Category Archives: Public Corporation

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T.

GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS
[G.R. No. 125416. September 26, 1996.]
FACTS:
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which among
others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone
R.A. No. 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military
reservation into alternative productive uses. 2Petitioner was organized with an authorized capital stock of P20
billion which was fully subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines with, among other assets,
(a)ll lands embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, as well as permanent improvements and fixtures
upon proper inventory not otherwise alienated, conveyed, or transferred to another government agency. 3
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippine government.
Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the seaports,
airports buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing
therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic
Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993 to the Office of the President. respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Not satisfied, and within 30 days
from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to their power of initiative under the Local
Government Code of 1991. Respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a Calendar of
Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan, and which indicated, among others, the scheduled Referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27,
1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for the rules and guidelines to govern
the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong, Bataan.
ISSUE: whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No.
2848.
HELD: NO. To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec
made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution 11 as reproduced in the
footnote below, the word referendum is repeated at least 27 times, initiative is not mentioned at all.
The Comelec labeled the exercise as a Referendum; the counting of votes was entrusted to a Referendum
Committee; the documents were called referendum returns; the canvassers, Referendum Board of Canvassers
and the ballots themselves bore the description referendum. To repeat, not once was the word initiative used in
said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the Initiative
and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus:
(a)Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1.Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2.Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3.Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal,
or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b)Indirect initiative is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local
legislative body for action.
(c)Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the
purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and
c.2Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
DIFFERENTIATED. There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In
enacting the Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other. Along these statutory
definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines initiative as the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to
enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, he explains that
referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. The foregoing
definitions, which are based on Blacks and other leading American authorities, are echoed in the Local Government
Code (R.A. 7160).
SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.
SEC. 126.Local Referendum Defined. Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the
local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within sixty (60) days in case of
provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either
because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or
because they want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body
is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If it refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its
presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of
initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect the
number of signed conformities within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on Elections shall then set
a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the
local government unit concerned . . .. On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the
registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly
enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and
direction of the Commission on Elections. In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate,
referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people
themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum
consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body.
Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where
expectedly the voters will simply write either Yes or No in the ballot.
COMELEC EXERCISES ADMINISTRATION AND SUPERVISION ON THE CONDUCT THEREOF. From
the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its
authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or
act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the
electorate. This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be
broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised
that (n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate, although two or more
propositions may be submitted in an initiative. It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of R.A. 6735, the
Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the
proposition. In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process
itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the
respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its
authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the
orderly exercise of these people-power features of our Constitution.

ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT CANNOT PASS UPON A PROPOSED INITIATIVE UNTIL THE PEOPLE HAVE
VOTED FOR IT AND IT HAS BECOME AN APPROVED ORDINANCE OR RESOLUTION. Deliberating on
this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the
proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and
to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that
rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ
of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only
actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself
provides that (n)othing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act . . .. So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court. It passes upon
errors of law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as well
as determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has
authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion.
However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated
or approved, or passed upon by any branch or instrumentality or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on
Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncement about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec
simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or
action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction
over, in the exercise of its review powers.
ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COMELEC MAY PASS UPON SUCH PROPOSAL INSOFAR AS TO ITS FORM AND
LANGUAGE ARE CONCERNED AND WHETHER THE SAME IS PATENTLY AND CLEARLY OUTSIDE
THE CAPACITY OF THE LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY TO ENACT. Having said that, we are in no wise
suggesting that the Comelec itself has no power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the
contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission to which
then the herein basic questions ought to have been addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in
the first instance. In other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over approved propositions per said
Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and
pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be
added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the capacity of the
local legislative body to enact. Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of this initiative is within the
capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand and after
hearing the parties thereon.
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MORONG, BATAAN
[G.R. No. 111230. September 30, 1994.]
FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, 1 The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed
to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic
Act No. 7227.
petitioners filed a petition 2 with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993
The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its submission
Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. 3 They started to
solicit the required number of signatures 4 to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown to the petitioners,
however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of . . . the
petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter
productive and futility.
The COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is merely a
resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. The same stance is assumed by the respondent
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.

