HUMAN RELATIONS

ALBENSON
ENTERPRISES
MENDIONA, petitioners, vs.
THE
BALTAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 88694

CORP.,
COURT

JESSE
YAP,
OF
APPEALS

January 11, 1993

and
BENJAMIN
and
EUGENIO
S.
217 SCRA 16

Facts: Albenson Ent. delivered a mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking
Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later
dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Company traced source of check and later discovered
that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon
Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a
complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had
son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from
the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages
against Albenson for the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a
check which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Issue: Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.
Held:Based on the provisions of Article 19, 20, 21 of the Civil Code, petitioners does not have the
intent to cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to
them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. Albenson
Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on the
inquiries.Records showed that President to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao, Bank said signature
belonged to Eugene Baltao.
The elements under Article 21 are there is an act which is legalbut which is contrary to
morals, good custom, public order or public policy. It is done with intent to injure. A person who
has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay
him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount
thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages
cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action
wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

SPOUSES CRISTINO, BRIGIDA CUSTODIO, SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA

SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181 , respondents.
G.R. No. 116100

February 9, 1996

253 SCRA 483

FACTS: The original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment
erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. The
plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto
Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described
to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street
as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiffs property, the row of houses will be
as follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria
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HUMAN RELATIONS
Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant
Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank. As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiffs
property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one
meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street.
Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second
passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P.
Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter
wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the
premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in
February, 1982. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to
see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway
making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santos
along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed
her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed and it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.
Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an
incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in
said apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of
having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk
and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondent is proper
2.) Whether or not the award of damages is in order

Held: With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same.
Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the
right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the
finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of
right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot
obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That
decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much
less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a
civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can
only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellants claim or to
uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required
to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be
considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but
not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellees favor and giving him
other affirmative reliefs.
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals
erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no
substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award
of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses
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HUMAN RELATIONS
in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the
closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover
damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria. in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action
for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach
of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it.

BARONS MARKETING CORP.,

PHILS., INC. respondents.
G. R. No. 126486

petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHELPS DODGE

February 9, 1998

286 SCRA 96

Facts: On August 31, 1973, plaintiff [Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. private respondent
herein] appointed defendant [petitioner Barons Marketing, Corporation] as one of its dealers of
electrical wires and cables effective September 1, 1973. As such dealer, defendant was given
by plaintiff 60 days credit for its purchases of plaintiffs electrical products. This credit term was
to be reckoned from the date of delivery by plaintiff of its products to defendant.
During the period covering December 1986 to August 17, 1987, defendant purchased, on
credit, from plaintiff various electrical wires and cables. These wires and cables were in turn sold,
pursuant to previous arrangements, by defendant to MERALCO, the former being the accredited
supplier of the electrical requirements of the latter. Under the sales invoices issued by plaintiff to
defendant for the subject purchases, it is stipulated that interest at 12% on the amount due for
attorneys fees and collection. On September 7, 1987, defendant paid plaintiff an amount out of its
total purchases as above-stated, thereby leaving an unpaid account on the aforesaid deliveries. On
several occasions, plaintiff wrote defendant demanding payment of its outstanding obligations. In
response, defendant wrote plaintiff requesting the latter if it could pay its outstanding account in
monthly installments plus 1% interest per month. Plaintiff, however, rejected defendants offer and
accordingly reiterated its demand for the full payment of defendants account. On 29 October 1987,
private respondent Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc. filed a complaint before the Pasig Regional Trial Court
against petitioner Barons Marketing Corporation for the recovery of the amount representing the
value of the wires and cables the former had delivered to the latter, including interest. Petitioner, in
its answer, admitted purchasing the wires and cables from private respondent but disputed the
amount claimed by the latter. Petitioner likewise interposed a counterclaim against private
respondent, alleging that it suffered injury to its reputation due to Phelps Dodges acts. Such acts
were purportedly calculated to humiliate petitioner and constituted an abuse of rights.
Issues: Whether or not private respondent Phelps Dodge not guilty of creditors abuse.
Held: Petitioner does not deny private respondents rights to institute an action for collection and
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HUMAN RELATIONS
to claim full payment. Indeed, petitioners right to file an action for collection is beyond cavil.
Likewise, private respondents right to reject petitioners offer to pay in installments is guaranteed
by Article 1248 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled
partially to receive the presentations in which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be
required to make partial payments.

