appealed the resolution of
Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ).[10] They alleged in their appeal that:
1. THE ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR NOT ONLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO
TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE CRIME TO MURDER, BUT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
PRESENCE OF OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:
A.
THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME WITH THE AID OF ARMED MEN AND WITH THE
USE OF A PERSON TO INSURE OR AFFORD IMPUNITY;
B.
THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD, OR PROMISE;
C.
THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION OF A DESTRUCTIVE CYCLONE, WHEN
THE SUPER-TYPHOON ROSING WAS RAGING ON NOVEMBER 3, 1995;
D.
THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH EVIDENT PREMEDITATION;
2. THAT THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI AND FRANCISCO YAMBAO BY RULING OUT
CONSPIRACY WITH THE YABUT BROTHERS AS AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI AND NOT CHARGING
FRANCISCO YAMBAO AS AN ACCESSORY TO MURDER.
To refute Alfonso-Flores finding that the means of execution were not deliberately adopted, petitioners asserted that the meeting
of the accused and the victim was not accidental as the former purposely searched for the victim at the height of a typhoon, while
accused Mayor Santiago Yabut even remarked to his co-accused Danny, Dikitan mo lang, alam mo na kung ano ang gagawin mo,
bahala ka na (Just stay close to him, you know what to do). Thus, Danny positioned himself near the stairs to goad the victim to
come out of his house, while Fortunato Mallari represented to the deceased that the latter was being invited by a certain General
Ventura. When the victim declined the invitation by claiming he was sick, accused Servillano Yabut persuaded the victim to come
down by saying, [T]o settle this matter, just apologize to the Mayor who is in the truck. In view of that enticement, the victim came
down, while Danny waited in ambush. To emphasize the accuseds resolve to kill the deceased, petitioners further narrated that when
the deceased ran away after the first shot, the gunman still pursued him, while Mayor Santiago Yabut, who was a doctor, kept away at
a safe distance and told everyone in the truck, Tama na, bilisan ninyo, (Thats enough, move quickly) without giving medical
assistance to the deceased and without exerting any effort to arrest the gunman.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was furnished with a copy of the Appeal.
On 26 February 1996, Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang issued a Resolution [11] ordering the release of accused Evelino
David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Arturo Naguit (who were then detained) in view of the aforementioned resolution of AlfonsoFlores, which, as stated in the order, the Provincial Prosecutor approved on February 7, 1996.
On 28 February 1996, an Information[12] for Homicide, signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Flores and Provincial
Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe, Pampanga, against the
YABUTs and John Doe alias Danny Manalili and docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). The accusatory portion of the
information read as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the municipality of Masantol, province of Pampanga, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to take the life of PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot the said PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac on his abdomen with the use of a handgun,
thereby inflicting upon him a gunshot wound which cause[d] the death of the said victim.
All contrary to law.
The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was signed by Provincial Prosecutor Manarang on 2/27/96, i.e., a day before
its filing in court.
On 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash bonds of the YABUTs, each in
the amount ofP20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their arrest.[13]
On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his appearance as private prosecutor, filed two (2) motions with the
trial court: (1) a Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order Against All Accuseds [14] [sic]; and an (2) Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings,
[15]
copies of which were furnished the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The second motion was grounded on the
pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice and a copy thereof was attached to the motion. Judge Roura set the motions for
hearing on 8 March 1996.[16]
On 7 March 1996, Judge Roura ordered the arrest of the remaining accused, Danny Manalili.[17]
On 8 March 1996, the YABUTs filed their opposition [18] to the Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order and the Motion to Defer
Proceedings. The YABUTs asserted that, as to the first, by posting bail bonds, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court and
were bound by the condition therein to surrender themselves whenever so required by the court, and to seek permission from the
court should any one of them desire to travel; and, as to the second, the pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice was
not a ground to defer arraignment; moreover, the trial court had to consider their right to a speedy trial, especially since there was no
definite date for the resolution of the appeal. Then invoking this Courts rulings in Crespo v. Mogul[19] and Balgos v. Sandiganbayan,
[20]
the YABUTs further asserted that petitioners should have filed a motion to defer the filing of the information for homicide with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, or sought, from the Secretary of Justice, an order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to defer the
filing of the information in court.
In a Reply[21] to the opposition, the private prosecution, citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, insisted on the need
for a hold-departure order against the accused; argued that the accuseds right to a speedy trial would not be impaired because the
appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed pursuant to Department Order No. 223 of the DOJ and there was clear and convincing

proof that the killing was committed with treachery and other qualifying circumstances not absorbed in treachery; and contended that
the accuseds invocation of the right to a speedy trial was inconsistent with their filing of various dilatory motions during the
preliminary investigation. The YABUTs filed a Rejoinder[22] to this Opposition.
On 26 March 1996, Judge Roura deferred resolution of the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order until such time that all the
accused who are out on bail are arraigned, but denied the Motion to Defer Proceedings as he found no compelling reason therefor,
considering that although the appeal was filed on 23 February 1996, the private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the]
appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice. Judge Roura also set the arraignment of the accused on 12 April 1996. [23]
It would appear that the private prosecution moved to reconsider the order denying the Motion to Defer Proceedings since, on 12
April 1996, Judge Roura issued an Order [24] giving the private prosecutor ten (10) days from today within which to file a petition
for certiorari questioning the order of the Court denying his motion for reconsideration of the order of March 26, 1996. Arraignment
was then reset to 3 May 1996.
On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura [25] from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) on the
ground that he: (a) hastily set the case for arraignment while the formers appeal in the DOJ was still pending evaluation; and (b)
prejudged the matter, having remarked in open court that there was nothing in the records of the case that would qualify the case into
Murder. At the same time, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition [26] with the Court of Appeals docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 40393, to enjoin Judge Roura from proceeding with the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).
On 24 April 1996, Public Prosecutor Olimpio R. Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment [27] with the trial court wherein he
opposed the motion to inhibit Judge Roura; manifested that there is nothing in the record which shows that the subject killing is
qualified into murder; and announced that he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution of
[the] case in view of the latters petition to inhibit Judge Roura.
On 29 April 1996, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the case transferred to Branch 54 of the RTC, presided
over by herein public respondent Judge Sesinando Villon.[28]
On 30 April 1996, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 54 of the RTC received the record of Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).[29]
On 30 April 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court a Manifestation [30] submitting, in connection with their Motion to Defer
Proceedings and Motion to Inhibit Judge Roura, documentary evidence to support their contention that the offense committed was
murder, not homicide. The documents which they claimed were not earlier submitted by the public prosecution were the following:
a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.
b. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Vladimir Yumul y Dimatulac.
c. Counter-Affidavit of Francisco I. Yambao.
d. Counter-Affidavit of SPO2 Fortunato Mallari.
e. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Aniano Magnaye.
f. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Leopoldo Soriano.
g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary Investigation of Criminal Case No. 95-360, containing the
testimony of:
a.
Peter Paul Dimatulac
b.
Vladimir D. Yumul
c.
SPO1 Gilberto Malabanan
d.
PO3 Alfonso Canilao
h. Investigation Report- dated November 4, 1995.
i. Dying declaration of Virgilio Dimatulac.
j. Sketch
k. Unscaled Sketch
Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, a Resolution [31] directing respondent
therein to file his comment to the petition within ten days from notice and to show cause within the same period why no writ of
preliminary injunction should be issued as prayed for in the petition. However, the Court of Appeals deferred action on the prayer
for a temporary restraining order until after the required comment [was] submitted.
On 3 May 1996, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation [32] with the RTC, furnishing the trial court with a copy of the
aforementioned resolution of the Court of Appeals and drawing the attention of the trial court to the rulings of this Court in Valdez vs.
Aquilisan, (133 SCRA 150), Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals as well as
the decision in Paul G. Roberts vs. The Court of Appeals.
On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May 1996. [33] On the latter date, the
YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty.[34]
Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment, [35] citing
the resolution of 30 April 996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 which, inter alia, deferred resolution on the
application for a temporary restraining order until after the required comment is submitted by the respondent; stressed that the filing
of the information for the lesser offense of homicide was clearly unjust and contrary to law in view of the unquestionable attendance
of circumstances qualifying the killing to murder; and asserted that a number of Supreme Court decisions supported suspension of
the proceedings in view of the pendency of their appeal before the DOJ.
On 31 May 1997, Judge Villon issued an Order [36] directing the accused to file their comment on the Urgent Motion to Set Aside
Arraignment within fifteen days from notice.
In a letter[37] addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated 7 June 1996, public respondent Secretary Teofisto Guingona of the
DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary Guingona ruled that treachery was present and directed the Provincial

Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga to amend the information filed against the accused from homicide to murder, and to include
Fortunato Mallari as accused in the amended information. The findings and conclusions of Secretary Guingona read as follows:
Contrary to your findings, we find that there is treachery that attended the killing of PO3 Dimatulac. Undisputedly, the
victim was suddenly shot while he was descending the stairs. The attack was unexpected as the victim was unarmed and
on his way to make peace with Mayor Yabut, he was unsuspecting so to speak. From the circumstances surrounding his
killing, PO3 Dimatulac was indeed deprived of an opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
Corollarily, we are also convinced that such mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by the respondents to
ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective. The admission of respondent Malabanan is replete with details on
how the principal respondent, Mayor Yabut, in conspiracy with the assailant and others, had consciously and deliberately
adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime. According to him, while they were on their way to the victims house,
Mayor Yabut already instructed Danny, the assailant, that, Dikitan mo lang, alam no na king ano ang gagawin mo, bahala
ka na. This explains why Danny positioned himself near the stairs of the victims house armed with a handgun, such
positioning was precisely adopted as a means to ensure the accomplishment of their evil design and Mayor Yabut ordered
nobody else but Danny to shoot the victim while descending the stairs as his position was very strategic to ensure the
killing of the victim.
As has been repeatedly held, to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1) employment of means of
execution that gives the person [attacked] no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted (People vs. Talaver, 230 SCRA 281 [1994]). In the case at bar, these two (2)
requisites are present as established from the foregoing discussion. Hence, there being a qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the crime committed herein is murder, not homicide (People vs. Gapasin, 231 SCRA 728 [1994]).
Anent the alleged participation of respondents Fortunato Mallari and Francisco Yambao, we find sufficient evidence
against Mallari as part of the conspiracy but not against Yambao. As can be gleaned from the sworn-statement of Yambao,
which appears to be credible, Mallari tried also to persuade the victim to go with them, using as a reason that he (victim)
was being invited by General Ventura. He was also seen trying to fix the gun which was used in killing the victim. These
actuations are inconsistent with the claim that his presence at the crime scene was merely passive.
On the other hand, we find credible the version and explanation of Yambao. Indeed, under the obtaining circumstances,
Yambao had no other option but to accede to the request of Mayor Yabut to provide transportation to the assailant. There
being an actual danger to his life then, and having acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear, reason dictates that he
should be freed from criminal liability.[38]
The YABUTs moved to reconsider the resolution, [39] citing Section 4 of Administrative/Administration Order No. 223 of the
DOJ.[40]
In an Ex-Parte Manifestation[41] dated 21 June 1996, petitioners called the trial courts attention to the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice, a copy of which was attached thereto. Later, in a Manifestation and Motion [42] dated 1 July 1996, petitioners asked the trial
court to grant their motion to set aside arraignment. Attached thereto was a copy of the Manifestation and Motion [43] of the Solicitor
General dated 18 June 1996 filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 wherein the Solicitor General joined cause with
petitioners and prayed that in the better interest of justice, [the] Petition for Prohibition be GRANTED and a writ of prohibition be
ISSUED forthwith. In support of said prayer, the Solicitor General argued:
2.
There is merit to the cause of petitioners. If the Secretary of Justice would find their Appeal meritorious, the
Provincial Prosecutor would be directed to upgrade the Information to Murder and extreme prejudice if not
gross injustice would thereby have been avoided.
3
Consequently, the undersigned counsel interpose no objection to the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
respondent Judge from holding further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 96-1667-M, particularly in holding
the arraignment of the accused, pending resolution of the Appeal with the Secretary of Justice.
The YABUTs opposed[44] petitioners Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had already been arraigned and,
therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the public prosecutor -- not the private prosecutor -- had control of the
prosecution of the case.
In his letter[45] dated 1 July 1996 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, the Secretary of Justice set aside his order
to amend the information from homicide to murder considering that the appeal was rendered moot and academic by the arraignment of
the accused for homicide and their having entered their pleas of not guilty. The Secretary stated:
Considering that Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut had already been arraigned on May 20, 1996 and
had pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide, as shown by a copy of the court order dated May 20, 1996, the petition
for review insofar as the respondents-Yabut are concerned has been rendered moot and academic.
However, the Secretary reiterated that Fortunato Mallari should be included in the information for homicide.
On 30 July 1996, Public Prosecutor Jaime Bustos filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Information and to Admit Amended
Information.[46] The Amended Information[47] merely impleaded Fortunato Mallari as one of the accused.
In his Order[48] of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners motion to set aside arraignment, citing Section 4, DOJ
Department Order No. 223, and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996. Petitioners forthwith moved for
reconsideration[49] of the order, arguing that the Motion to Defer the Proceedings filed by petitioners was meritorious and did not
violate the accuseds right to speedy trial; and that the DOJ had ruled that the proper offense to be charged was murder and did not
reverse such finding. Petitioners also cited the Solicitor Generals stand [50] in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 that holding accuseds
arraignment in abeyance was proper under the circumstances. Finally, petitioners contended that in proceeding with the arraignment
despite knowledge of a petition for prohibition pending before the Court of Appeals, the trial court violated Section 3(d), Rule 71 of