ISSUE: whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the
proper subject of an initiative.
HELD: YES.
Father Bernas explains that in republican systems, there are generally two kinds of legislative power, original and
derivative. Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative power is that
which has been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of
the people.
thru an initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. Likewise, thru an initiative, the people
were also endowed with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . .
An act includes a resolution. Black 20 defines an act as an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote
something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments,
resolves, awards, and determinations . . . It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in
violation of the Constitution. 21 In line with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that if there is doubt or
uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of
unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import
of the language used.
The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented
by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor. Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of
initiative on local legislations, viz: prcd
Sec. 3.Definition of Terms For purposes of this act, the following terms shall mean:
(a)Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1.Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.
a.2.Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3.Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal,
or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis ours).
In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of
Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government.
The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the
governance of its people.
Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the people of
Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their
voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the municipality of Morong for the
inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the welfare of the people of
Morong
MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. NAPARI vs. Hon.
FORTUNITO L. MADRONA
[G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003.]
FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By
agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement. No amicable settlement was reached.
The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the boundary dispute. Petitioner
municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the
RTC denied the same.

RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section 118 of the Local Government
Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out
their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held
that Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.
WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a
municipality and an independent component city.
HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE FOR
SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR MUNICIPALITY AND A
HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY; ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR.
Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. Boundary disputes between and
among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred
for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on
the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the
dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried
by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.
Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city
or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other or between two or more highly
urbanized cities shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government
units involved. There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By
virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly
urbanized, but an independent component, city created under Republic Act No. 179.
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary
dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality,
Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to
them.
SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN INDEPENDENT
COMPONENT CITY IN CASE AT BAR. Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or
highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from
voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component,
not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite;
and the Omnibus Election Code, which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is
neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the parties that it is highly urbanized.
On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG. 129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO ADJUDICATE ALL
CONTROVERSIES EXCEPT THOSE EXPRESSLY WITHHELD FROM THEIR PLENARY POWERS; CASE AT
BAR. As previously stated, jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. It
must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be
confused with venue. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the general rules

governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Since there is
no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes
between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, respondent court committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take
judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all
other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.
FRANCIS G. ONG vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
[G.R. No. 163295. January 23, 2006.]
FACTS: Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates
who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course
and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy3 of Francis. The petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive
term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections
and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections.
the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre
subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at
Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, 4
albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and
was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office as Mayor for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001
should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
HELD: YES
POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; TERM OF OFFICE; THREE-TERM LIMIT
RULE; PETITIONERS PROCLAMATION AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR IN THE 1998 MAYORALTY
ELECTION COUPLED BY HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE AND HIS CONTINUOUS EXERCISE OF THE
FUNCTIONS THEREOF FROM START TO FINISH OF THE TERM, SHOULD BE LEGALLY BE TAKEN AS
SERVICE FOR A FULL TERM IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE THREE-TERM RULE. The three-term limit
rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Section 43 (b) of the Local
Government Code restates the same rule. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply,
two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner
Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no
dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again
in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in
full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that
Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001
mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The
question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in the
context of the consecutive three-term limit rule. We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis,
service for the full term, and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected
and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position. It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines
Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis opponent (Alegre) who won in the 1998

mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be
stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested
office has expired. Petitioner Francis contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby
as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by
his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious
effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would under the
three-term rule be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest
ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
ANTHONY D. DEE vs. COMELEC and MARINO BOKING MORALES
[G.R. No. 170577. May 9, 2007.]
ANTHONY D. DEE, petitioner, vs. COMELEC and MARINO BOKING MORALES, respondents.
FACTS:
In G.R. No. 170577 ANTHONY DEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARIO BOKING MORALES
On May 24, 2004, after respondent Morales was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term
commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, petitioner Anthony Dee, also a candidate for mayor, filed with the RTC,
a petition for quo warranto against the said respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent Morales, having served as
mayor for three consecutive terms, is ineligible to run for another term or fourth term.
RTC: dismissed petitioner Dees petition
Comelec: Morales cannot be deemed to have served as mayor of Mabalacat during the term 1998 to 2001 because
his proclamation was declared void by the RTC
Morales was elected to the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following consecutive terms:
a)July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
b)July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
c)July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004
d)July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007
Respondent Morales argued and the Comelec held that the July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2007 term is not his fourth
because his second term, July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 to which he was elected and which he served, may not be
counted since his proclamation was declared void by the RTC
Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
(first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June
30, 2001 only as a caretaker of the office or as a de facto officer because:
a.He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to 2001 since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City in its Decision dated April 2, 2001 in Election Protest Case
(EPC) No. 98-131. The Decision became final and executory on August 6, 2001; and
b.He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999.
ISSUE:WON the second term should be counted for purposes of the three term limit
HELD: YES.
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He
served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in
the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v.
Alegre, 6 such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any
break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve
(12) continuous years.
Respondent Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a caretaker of the office or