However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand
and the debtor may affect the payment of the former without waiting for the liquidation of the
latter. Indeed, the law, as set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code, prescribes a primordial
limitation on all rights by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise
thereof. Thus,
ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Petitioner now invokes Article 19 and Article 21 of the Civil Code, claiming that private
respondent abused its rights when it rejected petitioners offer of settlement and subsequently filed
the action for collection considering that the relationship between the parties started in 1973
spanning more than 13 years before the complaint was filed, that the petitioner had been a good
and reliable dealer enjoying a good credit standing during the period before it became delinquent in
1987, that the relationship between the parties had been a fruitful one especially for the private
respondent, that the petitioner exerted its outmost efforts to settle its obligations and avoid a suit,
that the petitioner did not evade in the payment of its obligation to the private respondent, and
that the petitioner was just asking a small concession that it be allowed to liquidate its obligation to
eight (8) monthly installments plus 1% interest per month on the balance which proposal was
supported by post-dated checks. Both parties agree that to constitute an abuse of rights under
Article 19 the defendant must act with bad faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. They cite the
following comments of Tolentino as their authority:
Test of Abuse of Right. Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not
unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only
purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit
act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts
which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they violate the
concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. Hence, every abnormal exercise
of a right, contrary to its socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that will give rise to liability. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must
not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another. Ultimately, however,
and in practice, courts, in the sound exercise of their discretion, will have to determine all the facts
and circumstances when the exercise of a right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 81262

August 25, 1989

176 SCRA 778

Facts: Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Private
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HUMAN RELATIONS
respondent claims that it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them to his
immediate superior Eduardo Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the
Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY, but one day after private
respondent Tobias made the report, he was informed to be the number one suspect, and was
forced to a one week leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open,
and to leave the office keys. Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also
instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the
police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies, but the Manila police investigators
cleared private respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who, submitted a
report finding Tobias guilty, petitioner Hendry suspended Tobias from work preparatory to the filing
of criminal charges against him. On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police
Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous
transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report reiterating his previous finding that the
handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the
fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also
yielded negative results. On January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his
employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of
Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision.
Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the
pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a
compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
Petitioner Hendry, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY
due to dishonesty. Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. However, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of private respondent. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Held: One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights that
in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct
for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide
a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would be proper. Thus, Article 20 of Civil Code pertains to the damages arising from a violation of
law, which provides that:

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HUMAN RELATIONS
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

However, In the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law
since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not,
however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not
constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle
finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have
had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage
incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed
but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners. Moral
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of
Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI).,

APPEALS and LORETODIONELA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44748

August 29, 1986

petitioner,

vs. COURT OF

143 SCRA 657

Facts: Loreto Dionella alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him by the
operator RCPI not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and
affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know said defamatory
words.
Dionella filed for damages and was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court
of Appealsthe liability of petitioner company employer predicated under Article 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code. RCPI now comes to the Supreme Court for review by certiorari.
The basis of the complaint against the defendant corporation is a telegram sent through its Manila
Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela, reading as follows:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO
DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY

Persons and Family Relations Case Digest- Block C

HUMAN RELATIONS
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL

MO

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI is predicated
under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Held: The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the New Civil
Code. As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees. In
contracts the negligence of the employee (servant) is the negligence of the employer (master).
This is the master and servant rule.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting
messages. Every time a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a
contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit
the message accurately. There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included
in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case
of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message
sent to the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees.
Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the
petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the
pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the
petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order
that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases,
we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the
presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST,

GR No. 132344

petitioner,

vs. ROMEO A JADER,

February 7, 2000

respondent.

325 SCRA 804

Facts: Respondent Romeo Jader was enrolled in the defendants College of Law from 1984 up to
1988. In the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular
final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for
the second semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for
the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega which was approved by
Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 28,
1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of 5. In the
meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on who
among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiffs name appeared in
the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of
Second Semester (1987-1988).
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws
was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 and in the invitation for that occasion the name of the
plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies.
During the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called, escorted by her
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HUMAN RELATIONS
mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left
to right, and he was thereafter handed by the Dean a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the
Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the occasion. Thereafter, he tendered a blow-out that
evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him good luck in the
forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out. He thereafter
prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job
from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern
University. Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take
the bar examination.
Issue: May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the
case?
Held: SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the latters
actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic
status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not have
been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was
informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what
CA held because its also respondents duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all
necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, he should
have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his academic
achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesnt only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and
submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet.