the Rules of Court on indirect contempt. The YABUTs opposed the motion on the ground that it raised no argument which had not yet
been resolved.[51]
On 3 September 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, [52] which the trial court
granted in view of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the courts order denying petitioners motion to set aside private
respondents arraignment.[53] As expected, Mallari moved to reconsider the trial courts order and clamored for consistency in the trial
courts rulings.[54]
In an order[55] dated 15 October 1996, Judge Villon denied reconsideration of the order denying petitioners motion to set aside
arraignment, citing the YABUTs right to a speedy trial and explaining that the prosecution of an offense should be under the control of
the public prosecutor, whereas petitioners did not obtain the conformity of the prosecutor before they filed various motions to defer
proceedings. Considering said order, Judge Villon deemed accused Mallaris motion for reconsideration moot and academic. [56]
On 16 October 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision [57] in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 dismissing the petition therein
for having become moot and academic in view of Judge Rouras voluntary inhibition, the arraignment of the YABUTs and the
dismissal, by the Secretary of Justice, of petitioners appeal as it had been mooted by said arraignment.
Judge Villon was later detailed to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and Judge Roura was ordered by the Supreme
Court to preside over cases pending in Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, which was previously presided
over by Judge Villon.[58] Judge Roura informed the Office of the Court Administrator and this Court that he had already inhibited
himself from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).[59]
On 28 December 1996, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus. They urge this Court to
reverse the order of respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private respondents;
order that no further action be taken by any court in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) until this petition is resolved; and order
respondents Secretary of Justice and the prosecutors concerned to amend the information from homicide to murder.
Petitioners insist that the killing of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was attended by treachery since private respondents tricked the
victim into coming out of his house and then shot him while he was going down the stairs. There was, petitioners claim, an
orchestrated effort on the part of [private respondents] to manipulate the rules on administrative appeals with the end in view of
evading prosecution for the [non-bailable] offense of murder, as shown by the following events or circumstances:
(1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores downgraded the nature of the crime committed to homicide, a bailable
offense, on strength of a motion for reinvestigation filed by the YABUTs who had not yet been arrested.
(2) Respondent Mayor and his companions returned to Minalin after the killing and went into hiding for four (4) months
until the offense charged was downgraded.
(3) The information for homicide was nevertheless filed despite notice to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the
appeal filed with the Secretary of Justice and request to defer any action on the case.
(4) The Office of the Public Prosecutor of Pampanga disallowed the private prosecutor from further participating in the
case.
(5) Judge Roura denied the motion to defer proceedings and declared in open court that there was no prima facie case for
murder, notwithstanding the pendency of petitioners appeal with respondent Secretary of Justice.
(6) Even before receipt by petitioners of Judge Rouras order inhibiting himself and the order regarding the transfer of the
case to Branch 54, public respondent Judge Villon set the case for arraignment and, without notice to petitioners,
forthwith arraigned the accused on the information for homicide on 20 May 1996, despite the pendency of the petition
for prohibition before the Court of Appeals and of the appeal before the DOJ.
(7) The Pampanga Provincial Prosecutors Office did not object to the arraignment nor take any action to prevent further
proceedings on the case despite knowledge of the pendency of the appeal.
(8) The Provincial Prosecutor did not comply with the resolution of 7 June 1996 of the Secretary of Justice directing the
amendment of the information to charge the crime of murder.
Petitioners argue that in light of Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[60] respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
proceeding with private respondents' arraignment for homicide and denying petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment. Moreover,
although respondent Judge Villon was not the respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, he should have deferred the proceedings just the
same as the very issue in said case was whether or not the RTC could proceed with the arraignment despite the pending review of the
case by respondent Secretary of Justice. Further, Judge Villon unjustly invoked private respondents right to a speedy trial, after a
lapse of barely three (3) months from the filing of the information on 23 February 1996; overlooked that private respondents were
estopped from invoking said right as they went into hiding after the killing, only to resurface when the charge was reduced to
homicide; and failed to detect the Provincial Prosecutor's bias in favor of private respondents. Judge Villon should have been more
circumspect as he knew that by proceeding with the arraignment, the appeal with the DOJ would be rendered technically nugatory.
Finally, petitioners submit that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals from resolutions of prosecutors to the Secretary of Justice once
the accused had already been arraigned applies only to instances where the appellants are the accused, since by submitting to
arraignment, they voluntarily abandon their appeal.
In their comment, private respondents contend that no sufficient legal justification exists to set aside private respondents'
arraignment, it having already been reset twice from 12 April 1996 to 3 May 1996, due to petitioners pending appeal with the
DOJ; and from 3 May 1996 to 20 May 1996, due to the transfer of this case to Branch 54. Moreover, as of the latter date, the DOJ
had not yet resolved petitioners appeal and the DOJ did not request that arraignment be held in abeyance, despite the fact that
petitioners appeal had been filed as early as 23 February 1996, at least 86 days prior to private respondents arraignment. They point
out that petitioners did not move to reconsider the RTC's 26 March 1996 denial of the Motion to Defer, opting instead for Judge
Rouras recusal and recourse to the Court of Appeals, and as no restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals, it was but proper