as a de facto officer. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official
serves in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercises
the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him to stay on indefinitely.
VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
[G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002.]
FACTS: Out of the 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of Puerto Princesa, 312 convened
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate the recall of then Puerto Princesa Mayor Victorino
Dennis Socrates. The PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02, which declared their loss of confidence in Socrates and
called for his recall. Thereafter, the COMELEC scheduled the campaign period and the recall election. Mr. Edward
M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy and eventually won the recall election. The issues involved in these
consolidated petitions are: (1) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to
the recall resolution and in scheduling the recall election for mayor in Puerto Princesa; and (2) whether Hagedorn
was qualified to run for mayor despite serving three consecutive full terms immediately prior to recall election.
HELD: Qualified.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS; THREE-TERM LIMIT; CONSTRUED.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This threeterm limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local
official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is
no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer
an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service. Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a
fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection
for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall
election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection
to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election
referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other
subsequent election.
NTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF SERVICE MUST BE INVOLUNTARY; APPLICATION IN CASE
AT BAR. In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this
manner: . . . The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. . . . . In
Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years,
constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the
interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption for any length of time, as
long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local officials continuity of service.

RECALL ELECTION; WINNER THEREOF COULD NOT BE CREDITED WITH FULL TERM FOR THE
PURPOSE OF COUNTING CONSECUTIVENESS OF THE ELECTIVE OFFICIALS TERM OF OFFICE. We
held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his service and
prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive
terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his
continuity of service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his
previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the
interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the
interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking election for
a fourth term. In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after winning the
recall election. Talagas recall term did not retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talagas
recall term was made to so retroact, then he would have been disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he
would already have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall
term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the
recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly,
Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of
three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office.
THE UNEXPIRED TERM IS IN ITSELF ONE TERM FOR PURPOSE OF THREE-TERM LIMIT. The concept
of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term
limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. As this Court
aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec: Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving
the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine
years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative
proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position
in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against
prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose as a result of the proposed, absolute disqualification,
considering that the draft constitution contained provisions recognizing peoples power.' A necessary consequence
of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in
recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for
purposes of counting the three-term limit.
ROMEO LONZANIDA vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EUFEMIO MULI
FACTS:
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoralty elections. In the May 1995 elections, he again ran for mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor
until March 1998 and he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of a COMELEC decision dated November 13,
1997 on the election protest filed against him which declared his opponent Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of
San Antonio. This was made after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots. Alvez served the remaining
portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Again, on May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April
21, 1998, his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify the petitioner from running for mayor of
San Antonio on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, the
petitioner was proclaimed winner.
On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition which was also
affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether petitioner Lonzanidas assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for
elective local government officials.

HELD: NO.
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; TERM OF OFFICE; THREE TERM
RULE; INTENDED TO FORESTALL ACCUMULATION OF MASSIVE POLITICAL POWER. The records of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied in Section 8, Art. X of
the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running
for the same position after serving three consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to
forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in
order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the
electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying
officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The mayor was compared by some delegates to
the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a
political dynasty. The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials
run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office
after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted
upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the same post after
three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REFERS TO OFFICIAL ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE BY REASON OF ELECTION. The
scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials with the exception of barangay officials from
serving more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the case of Benjamin Borja, Jr., vs. COMELEC
and Jose Capco, Jr. where the issue raised was whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by
operation of law upon the death of the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term should be considered
to have served a term in that office for the purpose of computing the three term limit. The court pointed out that
from the discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates proceed from the premise that
the officials assumption of office is by reason of election.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TWO CONDITIONS FOR APPLICATION OF DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON
THEREOF. This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION SUBSEQUENTLY DECLARED VOID IS NO PROCLAMATION AT
ALL; CASE AT BAR. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared
by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as
winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a
valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the
strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject
to the final outcome of the election protest. Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as
presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that
Lonzanida lost in May 1995 mayoral elections.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INVOLUNTARY SEVERANCE FROM OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME
AMOUNTS TO AN INTERRUPTION OF CONTINUITY OF SERVICE; CASE AT BAR. The petitioner cannot
be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term. The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term
from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards
the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he
was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit
by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his
post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

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