OSMUNDO RAMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

No. L-44842

March 16, 1987

148 scra 496

Facts: A resolution was passed by herein petitioner Rama, then Vice Governor or Cebu, with corespondents Mandeola and Castillo, members Sangguniang Panlunsod of Cebu, to mechanize the
maintenance and repair of all roads and bridges of the province, to economize in the expenditure of
its Road and Bridges (R&B) Fund, etc. To implement such policy, the Provincial Board resolved to
abolish around 30 positions and 200 employees were dismissed the salaries of whom were
derived from the R&B fund. The Local Government, however, bought heavy equipment worth 4
million pesos, hired around 1000 new employees, renovated the office of the provincial engineer
and provided him with a Mercedes Benz.
Upon petition by herein respondents (dismissed employees), the then CFI of Cebu declared
said Resolution null and void and ordered the reinstatements of 56 dismissed employees and pay
their back wages. Upon appeal by both parties, then CA affirmed the lower courts decision, plus
an award of moral damages of P1000 for each of the employees, considering that the case involved
quasi-delict. The CA found that the employees were dismissed because of their different political
affiliations, that they were identified with the Liberal Party of Sergio Osmea Jr.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners-public officials (Gov. Espina, Rama, Mendiola and Carillo) are
personally liable for damages for adopting a resolution which abolished positions to the detriment
of the occupants thereof.
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Held: In principle, a public officer by virtue of his office alone is not immune from damages in his
personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith. A different rule sould sanction the use
of public office as a tool of oppression.
Thus, in Correa vs. CFI of Bulacan, 92 SCRA 312 (1979), a mayor was held liable for illegally
dismissing a policeman even if he had relinquished his position. The SC in that case held that a
public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his
duty is not protected by his office and is personally liable thereof like any private individual. This
personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or
discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of non-compliance
with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside
their official authority. The officials in these consolidated cases are personally liable for damages
because their precipitate dismissal of provincial employees through an ostensibly legal means.
Such act of the petitioners of dismissing employees who are of rival political party, to recommend
their own protges who even outnumbered the dismissed employees, reflected the petitioners
malicious intent. Municipal officers are liable for damages if they act maliciously or wantonly, and if
the work which they perform is done rather to injure an individual than to discharge a public duty.
A public officer is civilly liable for failure to observe honestly and in good faith in the performance of
their duties as public officers or for willfully or negligently causing loss or injury to another (Art. 20,
CC) or for willfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
custom and/or public policy (Art. 21, CC).
Dismissed employees are entitled to damages because they suffered a special and peculiar
injury from the wrongful act. The dismissed employees who were holding such positions as
foreman, watchman and drivers belonged to a low-salaried group, who, if deprived of wages, would
generally incur considerable economic hardship.

CECILIO PE, ET AL.,

G.R. No. L-17396

plaintiffs-appellants,

vs. ALFONSO PE,

May 30, 1962

defendant-appellee.

5 scra 200

Facts: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married
man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of
Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents
in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral
relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952,
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to
pray the rosary.
The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in
the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged
love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but
also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs
reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden
from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita
continued nonetheless.
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Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence
at 54-B Espaa Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. A
note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador. The present action was
instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs
appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
Held: There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that
defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs
injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that
plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita
which caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers
and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed
to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection.
The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any
other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter
to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but
also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs
reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and
even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a
Chinese national.
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the
parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection
and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and
her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has
committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-14628

petitioner,

vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL,

September 30, 1960

109 PHIL 629

Facts: An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as

complainant, filed with the said CFI acomplaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and
moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of the
child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry
complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then
a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years younger than her used to go around together
and were regarded as engaged, although he made no promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she
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gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter where intimacy developed between her
and petitioner, since one evening in 1953 when after coming from the movies, they had sexual
intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In
February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to
marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.
Issue: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to
marry.
Held: That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of
De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the
so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in
legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of
such causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of years of experience are
doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record,
Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the
clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court
of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiffappellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age
and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for
seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article
2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs
preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said
paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as
such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not
exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher
and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a
mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to
bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."

ERLINDA ESTOPA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LORETA PIANSAY, JR., defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-14733