for respondent Judge to proceed with the arraignment of private respondents, to which the public and private prosecutors did not
object.
Private respondents further argue that the decision of respondent Secretary, involving as it did the exercise of discretionary
powers, is not subject to judicial review. Under the principle of separation of powers, petitioners' recourse should have been to the
President. While as regards petitioners plea that the Secretary be compelled to amend the information from homicide to murder,
private respondents submit that mandamus does not lie, as the determination as to what offense was committed is a prerogative of the
DOJ, subject only to the control of the President.
As regards DOJ Department Order No. 223, private respondents theorize that appeal by complainants is allowed only if the
complaint is dismissed by the prosecutor and not when there is a finding of probable cause, in which case, only the accused can
appeal. Hence, petitioners appeal was improper.
Finally, private respondents stress the fact that petitioners never appealed the withdrawal by the public prosecutor of the private
prosecutor's authority to handle the case.
In its comment for the public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays that the petition be denied because:
(a) in accordance with Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223, upon arraignment of the accused, the appeal to the Secretary of Justice shall
be dismissed motu proprio; (b) the filing of the information for homicide was in compliance with the directive under Section 4(2),
D.O. No. 223, i.e., an appeal or motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause shall not hold the filing of the
information in court; (c) the trial court even accommodated petitioners by initially deferring arraignment pending resolution by the
Court of Appeals of the petition for prohibition, and since said Court did not issue any restraining order, arraignment was properly
had; and (d) reliance on Roberts is misplaced, as there, accused Roberts and others had not been arraigned and respondent Judge had
ordered the indefinite postponement of the arraignment pending resolution of their petitions before the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court.
We now consider the issues enumerated at the outset of this ponencia.
Plainly, the proceedings below were replete with procedural irregularities which lead us to conclude that something had gone
awry in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga resulting in manifest advantage to the accused, more particularly the
YABUTs, and grave prejudice to the State and to private complainants, herein petitioners.
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended for their temporary
liberty. However, for one reason or another undisclosed in the record, the YABUTs were not arrested; neither did they
surrender. Hence, they were never brought into the custody of the law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso-Reyes, either motu
proprio or upon motion of the YABUTs, conducted a reinvestigation. Since said accused were at large, Alfonso-Reyes should not
have done so. While it may be true that under the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the provincial
prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation, as here, this difference of opinion
must be on the basis of the review of the record and evidence transmitted by the judge. Were that all she did, as she had no other
option under the circumstances, she was without any other choice but to sustain the MCTC since the YABUTs and all other accused,
except Francisco Yambao, waived the filing of their counter-affidavits. Then, further stretching her magnanimity in favor of the
accused, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to submit their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender because of
the standing warrants of arrest against them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to make a mockery of the law in order that
they gain their provisional liberty pending trial and be charged with the lesser offense of homicide.
Second, Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of only P20,000.00 for the YABUTs and co-accused Danny, despite the fact that
they were charged with homicide and they were, at the time, fugitives from justice for having avoided service of the warrant of arrest
issued by the MCTC and having failed to voluntarily surrender.
Third, Alfonso-Reyes was fully aware of the private prosecutions appeal to the DOJ from her resolution. She could not have
been ignorant of the fact that the appeal vigorously assailed her finding that there was no qualifying circumstance attending the killing,
and that the private prosecution had convincing arguments to support the appeal. The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of Justice
confirmed the correctness of the private prosecutions stand and exposed the blatant errors of Alfonso-Reyes.
Fourth, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed the Information for homicide on 28 February 1996. It is
interesting to note that while the information was dated 29 January 1996, it was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only on 27
February 1996. This simply means that the Office of the Prosecutor was not, initially, in a hurry to file the Information. No undue
prejudice could have been caused to the YABUTs if it were filed even later for the YABUTs were still at large; in fact, they filed their
bonds of P20,000.00 each only after the filing of the Information. If Alfonso-Flores was extremely generous to the YABUTs, no
compelling reason existed why she could not afford the offended parties the same courtesy by at least waiting for instructions from the
Secretary of Justice in view of the appeal, if she were unwilling to voluntarily ask the latter for instructions. Clearly, under the
circumstances, the latter course of action would have been the most prudent thing to do.
Fifth, as if to show further bias in favor of the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga did not even bother
to motu proprioinform the trial court that the private prosecution had appealed from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores and had sought,
with all the vigour it could muster, the filing of an information for murder, as found by the MCTC and established by the evidence
before it.
Unsatisfied with what had been done so far to accommodate the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor did not even
have the decency to agree to defer arraignment despite its continuing knowledge of the pendency of the appeal. This amounted to
defiance of the DOJs power of control and supervision over prosecutors, a matter which we shall later elaborate on. Moreover, in an
unprecedented move, the trial prosecutor, Olimpio Datu, had the temerity, if not arrogance, to announce that he will no longer allow
the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution of [the] case simply because the private prosecution had asked for the
inhibition of Judge Roura. Said prosecutor forgot that since the offended parties here had not waived the civil action nor expressly

reserved their right to institute it separately from the criminal action, then they had the right to intervene in the criminal case pursuant
to Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores. The last paragraph of
Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief
state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information.
It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to therein could be either the offended party or the accused.
More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the Secretarys power of control over prosecutors. Thus, in Ledesma
v. Court of Appeals,[61] we emphatically held:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised
Administrative Code,[62]exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus
affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of
justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution
Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of
the Code:
(1) Supervision and Control. -- Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; x x
x x.
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:
Section 3. x x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State
Prosecutors shall x x x perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the
interest of public service.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power,
authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall
be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in
pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division
or service.
Supervision and control of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative law as
follows:
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial
steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities,
and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.
DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both the offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions
in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, as provided for in Section 1 and Section 4, respectively. Section 1 thereof provides,
thus:
SECTION 1. What May Be Appealed. -- Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State
Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary
of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
While the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint, petitioners herein were not barred from appealing from the
resolution holding that only homicide was committed, considering that their complaint was for murder. By holding that only homicide
was committed, the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Pampanga effectively dismissed the complaint for murder. Accordingly,
petitioners could file an appeal under said Section 1. To rule otherwise would be to forever bar redress of a valid grievance, especially
where the investigating prosecutor, as in this case, demonstrated what unquestionably appeared to be unmitigated bias in favor of the
accused. Section 1 is not to be literally applied in the sense that appeals by the offended parties are allowed only in cases of dismissal
of the complaint, otherwise the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court would be meaningless.
We cannot accept the view of the Office of the Solicitor General and private respondents that Section 4 of DOJ Department
Order No. 223 is the controlling rule; hence, pursuant to the second paragraph thereof, the appeal of petitioners did not hold the filing
of the information. As stated above, Section 4 applies even to appeals by the respondents or accused. The provision reads:
SEC. 4. Non-appealable cases. Exceptions. - No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon a showing of
manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no

appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the
pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the
information in court. (underscoring supplied)
The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section refers to appeals by respondents or accused. So we held in Marcelo v.
Court of Appeals[63] that nothing in the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul,[64] reiterated in Roberts v. Court of Appeals,[65] forecloses the power
or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already
having been filed in court. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion
to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of
the court. In Roberts we went further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed said power or authority of the Secretary of
Justice without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which is quoted
above.
Indubitably then, there was, on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the information for homicide,
depriving the State and the offended parties of due process.
As to the second issue, we likewise hold that Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when, in his order of 26 March
1996,[66] he deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until such time that all the accused who are out on bail are
arraigned and denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that the private prosecution has not shown any indication that
[the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice. Neither rhyme nor reason or even logic, supports the ground for the
deferment of the first motion. Precisely, immediate action thereon was called for as the accused were out on bail and, perforce, had all
the opportunity to leave the country if they wanted to. To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure
order could obviously defeat the purpose of said order. As to the second motion, Judge Roura was fully aware of the pendency of
petitioners appeal with the DOJ, which was filed as early as 23 February 1996. In fact, he must have taken that into consideration
when he set arraignment of the accused only on 12 April 1996, and on that date, after denying petitioners motion to reconsider the
denial of the motion to defer proceedings, he further reset arraignment to 3 May 1996 and gave petitioners ten (10) days within which
to file a petition for certiorari to question his denial of the motion to defer and of the order denying the reconsideration. In any event,
the better part of wisdom suggested that, at the very least, he should have asked petitioners as regards the status of the appeal or
warned them that if the DOJ would not decide the appeal within a certain period, then arraignment would proceed.
Petitioners did in fact file the petition with the Court of Appeals on 19 April 1996 and, at the same time, moved to inhibit Judge
Roura. These twin moves prompted Judge Roura to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case on 29 April 1996 [67] and to transfer the
case to the branch presided by public respondent Judge Villon. The latter received the record of the case on 30 April 1996. From that
time on, however, the offended parties did not receive any better deal. Acting with deliberate dispatch, Judge Villon issued an order on
3 May 1996 setting arraignment of the accused on 20 May 1996. If Judge Villon only perused the record of the case with due
diligence, as should be done by anyone who has just taken over a new case, he could not have helped but notice: (a) the motion to
defer further proceedings; (2) the order of Judge Roura giving petitioners ten days within which to file a petition with the Court of
Appeals; (3) the fact of the filing of such petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; (4) the resolution of the Court of Appeals directing
respondents to comment on the petition and show cause why the application for a writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted
and deferring resolution of the application for a temporary restraining order until after the required comment was filed, which
indicated a prima facie showing of merit; (5) the motion to inhibit Judge Roura precisely because of his prejudgment that the crime
committed was merely homicide; (6) Judge Rouras subsequent inhibition; (7) various pieces of documentary evidence submitted by
petitioners on 30 April 1996 supporting a charge of murder, not homicide; and (8) most importantly, the pending appeal with the
DOJ.
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind, especially that of Judge Villon, a cautious attitude as these were
unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should arraignment be precipitately held. However, Judge Villon
cursorily ignored all this. While it may be true that he was not bound to await the DOJs resolution of the appeal, as he had,
procedurally speaking, complete control over the case and any disposition thereof rested on his sound discretion, [68] his judicial instinct
should have led him to peruse the documents submitted on 30 April 1996 and to initially determine, for his own enlightenment with
serving the ends of justice as the ultimate goal, if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he could have directed the private
prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances, Judge Villon should have
heeded our statement in Marcelo[69] that prudence, if not wisdom, or at least, respect for the authority of the prosecution agency,
dictated that he should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending before the DOJ. All told, Judge Villon should not
have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.
We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs
on the assailed information for homicide. Again, the State and the offended parties were deprived of due process.
Up to the level then of Judge Villon, two pillars of the criminal justice system failed in this case to function in a manner
consistent with the principle of accountability inherent in the public trust character of a public office. Judges Roura and Villon and
prosecutors Alfonso-Flores and Datu need be reminded that it is in the public interest that every crime should be punished [70] and
judges and prosecutors play a crucial role in this regard for theirs is the delicate duty to see justice done, i.e., not to allow the guilty to
escape nor the innocent to suffer.[71]
Prosecutors must never forget that, in the language of Suarez v. Platon,[72] they are the representatives not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and

whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. As such, they are in a
peculiar and every definite sense the servants of the law, whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
Prosecutors are charged with the defense of the community aggrieved by a crime, and are expected to prosecute the public action
with such zeal and vigor as if they were the ones personally aggrieved, but at all times cautious that they refrain from improper
methods designed to secure a wrongful conviction. [73] With them lies the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at the judges
disposal with strict attention to punctilios, thereby clarifying contradictions and sealing all gaps in the evidence, with a view to erasing
all doubt from the courts mind as to the accuseds innocence or guilt.
The judge, on the other hand, should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. [74] He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to
a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious
liturgy, the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in him.
[75]
Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, [76] his discretion
is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. [77] The judges action must not impair the substantial rights
of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law.[78]
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of
society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not
necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party
wronged, it could also mean injustice. [79] Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State
and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public prosecution and Judges Roura and Villon was gross, grave and
palpable, denying the State and the offended parties their day in court, or in a constitutional sense, due process. As to said judges,
such amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or that their court was ousted of the jurisdiction in respect thereto, thereby nullifying
as having been done without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings, the denial of the motion to reconsider such
denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their plea of not guilty.
These lapses by both the judges and prosecutors concerned cannot be taken lightly. We must remedy the situation before the
onset of any irreversible effects. We thus have no other recourse, for as Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee pronounced in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan:[80]
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of
the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed
to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of
judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of
politics and prejudice.
We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal justice system that theirs is not a mere ministerial task to process each accused in
and out of prison, but a noble duty to preserve our democratic society under a rule of law.
Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996 resolution, holding that murder was
committed and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to accordingly amend the information, solely on the basis of the information that
the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latters inappropriate conduct or even
hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as to the undue
haste of Judge Roura and Villon in respect of the arraignment of the YABUTs. The sins of omission or commission of said
prosecutors and judges resulted, in light of the finding of the DOJ that the crime committed was murder, in unwarranted benefit to the
YABUTs and gross prejudice to the State and the offended parties. The DOJ should have courageously exercised its power of control
by taking bolder steps to rectify the shocking mistakes so far committed and, in the final analysis, to prevent further injustice and
fully serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. Further,
in the exercise of its disciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could have directed the public prosecutors concerned to show
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service in not, inter alia, even asking the trial court to defer arraignment in view of the pendency of the appeal, informing the DOJ,
from time to time, of the status of the case, and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was concerned, in disallowing the private prosecutor from
further participating in the case.
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to determine the regularity of arraignment,
considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23 February 1996.
We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio reconsideration of the 7 June 1996 resolution of the DOJ was attended with
grave abuse of discretion.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court, the acquittal of the accused [81] or the dismissal of the case [82] is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the
accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above
discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996 denying the Motion to
Defer Proceedings and of 12 April 1996 denying the motion to reconsider the denial of said Motion to Defer Proceedings, and the
orders of respondent Judge Sesinando Villon of 3 May 1996 resetting the arraignment to 20 May 1998 and of 15 October 1996
denying the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The

arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut and their separate pleas of not guilty are
likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order of public respondent Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996 is SET
ASIDE and his order of 7 June 1996 REINSTATED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to comply with the order (letter) of the Secretary of Justice
of 7 June 1996 by forthwith filing with the trial court the amended information for murder. Thereafter the trial court shall proceed in
said case with all reasonable dispatch.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 130026. May 31, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM: batas
Before this court for automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-96-68119 and Q-96-68120, finding accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio guilty of raping his daughter, Ann Fideli L.
Magat, on two occasions and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death for each case, and to pay the sum of P750,000.00
as compensatory, moral and exemplary damages.
The two (2) Informations, charging accused-appellant with rape reads:

CRIMINAL CASE NO.Q-96-68119

"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen year old (19) ANN FIDELI LIMPOCO
MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined and penalized under
Article 335, Revised Penal code, as amended by RA 7659, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 14th day of August 1994, during the 17th birthday of Ann Fideli L. Magat in Kasunduan,
Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with
lewd designs, and by means of threat and violence, did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat."[1]

CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-68120

"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen year old (19) ANN FIDELI LIMPOCO
MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO MAGAT y LON DONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined and penalized under
Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September1996, in Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with lewd designs and by means of threat and
violence, did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Ann
Fideli Limpoco Magat."[2]
Upon arraignment on January 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case.
Complainant's mother, Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and the public prosecutor, Rio Espiritu agreed with the plea bargain. Consequently, the
trial court issued, on that same day, an Order, the fallo of which reads: katarungan

"On arraignment, accused with the assistance of his counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano and upon the request of the
accused, the information was read and explained to him in tagalog, a dialect known to him and after which accused
entered a plea of "GUILTY" to the crime charged against him, and further pleads for a lower penalty to which the
Hon. Public Prosecutor interpose no objection.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby finds the accused ANTONIO LON DONIO MAGAT, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Article 335, RPC in relation to RA 7659 and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer a jail term of ten (10) years imprisonment for each case."[3]
After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the ground that the penalty imposed was "too
light."[4]As a consequence, accused-appellant was re-arraigned on both Informations on April 15, 1997 where he entered a plea of not
guilty.[5]
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting Dr. Ida Daniel, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation and complainant's mother.
On July 3, 1997 accused-appellant entered anew a plea of guilty.[6] The court read to him the Informations in English and Tagalog and
repeatedly asked whether he understood his change of plea and propounded questions as to his understanding of the consequences of
his plea.[7]
Convinced of accused-appellant's voluntariness of his plea of guilty, the court required the taking of complainant's testimony. The
accused-appellant did not present any evidence.
On July 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads: HTML
"CONSEQUENTLY, the court renders judgment finding the accused ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, GUILTY
of the crime of Rape in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, beyond reasonable doubt
and accordingly, sentences him as follows:
1.......In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68119, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by lethal
injection; and
2.......In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68120, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by lethal
injection.
On the civil aspect, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is hereby ordered to pay Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat the
sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages; further sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of
P500,000.00 as exemplary and corrective damages.
SO ORDERED."[8]
Hence, this automatic review.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in re-arraigning and proceeding into trial despite the fact that he was already
convicted per Order of the trial court dated January 10,1997 based on his plea of guilt. He also argues that when the court rendered
judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order.
Consequently, the conviction having attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified even if the prosecution later realizes that
the penalty imposed was too light. Accused-appellant likewise posit that the re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated
his right against double jeopardy.
The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his own plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground
that accused-appellant's plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance

where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of
Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.- The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included
in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. CODES
"A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double
jeopardy."
Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a lesser penalty.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only
bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the
penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to
the penalty to which he pleaded.
It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offense
imputed to him.[9] Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a
certain penalty will be meted unto him.[10]
Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial court should have vacated such a plea and
entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is
equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered. [11]
In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be
considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception.[12] Thus, since the
judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will not lie.
Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused-appellant was rectified when he was re-arraigned and
entered a new plea. Accused-appellant did not question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so, he is
deemed to have abandoned his right to question the same[13] and waived the errors in procedure.[14] yacats
Accused-appellant also maintains that assuming that there was proper basis for setting aside the Order of January 10,1997, the trial
court erred in not finding that he made an improvident plea of guilty. He faults the trial court in not complying with the procedure laid
down in the Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court.[15] He claims that the record of the case fails to support the trial court's
assertion that it conducted a searching inquiry to determine that the accused-appellant voluntarily entered his plea of guilty with full
understanding of the consequences of his plea. He claims that there is no evidence that the trial court conducted searching inquiry in
accordance with the rules.
Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts are now enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (b) to require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (c) to ask the accused if he so desires to present evidence
in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.[16]
This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges to comply with the procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment,
particularly the rules governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of
either the trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of
the accused as to the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission
of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.
[17]
Apart from the circumstances that such procedure may remove any doubt that the accused fully understood the consequences of his
plea is the fact that the evidence taken thereon is essential to the fulfillment by this Court of its duty of review of automatic appeals
from death sentences.[18]