September 30, 1960

109 PHIL 640

Facts:The plaintiff Erlinda Estopa, a beautiful girl of twenty-three, residing in Bago, Negros
Occidental, with her widowed mother, Felicidad Estopa, stated that she fell in love and submitted
herself completely to the defendant Loreta Piansay, Jr., sometime in September, 1957, after a
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courtship that lasted for a couple of months during which period the defendant consistently
promised and succeeded to make her believe in him that he was going to marry her; that
sometime in December, 1957, the plaintiff was informed reliably that defendant was backing out
from his promise of marriage so she demanded defendants compliance to his promise in order to
vindicate her honor, and plaintiff went to the extent of asking the help of defendants parents, but
all her efforts were in vain. Finally, realizing that her efforts were futile but knowing that her cause
was not completely lost, she decided to file her complaint, not to compel defendant to marry her,
but to demand from him a compensation for the damages that she sustained. n fact, Erlinda Estopa
filed no brief here. And her complaint merely alleged social humiliation, mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feeling and moral shock.
Issue: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to
marry.
Held: The court held that todays jurisdiction, under the New Civil Code, the mere breach of a
promise to marry is not actionable. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, Supra, 631);and we have
reversed the Cebu courts award for moral damages in breach of promise suit. Consistently with
such ruling, Loreta Piansay, Jr. may not be condemned to pay moral damages, in this case. Now, as
plaintiff has no right to moral damages, she may not demand exemplary damages. While the
amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded . (Art. 2234, New Civil Code) Therefore, as
plaintiff is not entitled to any damages at all, there is no reason to require Piansay, Jr. to satisfy
attorneys fees.

Beatriz Wassmer,
G.R. No. L-20089

petitioner,

vs. Francisco Velez,

December 26, 1964

respondent.

120 PHIL 1440

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be
saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But
the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is
returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Issue: Whether or not a mere breach of promise to marry is actionable
Held: No. It is not actionable for there is no provision in the Civil Code but the case is not a mere
breach of promise to marry. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
Francisco must still be punished for the damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The SC perpetuated that though breach of promise to marry is not actionable because there is no
provision in the Civil Code, the defendants act is still punishable under Article 21 of the Civil Code
which states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The
defendant acted contrary to Article 21 because he was reckless and oppressive in calling the
wedding off days before even if everything was already arranged for.

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AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by
the former, his motherand natural guardian, petitioners, vs. IVAN MENDEZ and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 57227

May 14, 1992

209 SCRA 18

Facts: Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought
monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelias complaint on damages. The latter and
Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan invited him at his
hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita,
afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact.
Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.
Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging
Michael as Ivans illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by
CA.
Issue: Whether or not the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.
Held: Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan
Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first
or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct
examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of
September, October and November, 1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to
Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to
marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BASH, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

MARILOU GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 97336

February 19, 1993

219 SCRA 115

Facts: This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel,
private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for
the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20
years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in
her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the
latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get
married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the
Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint,
petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a
result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand,
petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court
ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.
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Issue: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar

Held: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article
2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a mans
promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him
and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy.

VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 102316

June 30, 1997

168 SCRA 623

Facts: Carlos Telosa, a fisherman and farmer with a very limited education, obtained a loan from
the Rural Bank of Lucena sometime in 1960. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over
a parcel of land with an area of 50,000 square meters. When the Monetary Board placed the Rural
Bank of Lucena under liquidation, the account of Telosa was found in the inventory. As per
the Banks records, the principal amount of the loan of Telosa was P5,000.00. Demand was made
upon Telosa to pay. Because Telosa knew that his obligation to the rural bank was only P300.00, he
executed an affidavit protesting the demand. Telosa paid a total of P411.25. Claiming that the
payments made did not satisfy the whole amount due because the record still showed a balance of
P9,032.22, the Central Bank caused the foreclosure of the mortgage. To restrain the foreclosure,
the heirs of Telosa (who died earlier) filed a complaint seeking the nullification of the mortgage
and/or its reformation to state the real intention of the parties with the Court of first instance of
Quezon. The CFI ruled in favor of the private respondents which was affirmed by the CA. The heirs
invoked the provisions of Article 24 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of Article 24 of the Civil Code can be invoked by the heirs.
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HUMAN RELATIONS
Held: As adverted to earlier, it is undisputed that private respondent had acted as a private carrier
in transporting petitioner's lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on
common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by
the parties in their charter party.
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the
cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to
the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil
Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of
private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage,
the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on
them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general
public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general
public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.
Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter
party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers.
Indeed, where the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself does not apply. The general
public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers without a hand or a voice in
the preparation thereof. The riding public merely adheres to the contract; even if the public wants
to, it cannot submit its own stipulations for the approval of the common carrier. Thus, the law on
common carriers extends its protective mantle against one-sided stipulations inserted in tickets,
invoices or other documents over which the riding public has no understanding or, worse, no
choice. Compared to the general public, a charterer in a contract of private carriage is not similarly
situated. It can and in fact it usually does enter into a free and voluntary agreement. In
practice, the parties in a contract of private carriage can stipulate the carrier's obligations and
liabilities over the shipment which, in turn, determine the price or consideration of the charter.
Thus, a charterer, in exchange for convenience and economy, may opt to set aside the protection of
the law on common carriers. When the charterer decides to exercise this option, he takes a normal
business risk.

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