We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and are convinced that the trial judge has faithfully discharged his bounden duty as
minister of the law to determine the voluntariness and full understanding of accused-appellants' plea of guilty. The absence of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the arraignment do not make the procedure flawed. The minutes of the
proceedings[19]indubitably show that the judge read the Informations to the accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog, asked him
questions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea, his educational attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant could
have known of the consequence of his plea having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters sent to the
trial court judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his "sins" but also asked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform.
[20]
olanski
Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus, even assuming that there was an improvident plea of guilt, the
evidence on record can sustain the conviction of the accused-appellant.
The testimony of the complainant, as summarized by the Solicitor General, reveal:
"Complainant's x x x parents separated when she was only seven (7) years old and she and her younger brother
David were left with her father, accused-appellant, while another brother, Jonathan, and sister, Abigail, stayed with
their mother (TSN, July 15, 1997, p. 46; May 22, 1997, pp. 38-41; 49-51).
"On her 9th birthday, her father first raped her and she was beaten when she resisted, thus, she found it futile to
resist every time her father touched her after that (TSN, supra, pp. 24-25).
"August 14, 1994, was complainant's 17th birthday. That evening, while sleeping together with accused-appellant
and her brother in their rented house at Kasunduan, Quezon City, she was awakened by the kisses of her father. He
then removed her clothes and after removing his own clothes, went on top of her and inserted his penis inside her
vagina as he had done to her many times before this incident. After he had finished, he told her to wash her vagina
which she did (TSN, supra, pp. 12-17).
"On September 1, 1996, complainant who was already 19 years old, was at home with accused-appellant and her
brother after 'selling' when her father ordered her and her brother to go to sleep. Her brother fell asleep but
complainant could not sleep and was restless that night. Again, accused-appellant raped her on the same bed where
her brother was also sleeping. She did not resist him anymore because nothing would happen anyway and he would
just beat her if she did (TSN, supra, 21-25). haideem
"x x x complainant further revealed that she was not only sexually abused but also physically abused by accusedappellant who even beat her with a whip while being tied and struck her with a bag containing tin cans causing head
injuries necessitating her hospitalization. She also confirmed that her father started raping her on her 9th birthday
which was repeated several times after that. She likewise revealed that she felt some fluid ('katas') coming out of her
fathers penis every time he raped her but she did not become pregnant because her father made her drink the water
from boiled guava leaves and a medicine she identified as 'Gextex' (should be Gestex) if her menstruation was
delayed. In fact, when her menstrual period was delayed for three (3) months, her father even boxed her stomach
after making her drink the water boiled from guava leaves and Gextex thereby causing her to bleed profusely. She
was not able to report or reveal what her father did to her because she was warned by him that he would kill her, her
brother, her mother and her relatives if ever she would escape and reveal the rape. Besides, she had nowhere else to
go and was further made to believe by her father that there was nothing wrong with what he was doing to her
because it was not forbidden by the Bible."
The medical examination confirmed complainant's testimony. Dr. Ida P. Daniel of the NBI testified that complainant had "lax
fourchette" and "distensible hymen" which may be caused by sexual intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object such as a penis.
She also concluded that the "shallow rugosities" inside her vagina lead to the conclusion that there was more than one or even more
than ten (10) times of sexual intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object that passed through her vaginal canal. Moreover, her
hymen orifice can allow complete penetration of an average-sized Filipino adult penis in its erect stage which is from 2.5 to 3.0 cms.
in diameter.[21] hustisya

Surprisingly, accused-appellant did not present any evidence to rebut the prosecution's evidence nor testified in his behalf to deny the
in culpatory testimony of the complainant, giving us the impression that he acknowledges the charges against him.
While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of the improvidence of
the plea, we did so only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment of the condemnatory judgment. Thus, when the trial court in
obedience to this Court's injunction, receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting guilt,
the manner in which the plea of guilty is made loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is predicated not on
the plea but on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged. [22] In such case, it cannot be claimed that
defendant was sentenced to death without having been previously informed of the nature of the charges against him and of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances recited in the information, as he is fully apprised not only of the allegations in the
information but of the entire evidence of the prosecution.[23]
Additionally, accused-appellant's second plea of guilty validated his first plea of guilt. It removed any reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
[24]

Accused-appellant further impugns the trial court's imposition of the death penalty in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 contending that
the complainant was already nineteen (19) years old when the alleged rape occurred.
Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1.......when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim." (Underscoring supplied)
Complainant was born on August 14, 1977.[25] On September 1, 1996, when the rape was committed (Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120),
complainant was already nineteen (19) years of age. Therefore, the same does not fall under the last paragraph of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659. The proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. Jksm
However, the extreme penalty of death should be imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68119, complainant being only 17 years of age
when accused-appellant, his father, raped her.
Finally, accused-appellant likewise assails the award of P750,000.00 damages claiming that the same is excessive.
With regard to the award of compensatory damages, we have ruled in People vs. Victor,[26] which was later reaffirmed in People vs.
Prades,[27] that "if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity of the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than
P75,000.00."[28] Accordingly, in Criminal Case NO. Q-96-68119, the award of compensatory damages should be increased from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 however, while appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the
compensatory damage should be the same (P75,000.00). As rightly argued by the Solicitor General, the trauma, ignominy, pain and
shame suffered by the complainant can not be treated or regarded any lesser.
The award of civil indemnity "is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations
overtime, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." [29] More so, if
the crime is committed by the father against his own flesh and blood.
With respect to the award of moral damages, we have in People vs. Prades[30] held: Chiefx
" x x x The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages may
additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without

the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional
requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed within
criminal prosecution for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein
such allegations can be made.
"Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings
which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the
victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility.
What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through the superfluity of
still being proved through a testimonial charade."
Nevertheless, we find the award of P200,000.00 moral damages excessive. An award of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is to our
mind more reasonable. However, we are deleting the award of exemplary or corrective damages, in the absence of any legal basis
therefor.
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is
unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty should be imposed accordingly.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.......In Criminal Case No. Q - 96 - 68119, the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting accused-appellant
Antonio Magat y Londonio of rape and sentencing him to the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modification that the award of compensatory damages be increased to Seventy - Five Thousand Pesos
(75,000.00), moral damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages deleted. Esm
2.......In Criminal Case No. Q- 96-68120, the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting accused - appellant of
rape and sentencing him to the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. The
award of compensatory damages is increased to Seventy - Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) , moral damages is
reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages is deleted.
In accordance with Section 25 of the RA 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let
the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of executive clemency or
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 137953-58. April 11, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellant, vs. WILFREDO DELA TORRE, appellee.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed in
a conviction.
The Case
The prosecution appeals the March 31, 1998 Decision [1] and June 3, 1998 Order[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iba, Zambales (Branch 69)[3] in Criminal Cases Nos. 2179-I, 2180-I, 2181-I, 2182-I, 2183-I and 2184-I. The assailed Decision

convicted Wilfredo Dela Torre of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of rape, while the challenged Order denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by plaintiff (now appellant).
The dispositive portion of the Decision is reproduced hereunder:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Wilfredo dela Torre is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as follows:
1)

In Crim. Case No. RTC 2179-I of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years of
prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of civil
damages.

2)

In Crim. Case No. RTC 2180-I of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years of
prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of civil
damages.

3)

In Crim. Case No. RTC 2181-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the
amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

4)

In Crim. Case No. RTC 2182-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the
amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

5)

In Crim. Case No. RTC 2183-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the
amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

6)

In Crim. Case No. RTC 2184-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the
amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.[4]

The two Amended Informations for acts of lasciviousness, dated July 1, 1997, were similarly worded as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of September, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, actuated by lust
and by means of coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of lasciviousness on the person of Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Mary Rose de la Torre.[5]
The other Information[6] charged appellee with the same crime against the same victim on a different date, October 10, 1996.
On the other hand, the four Informations charging him with rape, dated July 1, 1997, similarly read as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of October, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippine[s], and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, with lewd design by
means of coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge with one Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.[7]

The three other Amended Informations recited the same allegations on different dates: November 1, [8] November 12[9] and
December 23,[10] 1996. When arraigned on August 13, 1997, appellee pleaded [11] not guilty[12] to all six (6) Informations. After trial in
due course, the RTC rendered the challenged Decision.
Appellee did not appeal, but the prosecution filed a Notice of Appeal[13] dated June 9, 1998.
The Facts
Appellants Version
In its Brief,[14] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:
Appellee Wilfredo dela Torre had a common-law relationship with Melinda dela Torre. The latter gave birth to three children, Mary
Rose, Mark Anthony, and Mark Domil. When Mary Rose was about seven (7) years old, her mother left the conjugal abode with
Mark Domil, leaving her and sibling Mark Anthony in the care of appellee, who resided with his progeny in a one-room hut in Sitio
Pao, Guis-guis, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
Mary Rose and her brother Mark Anthony studied at the Guinabon Elementary School. She was the brightest in her class, even
though because of their poverty, she had to walk from their hut to the school everyday.
In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, noticed a sudden change in the behavior and performance of Mary Rose, who was twelveyear[s] old at th[at] time. The latter appeared sleepy, hungry and snobbish. She also urinated on her panty. When confronted by
Generosa Mayo, the head teacher, Mary Rose admitted to her that she was abused repeatedly by appellee. Mayo informed Elpidia
Balindo, the aunt of Mary Rose, about the abuses. They then decided to refer the matter to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), who took Mary Rose under its custody.
It turned out that on September 30, 1996, Mary Rose was about to sleep when appellee told her, anak puwede ba nating subukan?
She did not understand what that meant and continued to sleep. Appellee then placed himself on top of Mary Rose. After removing
her shorts as well as his shorts, he poked his penis into her organ. He also kissed and embraced Mary Rose, who just wept. The same
incident was repeated in the evening of October 10, 1996.
In the evening of October 18, 1996, appellee was able to insert his penis into the vagina of Mary Rose. After the act, her whole body
ached. She started to fear appellee. He also had sexual intercourse with his minor daughter on three more occasions, that is, on
November 1 and 12 and December 23, 1996.
A medical examination conducted by Dr. Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed
that her vagina admitted one finger with ease. She was no longer a virgin. Her hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the 3:00,
6:00 and 9:00 nine oclock positions. The girl also suffered from urinary tract infection.[15] (Citations omitted)
Appellees Version
On the other hand, appellees statement of facts,[16] as contained in his Brief,[17] is reproduced as follows:
Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three (3) children with Melinda Torre, namely: Mary Rose, Mark Anthony and Mark
Ronnil. Melinda left her family when Mary Rose was about seven (7) years old bringing with her Mark Ronnil. The victim lived with
her father and brother Mark Anthony in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
Felina Sobrevilla, teacher of Mary Rose, noticed sudden changes in her behavior and when confronted, the latter admitted that she
was sexually abused by her father. Her head teacher informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the sexual abuses. They referred the
case to the DSWD who took her under its custody.
Mary Rose testified that her father committed sexual abuses on her on the following dates: September 30, 1996, October 10, 1996,
October 18, 1996, November 01, 1996, November 12, 1996 and December 23, 1996.

Appellee, on the other hand denies vehemently the charges being imputed on him by her daughter and said that the only reason he
can think of why the daughter filed the charges is because he did not allow her to stay with her teacher, Mrs. Sobrevilla. [18] (Citations
omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC ruled that it was duly established that accused Wilfredo committed acts of lasciviousness against Mary Rose on 30
September 1996 and 10 October 1996, and had carnal knowledge [of] Mary Rose on 18 October 1996, 01 November 1996, 12
November 1996 and 23 December 1996.[19]Further, the trial court added that the moral ascendancy of appellee over the victim was
equivalent to intimidation. It did not give any probative value to his uncorroborated and unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi.
However, the court a quo refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were
circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses, as follows:
1. As testified to (supra) there was absence of any actual, physical violence or intimidation in the commission of the acts
complained of.
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. The abandonement by Melinda (common-law wife of accused Wilfredo and mother of Mary Rose) when Mary Rose
was seven (7) years old leaving behind Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother, Mark Anthony.
3. The extreme poverty on the life of Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony.
4. After the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five (5) years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark
Anthony were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father.
5. There is reason to deprive Wilfredo of the love of her daughter Mary Rose but there is no reason to deprive Mark
Anthony of the love of his father considering that both Mary Rose and Mark Anthony have no one to call as a
mother.[20]
Hence, this appeal.[21]
The Issue
In this appeal, the solicitor general assigns this single error for our consideration:
The Court a quo erred in penalizing appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments for rape, instead of imposing the
supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. No. 7659.[22]
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Lone Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Prosecution
The prosecution asks this Court to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death on the accused. It argues
that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen (18) years old when the rapes took
place. As a consequence, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659.[23]

Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless
the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. This provision is substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules.
The question now is whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate the right of the accused against
double jeopardy.
In several cases, this Court has already definitively ruled on this issue. Recently, in People v. Leones,[24] it unmistakably declared
that [w]hile it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we
ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the
penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardy. [25] It added:
This Court has not just once ruled that where the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his conviction, an appeal
by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should
therefore be dismissed.[26]
This doctrine was applied as early as 1904 in Kepner v. United States[27] (hereinafter Kepner), as follows:
The Court of First Instance, having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused, found Kepner not guilty;
to try him again upon the merits, even in an appellate court, is to put him a second time in jeopardy for the same offense. [28]
The Kepner doctrine was clarified in a 1987 case.[29] Speaking through Justice Isagani A. Cruz, the Court explained that an
appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would
place him in double jeopardy.[30]
Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2)
against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense. [31]
Although Kepner technically involved only a single proceeding, the Court regarded the practice as equivalent to two separate
trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of multiple prosecution. [32]
The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents
the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with
accumulated trials.[33] It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying
the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction.[34] And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the
defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.[35]
Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the instant appeal filed by the prosecution cannot prosper. The rule is clear
-- the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.[36]
Besides, even assuming that the penalties imposed by the RTC were erroneous, these cannot be corrected by this Court on an
appeal by the prosecution. Said the Court:
Whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not
affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no
matter how obvious the error may be.[37]
The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper petition for certiorari to show grave abuse of
discretion. This was explained in People v. CA and Maquiling[38] as follows:
While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate
that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. On the other
hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the
constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari

into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double
jeopardy.[39]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.